Official Report of

DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(Hansard)

TUESDAY, JULY 15, 1997

Afternoon

Volume 6, Number 23

Part 1

[ Page 5733 ]

The House met at 2:05 p.m.

G. Brewin: It gives me great pleasure today to introduce a very special visitor, Ms. Robyn McMorris, who is a lawyer living in Calgary. She is in the members' gallery, and she is being welcomed to Victoria by her uncle, who is the Clerk of the House. Would the House please make her welcome.

Hon. J. Pullinger: I had a delightful lunch with four women from the Cowichan Valley and my colleague the Minister of Women's Equality. Three of the women are with us today in the gallery, but I would like to introduce all four who have visited us today. They are Dee Kinnee, Doran Doyle, Marilyn Guille and Kate Mortimer. I'd like to ask all of the members of the House to help me make these terrific women welcome.

R. Neufeld: Again, it gives me pleasure to be able to stand in the House and introduce some guests. [Applause.] Thank you for the round of applause. Unfortunately, these people are not from the north, but it goes to show that even us folks from the north have some friends in the south. I'd like the House to make very welcome my son Nathan Neufeld and his friend, Dana Kowalski. Would the House please make them welcome.

G. Bowbrick: Joining us in the gallery today is Susan Penev, a constituent of mine in New Westminster. She is very active with the John Robson Elementary School in helping to alleviate the problems in our community posed by the drug trade and prostitution and the threat that poses to our kids. I'd like the House to join me in making her very welcome.

H. Giesbrecht: Visiting us in the gallery today is a very special friend and someone who doesn't come here very often. My wife Wendy is here to find out what's keeping me from doing all those jobs at home. Would the House please make her welcome.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: I'd like the House to join me in welcoming members of the Cariboo Communities Coalition who are down here for discussion with government. They are Grant Huffman, Terry Tate, Brian Goodrich, Diane Walters, Wade Fisher, Lala Hampton and Guenter Weckerle. Please make them welcome.

A. Sanders: I have an individual in the gallery who wanted to come down and see what kinds of people I hung around with all day -- on the other side as well as on this side. She's a very important person: my mother Lila Robertson.

The Speaker: Hon. members, before I call on the Clerk for orders of the day and other business, I would like to make a very brief announcement. All of us in this chamber are certainly well aware of the blood shortage that has confronted the citizens of this province. I'm pleased to advise you that by arrangement with the Red Cross, we have established a couple of particular times for a clinic in the next two days.

This is to advise members that there will be a return bus shuttle service leaving from the library steps at the rear of the Legislature, leaving every half-hour from the chamber, and you will also get a ride back. That will be between 2:30 and 8 o'clock today as well as tomorrow, and I would dearly hope that all of us who are able to leave these premises will be able to do so and donate blood. It's obviously a worthwhile cause.

Oral Questions

KELLEHER-READY REPORT ON

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

C. Hansen: In March of 1995 this government appointed Stephen Kelleher and Vince Ready to head up a construction industry review panel. This panel was mandated specifically to do an interim report and a final report.

When the interim report was released, the then Minister of Labour said: "I asked two of British Columbia's most respected industrial relations experts to look at changes that have taken place in construction, and they have reported back with an excellent

summary for employers, trade unions and government."

I have spoken with Mr. Kelleher, who tells me that they are not preparing a final report, and no work has been done on the review panel for the past year and a half. My question to the Minister of Labour is: why has the minister not given instructions to Kelleher and Ready to complete their final report?

Hon. J. Cashore: Kelleher and Ready did an excellent job in their interim report. The information in that report has been very important. They did say that one size does not fit all, and we have taken that approach. We have consulted broadly over a great many years with regard to the vital issues that are addressed in this legislation.

This legislation is on the order paper, it will be discussed in second reading, and it will be discussed very thoroughly. We'll be listening very carefully to the points that the hon. member has to make.

C. Hansen: Kelleher and Ready were very clear in their interim report, and they recommended against sectoral bargaining. The quote that they have in their report is: "The complexities of the industry militate against a single negotiated agreement" -- and as the minister said, one size does not fit all. What they're bringing in is what Kelleher and Ready recommended against. Kelleher and Ready have been muzzled by this government, and instead this government is listening to only Ken Georgetti and the union bosses in the building trades unions.

To the minister: does the $265,000 that the building trades union donated to NDP coffers speak louder than the thousands of dollars that taxpayers spent on the expert opinions of two of British Columbia's top labour experts?

Hon. J. Cashore: Well, if this was to get into a debate about who donates to whom politically, I could go on for a long time, and that side of the House would definitely lose that debate.

But as I said, what we have brought forward is not one-size-fits-all, and the appropriate place for that debate to take place is once that legislation, which is in the Orders of the Day , comes forward.

C. Hansen: One last question to the minister: why has he not given instructions to Kelleher and Ready to proceed with their review panel and to complete their final report?

Hon. J. Cashore: I have answered that question. We've consulted very broadly over a long period of time with the full spectrum of British Columbians, and we have brought forward our decision based on that taking place.

[ Page 5734 ]

EFFECT OF LABOUR CODE CHANGES ON

HOUSING PRICES AND CONSTRUCTION JOBS

R. Coleman: The NDP is making it more expensive to buy, repair, renovate or rent a home.

Interjections.

The Speaker: Order, members! Members, please. Our time for question period is very finite.

R. Coleman: According to the Urban Development Institute, the NDP's radical changes to the Labour Code would increase house prices by 10 percent and reduce the number of people who qualify for a new home -- first-time homebuyers -- by 15 percent. Will the Minister of Labour tell British Columbians why he insists on putting the dream of home-ownership further out of the reach of young people trying to buy their first home?

[2:15]

Hon. J. Cashore: If the Liberal opposition really cared about the investment climate in this province, if they really cared about the prices of new homes, which are dictated by the market -- if they really cared about that -- they would not be fomenting misinformation with regard to this legislation, which in itself seeks to take on a life of its own and dissuade investment in this province. That, hon. Speaker, is unconscionable.

R. Coleman: Higher prices for new homes means fewer homes will be built. Fewer new homes being built means fewer jobs. Can the Minister of Labour tell us how many construction jobs will be lost when his government forces through these radical labour changes?

Hon. J. Cashore: The residential housing sector is not unionized, has not been unionized and will not likely be unionized. The proposition the hon. member puts forward is without substance. Again I would appeal to this hon. member not to, through misinformation, seek to dissuade investment in this province.

GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES

AND PEACE REGION JOB LOSS

R. Neufeld: My question is to the Minister of Finance. At least four of Fort St. John's major employers may pull up stakes and move just across the border to Alberta's investment-friendly climate. Companies are escaping B.C.'s onerous labour laws, taxes and red tape. Recent employment standards changes may well be the death knell for bringing in new businesses or expanding existing ones in the Peace. This government has ensured that the Peace region is not on a level playing field with our major jobs competitor, Alberta. As many as 500 jobs and millions of dollars in wages may be lost if this government thumbs its nose at the concern of local employers.

Has the minister instructed any of his staff to travel to the Peace region, with decision-making authority, to discuss face to face with company executives what his government must do to keep jobs in the Peace?

Hon. A. Petter: As indicated in the budget, the commitment of this government is to work with the business community and other sectors from throughout the province to develop investor confidence and to encourage job creation. I'd be very happy to talk to the member about how I might ensure that representatives from the Peace region have a voice as part of that process or in relation to it. This government did cut taxes for small business by 10 percent in last year's budget.

This government has an enviable record in terms of job creation over the last five years, and this government remains committed to encouraging investment and growth in all parts of British Columbia, including the Peace region.

