EVIDENCE

Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security NUMBER 110 1st SESSION 44th PARLIAMENT Monday, June 3, 2024 Le lundi 3 juin 2024 Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security CANADA [Recorded by Electronic Apparatus] EVIDENCE June 3, 2024 Committee NUMBER 110 NUMBER 110 NUMÉRO 110 110 03 06 2024 2024/06/03 15:45:00 House Of Commons Comité permanent de la sécurité publique et nationale Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security SECU Chair Mr. Ron McKinnon 1 44

(1545) [ English ]

The Chair (Mr. Ron McKinnon (Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, Lib.)) :

I call this meeting to order. Welcome to meeting number 110 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70 ,

an act respecting countering foreign interference. Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents. Please take note of the following preventative measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters. Only use a black, approved earpiece. The former, grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times.

When you're not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose. Thank you for your consideration. Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair. Regarding specific comments on Bill C-70 , as indicated in the memo that was sent out on May 31, I would like to remind members that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m.

Eastern Standard Time, Friday, June 7, 2024. It is important for members to note that, pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee. I would now like to welcome our witnesses for the first panel today. We have Mr. Charles Burton, senior fellow, Sinopsis. We also have Mr. Michael Kempa, associate professor of criminology at the University of Ottawa.

Welcome, gentlemen, and thank you for joining us today. I now invite Mr. Burton to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Dr. Charles Burton (Senior Fellow, Sinopsis, As an Individual) :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My area of expertise is Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy. I was educated in China, and I've worked in the CSE, in the Canadian diplomatic service and as an academic. I have published several articles and reports on Chinese influence operations in Canada. I will focus my remarks on

part 4 of Bill C-70 , the foreign influence transparency and accountability act part, as it impinges on the activities of agents of the Chinese Ministry of State Security targeting politicians, civil servants and others involved with shaping Canada's relations with the People's Republic of China regime.

Justice Hogue's report earlier this month noted that her mandate is to investigate potential foreign interference with “Executive decision-making by Cabinet and its ministers in relation to their departments, including indirect foreign interference with ministerial decisions when such decisions are based on information originating at a lower level of government covertly influenced by a foreign state (or its proxy, agent, etc.).” I'm not sure why Justice Hogue's mandate is limited to “a lower level of government covertly influenced by a foreign state”. In the previous meeting of this committee, Mr.

Genuis raised the possibility of a future Attorney General of Canada being in a conflict of interest because he or she had benefited from foreign interference in his or her riding. My knowledge of China's united front strategy around the world is that there is enhanced Chinese Ministry of State Security early targeting of politicians deemed likely to, in future, assume influential positions such as Attorney General of Canada.

We know from a leaked December 2021 CSIS report how China's Ministry of State Security uses three colour-coded political interference tactics to gain influence over Canadian government officials here in Canada and those travelling to China. Blue refers to sophisticated cyber-attacks on targets' computers, smart phones and hotel rooms for possible blackmail. Gold refers to bribes. Yellow is what CSIS described as “honey pots”. That's how China employs sexual seduction to compromise a target.

Bill C-70 and existing legislation should go a long way to addressing this kind of concern, but I would put forward that there are more sophisticated operations by the Chinese regime here in Canada and other countries that are more challenging for us to counter. For example, former Australian prime minister Bob Hawke recalls in his biography that shortly after he retired from politics, he travelled to Beijing and met with Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, who told him, “Mr. Hawke, China never forgets its friends. I want you to know that we regard you as one of our best friends.” In the years that followed, Mr.

Hawke took on several directorships and consultancy positions relating to China, which enabled him to achieve considerable financial success. Here in Canada, we observe former cabinet ministers, former ambassadors to China and people retired from senior roles in our foreign ministry who have assumed lucrative opportunities relating to China after leaving government.

Government career options in law firms, businesses and other sectors with associations with business networks identified with the Chinese Communist Party would, clearly, not be open to those identified as unfriendly to China while in a position of public trust, because we know that the Chinese regime keeps extensive files on all of us. They know who their friends are.

A concern is whether Canadian officials, because of the very subtle Chinese influence process of implied future benefits after retirement for Canadian policy-makers, which Bill C-70 cannot track, would perhaps not act immediately on intelligence assessments they receive that would call for Canadian government action that goes against Chinese interests in Canada, but leave these for others to respond to, for fear of being identified with actions the Chinese embassy would not feel well disposed towards.

(1550) If I could just conclude, I would say from this that just as government officials cannot exploit classified information to serve personal interests after retirement and have to keep the secrets that they derive in the course of their service secret for life, perhaps we need to restrict public servants from receiving benefits from foreign entities for life as well. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair :

Thank you. We'll go now to Mr. Kempa for an opening statement of up to five minutes. Please go ahead, sir.

Mr. Michael Kempa (Associate Professor, Criminology, University of Ottawa, As an Individual) :

Thank you very much, Chair McKinnon and members, for inviting me. I would just begin by saying that, overall, the very large bill, which touches on the constellation of laws that govern Canadian national security, is very complex and welcome. The amendments, I understand, are quite urgent. There is a desire, perhaps, to have certain measures in place in time for any election that may come in 2025. Some of the easier reforms certainly could possibly be achieved in that time frame.

I'll flag some that are perhaps a little bit more complicated, that raise more concerns and that may render it more difficult to implement some recommendations in time for that potential election. Reform to the CSIS Act, amendments to other areas of national security legislation, and the creation of a foreign influence transparency registry are obviously the three main dimensions of reform. Most of what I have to say relates to the CSIS Act itself, seeing as that's one of my major areas of expertise, as opposed to the others, although I will raise a couple of issues with regard to the other two categories.

With respect to CSIS Act reform, I would regard it as very appropriate that CSIS now be able to pursue foreign intelligence virtually stored beyond Canada's borders. Having wider ability to secure information from third parties, notably telecommunications companies, through streamlined procedures is very welcome. All of this coming through streamlined applications procedures for less invasive warrants is very welcome. As I read it in the bill, it's probably a good balance for ensuring civil liberties on those sliding scales of pursuing warrants in an expedited fashion.

The key new ability for CSIS to share threat intelligence with other levels of government beyond Ottawa—including indigenous governance bodies, private sector institutions and the university community—is, indeed, extremely urgent. Fortunately, it's very easy to legislate, which means that it could possibly be done in time for CSIS to be able to advise other bodies around any election in 2025. However, it's more difficult to implement in practice once on the ground.

I'd merely flag for you that CSIS and its new partners will have to figure out how best to share this new intelligence and what the thresholds for the sharing of intelligence with a wider variety of partners ought to look like, not only because of CSIS's long-standing culture of being reticent with the sharing of information, but also because of many partners simply not yet being skilled in weighing the value of and so putting into action different types of intelligence.

Perhaps these types of issues could be addressed through regulations developed through Public Safety or Foreign Affairs and with CSIS's oversight body to guide CSIS in the development of those protocols. It's very encouraging, in particular, given that this bill is understandably.... Although large, it does not address some of the broader thematic issues around CSIS's mandate and CSIS's relationship with other agencies, such as the RCMP, whose role in national security is itself evolving and certain to be significantly reformed over the course of the next five years or so.

The automatic requirement for review of the CSIS Act every five years is extremely important and welcome. It leads me to read this bill in terms of whether we are putting in place anything that could frustrate some of the broader reforms that may be coming down the pipe in five years' time. Fortunately, there are not many areas that appear to lay barriers to bigger questions that may come up, but there are a couple of areas where we may not want to tie our hands, which I'll briefly touch on before I close my five minutes.

I would encourage you to read your reforms to the CSIS Act as part of a triptych of legislation—as it was in the 1980s when the CSIS Act, the Emergencies Act, and the RCMP Act were all drafted with reference to one another—such that in this piece of legislation, we have not revisited the question of the mandate of CSIS overall or the connection of the CSIS Act's famous

section 2 standards for whether or not CSIS gets involved in anything to the standards for invoking the Emergencies Act itself.

(1555) It is probably wise to leave the

section 2 standards as they are in this legislation, for the reason that the second set of issues will be certain to come up as we have decisions from the Federal Court of Appeal on what exactly the

section 2 standards for the Emergencies Act entail. There will be future lessons that will come from the Hogue commission's review, added to the Rouleau commission's insights into the Emergencies Act, as well as the ongoing work of NSICOP and NSIRA into the future of the RCMP and so forth. Therefore, leaving that open is very wise at this time. However—

The Chair :

Could you wrap up quickly, please?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

Yes, certainly. As we get to the CSIS Act review, a key question will be whether or not “threats to the security of Canada” can include economic disruption as a form of violence that could pose a threat to the security of Canada. Very briefly, there are two areas of concern that may tie our hands into the future. One is creating Criminal Code offences related to interference, any type of offence beyond terrorism committed in service of a foreign entity. You may find hurdles there if you have very minor offences, such as

summary offences committed for a foreign entity, that could lead to severe penalties similar to those for major indictable offences. Finally, on the transparency registry, it seems that the country-agnostic approach might prove difficult, in that you would bring a very wide range of countries to the attention of an agency that potentially could not monitor all of that information. I understand the desire not to create a permanent list of blacklisted countries, but a potential solution there would be to allow for regulations whereby the ministers, in co-operation with CSIS and its oversight body, could produce periodic lists of countries of concern that could change with time. Thank you.

The Chair :

Thank you. We'll start our questions with Mr. Caputo. Mr. Caputo, go ahead, please, for six minutes.

Mr. Frank Caputo (Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, CPC) :

Thank you, Professor Kempa and Mr. Burton. Mr. Kempa, if there was anything you were just dying to get to but left out, here's your chance.

Mr. Michael Kempa :

No, I think I've covered it. On anything that would come up in questions, I'm sure we could elaborate.

Mr. Frank Caputo :

Certainly. I have a couple of potential questions, but I'm going to turn to Mr. Burton first. You highlighted relations with China in particular, but I'm concerned about all sorts of relations, as we all should be, when it comes to foreign interference. You mentioned a colour-coding system, and you said that this bill goes a long way to addressing this type of interference. Do I have that right?

(1600) Dr. Charles Burton :

Yes.

Mr. Frank Caputo :

Okay. Can you expand on how and why that is?

Dr. Charles Burton :

I think the main thing is that it empowers CSIS to inform people when there is potentially an issue with respect to a conflict of interest involving certain significant people who are influential in the decision-making process. I think that's a very good thing.

Mr. Frank Caputo :

Mr. Genuis isn't here. He's in a lot of places, but right here, right now, isn't one of them. He will be joining us later, I'm sure. Let's take his example about the Attorney General. I assume this would involve a foreign entity having a dossier of some sort about an attorney general or something like that. In that instance, based on what you just said, what positive impact would Bill C-70 have on information sharing or the ability to alert?

