Lauren Langille, by her Litigation Guardian Dr. Christine Foell Petitioner And: Crime Victim Assistance Program Respondent And: Workers’ Compensation Board of British Columbia Respondent, 2017 BCSC 2241

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Langille v. Crime Victim Assistance Program, 2017 BCSC 2241 Date: 20171207 Docket: 16-1553 Registry: Victoria Between: Lauren Langille, by her Litigation Guardian Dr. Christine Foell Petitioner And: Crime Victim Assistance Program Respondent And: Workers’ Compensation Board of British Columbia Respondent Before: The Honourable Madam Justice J. A.

Power On judicial review from: A decision of the Director, Crime Victim Assistance Program, dated March 14, 2016; and a decision of Marie Johnson, a Board Officer of the Workers’ Compensation Board of British Columbia, dated June 29, 2015 Reasons for Judgment Counsel for Petitioner: V. A. Ishkanian Counsel for Respondent, Crime Victim Assistance Program and the Attorney General of British Columbia: N. Carnegie Counsel for Respondent, Work Safe BC B. Parkin Place and Date of Hearing: Victoria, B.C. June 19-20, 2017 Place and Date of Judgment: Victoria, B.C.

December 7, 2017 Introduction [ 1 ] This is a judicial review of a decision by the Director of the Crime Victim Assistance Program (“CVAP”) made March 14, 2016. His decision concerned an application for the reconsideration of a decision pursuant to the Crime Victim Assistance Act , S.B.C. 2001, c. 38, s. 13(1) (hereinafter referred to as “the new CVAA ”). The Director declined to reconsider the decision of Marie Johnson, a Board Officer of the Workers’ Compensation Board (“WCB”).

The June 29, 2015 decision of Board Officer Johnson awarded the petitioner some, but not all, of the compensation she sought under the Criminal Injury Compensation Act , R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 85 (“the old CICA ”). [ 2 ] In the alternative, the petitioner also seeks judicial review of the June 29, 2015 decision of Board Officer Johnson. [ 3 ] I have concluded that for the reasons that follow, the petition must be dismissed.

Background [ 4 ] The background to this petition is somewhat complex, in part because this matter began in 1995 and has resulted in a number of administrative decisions. [ 5 ] On or about January 13, 1995, the petitioner, Ms. Lauren Langille, was the victim of a violent crime. The petitioner sustained a significant head injury as a result of being shaken by her father. Ms. Langille was a four and a half month old baby at the time. [ 6 ] Ms. Langille applied for compensation from the Criminal Injury Compensation Board through her mother, who acted as her legal guardian.

At the time of the application, criminal injury compensation claims were administered by the WCB, pursuant to s. 2 of the old CICA .

[ 7 ] Ms. Langille’s claim was accepted. On June 26, 1998, the WCB concluded that she was a victim of crime within the meaning of the old CICA . The WCB awarded her $10,000 as an “interim compensation award”, taking into consideration “the nature of the injuries sustained”, as well as “pain, suffering, and trauma arising therefrom”. The WCB declined to assess a final compensation award for Ms.

Langille at that time because she was still a young child progressing through her developmental stages, and it was unclear how extensive her injuries would be going forward. [ 8 ] On September 14, 1998, the WCB rendered a supplemental decision, indicating that a further review of Ms. Langille’s claim would be done in 2003 and 2009, based on medical evidence then available (although it would appear that these reviews did not take place, because this decision was overtaken by subsequent administrative decisions). [ 9 ] Ms. Langille appealed the WCB’s decisions to the WCB Appeal Committee.

In her submissions (made through counsel), Ms. Langille asked that the WCB increase the amount of the award. She also requested consideration of a full pension based on her “function impairment and a likely average earnings of someone in [her] family and social situation”. [ 10 ] As a result, on January 24, 2000, the WCB issued another supplementary decision in which it declined to award Ms. Langille a pension award at that time.

The WCB indicated, however, that “the Board is prepared to revisit this issue when the child attains the age of majority.” [ 11 ] On April 4, 2000, the WCB issued a further decision increasing Ms. Langille’s lump sum pain and suffering award from $10,000 to $25,000. [ 12 ] On September 22, 2000, the Criminal Injury Appeal Committee upheld the January 24, 2000 decision deferring consideration of a pension until Ms. Langille achieved the age of majority. [ 13 ] On June 30, 2002, the new CVAA came into force.