R. Neufeld: The minister knows full well there's a 20 percent differential in costs from British Columbia to Alberta. That's our problem, and that's what your government doesn't want to own up to. But interestingly enough, the Premier made no bones about his moves to entice a company with reportedly questionable international labour practices to set up shop in British Columbia. Isn't it ironic that this government has more time to cosy up to U.S.-based businesses than to meet with existing Peace region businesses employing hundreds of local British Columbia residents?

In fact, the Premier has spent more time south of the border trying to lure new businesses to the lower mainland than in trying to keep established businesses and jobs in the Peace region.

The Speaker: Question, please.

R. Neufeld: Does the minister believe that it is better to focus on keeping good, high-paying, quality jobs in the Peace region instead of on some cross-border shopping?

Hon. A. Petter: This government's commitment to create jobs knows no geographical bounds, and we will make efforts to attract investment from offshore as well as increase jobs in the Peace. I'd remind the member opposite of the extraordinary efforts this government made to help establish an oriented strand board plant in the Peace region. When I was Forests Minister, I had the happy opportunity of going up to the Peace region around the time of the opening of that plant.

Let me assure the member that it is not a matter of trading off international investment and international opportunities against the Peace. This government is going to work in every part of this province to bring in investment, to encourage investment and to create jobs. That's our commitment.

PHARMACARE COVERAGE OF

SCHIZOPHRENIA DRUGS

A. Sanders: Traditional medications for schizophrenia are so toxic and so side effect-plagued that 50 percent of those in need of treatment refuse therapy. Untreated, these people are a danger to themselves and to society. New medications are available. Risperidone and olanzapine are effective and tolerable and should be available to these same people, but this government refuses to cover the cost of these medications.

To the Minister of Health: given the medical evidence, why does the government refuse to fund these medications that would make such a positive difference in these people's lives?

Hon. J. MacPhail: If the hon. member were concerned about this being such an important issue, she would actually put the facts on the table. I consider this a very important issue, too. The Pharmacare program actually grandparented each and every person on risperidone. There are 4,000 patients

[ Page 5735 ]

on risperidone. We are paying for olanzapine and risperidone as a second-line medication. In fact, the record of special authorities is that 99.9 percent of all special authorities of olanzapine and risperidone are being paid for by Pharmacare. Those are the facts as they exist today.

What are we doing about the concerns raised by the community -- both the medical community and the families -- and the people who have to take risperidone or olanzapine? We've done a review, a consultation -- a very thorough consultation. The fact of the matter is that the decision to put this on special authority was made by the therapeutics initiative and the pharmaco-economics initiative. However, there are people in the community who say otherwise. We've done a review, and that review is almost complete. I met with the Schizophrenia Society on Friday, and an announcement will be made very shortly.

A. Sanders: You know, hon. Speaker, one of the things I've learned about this government is that when it's all said and done, there is more said than done. It is not an issue of whether people are grandfathered or there's special authority. It is that this medication should be available to every single British Columbian with schizophrenia who needs it. That is the end of the story.

Aaron Millar is a young schizophrenic man accused of murder. This Victoria youth is accused of killing his own mother while untreated and in a psychotic state. My question is to the Minister of Health: is there any price of any treatment too great for government not to have done whatever it could to have prevented this tragedy?

Hon. J. MacPhail: I think the hon. member knows that the tragic death of Mrs. Millar is under a coroner's investigation, and under public investigation as well. Frankly, if the hon. member is offering some information that so far is not known, I think she should bring that to the attention of the coroner.

GOVERNMENT POLICY ON GAMBLING

AND SECURITY AGAINST CRIME

K. Krueger: The facts speak for themselves. When you increase gambling, you increase crime. One year after Gulfport, Mississippi, launched casino expansion . . .

Interjections.

The Speaker: Order, members, please. Let us hear the question.

K. Krueger: . . . the chief of police released a report, and the results are shocking. Robberies were up 218 percent, vehicle theft up 166 percent and burglaries up 100 percent. My question is to the Attorney General: what specific plans does the minister have to cope with the crime wave that British Columbia must expect as a result of the NDP's massive gambling expansion?

Hon. U. Dosanjh: It never ceases to amaze me that some members of the opposition continue to sensationalize whatever minimal consequences our modest expansion of gaming may have in British Columbia. I want to say, as I said yesterday, that we are in ongoing discussions with the chiefs of police in British Columbia. As it is, with the amount of money dedicated to gambling issues vis-�-vis law enforcement, I can indicate to this House that we are in front of the pack nationally, and we will pour more money into those resources.

The Speaker: The bell terminates question period.

Tabling Reports

Hon. S. Hammell: It is my pleasure to table the 1995-96 annual report of the Ministry of Women's Equality.

P. Calendino: I seek leave to make an introduction.

Leave granted.

P. Calendino: I'm sorry that this introduction is late, but I didn't see them when we came in. With the consent of my other colleagues from Burnaby, I'm happy to introduce an old friend of ours, a former school trustee, a very active member of the Burnaby Arts Council and of the Burnaby Multicultural Society and a current instructor at BCIT. I would like the House to welcome Mr. Rudy Spence and his wife.

Hon. J. MacPhail: I would like to advise the members of the House that we will be sitting tomorrow. By leave, I move that in addition to the powers previously conferred upon the Select Standing Committee on Public Accounts, the committee be empowered to sit during any sitting of the House.

Leave granted.

Motion approved.

Orders of the Day

Hon. J. MacPhail: In Committee A, I call Committee of Supply. For the information of the members, we will be debating the estimates of the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks. In this House, I call Committee of the Whole House to debate Bill 31.

FAMILY RELATIONS AMENDMENT ACT, 1997

The House in committee on Bill 31; G. Brewin in the chair.

section 1.

G. Plant: I rise to move the amendments to

section 1 of this bill which stand in my name on the order paper. I should perhaps observe first that there are amendments to three subsections of

section 1, and I intend to speak to those three amendments collectively. The amendments that are in my name on the order paper to

section 1.1 and a series of other sections to the bill are consequential amendments. They stand or fall according to whether the amendments that I'm going to speak about first stand or fall.

[SECTION 1(a), by adding the following definition:

"domestic partner" means a person who, except under parts 5 and 6, lived with another person for a period of at least 2 years in a close, personal relationship that is of primary importance in both persons' lives and which has the attributes of permanence, physical intimacy, sharing and interdependence, if the application under this Act is made within one year after they ceased to live together, and for the purposes of this Act the relationship may be between persons of the same gender.

SECTION 1(c), by deleting paragraph (

b) and substituting the following:

[ Page 5736 ]

(

b) except under Parts 5 and 6, lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship for a period of at least 2 years if the application under this Act is made within one year after they ceased to live together.

SECTION 1(d), by deleting subparagraph 2(

b) and substituting the following:

(

b) lived together in a marriage-like relationship for a period of at least 2 years, or

(

c) lived together for a period of at least 2 years in a close, personal relationship that is of primary importance in both persons' lives and which has the attributes of permanence, physical intimacy, sharing and interdependence, and for the purposes of this Act the relationship may be between persons of the same gender.]

The Chair: Hon. member, I think what the Chair will do, then, is put the question all in one, as well.

G. Plant: I appreciate that. Thank you, hon. Chair. That would be a most expeditious way to deal with this.

I spoke yesterday in second reading about the larger context of the issues raised by this bill: the issues of principle that are raised by this bill, the public policy purposes of this bill, and the concern that has been expressed to me and to other members of this assembly by a wide variety of British Columbians from a wide variety of backgrounds with respect to the terminology issue that is raised by the

definitions in

section 1 of the bill, and in particular the definition of "spouse."

