S.M. v. R.M., 2015 BCSC 1344

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: S.M. v. R.M., 2015 BCSC 1344 Date: 20150703 Docket: E102197 Registry: Vancouver Between: S.M. Claimant And R.M. Respondent Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Fitch Oral Reasons for Judgment In Chambers Appearing on her own behalf by teleconference: S.M. Appearing on his own behalf by teleconference: R.M. Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. July 2, 2015 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. July 3, 2015 THE COURT: The claimant, S.M., and the respondent, R.M., separated in 2010.

They have two children, R.A.M., born January 26, 1996, and A.L.M.M., born April 27, 1998. [ 1 ] By consent order entered July 5, 2011, the parties came to a full and comprehensive settlement of their financial affairs and made the following provisions with respect to the two children of the marriage: they would share joint custody and joint guardianship of the children; the claimant would have the primary residency of the children; and, the respondent would have liberal and generous access, the terms of which were more specifically defined in the order. [ 2 ] For child support and s. 7 purposes, the respondent's Guidelines income was fixed at $25,000.

He agreed to make monthly base child support payments of $394 for the two children by way of automatic direct deposit to the claimant's account. The respondent was to provide the claimant by July 1st each year with his notice of assessment and reassessment. The order provides that if the respondent's income increased to over $33,400, his Guidelines income would be adjusted accordingly.

The consent order further provides that the respondent could reduce his Guidelines income by the amount he spends per year on prescription medication not covered by his insurance, up to a maximum $8,400. [ 3 ] The consent order provides that s. 7 expenses would be split equally by the parties. Various pre-approved special expenses were specifically enumerated in the order. Other special expenses were to be approved on a case-by-case basis following consultation between the parties.

The expenses falling into this latter category include costs for trips and camps agreed upon by the parties, and graduation or other special costs associated with the schooling of the children. [ 4 ] As security for payment by the respondent to the claimant of base child support and his share of special expenses, the parties agreed that the respondent would place "a minimum of $50,000 into a trust account to be set up as agreed between the parties ... upon receipt of his share of the proceeds of the family assets." The parties further agreed that each month the base child support payment and any amounts approved to be paid by the respondent to the claimant for special expenses would be automatically transferred to the claimant from the trust account.

Upon both children no longer being found to be children of the marriage as defined under the Divorce Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), any funds left in the trust would be released to the respondent. [ 5 ] Following entry of the consent order, the parties agreed to establish a joint account from which the funds set aside for the children would be managed. Subsequently, the account was transferred solely to the claimant's name at the respondent's request, and she has administered the funds in accordance with the consent order since that time.

She has also supplied the respondent with an accounting of all funds disbursed from the account to the end of 2014. She has tendered evidence satisfying me that disbursements from the account were in relation to pre-approved special expenses or expenses specifically authorized by the respondent. [ 6 ] The respondent last saw the claimant and his children about a year ago at R.A.M.'s high school graduation.

[ 7 ] In March 2015, the respondent filed a notice of civil claim naming the claimant, the respondent's physician, the respondent's ex-girlfriend, two constables employed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Minister of Justice for British Columbia, the Attorney General of Canada, and others as defendants. As I understand it, the respondent alleges that his physician breached the Privacy Act , R.S.B.C. c. 373, by disclosing to other named defendants confidential information about his medical condition which led to his arrest and involuntary commitment under the Mental Health Act , R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 288.

Civil proceedings were initially commenced in the Provincial Court, but have since been discontinued and recommenced in this Court. [ 8 ] Against this background, I have before me two applications, one initiated by the claimant, and the other initiated by the respondent. Both are self-represented. [ 9 ] The claimant seeks: • a protection order under s. 183 of the Family Law Act , S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 ( FLA ); • an order under s. 221 of the FLA prohibiting the respondent from making further applications or continuing a proceeding without leave of the Court; • an order under s. 221(2)(

