EVIDENCE

Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security NUMBER 044 1st SESSION 45th PARLIAMENT Tuesday, June 16, 2026 Le mardi 16 juin 2026 Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security CANADA [Recorded by Electronic Apparatus] EVIDENCE June 16, 2026 Committee NUMBER 044 NUMBER 044 NUMÉRO 044 44 16 06 2026 2026/06/16 15:35:00 House Of Commons Comité permanent de la sécurité publique et nationale Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security SECU Chair Jean-Yves Duclos 1 45

(1535) [ Translation ]

The Chair (Hon. Jean-Yves Duclos (Québec Centre, Lib.)) :

I call this meeting to order. Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for being here for meeting number 44 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. As you know, we're meeting pursuant to the House of Commons order of reference of April 30, 2026, and the motion that we adopted on April 30, 2026, to study Bill C‑22 ,

an act respecting lawful access. Welcome back to our distinguished witnesses. As we said last time, we're getting to know them very well. They must be getting to know us well, too. From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Ramzi Nashef and Juanita M. From the Department of Justice, we have Kimberly Gibner and Norman Wong. From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Richard Bilodeau, Shannon Hiegel and Fenton Ho. From the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, we have Chief Superintendent Richard Burchill and Sergeant Aaron Gilkes.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you again for being with us. We still have a lot of work to do today. As I've done a few times recently, I will encourage all members to be as efficient as possible when asking their questions. According to my calculations and those of the clerk, we've spent 26 hours and 52 minutes studying Bill C‑22 so far, and only 10 and a half hours of that was devoted to clause-by-clause consideration. By my basic math, since we covered seven amendments during those 10 and a half hours, we would need another 270 hours of clause-by-clause consideration to complete our study of this bill.

That would take us to the end of 2028. I highly doubt that we want to continue debating this bill until the end of 2028, so I encourage all members to be efficient and disciplined during the proceedings so we can move forward as quickly and smoothly as possible. (On clause 6)

The Chair: That said, I would remind you that, at the end of our last meeting, we had finished consideration of BQ‑4 and CPC‑3. That brings us to BQ‑5. Mrs. DeBellefeuille, would you like to move BQ‑5?

Claude DeBellefeuille (Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, BQ) :

Certainly, Mr. Chair. I want you to know that I usually appreciate your sense of humour, but I think you went a bit too far when you speculated that, based on how much time we've put in so far, this study would go on until 2028. Of course, if we had genuine co-operation among all parties, we could have done this in less time. However, I don't think there's really any room for discussion or debate when the government isn't necessarily willing to listen to our arguments or amendments. I just want to put your humorous remark and tone into perspective. They did not sit well with me, as an opposition party member.

I would have appreciated a bit more sensitivity from the chair. Regarding amendment BQ‑5, this proposal stems from the brief submitted by the Barreau du Québec. As I'm sure you understand, the Barreau du Québec is, in my view, quite an important and credible witness. Amendment BQ‑5 reflects one of their recommendations. They propose changing the standard for making an order to disclose subscriber information from “reasonable grounds to suspect” to “reasonable grounds to believe”. I actually supported the first part of the argument for “reasonable grounds to suspect”.

I no longer recall which amendment it was, but I agreed with the government. However, this time, I think it would be more reasonable to introduce an amendment and change the threshold for obtaining the data. With respect to this specific clause, I would like someone to explain to me how changing the threshold for accessing data and replacing “suspect” with “believe” in the context of the production order would hinder police work. This change would take us to a whole new level of accessing information and data. Why are you so attached to leaving it as is?

If my amendment is adopted, would that be the end of the world for police work? Sergeant Gilkes, you're so good at explaining things clearly. Can you try to help me understand why the amendment proposed by the Barreau du Québec isn't a good idea?

(1540) Aaron Gilkes (Acting Officer-in-Charge, RCMP Lawful Access, Royal Canadian Mounted Police) :

Thank you for your question. The best way to explain this is to say that we usually make this type of request when we're at the beginning of an investigation. When we're further along in an investigation, we have tools, such as the general production order, that we can use to obtain information. I'm thinking of the contents of the records kept by the company itself. At the beginning of the investigation, we usually try to find connections, whether it's a statement of some kind, an account or an activity. Normally, this is a period when we try to expedite the exoneration of an individual.

Claude DeBellefeuille :

Do you mean “indict”?

Aaron Gilkes :

No. I mean “exonerate”, that is to say, remove the individual from the list of suspects.

Claude DeBellefeuille :

Okay. Sorry.

Aaron Gilkes :

This isn't about incriminating the person. We can conduct some sort of verification and find that, in the end, there is a connection to one person rather than another, which will allow us to remove that person from the list of suspects and move on to another person on the list, for example.

Claude DeBellefeuille :

The question on my mind concerns the moment you gave me the same explanation, saying that all you want to know is whether or not the subscriber is receiving service. You told me that, at the beginning of the investigation, you just need grounds to suspect someone and that, based on that, you'll be able to continue your investigation. Now, however, you're using the same argument to request an information production order. In my opinion, if you're requesting that type of order, it means you've progressed a bit further in the investigation. I'm not a police officer or a lawyer, but I can picture the situation.

I agree with you. You've convinced me enough with your first argument. Now, this is another tool for your investigation. It seems to me that you're exaggerating a bit when you say that you still just need to suspect someone, because you're at the beginning of an investigation. You're making the same arguments. You'll have to explain this to me, because I really want to understand.

(1545) Aaron Gilkes :

As I mentioned regarding the confirmation of service, we need to identify the service provider to issue a warrant to obtain further information. This is one of our requirements for obtaining a standard production order. Thanks to the confirmation of service, we can confirm that a specific company provides services to a specific telephone number or IP address, but we still don't know who the customer using that service is. We also don't know if there are other services available or offered by the company to the same person.

Normally, we use basic information—such as details that identify the person—to charge someone who claims they didn't access a particular account. If we confirm that company X is providing the service, we will then request information that supports the suspicion regarding the customer.

Claude DeBellefeuille :

You do mean “suspicion”, is that right?

Aaron Gilkes :

Yes, I'm sorry. Next, we'll request customer information to confirm that the person associated with this IP address is the person who made the report or complaint, or to confirm that it's a completely different person and that we need to pursue another lead. This allows us to determine whether the person who filed the report is not necessarily the person associated with the IP address.

Claude DeBellefeuille :

As I understand it, you want to keep the threshold as low as possible until you've linked the name to the right person, and then obtain a warrant. As for linking the person to a telephone number, let's say I call you first. You ask me if Claude DeBellefeuille is a customer of the provider. The provider says yes or no to you. If they say yes, then you know my telephone number but not my name, and you continue investigating. However, by that point, it seems to me that you already have a pretty good idea.

If I add that you must have a good reason to continue the investigation—by having “reasonable grounds to believe”—are there currently any investigations where you tell yourself that if I don't give you that information, the investigation will end there? I think you still have opportunities to obtain the information based on “reasonable grounds to believe” rather than “reasonable grounds to suspect”. Right now, you need “reasonable grounds to believe”, so you want to lower the threshold.

Aaron Gilkes :

Yes, we want to lower the threshold, but the information that is available is also limited by the threshold. We're talking about a production order signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, so ultimately, it's a third party who will review the warrant and verify whether the request meets the threshold.

Claude DeBellefeuille :

At the lowest threshold?

Aaron Gilkes :

If it is met.

Claude DeBellefeuille :

How could a lower threshold not be met if it's so low? It seems to me that with reasonable grounds to “suspect”, it's almost impossible for them to deny you that, isn't it?

Aaron Gilkes :

It depends on the information being requested, and the information must be directly related to the information we've already collected. As I mentioned, we're usually at the very beginning of the investigation and we have only one person's statement saying that a certain incident occurred. We have to build a case before presenting it to the judge. We can't just say we believe it's true, simply “because”. We have to start conducting verifications. For example, we have to state that we've confirmed that Mr. So-And-So is a customer of a certain provider.

We can then state that a certain individual is associated with a certain account. We then have reasonable grounds to suspect that this person may be involved in the investigation.

(1550) Claude DeBellefeuille :

You would have access to the data, since I don't see any reason why you would be denied that. Basically, as we speak, you need to have “reasonable grounds to believe” before moving on to the next stage of your investigation. You want to lower the threshold to make it easier to obtain data to continue your investigation. What surprises me is that it's a bit like the lawyers versus the police. All the lawyers, the Barreau du Québec, the Canadian Bar Association and many experts have told us that giving you this ability would be the wrong way to go. I'm sure you're an honest person, an honest police officer.

You have a flawless track record. However, we know that no one is infallible. We know that there have been corrupt police officers. We know that there have been police officers who have been infiltrated. We have some questions. Lawyers in Quebec and Canada are recommending that we don't go down this path, and what you're giving me as testimony right now is not convincing me to withdraw my amendment. I know that my amendment will be defeated, but that doesn't make me want to withdraw it.

Honestly, if I felt I was on the wrong track, I wouldn't be embarrassed to withdraw it, because I'm not an MP who plays politics. I'm genuinely interested in the content, and I want to improve the bill. However, your examples aren't convincing me. If you have any others, I encourage you to share them with us, because right now, I'm not convinced of the merits of having such a low threshold to access that data. Do you want to give me another example?

Aaron Gilkes :

Yes, I can provide you with one. We're in the process of building a case to eventually secure charges. The information we receive at the very beginning of the case is information that has to be corroborated afterward for charges to be laid. For example, even if we have an IP address, we have to link it to a device. We have to then link that device to a person, and we have to then confirm that the person linked to that device is the one who was behind the keyboard or is indeed the person responsible for the crime.

The information we seek at the very start of the investigation is all information that we have to then corroborate through other methods and other information, which we have to seek through other orders, other warrants or other interviews.

Claude DeBellefeuille :

Mr. Gilkes, I'm going to conclude with this, because I wouldn't want to be accused of filibustering. I know that, after conducting an investigation, you successfully charge people. The investigators are good, and they manage to secure charges. However, today, it's as if you're telling us that you can't catch criminals with the tools you have. However, I know that your success rate is quite significant. I believe in your intelligence and your experience. According to your testimony, it's as if it were a life and death situation.

You aren't telling me that you're currently doing a good job, that you're succeeding in catching criminals even though the threshold is a bit higher, but that it would be easier if the threshold were lower. To me, that isn't necessarily a good argument. What I always have in mind is that there has to be a balance between security and privacy. What I'm hearing right now is that it would be easier, but it isn't impossible, since you're already doing it. Your success rate isn't 0%. You're successfully catching criminals. I don't want to belabour my arguments, but I have to say that I remain skeptical.