[2:30]

I said yesterday that there would be amendments put forward and that the intention of these amendments was really twofold: on the one hand, to create a separate structure of terms to accommodate the concerns of people who simply find unacceptable the redefinition of the word "spouse" to encompass same-gender partners. The second purpose of these amendments is to keep in place all of the principles, all of the rights, all of the responsibilities and all of the obligations that this bill creates in substance.

What the amendments seek to do is simply to replace, in effect, one term, the term "spouse" in a particular context, with another term, the term "domestic partner," which is a term that will apply only in the context of relationships between persons of the same gender.

I want to just spend a moment or two explaining how that happens. That happens in a number of ways: firstly, by adding a new term and a definition. The new term is "domestic partner," and it will be added in

section 1(

a) of the bill. It will become a new definition in the act, and I'll come back and speak about the terms of that definition in a minute or two.

The second thing I do with these amendments is make changes to the definition of "spouse" as it appears in the bill. The definition of "spouse" in the bill has four parts: " 'spouse' means a person who . . . is married to another person"; and under subparagraph (

b) it means, in some circumstances, a person who has " . . . lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship for a period of at least 2 years if the application under this Act is made within one year after they cease to live together and, for the purposes of this Act, the marriage-like relationship may be between persons of the same gender." There are two other subparagraphs for the definition of "spouse"; neither is particularly significant to the point that I am making here.

It is subparagraph (

b) in the definition of "spouse" which creates the concern for those who have expressed that concern. The current definition encompasses relationships under the umbrella of marriage-like relationships. It encompasses two kinds of relationships: relationships that are marriage-like between persons of opposite genders and marriage-like relations between persons of the same gender.

The amendment that I propose to

section 1(

c) of the bill before us is to take out from the definition of "spouse" that part which refers to the relationship that may be between persons of the same gender -- to delete that. So what would happen is that we would be left with a definition of a relationship which is to be described as marriage-like and would be a relationship that would presumably only exist between two persons of different genders: a man and a woman. So that's the next stage of the process.

Finally, the third stage of the process of these amendments takes us over to that part of

section 1 of this bill which redefines step-parent to include people living together in a marriage-like relationship, whether they be of the same gender or of different genders. Again, the intention here is to break out that definition into two separate categories so that there is one category for people who are the same gender in a relationship, and another category of relationship is for people who are of the opposite sex. So that's the starting point to the structure of what I propose.

Then the next task of the amendment, as I said, is to preserve all of the rights and obligations that are imposed by this bill and by the act on persons in particular relations and to preserve all of those for the people who will come under the umbrella of the new definition of domestic partner.

So what I think is the most expedient way to do that is to simply work through the act, and in every place where the term "spouse" appears, take out the word "spouse" and replace it with the phrase "spouse or domestic partner." So as one moves through the Family Relations Act, one would find that in each case where the act made reference to a spouse, there would now be a reference to a spouse or a domestic partner. Both of those legal actors, if I can put it in that technical language, would then have all of the same rights and obligations.

There are one or two exceptions. I can't remember if it's in this bill or in Bill 32 that there are provisions about compellability, which relate to husbands and wives giving evidence against each other. There are old rules of the common law that deal with that, and I don't think that what the act does in that respect needs to be amended to accommodate this issue.

So I have created a new term. The new term is "domestic partner," and the definition is there on the order paper.

" 'Domestic partner' means a person who, except under parts 5 and 6" -- and I'll pause to say that that language is put there to be consistent with the expanded definition of spouse, so again I'm trying to maintain consistency between these amendments and the original bill -- "lived with another person for a period of at least 2 years" -- and I pause again; this language is the time element of the triggering requirement that is exactly the same as that in the existing act -- "in a close, personal relationship that is of primary importance in both persons' lives and which has the attributes of permanence, physical intimacy, sharing and interdependence . . . .

"

I pause there. After that, there are some words about the triggering of these statuses that are exactly the same as the words in the current bill. Again, I'm trying to be consistent. Finally, my definition concludes with the words: " . . . and for the purposes of this Act the relationship may be between persons of the same gender." Again, those are words found in the current act. So that is the structure of the amendments and their intention and how they would work as you move through the act.

[ Page 5737 ]

I want to say a word or two here about where some of these new words come from. They are not mine. They're not original to me. I have taken them for a variety of sources. There are other jurisdictions, both in North America and in Europe, which have used and legislated the concept of registered domestic partnership. That is a device that is used to encompass what traditionally might have been common-law relationships, whether they are relationships between people of the same gender or people of different genders.

There are other jurisdictions that use registered domestic partnerships as a vehicle somewhat analogous to marriage, which allows a distinction to be made between marriage -- which for many people has a very special significance -- and this other concept, which is the concept of a registered domestic partnership.

Now, I am not in a position here to advocate that there be a registry of domestic partnerships. That would go far beyond the bounds of what I'm allowed to do in an attempt to improve the government's legislation. So I have not attempted to draft a scheme that would allow for registered domestic partnerships. But the term "domestic partner" is the term I am interested in putting forward for debate and consideration. As I said, it is not a new term; it's not an original term. It's a term that is used in other jurisdictions, and so far as I can gather, it appears to be used with some success.

Secondly, in my definition about close, personal relationships, there is language that describes those relationships -- the phrase "primary importance in both persons' lives" and the phrase "attributes of permanence, physical intimacy, sharing and interdependence." I've listened with interest to the helpful and thoughtful speeches that were made on the other side of the House yesterday about these amendments in the general terms that they were cast then. I got the feeling that perhaps these words were seen by some members of the other side as being new or unusual.

Again, I want to assure the members that I have not made these words up. These are words that come from the jurisprudence of Canadian courts that have tried to deal with the issues of discrimination and equality around the definition of spouse.

Let me tell you specifically where I have taken these words from. I have the Ontario Court of Appeal judgment delivered in December of 1996 in the M. v. H. case, and that's a case which is on its way to the Supreme Court of Canada. I don't want to spend a lot of time going through the technical parts of the judgment in that case, but I want to assure the members opposite that there are some important passages in the judgment in that case, which use some of the same phrases I have used in this definition.

In the majority judgment of the court in that case, there is reference to a report of the Ontario Law Reform Commission. The Ontario Law Reform Commission report talks about the need to focus a statute of this nature on relationships that "embody the fundamental elements of intimacy, mutual economic interdependence and living together in a 'close, personal relationship that is of primary importance in both persons' lives,' which we see as the essence of the concept of 'family.' " This is the Ontario Law Reform Commission speaking; this is not a completely ill-considered body. This is a careful and thoughtful study of the issues raised by this bill and the issues raised in Ontario.

I've taken language that is used in judicial decisions to deal with this issue, and I have put it forward in my amendment. It may not be perfect language -- I said that yesterday and I'll say it again. There may be ways to improve it, and I look forward to any suggestions that the members opposite may have in order to improve this language. But I think it's a starting point. I think it's a way of achieving the accommodation of building the bridge and finding and enlarging the consensus that exists on the major principles of this bill.

It is, in my view, something of the essence of a compromise and a way of moving forward on this bill, which I commend to the members opposite and all members of the House.

[2:45]

V. Anderson: I rise to speak in favour of the amendment, which has been put forward and explained briefly by my colleague from Richmond-Steveston. First of all, I want to thank him for his diligence and expertise in trying to resolve in our Legislature a very important item, which needs to be dealt with with the utmost respect for all of the different opinions we have heard over the last few days since the community became aware of this particular bill.

I think it's important that we consider this in respect of the diversity of the cultural expressions and religious beliefs within our community, for our concern here is to do the best we can to provide equality for all within that element of respect.

Equality for all is something like the struggle we have within our own family, when each member of the family has their own individual opinion and we have to arrive at a collective decision. The collective decision probably may not be totally agreeable to any of the individual members who are part of that family unit. So we are in that situation with this particular bill. We're striving as a legislative body to arrive at laws that can accommodate and respect very widely held opinions and ideas about what is right. I sincerely believe each of these opinions is striving to arrive at equality for each of those persons who are involved within our community.