c) requiring the respondent to pay the claimant all or part of her expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred as a consequence of the respondent's actions, including his pursuit of civil and family remedies in both the Supreme Court of British Columbia and Provincial Court of British Columbia; • an order compelling the respondent to file his income tax returns for the taxation years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, and to provide the claimant forthwith with copies of the notices of assessment and reassessment issued to him by the Canada Revenue Agency; • an order that should the respondent wish to claim any prescription medication deductions for the above-noted taxation years, he must provide copies of supporting receipts for these deductions at the same time he provides the claimant with his notices of assessment and reassessment; • an order that the claimant be permitted to take from the trust account any additional amounts owing by the respondent for base child support upon receipt of CRA notices of assessment demonstrating that his Guidelines income has exceeded $33,400 in any of the above-noted taxation years; and • costs. [ 10 ] The respondent seeks: • an order reinstating the original terms of the consent order; • an order requiring the claimant to immediately turn over to him the remaining portion of the trust funds; • an order requiring the claimant to immediately provide an accounting for monies spent from the trust fund for the benefit of the two children; • an order requiring the claimant to personally pay back to the trust account any amount she directed to be disbursed from that account for s. 7 expenses not approved by the respondent; • an order requiring the claimant to transfer to the respondent title to a 2008 Keystone Outback trailer, and pay the respondent provincial sales tax levied in connection with the transfer; • an order requiring the claimant to transfer the remaining portion of the trust funds to a "legally recognized trust account" with the parties to share equally the costs associated with this transfer.

In addition, the respondent seeks an order that his 50 per cent share of the costs associated with this transaction be paid for out of the trust fund set aside for the children in accordance with the terms of the consent order; and • costs. [ 11 ] The claimant's application for a protection order came before Justice Affleck on May 19, 2015. It was adjourned to July 2, 2015.

In the intervening period, a protection order was made pursuant to s. 183 of the FLA prohibiting the respondent from contacting the claimant, their children, and the claimant's common-law partner, L.M. [ 12 ] I will deal first with the claimant's application. [ 13 ] Section 183(2) of the FLA provides that the Court may make a protection order if it determines that family violence is likely to occur and the other family member is an at-risk family member. [ 14 ] "Family member" is defined in s. 1 of the Act to include the person's spouse or former spouse and the person's child.

It also includes a person who lives with and is related to the person's former spouse. In my view, the language of s. 1 is broad enough to include within the definition of "family member" the current common-law partner of a person's former spouse. [ 15 ] "Child" is defined to mean a person who is under 19 years of age.

R.A.M. is 19 years of age, but A.L.M.M. is 17 years of age. [ 16 ] "At-risk family member" is defined to mean a person whose safety and security is or is likely at risk from family violence carried out by a family member. [ 17 ] "Family violence" is defined in s. 1 to include physical and sexual abuse, but also the psychological or emotional abuse of a

family member, including acts of intimidation, harassment, coercion or threats, and stalking.

In the case of a child, "family violence" includes direct or indirect exposure to family violence. [ 18 ] In determining whether to make a protection order, the Court must consider the risk factors set out in s. 184(1), including: • any history of family violence by the family member against whom the order is to be made; • whether any family violence is repetitive or escalating; • whether any psychological or emotional abuse constitutes, or is evidence of, a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour directed at the at-risk family member; • the current status of the relationship; • any circumstances of the family member against whom the order is sought that may increase the risk of family violence by that family member, including substance abuse, employment or financial problems, mental health problems associated with a risk of violence, access to weapons, or a history of violence; • the at-risk family member's perception of risks to his or her own safety and security; and • any other circumstances that may increase the at-risk family member's vulnerability. [ 19 ] Under s. 185, if a child is a family member, the Court must consider, in addition to the factors set out in s. 184, whether the child may be exposed to family violence if a protection order is not made. [ 20 ] If the Court determines that family violence is likely to occur and the other family member is an at-risk family member, the order may include one or more of the protective provisions set out in s. 183(3). [ 21 ] Unless otherwise ordered, a protection order expires one year after the date it is made: s. 183(4). [ 22 ] A protection order may be made even if an order under s. 225 [an order restricting communication] has been made against the family member in respect of whom the protection order is sought. [ 23 ] As Justice Schultes noted in Morgadinho v.

Morgadinho , 2014 BCSC 192 : The purpose of these provisions is obvious -- to recognize the danger to vulnerable family members that can arise in these often-volatile relationships and to ensure that courts have the means of ensuring the safety of those who are at risk.

The broad and inclusive definition of "family violence" recognizes that the kinds of harm that can be inflicted in this situation extend beyond the infliction of physical violence. [ 24 ] I also agree with the observation made in Morgadinho that care must taken to distinguish between mutually unpleasant exchanges separating parties sometimes engage in, particularly through the informal medium that email and text messaging has become, and the commission of acts of "family violence" as defined in the Act.