Perhaps my colleagues will ask questions that will enlighten me more. I remain skeptical, but I don't want you to think that you haven't answered my questions well. I'm wondering if this is a case of looking for an easy option. Basically, you're already doing your job very well, and you're asking the provider for confirmation. Why do you need a lower threshold to continue the investigation? I remain skeptical. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

(1555) The Chair :

Thank you for that excellent exchange, Mrs. DeBellefeuille. Ms. Cody, you now have the floor.

[ English ]

Connie Cody (Cambridge, CPC) :

Thank you. I really appreciate this time to ask some questions so that I'm a little bit more informed. I'm kind of new here with the bill. With my systems background, I'm going to have a lot of questions based on IT and such. Bill C-22 contains two distinct parts. The second part, the supporting authorized access to information act, or SAAIA, is where the broad interception obligations, the ministerial powers and the electronic service provider requirements all live. When we talk about the risk in this bill, we are largely talking about the SAAIA. Is that a fair characterization of where the most significant new authorities in this legislation are found?

Richard Bilodeau (Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security Branch, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) :

I think both

part 1 and

part 2 are equally important to the lawful access regime. Obviously, from a technical and complexity perspective,

part 2 is probably a little bit more complex and technical. However, I would say that both parts operate together to help give law enforcement the ability to gather the information they need to advance investigations.

Connie Cody :

The government has repeatedly assured Canadians that this bill will not create systemic vulnerabilities. That assurance is carrying a lot—

[ Translation ]

Jacques Ramsay (La Prairie—Atateken, Lib.) :

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

The Chair :

Mr. Ramsay, go ahead on a point of order.

Jacques Ramsay :

Once again, the Conservatives are discussing the purpose of the bill. I would like to point out that we are currently discussing BQ‑5, which deals with line 27 on page 7. I understand that Ms. Cody wants further explanations, but all she had to do was come forward when we did this work in extenso for several weeks.

The Chair :

Thank you, Mr. Ramsay. Your point of view has been noted. Mr. Caputo, you have the floor.

[ English ]

Frank Caputo (Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, CPC) :

I'd like to speak on the same point of order.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

The floor is yours.

[ English ]

Frank Caputo :

With all due respect, Mr. Chair, I don't think it's well noted. We are parliamentarians. We get to come here, and we get to ask questions. I will not allow anybody to get in the way of anybody asking a question, whether it be a Liberal member who has privilege or a Conservative member. If Ms. Cody wants to ask a question about the bill, about the general nature of the bill and about how the general nature of the bill impacts line 27, or whatever it was, she has the right to do so. The fact that someone doesn't like it is irrelevant.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

There is indeed a great deal of latitude in the questions that can be asked. Mr. Caputo's point has been duly noted. The same goes for Mr. Ramsay's point that it's preferable to ask relevant questions about the subjects discussed at the appropriate time. Right now, we are indeed discussing BQ‑5. Ms. Cody, the floor is yours.

[ English ]

Connie Cody :

I want to know about the assurance, which carries a lot of weight here, so we can fairly look at anything else this bill claims to do. It would really help to know what the term actually means in law. Does mandating interception capability in an encrypted system fall inside that definition, or outside of it?

Richard Bilodeau :

I'm sorry. Can you repeat that question?

Connie Cody :

I'll read it again so that it's clearer. We've been told that this bill would not create systemic vulnerabilities. What I'm asking is, does mandating interception capability in an encrypted system fall inside or outside of that definition?

Richard Bilodeau :

When looking at the definition of “systemic vulnerability”.... There might be amendments that speak to this as we move along. The minister has spoken about this publicly. The term “systemic vulnerability” is understood to mean, from a government perspective.... It is not targeting end-to-end encryption. As such, the answer to your question will depend on a specific situation. If the regulation or a ministerial order mandates something, the core provider, person or company subject to the order would not have to do anything if it creates a vulnerability in their system. That's how the legislation in

part 2 is constructed. There's a process for developing regulation that everybody is familiar with. Ministerial orders have a very specific process that involves electronic service providers, law enforcement, the minister and the intelligence commissioner. There's a process there. At any point during that process, if an electronic service provider says to us—because they know their system best—that introducing a capability would create a systemic vulnerability, there's an opportunity to address this and make sure it doesn't.

(1600) Connie Cody :

A law describes what should happen and sets out consequences when things go wrong, but it does not physically prevent an attack from occurring. The assumption this bill seems to rest on is that if the rules are clear enough, the infrastructure will be safe. However, rules do not stop a breach. They describe what happens after one. The people targeting Canadian systems do not factor in what Parliament has passed. They look for a door. This bill would require that a door be built into every qualifying service provider. What in this bill—not the rules around it but the technical reality—keeps that door from being found?

Richard Bilodeau :

Taking a quick step back, the legislation would not apply to every single electronic service provider from day one. For an electronic service provider to be covered by the legislation, either it would have to be covered as a core provider through the regulation, or it would need to be identified through a ministerial order...to develop any capability that is mandated by the regulation or the ministerial order. The legislation is not intended to introduce vulnerabilities into systems. We don't refer to back doors. We don't believe it creates back doors.

I think there's a letter from the CSE that was shared with the community on some of these points. Whether or not it's in this legislation as it currently stands, it is the responsibility of companies to protect their cybersecurity. They do it every day. Attacks happen. We had testimony from my colleagues at the service: No system is 100% protected from cyber breaches. I think we all know this from what we see every day. Companies are well positioned to defend their systems. This legislation has safeguards to prevent new vulnerabilities from being introduced into systems.

Connie Cody :

On that note, in 2024, Chinese state-sponsored hackers, specifically Salt Typhoon, got into lawful intercept infrastructure that had been built into American telecom systems. The access point that existed for authorized law enforcement became the way a foreign state got in. Bill C-22 asks Canadian providers to build that same type of architecture. Did the Department of Public Safety do a threat assessment specifically on that scenario and, if it did, is there something we can see?

Richard Bilodeau :

We're obviously aware of that information on Salt Typhoon. Without going into detail on that specific situation and breach, I can tell you that we always learn from past breaches in different situations. This is obviously something we'd keep in mind with the implementation of this legislation, should it become law. We'd work with companies as the legislation gets implemented.

Connie Cody :

The term “electronic service provider” in SAAIA is extraordinarily broad. It could capture telecoms, messaging apps, cloud storage, AI platforms, email services and potentially much more beyond that, and many of those providers are not Canadian companies. They are headquartered in the United States, the European Union or elsewhere, and they operate under the laws of those jurisdictions. Can this committee get a clear answer on exactly which categories of service are captured under that definition and which are not, and does that obligation apply equally to providers headquartered outside Canada?

Richard Bilodeau :

I'll start, and I might go to my colleague Shannon Hiegel, who's with us virtually today. As I explained earlier, who the legislation will end up applying to specifically will be determined through regulation on core providers. We've talked a lot about telecommunication service providers probably being one of the most important electronic service providers that might be subjected to

part 2. Then, in ministerial orders, they will be able to identify electronic service providers after that. There's a process for decision-making in terms of who it gets applied to in regulation, and the same thing goes for ministerial orders. As for differences in applications, whether or not they're domestic or international firms, maybe I can ask my colleague Shannon to elaborate on that.

Shannon Hiegel (Director General, National Security Policy Directorate, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) :

I would be quite specific in pointing out that “electronic service provider” in the act refers to, in proposed paragraph (a), providing the service to a person in Canada or, in proposed paragraph (b), carrying out all or part of its business activities in Canada. What we're trying to ensure is that Canadians can have the certitude that we are covering any type of electronic service provider that services and operates within the jurisdiction of Canada. I think that's certainly an important definition and explanation to give you related to your question.

(1605) Connie Cody :

Thank you. Anyone who has worked inside a data system knows that security gaps do not only come from outside attackers. Every time a service provider adds a third-party program, every time two systems get connected and every time a new software link gets built in to meet a requirement like the one this bill creates, a potential gap opens. The interception architecture, SAAIA, will not be built once and left alone. It will be patched, updated and connected to other systems by providers of very different technical capacity, and each of those moments is an opportunity for a gap to open that nobody anticipated.

Does this bill require any ongoing security testing of the interception infrastructure after it is built, or does the obligation end at construction?

Richard Bilodeau :

This legislation is part of an ensemble of legislation, but I would point out to you that companies already take a number of steps to protect their systems. They do so in collaboration with their own service providers, with third parties and with the Canadian centre for cybersecurity, which is a good partner of the private sector specifically on critical infrastructure. I would also point out that Bill C-8 , which received royal assent late yesterday, imposes a number of obligations on federal critical infrastructure owners, including cybersecurity and in relation to third parties.

I think we need to look at it in totality in terms of what is done in the private sector and the obligations they have in regard to other pieces of legislation, but also, it is their responsibility. We know that companies do this. They want to protect their systems because it's good for them and it's good for their customers. They are all constantly patching whether or not this legislation exists.

As this legislation gets implemented and there are discussions with the government in terms of the regulations and ministerial orders, again, the legislation allows ESPs to say, “I can't do that because it introduces a systemic vulnerability.” There are a number of safeguards in the legislation but also in totality in terms of obligations that apply to a number of providers.

Connie Cody :

Thank you. You're saying that there's going to be a lot of security being looked at with the bill, but in August 2025, hackers got into the House of Commons by exploiting a Microsoft vulnerability and pulled employee names, job titles, office locations, email addresses and device information belonging to members and staff. Canada's own cyber—

Sima Acan (Oakville West, Lib.) :

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair. The last three questions and this one are irrelevant to the topic we are studying on the clause. If our Conservative colleagues are willing to be productive, I suggest to them to get back to the topic and questions on the clause, please.

Andrew Lawton (Elgin—St. Thomas—London South, CPC) :

I'll speak on the same point of order.

The Chair :

Go ahead, MP Lawton.

Andrew Lawton :

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I would note that this morning, the Liberal government House leader put on notice a motion to silence debate and shut down this committee's work. For members like Ms. Cody and me, who have taken a keen interest in this bill and others, today may be our only opportunity because of what the Liberals are doing to shut down this committee's work. For them to try to use their points of order to silence very legitimate questions on this bill even further is shameful.

Sima Acan :

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

The Chair :

MP Acan, is it the same point of order?

Sima Acan :

It's the same point of order, Mr. Chair. Again, we are studying clause-by-clause. We did hours of study in this committee for this bill. I suggest that we be more productive and, instead of spending 11 hours like last week filibustering, focus on the clause and ask questions relevant to the clause so that we can pass it. Those questions will definitely have a place to be asked.

The Chair :

Let me try to reconcile those two views. It's about freedom and focus. It's the freedom to ask questions, but we want to focus on the topic raised by a particular amendment. If we want to have an efficient and productive discussion, we need to focus as we engage freely on the topics of our conversations. We have a limited amount of time, as you rightly said, MP Lawton. Therefore, we'll encourage both freedom and focus. MP Cody—

Frank Caputo :

I have a point of order. I believe the bells are ringing, Mr. Chair.