It's that struggle as a legislature to speak on behalf of everyone, which we do not have in a way in other elements of our society . . . . That's our task here, and mine as a legislator is to acknowledge my own position, and having acknowledged it, to say that it's not my position which should be placed upon all the citizens of this province. Rather, it is my and other legislators' obligation to balance out our positions and the many other positions that are there and see if we can come to accommodation that can be meaningful for all of us.

I spent a number of years in interfaith work, so I'm very aware of the variety of intense beliefs which many people have been willing to live and to die for. They're not things to be taken lightly or thoughtlessly. It's always hard when you have a definite opinion of your own, which you believe to be totally right, to accept that other people who have a totally opposite opinion to yours also believe themselves to be totally right.

Perhaps I have mentioned here before one of the lessons that was taught to me by a farmer in Saskatchewan, which is relevant in this discussion. He came out one Sunday after a sermon, and I gather he did not particularly agree with what I had said in that Sunday sermon. He looked at me very seriously and said: "There are three sides to every question." Of course, I had to ask him what he meant. He said: "Well, there's your side and there's my side and there's the right side." What we're trying to discover here and put into legislation is not my opinion or somebody else's opinion, but the right side.

We're truly trying not to do a political thing here. We're trying to be honest to the people of our community, for we have heard . . . . All of us have received countless letters on all sides of the issue -- some for and some against the particular amendment, and others for parts of it and not for all of it.

I think the majority of us very clearly accept the intention of this bill, which is to provide protection for children in

[ Page 5738 ]

whatever relationships those children may find themselves in during their growing years. So we're striving to find that statement which can acknowledge the protection of children and also deal with the very real and serious concerns of our community. I appreciate that the amendment has tried to accommodate that very purpose.

The current misunderstanding of the legislation is unfortunate. It's unfortunate because the community at large has not had the opportunity to have this legislation before them, to study it in its wholeness and to understand its intent to protect children. So many of those, if not most of those, who are responding are responding out of context and out of a lack of awareness of the purpose of the bill itself. We need to take that into account.

I would say clearly that I would have to vote against the bill as it is in this section, because I don't feel that it fairly reflects the community to which we are responsible. But I would vote, then, in favour of the amendment, because it moves to respond to those wishes without depriving the rights of other people. It acknowledges the equal rights of everyone in society by putting the amendment forth as it is at this point.

I was interested when, after this had been proposed, after it had been put forward, finalized and made public, I was visited by Mr. Vandezande -- who, incidentally, was the person who was invited by the Premier to come to the Legislature and be the keynote speaker at the Premier's meeting with the representatives of the faith community across the province, to talk about public issues and people's concerns about them. Mr. Vandezande is part of Citizens for Public Justice.

This is the longstanding, reputable organization which for many years has been working on public policy, making representation to federal and provincial governments -- both in Canada and around the world -- from the base of strong religious conviction, both Christian and multifaith.

So as the member for Richmond-Steveston said, we are not bringing this amendment forth without some history, background and understanding of others across the country and around the world who have tried to put forth equal justice concerns, at the same time respecting the beliefs, the attitudes and the cultures of all of those who live in our communities and in our society.

I say again that I would not vote for the original category here in this document; I would vote for the amendment instead. But whether that amendment wins or loses, I would still vote for the document because my understanding is that the principle of caring for children cannot be undermined. We will have to come back and review the subject again many times, no doubt, in the future.

So I speak in favour of the amendment, and I hope others will seriously consider it as one way of meeting and responding to the needs and wishes, the cultural and religious beliefs, that are there in our multicultural, multifaith, democratic community.

J. Dalton: I also rise in support of the amendment. Bill 31 invites us to sanction marriage-like relationships, of course, including same-gender relationships.

Marriage, as dealt with in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Egan v. Canada, "is by nature heterosexual." The Egan case goes on: "It would be possible to legally define marriage to include homosexual couples, but this would not change the biological and social realities that underlie the traditional marriage." The U.S. Supreme Court has also commented on marriage: "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." I have some other comments as well, and I just want to make sure I get all of these on the record.

I think we all agree, certainly on this side of the House as well as on the government side, on the obligation of the Attorney General and the government to protect children who will or could be affected by relationships breaking up. But I would submit that we should not, by doing so, erode the foundation of our society, which is the family.

A noted American author, Mark Halpern, has made some observations in the aftermath of last year's U.S. elections. Again, I'm going to quote from some of his comments. He comments in one of his articles that in his opinion the Americans went through a form of revolution, as last year's election results demonstrated. Mr. Halpern writes:

"It is a revolution in which individual rights have become group rights, in which responsibility has become entitlement, marriage has become divorce, birth has become abortion, medicine has become euthanasia, murder is neither a surprise nor necessarily punishable, pornography is piped into almost every home, gambling is legal, drugs are rife, students think Alaska is an island south of Los Angeles and mothers of small children are sent off to war with great fanfare and pride."

[3:00]

Mr. Halpern also goes on in the same article: "The state must not usurp, out of good intentions or otherwise, the duty and privileges of the family." And I concur with those remarks.

I've also sought some legal advice on the contentious phrase that we are seeking to amend with our amendment. Just to give you some sense of the legal opinions that have been expressed to me, one family practitioner is of the opinion that the phrase in question, the phrase "marriage-like," is not needed to fulfil the purpose of this bill. Given the uncertainty it will create, it's his opinion that there will be a lot of litigation. And I would submit that that is quite likely to be the case.

Another lawyer, who's not a family law practitioner but has been in practice for over 25 years, comments: "It is unnecessary to redefine the term 'spouse' to protect children." And again I have to concur with those legal opinions.

So I support the amendment that the Attorney General critic has put on the order paper and that we're speaking to right now. I would invite the Attorney General and all members opposite to do likewise.

[ Page 5739 ]

M. de Jong: I've chosen to interject in the debate at this stage for a particular reason. I don't want there to be any confusion about the nature of my concern with the bill and how those concerns can be properly addressed. Bill 31 really is one of those pieces of legislation that cause many legislators to ponder, again, what it was that brought them to elected office, why they sought elected office. We all know how we get here, and that is a very partisan, at times exciting -- generally exciting -- exercise that I very much enjoy.

But when we get here, it occurs to me that beyond bringing with us all a vision of what we want to see our society built around, we bring with us -- although it's sometimes difficult to discern in this chamber -- a desire to build consensus around that vision, to involve as many people in our society as possible to build that cooperative spirit that makes us better as a society. It was with that in mind that I examined and reviewed Bill 31.

It also occurred to me that this Legislature and the laws we pass really acquire their legitimacy in a couple of different ways. We can talk about the legalities of passing a bill, of it receiving royal assent and being proclaimed. That is certainly one way that that happens. We can talk about the operational component of the law and the Legislature and how the courts enforce the provisions that we pass here. But we also have to recognize the social component -- that the laws we pass here are designed to respond to a recognized social need or objective.

All of those things need to be balanced, and if they aren't, we run the risk of alienating a significant portion of our society. Those are all important components, in my view, and I examined Bill 31 with those in mind.

Let me share with you the presentation I received from one constituent. I don't know if it's a majority of my constituents. I know that it represents a significant component of my constituency, but I learned long ago that it is a dangerous game we try to play in ascertaining whether a particular view represents a majority or a minority, and those measurements tend to be very difficult to make. I can say this about this constituent. She is thoughtful, she is fair -- in my mind -- but she is genuinely troubled. To be troubled, in my view, by a component of Bill 31 doesn't make her any less thoughtful, any less fair-minded or any less tolerant. It just leaves her troubled.