The new CVAA set out a new framework for criminal injury compensation in British Columbia, and transferred the administration of the program from the WCB to the Minister of Public Safety and the Director of the CVAP. [ 14 ] In August 2013, Ms. Langille had her nineteenth birthday, and reached the age of majority in British Columbia. [ 15 ] On November 7, 2013, a CVAP official made a decision regarding Ms. Langille’s entitlement to a pension. The decision-maker awarded her $1,319.06 per month, effective her nineteenth birthday, based on s. 2(4)(

b) of the old CICA . However, because Ms. Langille and the respondents subsequently agreed that this decision was made in error, it was set aside through a consent order dated January 13, 2015. The CVAP decision-maker erred by making a decision, when, in reality, Ms. Langille’s case was still under the authority of the WCB.

Because the pension decision had been merely deferred by the September 22, 2000 decision of the WCB, under transitional provisions of the old CICA , a final decision still had to be made by the WCB, not the CVAP. [ 16 ] On June 29, 2015, Marie Johnson, a Board Officer, rendered a decision on Ms. Langille’s entitlement to a pension. Ms. Johnson concluded that Ms. Langille was not entitled to a pension for the period between the date of the injury and the date on which she could reasonably be assumed to be able to start work. However, Ms. Johnson concluded that Ms.

Langille was entitled to a pension for the period after she would have reasonably been expected to be able to work. Noting that Ms. Langille had no work history that could be used to assess earning capacity, Ms. Johnson relied on assumptions relating to the earning power of an average woman with a bachelor’s degree in British Columbia. Ms. Johnson also concluded that Ms. Langille likely would have earned some wages as a student. [ 17 ] Ms. Langille applied for reconsideration of Ms. Johnson’s decision. She only sought reconsideration for the portion of the decision in which Ms. Johnson concluded that Ms.

Langille was not entitled to a pension for the period between the date of the injury and the date on which she could reasonably be assumed to be able to start work. Ms. Langille, through her counsel, made it clear that she was not seeking to review the decision of Ms. Johnson that Ms. Langille was entitled to a pension for the period after she was able to start working. In essence, Ms.

Langille was seeking a pension for the period of infancy. [ 18 ] On March 14, 2016, a decision-maker acting for the Director of the CVAP (referred to in these reasons as “the Director”) concluded that he was unable to grant the remedy sought by Ms. Langille. The Director concluded that, because of the language of the transitional rules for the CVAP, reconsideration decisions could only be granted in certain situations, and Ms. Langille’s situation did not fall within these categories. [ 19 ] In this court, Ms.

Langille seeks judicial review of both the Director’s March 14, 2016 reconsideration decision as well as Marie Johnson’s June 29, 2015 decision. Analysis Standard of Review is Reasonableness [ 20 ] The Administrative Tribunals Act , S.B.C. 2004, c. 45, does not apply to the old CICA or the new CVAA . It is common ground between the parties that the appropriate standard of review for this judicial review is reasonableness. I agree. Jurisprudence of this court has already accepted that the standard of review for cases of this nature is reasonableness: Stehlik v.

British Columbia (Public Safety) , 2013 BCSC 801 at para. 85 . In addition, I see no reason to conclude that the presumption of the reasonableness standard applied to a decision-maker interpreting its own statute has been rebutted: McLean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission) , 2013 SCC 67 at paras. 21-22 . As a result, the standard of review which I will apply in this judicial review is reasonableness. Both WCB Decision and Director’s Reconsideration Decision Subject to Review [ 21 ] In her petition to the Court, Ms. Langille seeks judicial review of the March 14, 2016 decision of the Director.

The petitioner also seeks, in the alternative, judicial review of the June 29, 2015 decision of the WCB, written by Ms. Johnson.

[ 22 ] The respondents argue that the focus of this judicial review should be limited to the March 14, 2016 decision. The respondents rely on the decision of my colleague Madam Justice Ballance in Stehlik , as well as our Court of Appeal in United Steelworkers, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, Local 2009 v. Auyeung , 2011 BCCA 527 .

As I understand it, the respondents point to these decisions as standing for the proposition that, where there is statutory review of an administrative decision, it is only the review level that can be the subject of the judicial review, and not the first instance administrative decision. [ 23 ] However, I agree with Groberman J.A. in Yellow Cab Company Ltd. v.