Without more, mere incivility is not the sort of conduct the Legislature intended would attract a protection order. [ 25 ] Having said this, the Legislature has made clear that judges hearing applications of this kind must approach the issue from a broad and contextual perspective, taking into account a variety of factors that frame the risk analysis in determining whether family violence is likely to occur.

The inquiry is future oriented, but it takes its shape from past conduct and present circumstances that inform the assessment of risk. [ 26 ] In this case, there is no suggestion that the respondent has ever physically abused a family member. [ 27 ] The application is grounded in the claimant's contention that the respondent has engaged in psychological and emotional abuse of family members in the past and is likely to do so in the future. [ 28 ] In support of the application, the claimant relies on a selection of emails and text messages the respondent has sent to her and his two children between March 2013 and April 26, 2015.

Although none of the messages were sent to the claimant's current common-law partner, he is referred to in some of the email communications in derogatory terms, including in communications that were copied to the children of the marriage. [ 29 ] The claimant deposes that since separation, the respondent has sent her over 900 unwelcome emails and text messages. She says he has included the children in many of these communications. I have read all of the email and text messages that have been put before me on this application.

They confirm the claimant's contention that the children have been included in many of the communications initiated by the respondent. [ 30 ] The respondent admits to sending these emails and text messages, says he now understands why they were upsetting for the claimant and his children, and claims to recognize, in retrospect, that they were, to use his words, "offensive" and "improper".

He apologized to the claimant and to the Court for his behaviour on the hearing of this application. [ 31 ] The respondent agrees to the imposition of an order restricting communications pursuant to s. 225 of the FLA , but opposes the imposition of a protection order.

Section 225 provides that unless it would be more appropriate to make a protection order, the Court may make an order setting restrictions or conditions respecting communications between parties, including when or how communications may be made. [ 32 ] Turning to the risk factors enumerated in s. 184 of the Act, the offensive emails and text messages speak to a four-year history

on the part of the respondent of harassing and coercive behaviour directed at the claimant and their children. The respondent has repeatedly exposed the children to his anger and manipulations. He has made no effort to spare them from the hostility he holds towards the claimant, or the degrading and profane language he occasionally uses in his communications. [ 33 ] He has copied his children on emails sent to the claimant alleging that their mother has threatened to take custody rights away from him.

He speaks directly to the children in these communications, saying things like, "Hey kids, have you read that letter." [ 34 ] In one recent email (April 24, 2015) he refers to the claimant and her common-law partner in the vilest of terms, and then suggests that he is simply repeating language that has been used by R.A.M., to describe the claimant and her current common-law partner. Both R.A.M. and A.L.M.M. were copied on this particular email. It is emotionally abusive. [ 35 ] In another recent email, he tells his two children that they will be deprived of the essentials of life, like food and clothing.

In another relatively recent email (January 23, 2015) he accuses the claimant of depriving him and the children of all their memories and relationships.

Again, this email is copied to the children. [ 36 ] In an email sent to the claimant on December 22, 2014 and copied to his children, the respondent reminds his family that he will be enjoying Christmas at the Union Gospel Mission along with other homeless people, and wishes his family a "Merry Fucking Christmas", a comment repeated in other emails. [ 37 ] In another email, the respondent threatens to show up at R.A.M.'s graduation ceremony to personally serve the claimant with his notice of civil claim.

In a related email sent to the claimant and the children, the respondent said that if he was not invited to R.A.M.'s graduation ceremony, he would exercise his right to protest and would display a sign saying his family was too embarrassed to have him there. [ 38 ] In another email, he sought to bargain with R.A.M. in the following terms: he would agree to a disbursement from the trust of a small financial birthday gift to R.A.M., if R.A.M. agreed to send him a Superstore gift card in the same amount. [ 39 ] In another email, he tells the claimant and the children that L.M. is now the de facto father of the children and, as such, has voluntarily assumed financial responsibility for them. [ 40 ] In another, the respondent appears to make a reference to ending his own life.

That email was not copied to the children. That email was sent close in time to another in which the respondent sought to bargain with the claimant, saying that he would obtain treatment if she loaned him money. [ 41 ] In another, he led the claimant to believe he had transmitted an IP tracker into a communication and was able to see the websites the claimant and the children were visiting. [ 42 ] The respondent is aware of the upset he is causing.