Let me say that as best as I can tell, I'll talk about the things she's not troubled by. She's not troubled by expanding the application of maintenance obligations to ensure that all children in all manner of circumstances are protected. That doesn't trouble her. She's not opposed to the application of child support guidelines. She wants them to be applied in a fair manner, but she does not object to the legislation's attempt to do that.

She's not opposed to a legislative regime that will provide for an equitable division of pensions. That does not trouble her. She is not in any way troubled or opposed to the courts compelling the full disclosure of assets and income to ensure that there are equitable maintenance awards and property divisions. In fact, I can say that I have received no submissions from any quarter expressing any fundamental opposition to those general propositions.

What she is troubled by -- extremely troubled by -- is that in seeking to achieve those objectives, the government would, from her perspective, so easily tamper with a definition that for her and many others holds great symbolic, moral and indeed spiritual significance. She writes in her letter to me: "Any law enacted should protect all children, and surely all children can be protected without changing the definition of spouse." I have to say that hers is a sentiment that has been expressed to me very often in the past couple of weeks.

I happen to be Catholic. That has been mentioned in this chamber in the past. At the same time, though, I believe that it's absolutely essential that we maintain the separation of church and state. That has become the hallmark of our legislative democracy. I think it was St. Augustine who talked about rendering unto Caesar those things which are Caesar's and unto God that which is God's, and that is fundamentally important.

But I would be less than honest if I didn't admit that when the archbishop of the Catholic church makes a submission to the Premier, I take notice. I will quote the paragraph in the letter, where he writes:

"One of the primary objectives of the legislative proposals is the protection of children. I commend your government undertaking this important objective. All children, including those in the care of homosexual persons, should be afforded the benefit of child support and family maintenance. I believe, however, that children can be fully protected without altering the present legal definition of spouse."

I could ask all sorts of questions about what is motivating the archbishop. I could seek out the spiritual or biblical foundations from which he and other theological leaders in our community have approached this issue, but I don't think that's necessarily helpful. At the end of the day, the question that I'm really interested in answering is that which the archbishop and so many others have posed -- that is, can children be fully protected without altering the present legal definition of spouse? The answer I'm compelled to arrive at is yes. That in fact can happen and can happen in an equitable way.

The amendment that we have tabled here today accomplishes that goal. You have heard the words of the member for Richmond-Steveston. The amendment appears on the order paper and purports to define a "domestic partner." I will reread the definition. It says: " . . . a person who, except under parts 5 and 6, lived with another person for a period of at least 2 years in a close, personal relationship that is of primary importance in both persons' lives and which has the attributes of permanence, physical intimacy, sharing and interdependence . . . . "

There are same-sex couples. Nothing we do in this chamber is going to change that fact -- nor should it, quite frankly. There are same-sex couples who are raising children. Nothing we do in this chamber is going to alter that fact -- nor should it. What we are charged with, and the challenge that we face, is responding to those circumstances, achieving the objective that we have set insofar as protecting children in all circumstances in a fair and equitable way.

I will conclude my remarks by saying this. There will be those who are dissatisfied and will be dissatisfied with the approach that I have chosen to take to this bill. There will be people who are angered that I have spoken against the existing

section and instead opted to urge acceptance of the amendments that are on the order paper via the member for Richmond-Steveston.

Others, I am sure, will argue that the amendments don't go far enough. There are people watching and listening to this debate; some of them are my constituents. I will say to them and to others that I have done my best to give voice to the concerns that I have heard to try to achieve that synthesis -- more importantly that consensus -- that I think, at the end of the day, is the objective we all seek when we come into this chamber insofar as crafting a society that works for everyone.

I need to say one last thing, and that is to express how obliged I am to my constituents -- many of them have taken time to write to me, to call me, to meet with me -- and that my ability to respond to this

section is made a much more

mean-

[ Page 5740 ]

ingful exercise by their involvement. As I say, my response will not satisfy all, but at the end of the day, I am able to say that I have done my best in responding and giving voice in a way that I think would achieve the consensus that we all seek when we come to this House.

T. Nebbeling: First of all, I'd like to show my appreciation for the many sentiments that have been expressed yesterday and today in debating this bill, especially in recognizing that relationships between people, regardless of their gender, are a unique bond and a unique union.

I feel an undertone in all the debate -- that we're all trying to struggle with how we can overcome the controversy that has been created by the introduction of this bill. And for me, in particular, it's a very difficult thing to speak to.

When Bill 31 and Bill 32 were introduced, it was to put something in place to make sure that children who are in an adoptive environment are going to have the security and the protection of the law -- and, I think, the rights -- that regardless of the union of the people that have adopted that child, the protection will always be there, and also in case the union no longer continues to be. To me, that is the real merit of the bill: how we can make sure that children will not ever become victims of a commitment made by adults to these children in that environment.

For me, it has been very unfortunate to see the focus, which should have been on the well-being of children, being put aside, and this bill becoming totally focused on the word "spouse" and the consequences of the term "spouse," as seen by various groups.

In the end, I am going to support the bill. First of all, I am going to support the motion. I hope that the other side will consider the motion seriously. After I have finished speaking, maybe I will have been able to put another element into the thought process to be considered by the government side.

[3:15]

The reason is that I do not think it is just the so-called heterosexual world that is standing up and saying: "We just cannot accept that spousal definition to include same-sex partners." Quite frankly, I had never really looked at the word "spouse" in the dictionary. So when this became a big issue I looked in the dictionary, and it clearly said that spouse is a man or a woman becoming husband and wife through wedlock. I have used that definition on many occasions in the last five or six weeks when this bill was up for discussion in the House, and also within the community.

I have asked many of my gay and lesbian friends how the definition of man and woman becoming husband and wife through wedlock would apply to their relationship, and if they felt the need -- in order to see rights become equal for all people -- for that spousal definition to apply to their relationship. Quite frankly, I have found very few gay and lesbian partners that felt comfortable with that spousal definition as I described it from Webster's .

As a matter of fact, I can say that after having lived with a same-sex partner for 26 years of complete happiness, I have never in my life called my partner "spouse" and have never in my life had my partner introduce me as his spouse. I would like to leave it that way, because when I am introduced as a spouse, there is a risk that the next question is going to be: "According to the definition, what are you in the relationship?"

Why should we do that? Why can't we just celebrate the uniqueness of every relationship? I am convinced that this is not just a heterosexual issue. This is an issue in the gay and lesbian community, as well, because I don't think people in the gay community are looking for a new label today. They are looking for rights, and they are looking for equal rights. I'm talking about equal rights and the need for equal rights.

In the political climate, we still see politicians standing up and saying that if a person works in a store and a client is not totally happy with the person because he or she is seen as a gay person, that it is okay for that person to be put at the back of the store, out of sight. There are politicians who believe that -- thank God, not in this House -- but as long as that kind of thing can still be said . . . . Because the law is not clear about protecting people from that kind of evil thinking, I will fight and stand up for gay and lesbian rights. But I don't think this definition does that.

This definition will just put another label to a bond or a union that can really stand on its own and be recognized on its own.

I hope that the other side will understand that this is much more than just the issue of the family relationship where this law will apply. If we ignore the sensitivity that is shared by traditional couples on this issue, then rather than getting people to understand that gay couples are equal in any way, shape or form when it comes to how they live together, how they relate to others . . . . I'm afraid that if we start pushing laws that include elements that offend people, that make people feel uncomfortable, we are not serving the gay community at all; we're actually taking a step back.

I say that because some of the people I have spoken to are regular, heterosexual couples that have always been totally comfortable with my lifestyle -- with any other gay or lesbian lifestyle -- who I consider my friends, and they are saying: "Does it have to be?" When I have had these discussions in the past I talked about common-law relationships, and they immediately said: "That's great. I want you to have the protection of the law, just like we all have. But don't undermine some of the values that we personally have when it comes to identifying that relationship."