(1610) The Chair :

Do we have unanimous consent to continue while the vote is going on?

Some hon. members: No.

The Chair: I hear that we don't have unanimous consent, so we'll suspend. We'll have 10 minutes after the vote and then we'll resume again.

(1610) (1700)

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

I call the meeting back to order. Thank you for being back. We were discussing BQ‑5. I believe Ms. Cody had nearly finished her remarks. If you would like to continue, you have the floor, Ms. Cody.

[ English ]

Connie Cody :

Thank you, Chair. I would definitely like to make my comments since it is our people who are asking for this information. It's not like they're just going to a drawer and making a request to a service provider and it pulls out a file. It includes a lot of information going through systems and third party software. To be clear, we need to ensure that when people are asking for private information, they know what tools are being used, so they can be comfortable when they submit that request. I'll continue with my questions.

Because this bill requires service providers to build and maintain an infrastructure for a production order as a permanent feature of their systems, the threat environment that this infrastructure has to withstand is directly relevant to whether this bill is fit for purpose. Published cybersecurity assessments have found that AI tools have made it possible for people with relatively modest skills to scope out systems, find vulnerabilities and carry out attacks that used to require serious expertise and resources. The window between finding a weakness and exploiting it has narrowed dramatically.

Was any analysis done on what the interception infrastructure of this bill mandate looks like as an attack surface in that kind of environment? If not, what is the basis for bringing this forward without it?

Richard Bilodeau :

The focus of the legislation in

part 2 is to establish a floor of capabilities, providing law enforcement with some of the information needed to advance their investigations. At the end of the day, the legislation is about creating those conditions, but it's up to the individual companies that are going to be subject to the regulations and the ministerial orders to determine how they meet those obligations. They will have to ensure that there are no systemic vulnerabilities in the system. That's the answer that I would give. To be quite frank, it's hard to say, in advance, that if you do it this way, this is a vulnerability.

Ultimately, the responsibility lies with the company to meet the obligations of a production order, a search warrant or whatever the case may be, and to provide the information that's being requested following a judicial authorization.

Connie Cody :

Thank you. The security of the interception infrastructure this bill requires to be built to follow these production orders will depend entirely on whether that infrastructure can withstand the tools currently available to those who want to break into it. Before Claude Mythos was released to the public, it found a security flaw that had been sitting undetected in a widely used operating system for 27 years.

[ Translation ]

Anthony Housefather (Mount Royal, Lib.) :

Mr. Chair—

The Chair :

Mr. Housefather, you have the floor.

Anthony Housefather :

As far as I understand, we're in the middle of a debate on BQ‑5. This question has nothing to do with BQ‑5.

The Chair :

Mr. Housefather, I understand your point of view very well. For this debate to be as effective as possible, it's best to focus on the subject of the amendment at hand, which is BQ‑5, but the chair can't compel members to do so.

[ English ]

Connie Cody :

Thank you, Chair. I'm going to continue with my questions. These are questions that I feel are important.

Anthony Housefather :

I have a point of order. Mr. Chair, I do not believe that when you are on a specific amendment, you are allowed to stray off of that specific amendment to the point where you are asking about the bill as a whole and it has nothing to do with that specific amendment. I would ask you to look at whether or not these questions are relevant because we have a choice. We can actually go through all of the amendments tonight. We have seven and a half hours to go through all the amendments, or we could do nothing and then be subject to a programming motion that will have us only vote on amendments and not discuss them.

Mr. Chair, please check whether or not she has to stay relevant because it's not relevant.

(1705) [ Translation ]

The Chair :

Mr. Lawton, the floor is yours.

[ English ]

Andrew Lawton :

I have the same point of order. Mr. Housefather wasn't here before when we had an identical discussion. Once again, we have Liberal members trying to silence very legitimate questions being raised by members of this committee. It was incredibly patronizing that Mr. Housefather was asking you to check Ms. Cody's questions. If Bill C-22 were to pass, the government could check whatever it wants on people's devices, I guess, but these are incredibly important questions.

The fact that these Liberals are threatening, even in this committee process, to use the programming motion as a way to deny members the opportunity to speak is exactly why it is important to interrogate and scrutinize this bill.

Sima Acan :

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair. It's the same point of order.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

Ms. Acan, you have the floor.

[ English ]

Sima Acan :

As committee members—not only the Liberals but Conservatives and the Bloc—we had lots of hours on this committee and we did ask all these questions. Can we just be relevant? We are doing clause-by-clause. We are not doing a study with a question period here. We are doing clause-by-clause. We have to stick to the clauses. We have to study the relevance of the clauses and ask questions that are relevant to the clauses so we can move forward. Those questions will be coming soon and there will be time. If we can pass at least

part 1 and move to

part 2, then Ms. Cody can ask those questions when it's relevant. Thank you.

The Chair :

I don't believe I need to repeat what you just said. I think these points are well stated, and I expect everyone to take them into account as they proceed efficiently through this meeting. Ms. Kirkland.

Rhonda Kirkland (Oshawa, CPC) :

Can I ask something here? I think Ms. Cody is getting through her questions. I also think that it's possible she could get through her questions if she would stop being interrupted, and we could move on to the next amendments. I do think that she's going to get through her questions and then we'll move on. She has a right to ask them. I think we should just....

The Chair :

That is, I understand, an addition to that same point of order. MP Lawton.

Andrew Lawton :

Just in the spirit of collaboration here, Ms. Acan had mentioned the importance of passing

part 1. Are the Liberals taking us up on our offer to expeditiously pass

part 1, which we've been offering for weeks now and which is not even all that contentious?

Jacques Ramsay :

I have a point of order. Mr. Lawton should know very well that

part 1 without

part 2 is not a bill. It doesn't make sense.

The Chair :

My understanding of what MP Acan said is that if we want to proceed efficiently through

part 1 and eventually

part 2, then we have to do that in the sequence of the amendments. That's therefore why it is suggested, though obviously not made obligatory by the chair, to focus on the topic of the amendment that is currently under consideration if we want to proceed eventually to other amendments thereafter. MP Cody.

Connie Cody :

Thank you. Through you, Chair, in the matter of trying to collaborate with the members across, I will reduce the number of questions, but I do feel that there are important questions I want to ask and I'll continue with them. I'll be able to continue more quickly if their points of order do not interrupt. I think that would be a fair compromise. I'll continue.

To go back to the question, the security of the interception infrastructure this bill requires to be built to follow these production orders will depend entirely on whether that infrastructure can withstand the tools currently available to those who want to break into it. Before Claude Mythos was released to the public, it found a security flaw that had been sitting undetected in a widely used operating system for 27 years. It cost only $50 and took hours, where human researchers would have needed months. Just last week—

Jacques Ramsay :

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

Mr. Ramsay, go ahead on a point of order.

[ English ]

Jacques Ramsay :

Relevance.

The Chair :

You must be saying relevance to the amendment. Ms. Cody, you would have heard that before.

Connie Cody :

Yes, I hear it. You're asking someone to make an order based on what they believe. To do that, they're going to use a tool and they have to be confident that the tool is going to access the information properly, correctly and accurately. If you're going to have a judge who is looking to be satisfied by the information on oath, these questions do need to be answered, so they are relevant. Thank you. I'll go from the top and continue again so that there's no miscommunication with the question.

The security of the interception infrastructure this bill requires to be built to follow production orders will depend entirely on whether that infrastructure can withstand the tools currently available to those who want to break into it. Before Claude Mythos was released to the public, it found a security flaw that had been sitting undetected in a widely used operating system for 27 years. It cost only $50 and took hours, where human researchers would have needed months. Just last week, Anthropic released Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5, making that level of capability broadly available for the first time.

The U.S. government's response was immediate, an export control directive forcing Anthropic to suspend global access to both models entirely. It was the first time a government has shut down an AI company's products over national security concerns. Has the Department of Public Safety looked at what AI-powered vulnerability discovery at that speed and that cost actually means for the long-term security of what this bill is asking to be built?

(1710) Richard Bilodeau :

The short answer to that is no, because the legislation does not mandate that specific things be built. That will be something that will be done through regulation and/or ministerial orders subject to that. As part of that process, we expect security conversations to be part of the consultation process, whether it's with internal government experts or with the people who may be subject to regulation. Obviously, it's an evolving environment. I am not one of those foremost cybersecurity experts, and I won't delve too much into that. However, we will be consulting with experts as we move forward and, subject to the regulations, that will dictate how we approach it.

Connie Cody :

One of the core assumptions underlying this bill is that data moves only when someone with legal authority requests it, but the infrastructure SAAIA creates will operate in an environment where that assumption does not hold. Claude Mythos did not wait to be asked. During a controlled stress test directly relevant to the kind of security environment this bill's infrastructure will face, it decrypted—

The Chair :

I'm sorry, Ms. Cody. What you're saying is both dense and quick, and I suspect that it must be quite difficult for interpreters to follow the rhythm.

Connie Cody :

Okay. I was just trying to hurry so that I could get through it. Anyway, one of the core assumptions underlying this bill is that data moves only when someone with legal authority requests it, but the infrastructure SAAIA creates will operate in an environment where that assumption does not hold. Claude Mythos did not wait to be asked.

During a controlled stress test directly relevant to the kind of security environment this bill's infrastructure will face, it decrypted and exposed confidential internal documentation on its own, following its own logic to a place nobody directed it to go, and then flagged to a researcher that it had gotten out. That is not a malfunction. That is the system working as designed and going further than anyone intended. Claude Mythos is not unique in this. AI systems of this capability class, built by any number of companies in any number of countries, operate the same way.

The interception infrastructure this bill creates will exist in an environment where AI systems can reach, surface and expose data without a request, without authorization and without anyone knowing it is happening until after the fact. Where in this bill does the government account for that?

Richard Bilodeau :

Thank you for the question. First, I'll clarify that the legislation being discussed today does not create a surveillance infrastructure. It does not mandate specific types of capabilities. That's a process that won't even be done through regulation because it will not mandate a massive surveillance infrastructure. As the development of the regulations proceed, security will be part of that process. Systemic vulnerability analysis will be part of that process.

I will also say that the legislation creates, for companies, a framework that will need to be followed to level the playing field in terms of being able to provide this information, and the information will be provided to law enforcement only if and when there's a judicially authorized production order to do so. It will be up to the company, at that point, to fulfill their obligations under that court-ordered production order.

At the end of the day, as I said earlier, right now the companies already have a lot of this data that might be subject to the regulations and to ministerial orders, and they already take a number of steps to protect that. In the face of the threats that you just mentioned, in terms of AI capabilities to sniff out cybersecurity vulnerabilities, they are very good at protecting their systems, and they continually try to get better by engaging third parties and by working with folks like those at CSIS and the Canadian centre for cybersecurity.