Dr. Charles Burton :

I think the people who have to be alerted are the people who would potentially be the subjects of this. I have, for example, a young friend who was running for office in Saskatchewan. I calculated that he was being engaged by potential agents of the Chinese state, proxies of the United Front Work Department, who were offering him things and extensive praise. I said that this is how they start. They see him as an up-and-coming young man who may, in fact, someday be serving in our Parliament, and they would like to cultivate good relations and a possible sense of obligation in him. I told him to just be careful.

In fact, he'll be speaking to CSIS about what happened. I think it's just a question of people not knowing when they're subject to a sophisticated engagement by the very many agents of the Chinese state who are operating in our country.

Mr. Frank Caputo :

Well, that's an interesting point. People don't even know. To me, the question would be why there isn't training on this type of thing. Obviously, as parliamentarians and elected representatives, people should be aware, but from what you're saying, it's much more insidious, maybe surreptitious, and people may not even know it's occurring. Is that accurate?

Dr. Charles Burton :

Yes. I've spoken to someone who was central in the development of the Australian Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act. He said that perhaps the act is not drafted very well and perhaps the Government of Australia has not allocated the resources to their security intelligence agencies to follow up on the act, but that simply the existence of the act is a consciousness-raising device.

I think a lot of people who might have been inclined to accept some sort of going easy on China in anticipation of future benefits will now be aware that this is something that will not reflect well on them and makes them complicit in the Chinese regime, including all of the espionage, foreign subversive activities and genocide that the regime is characteristic of.

I think that just the fact that we're talking about this is already a very positive thing in terms of raising people's awareness that they shouldn't just let the Chinese regime start to make them beholden to a regime that is hostile to our interests and is engaged, as General Eyre has said, in hybrid warfare against us already.

Mr. Frank Caputo :

Thank you. How much time do I have, please, Chair?

The Chair :

You have a minute and a half.

Mr. Frank Caputo :

Okay. Professor Kempa, you spoke about the “country-agnostic” nature of Bill C-70 , which is something that, at first blush, I would be supportive of. Now, one of the reasons why I suppose we would deal with this is that we have a changing world, and different governments are going to have different mandates. Is there a compelling reason why we wouldn't apply the same standard—and a high standard at that—when it comes to transparency and the registry of any foreign agents?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

I think the only reason has to do with capacity. If you were to establish a registrar's office that would be responsible for maintaining the database and some information on the activities of all those seeking to impact Canadian policy and outcomes and so forth in a legitimate fashion, the amount of information would simply be overwhelming, to the point that it would—as a senior colleague of mine, Wesley Wark, refers to it—have the potential to develop into a form of almost security theatre, where you have an office that exists and that by trying to watch agents from around the world simply cannot do so.

The idea is that if you were to focus your attention on updated and rolling lists for which there was evidence to suggest we should be focusing on certain regions, you would have more capacity in that institution.

(1605) Mr. Frank Caputo :

That could be addressed through regulation, obviously.

Mr. Michael Kempa :

Yes.

Mr. Frank Caputo :

Okay. I think my time is probably up. Thanks to both of you.

The Chair :

I'll go now to Ms. Damoff for six minutes.

Ms. Pam Damoff (Oakville North—Burlington, Lib.) :

Thank you. It's a pleasure to be back at the public safety committee for a bit. Thank you to both of our witnesses for being here on this really important piece of legislation. Dr. Burton, in particular, I want to thank you for bringing your expertise. I think that when it comes to China, we'd be hard pressed to find anybody else in Canada who has your level of expertise on this subject. You mentioned working with Australia, but I wonder if you could compare Bill C-70 to our Five Eyes partners and how it compares to the legislation they have in place in dealing with foreign interference.

Dr. Charles Burton :

I would say one thing about country-agnostic. I was invited down to the U.S. Congress to talk about Canada-China, and I mentioned the possibility of this legislation. The American congresspeople were not entirely happy about the idea that we were going to be requiring transparency of foreign influence, because they're foreign in Canada too. I was a bit taken aback by that. I think the real difference in terms of the U.S. FARA is the degree of resources and implementation and effectiveness of the legislation. Australia has been slow to bring people to account. I think they just did the first one.

They've had the act since 2019. When the act came into effect, Andrew Robb, the former Australian trade and investment minister, had been responsible for shaping the China-Australia free trade agreement, which we did not regard that highly when we were thinking of doing free trade with China, and negotiated a 99-year lease on the port of Darwin. Andrew Robb, we subsequently found out, had been paid almost $800,000 a year by a Chinese billionaire associated with the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which is the number one agency for the United Front Work Department in China.

He resigned from that consultancy just before the legislation came into effect. We saw some other Australians who did so. We might see a similar impact in Canada of people who decided they'd rather not be associated with potential Chinese association. I think Mr. Robb suggested that it was really the political pressure that caused him to resign. There's no suggestion that he ever did anything that was against the law or anything like that.

I do think it's a question of how enthusiastically we decide to implement this legislation, more than the legislation itself: the extent to which we provide the resources necessary, including to the foreign influence commissioner; the nature of the regulations we decide to put into effect; and I guess whom the government decides to appoint, through an order in council, to that role. Legislation is one thing, but making it work is something else.

Ms. Pam Damoff :

Professor Kempa, did you want to add anything on that?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

The point I would add on implementation capacity would be that, again, it is essential and important to clarify in the Criminal Code issues around, or create criminal offences around, foreign interference related to the protection of, for example, essential infrastructure and to update

definitions of sabotage, etc. Then the issue comes down to this: If CSIS and others are able to amass information or intelligence that might guide criminal investigation, you would need an RCMP, or some other federal policing service, that has the capacity to actually carry out those investigations to produce evidence for criminal prosecution. This is the necessary first step, but at the moment, the implementation would be quite difficult, in that it's clear that the RCMP does not have that capacity.

Ms. Pam Damoff :

Thank you. I think I have a couple of minutes left. Dr. Burton mentioned resources and regulations. Well, you both mentioned resources, actually. Having the legislation is one thing, but how critical is it that the government puts resources behind this legislation to make sure that what we put in place...? I think all parties have agreed to fast-track this bill. We recognize that it's a priority. How important is it for those resources to be attached to the legislation?

(1610) Dr. Charles Burton :

Obviously, we need the security agencies and the RCMP to regard this as a priority area, but it's very difficult politically. People who may have found themselves beholden to the Chinese state for whatever reason, whether it was something they did in China or China knows something about them, are not going to be supportive of the idea of this information coming to light. From the point of view of the investigation agencies—I think Mr.

Kempa would know better than me—do they want to take up a case that's going to be controversial and cause kickback from important people in our government who may in fact be needing some guidance with regard to whether or not they're fully supporting Canadian interests and are not being partially compromised by the interests of a hostile foreign state? It's not going to be easy, and I think the role of the commissioner will be quite critical.

I do have some concerns about the nature of that appointment as an order in council appointment and the provisions in the act that allow that person to be removed at any time by the government. I don't know enough about the mechanisms of government, but I'd really prefer that there be a very high degree of independence for such a person.

Ms. Pam Damoff :

Thank you. I think that's my time. Do I have six seconds? Professor Kempa, do you want to quickly add anything to that?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

I absolutely echo the point on the importance of the independence of that office. We could almost consider a type of tripartite governance structure for that body, similar to the direction the RCMP is very slowly moving in with the establishment of a management advisory body. It is not currently, formally, an oversight body, but it may become a civilian oversight mechanism for the RCMP. Something similar for this office might be appropriate, in order to insulate it from government influence.

The Chair :

Thank you. [ Translation ] Mr. Villemure now has the floor for six minutes.

Mr. René Villemure (Trois-Rivières, BQ) :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Burton, you talked about people being recruited, possibly unwittingly. For some, it is during their career, and for others, it could even follow their retirement. Some have used the term “useful idiots”. Do you think it's important to establish post-employment guidelines for public office holders by prohibiting them, for example, from engaging in any activity with a foreign country? Do you think such a measure could be useful and applicable?

[ English ]

Dr. Charles Burton :

I've made this recommendation. If you've served in government, you shouldn't be allowed to take money from a foreign power in retirement when you return to the private sector. Many of our people are leaving Foreign Affairs in their fifties. They feel they never got rewarded enough and want to make big money. I'm seeing a number of my friends from my years in diplomatic service who, in fact, have left government and are working for China-related associations.

The issue is this: If, while in a position of public trust, you were identified by the Chinese government as not being friendly to China in some way, you would be toxic to a wide range of Canadian law firms, businesses and boards that would not be able to hire you for fear of alienating the Chinese, who we know do this. We know from Jenny Kwan , for example, that she's not able to go to normal events in her riding because the Chinese evidently don't like her and don't want her present.

From that point of view, we have to accept the reality that it's very hard for people not to be tempted to go easy on China while in public life, because they have half a mind on what they're doing afterwards. I'm not suggesting that they have this all planned out. I think it could be a somewhat unconscious thing, not shaking the Chinese tree.

I don't think we have a situation where, say, the Chinese ambassador goes to the Canadian foreign minister and says, “You know, if you take it easy on the Ministry of State Security agents operating in your country, we'll do good things for you when you leave office.” It doesn't work that way. It's a much more sophisticated process of “We just know this is how it goes.” There are so many examples that seem to me to be awfully coincidental.

People who seem to give China an easy time or support Chinese purposes—those who, say, supported the immediate release of Meng Wanzhou—find themselves being very successful in China business after they leave public service, even though they previously had no business experience.

(1615) [ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

You mentioned the independence of the commissioner. The bill suggests that the commissioner is independent and that he can conduct investigations as he sees fit. However, he is accountable to Public Safety Canada and does not have a working group at his disposal, as mentioned by Mr. Kempa. Do you believe that the commissioner's independence as currently worded in the bill is adequate or that we need to go a little further to ensure transparency and public trust?

[ English ]

Dr. Charles Burton :

I'd like to see it be more independent. I have some concerns about the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner related to similar sorts of notions. I think it's hard for people who are answerable to the government to investigate the people who are, in effect, their boss.

However, as I said, I'll put this out there: I don't understand the mechanism or the possibilities for ensuring greater independence, but I would like to see the commissioner pretty independent and the provisions for removing this person be subject to a transparent and open process so that, if they're getting too close to sensitive issues, they won't be removed so that they can't find out things the Canadian public has a right to know about.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

Thank you. Mr. Kempa, I would like to ask you the same question, the one about the commissioner's independence.