In an email sent to the claimant, her former lawyer, and his children, he said, in a comment directed to the claimant's former lawyer: I can tell you the two children are very upset with my behaviour, but they are more upset by your forcing my cards, and filing the Supreme Court action and by the fact that my ex, [S.M.], will face huge legal costs and possibly her house. Again, this email was sent to the children. [ 43 ] In an email sent to the claimant in April 2013, the respondent wrote: It's sad to say, but I'm actually feeling very good about what I've just done to mess up your life.

I've got a few other creative ideas to cause you upset also!

Just you wait and see! [ 44 ] The claimant's affidavit evidence that he transmitted approximately 900 similarly unwelcome messages to her and to the children since the separation has not been challenged by the respondent. [ 45 ] While I am unable to conclude on the evidence before me that the respondent's behaviour is escalating, the evidence demonstrates a pattern of repetitive behaviour designed to coerce concessions from the claimant in relation to family law matters and the civil litigation initiated by the respondent, and disturb both the claimant and the children's entitlement to emotional security. [ 46 ] I am also satisfied that the respondent's communications contain thinly-veiled threats to the claimant.

They are designed to intimidate and harass her. He repeatedly uses references to the commencement of his civil action to say things to the claimant that would, objectively viewed, be emotionally upsetting for anyone in her situation. [ 47 ] In referring to the time limit for filing a response to his notice of civil claim, the respondent reminds the claimant that, "time is running out and it is for you too".

The respondent, who is a process server, repeatedly reminds the claimant and his children that he can find anyone. [ 48 ] In another reference to service of his notice of civil claim, the respondent says in an email sent to the claimant and the children, "Yes, kids, I have a very special gift for your mother which will be delivered to her very soon." He threatens to serve his notice of civil claim on the claimant on Christmas Eve.

This is another email that is copied to his children. [ 49 ] In another email sent to the claimant, he ends the communication with this remark, "Oh, and do look over your shoulders!!" [ 50 ] In yet another, he cautions the claimant not to make the "fatal mistake" of thinking he is not serious about pursuing his civil claim. [ 51 ] On the day the claimant filed her application for a protection order, the respondent sent a text message to R.A.M., advising that

he had a chance to move into a suite a block away from the family home. He ends that communication with this, "Wonder how much fun that'll cause? Quick, go tell yo' momma." [ 52 ] I am obliged to consider the claimant's perception of risks to her own safety. Having done so, I am compelled to the conclusion that her experience of intimidation, harassment, coercion, and thinly-veiled threats at the hands of the respondent, and her perception of the risks flowing therefrom, are grounded in the evidence.

Collectively viewed, I am satisfied that the communications were designed to, and did, instill fear. [ 53 ] Viewing the communications collectively and contextually, I am satisfied that the respondent's behaviour meets the definition of "family violence". Further, I am satisfied that the respondent's behaviour is likely to repeat itself in the future. I draw this conclusion not only from the respondent's long-standing and entrenched pattern of communication with the claimant and his children, but from: 1.

The persistence with which he has pursued his pattern of communication despite his acknowledgment, at the time he sent some of the communications, that he knew they were causing emotional upset to the claimant and the children; 2. His refusal to desist in the behaviour, even after he was warned by the claimant that if his behaviour continued, she would seek to have criminal charges laid against him. That warning was sent by the claimant to the respondent in January 2014. It apparently did not deter him from repeatedly communicating with her and the children in a similarly offensive fashion; and 3.

The fuel that is being added to the fire by the notice of civil claim filed by the respondent in March 2015. This is a contextual factor of recent origin that is clearly adding to the respondent's anger and ongoing sense of aggrievement. This is confirmed by an email the respondent sent to the claimant and the children in November 2014, advising that while he was contemplating only bringing the action against his physician, he was bringing it against all of the named defendants "as an extra special tint of retribution".

At minimum, this speaks to the dynamic of the current relationship between the claimant and respondent which, in turn, informs the Court's assessment of risk. [ 54 ] I am satisfied that family violence is likely to occur and that the claimant and her children and common-law spouse are at-risk family members. I am satisfied that it is more appropriate to make a protection order than an order under s. 225 of the FLA . [ 55 ] Accordingly, I make a protection order which shall include the following terms: 1.