Connie Cody :

Thank you. When a production order is requested and the officer believes that there is a reason to pursue or to inquire, SAAIA does not appear to draw any practical distinction between the data of a person who is the subject of a production order and the data of innocent people who share an account with that person. I see that as a significant gap. Most Canadians share phone plans, cloud storage and digital accounts with family members. A production order targeting one person on a shared account does not stop at that person's data.

It pulls everything on that account, including the private information of people who have never been suspected of anything and have no idea that an order was ever made. The bill may intend for providers to limit disclosure to what is ordered, but the technical reality of shared accounts is that one person's data cannot always be practically separated from another's. Canadian law already recognizes this principle in other contexts. A joint bank account holder cannot be compelled to hand over funds or information belonging to the other holder simply because that person is under investigation.

Why does that protection exist at the bank, but when it comes to a telecom or digital service provider through which a family shares an account, the technical architecture makes that same separation nearly impossible? What enforcement mechanism in this bill ensures providers actually achieve it?

(1715) Richard Bilodeau :

Thank you for the question. The bill doesn't speak to production orders or address tools that, whether it's CSIS or law enforcement, are already used to compel production of information. The situation that you describe exists today in the current environment, whether it's within telecommunications or others. I might turn to the RCMP for a practical perspective about how they deal with that. I don't know whether the Department of Justice or the service can also add to that. It is more of a question about how production orders are applied for and then given by judges.

Aaron Gilkes :

I appreciate the question. Actually, I very much appreciate your highlighting the complexities that police are currently dealing with. This is something, as mentioned by my colleague previously, that we regularly deal with, and it's partly why we have experts who do analysis on the information we actually receive. Their intention is to establish who might be the originator of a particular type of traffic. That speaks to the information we actually request when we're asking for information—for example, in production orders—because it's not just the information related to the offence itself.

It's also information related to the use of a particular device, at a particular time and in a particular place that we try to collect. We use that for attribution to a particular individual at a particular time. This is something that we're actually very familiar with, and we do it on a regular basis. However, I very much appreciate your highlighting the complexity.

Connie Cody :

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, the body that would be expected to oversee the authorities, has raised concerns about whether it has sufficient access to do that job effectively. At the same time, SAAIA stops service providers from telling anyone that a demand was ever made against them. The public does not know, the oversight body cannot fully see, the companies cannot say anything and the person whose data was accessed may never find out. How does that combination produce real accountability, and who, exactly, is in a position to catch a problem if one comes up?

Anthony Housefather :

I have a point of order. Mr. Chair, I respectfully listened to Ms. Cody's last question. It is the same as her others. We're in a

section in which we're making a determination whether we should amend “reasonable grounds to suspect” to “reasonable grounds to believe”, which is a debate about what legal standard to apply to part of this bill. It's a very important debate. It's a very important discussion, but this question is entirely unrelated to the discussion, which is the purpose of this amendment. Mr.

Chair, if these questions are allowed, then it means that these same questions could be repeated with each and every amendment and each and every subamendment that is introduced, irrespective of the relevance to that amendment or subamendment. I would respectfully submit, Mr. Chair, this is not how clause-by-clause is supposed to proceed.

The Chair :

That's right. Part of the blame is on me, and I appreciate that. I have, also, the responsibility to allow some freedom. However, it is true that if we want to vote on a particular amendment, the topic of the discussion needs to be on that amendment; otherwise, we will never proceed to the consideration of other amendments. If we want to consider amendment BQ-5, then I would certainly encourage everyone to focus on the topic, the content of that amendment, in the questions and answers.

(1720) Connie Cody :

I will conclude with the last two questions, then. I've had several, and I've turned them away. I do feel that these are correct to ask because we are asking our law enforcement to believe in what they put in the order. To do so, they have to understand and have confidence in the accuracy of what they're going to be retrieving, and what may or may not happen before they do it. I do think that it does have some relevance to believing, so I will continue. The United States just demonstrated that it can shut down AI tools used by Canadian service providers overnight, with no notice and by executive order.

Canada is asking those same providers to build and maintain permanent interception infrastructure under this bill. What is the government's continuity plan when the tools a service provider depends on are switched off by a foreign government's decision? Does this bill create any obligation to disclose that kind of disruption to the people whose data sits behind it?

Richard Bilodeau :

Thank you for the question. The bill doesn't address that. It's not within the scope of the legislation.

Connie Cody :

Again, I'm going to mention that Anthropic flagged the cybersecurity risk of Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5 before the United States government acted. The company raised the alarm first. The U.S. ban came within days of release. Canada has said nothing. This bill asks Canadians to trust that the government understands the AI threat environment well enough to build permanent interception infrastructure inside it. However, when both the company that built the tool and then a foreign government moved, before Canada even asked a question, that trust has to be earned.

Is the government's position that it needs a foreign government to identify an AI national security threat before it will act? If that is the standard, how many days behind Washington should Canadians expect their government to be?

Anthony Housefather :

I have a point of order. Mr. Chair, people are not here to answer for the government as to the government's intentions on something that has nothing to do with this bill. That is a question she could ask in question period. This is not a question for these witnesses. It's on a subject that is not part of the bill. She's asking them a much greater question about the government's intention. The question is unreceivable.

The Chair :

That is a risk, indeed, of asking those types of questions, but obviously you are free to ask them. Then we'll see whether the answers are either reasonable or up to the expectations that you're setting. Madame DeBellefeuille, go ahead.

[ Translation ]

Claude DeBellefeuille :

I want to tell you that these rapid exchanges are very difficult. Mr. Housefather also speaks at the speed of light. I understand that. The interpreter who is interpreting is very good. She's interpreting very quickly, but I'm sure she won't last until midnight like that. I don't know if you noticed that I don't have a headset today. It's banned because it hasn't been tested, so I only have an earpiece. It's very difficult for me. I would ask my Conservative and Liberal colleagues to slow down. We'll be here until midnight.

I would ask them to speak more slowly so that I can keep up and participate in the discussion. Otherwise, I will remove my earpiece and you can call me when it's time to vote.

The Chair :

It's a question of privilege for members. They must be able to participate in the discussions in either official language. The opposite would be true, but in this case, it's particularly true, because Mrs. DeBellefeuille uses the

interpretation and is often seated near those who speak quite quickly, so please keep that in mind as you speak from now on. [ English ] Ms. Cody, would you like to continue, or is that, as you said, the end of your questioning?

Connie Cody :

I have one more relevant question. Thank you. I want to know if there is going to be a more clear definition. Will “belief” be strong enough for an arrest, or could it be a suspicion or a thought? Is there a risk that “belief” will come from false accusations or

an act of bad faith by someone who wants to create distress for another person?

Richard Bilodeau :

I'll go to my colleagues from the RCMP. When you're going to a court to apply for a production order on “reasonable grounds to believe”, there's a robust process to draft up affidavits and get a judge to sign off on that. As to what that means in practice, I'll go to Sergeant Gilkes.

Aaron Gilkes :

I'm sorry, but could you just repeat the question, please?

Connie Cody :

I was just wondering if there's going to be a more clear definition of “belief”, because it could be a suspicion or it could be just a thought by someone. Is there a risk that when you're going to be making a production order to investigate someone, it could be from a false accusation or

an act of bad faith by someone who wants to create distress for another person? We've seen complaints get called in...you know, there's a neighbour upset about someone. When you have a word that is so vague, like “believe”, what definition are we actually going to use and follow to ensure that the strength of “believe” is going to be enough to warrant an investigation and not just chase someone down a rabbit hole?

(1725) Aaron Gilkes :

Thank you for your question. Essentially, especially if we're going to be presenting our information to obtain to a judge or a justice, they have a guideline themselves. It is, in fact, subjective, but they were trained to properly assess whatever grounds are being put before them. They have their own tests, which will test whatever grounds are being put before them, and they will attribute the level of grounds which have been or have not been met. We can present only what we learn, what we collect in terms of evidence.

If it does not meet the grounds and the judge or the justice feels that it's either “to suspect” or “to believe”, then, quite simply, it's not signed and not attributed or active as a warrant.

Connie Cody :

I'd like to thank all of you for answering all of these questions that I had and your patience with them. I will conclude.

The Chair :

Thank you, Ms. Cody. [ Translation ] Mr. Ramsay, you have the floor.

Jacques Ramsay :

I'm going to have to make an effort to remember that, because we went to Timbuktu and came back via Vladivostok, and now we're returning here. So let me remind you that BQ‑5 seeks to replace line 27 on page 7 with the phrase “are reasonable grounds to believe” with the phrase “are reasonable grounds to suspect”. One word is being changed. Then there are two conditions:

(

a) an offence has been or will be committed under this Act or any other Act of Parliament; (

b) the metadata is in the core provider's possession or control and will assist in the investigation of the offence.

Also, I believe it was Mr. Gilkes who spoke to us about, among other things, a case involving the online sexual exploitation of children. In that case, the amendment to replace “reasonable grounds to suspect” with “reasonable grounds to believe” would require a much higher standard of proof even before the identity is known. I don't want to assume anything, so I'd like to ask the Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers a question. Roughly how many crimes or cases of sexual exploitation occur in Canada each year?

[ English ]

Chief Superintendent Richard Burchill (Director General, Technical Investigation Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police) :

We wouldn't have the number for you on that question.

[ Translation ]

Jacques Ramsay :

Could we be talking about thousands of cases?

[ English ]

The Chair :

I have Ms. Acan on a point of order.

Sima Acan :

I think the bells are ringing now. Could we look for unanimous consent to continue our study?

The Chair :

We can certainly do that. Is there unanimous consent to continue the proceedings?

Some hon. members: No.

The Chair: There is no unanimous consent, which means we will need—

Sima Acan :

We will take another 40-minute break, I guess.

The Chair :

We'll need to stop now. I suppose there might be a bell. Whatever happens, 10 minutes after the vote is the maximum time that I would be waiting for people to come back. If everyone is back, I will start before that.

(1725) (1820)

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

I call the meeting back to order. Thank you for coming back. We'll move on. Mr. Ramsay, you have the floor.

Jacques Ramsay :

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. First of all, I would like to say that I disagree with your assertion that, at this rate, we would finish in 2028. I suggest it would be more like 2029. After three hours of discussion, we've made no progress on an amendment that is essentially very simple. Indeed, as Mr. Gilkes explained to us, it specifically addresses cases of online child sexual exploitation. So this is an issue that should command unanimous support. I know the witnesses didn't have any statistics on this. If I suggest that there are around 20,000 cases of online child sexual exploitation a year, am I far off the mark?