[ English ]

Mr. Michael Kempa :

It is absolutely the case that serving at the pleasure of a minister is troublesome for any head of a major policing or security organization. It's not necessarily that the commissioner lacks the integrity or the personal ability to stand up to their minister. It's simply on the point that they will tend, over time, to manage with one eye upwards, as they call it, in the sense that they have to anticipate the wants and desires of the minister, sometimes against the interests of their organization. The RCMP is the best example that exists of how that model is troublesome.

If there wasn't a sort of tripartite arrangement but there was at least a very transparent and clear information exchange, then if the commissioner were to be dismissed on questionable grounds, at least there would be public awareness and potentially outrage for an egregious dismissal.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

According to the bill, the commissioner's appointment must be preceded by consultation with certain individuals. The parties in question are notified, but their formal agreement is not required to appoint the commissioner. They are simply informed of an appointment. Do you think that's sufficient?

[ English ]

Mr. Michael Kempa :

I would prefer perhaps a deeper process other than the one listed here. I'm not quite sure, other than a tripartite situation where there's some advisory body—as there are with police organizations for the naming of chiefs or commissioners, apart from the RCMP—and where they're not simply picked by a minister through a process along those lines.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

Thank you very much.

[ English ]

The Chair :

Thank you, sir. We'll go now to Mr. McAllister—sorry, Mr. MacGregor. You'd think I'd know by now. Please go ahead for six minutes.

Mr. Alistair MacGregor (Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, NDP) :

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I'd like to thank both of you for being here today to help guide us through this study of a very important piece of legislation. Professor Kempa, I'd like to start with you. Going to clause 34 of the bill, which is giving the new disclosure rules to CSIS, I can read very clearly that all of the following conditions have to be met before it's disclosed, but I, too, have questions on how the service is going to make decisions. More importantly, what will the receiving entity or person do with that because it's intelligence that is being shared?

Then I guess the questions arise of what the person is expected to do. I know there are protections for personal information, but if an organization is told by the service that there's someone in its employ whom they have concerns with, what is it then supposed to do with that? Is there anything that you could elaborate on to help guide this committee? Does this

section need some amending or, as you said, would you like to see some clarification in regulatory-making authority?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

To my mind, it would actually be impossible to legislate, for example, a precise list of how exactly CSIS is meant to share every form of intelligence on a scale of most-to-least reliable with every possible public, private and civil body that it now can. Rather, I would see it as falling within regulations, and they would be more in terms of guidance for CSIS rather than a prescriptive list.

Depending on the nature of the intelligence, you would almost have to imagine a situation where if there is an entity like a university or a corporation, for example, it would have to have basically an employee or designated office to receive intelligence information. Perhaps in exchange for working with CSIS, it would have to submit basically what its information management plan is, to become a formal partner ongoing.

(1620) Mr. Alistair MacGregor :

To be clear, I think this is a good thing that we're doing to allow disclosure of information. It's just that more questions arise. We just want to make sure that it's done correctly and that the sharing is actually going to lead to a fruitful outcome and have a positive net impact, instead of leading us into more rabbit holes by accident. Moving further on in the bill, there are quite significant amendments to the Security of Information Act in this legislation. I'm thinking specifically of clause 53 of the bill. Clause 53 is roughly five pages long. In the existing Security of Information Act,

section 24 says, “No prosecution shall be commenced for an offence against this Act without the consent of the Attorney General.” However, in clause 53, specifically there's a

section “Political Interference for a Foreign Entity”. Given that the Attorney General ultimately is someone who was elected to the House of Commons and then appointed to cabinet, I'm just wondering if you are comfortable with that section, needing the consent of the Attorney General. Do we need to inoculate it with a more permanent member of the civil service who is not elected and not swayed by political events? Do you have an opinion on that?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

On that one, it would be the standard conventional practice to rely on the Attorney General, but I understand the reservations there. I would say that as long as there was some measure of transparency or accountability, such that if an egregious decision were taken there could be some form of remedial action, then that would probably be preferable to allocating it to a professional public servant, for example.

Mr. Alistair MacGregor :

Thank you for that. Professor Burton, I'd like to turn to you because, as you said, most of your comments were directed to

part 4 of this bill. I raised questions during our first meeting on the definition of “arrangement”. It's talking about being “under the direction of or in association with”. Those are two very different things. In being “under the direction of”, there's an obvious hierarchy. It suggests employment, and it suggests that someone is giving orders and someone is executing them,

whereas being “in association with a foreign principal” seems to be a little bit more open to

interpretation. I'm just wondering, with universities often being a nexus of the political world and the educational world, but also of sharing knowledge with foreign entities, is there a risk that universities might have some difficulty with this in having to register the free flow of information between countries? Do you foresee any dangers we need to look out for as a committee?

Dr. Charles Burton :

It is very troubling. Obviously, universities have a mandate to create and disseminate knowledge. They don't have a mandate to protect our nation's national security, and they are internationalized. Academic freedom does make it challenging for us to tell universities that they can't do this or that. Then there's the troubling reality that scientists of Chinese origin who have come to Canada naturally have extensive networks within China. Are they going to be unable to get research funding because of these suspicions?

I really don't know how we can square this circle, unless we start to look much more carefully at the relationship between universities and the state. We are perceived, I think, by our Five Eyes partners as being a weak link in the protection of dual-use technologies and sensitive research. The Winnipeg lab fiasco has not helped the confidence of our partners in terms of sharing information with us. I am troubled by this, and I do agree with you. I looked it over and I don't understand what those words mean either.

(1625) The Chair :

Thank you, Mr. MacGregor. We'll start our second round now with Mr. Shipley for five minutes, please.

Mr. Doug Shipley (Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, CPC) :

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today. I'd like to start with Mr. Kempa, if I could. In your opening remarks, you mentioned that Bill C-70 was a good platform or a basis to get started with this. I tried to scribble down quickly what you said here. You mentioned there was definitely a lack of RCMP capabilities to investigate, and that really needed to be built on or this legislation wasn't going to be that good. I didn't quite get completely what you meant there. If you could expand on that, I'd appreciate it.

Mr. Michael Kempa :

Sure. I think what I was getting at is that, given that we have a five-year requirement to review this legislation, it enables us to come back to some of the lessons that we will pick up over how well the institutions on the ground, some of which are significantly evolving their mandates, are able to enact or carry out what you have here. In the 1980s, of course, the Emergencies Act, the RCMP Act and the CSIS Act were all written over a period of a couple of years with reference to one another. Obviously, CSIS was created from taking national security and intelligence issues away from the RCMP.

Given that there's an ongoing debate about the capacity of the RCMP to fulfill its federal policing functions, including investigations in national security, it would be great if CSIS now becomes more effective at sharing information or intelligence with the RCMP, but if they're not in a position to carry that out, it will be very difficult. There's an ongoing debate as to what the future of the RCMP will be. Will they carry on, and to what extent, with contract policing across the country? Will they become two organizations, with one principally focused on federal policing issues?

We don't have the answers to that today, nor will we have them in a year. What we have laid out here, and how the RCMP manages its new responsibilities with CSIS sharing information, could inform what's done with the RCMP Act in five years' time, for example, and the review of the CSIS Act in five years' time, taking into consideration what happens with the RCMP and CBSA, for that matter, and other partners down the line. It's a learning basis here for what ends up working well and poorly for review in five years.

Mr. Doug Shipley :

Thank you for that. Hopefully, a lot of it works in the good way and not the poorly way. Mr. Burton, I had a whole bunch of questions here specifically on Bill C-70 , but you've mentioned a few things that I need to get a little more clarification on or it's going to bother me for a while. You mentioned that some of your colleagues have left to join other entities. You mentioned specifically China. Could you give me some examples? What do you mean by that?

Dr. Charles Burton :

There are certain agencies that are identified with promoting interests that favour greater engagement between Canada and China. For example, the Canada China Business Council, the Asia Pacific Foundation, and the China Institute at the University of Alberta are all institutions that enjoy funding, some of them from Chinese sources. In fact, the China Institute at the University of Alberta received 10 years of sustaining funding from a Chinese billionaire who is vice-chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

The University of Alberta will not say how much money or the terms of that funding, but one gets the feeling that if the University of Alberta's China Institute produced a report that was supportive of this bill, that funding might terminate. You have these very complicated relationships and interactions between people in the government and these agencies that are troubling to me. Senator Woo, for example, was associated with the Asia Pacific Foundation for quite a long time and continues to support their purposes in Canada. I can think of three ambassadors who are working in China trade.

I don't think there's any harm in my mentioning John McCallum as someone who has been highly regarded by China, because the Chinese have said that in as many words. I believe they've referred to him as the “son of China”. There are others whose relationship I feel a little bit uncomfortable about. We have some cabinet ministers who are also working on things relating to China, which then causes me to wonder how they were performing when they were in a position of public trust. Because we don't have this commissioner set up yet, all of it is just smoke and mirrors. I can't condemn people.

I think that if anybody was doing anything illegal, our RCMP would be pursuing it. However, I just feel that there does seem to be a lot of Chinese influence in our country, which is why we have the commission going. We need to root it out. This legislation is particularly important in trying to maintain our security and sovereignty against a foreign threat.

(1630) The Chair :

Thank you, Mr. Shipley. We'll go now to Mr. MacDonald, please, for five minutes.

Mr. Heath MacDonald (Malpeque, Lib.) :

Thank you, Chair. Dr. Burton, I want to touch base on the transparency issue that you addressed in your

preamble, possibly relevant to foreign governments and individuals. What's missing or what should we be doing to enhance that level of transparency in Bill C-70 , or is it appropriate as it is?

Dr. Charles Burton :

There are clearly a lot of institutions that are pretending to be civil institutions but that in fact, as we know from some of the leaked CSIS documents, are under the supervision of the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party. We know that some of those leaders, 100- some in number, have been vetted by the Chinese embassy. One can assume that those institutions to some extent have a mandate to serve Chinese purposes.

They often have addresses that are the same as the so-called police stations that we are concerned about, where the Chinese government is engaging in activities off-site that probably involve some degree of influence or espionage activities. I think we need more transparency on that.

The commissioner can provide that kind of information so people are aware, when they're dealing with institutions that may have a function which serves the interests of a foreign state in addition to their social function, that these are institutions that sign petitions in newspapers that support the Hong Kong national security law, urge that Meng Wanzhou be released early, or other things that the Chinese government feels are positive and that probably most Canadians would feel are not in the Canadian interest.

That being said, I think people have the right to have a political choice, and if their political choices correspond with the interests of China in Canada, that's well within their rights as Canadian citizens. What it really comes down to is whether they are receiving funding or support from a foreign power. When you look at things coming up on the Internet for elections, it's perfectly legitimate for governments to put together videos of politicians saying things they wish they hadn't said or doing embarrassing things.