Subject to the exceptions noted in paragraph 8 below, R.M., born September 29, 1959, shall not contact or communicate, directly or indirectly, including by telephone, email, text messaging, through a social media site, or by any other electronic means, with S.M., R.A.M., A.L.M.M., and L.M.; 2. R.M., shall not go to, enter, or be found within 200 metres of the residence, place of employment, business, or school of S.M., R.A.M., A.L.M.M., and L.M.; 3. R.M. shall not own, possess, or carry any weapons as defined by s. 2 of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c.

C-46, nor shall he own, possess, or carry any firearm, ammunition, or imitation weapon; 4. If R.M. is currently in possession of the items referred to in paragraph 3, he shall immediately attend at a police station or detachment and accompany a police officer having jurisdiction in the Province of British Columbia to the location of any weapon, firearm, ammunition, or imitation weapon, and to the location of any related authorizations, licences, and registration certificates he possesses, and surrender the said items to the police officer until further order of the Court; 5.

R.M. shall carry a copy of this order on his person at all times when outside his place of residence, and produce it upon the demand of a peace officer; 6. This order will expire one year from the date of its issuance; 7. R.M. may apply on seven days' notice to the claimant to be relieved from complying with the terms of this order for the purposes of attending an identified family event or meeting; and 8. R.M. shall, during the currency of this order, be permitted to contact the claimant by mail only, only at her residential address, and only for the following purposes: (

i) to send her his filed income tax returns; (ii) to send her the notices of assessment and reassessment received by him from the Canada Revenue Agency; (iii) to serve her with documents in connection with the civil litigation; (iv) as may be necessary to discuss the tax liability contemplated by paragraph 20(

g) of the consent order entered July 5, 2011; and for any other purpose in respect of which the claimant provides the respondent with advance written consent permitting him to contact her.

Any documents sent by the respondent to the claimant as contemplated herein shall not contain any personal messages. [ 56 ] The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the consent order entered July 5, 2011, that would ordinarily require contact between the claimant and respondent, as well as between the claimant and his children, are suspended during the currency of the protection order. [ 57 ] I wish to make clear that nothing in this order precludes either of the children from deciding to initiate contact with their father. That is their choice.

Further, if the contact has been initiated by the children and not terminated by them, the respondent is not in breach of this order by participating in that communication. Should either of the children terminate a communication they initiated by giving notice of their wishes to the respondent, the respondent is bound by the terms of the order not to pursue any further communications with

them. [ 58 ] In accordance with newly enacted Supreme Court Family Rule 15-1(16.1), this protection order will be drawn by the registry and shall be a stand-alone order, independent of the other orders made herein. [ 59 ] I do not grant the orders sought by the claimant under s. 221 of the Act. Apart from the claimant's applications, there are no family law proceedings before this Court. With respect to the civil action, the respondent's notice of civil claim was filed in March 2015. I was advised on the hearing of the application that the claimant has filed her response to civil claim.

It is not before me on this application. I do not know whether the other named defendants have filed their responses. I am unaware of any applications the respondent has made in connection with his civil suit. Apart from the merits of the civil claim as it relates to the claimant, I am not aware of instances in which the respondent has made trivial applications or misused the process of the Court. If the action is pursued, it seems to me that the claimant has a number of remedies open to her, including an application for

summary judgment under Rule 9-6 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules . [ 60 ] I order the respondent to provide the claimant with copies of his filed income tax returns for the taxation years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, within 90 days of the date of this order. [ 61 ] For clarity, paragraph 9 of the consent order, which obliges the respondent to provide the claimant with his notice of assessment and any notice of reassessment he receives from the Canada Revenue Agency by July 1st each year, is unaffected by this order.

In addition, the respondent will provide the claimant with his notice of assessment and notice of reassessment he receives from the Canada Revenue Agency in relation to his tax returns for the years 2010 to 2014 forthwith upon receipt. [ 62 ] I dismiss the claimant's application that the respondent provide her with any and all receipts for prescription medication deductions he may claim for the above-noted taxation years.

The parties agreed in the consent order that the respondent was entitled to reduce his Guidelines income by the amount he spends per year on prescription medications not covered by insurance up to a maximum $8,400. I am not inclined to revisit that term at this stage, particularly given the privacy issues the application engages.