Passenger Transportation Board , 2014 BCCA 329 at para. 38 where he wrote: I do not read Auyeung as standing for the broad proposition that whenever a statute provides a tribunal with power to reconsider its decisions, the courts will refuse to entertain judicial review of the tribunal's initial decisions. Auyeung is more nuanced. ... [ 24 ] In Yellow Cab , our Court of Appeal explained that, in deciding whether a lower level of decision-making is properly subject to judicial review, the court should look at “the scope of the reconsideration power and whether an attempt has been made to invoke it” (para. 38).

This means looking at whether, under the relevant legislative scheme, the decision-maker was empowered to undertake a review comparable to a court’s judicial review. As stated at para. 44 in Yellow Cab : ... To hold otherwise would be to allow a tribunal, through procedural machinations, to oust the inherent, constitutionally-protected supervisory jurisdiction of the superior courts. ... [ 25 ] The respondents point to Stehlik as having settled the issue of what level of statutory decision-making is the subject of review in decisions made under the new CVAA .

However, in my opinion, despite being decided under the same legislative scheme, Stehlik is distinguishable because of the different way that the decision-maker applied that scheme. [ 26 ] In Stehlik , Madam Justice Ballance described the reconsideration decisions as “comprehensive” (para. 43), and that “the decision makers exercised a high degree of care to ensure that Mr. Stehlik's claims received the full benefit of the available reassessment and reconsideration procedures” (para. 86). [ 27 ] In my respectful view, the substance of Ms.

Langille’s reconsideration claim did not enjoy the same comprehensive analysis. Indeed, the Director did not engage in any analysis of the substance of the June 29, 2015 decision. He instead indicated that, because of s. 34 of the Crime Victim Assistance (General) Regulation , he did not have the power to grant the remedy sought by Ms. Langille.

In essence, the Director interpreted the regulations to mean that he did not have the authority to engage in a meaningful review of the WCB decision. [ 28 ] In my view, because the Director’s reconsideration decision did not contain a review of the substance of the June 29, 2015 decision, I am not constrained to limiting the focus of this judicial review to only the March 14, 2016 reconsideration decision.

Otherwise, the impossible situation would be created where the Board Officer would be able to arrive at any decision she desired, no matter how unreasonable, free in the knowledge that her decision was safe from judicial review. In my view, this conclusion is incompatible with this court’s inherent and constitutionally-protected power of judicial review (see Yellow Cab at para. 44). Decision-Makers Owed Deference on Reasonableness Standard [ 29 ] Courts engaging in the judicial review of administrative decisions apply considerable deference to decision-makers.

As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 at paras. 47-49 , deference does not mean that courts must be subservient to or show blind deference to the

interpretations of administrative decision-makers. But nevertheless, courts must also recognize that administrative decision-makers working within complex legislative schemes will frequently be best placed to apply their statutory frameworks. [ 30 ] The reasonableness standard does not require perfection from decision-makers: Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board) , 2011 SCC 62 at para. 18 .

Rather, in order to be upheld as reasonable, decisions need only be justifiable, transparent, and intelligible, and fall “within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”: Dunsmuir at para. 47 . [ 31 ] The court must be careful not to reassess the relevant factors and substitute its view for that of the decision-maker. This is not the role of a reviewing court when applying the reasonableness standard: India v. Badesha , 2017 SCC 44 at paras. 39 , 57, 63. [ 32 ] When a court must review a decision of a decision-maker involving a question of statutory

interpretation, the

interpretation of the decision-maker is also owed deference. Where there are multiple reasonable

interpretations of a statute, the court will give deference to a reasonable

interpretation selected by the administrative decision-maker: McLean at paras. 32-33 . Director’s Decision Was Reasonable [ 33 ] The Director concluded that he was unable to grant the relief sought by Ms. Langille for two reasons: first, because the grounds of her request for reconsideration did not fall within the scope of the reconsideration contemplated by the statutory scheme; and second, because the statutory scheme precluded the granting of lost earning capacity awards to individuals who had previously received a pain and suffering award under the old CICA .