However, if those videos are funded and supported by a foreign power, it's a different level of participation in our democratic process.

Mr. Heath MacDonald :

I think we're seeing that now with AI quite frequently.

Dr. Charles Burton :

Yes.

Mr. Heath MacDonald :

You also talked a bit about the individuals at the other end of this question. If someone is compromised and they're unaware of it, what should the process be? What is the administrative, investigative process at that end of it? How do they, in layman's terms, contact those individuals and ensure that those individuals are not compromised in their situation of, say, their workplace or what have you? What is the process now? What does the U.K. do in trying to eliminate those types of compromised individuals, who aren't even aware that they're possibly under the influence of foreign state actors?

Dr. Charles Burton :

The U.K. exposed an actor who was active in funding political candidates, and sent around a message to all of the MPs to warn them about this individual. They also found that there were staffers in parliamentary offices who they believe are under the influence of China. There are now legal cases ongoing about that. We know from the CSIS documents about staffers in our Parliament and parliamentarians whom CSIS regards as being under the influence of a foreign power. They may sort of half understand the implications of what's going on.

I think once we have this process in place and we have this commissioner, the commissioner can make it clear to people where the lines are in terms of one's engagement with a hostile foreign power, and maybe inform their boss that this person may be providing information to a foreign power that they would prefer wasn't provided to a foreign power.

(1635) Mr. Heath MacDonald :

How's my time, Mr. Chair? I have 16 seconds. I want to go back to Mr. Kempa for a quick moment with regard to the function of CSIS now, compared to what will and should be the function of CSIS after this bill is passed. Can you quickly say if it is just based on resources or working closely with the RCMP?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

It basically changes its role from being an entity that serves the government to an intelligence agency that circulates essential information to all manner of partners. It's a fundamentally different role. There's a capacity issue for sure, but also the purpose would require a shift in the culture of the organization.

Mr. Heath MacDonald :

Is that not happening now?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

Certainly. In a sense, this bill supports where CSIS is currently heading and has publicly stated it needs to head—

The Chair :

Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. Michael Kempa :

Am I finished? I'm sorry.

The Chair :

Wrap it up really quickly.

Mr. Michael Kempa :

No, I'll wait for another question to elaborate on the point.

The Chair :

We're here for your answers, not for our questions. [ Translation ] Mr. Villemure, you have two and a half minutes.

Mr. René Villemure :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Since I only have two and a half minutes, I'm going to ask both witnesses the same question and ask them to give short answers. Dr. Burton, in its current form, could the registry have prevented what happened at the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg?

[ English ]

Dr. Charles Burton :

If the register showed that there were people who were responsible for the lab and seemed to have influence with China, that would be one thing. We are puzzled by who authorized the presence of People’s Liberation Army researchers and some students in the lab. I don't want to get too political about this, but no one has been made accountable for what happened. I'm also puzzled by how the two scientists—who, according to the minister, are still under investigation by the RCMP—were able to leave for China and continue to work in sensitive areas under new names.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

That's interesting too.

[ English ]

Dr. Charles Burton :

I'm just at a loss as to how this situation came up, and I'm very disturbed about what it does for our reputation with other countries. Of course, there's the damage of the transfer of technologies to the Chinese state, which may not be using them for good public health purposes.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

What do you think, Mr. Kempa?

[ English ]

Mr. Michael Kempa :

I would just add that I think the main value of a registrar's office that provides, basically, a map of the agencies or networks involved in legitimate influence is that it provides CSIS, police and other investigative bodies with a starting point for some of the darker networks that might be beneath that map. In many cases, it's a starting point for an investigation or intelligence gathering, whereby they have some idea of whom they could at least start asking questions of to seek information.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

Do you think the scientists would have been on the registry?

[ English ]

Mr. Michael Kempa :

No, not for their clandestine purposes, but what I'm saying is that perhaps some other body, such as a university office or other that had been in any way related to the exchange of laboratory information between Canada and China, would have been an agency that CSIS, or a police organization, could have asked questions of to get started on an investigation earlier.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

All right. Earlier, you mentioned that the act should be reviewed every five years. The Privacy Act and the Consumer Privacy Protection Act contain such obligations, but they haven't been reviewed since 1983 or 1984. How can we be sure that this review will in fact be carried out?

(1640) [ English ]

Mr. Michael Kempa :

Again, I don't think that can be specified in legislation. I simply think it's for the development of protocols through basically getting started and keeping track of best practices that we can formalize in the working manuals of those organizations over time.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

Thank you very much, Mr. Kempa.

The Chair :

Thank you, gentlemen. [ English ] We'll go now to Mr. MacGregor. In my defence, I used to work for a fellow named McAllister. You have two and a half minutes, please.

Mr. Alistair MacGregor :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Maybe I'll have a pseudonym one day as Gregor McAllister, and that would confuse everyone. Professor Kempa, when I was reading through this bill, everything seemed to flow and make sense in terms of the title of the bill and what it is aiming to do. The one section, though, that seems to stick out to me as being in an odd place to fit it in is the amendments to the Criminal Code. I'm talking specifically about clause 60 and clause 61. There's an update to the “Sabotage”

section of the Criminal Code. I note that the government, in drafting this bill, did insert two sections where, for greater certainty, it's not an offence if it's “advocacy, protest or dissent”. I'm just wondering if, in your review of these amendments to the Criminal Cod, you have any opinions on them. Are you satisfied that they are in good order?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

Of course, the main concern there is that some way or another those powers could be used to somehow police or lay charges for legitimate domestic protests. It's disruptive to essential infrastructure, basically. I would think that the provision that the protest must be significantly driven or influenced by or caused by foreign interference is the safety valve mechanism there. I do find that perhaps that language could be accentuated—that the action against essential infrastructure must be motivated by serving a foreign entity.

Mr. Alistair MacGregor :

Thank you. Very quickly, you've heard my concerns with the definition of “arrangement” in

part 4 of this bill, the new foreign influence transparency and accountability act. Just in terms of “association”, do you have any thoughts on that term, “in association”? Is it quite clear to you, or do you think this committee needs to do work on that?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

That is one term where I think there's a need for work. It's very broad, and most of the civil liberties critiques have focused in on that precise terminology.

Mr. Alistair MacGregor :

Thank you.

The Chair :

Thank you. We'll go now to Mr. Kurek for five minutes, please.

Mr. Damien Kurek (Battle River—Crowfoot, CPC) :

Thanks very much, and thank you to our witnesses. I appreciate the insight. I'll start with Mr. Burton and then go to Professor Kempa. You talked about that tension that needs to exist because somebody holding views is not necessarily the problem, but it's when it's a foreign state and there's influence in that process. I'm just wondering how we square that circle, so to speak, to make sure that we can in fact have a framework that ensures that we are protecting our democratic infrastructure, research infrastructure, etc., while also protecting the freedoms and rights of Canadians.

There's a tension there, and we have to make sure that we get it right. I'd ask for your feedback and whether you have any specific suggestions about what that should look like in terms of the context of this bill, especially because there's such a tight deadline for amendments. I'll start with Mr. Burton.

Dr. Charles Burton :

Well, I certainly think it's important that citizens of Canada should be serving the purposes of Canada and shouldn't have some remnant loyalties to a nation that they or their ancestors may have come from. I do think it's incumbent on us to have much more transparency in these matters. With the Winnipeg lab matter, I suppose the issue was that Professor Qiu was receiving benefits from China through these thousand talents programs and other arrangements with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which she was not open about.

In terms of the issue with Kenny Chiu, for example, I think the main problem was that we couldn't find out where the information on WeChat and other Chinese websites was coming from. Was it domestic political preference, or was it something coming out of Beijing? We couldn't get any transparency on the sources. All of the stuff was under pen names and on websites that we couldn't associate with any existing institution, which of course by itself is suspicious. I do think that we just have to know.

Also, of course, we haven't talked about this, but the point of this legislation is not to prevent people from taking benefits from a foreign state, but for them to be transparent about it. That would be a choice of Canadians. I receive funding from different foreign governments that have engaged my consulting services. I am only too happy, if called upon, to make that publicly known.

(1645) Mr. Damien Kurek :

I appreciate that. Mr. Kempa, go ahead quickly.

Mr. Michael Kempa :

A quick addition would be about the constant emphasis of the term “clandestine” in the legislation, so that it's not the issue of influence at all. A Canadian citizen is democratically permitted to overtly promote the interests of another state. It's the clandestine piece and the disclosure of any interest.

Mr. Damien Kurek :

There's a comparison made with the ethics act. I hear from my constituents often, and they are frustrated. I also sit on the ethics committee, and this issue has touched it. There's that transparency piece that is so essential to make sure that Canadians know about it. Then, at least if Canadians know about it, they can make decisions accordingly. What should that mechanism be in terms of transparency? Should there be bulletins, or is it enough to be on a list? Is it enough to make sure there's this coordination between different levels of law enforcement? What's the right level of transparency?

Does there need to be more, or does what's proposed in the legislation go far enough? I have one more quick question if we have time.

Dr. Charles Burton :

I think the legislation is good. As I said before, I think it's really the regulations that are going to be the key here. There are still a lot of things that haven't been fully explained, including, as you said, how we define those terms and whether we shouldn't have terms that are very clear in these things. My own feeling with regard to receiving benefits from abroad is that there shouldn't be any privacy allowed and that you have to be completely forthcoming about any conflicts of interest because of foreign money. I think that if people feel that violates their privacy, it's easy: Don't take any foreign money and then you won't have to talk about it.

Mr. Damien Kurek :

That's great. Do you have anything to add, Mr. Kempa?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

Annual reporting on the part of the registrar's office, which would be picked up on media and whatnot, would be very helpful.

Mr. Damien Kurek :

I appreciate that. Mr. Burton—

The Chair :

Thank you, Mr. Kurek.

Mr. Damien Kurek :

Is that the time? Okay.

The Chair :

We go now to Ms. Dzerowicz for five minutes, please.

Ms. Julie Dzerowicz (Davenport, Lib.) :

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. I want to thank both of you for your excellent contributions so far. I'm not usually someone who sits on this committee, and I feel very privileged to be here. One of the hats I wear is that of chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. I'm often with other NATO parliamentarians around the world. We often talk about foreign interference, cybersecurity and disinformation. One of the things we talk about is whether or not our national security and intelligence units have the ability to be transparent about attacks that might be happening and that they stop.

For example, around disinformation, often it's a way of communicating to the broader public that something has taken place and has been stopped. I want to get your take first, Mr. Kempa, and then Mr. Burton's, if he has something to add, as to whether there is the framework in place that allows CSIS to be able to provide that transparency to Canadians.

