Senate Committee — SECD — Brief — 2023-02-16_secd_ss-3_brief_choi_e

SECD / Brief / 2023-02-16_secd_ss-3_brief_choi_e

Senate Committees

FACULTY OF ARTS Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies 2500 University Drive NW Calgary, AB, Canada T2N 1N4 ucalgary.ca 1 February 15, 2023 Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs Senate of Canada Ottawa, Canada Dear Members of the Senate, Thank you for inviting me to provide my insights on the procurement of Arctic-capable assets to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. I regret that I was not able to speak to you directly in the November 14 session, but I hope this written submission will be a sufficient substitute.

Many other witnesses have already spoken to you about the complexities and challenges of the Arctic broadly, so I will focus my remarks on the Royal Canadian Navy’s Harry DeWolf class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships/Vessels (AOPS). Specifically, I would like to bring to your attention some of the myths and realities concerning their capabilities in comparison to our allies’ Arctic patrol ships. Critics have highlighted the seemingly poor value of the AOPS in comparison to counterparts in Norway and Denmark. However, such criticisms result from a lack of in-depth research on those two countries’ naval assets.

In this submission, I leverage the research I conducted as part of my PhD dissertation that compared the naval forces of Canada, Norway, and Denmark. My sources include field research on board the vessels in question, interviews with Norwegian and Danish naval officers, archival documents and photographs, and Norwegian and Danish publications. This submission will be divided into three parts: armament, ice capability, and crewing. Ultimately, I argue that the AOPS design and performance is equal or superior to their Scandinavian counterparts in all important respects.

Armaments The AOPS are armed with a 25mm cannon and a pair of .50 calibre heavy machine guns. Compared to our frigates and other front-line warships, this is considered on the very low end of coercive capability. However, for a patrol vessel meant for peacetime constabulary missions like fisheries enforcement and drug interdiction, it is more than adequate. After all, a 25mm cannon is the same as those on our army’s Light Armoured Vehicles, and no one would scoff at one being aimed at them from the other end of a city block.

Consistent with their constabulary focus, there are no heavy weapon systems like missiles or torpedoes. This has been a point of contention by critics, who cite the presence of such weapons on 2 Norwegian and Danish patrol vessels and the lack of similar systems on the AOPS show how they fall behind our peers. However, such claims are inaccurate. Specifically, there are oft-repeated claims that the Norwegian Svalbard icebreaker, which provided the starting design for the AOPS, is equipped with both the bow gun and a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system.

There are two issues with the claim of the SAM system: firstly, there is no evidence that Svalbard has ever been equipped with it and secondly, the SAM system that Svalbard is supposedly equipped with is little better than those carried on the shoulders of individual soldiers. This system, the Mistral Simbad, is usually carried on Norwegian minesweepers and might theoretically be remounted onto the Svalbard, but there is no evidence that this has ever been done.

Even if Svalbard could mount the Simbad system, it would be no better than a couple of Canadian Army soldiers standing on the AOPS deck with man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) like the infamous Stinger. Of course, the Canadian Army does not currently have MANPADS in its inventory, but that is not an issue with the AOPS design. Another frequently-mentioned example of supposedly superior armament on the AOPS’ peers are the Danish navy’s Knud Rasmussen class and Thetis class patrol vessels.

This argument surrounds the Danish navy’s use of “Standard Flex” weapon modules, some of which include surface-to-air missiles and anti-submarine torpedoes like the ones on our Halifax-class frigates. The Danish patrol ships were built with the empty slots for these modules, and generalist publications have assumed that this means the ships can use every module including missiles and torpedoes. AOPS critics have latched onto this assumption in their comparisons. However, the reality is that the Danish Arctic patrol ships have never embarked these missiles and torpedoes in their module slots.

This means they have never trained for it and their combat systems have not been set up to operate these major weapons. Without training and systems integration, there is no capability regardless of whether the weapons can physically fit. Indeed, the Danish navy itself has deemed this modular potential to be unnecessary and has replaced two of the three slots on their Thetis class with permanent cranes and boats. One observation by critics of the AOPS that is accurate is the larger calibre of the main gun of their Scandinavian counterparts.

Although accurate, it is not as relevant as their proponents would make it out to be. Ranging from 57mm to 76mm in calibre, the guns on the Norwegian and Danish patrol ships are certainly larger than the 25mm on the AOPS. However, larger is not necessarily better, especially in a constabulary capacity. In practice, the use of lethal force is a matter of very last resort.

Ever since the International Court of Justice’s admonition of a Danish patrol ship’s use of 127mm guns against the Scottish trawler Red Crusader in 1962, Western navies have not employed their gun armament unless numerous hails and boarding attempts have failed. Unless the ship is in physical danger, the ship’s captain must request authorization to employ lethal force from their chain of command, with the decision often falling into ministerial hands.

Indeed, during the entire service lives of Danish and Norwegian patrol ships since the 1980s, they have never been able to use their main gun in any operational scenario. The closest that current Danish patrol ships came to using force was during the 2007 pursuit of the French trawler Bruix off the Faroe Islands, and even permission to use the .50 calibre guns was not authorized despite the French trawler ramming the Danish ship. For the 3 Norwegians, the “kidnapping” of two of their fisheries inspectors on board a Russian trawler in 2005 also saw no authorization for the use of lethal force.