Since the Director decided that the remedy requested by Ms. Langille fell outside of the scope of the powers available as part of the reconsideration decision, he did not engage with the substantive arguments relating to the alleged errors in the June 29, 2015 decision raised by Ms. Langille. [ 34 ] In order to adequately describe the decision-making process of the Director, it is necessary to delve into the interplay of statutes and regulations at work in this case. [ 35 ] Because the WCB decided on January 24, 2000 that it would wait until Ms. Langille reached the age of majority before

determining whether she was entitled to a pension, her claim remained under the framework of the old CICA . But on June 29, 2015, when Ms. Johnson made her decision under the CICA framework, this constituted a “final determination”, which triggered the transitional provisions of the new CVAA . [ 36 ] The Crime Victim Assistance (General) Regulation , B.C. Reg. 161/2002, is a regulation made under the authority of the new CVAA .

Subsection 34(2) of this regulation states that, effective on reconsideration, an applicant who made an application for compensation under the old CICA is no longer eligible for the compensation sought under the old CICA . Instead, the applicant is only eligible for “an item of benefit that may be awarded under the [new CVAA ] for the same or a similar purpose as the item of compensation [applied for under the old CICA ]”. [ 37 ] Ms. Langille applied on October 14, 2015 for reconsideration of Ms. Johnson’s decision. She applied under the authority of s. 13(1)(

b) of the new CVAA . The Director’s Decision Confirming the WCB Decision [ 38 ] Subsection 34(3) of the regulation states that ss. 34(4) through 34(6) of regulation apply if a compensation for an injury of a former applicant is awarded as a periodic payment under the former act and the compensation is not awarded as the result of the death of a victim. [ 39 ] The Director concluded that s. 34(3) of the regulation applied to Ms.

Langille’s case, presumably because she met the definition of being an applicant under the old CICA who made an application for reconsideration under the new CVAA and she was receiving compensation for an injury awarded as a periodic payment under the old CICA . [ 40 ] Subsections 34(4) through 34(6) of the regulation provide guidance concerning the eligibility of benefits where the injury of a former applicant has worsened, remained unchanged, or improved.

Because these subsections are central to the decision of the Director, I will reproduce them here, in the same way that the Director reproduced them in his decision (including his redactions and emphasis):

(4) If, on ... reconsideration under the Act , it is determined that the injury of a former applicant has worsened [my emphasis] from the date when the amount of the periodic payment that is being ... reconsidered was determined under the [ CICA ], the applicant is eligible for a benefit that is the greater of ...

(5) If, on ... reconsideration under the Act , it is determined that the injury of a former applicant is unchanged from the date when the amount of the periodic payment that is being ... reconsidered was determined under the [ CICA ], the applicant is eligible for a benefit that equals the amount of the periodic payment he or she was receiving immediately before the ... reconsideration ...

(6) If, on ... reconsideration under the Act , it is determined that the injury of a former applicant is less severe [my emphasis] than it was on the date when the amount of the periodic payment that is being ... reconsidered was determined under the [ CICA ], the applicant is eligible for a benefit that equals the amount of the periodic payment that would be awarded under the Act , if the applicant had filed an application under the Act at the time of ... reconsideration ... [ 41 ] The Director concluded that these subsections “have the effect of limiting the scope of reconsideration of periodic payments awarded under the CICA ”, and that the circumstances of Ms.

Langille’s request for reconsideration did not fit within the scope of these subsections. [ 42 ] In my view, the reasoning of the Director is subject to at least two grounds of criticism. First, as noted by the petitioner, s. 34(2) applies where an item of compensation is “awarded”. Ms. Langille has been consistent in her position that she was not challenging the June 29, 2015 decision as it related to the award of the post-working age pension, but rather she was challenging the decision not to award a pension from the time of injury. In effect, Ms.

Langille was challenging a decision to not award compensation; no compensation was awarded, and therefore (she argues) s. 34(2) should not have been applied. However, the view of the Director implicitly may have been that it was not possible to separate out the pension award in the manner that Ms. Langille wants to. Under Ms. Johnson’s decision, Ms.

Langille was in fact awarded a pension, just not for the period of her infancy, which is what she now seeks. [ 43 ] Second, as acknowledged by the Director (as represented by the Attorney General) in written submissions, even if it was reasonable for the Director to conclude that compensation had been awarded, and s. 34(2) came into play, it is unclear why s. 34(5) would not be applied. Subsection 34(5) states that where the injury of an applicant has remained unchanged, the applicant is entitled to a benefit that equals the amount of the periodic payment she was receiving before the reassessment decision.