So I don't think that this is going to do much for the gay and lesbian community. I think this is going to offend more people and give them that feeling of: "Well, why should I support them if they can't respect my values? Why should I have to respect the gay and lesbian values?" So there's another reason that we should really look at the definition that gives us that right, that gives us the equality.

If we do that, then I think we are creating a framework -- a base -- so that every law that comes into this House in the future will include the need to recognize the union between two same-gender people, and so that that bill will then be discussed on the issue of the bill rather than on a definition.

I hope that we keep that in mind, because this is not the only time we are going to see "spouse" in a bill. Every time it comes up we will see the forces of opposition rise, get stronger and create more animosity toward gay people. So I don't think this is positive in that sense, either.

Having spoken with gay friends, lesbian friends and heterosexual couples, these are the issues I think have to be considered. To me, their responses, which I have shared with you, merit very much this chamber indeed including in the

definitions the new definition reflecting the union of two people of the same sex without being a threat to values that other people cherish. I ask everybody to support the amendment to the bill.

M. Sihota: I want to spend a few minutes talking about what's happening in the Legislature during the course of this

[ Page 5741 ]

debate on this quiet Tuesday afternoon. I think what's happening in this debate goes beyond just the context of this legislation and this amendment. It speaks volumes about what's happened during the course of this entire legislative session, and in some ways it gives us a good glimpse of what's happening politically in this province, particularly with the party opposite.

Let me start by saying this. This bill is before this House because on this side of the House we come from a particular value system. There wasn't one person in our caucus who in any way flinched over this legislation coming to this House. There's a glue that is very common to all of us, and a fundamental recognition of the equality of all people is one of those glues that binds us as members on this side of the House.

When the Attorney General first advised our caucus that this bill was coming forward, the reaction was one of saying that it is long overdue that we come to recognize the inherent equality of people and that the value system we have in terms of recognizing the equality of people must be expressed in legislation.

Therefore we had no difficulty coming forward with legislation that says that all people engaged in a relationship, all spouses -- and I remind the member for West Vancouver-Garibaldi that spouse is a gender-neutral word -- ought to be treated in an equal way, whether they are in a relationship that is composed of a same-sex couple or of people of different sexes.

Contrary to the comments of both the member for Matsqui and the member for West Vancouver-Garibaldi, the amendment that is before the House violates that basic tenet of equality. What the amendment does is create a different class. It creates a different class of discrimination. It creates a higher and different test for those that are engaged in a common-law relationship than for those that are involved in a same-sex relationship. It creates a different test and a higher test. By so doing, the opposition is seeking to entrench an inequality.

They are proposing that we make a law that states that we can treat people differently and a law that says that inequality is now enshrined in legislation. That's why it will be rejected by this side of the House, because it runs as a crosscurrent to the fundamental tenet that we have on this side of the House about equality.

This is more than simply an amendment to legislation. It goes way beyond that, hon. Speaker. It also speaks to what's happening in that opposition caucus. There are traditional Liberals over there who would probably support what we on this side of the House have brought forward. There are Vander Zalm Liberals over there -- if I can put it that way -- or Socred Liberals who would be violently opposed to this. There are Reform Liberals over there who are trying to outdo the Reform Party.

I thought there were some very thoughtful comments yesterday from the member for Peace River North. I'm just reading his comments. It's not often that I get the opportunity to quote him. Speaking of this legislation, he said: "This is all based on equality, and I look at this bill as dealing with things such as that based on equality amongst people in whatever type of union they intend to have. That doesn't mean that I have to agree with any of the unions, but I should respect them on an equal basis."

It's interesting that a Reform member of this chamber has struggled with the notion of equality. He has received many of the letters that all of us on this side of the House have received, but he thought the issue through. He didn't try to make some artificial distinctions. He didn't try to sort of stumble and babble as much of the rhetoric we've heard today has done around this amendment. Rather, he stuck to the principle of equality of treatment.

Yet this divided opposition is incapable of doing that. In doing so in the broader context, they have demonstrated the fundamental weakness they have. During the course of this session, they have demonstrated that they are divided on the issue of leadership. It's apparent to all of us on this side of the House and to many in the gallery who sit here and watch. It is evident to us that they are divided on matters of policy, this being one of several examples. It is evident that they are also divided on matters of fundamental rights, and that's also evident to all of us in the context of this debate directly.

If this session has marked anything, it's marked the end of that party. It's the end of that party, mark my words. You know, the opinion polls we've seen over the past few weeks demonstrate the depth of the problem that they are facing opposite. They have seen it; they have seen their numbers fall; and they know that they are an opposition without a beacon. This debate demonstrates that the Liberal opposition is bound by one thing only. They have one glue that binds them, and that's a sense of opportunism. That was lost when the verdict of the last election came down, and now they're drifting.

They've drifted since March, they've drifted into July, and they're just drifting. It's inevitable, and this debate has brought it all home.

[3:30]

G. Wilson: I'm tempted to let the member for Vancouver-Little Mountain get up and actually make a response directly. As that was an assault against the opposition, I will yield if I can get back into the debate later.

[E. Walsh in the chair.]

G. Farrell-Collins: We've seen what I thought was some extremely enlightened debate around an extremely difficult and volatile issue over the last number of days. This issue has percolated through the people of British Columbia, and many feel strongly one way, on the one hand, and many feel just as strongly, if not more so, about this issue on the other hand. I must say that in the last two days I've been extremely proud to be a member of the Legislature.

We've had that sometimes vociferous -- having read some of the letters -- sometimes almost violent debate in the public around an extremely difficult issue, something I'm sure every member of this House has taken inside and had to listen to and think about quite deeply. I was proud to hear the speeches that were given. I was proud to hear the cooperation. I was proud to see members moving freely back and forth across the House to talk to each other about this issue. I was proud because I think that as members of the Legislature, you're here to lead.

You're here to take those difficult issues, you're here to listen to what people have to say, and you're here to try and calm things down sometimes and actually try and bring people together with a consensus.

I was proud to be a member of this chamber until about four or five minutes ago, when the member for Esquimalt-Metchosin rose and made some comments that I think -- if I can try and be as polite as I can -- were designed to do nothing other than inflame those very divisions, those very issues that are out there. But he did more than that. He demeaned the members of this House on all sides by discrediting members' rights to have an opinion and to express that opinion in this chamber.

[ Page 5742 ]

Without repeating his speech, he called members opposite by a variety of names; he dragged in a number of issues that have nothing to do with this difficult issue. I can honestly say that at a time when leadership was required, at a time when members had a duty to their constituents and to the people of British Columbia to take a stand on a difficult issue, to respect each other's opinions and to come to some sort of an agreement or agree to disagree, that member debased the debate, debased the process that we've gone on and debased the tenor of this House.

I must say that I'm disappointed by that. I'm disappointed by the behaviour of that member; I'm disappointed by his comments. I think he did a disservice not only to the members of the Legislature and not only to the people of British Columbia: I think he did himself a great disservice.

G. Wilson: I want to get to the specifics of the amendment that's before us, but I want to say . . . .

The Chair: Excuse me, member. Just have your seat for a moment. The member rises on point of order.

M. Sihota: I'm sorry. I left the chamber a minute ago after giving my comments on this bill. I got down to my office, and I understand that a number of members opposite were calling me a coward, and I would ask that that be withdrawn.

I went down because I have an appointment. Any member opposite who wants to come down with me and know that that's the case can satisfy themselves that that's the case. But I would ask the member who made that comment to withdraw it.