Mr. Michael Kempa :

CSIS, currently and with this legislation, would have the transparency to report on, essentially, successes in addressing disinformation campaigns. The only thing I would say is that, obviously, they wouldn't release details that would let other entities know what they're capable of or how they succeeded, because then those entities would simply change their tactics and so forth. However, as part of CSIS's developing culture to inform the public and report, there's no reason they couldn't do so in general terms.

Ms. Julie Dzerowicz :

Do you have anything to add, Dr. Burton?

Dr. Charles Burton :

Yes. I've mentioned this before in Parliament: Compared with Australia, the United States and Great Britain, our security agencies, up until relatively recently, have been much less forthcoming about matters. Mr. Vigneault said to the old commission, “The purpose of CSIS is to have secrets.” Well, I hear what he's saying, but I think a sort of cult of secrecy may be going too far. If other nations are able to be more forthcoming and provide more information about foreign interference and influence operations in their statements of claim in legal cases and so on, Canada could start to do the same. I defer to Mr.

Kempa on this, but there seems to be a cultural issue within our security agencies. They are much more reluctant than other nations to inform Canadians and Parliament about what they're doing.

(1650) Ms. Julie Dzerowicz :

Well, I think there's been excellent testimony today about the need for a culture shift, not only because of Bill C-70 but also, I think, because of the world we live in and the threats we face. Mr. Kempa, in a number of recent articles, you discussed the serious problem that foreign interference represents, particularly in local nominations. Of course, there's a minority government under way right now. Lots of nominations are under way and will continue to be under way. To what extent do you think Bill C-70 will protect the legitimacy of upcoming nominations in the next election?

Mr. Michael Kempa :

It helps directly, in the sense that CSIS would be able to share information, obviously, with political parties across the board sooner, and also work in partnership, for example, with Elections Canada. Obviously, Elections Canada does not regulate most of the details of nomination procedures, but it certainly does in the area of, for example, the financing of nominations. That would be a significant step forward, certainly.

The other issue around the leaky nature of unregulated nominations and foreign interference has to do with the Elections Act and the fact that parties follow private rules for nominations, apart from finance. This bill would be a step in the right direction in that sense.

Ms. Julie Dzerowicz :

Thank you. My final question is for Dr. Burton. I've had constituents in my own riding come to my office and say, “Julie, I'm convinced that I am being monitored by the Chinese government.” The only place I can refer them to is our local police. I think there's some division somewhere that is supporting them. I guess my question to you is this: It might be in protocols and regulations, but is there enough of a framework here, particularly around the commissioner, for when someone in public feels they are being monitored? Would they be able to find an avenue where someone could help them?

Dr. Charles Burton :

Yes, I think that also came up among parliamentarians in the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, IPAC. I received some informal information from CSIS in that regard. I didn't know about it. For whatever reason, it doesn't seem to be their common practice. However, they approached me about this, and I'm grateful they did. I don't know. I don't think I'm really equal to challenging skilled young hackers out of Shanghai who are trying to get my emails and telephone conversations, but I'm making my best effort to encrypt and be more careful. I don't see why CSIS can't tell you if they suspect that.

They did not tell me who it was, or why it was. They only told me when it started. I took that information on board and tried my best to find out about how to be more careful in my cyber-communications.

Ms. Julie Dzerowicz :

Thank you.

The Chair :

Thank you, Ms. Dzerowicz. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today. It's been most helpful. It will be a great help to us in moving forward with this legislation. We'll suspend for a few minutes and bring in the next panel. Thank you.

(1650) (1700) The Chair :

I call this meeting back to order. I'd like to welcome our witnesses for the second hour. We have, from the Canada Tibet Committee, Sherap Therchin, executive director; from the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, Mehmet Tohti, executive director; and from the World Sikh Organization of Canada, Balpreet Singh, legal counsel, who is joining us by video conference. I will now invite Mr. Therchin to make an opening statement of up to five minutes. Please go ahead, sir.

Mr. Sherap Therchin (Executive Director, Canada Tibet Committee) :

Thank you, Chair and committee members. I deeply appreciate this opportunity to speak with you today on the important matter of countering foreign interference. I would like to thank everyone involved for taking this matter seriously and for the detailed process to develop countering measures. I would like to focus my presentation on

part 1 of Bill C-70 with reference to the review of the bill by Sarah Teich and Hannah Taylor. While the review finds many of the amendments encouraging, it points to a limitation, which is that Bill C-70 does not propose the addition of a definition of “transnational repression” to any pieces of legislation that the bill proposes to amend or enact. Defining transnational repression is essential to recognize and address the specific tactics used by foreign states to silence dissent among diaspora communities.

This repression can take various forms, including harassment, surveillance, threats, coercion and physical violence. Authoritarian states, such as the People's Republic of China, routinely use these tactics to control dissent and opposition beyond their borders. The PRC's transnational repression is a well-documented phenomenon affecting several groups, including the Tibetan diaspora. The Chinese Communist Party employs various methods to exert control and suppress Tibetan activism and identity worldwide. I'd like to describe some of the key tactics here. One is surveillance and intimidation.

The CCP gathers personal information on exiled Tibetans through cyber-attacks and spyware and by questioning relatives in Tibet. This information is used to intimidate and coerce Tibetans abroad, often through direct threats or by harming their families back home. Two is coercion by proxy. The Chinese authorities frequently threaten or harm relatives of exiled Tibetans in Tibet to exert control over the diaspora. This method ensures that exiled activists are silenced or forced to conform to the CCP's demands out of fear for their loved ones. Three is infiltration and disinformation.

The CCP infiltrates the Tibetan diaspora communities and organizations, using spies and co-opted individuals to sow distrust, spread disinformation and undermine solidarity networks. These activities severely disrupt the community's ability to organize and advocate for Tibetan rights. Four is economic and social coercion. Tibetan exiles often face economic and social pressure from the CCP, including blackmail and efforts to sabotage their livelihoods. Such tactics aim to destabilize the diaspora and reduce its capacity to support the Tibetan cause. There is a need for a clear definition in Bill C-70 .

Incorporating a clear definition of transnational repression in Bill C-70 would enhance Canada's ability to combat such foreign interference effectively. It would provide a legal basis for identifying and prosecuting transnational repression activities, thereby protecting diaspora communities from foreign state harassment and coercion. With this, I'd like to offer some recommendations for Bill C-70 .

Recommendation one is to define “transnational repression”: Include a comprehensive definition of transnational repression that encompasses all forms of extraterritorial control and coercion used by foreign states against diaspora communities. Recommendation two is to enhance surveillance and prosecution mechanisms: Strengthen provisions within the CSIS Act and the Criminal Code to allow for robust monitoring and prosecution of transnational repression activities, ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable.

Recommendation three is to support victims and communities: Establish mechanisms, including specialized funds, to support and protect diaspora communities, providing resources and assistance to those affected by transnational repression. Finally, recommendation four is international co-operation: Foster international collaboration to address transnational repression, working with allies to develop coordinated responses and share best practices.

(1705) In conclusion, defining transnational repression in Bill C-70 is a crucial step towards effectively countering the PRC's tactics against the Tibetan diaspora and other affected communities. By recognizing and addressing these activities, Canada can better protect the rights and freedoms of all its residents, ensuring a safe and supportive environment for those fleeing authoritarian oppression. Thank you.

(1710) The Chair :

Thank you. We'll go now to Mr. Tohti for an opening statement of up to five minutes. Please go ahead, sir.

Mr. Mehmet Tohti (Executive Director, Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project) :

Thank you, Chair and distinguished members. I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify today about the critical and pressing issue that we have been advocating on for nearly decades: countering foreign interference. As a fervent advocate for the Uyghur people and against the Chinese Communist Party's ongoing genocide, I can say that foreign interference by the Chinese state has had a marked impact on my personal life here in Canada.

Chinese repressive and innovative efforts to silence dissidents have attempted to shackle my activism and intimidate me into retreating from speaking out about the devastation of my family, friends and community. I have received numerous times threatening phone calls from the state police directly and messages about the most wild things being said about my loved ones. I'm a Canadian, and my rights to exercise free speech and freedom of assembly are attempted to be curtailed by the Chinese government all the time.

Bill C-70 is a heartening response by the Canadian government to my community's experience of transnational repression. Bill C-70 is a significant step forward in addressing foreign interference and protecting Canadian citizens from transnational repression. We talk about transnational repression because, on a personal level, we do not experience interference. We experience repression by the hijacking of our family members just for our speaking up in Canada. For that reason, both Tibetans and Uyghurs use the term “transnational repression”.

As a human rights defender, I do believe that the broader application and the coverage of certain acts of transnational repression against human rights activists afforded by the proposed amendments in Bill C-70 will allow for greater protection of the full and uninhibited exercise of our democratic rights in Canada. The proposed amendments in Bill C-70 will foster a joint strength among us Canadians to effectively counter threats to the security of Canada and safeguard the diaspora communities in Canada and abroad.

The expansion of information disclosure to anyone, not just a public official, if deemed to be essential in the public interest, will allow for enhanced bureaucratic transparency. Enhancing CSIS's ability to carry out its important functions serves to strengthen Canadians' trust in the agency and its capacity to detect, prevent and respond to threats from foreign agents, including those from China. Necessarily, Bill C-70 's emphasis on international co-operation underpins a crucial and powerful tactic in countering the global reach of authoritarian regimes such as China.

I applaud the proposed creation of a foreign influence transparency registry, which will enhance the effectiveness of protecting vulnerable diaspora communities, and the proposed appointment of a commissioner of foreign influence transparency; however, I am a little bit concerned about the absence in Bill C-70 of proposing the addition of specific foreign interference offences to the Criminal Code, nor does it propose that refugee espionage, online harassment or digital violence be criminalized.

Further, given the limited amendments to the Criminal Code, there are deficient means for the victims of foreign interference to seek redress for the impacts of transnational oppression. It is crucial that the government go beyond interference that activists carry out in relation to certain political and government processes in all aspects of Bill C-70 . The Chinese government's reach extends far beyond attempts at directly interfering with Canadian institutions.

My experience of transnational oppression is unrelated to political or governmental process, yet it is an assault on my democratic rights, warranting protection as much as upholding the integrity of our democratic process. Crucially, addressing foreign interference must take a victim-centric approach. Chinese transnational oppression and interference in Canada pose a significant threat to the Uyghur communities and the Canadian values of freedom and democracy. With the introduction of Bill C-70 , Canada is making a strong statement against those oppressive tactics.