It is unclear why the Director could not have used that avenue to proceed with a reconsideration of the merits of the June 29, 2015 decision. [ 44 ] However, although I am of the view that that the reasoning of the decision-maker on these points could have been clearer, I cannot conclude that his decision was unreasonable. Administrative decisions need not be perfect, and these decisions need not be the decision that the reviewing court would have arrived at. They must merely represent one of a number of reasonable outcomes, and be sufficiently justifiable, transparent, and intelligible.

I conclude that the Director’s decision on this point achieves this standard: he provides an intelligible explanation for his

interpretation of a complicated statutory framework that falls squarely within his area of expertise. [ 45 ] The Director also based his decision on a second reason. Subsection 34(2) of the Crime Victim Assistance (General) Regulation states that if an item of compensation awarded under the old CICA to a former applicant is being reconsidered, the former applicant becomes only eligible for an item or benefit that may be awarded under the new CVAA for the same or a similar purpose as the item of compensation. In light of this, the Director turned to s. 36(1) of the regulation, which deals with ineligible benefits.

Subsection 36(1) states that if a former applicant was awarded compensation for pain and suffering under s. 2(4)(

f) of the old CICA , the former applicant may not also receive an award for lost earning capacity under s. 4(1)(

m) of the new CVAA . [ 46 ] The Director concluded that, because Ms. Langille received compensation for pain and suffering under the old CICA (the $25,000 awarded by the WCB on April 4, 2000), by virtue of s. 36(1)(

b) of the regulations she was excluded from also receiving a

pension for her lost earning capacity. [ 47 ] Ms. Langille contends that the Director erred in these conclusions. Her reasons, as I understand them, are based on s. 13(2) of the old CICA , which allows for both a lump sum award, but also a periodic payment, so long as neither exceeds 50% of the maximum amount that could be awarded under ss. 13(1)(

a) or (

b) of the old CICA . Ms. Langille argues that because the old CICA contemplated allowing her both a lump sum pain and suffering award, plus a periodic functional pension award, the Director consequently erred in concluding that this outcome was no longer available. [ 48 ] I disagree. Subsection 34(2) of the regulation has the effect of ousting the framework of the old CICA and replacing it with the new CVAA . Even if it is true that Ms.

Langille was eligible for both a lump sum award for pain and suffering and a periodic payment for a functional pension under the old CICA , that eligibility structure was replaced by the eligibility structure of the new CVAA effective on the reconsideration. Because of s. 36(1)(

b) of the regulation, an applicant is not entitled to both a pain and suffering award and a lost earning capacity award. The Director, after making reference to s. 6 of the Crime Victim Assistance (Income Support and Vocational Services or Expenses Benefits) Regulation , B.C. Reg. 162/2002, concluded that the functional pension sought by Ms. Langille was equivalent to a lost earning capacity benefit. Since she already received a lump sum pain and suffering award, the Director concluded that Ms. Langille is prevented by s. 36(1) (

b) of the Crime Victim Assistance (General) Regulation from also receiving a lost earning capacity award. In my opinion, this

interpretation of the interlacing statutes and regulations was a reasonable one, and is entitled to deference. [ 49 ] I note in passing that counsel for the respondents appeared to concede that there were problems with the Director’s reasoning as it related to the application of s. 34(2) . The respondents suggest that the same logic used by the Director in applying s. 34(2) could have meant that Ms. Langille was disentitled from receiving the unchallenged portion of the June 29, 2015 decision, namely the pension that was awarded by Ms. Johnson for the period starting when Ms. Langille was able to begin working.

Like the pension from the date of injury sought by Ms. Langille, the pension from the date of working age awarded by Ms. Johnson would have represented a lost earning capacity award, and therefore would be barred by s. 36(1)(

b) of the regulation. [ 50 ] I disagree with this

interpretation. The June 29, 2015 pension award was made under the framework of the old CICA , and until a final decision was made, s. 36(1)(

b) of the regulations did not come into play. Absent very clear language, I do not accept that s. 36(1) (

b) of the regulations was intended to operate with retroactive effect, and could be used to annul compensation already awarded. Conclusion on Reasonableness of Director’s March 14, 2016 Decision [ 51 ] I conclude that the decision of the Director confirming the 2015 WCB decision was reasonable and should not be disturbed. June 29, 2015 Decision of Marie Johnson Was Reasonable [ 52 ] In light of my conclusion, it is not strictly necessary for me to consider the reasonableness of the June 29, 2015 decision of Ms. Johnson. However, for the sake of completeness, I will review the June 2015 decision.