Having said that, I grant leave to the claimant to renew this portion of her application if she is so minded at a later date, but only following receipt by her of copies of the filed income tax returns of the respondent for past years. [ 63 ] I grant the claimant's application that she be permitted on a go-forward basis to take from the trust account any additional amounts owed by the respondent for base child support based on his notices of assessment demonstrating that his Guidelines income, after the adjustment for prescription medication, exceeds $33,400.

I do not consider this order to be anything other than what the parties agreed to in July 2011. [ 64 ] The claimant will have her costs in relation to this application at Scale B forthwith after assessment. For clarity, costs the claimant has incurred in pursuing her application shall not be taken out of the trust fund set aside for the children. [ 65 ] I turn next to consider the respondent's applications. There is no basis upon which any of the relief sought by the respondent could properly be granted. [ 66 ] The terms of the original consent order have never been varied.

While the parties agreed to place the funds for the children in an account that is not a formal trust fund, paragraph 13 of the order contemplates the placement of these funds into a trust account as agreed between the parties. The parties settled upon the arrangements currently in place. Those arrangements have worked and are in the best interests of the children. The respondent has no cause for complaint on this issue. [ 67 ] Further, there is no basis upon which the Court could order that the funds being held for the benefit of the children be paid to him.

Indeed, the relief the respondent seeks on this issue is inconsistent with his concurrent application that the funds be transferred to a formal trust fund, a position that was, in any event, effectively abandoned by the respondent in the course of argument when he noted the prohibitive costs associated with taking such a step. [ 68 ] The respondent's application that the claimant provide him with an accounting for all monies disbursed from the trust fund is also dismissed. The claimant has provided an accounting respecting the disbursement of funds from this account current to December 2014.

There is no evidence of any impropriety on the claimant's part with respect to these funds. Having said this, I order that the claimant provide the respondent with an up-to-date accounting of disbursements from the trust account 90 days from the date of this order. In other words, an accounting current to September 30, 2015. [ 69 ] The respondent's application that the claimant personally pay back to the trust account any monies shown to have been disbursed from that account for unauthorized purposes is dismissed.

As noted earlier, the claimant has satisfied me that funds disbursed from the account were for base child support, pre-approved special expenses, or special expenses in respect of which the claimant obtained the respondent's approval before making the disbursement. [ 70 ] The respondent's application that the claimant immediately transfer to him all title and interest to the 2008 Keystone Outback trailer is dismissed. The sale of the trailer was the subject of a written agreement between the parties entered into following the consent order.

The respondent has demonstrated no ground upon which the Court could properly intervene to set aside that agreement. [ 71 ] As the claimant has been substantially successful in resisting the respondent's application, she will also have her costs in relation to this application at Scale B forthwith after assessment. Once again, costs the claimant has incurred in resisting the respondent's application shall not come out of the funds set aside for the children. [ 72 ] That is the end of my judgment, R.M. and S.M.

I am going to do these things: First, as I have indicated in my judgment, the registry will prepare the protection order. S.M., I will ask you to prepare orders reflecting the disposition of your application and R.M.'s application. Those orders are to be sent to me for sign-off. I dispense with R.M.'s approval as to the form and content of those orders. R.M., I will ensure that they are correct.

[ 73 ] In view of the detailed nature of the orders made this morning, I am also going to order that a copy of these reasons be transcribed and provided to both parties.

When they are transcribed, initials will be used in the reasons for judgment to identify the parties, the children, and L.M. [ 74 ] Any issues arising from the orders made this morning, R.M. or S.M.? [ 75 ] S.M.: No, thank you, My Lord. [ 76 ] R.M.: My Lord, the paragraph 8 when you mentioned the method of contact, I am assuming that you said mail, correct? [ 77 ] THE COURT: Correct. [ 78 ] R.M.: And that's just regular standard mail, not registered mail? [ 79 ] THE COURT: I think both are covered by mail.

In other words, delivery through a third-party mail carrier. [ 80 ] R.M.: Okay, and one more thing, I'm just making it clear to the court right now that I do not own any weapons at all as described in your order. [ 81 ] THE COURT: If that is the case, you have complied with paragraph 4 of the order, which is conditional upon your owning such weapons. If you do not own such weapons, you are not obliged to attend at the police station and have a police officer accompany you to the location of those weapons. [ 82 ] R.M.: Fair enough, thank you. "FITCH J."