G. Farrell-Collins: I believe a number of members made a comment. I wasn't one of them, but on behalf of the Liberal opposition, if anything we've ever done offended the member for Esquimalt-Metchosin, then I would be more than happy to withdraw that.

And I . . . . Well, I'll leave it at that.

G. Wilson: As I was saying, I want to come back to the substance of the amendments on this bill, but before I do, I want to make a couple of comments with respect to what it is we're dealing with.

This is, I believe, a profoundly important piece of legislation. It is one that is going to be very difficult for people to understand who do not have the benefit of reading it and studying it as we do. It is also one that I think attacks both legislative issues and, in the minds of many, moral and religious issues. Whenever that comes together, it means that we have to treat with the utmost sensitivity what it is we're doing.

I know that the comments I made in second reading have hurt some people and hurt them deeply, and these are people whom I care about, because they are members of the homosexual community. They are personal friends of mine, and they expected that I would take a different position or point of view. I'm sorry for that, because I don't intend to hurt anybody.

I think that the difficulty is exacerbated when the extreme points of view in our society -- and they exist; we all know they do -- are brought forward and held up as examples of what the average person out there is thinking or writing or saying. When we do that, it paints this debate on two sides: those who are supportive of the homosexual community and those who are not.

This bill is not about that; it's not about that at all. I would hope that the Attorney General would take note that part of what stemmed this was the comment that much of the literature that has been received -- I think his words were -- "bordered on hate literature." I don't doubt that there are people who are homophobic who write hateful things about people who live within the homosexual community. I don't condone them, I don't support them, and I would wish that they wouldn't do that. We have laws in the province to try to protect against it, and I support those laws.

But what we're dealing with in this legislation is not marriage between homosexual people. If that's what this is about, then the government should have been honest enough to come forward and bring in amendments to the Marriage Act, because that's what the Marriage Act . . . .

An Hon. Member: That's federal.

G. Wilson: It is not federal, hon. member. The Marriage Act is in the statutes of the province of British Columbia right here in front of me. This is the Marriage Act, right here.

If we are talking about marriage rights between homosexual people, then amend the Marriage Act. If we are not, then let's address what it is we are really talking about. We're talking about money and the ability for people who are in a same-sex relationship to get support or to have children who are within that context supported in the event that that relationship dissolves. That's what this bill is all about. There is nothing in the provision of those requirements that requires any amendment or change to the term "spouse" -- nothing.

Within the Family Relations Act, there are two

definitions that are critical to the way the act is applied. The first is the question of parent, because there are obligations within the Family Relations Act for those who are defined and are addressed as a parent. The second is one with respect to father or mother, and the responsibilities and obligations for a father or mother are different than for a parent.

So one has to ask, when we're dealing with the term "spouse" in the relationship, what are we really talking about? Are we talking about the rights of children? No. We're talking about the rights of people who wish to cohabit in some form of union, and that's got nothing whatsoever to do with what we're told this bill is all about. We're told it's about trying to find adequate support for children, and yet the whole debate so far has centred around the terminology, around two people who wish to cohabit who happen to be of the same gender. What on earth has that got to do with the well-being of a child?

If people of the same gender want to care for children, they will care for children whether they live together or they don't.

What is it of marriage that we're talking about here? The fact is, marriage is in the head and in the heart. You are only as married as you want to be married. I don't care what paper you've signed, what the law says. People who come together who honestly and truly love and care and share the relationship of people are, within the context of their head and heart, married. Should the state give any care whether or not they are of the same gender if it's a loving, caring, honest relationship? No. It has no business making definition or commentary on it.

But we have got to respect the institution of marriage as it is defined, not just within the statutes but within the sanctity of those who believe it is a sacrament before God, and there are hundreds and hundreds of years of history that define it that way.

So let us be very, very clear that people of the Jewish faith, people who are of the Muslim faith, the Hindu faith, the Sikh

[ Page 5743 ]

faith, the Catholic faith -- Christians, generally -- all have

definitions and concepts within the sacrament of the term "marriage." It has been the most fundamental right of passage for thousands of years. And what is the reason for that? It is to provide some measure of definition of the rights of the children born to the union. That's what it is about. And if this bill is about children, then let's stop fiddling around with nonsensical -- and I mean that with no disrespect --

definitions of the concept of spouse, and let's get down to what I believe the Charter talks about, and that is the fundamental right of every individual to equal benefit under the law.

If we're talking about benefits and the applications of benefits, let's talk about benefits. To me, it makes no difference if I come before whatever authority and say: "This is the person to whom I wish to have my benefits apply." What does the state care if we're in a marriage-like relationship or not, and how in the hell did they define it? Excuse my language, but I get carried away.

Why should the state interfere in my personal relationship, beyond the fact that we each have individual rights to have those benefits applied -- as the Charter provides? It can be done now within the confines of the laws as they exist. It does not require this amendment. Neither does it mean that we have to change the definition of spouse.

I will tell you this. We hear a lot about equality. It was raised in the context of these amendments, and a number of people said that this deals with equality. That's rubbish! Equality doesn't mean sameness. We can be equal under the law and still each of us be defined differently on the basis of our age, the institutions that we tend to join or the religion that we practise. It doesn't mean we're not equal because we are different.

And if that applied under the Charter provisions as the definition so loosely defined over here on equality -- and we hear it all over the place -- that every person must be equal to every other person . . . . We're not. We never can be. But we must have equal opportunity under the law, and we must have equal access to the benefits that the law provides us. There is nothing to prohibit that from occurring within the confines of this act -- without getting into a change in the definition of spouse.

[3:45]

Let me just for a moment look at the amendment specifically. The amendment under

section 1(

a) that's being put forward by the member for Richmond-Steveston defines a domestic partner -- and keep in mind that that not only is now going to be important throughout the Family Relations Act but will also have provisions within a number of other statutes that will apply. It says: " 'domestic partner' means a person who, except under parts 5 and 6, lived with another person for a period of at least 2 years in a close, personal relationship that is of primary importance in both persons' lives and which has the attributes of permanence, physical intimacy, sharing and interdependence . . . .

" Well, that could be my son or daughter, depending on how you define physical intimacy. When they hurt and they cried, and I held them and I hugged them, and I stroked their hair at night, that's as physically intimate as a person can ever be with another. If you've ever been a parent, you'll know.

It goes on to say: " . . . except under parts 5 and 6, lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship . . . . " What does that mean? What does marriage-like mean? And why does that have any bearing whatsoever on a child who, after the splitting up of two people who have lived together, requires adequate resources for the child to be adequately and properly cared for? Why is this even relevant?

I'll tell you the downside to this definition and the reason I can't support the amendment. It does not speak to the distinction that is made between the term "parent" and the term "father" or "mother," because once we get into the question of father and mother, we have to get into the question of whether we're talking about biological father or biological mother, or whether we're talking about a stepfather or a stepmother, or how we're dealing with that relationship.

Not only is that important in the definition and distinction in the Family Relations Act and the Marriage Act, but it becomes important in the inheritance act . . . . It doesn't talk about, in the inheritance act . . . . It doesn't say "responsible for a biological father." It says "for a father." Well, who is the father?

Similarly, we have to think this through carefully, because if we're talking about the rights of children in these relationships and we're going to sanctify, through this bill, the amendment and change to the definition of "spouse," we have to consider what the rights are of the children come into this new relationship. I don't think we've thought that one through, frankly.

I don't know whether or not we've really thought through what the rights of children who will now be in these new unions are going to be, to the extent that the biological father or mother is not on the scene or to the extent that the financial responsibility is applied against the parent but there are no rights of access to the child. Remember, as the Attorney General himself said, questions of access have a lot to do with the child's right. We haven't thought that through clearly at all.