It is imperative that we remain vigilant, stand in solidarity with those affected and take concrete steps to counter these challenges. Thank you.

(1715) The Chair :

Thank you, sir. I now invite Mr. Singh to make an opening statement of up to five minutes. Please go ahead, sir.

Mr. Balpreet Singh (Legal Counsel, World Sikh Organization of Canada) :

Good afternoon. My name is Balpreet Singh. I serve as legal counsel for the World Sikh Organization of Canada, which is also known as the WSO. The first week of June is a particularly sombre time for Sikhs, as we remember the 1984 Sikh genocide and the Indian government's brutal attack on the Darbar Sahib complex and approximately 70 other gurdwaras across Punjab. I mention the horrific acts of June 1984 to remind committee members of the price that Sikh community members have paid due to state-sponsored violence, foreign interference and surveillance, simply for practising our faith.

For the past 40 years, India has consistently sought to intimidate Sikhs in Canada and stifle Sikh advocacy for Khalistan, which is a sovereign state governed according to Sikh principles and values. This interference has included disinformation campaigns, visa denials, intimidation of family members and, as we know now, even assassinations. Discussing or promoting Khalistan is protected under freedom of expression and political discourse. Attempts to draw attention to ongoing Indian interference targeting Sikhs have fallen largely on deaf ears, as India constantly maligns Sikh activism as extremism and worse.

The Sikh community is currently at a pivotal moment in its history. In June 2023, Bhai Hardeep Singh Nijjar was assassinated while leaving the Guru Nanak gurdwara in Surrey, where he served as president. The community, including our own organization, the WSO, recognized that this was an assassination at the hands of the Indian state. This was later substantiated as information emerged of Indian plans to kill Sikh activists here in Canada and across the world. This weekend, I met with two Sikhs who have been given duties to warn.

They have been provided with no details on the source of the threat they face or any resources to protect themselves. In short, they feel that they are on their own and pretty much abandoned. Foreign interference has had deadly consequences for Sikhs in Canada. We believe more needs to be done to counter foreign interference. In that respect, Bill C-70 is a step in the right direction. I would like to highlight the ability of CSIS to now disclose security information to any person or entity, should CSIS deem it relevant. This will be a positive step.

However, we are also concerned about whether foreign consular officials in Canada might also be considered an entity. Also, India regularly supplies false and misleading intelligence about Sikh activists in Canada. There would need to be some sort of controls to ensure that this isn't further disseminated. We know that the framework for co-operation on countering terrorism and violent extremism between Canada and India is still active. We have grave concerns over intelligence sharing between Canada and India.

Vigilance needs to be ensured, so that new powers created by this legislation are used to counter foreign interference and not turned around against communities here. India has falsely claimed that Khalistan activism in Canada is directed by foreign state actors. Could accusations like that trigger the provisions in this bill?

The sabotage provision being added to the Criminal Code makes it an offence to interfere “with access to an essential infrastructure...with the intent to”—and this is in (b)—“endanger the safety or security of the naval, army or air forces of any state other than Canada that are lawfully present in Canada”. Sikhs have often protested in front of Indian consulates and the embassy here in Ottawa. The Indian embassy staff includes a military, naval and air attaché.

Last year, the Indian media falsely reported that the Indian embassy in Ottawa was targeted with “two grenades” by a Sikh protester—a story covered today in the Journal de Montréal. India's NIA, the National Investigation Agency, also filed charges against a Montreal-based Sikh based on these accusations. Could this new Criminal Code provision be used to stifle Sikh protests? With the short amount of time I have left, I'd like to highlight the reference to international relations between countries in Bill C-70 .

We're concerned that this language and provision could go against the overall purpose of the legislation. Judges are given discretion to not release records following a trial if they believe that doing so “would be injurious to international relations or national defence or national security”. Additionally, subsection 82.31(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act gives the minister the ability to intervene if they believe that matters could damage international relations.

The reason foreign interference against Sikhs has gone unchecked for the past 40 years is the desire of successive Canadian governments to increase trade relations with India. This has been at the expense of the Sikh community. A report by Sam Cooper in The Bureau revealed that “CSIS planned a major intervention in 2017” to dismantle “Indian intelligence networks in Vancouver that were monitoring and targeting the Sikh community”. According to this report, this operation was obstructed by the government, citing potential repercussions for Canada-India relations.

Canada needs new tools to counter foreign interference, no doubt. However, our organization and the Sikh community fear that the international relations clause may be used as an excuse to ignore ongoing interference by India against Sikhs in Canada and might even create tools that would persecute Canadian Sikh activists.

(1720) That's my time. I look forward to the questions you might have.

The Chair :

Thank you, sir, for your remarks. We'll start the questions with Mr. Genuis, please. You have six minutes.

Mr. Garnett Genuis (Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, CPC) :

Thank you very much, Chair. It's a real pleasure for me to have these three witnesses before the committee. All three individuals represent groups that I've had a chance to work with for almost the entirety of my time as a member of Parliament. I want to thank all three of you for the way you diligently inform us as legislators and also for your work on many important issues. As all of you know, Conservatives have been highlighting the urgent need to pass this legislation. The Liberal government has done everything possible over the last nine years to delay action on foreign interference.

We are concerned, given the delays we've seen, that they may want to avoid this legislation being in force in time for the next election, which is why we have been pushing them for timelines to get this done. This is a question for all three of you. I would ask you to answer it quickly, if possible. I want feedback from each of your on the information-sharing provisions in this legislation. If CSIS is aware of a threat against an individual, there are obviously many advantages to CSIS being able to make the decision to inform that individual of the threats directly.

There's maybe the concern about potentially political decision-making if there's a political check requirement and that leading to an avoidance of information being disseminated. What do you think about the information-sharing provisions? Are they adequate? Should they be strengthened? I would ask for a quick response from all three of you, please.

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

It is important. It has been a one-way street. At least now we will have a chance to hear from CSIS. A number of times we faced direct threats and there was no warning. We could face a direct attack by people just following us in a car. In that circumstance, if there was a warning beforehand, and if there was a car chasing us in our daily life, at least we could take some personal precautions or additional measures to protect ourselves.

Mr. Sherap Therchin :

I would add that depending upon the level of seriousness of information that is available from CSIS about the citizen, if the information is serious enough and if it could possibly help prevent any danger to the citizen, then I think the information should be made available or shared with the concerned citizen.

Mr. Balpreet Singh :

I'll just add that this could potentially be a double-edged sword. We definitely, as a community, need to know more when there are threats against members of our community. Right now, like I said, these individuals who have duties to warn are completely in the dark. They have no idea who's threatening them and what the level of that threat is. On the other side, we also know that there's an open channel with this framework of co-operation between India and Canada passing information back and forth.

Is this information, potentially false information, often coming from India, going to be disseminated further as a result of this? Second, do foreign diplomats or other entities here in Canada count as entities with whom CSIS can share this information?

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

Thank you. I have a second question. How will bad actors try to get around this legislation, and what could we possibly do to block those workarounds? One area that occurred to me is that they might try to interfere through subtle pressure, discrimination or implied threats rather than direct threats. What do you see as being the likely response from bad actors, and how can we cut off those kinds of potential responses? I would ask for a quick response from everyone again.

(1725) Mr. Sherap Therchin :

I would like to go back to my focus on the need to define transnational repression. If the legislation does not include a clear definition of transnational repression, I think it gives an opportunity for authoritarian states like China to go around the legislation and coerce diaspora communities, including Tibetans, to do what they want them to do. In the specific example of Tibetans, in recent years there have been cases of Tibetans applying for a visa to visit Tibet, which is usually considered very difficult.

If you have participated in, let's say, the annual Tibetan National Uprising Day, which is on March 10, or if you are a regular participant at the celebration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's birthday, you most likely won't get a visa. If you do manage to get a visa and if you do manage to visit inside Tibet, when you come back to Canada, you'll be asked to gather information, or you'll be asked not to attend anymore those events that you used to attend. It's about having that clear definition. This is just one example.

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

Okay. We have probably about 20 seconds for both of you on this.

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

The bad actors will always develop and explore the means and ways to exploit this process, but what's most important is how we protect ourselves and how we prepare ourselves. This will at least strengthen that process and give us the tools to combat against the people who are just skipping this process or trying to make use of it for their own advantage.

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

Mr. Singh.

Mr. Balpreet Singh :

Briefly, I can tell you that India uses foreign-based or Canada-based proxies. There are usually different layers. In practical terms, getting to where the orders are coming from is often a challenge. Do I have a solution? No, I don't, but you're quite right that there are different layers. Often it looks like there's a Canada-based individual who actually has different layers above, and finally you can trace that to India, but it's not straightforward.

The Chair :

Thank you, Mr. Genuis. We'll go now to Mr. Gaheer for six minutes, please.

Mr. Iqwinder Gaheer (Mississauga—Malton, Lib.) :

Thank you, Chair. Thank you to the witnesses for appearing. My questions are largely for Mr. Balpreet Singh. Look, as a Sikh, as a Canadian, I resonate with large segments of your opening testimony. I think when the Prime Minister stood up in Parliament last year and spoke on the murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, that was quite a moment for the community. I know that for you and for me and for other members of the Sikh community, that moment really confirmed what Sikhs already knew and felt. Many deep-seated fears were realized. I now find it very ironic that Mr.

Genuis is showing concern for this issue, because I remember the moment when the leader the next day flip-flopped and said they needed more information to comment on this issue and did not stand with the Sikh community. When the debate happened in Parliament regarding that murder, the Conservatives did not show up. So it's quite ironic that now—

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

On a point of order, Chair, it is unparliamentary to refer to the presence or absence of members, for one thing, but I was sitting there for the entire debate, and—

The Chair :

Excuse me, Mr. Genuis.

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

Okay. I have a point of order.

The Chair :

Mr. Genuis, go ahead on your point of order.

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

Mr. Gaheer is dead wrong about whether I've stood with the Sikh community. He should ask the witness whether I've stood up for the Sikh community, because I've said far more in defence of the Sikh community's concerns than he ever has. I'd like him to withdraw his comments about the presence or absence of members in the House.

The Chair: Mr. Genuis—

Mr. Garnett Genuis: He's dead wrong. I was there.

The Chair :

Mr. Genuis—

Mr. Iqwinder Gaheer :

Wait, let me get that straight: You've stood more with the Sikh community than me, as a Sikh?

The Chair: Mr. Gaheer—

Mr. Iqwinder Gaheer: You're kidding me, right?

The Chair :

Let's not talk across each other.

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

Look up interventions in the House.

The Chair :

Mr. Gaheer, carry on with your questions.

Mr. Garnett Genuis: Ask Balpreet.