As discussed above, it is my conclusion that I am not prevented from doing so because of the holding in Yellow Cab . [ 53 ] I have concluded that Ms. Johnson’s decision was reasonable as well. [ 54 ] Ms. Langille argues that, because she suffered from a permanent total disability that began at the time of injury, Ms. Johnson had to apply s. 22(2) of the Workers Compensation Act , R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 492 (“ WCA ”). This provision states that “the compensation awarded under this

section must not be less than [the WCB’s minimum wage rate].” She contends that awarding compensation in this amount (updated for inflation) is mandatory under the language of s. 22(2), as well as s. 3(1)(b)(

i) of the old CICA , which stated at the relevant time: [I]f the periodic payments are awarded to a victim who is disabled as a result of an injury, they must, subject to this Act, be of the same amount and for the same duration as payments made to a disabled worker under sections 22, 23, 29 and 30 of the Workers Compensation Act [.] [ 55 ] Ms. Langille contends that, because she suffered a permanent total disability, there was no other reasonable decision available to Ms. Johnson except to award her a pension in accordance with s. 22 of the WCA . [ 56 ] Ms.

Johnson concluded that, for the relevant time period between the date of the injury and the date when Ms. Langille was able to being working, Ms. Langille did not have a permanent total disability. Therefore, s. 22 of the WCA did not apply. Ms. Johnson reached this conclusion based on what she described as the plain meaning of a permanent condition: that it will remain unchanged indefinitely. She concluded that this definition did not apply to Ms. Langille’s situation, because her condition continued to change after the date of the injury. Ms.

Johnson wrote: I agree that Lauren’s injuries were catastrophic, but am not persuaded that she had a permanent condition, as of the date of the injury. The plain meaning of a permanent condition is that it will remain unchanged indefinitely. Clearly, Lauren’s condition changed in the months and years after the date of injury. [ 57 ] I am of the view that Ms. Johnson’s decision was reasonable. Ms. Langille was an infant at the time of the initial injury and had yet to meet developmental milestones, so that her injury, although catastrophic, might not yet be permanent. The reasons for Ms.

Johnson’s conclusions were sufficiently justifiable, transparent, and intelligible. The decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law. [ 58 ] Ms. Johnson also concluded that Ms. Langille was not entitled to a pension for having a temporary disability under ss. 29 and 30 of the WCA . Ms.

Johnson concluded, by making reference to internal crime victim injury compensation policy documents and Appeal Division decisions, that the temporary disability provisions were only available where victims had a history of wage earning that could be used to calculate loss. Ms. Johnson concluded that, to find that Ms. Langille had suffered a compensable loss and was entitled to

compensation under ss. 29 or 30 of the WCA , there must have been evidence that Ms. Langille had suffered a pecuniary loss. Without evidence that she could have earned money as a child, Ms. Johnson concluded that compensation for a pecuniary loss during this period was inappropriate. [ 59 ] Ms. Langille argues that Ms. Johnson had to apply s. 22 and grant her a permanent total disability pension after arriving at the conclusion that she had suffered a total disability. In my view, this argument ignores the reasoning clearly laid out Ms.

Johnson: a person can be totally disabled without that disability also being permanent. While Ms. Langille disagrees with this logic, in my view it was a conclusion that was open to the decision-maker. [ 60 ] Ms. Johnson ultimately concluded that Ms. Langille was not entitled to a pension for the period starting at the time of the injury (when she was an infant), but she was eligible for a pension starting at the time when she would have reasonably expected to begin her working career. In my opinion, Ms. Johnson’s decision was thoughtful and well-reasoned, and this was a reasonable conclusion.

Conclusion [ 61 ] In the result, the petition for judicial review of both the March 14, 2016 decision of the Director and the June 29, 2015 decision of the Board Officer of the WCB is dismissed. [ 62 ] I decline to make an order as to costs. “J. A. Power, J.” The Honourable Madam Justice J. A. Power