[ English ]

C/Supt Richard Burchill :

Thank you for the question. I still don't have exact numbers from our RCMP units. However, I would like to call on my colleagues from the Department of Justice, just to repeat.... They did have some Juristat statistics on that the other day. If they could repeat them, then I can speak to context.

Normand Wong (Acting General Counsel, Policy Sector, Department of Justice) :

Thank you. I have a few statistics from a variety of sources. The Canadian Centre for Child Protection, which I believe appeared as a witness here, received about 23,000 in 2024. These are all reports they receive from the public that they refer to Canadian law enforcement. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children in the United States refers approximately 100,000 child sexual exploitation cases to Canadian authorities every year. Juristat reported that police incidents were at approximately 17,000 reports last year.

Importantly, 94% of these cases are not cleared by police because of either insufficient evidence or the impossibility of identifying criminals. I would also like to add—it doesn't have to do with child sexual exploitation—that in terms of Internet fraud cases, only about 5% of Internet fraud cases are reported at any given time. In the first three months of this year, there were 8,000 reports that were processed by police, totalling $188 million. In 2025, it was almost $800 million, and again, that's only 5% of Internet fraud cases.

[ Translation ]

Jacques Ramsay :

Mr. Chair, I would suggest that these numbers speak for themselves. I'm really surprised that our colleagues opposite have the reflex to vote against a clause that is extremely simple. Let me remind you that it concerns just one word and that it will allow, as the title of

part 1 of the bill states, timely access to data and information. I would like to hear what the RCMP witnesses have to say about this. Acting in a timely manner is what will make it possible to arrest more criminals, cybercriminals, and those responsible for fraud and sexual exploitation cases. These are not small numbers. We're not talking about 10 children. We're talking about thousands of cases. If we are serious about fighting crime in 2026, then we agree on—

[ English ]

Rhonda Kirkland :

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

[ Translation ]

Jacques Ramsay :

We agree with Bill C‑22 .

The Chair :

Ms. Kirkland on a point of order.

[ English ]

Rhonda Kirkland :

I'm sorry. I am confused. Are we not talking about BQ-5?

Jacques Ramsay :

Absolutely.

Rhonda Kirkland :

You're going to support—

Jacques Ramsay :

Absolutely. Please listen to what I say. (1825) [ Translation ] I speak in French, so you may need your earpiece.

[ English ]

The Chair :

No, I'm sorry— [ Translation ] Mr. Ramsay—

Jacques Ramsay :

Mr. Chair, members of the Conservative Party talk for hours, and then they criticize me. I'm talking about BQ‑5. I'm talking about substituting the word “suspect” with the word “believe”.

[ English ]

The Chair :

Ms. Kirkland, if you have a point of order, please state it.

Rhonda Kirkland :

My point of order is that I would like to be treated with respect. I'm simply asking for clarification. Are we talking about BQ-5? He said he would support the amendment, which I was surprised by, so I'm trying to understand. Thank you.

The Chair :

The question is whether you were speaking about BQ-5. It is a relevant question. It's not necessarily a point of order.

Rhonda Kirkland :

I'm sorry. I guess it's a point of clarification.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

Mr. Ramsay may want to take that comment into account. Mr. Ramsay, you have the floor.

Jacques Ramsay :

This is for the law enforcement representatives. Does the fact that we can act quickly—and here we agree that, if we change the requirement in BQ‑5 from “reasonable grounds to suspect” to “reasonable grounds to believe”, we will slow down the proceedings—mean that, in many cases, we won't be able to access the information because the evidentiary threshold will be higher? Am I correct in saying that several hundred, if not thousand, cases will bypass the judicial proceedings that should be the norm in cases of cybercrime or fraud?

[ English ]

C/Supt Richard Burchill :

Thank you for the question. Speaking to the tools proposed in this legislation, “reasonable grounds to suspect” in the confirmation of service and subscriber information production order would, yes, speed up that process and help assist with the backlog of cases, most certainly. That's because you'd be, at the very beginning of an investigation, looking to attach somebody to a device that has been reported in a criminal offence. The threshold of “reasonable grounds to believe” is much higher. At the beginning of an investigation, trying to get to that level—given the complexity of online crime and the volume of complaints—is very difficult, yes.

[ Translation ]

Jacques Ramsay :

Mr. Chair, I think we've just heard clearly, after all this debate about “reasonable grounds to suspect” and “reasonable grounds to believe”, why Bill C‑22 adopted “reasonable grounds to suspect”. It's because there are aspects of this issue that involve thousands of crimes that will remain unsolved. Our party, the Liberal Party of Canada, cares about the safety of Canadians. This party wants criminals to go to jail. [ English ] The bad guys should go to jail. [ Translation ] We'll defend this principle, which our opponents, our colleagues on the other side, have literally renounced. They demonstrated this today in this committee, which has become a farce. I'll leave it at that, Mr. Chair.

The Chair :

Thank you, Mr. Ramsay. I will now turn the floor over to Mr. Lawton. Then it will be Mr. Au's turn.

[ English ]

Andrew Lawton :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. This is to whichever official—perhaps one of our witnesses from law enforcement. Can you please give us an example...and if you have a concrete example, that would be ideal, but if you need to go into the realm of the hypothetical, I would understand. Can you give an example of someone who would fall between the two evidentiary thresholds at issue—the one originally put forward in Bill C-22 , as drafted by the government, and the one in Madame DeBellefeuille's amendment? I basically want to know who's being captured by one definition but not the other, in order to justify changing or not changing it.

Aaron Gilkes :

I suppose I could return to an example I used previously. Someone makes a complaint that they've been defrauded at a financial institution. There's money missing from their account, and they're alleging that someone defrauded them of the funds. However, the bank might make an allegation or a counter-statement saying that they believe the individual is the one responsible. At this point, we cannot necessarily say that we believe an offence has been committed, but we suspect that one has, maybe. We can't automatically take one person's word over the other's. We are not at that stage yet.

We don't have enough information to make that assertion. We start to build our grounds by collecting information, and some of that would be subscriber information.

(1830) Andrew Lawton :

Following on this logically, the number of people who fall into the “reasonable grounds to suspect” bucket would be fundamentally different from the “reasonable grounds to believe” number. In one, you're going to have a broader net, which means, statistically, you're going to have more people captured who are not criminals and not going to be charged, let alone convicted. Do we have any sense of how big that pool would be? We're talking about who these extraordinary powers Bill C-22 would grant authorities apply to. No one has issues with laws being used against people who have broken the law.

We have issues with laws like these being used against people who haven't. How many more people in that category would be caught up by this definitional change, if Madame DeBellefeuille's amendment is not put in the bill?

Aaron Gilkes :

I can't really speak to exact numbers, but we did hear, from our colleagues at the Department of Justice, the number of cases that are not going forward as a result of not being able to confirm basic information at the beginning of an investigation. This information has to be obtained in a timely fashion because of the nature, the speed and the complexity of the investigations that we're currently seeing. I can't speak to an exact number for the difference that would be caught there, but I can speak in terms of the grounds to suspect.

Once again, the production order itself is scoped in a way that it's not providing the content of the information or of the accounts that are being held by the individuals, but it's providing identifying information as to who the account holder might be or the services that are actually provided. This could allow for connections to be made, which could allow for assertions and corroborations to be made with other information that's been received early on in an investigation.

Andrew Lawton :

I suspect I will probably have some more questions when we get to the overarching question on clause 6, but I appreciate that on BQ-5. Thank you, Sergeant.

Richard Bilodeau :

I can supplement that answer to your question, if it's helpful, because I think you're asking an important question. I want to make sure that I put it in the context of...because our colleagues from the RCMP talked about this in a previous meeting. They're going to have a device number, for example, and they're going to go and ask a provider if it belongs to them—Rogers, for example. If Rogers says, yes, that's my device number, they will ask a judge to issue a production order on a reasonable grounds to suspect to get subscriber information for that particular device.

It won't be associated with 50 people or 100 people, it will be directed only at that device number to get subscriber information for that device number. That will be related to that investigation. The way you were asking your question.... It's not a basket of people that you capture. It still has to be grounded in a specific crime and specific to that information you're trying to get. I just wanted to provide that clarity.

Andrew Lawton :

I appreciate it. What I was referring to was the aggregate of people suspected of different crimes by different law enforcement bodies. I'm not talking about the Venn diagram, if you will, but the concentric circles of people caught in beyond a reasonable doubt versus reasonable belief or reasonable suspicion. However, I appreciate your contribution there. I'll yield at this time, but when we get to clause 6, I feel like, depending on how the Liberals vote on what I think is a very good amendment, we may have further questions.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

Thank you very much, Mr. Lawton. Mr. Au, you have the floor.

[ English ]

Chak Au (Richmond Centre—Marpole, CPC) :

Thank you. I have many questions, but I just want to ask one question for now, based on the answer given by Mr. Wong to MP Ramsay's question. It's a follow-up of the previous question. I get that there are numbers. You can talk about hundreds or thousands of cases in which investigations cannot be completed for many reasons. You gave the number, but I did not see the connections between the threshold for asking for information and the number of cases that could not be further investigated.

There may be thousands of cases where you cannot complete the investigation, but the question is this: What percentage of those dead cases were caused because you did not have the reasonable grounds to suspect in order to get the information? I don't see the causation here. The numbers of cases could be great, but what is the actual percentage of cases that could not be investigated further due to the obstacle that you mentioned?

(1835) Normand Wong :

Thank you for the question. Perhaps I wasn't clear when I spoke, but the recent Juristat report said 94% of cases were not cleared—and this is for child sexual exploitation cases. The two main reasons they gave were that they had insufficient evidence—either they couldn't meet the evidentiary threshold to get, probably, the next tool, or they were unable to identify the suspect. Those are the two main reasons that 94% of child sexual exploitations are not cleared.

The subscriber information production order is designed to help police lower that number, because it will provide quicker access to evidence so that they could identify the suspects and decide whether or not to pursue an investigation. I would also like to say, in terms of the example that Sergeant Gilkes gave, that it's important when tools that the police use might generate other leads. You know you're investigating a bad guy, and that bad guy has known associates, or he's phoning other people. Some of the tools in the Criminal Code allow us to monitor the activities of these bad actors.

Those numbers that are generated are the types of identifiers that need to be tied to an individual. Therefore, a lower-threshold tool with specific information allows police to get only the identifying information so that they can identify who's on the other end of that number. The tools that are available for them today are the general production orders, and those would allow police to access any and all information when they can eventually reach that threshold. That's a longer process, but it's also much more privacy-invasive for, say, the pizza delivery guy whom the bad guy called.

Instead of saying that he's the pizza delivery guy and no longer a suspect, he is now the pizza delivery guy whom the police have all the information on. These tools are not only meant to provide police with greater flexibility and agility in investigations but also meant—because they're specific production orders—to protect privacy.