The Chair: Mr. Genuis—please.

Mr. Iqwinder Gaheer :

In your opening testimony, Balpreet, you spoke about the security sharing that's taking place under this bill. From my review of the bill and the legislation, this bill, as far as I am aware, does not open up new avenues for security information sharing with foreign entities. It's largely for Canadian entities, whether it be government bodies or individual persons within Canada. Any sort of information sharing that's taking place is happening within frameworks that are already established. You mentioned one of them, which is the co-operation agreement. I think that was established with India as well.

As far as I'm aware, this bill does not open up new avenues for that kind of information sharing. Again, we are going to have CSIS appear before us, and the minister . I'd be happy to raise these concerns with him and with CSIS as well. As for the information sharing, it's among government bodies. We've heard testimony that CSIS is reticent at times to share information. This bill will allow for more information sharing.

Different government agencies may have different pieces of that pie, and only when you put those pieces together do you get the full picture and perhaps reach that bar whereby you can move to the next step. I do want to say that from what I've heard from testimony and from witnesses and from conversations that I've had, we are generally a net recipient of information. I think that's a good thing in the international framework.

One thing about this legislation is that there's a requirement that Parliament review the CSIS Act every five years in order to ensure that CSIS's mandate and powers are consistent to address the threat landscape that they operate in. Does your organization support this review?

(1730) Mr. Balpreet Singh :

Yes. I'll touch on a couple of the points you've raised. First, we know that this channel is open between Canada and India. Now, India is notoriously bad when it comes to respecting human rights. We've seen the transnational repression that's taken place, including killings on Canadian soil. I appreciate that we can say that it's been largely data coming our way as opposed to the other way around, but having this channel available means that we can't control how it's used in the future. I mean, there will be other governments that come in. There will be other people who come in your place and in others'.

Having this channel open is problematic. That's my first comment. The review after five years is absolutely essential. There are so many things we're trying out for the first time, including the registry, that we'll need time to see how it works. Then, you're right, we'll need to have a review to see if we can improve things or change things if necessary. Yes, we're completely supportive of that.

Mr. Iqwinder Gaheer :

Mr. Chair, how much time do I have? I have two minutes. Okay, that's great. Again, from what I've heard from testimony, when you look at the co-operation agreement, you see that large sections of it, actually.... Most of that information sharing is for immigration purposes. It's for the security background checks that happen. It's not necessarily the type of information that I think the Sikh community is worried about. I think it has largely been used for immigration purposes.

Obviously, a large segment of the population in India wishes to emigrate from India, and large sections come to Canada, so that security framework is used for doing those background checks. I also want to ask about the foreign interference that the Sikh community has faced over the last few years and over the last few decades. How has that changed, perhaps, under the current Government of India?

Mr. Balpreet Singh :

Once again, touching back on your initial point about the intelligence sharing, the intelligence-sharing framework itself names a number of so-called extremist groups. It names two Sikh groups that are, as far as I can tell, completely defunct. I haven't seen any actions by them. However, when it was presented in the Indian media in 2018, it was presented as an intelligence framework co-operation agreement to clamp down on so-called Sikh extremism in Canada. That's how it was framed in India, and I believe that's how it's intended to be used by the Indians.

Now, I'm glad that, if what you're telling me is correct, that's not the way it's being used. However, once again, just having this open and the wording of the framework are problematic. In terms of the transnational repression, under the Congress governments that we've seen in the past, the messaging has been very similar in terms of claims of so-called extremism, which is largely just—

Mr. Iqwinder Gaheer :

That's great. Thank you. I do want to say, Balpreet, that when the minister does appear and when CSIS does appear, I will specifically ask about that information-sharing co-operation. Thank you.

The Chair :

Thank you, Mr. Gaheer. [ Translation ] I now give the floor to Mr. Villemure for six minutes.

Mr. René Villemure :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to our guests, Mr. Tohti, Mr. Therchin and Mr. Singh. I'll start with you, Mr. Tohti, and then go to Mr. Therchin. You have actively supported the creation of a foreign influence registry. Does the government's proposal in Bill C-70 meet your expectations?

[ English ]

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

As I said, it is the right direction, and it is the first step. We have been trying to get some sort of legislative action on this because China has been very active, not just in Canada but in many of our allies' countries. For that reason, some countries have already taken some actions, but in Canada, it took some time. At least we have this opportunity. There are a number of amendments required. When we have something, we can improve it. We look at the issue from this perspective because our communities....

One of our community members, Huseyin Celil, has been in a Chinese jail for 17 years as the first victim of transnational repression. For that purpose and reason, we have one bill right now tabled, and we prefer to work on this bill and, with our suggestions and recommendations, to improve this bill down the road. At the very least, we have to pass this bill as soon as possible.

(1735) [ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

If you had a suggestion to make to improve the registry, what would it be?

[ English ]

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

We should go one step ahead of what Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. have right now because it is quite outdated. At least now we are working on this bill. For that reason, we can study those other countries' legislative provisions, and we can improve it from their experience and strengthen it.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

Thank you. Mr. Therchin, could you answer the same question, please?

[ English ]

Mr. Sherap Therchin :

I echo the point of my colleague and friend, Mehmet. I think the timing is of concern. We need to get this passed and implemented before the next election. We are part of a coalition that is actively working on the foreign influence registry act, which includes an activist from Canada and Hong Kong named Gloria Fung, who will be testifying, I think, in a couple of days here at this same committee. I would defer to my colleague Mehmet Tohti and to Gloria Fung in the upcoming days.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

If you had a suggestion to make to improve the registry, what would it be?

[ English ]

Mr. Sherap Therchin :

Again, with colleagues from Hong Kong leading this discussion, one of the points raised in our discussion was the definition of proxies in the foreign influence registration act . If possible, that needs to be clearly defined.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

Mr. Singh, could you please answer the same question?

[ English ]

Mr. Balpreet Singh :

I'll go back to the initial point I made, which is the fact that international relations can play a role. We need to take a look at that. I know that in England, they have a two-tier system, and you can pick countries of more concern and less concern. I don't agree with that approach. Another suggestion I have is.... The transparency commissioner being a cabinet appointment could be a problem. I think we need to make the commissioner as independent as possible.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

Mr. Singh, I get the impression that you do not believe that the commissioner's independence is assured to a satisfactory extent, given the wording proposed in Bill C‑70.

[ English ]

Mr. Balpreet Singh :

I think it would be better if it were not at the whim of cabinet. Yes.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

All right. Mr. Tohti, I have the same question for you. Does the commissioner's independence appeal to you?

[ English ]

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

The commissioner should be independent, period, and should be in line with our democratic norms and accountability. This is the part of the national security issue for Canada, and it is related to our future generations. For that reason, we should keep this commissioner far away from political disputes and keep that person impartial. For that reason, it is important.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

Would that impartiality be similar to that of the Auditor General?

[ English ]

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

I don't know how far we can go technically, but the impartiality of the commissioner is crucial.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

So that's a critical element, a requirement. Mr. Therchin, I have the same question for you about the commissioner's independence.

[ English ]

Mr. Sherap Therchin :

I think everyone agrees that the commissioner should be independent. I think this whole discussion on foreign interference has involved a lot of consultations with the various parties and stakeholders involved. The idea of keeping the commissioner independent is very important for everyone, including for witnesses like us.

[ Translation ]

Mr. René Villemure :

I think all parties have agreed that this is in the public interest and something needs to be done. Mr. Tohti, do you have a suggestion with respect to sharing information?

(1740) [ English ]

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

The first time the media reported on unknown vehicles chasing or following me was in 2007, and 17 years have passed since then. Last year at this time, one government official, who happened to be at the same occasion as me, called me after I left to say two cars were following me and there was a direct threat my safety and security. It is crucial, because we are taking on China. We're talking about China, which is one of the most notorious and brutal regimes in the world. The Chinese government is deploying tons of ways and means just to attack and silence us.

Therefore, if there is any crucial information that relates to our safety and the security of our family members here or back home, we should know and be alerted. That is crucial.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

Thank you very much. [ English ] We'll go now to Mr. MacGregor for six minutes.

Mr. Alistair MacGregor :

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank you to all of the witnesses for joining us today as we take a deep dive into Bill C-70 . I want to start with Mr. Therchin and Mr. Tohti. I was taking notes when you both made your opening statements, particularly with regard to the need for a definition of “transnational oppression”. I'm trying to figure out, when we come to a stage where we're considering amendments, where to best fit this in. This bill amends a number of different existing statutes and also creates a new one.

However, I want to draw your attention to the fact that, in this bill, there are important amendments to the Security of Information Act. There are going to be new clauses to go after intimidation, threats or violence committed on behalf of a foreign entity. There are going to be amendments about committing an indictable offence on behalf of a foreign entity, about omitting the fact that you are working for a foreign entity, or about interfering in the political process on behalf of a foreign entity. A lot of these—in fact, all of them—have quite serious punishments associated with them.

If you want to submit a brief to this committee, that's great. We can get it later on. However, is there anything you want that is missing in those I covered? What are we missing? This seems to cover a lot of what you said in your opening statements. I want to make sure we're getting all of our bases covered. I'll start with you, sir.

Mr. Sherap Therchin :

I think the bill covers a lot of things. As a human rights activist, I find it quite encouraging, and I mentioned this in my opening remarks. Also, the analytical reports submitted, I think, just yesterday by Sarah Teich and Hannah Taylor mention that many of the amendments in the legislation are quite encouraging. Having said that, the analysis in the report points out, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, the lack of a definition for “transnational repression”. I think the aspect here is, as you mentioned, that foreign entities are common in transnational repression as well as in foreign interference.

However—at least based on what some of the available literature seems to suggest—the target groups are different for foreign interference and transnational repression. In cases of foreign interference, the target group seems to be more within a state structure,

whereas, in cases of transnational repression, it is the diaspora communities, such as Uyghurs and Tibetans. That was the reason. Otherwise, we actually find it very encouraging.

Mr. Alistair MacGregor :

Mr. Tohti, do you want a chance to...?

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

Yes. It is really important to have a clear definition. The U.S. Senate introduced Bill S. 831 for what will be called the transnational repression policy act. That bill on transnational repression clearly defines what transnational repression is. There are names and numbers for

definitions of offences. Most of those

definitions are amended as a result of consequential amendments. When you add one thing, the related bills need to be updated, consequently. For that reason, we need, as part of this important bill—Bill C-70 —to clearly define what transnational repression is.