In contrast to these incidents, Canadian patrol vessels during the 1995 “Turbot War” did receive explicit permission from then-Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to fire warning shots from their .50 cal. machine guns off the Newfoundland Grand Banks. These warning shots sufficed to ensure compliance by the Spanish trawler that was suspected of illegal fishing. This (and others too lengthy to include) historical record tell us two things: firstly, that larger guns are rarely useable and secondly, that smaller arms do suffice to bring civilian violators into compliance.

In fact, I would argue that if a ship only had large-calibre weapons, it would not be a credible weapon in a constabulary situation. A large gun that ends up sinking an illegal fishing vessel would cause the very environmental damage that the fisheries enforcement mission is meant to prevent. Smaller weapons with more precision and less damage would, in fact, be more effective due to the violator’s belief that they are more usable. Ice capability Another point of criticism regarding the AOPS concerns their ability to sail in ice.

Ignominiously dubbed “slushbreakers” by a political science professor a decade ago, critics have inappropriately compared the AOPS to Coast Guard icebreakers designed specifically to escort merchant shipping. A more appropriate comparison would be with other patrol ships, and here the AOPS design can sail in thicker and harder ice than their Danish and Norwegian counterparts.

Specifically, while the Danish ships have demonstrated an occasional ability to sail in over 100 cm of ice despite being rated for only 70-80 cm, the AOPS are rated for 120 cm and have already encountered occasional sections of 200 cm in winter trials. More importantly, Arctic currents mean Canadian waters are infested with more multiyear ice than the waters where Danish and Norwegian ships sail. So while the Norwegian Svalbard provided a basis for AOPS, the AOPS hull has been strengthened in key areas to handle the much harder multiyear ice.

Indeed, Norwegian officials have scoffed at the notion that Canada should have simply copied their Svalbard without modifications. Meanwhile, suggestions that Canada should just acquire the Danish Knud class are also misguided. At only 2000 tons, they are one-third the size of AOPS. As ice capability is partially a function of the ship’s mass pressing down on the ice to break it, a heavier ship provides greater icebreaking ability. Ultimately, a patrol ship only needs to sail in enough ice to meet potential lawbreakers, few of which have the ability to sail in the dead of winter.

Crewing One overlooked factor in the effectiveness of offshore patrol ships like AOPS is their crew size. While a small crew will save substantial amounts of operating costs, it also drastically curtails the ship’s ability to operate for long periods and to tackle simultaneous missions. The Danish Knud class, for example, only operates with a crew of 19.

Compared to their larger, but older, Thetis class brethren’s crew of 4 49-60 (depending on if conscripts are on board), the Knud class’s smaller crew results in the following drawbacks: they cannot maintain 24-hour operations for more than a couple of days; their need for rest means needing to stay close to sheltered coastal waters; they cannot conduct simultaneous tasks like landing a helicopter while boarding another vessel using small boats; and they lack specialists like doctors as all crew members must play a greater variety of roles. The AOPS’ crew of 65 helps ensure these drawbacks will be minimized.

Additionally, extra accommodations are available for embarking scientists, law enforcement officials, and other personnel depending on the operation. As uncrewed vehicles become more popular in the coming years, the extra personnel will be necessary to operate and maintain them. We have already seen the importance of a relatively large crew on HMCS Harry DeWolf’s Operation Caribbe deployments, when its small boats with dedicated boarding parties intercepted drug smugglers in the Pacific and Caribbean.

Ships with small crews would be challenged to operate the ship and one boat, nevermind multiple boats and an uncrewed aerial vehicle. The extra crew and accommodations also help enable new containerized sensors like the towed sonar that was tested on Harry DeWolf’s inaugural Arctic deployment. Ultimately, a larger crew allows for more crew members that are specialists in their trade. In other words, it allows for more “masters of one” while relying less on “jacks of all trades”. Conclusion In short, our allies’ ships are not as powerful and ours are not as inferior as critics have proclaimed.

This is not to say our allies have “bad” ships, only that they are built for their own navies’ needs and that they differ from Canada’s. Ultimately, Canadians should be satisfied with the AOPS. In almost all areas, the core design and capabilities of the ships are equal to or better than their Scandinavian counterparts that critics advocate for. In the very limited area where the latter are “better”, namely gun size, there is no historical evidence that shows it to be useful for the tasks for which offshore patrol ships are employed.

While the limited data on other countries’ shipbuilding costs seem to suggest the AOPS have cost more to build than their foreign peers, they are also superior in most metrics. As well, Canadian shipbuilders are paid a much higher wage than the Polish and Romanian workers who built the newer Danish and Norwegian vessels. But as Arctic tensions increase, consideration should be given to improve the military capabilities of the AOPS.

Without sacrificing what makes them excellent constabulary vessels, continual analysis should be conducted to see how their weapons and sensors can play a greater role in contested environments. This especially important as the Halifax class frigates age and their availabilities decrease, which may result in the AOPS being called upon to carry out global operations in more dangerous regions. I hope these observations are useful to you in your deliberations. Sincerely yours, Dr. Timothy Hiu-Tung Choi, Ph.D

Document details

Collection	Senate Committees
Citation	SECD / Brief / 2023-02-16_secd_ss-3_brief_choi_e
Type	committee
Volume / chapter	441 / Brief / 2023-02-16_secd_ss-3_brief_choi_e
Language	en
Format	pdf
Source	COMM_SEN
Identifier	3d568a6664a6683d90bc1d8307cecba0fc89a75e

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