Chak Au :

Mr. Wong, I think you have opened up another can of worms. By what you just mentioned, you're saying that one can lead to the other and to many others. This is exactly why we are being cautious. You were just telling me that this is a way to open up the gate to investigate many more people who may or may not be associated.

Normand Wong :

If I may, these tools have existed in the Criminal Code for many years. This tool that I'm speaking about has existed in the Criminal Code since 1993.

Chak Au :

Again, the difference is in the threshold.

Normand Wong :

These tools are available under reasonable suspicion.

Chak Au :

Right. I want to ask another question because of time. Even if your logic is right and you can make that connection, saying that it's because of the high threshold that you cannot go on to further investigation, that doesn't mean it is a legislative problem. It could be a procedural problem where you cannot get the order, warrant or whatever you need to have to further investigate. It could be a lack of resources. It could be the work hours, or the judge may be on leave, on vacation. It could be many other reasons that you cannot get that kind of permission or authorization in time.

That doesn't mean it's a problem in the law itself. It could be a problem in the administration. It could be a problem with procedure or a problem with resources. Why do you need to change the law and not review your procedures so that you can get the information through the legal means faster, in a timely manner, instead of making this big hole and opening up many cans of worms?

(1840) Normand Wong :

Thank you again for the question. All of the procedures are actually statutory. They're in the Criminal Code. It's been since 2014—my colleague has mentioned this, and I think I have, too—when the Supreme Court decided in Spencer that there was a gap in the law and that the police's common law power was insufficient to get this information. Absent a reasonable law, police have had to avail themselves of the general production orders. This gap has existed in the law for the last 12 years. I'll just stop there.

Chak Au :

I will have questions further down the road.

The Chair :

Thank you, MP Au. Shall BQ-5 be adopted?

An hon. member: I'd like a recorded division. There is a recorded division being asked for. I also forgot to mention that CPC-4 and NDP-4 are identical to that amendment, so the vote on that amendment will therefore lead us to skip CPC-4 and NDP-4 due to their being identical. [ Translation ] Mr. Clerk, I would ask you to proceed with a recorded vote. (Amendment negatived: nays 6; yeas 5 [ See Minutes of Proceedings ]

The Chair :

Amendments NDP‑4 and CPC‑4 are identical to the amendment we just dealt with, which takes us to NDP‑6. Mrs. DeBellefeuille, do you want to present BQ‑6?

Claude DeBellefeuille :

Yes, Mr. Chair. I move that Bill C‑22 , in clause 6, be amended by adding after line 3 on page 8 the following:

(5) An order must not be made if executing it would disclose medical information or information that is subject to solicitor-client privilege or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries.

This recommendation comes from the Privacy Commissioner. It therefore seems to me that it makes sense for health information to be protected by solicitor-client privilege or notarial privilege. That said, I hope to have the support of my colleagues.

The Chair :

Thank you, Mrs. DeBellefeuille. Mr. Lawton, the floor is yours.

[ English ]

Andrew Lawton :

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank you to Madame DeBellefeuille for introducing this. I want to ask the officials a couple of questions. Do any protections like this exist elsewhere, to your knowledge, in other statutes under other circumstances?

Normand Wong :

Thank you for the question. There is a general provision that applies to all production orders in the Criminal Code that allows the person served with the production order to object on the grounds that information is privileged. As far as lawyers are concerned, this is already covered. That's found at

section 487.0193 of the Criminal Code, so this already exists. In relation to the clinics, we've heard testimony before, and there are ways for a production order to be used against medical clinics or other things because of insurance fraud and such. Again, this is a judicially authorized production order, so the judge has the final say on whether or not the information sought is appropriate.

(1845) Andrew Lawton :

Mr. Wong, I think you were speaking specifically, if I'm not mistaken, about the solicitor-client angle at first. You said a lawyer could object to an order, but they would not have a guarantee of being successful in that. Is it a correct

interpretation of your comments that the onus is on them to prove why that privilege needs to be invoked?

Normand Wong :

Yes, but there are certain rules against getting production orders against lawyers' offices and certain procedures that have to be followed. This is with respect to people who usually receive these production orders, and they have the ability to object on that basis as well.

Andrew Lawton :

From what you're saying, this is not redundant. This is actually shifting the situation quite significantly, it would seem, because now there is a statutory exclusion under this amendment. It isn't just replicating what's already in law, is it?

Normand Wong :

In terms of what its objective is, it may be redundant. In relation to its scope, as I mentioned, there may be many reasons that police might need to serve a production order on a health clinic. It wouldn't be redundant in that way, but in relation to the solicitor-client information, it may be redundant.

Andrew Lawton :

I hope you understand that I'm asking this question seriously: Is medical information defined, or is that term in and of itself subjective, in your view, in terms of what would constitute medical information if this amendment were adopted?

Normand Wong :

Medical information is not defined, to my knowledge, in the Criminal Code. Generally, the courts use ordinary dictionary meanings of things. It could be broad or it could be narrow, depending on the court that is interpreting it.

Andrew Lawton :

I mean, if we want to look to not too distantly in the past, there was a period in which vaccination status was actually highly germane to some regulations and restrictions on where you could go. I know that one of the concerns raised in relation to the broader issues of Bill C-22 , specifically looking at metadata, is that location data would be retained. If we are talking about the type of information that could be made available, I know that a lot of people would be very mindful of whether vaccination status or other medical decisions and choices and things like that were subject to it.

As worded, would this protect someone's information related to vaccination status from being disclosed as part of a production?

Normand Wong :

I would say that this type of information is not available under the subscriber information production order. The subscriber information is defined. Vaccination status would be more privacy-focused. If police required that information, they'd have to get a general production order under the higher “reasonable grounds to believe” standard.

Andrew Lawton :

Again, there has been a lot of discussion in this committee and also elsewhere about exactly what information is contained in that. I take your point, but if there is no risk that medical information would be transmitted as part of this, what would be the harm in making it crystal clear that the information is safeguarded? The same is true of solicitor-client information. If the view is that this information is not really at issue in what would be contained in subscriber details, why not offer the assurance that these pretty critical details will be protected?

Normand Wong :

All I can say is that it would make it inconsistent with other provisions in the Criminal Code that could lend to the

interpretation that this type of information is disclosable for the other provisions in the Criminal Code, or all the other production orders. As I think I started off with, it creates a bit of redundancy in relation to the aspect of solicitor-client information. As I mentioned, again, there may be many reasons why police might want to confirm that a suspect is a patient at a particular clinic so that they can get subsequent types of production orders to obtain more evidence.

(1850) Andrew Lawton :

My understanding is that there is a lengthy body of evidence about solicitor-client privilege. It isn't just about communications between lawyers and their clients; it's even about the identity of clients. Am I understanding that correctly?

Normand Wong :

Yes, but I'm not an expert in solicitor-client information.

Andrew Lawton :

That's understandable. I appreciate you sharing your expertise on all these things. If one of your colleagues is more suited to answer my next question, that's fine. This is where my question stems from: Because a lot of the information we're talking about—let's go to metadata for a moment—is about which phone numbers have been in communication with others, that could reveal a relationship that would be privileged, could it not?

Normand Wong :

It could, yes.

Andrew Lawton :

If we are trying to protect solicitor-client privilege in explicit terms, I think that Madame DeBellefeuille is right to put that in clear language. I know the Supreme Court has held in the past this is a principle of fundamental justice. This is under

section 7 of the charter. It's a hugely important right. I am not a lawyer, but being in politics, I have the misfortune of working alongside many of them. I greatly appreciate and respect a lot of what my colleagues do and what you all do, and I thank you for it, all jokes aside and being married to someone who's soon to be a lawyer as well. What I take from your earlier comment, Mr. Wong, is that we, as a principle, are trying to protect solicitor-client privilege. We have mechanisms to do that already, so why not spell it out explicitly? I know that's a point of argumentation on the merits of the amendment.

I'll make that rhetorical instead of getting you to weigh in on that. I would encourage my Liberal colleagues to very strongly consider supporting that. I'm willing to hear from other colleagues from different parties on this. I would also point out medical information. A lot of the opposition to Bill C-22 has come from people who fundamentally distrust this government. I would say, having seen what this government has done and is trying to do in other bills, that's with good reason.

If we are trying to safeguard and remove the reasons that Canadians are distrustful of this particular legislation, I don't know why we would not want to make it airtight, especially if the official position of the government is that none of these things would ever be conveyed in this process anyway. Why not spell that out? I think it's reasonable. I am open to hearing arguments to the contrary. I will yield at this time, but I think it certainly merits consideration by my colleagues from the Liberal Party.

The Chair :

Thank you, MP Lawton. I have MP Mantle and then MP Housefather.

Jacob Mantle (York—Durham, CPC) :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you again to our witnesses for appearing and providing their valuable feedback and testimony on these different portions of the bill. I wonder if our colleagues from the Department of Justice could just.... I'm not an expert on solicitor-client privilege, other than when I used it as a lawyer and had to engage in that. To Mr. Lawton's point, yes, the identity of a client can certainly be privileged. I've had many cases where the identity of the client was an important factor to keep confidential.

Of all the standards of confidentiality, my understanding has always been that solicitor-client privilege is probably at the top of the list. Is that a fair assessment? This is for Ms. Gibner or Mr. Wong.

Normand Wong :

I'm sorry. Could you repeat that? I was trying to get help from my colleagues behind me as you were asking the question.

Jacob Mantle :

Yes, bring them to the table. My view has always been that solicitor-client privilege is at the top of the list of confidentiality that can exist between two people.

Normand Wong :

I would say it is. There is a partial provision in the Criminal Code that talks about searches on lawyers' offices. When we're talking about the subscriber information production order, we're not considering it being served on production orders because there's a special process any time a lawyer's office has to be searched. This is when police do not know that a prior privilege situation exists, and it allows the holder of the information to object on that basis. I believe Madame DeBellefeuille's amendment speaks to that same objective.

(1855) Jacob Mantle :

As I see it in this amendment, I don't think the issue is that somebody who's in receipt of a production order and thinks it may disclose information that's subject to solicitor-client privilege couldn't object. I would assume, regardless of what type of production order or demand for information you receive from any government authority or otherwise, you could always raise an issue of solicitor-client privilege. After the fact, you could always raise it. I see nodding heads. Okay.

Normand Wong :

You can, yes.

Jacob Mantle :

I raise that because it's not after the fact that's at issue. It's signalling to those who are making the production orders, or who are considering the scope of information or the place to search, to make it very clear that this type of information is off limits. I think it's more of a signal in the law. I want to ask a couple of questions about it. You made a comment that, in your view, it might be redundant. Is that right, Mr. Wong?