(1745) Mr. Alistair MacGregor :

Thank you. I took note of how you had a slight bit of disappointment that we weren't using the term in the Criminal Code. However, I think, given that the Security of Information Act is being amended in these ways and that there are some significant punishments—some of these are up to life imprisonment—perhaps there's an area of the bill where the committee can look at inserting the definition. We've noted that and I appreciate your testimony. I wanted to save my last question for the World Sikh Organization. Mr. Singh, with regard to your comments about amendments to the Criminal Code, you referenced the definition of “sabotage”, which specifically says:

endanger the safety or security of the naval, army or air forces of any state other than Canada that are lawfully present in Canada

If you read further down the bill, there is a

section that says:

For greater certainty, no person commits an offence [if they are] participating in advocacy, protest or dissent but they do not intend to cause any of the harms referred to in [that paragraph].

Are you satisfied with that, or do you think this committee needs to establish guardrails that are better than what's already in the bill?

Mr. Balpreet Singh :

I gave you the example of the Ottawa protest from March 2023. This was, by all accounts, a peaceful protest, but when you have accusations of grenades being thrown, how is that going to affect individuals who want to come and protest? I mean, is this opening it up to foreign governments basically threatening or throwing the sink at these dissenting communities and hoping something sticks? On the other side, even if you know you're going to be exonerated at the end, it puts you in this long process and you just decide that it's not worth the risk.

This is how I see a lot of things in this entire bill: They're double-edged swords if they're used by foreign governments. For example, the Sikhs are a stateless people. We have networks in countries across the world. Now when India accuses us of Khalistan advocacy, of being directed by foreign entities, is this going to cause us trouble here? I hope not, but what are the safeguards? This is what I'm confused about.

This is intended to stop transnational oppression and foreign interference, but will it be a wet blanket for communities like mine, who are advocating for causes that foreign governments do not like and which they're willing to use all of their resources to stop?

The Chair :

Thank you, Mr. MacGregor. We're going to start our second round now. It will be an abbreviated second round, ending with Mr. MacGregor. We will start with Mr. Genuis for five minutes, please.

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

Thank you, Chair. I do have to respond just a bit to Mr. Gaheer's line of questioning—

Mr. Iqwinder Gaheer :

I have a point of order, Chair.

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

The Liberals want to praise the Prime Minister 's—

Mr. Iqwinder Gaheer :

I have a point of order.

The Chair :

There's a point of order.

Mr. Iqwinder Gaheer :

Chair, the member opposite who's speaking right now, Mr. Genuis, claimed earlier that he's done more for the Sikh community than I have—

The Chair :

That is debate—

Mr. Iqwinder Gaheer :

—on the House floor. We just wanted to do a quick search. This member did not speak at all. When we had an emergency debate on the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, this member did not speak, and he's claiming that he's done more.

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

I'll respond to the point of order.

The Chair :

This is debate. I don't want to get into a debate. We want to deal with our witnesses to get the information they have to offer us. I'd recommend that you guys take this up off-line. I would encourage you to get back to questioning the witnesses.

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

The World Sikh Organization, the organization represented here, has actually done rankings of members of Parliament by the volume of their raising Sikh issues. I would refer the member to those rankings and how I performed in them if he wants to know how often I speak about Sikh issues in the House.

Mr. Iqwinder Gaheer :

So why didn't you speak about Hardeep? Why didn't you speak on Mr. Nijjar?

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

Can I speak, Chair? Can you bring the member to order? The Liberals want to praise the Prime Minister 's public statement in the House even though this Liberal government has done nothing substantively to combat foreign interference. Following the assassination of Mr. Nijjar, I submitted Order Paper Question No. 2488, regarding information-sharing between Canada and India. The government confirmed in response to that question that the information-sharing agreement signed by the Trudeau government is still operating and information continues to be shared.

I further asked in the same question if any information had been shared with the Government of India regarding Mr. Nijjar specifically, before or after his assassination. I said in the question: “was any information shared at any time between law enforcement or security agencies of Canada and India regarding Hardeep Singh Nijjar?” The government refused to answer the question. They flat out refused to answer my question about whether intelligence was shared with the Government of India on Mr. Nijjar. One would think that if the answer had been no, they would have just given a no. Mr.

Singh, I want to bring you into this conversation. Do you think it is inconsistent for the Prime Minister and for Mr. Gaheer to make statements in the House on the one hand but refuse to answer questions about whether this Liberal government shared intelligence about Mr. Nijjar?

(1750) Mr. Balpreet Singh :

I can tell you that the community much appreciated the Prime Minister 's statement in September, and it was farther than we've seen any prime minister go. Are we completely satisfied with the record? As I said in my statements in 2017, according to The Bureau article, this network operating out of Vancouver that was targeting Sikhs was not cracked down on as a result of not wanting to endanger Canada-India relations, so these things have irked us for the past 40 years, but I mean, credit where credit is due: The Prime Minister 's statement was really a turning point for our community here.

In terms of intelligence-sharing, you're right that the entire community wants to know: Was intelligence shared on Mr. Nijjar? We know that Mr. Nijjar was part of lists that India had sent to Canada on a number of occasions, with absolutely laughable intelligence—so-called intelligence. Was anything sent back? I certainly hope not, but if we can find that out, that would be great.

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

Yes, I understand what you're saying. I think at a minimum the government should answer questions from parliamentarians. Again, if the answer was no, a simple no could have been given. We submitted that Order Paper Question 2488, and we haven't seen questions like that submitted from government members. I wish they would do more to stand up for the various communities they claim to represent. I want to ask our other two witnesses something. Mr. Therchin raised the point about limits around travelling, fear of travelling, possible threats around visas being used as a vehicle for foreign interference.

We've also seen the problem of people being rendered from third countries. This is the case of Huseyin Celil. Given how the Government of China seeks to exercise dominance and influence throughout the world, not just within their own borders, rendering from third countries can be a real problem, the abuse of red notices and other such things. How can we combat these fears that people may have that if they speak out on certain issues they will be very limited in their ability to travel, not just to China, but also to other countries?

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

Yes, you raised a really important and crucial point. I've been living in Canada since 1998. So far, I can travel to the western democracies. I cannot travel to Central Asian “Stan” countries, for example. Turkey imposed a travel ban on me in effect since 2004 as did a number of other countries, for example, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan and Egypt. I would like to just go to Saudi Arabia. As a Muslim, I would like to perform my hajj, the duty. I cannot go because of the close relationship that Saudi Arabia has forged with China. They are acting upon Chinese requests at any time. It is quite a limitation for me.

Mr. Garnett Genuis :

Mr. Therchin, go ahead.

Mr. Sherap Therchin :

I think one of the available mechanisms to deal with this—albeit maybe this is not within the scope of this committee—is the principle of reciprocity. I think it is an important mechanism to solve this problem. I had a chance to speak on this in the foreign affairs committee last year. The U.S. passed a bill on Tibet called the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act. Any Chinese officials, media, have access to visit any part of the U.S., but the same access should be available for American officials, media, journalists, congressmen and senators.

If similar such legislation on the principle of reciprocity were passed in Canada—which could be extended to common citizens—I think it would solve this problem.

The Chair :

Thank you, Mr. Genuis. We'll go now to Ms. Zahid. Ms. Zahid, you have five minutes, please.

Mrs. Salma Zahid (Scarborough Centre, Lib.) :

Thank you, Chair. Thanks to all of the witnesses for appearing before this committee on a very important issue. I'm glad that we are examining legislation on an important issue that the Harper Conservatives did little to nothing to address in over a decade in government. My first question is for Mr. Tohti. Mr. Tohti, thank you for being here. Thank you for your relentless advocacy for the Uyghur people. I know it has not been without personal cost. Last year, you told the ethics committee about threats you received in July 2020 before your testimony at another parliamentary committee.

Could you please talk about that and other ways the Chinese government tries to intimidate and silence people like you, who are standing up for the human rights of the Uyghur people?

(1755) Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

Thank you. Yes, as I said, since 1998 I have been living in Canada. I'm totally isolated from my family members. I didn't have any chance to visit my mother and all of my siblings. For them, they didn't have any chance to come to Canada and visit me because the Chinese government has blocked their passport applications. For more than 33 years it is total isolation; I'm alone here in Canada with my own family. As I said, Chinese repression did not stop within its borders. Wherever we do advocacy work in Canada or some other places, the extended arms of Chinese authorities always hunt us.

Just a couple of hours before testifying before the committee on China's genocidal policy, I received a very ugly message about my mother. Then just two weeks before the parliamentary vote on M-62 for resettlement of 10,000 Uyghur refugees, I received a direct call from the Chinese state police. They put my uncle on the other end of the phone and threatened me. They said a number of my family members were already dead and if I continued I would face the consequence. It was that kind of death threat. Last year again, before I headed to one conference, two cars chased me.

It was a warning from Canadian officials at Global Affairs that saved our lives, because we then changed our route. This threat is imminent every day, and this bill in that regard just provides one tool to combat those foreign actors.

Mrs. Salma Zahid :

Thank you for sharing what you have gone through. In one of the recent interviews in The Hill Times, you mentioned that, most importantly, the legislation clearly defines foreign interference in the Criminal Code. Can you please speak to why this Criminal Code amendment is so important?

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

It means that, in our legislation or in our bill, there is a name for it. There is a penalty for it, and there are consequences for foreign interference. For that reason, it is important. Unless we define it, unless we criminalize it, unless we put certain sanctions on certain offenses, we cannot do anything. For example, there should be some provisions in our law for bullying, intimidation or harassment, but there is no clear definition, especially when it comes to foreign interference. Our law enforcement agencies are helpless. With this law, there is a clear definition, and there is criminalization of that offence, so that at least it gives a tool for our law enforcement to act upon.

Mrs. Salma Zahid :

Thank you. How important is it that we pass this legislation as quickly as possible to ensure its full implementation prior to the next election next year?

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

It is extremely important, and it should be passed immediately because a lot of discussions have taken place on the importance of this bill, and we already have experience from neighbouring countries and allies, and they had a great deal of experience. For that reason, this was a loophole in Canada. We are trying to close it down. It is important that all political parties set aside their differences, focus on this bill, pass it as soon as possible and try to make it better down the road, because every five years we will have a chance to review it.

Mrs. Salma Zahid :

Thank you.

The Chair :

Thank you, Mrs Zahid.

Mrs. Salma Zahid :

Thank you.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

Mr. Villemure, you have two and a half minutes.

Mr. René Villemure :

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Mr. Tohti, you spoke earlier about the commissioner's independence. When we look at the bill as a whole, apart from that independence, what would give you faith in the process? What would it take to reassure you?

(1800) [ English ]

Mr. Mehmet Tohti :

Implementation is the key. The bill is important. For example, we signed the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement on trade. In that bill, the USMCA, there is a provision to ban forced labour production from