Normand Wong :

Yes, but if I could briefly comment on what you were talking about, I think Sergeant Gilkes talked about this earlier. When it's at the beginning of an investigation, if it's nothing but numbers, police have no idea what those numbers relate to, because they don't know who the people are who are implicated in the investigation. I think part of the issue with this on the front end is that police don't know what they don't know. They're trying to identify the people who are implicated in the offence.

Even if this were here, they would not be able to determine whether or not it was a medical clinic attached to the phone number, or a lawyer's office. They don't know until that information is produced.

Jacob Mantle :

Why, then, in the confirmation of service provisions of Bill C-22 , are there specific carve-outs for solicitor-client privilege?

Normand Wong :

Those carve-outs relate to who can be served with the order. The confirmation of service demand or the “information demand”, as it was called in Bill C-2 , was a general tool that could have been served on any provider of public services. Generally right now, in the Bill C-22 version, because it's limited to telecommunications service providers, that articulation or that clarification is arguably unnecessary. I think the government wanted to make it crystal clear that they were listening to stakeholders and made the carve-out, because most medical clinics, as far as I know, are not telecommunications service providers.

Jacob Mantle :

Thanks for that. I think you're agreeing with me. The government, at least with respect to the confirmation of service demand, did include that very clear marker to say...and it's not just with respect to this that it can be requested. The

section doesn't make reference to it being requested. It just says that a demand must not be made if the confirmation would disclose the information. I think you're quite right that it was made on purpose to signal that this information—medical and solicitor-client privilege—is off limits. I think what we're suggesting is, what is the downside of doing the exact same thing for arguably the more intrusive tool, which is the production order? The confirmation of service demand is certainly less intrusive, we've established, than the production order itself. Why not make that same declaration here that we have that information again out of scope?

Normand Wong :

Thank you again for the question. I think the difference is that under the confirmation of service demand, it's a statutory power for the police to exercise without judicial supervision. Here, when we're talking about the subscriber information production order, it's at the discretion of a judge. Perhaps I can point back to my RCMP colleagues to give some examples of instances where they may need to serve it on medical clinics or other clinics or areas where this might be relevant.

In terms of the difference between the two, I think there was some concern by the government that because it's a demand, a police officer statutory power, that wasn't sufficient supervision. However, because this is a production order, it fits in the realm of all the other production orders and benefits as well from all the general provisions in the production order scheme.

(1900) Aaron Gilkes :

Thank you for the question. I suppose for us the challenges that we see, particularly, for example, in medical records.... This is an example that you can see in the case of an assault, where an individual who's a suspect of an assault or the suspect of a particular crime has been injured in some way. Let's say it was a gunshot wound or something and we're fairly certain that this individual would have been harmed and would have needed medical attention. It's not uncommon for police to canvass an area and try to figure out which hospital they might have went to.

Asking whether an individual has been in the hospital is one question, but then it's confirming what type of treatment they may have received, not actually seeing the medical records but seeing if that person was actually checked into the hospital and if they received treatment at that time. That would be, at this point, some of the information we would require, without getting the actual content of the records, in order to carry forward the investigation.

Jacob Mantle :

Thank you for that, Sergeant Gilkes. I guess I'm having a bit of trouble with the idea that we shouldn't include this because there's sufficient supervision. You mentioned a judge. These will not just be issued by judges. They may be issued by justices of the peace who may have no legal training at all, so we could have a discussion about the level of supervision. Leaving that aside for a moment, we're always reviewing this after the fact. Whether it's a confirmation of service demand or a production order, “Was it done correctly?” is always going to be asked after the fact.

If the information violated solicitor-client privilege, that would be a basis to appeal, but it's up front to make that signal. I want to provide another example. In other circumstances, at least in terms of what I was able to find, this is specifically laid out in legislation. In the CSIS Act, there's a specific provision with respect to orders. It allows a judge to revoke or vary an order if they're satisfied that it would disclose privileged information.

That's the same situation—a production order or getting information—but it's in black and white to make sure it's clear that information subject to privilege should be protected. Why include it in some, such as the CSIS Act, but not in Bill C-22 ? We've already included it in another provision. I always look at

an act and say, “Well, if Parliament says something in one

section but doesn't say it in another section, that means something.” I would prefer to be consistent. I think we can all agree. I'm not going to talk about medical information because I don't have enough knowledge, right now, to speak to that, but I don't think there is disagreement that solicitor-client information should be protected under a production order or a confirmation of service demand. The bill says that this would be protected under the confirmation of service demand itself, so why not be consistent?

Normand Wong :

Thanks, again, for the question. I really don't think the bill is inconsistent. As I mentioned before,

section 487.0193 already exists in relation to that. I also mentioned that there's a special process police have to follow if they're going to search a lawyer's office. I don't think it's very common that lawyers' offices are served with production orders because of the reason we talked about: solicitor-client privilege. There are already a lot of protections for solicitor-client privilege in the Criminal Code, so if we're just focusing on that part of the amendment, I would say that it's completely redundant. Although it's not up front in the provision itself, it's in a provision that applies to all production orders. This provision,

section 487.0193, would apply to this new production order.

(1905) Jacob Mantle :

That's fair enough. Thank you for your comments, Mr. Wong. I will just say that I don't see any harm in saying, for greater certainty, that this is important. We've done that in another

section of the bill. You provided reasons for why you think that is, but when we're dealing with something like solicitor-client privilege—which is at the top of the hierarchy of information that should be protected.... Searching a lawyer's office, yes, is going to put it smack dab in front of somebody. Solicitor-client privilege can be held in many different places. It doesn't mean you're just searching my former law offices. I would be much more comfortable if it were clear in Bill C-22 that privileged solicitor-client information is off limits for production orders. Thank you.

The Chair :

Thank you, MP Mantle. MP Housefather.

Anthony Housefather :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. A lot was said just now about solicitor-client privilege. Would I be correct in saying that the Supreme Court ruled in Lavallee that the name and address of a client is generally not covered by solicitor-client privilege?

Normand Wong :

I'm sorry. Could you please repeat the question? I missed part of it.

Anthony Housefather :

Would I be correct in saying that the Supreme Court ruled in Lavallee that the name and address of a client is generally not covered by solicitor-client privilege? For example, as I understand it, it was determined in R v. Budd that the identity of a client is not privileged unless that identity is critical to the essence of solicitor-client communications. Presumptively, the name of a client is not privileged.

Normand Wong :

I think that's contextual, as you said. If the name of the client would reveal some aspect of that, then it may.

Anthony Housefather :

It would have to be critical to the essence of solicitor-client communication.

Normand Wong :

It would have to be critical, yes.

Anthony Housefather :

In the context of the limited information that could come under such a production order, is that even possible given what can be provided under this type of an order?

Normand Wong :

Not only would I say it's not possible, but in the scenarios that we've talked about it would be, I think, impossible for police to determine from the outset whether or not it's going to involve that unless they were actually targeting a lawyer's office. Then there are lots of protections in the criminal law for that.

Anthony Housefather :

Thank you.

The Chair :

Thank you, MP Housefather. MP Lawton.

Andrew Lawton :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I was hoping Mr. Housefather would continue for a few more moments so I could finish the paragraph in Lavallee. One thing that is worth noting is that Lavallee is clear that identity can be. There is a clear statement in that ruling that there are cases where that is germane. It isn't a blanket rule that the name of a client is not privileged. We're talking about things that can be here. I think when we're drafting legislation, when we're giving the government new powers, we have to think of edge cases.

We have to think of areas that will push the boundaries because that's what prevents this from being unconstitutional legislation or constitutional legislation in a lot of cases. We've certainly had at other committees discussions about the Supreme Court's own usage of hypotheticals to push those boundaries, even without a fact scenario requiring it. I just want to return—and Mr. Mantle started off down this road—to this duplication. Mr.

Wong, you seem to say, and I do not want to put words in your mouth so please tell me if this is not the case, that if the existing “for greater certainty” clause in clause 31.... This is under “Confirmation of Service Demand and Judicial Control”. Just for certainty of what I'm talking about, it says:

For greater certainty, a demand must not be made if the confirmation would disclose medical information or information that is subject to solicitor-client privilege or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries.

That was in Bill C-22 . Now we have Madame DeBellefeuille's amendment, which would insert in clause 6, “

(5) An order must not be made if executing it would disclose medical information or information that is subject to solicitor-client privilege or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries.” The substantive part of it is identically worded. The difference is that where it appears in Bill C-22 , it talks about “For greater certainty”. Do I understand your earlier point, Mr. Wong, correctly that, in your opinion, if that clause in Bill C-22 were not there, it would make no difference at all and the bill would be exactly the same?

(1910) Normand Wong :

Arguably, I think it would be the same without it because the confirmation of service demand now is limited only to telecommunications service providers. I'm not aware of any lawyer's office or doctor's office that runs its own telecommunications service. They're the only ones who can be served with a confirmation of service demand.

Andrew Lawton :

Why did the government direct the department to put that in the bill then?

Normand Wong :

I guess as a belt-and-suspenders sort of thing since there was such a public concern that this information might be disclosed. It's highly unlikely in the current drafting of the bill because of the limited scope of the confirmation of service demand, but there might be instances where there is a telco that knows for certain that what they're going to reveal.... I think Sergeant Gilkes has talked about IP addresses being sold to other providers and then their services being sold. It might end up being an online health sort of telco that might fall under the definition. That would preclude the confirmation of service demand being issued against them.

Andrew Lawton :

Thank you. Mr. Chair, I don't have a full agenda of the names of the witnesses. Am I understanding correctly that the Liberal government has not made the Privacy Commissioner available to this committee as we engage in this work for clause-by-clause?

The Chair :

My understanding is that the Privacy Commissioner did come as a witness several weeks ago. You may not have been present, but he was here. Ms. Kirkland can testify to that.

Andrew Lawton :

The Privacy Commissioner was not here for clause-by-clause. The reason it's important is that the Privacy Commissioner was the—

[ Translation ]

Claude DeBellefeuille :

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

The Chair :

Mrs. DeBellefeuille, you have the floor.

Claude DeBellefeuille :

Mr. Chair, you said he appeared as a witness, which is true. However, I don't know if you recall, but he was referring to the tabling of his brief, and we didn't have it in front of us. Was that the brief that did not get distributed? Was that the time when we didn't have his recommendations in front of us, and he was speaking as if we were discussing the matter with full knowledge? I'm confused. I may be mixing him up with another witness. Could you confirm whether, at the time he testified, we did not have the brief and that it had not been sent by the clerk? Was it in relation to that brief that the clerk apologized? I would appreciate it if you could clarify that for me.

The Chair :

I would have to consult the minutes of the meetings. However, I recall that all the briefs were submitted and translated, except for one or two, which were sent out just a few days ago. All the others have now been available for some time.

Claude DeBellefeuille :

Mr. Chair, I just want to finish my remarks. You said he came to testify, which is true. However, we were all surprised not to have his brief translated into both languages, including his recommendations, in front of us. This is an important distinction to make. I'm not a lawyer or a notary, but I have a good memory. I can tell you that our clerk apologized for that brief. I don't hold it against him. He forgot to send it to us so that we could have it in front of us to question the commissioner. This is an important distinction, and I would like Mr. Lawton to know that. He wasn't there, but I remember it very well.

The Chair :

Okay. If your brief is much more accurate than mine, then that's good news. Mrs. DeBellefeuille confirms that this is indeed what happened. We could check with the clerk, but I think we can take him at his word. Ms. Dandurand, the floor is yours.

Marianne Dandurand (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.) :

Mr. Chair, I have a point of clarification. I generally take the word of Mrs. DeBellefeuille, who has an exceptional memory and knows just about all the details. As I recall, it was the Barreau du Québec. If I'm not mistaken, the commissioner came to testify at the end of May, and we had had his brief for a few weeks already.

The Chair :

Okay. Ms. Dandurand, you have a good memory as well. Mr. Au, you have the floor.

[ English ]

Chak Au :

Mr. Chair, before we go on, instead of relying on memory, shall we find out from the minutes what was submitted at the time? Otherwise, we are basing this on memory, which could be faulty. May I suggest that we pause and find this out from the minutes?

(1915) The Chair :

Good. That's what we'll do. As the analysts and others do that behind the scenes and behind the screen, let me turn back to MP Lawton for any additional input.

[ Translation ]

Andrew Lawton :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. That was a good question from my colleague Mrs. DeBellefeuille. I believe the recommendation was made by Mr. Dufresne. [ English ] I think this is exactly why it would have been valuable to have the commissioner testifying about the amendments that were very important to protecting the privacy rights of Canadians. I know that this was something my colleagues attempted multiple times to have happen. It's unfortunate that the Liberal government did not want to do that and have now introduced legislation that further weakens the power of the Privacy Commissioner.

That seems to be adding insult to injury for someone who's trying to help Canadians. In any event, I appreciate that very much. I would just submit to this committee that if the government felt it suitable to make crystal clear in the statute that medical information and solicitor-client privilege would not be at issue in the confirmation of service.... Again, it's a lot harder to draw a line from confirmation of service to medical information or solicitor-client privilege.

If that were the argument from the government in that section, I see no reason why they would not want to make the same crystal clarity in the actual production component, where there is potentially a greater connection between these two things—unless, as Mr. Mantle suggested, it was deliberate to not offer that certainty and not offer that assurance. The government has had months to work on this bill. You have to assume that everything in it is deliberate, just as you have to assume that everything not in it is deliberate.

That speaks to the broader point of why cutting short this committee's process and preventing us from being able to subamend amendments is an incredible violation of the rights and privileges of members. Thank you.

The Chair :

MP Mantle, do you want to intervene again? Please go ahead.

Jacob Mantle :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to also comment. I think I heard Mr. Housefather say that some of the information in the subscriber production order was minimally identifying or narrow. I take a very different view. We've established that the confirmation of service is certainly much less intrusive, but the subscriber information is quite broad. It goes beyond just the potential to identify a name or an identifier of a person. I'm not sure I agree with his point that there's no likelihood that it might be disclosed in this.

It could include all the types of services provided, when those services were provided and anything that identifies devices, equipment, etc. I want to put that on the record. That's a different view on the scope and how broad the production order for subscriber information is. Second, I will reiterate that it would be fabulous and useful to the committee to have the Privacy Commissioner here to speak on his suggested amendments.

I know we have asked for unanimous consent multiple times to get consent to bring the Privacy Commissioner here, so I'm not going to do it again because it will be futile with the members across the way. This is an example of how this process has become fouled by the members opposite who simply don't want to devote sufficient time to going through this bill in a civil and substantive way in order to deal with these issues. They may not like being reminded of those decisions, but we will continue reminding them of those decisions. Thank you.

The Chair :

Thank you, MP Mantle. Go ahead, MP Kirkland.

Rhonda Kirkland :

Thank you, Chair. I want to take a moment to defend the honour of my colleague Mr. Lawton. It seemed like there was a lot of anger thrust toward him just now when he said that we really want the ability to possibly add subamendments to amendments. If the Liberals get their way and they choose to follow through on a programming motion, the truth is that not only will we not get to look at each amendment and possibly suggest subamendments, but we will also be hiding that from Canadians because they will be deemed moved. Canadians will not be able to see what the amendments are until they've already been voted on.

They will not be able to give their opinion or their thoughts. I would just ask that we consider that. I urge the Liberal government, based on this information, to move forward and have good amendments on this. I can assure law enforcement as well that we want to give you the tools you need, but we need to do this right. Voting without the ability to add subamendments or voting on amendments without the Canadian public even knowing what they are...because they don't get to see them if they are deemed moved. We don't get to read them, and the public doesn't get to see them until after they're voted on.

I want that very clear and on the record. That's all I'll say on this point. Thank you.

(1920) [ Translation ]

The Chair :

Thank you, Ms. Kirkland. Mr. Housefather, you have the floor.

[ English ]

Anthony Housefather :

Mr. Chair, that would have been very reasonable. To my knowledge, having been here now 10 years, you normally can get through somewhere between six and seven amendments an hour in a clause-by-clause. Right now, we've been going since 3:30, and we've gotten through one vote. That only happens if people procedurally block us from doing our work. That seems to be what's been happening today. The Conservatives are desperate to not vote on anything, desperate to ask anything about everything that has nothing to do with the amendment at hand. They don't want us to move forward.

Then we have no choice but to do a programming motion. If I see in the next hour that we get through six amendments, then I'll see that we're starting to work, but so far, in the last several meetings, Mr. Chair, we haven't done any of that.

The Chair :

Thank you, MP Housefather. MP Kirkland, you have the floor.

Rhonda Kirkland :

Thank you. Because you said that, I feel like I need to respond. I will respectfully disagree. We are trying to move through these. We've had legitimate questions. Every question has been legitimate. In fact, I think we're just about ready to move on with regard to this one. The truth is that we wouldn't need to spend so much time asking questions on the amendment and the bill had we had enough study before clause-by-clause to be able to fully study the bill and understand it. For instance, when the Privacy Commissioner was here, there were only two rounds of questions.

We couldn't even ask him about his suggested amendments. We didn't have them at that point, as Ms. DeBellefeuille said. That is the issue I take, which is why I asked last week for consent to have the Privacy Commissioner here. The Liberals blocked that, as they have been doing. We've been trying to move, and the Liberals have been blocking the movement that we've been trying to make. I want to leave it at that because I genuinely would like to see us move forward on some amendments. That is the truth.

Despite the arguments happening across the table, I think we can move on and ask some excellent questions, as my colleagues have been asking tonight. Thank you.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

Thank you, Ms. Kirkland. Mr. Mantle, the floor is yours.

[ English ]

Jacob Mantle :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will disagree with my colleague, Mr. Housefather. All of the questions I've asked this evening have been directly on point. In fact, all of the questions I've asked at this committee have been directly on point, and I would stand by that. We can go through the transcript together and look at that. I'm trying to understand a complicated bill that has sweeping repercussions for Canadians, for our security interests and for our privacy interests. There's no magic formula for how many clauses should or shouldn't get passed in a set amount of time. It's contextual.

It depends on the complexity of the clause, the complexity of the bill and how a clause interacts with other clauses. I don't think it's a fair assessment to draw a blanket generalization about how many clauses should or shouldn't be done. It sounded to me like the programming motion was being used as a cudgel or as blackmail, that if the government sees that this is moving to its liking—

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

Mr. Mantle, there seems to be a problem with the

interpretation. (1925) [ English ] Let me speak in my broken English to see whether

interpretation is working. [ Translation ] Thank you, Mrs. DeBellefeuille, for pointing that out.

[ English ]

Elizabeth May (Saanich—Gulf Islands, GP) :

Mr. Chair, your English is nothing but perfect.

The Chair :

We should listen to you more often, MP May.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Chair: We'll return to MP Mantle.

Jacob Mantle :

Thank you, Mr. Chair. It's always good to have some levity at the table. That's a good reminder for me as well. I'll begin my thought again. It sounded to me like Mr. Housefather was suggesting—and he can go on and clarify in his own words—that if the government is seeing progress, whatever that may be, to its liking, programming would not be necessary. That seems to me like blackmail rather than civilly and substantially engaging in the content of this bill and giving it the appropriate time and consideration it requires.

It is certainly not the fault of the opposition that this government waited 10 or 11 years to bring forward lawful access legislation and then, in the last week of Parliament, decided to try to ram it through the House. I will respectfully disagree that the programming motion is a necessity on the part of the government. It is not. The government has had sufficient time to do this. I'm going to ask the questions I need to ask so that I, as a voting member, am comfortable with whichever way I decide to vote on this bill.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

Thank you. Mr. Housefather, you have the floor.

[ English ]

Anthony Housefather :

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. The word “blackmail”, of course, is completely offensive. It would be like me saying, when the Conservatives said that they would allow

part 1 of the bill to go forward as long as we split the bill and didn't have

part 2, that it would be, under Mr. Mantle's words, blackmail. I would never call it that, but he would. All I can say is that I've been here for 10 years. I know when people are genuinely trying to move forward with a bill and asking pertinent questions. I watched Mr. Mantle last meeting spend an hour on a very simple amendment, asking exactly the same question over and over to the point that it was repetitive to the nth degree. It seems clear to me that we could have, starting at 3:30, gone through 20 amendments by now. We haven't—and that would have been at a slow pace.

Certainly, some are going to be more complex than others, but there is not actually any effort to make it through clause-by-clause in good faith. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair :

Thank you, MP Housefather. [ Translation ] Shall BQ‑6 carry?

[ English ]

Rhonda Kirkland :

I would like a recorded vote, please.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

A recorded vote has been requested, Mr. Clerk. (Amendment negatived: nays 6; yeas 5)

The Chair :

Shall amended clause 6 carry?

[ English ]

Jacob Mantle :

I would like a recorded division, please.

[ Translation ]

The Chair :

A recorded vote has been requested, Mr. Clerk. (Clause 6 as amended agreed to: yeas 7; nays 4) (On clause 7)

(1930) The Chair :

Mrs. DeBellefeuille, do you want to move BQ‑7?

Claude DeBellefeuille :

Yes, Mr. Chair. BQ‑7 was recommended by the Barreau du Québec, which, once again, finds that the threshold for obtaining subscriber information is too low. The amendment seeks to raise the threshold by using the legal standard of “reasonable grounds to believe” rather than “reasonable grounds to suspect”. Obviously, I would like an explanation. At this point, is it the beginning or the middle of the investigation? Could you help me im