So I'm going to oppose these amendments because they don't do anything except make the water far more murky than it already is. I would hope that we can really start to understand the fact that we can accomplish what is needed -- and that is adequate financial support for the children -- without going in this direction and this route. It can be done more simply; it can be done under existing legislation with a minor amendment.

If the government was really trying to introduce a change to the Marriage Act, then it should have had the courage to come out and do it straight up, and not try to do it through the back door, which is what they're doing in this bill.

T. Stevenson: For many of us, this is an emotional subject -- obviously for some more than others. I would like to start off by rereading a decision of a Supreme Court judge in the Egan and Nesbit case, directing this particularly to the member for West Vancouver-Capilano, who I must say I'm tempted to get into a far more partisan discussion with after his attack on me some time ago. But I will leave that for now and pick that up at a later date. The judge said: "It is possible to be pro-family without rejecting less traditional family forms.

It is not anti-family to support protection for non-traditional families. The traditional family is not the only family form, and non-traditional family forms may equally advance true family forms."

There is much discussion today around the term "spouse," obviously. From that same decision, Justice Cory had an important thing to say:

"The definition of 'spouse' as someone of the opposite sex reinforces the stereotype that homosexuals cannot and do not form lasting, caring, mutually supportive relationships with economic interdependence in the same manner as heterosexual couples. The appellant's relationship vividly demonstrates the error of that approach. The discriminatory impact cannot be deemed to be trivial when the legislation reinforces prejudicial attitudes based on such faulty stereotypes."

I've listened to and read over the amendments by the opposition, and the question that kept coming into my mind

[ Page 5744 ]

was: "Why are they doing this?" Is this to appease all of these people who are in opposition? Is this to appease the Catholic bishops who have come out so strongly opposed? It is my belief that this won't do it, anyway. It is my belief that those people who feel strongly about the term "spouse" will feel just as strongly about the definition of domestic partner -- which at first I read as domestic help, but I found out that that wasn't quite the case. So I would ask the opposition to rethink why it is that they feel this is necessary.

One of the speakers said that the term "spouse" is of great moral, symbolic importance, and I agree, but not just to heterosexuals; it is to gay and lesbian people, as well. That's what this is about: it's about equality.

As the member for West Vancouver-Garibaldi pointed out, there is a debate within the gay and lesbian community, but it is around the term "marriage." It is not around the term "spouse" -- at least, certainly not with the gay and lesbian people I know, and I have been active in that community for 20 years and have been receiving letters and phone calls from across the country. It's not around the term "spouse"; it is definitely around the term "marriage." The community is divided on that. Some see that as a heterosexual term and a word that they don't want.

Others say: "That may well be, but we want to choose whether or not we want to embark on this institution called marriage. We don't want Catholic bishops or others deciding whether or not one can marry." Again, that's off the point; we're talking about the term "spouse."

There has been much talk about respect, and I agree. But I can tell you about a number of letters I have got -- and there are not just a few; there are many -- that are very spiteful letters and that it's difficult for me to respect. I do not respect the homophobic views that I have heard over and over, even though I might respect the person, any more than I respect the racist views of some people, although I can respect the person and try to talk to them about why I don't think racism should be upheld and why we pass laws against such things. So yes, I am willing to respect people, but no, I am not willing to respect everyone's views just because they have a point of view.

I would also like to speak a little about the issue of whether or not the government should be taking the lead. It was suggested yesterday that we should be reflecting the views of the constituency -- of these people who have such diametrically opposed views. If we felt that way about capital punishment, for instance, we'd still be hanging people today. I think that the government has taken and must continue to take the lead, as it is doing in this particular bill.

I reject this new definition of domestic partner, because it now sets up two categories of people. It doesn't move towards equality; in fact, it moves in the other direction, in my opinion. The member for West Vancouver-Garibaldi said that gay and lesbian people didn't want any more labels. Well, that's precisely what the opposition is giving them: a brand-new label, when one, "spouse," should suffice for heterosexual couples as well as for gay and lesbian couples.

I was also concerned about how people are embracing certain parts of this legislation. For instance, some members said that they liked the idea that responsibilities were expanded -- that gay and lesbian couples now had more responsibilities. I agree with that, but I don't want that in isolation without the rights. People balk, saying: "They don't want 'spouse,' but as long as we're giving more responsibilities, let's do that." They go hand in hand: rights and responsibilities.

[G. Brewin in the chair.]

I'm sure you're all aware that yesterday the Anglican church came out in favour of this legislation -- four bishops. I was very pleased to see that, because it balanced the bishops that were opposed in their press statements two weeks ago.

I'm also very pleased today to read a letter that just arrived half an hour ago from the executive secretary of the United Church of Canada, which is, of course, my own denomination. The secretary writes:

"I am writing to express my support for your government with regard to bills 31 and 32, currently before the Legislature.

"The United Church of Canada has a history of supporting initiatives which extend the same rights and responsibilities to gay and lesbian persons as are currently in place for heterosexuals. The United Church would also be supportive of legislation which would seek to strengthen and protect families and their members, whatever the particular configuration of the family.

"With regard to same-sex partners, our church offers the same benefits and support to such couples as it does to any other committed relationship.

"I'm aware of the fact that you have received messages of opposition to these bills from some religious leaders. In response to this, three facts that are important to consider.

"First, despite the appearance created by a recent story in the Vancouver Sun , there is no consensus on the role played in our community by same-gender couples. Many of our congregations extend the blessing of the church to persons in covenanted" -- which means marriage-like, or marriage, if you wish -- "same-gender relationships. They would want their government to do no less.

"Second, for those who are opposed to same-gender relationships on religious grounds, the legislation which you propose does not prevent communities within our province from establishing their own ground rules for such relationships within their own community.

"Third, religious groups do have a right and responsibility to criticize government when they feel that a proposed action will do harm to the fabric of society. In the case of this legislation, I am confident that no harm will be done and that, in fact, the legislation will strengthen the family. From personal experience I know that some of the healthiest, some of the most creative and some of the most integral families are those parented by gays and lesbians. The legal recognition of the validity of such families cannot help but enhance and enrich our understanding of both the importance and the diversity of the family unit."

That is signed by the Rev. Dr. Brian Thorpe, executive secretary of the United Church of Canada, B.C. Conference.

[4:00]

In conclusion, Madam Speaker, I would just like to reiterate that from this side of the House, this is a matter of equality. We will be voting against the amendment, and we will be voting for the legislation.

I wish to thank all of the members for the debate. It has been thoughtful, and I have appreciated being part of it.

Hon. U. Dosanjh: Hon. Chair, this has not been an easy debate. I want to say that all of the members have participated in this debate with all the seriousness that it requires.

Let me deal with some of the issues that have been raised, and then I understand the hon. member for Richmond-Steveston wants to say something, since these are his amendments.

Let me first give some comfort to the hon. member for Powell River-Sunshine Coast. There is no attempt in this legislation to do indirectly what cannot be done directly by the province. The province is powerless in providing the capacity for anyone to marry in British Columbia, because that capacity is governed by the federal Parliament and federal common law. The province cannot change that, nor do we intend to change that, with this legislation.

[ Page 5745 ]

The provincial Marriage Act simply deals with the solemnization of marriages and procedures around marriages -- if you're under 16, what conditions are required to be met; and if you're over 16, what other conditions are required to be met. That's my understanding of the law as it is. I just want to make it clear, therefore, that there is no attempt here to provide any capacity to marry, nor am I sure whether the homosexual community wishes us, even if we had the power, to grant power to marry. That's not at issue in this debate.

The point has been made by many speakers that we're all willing to provide protection to children, rights around custody, access and maintenance for children. That's a wonderful thing. We forget that if we provide rights around custody, access and maintenance, there are corresponding rights of the parents with respect to that custody, access and maintenance.

In this particular instance, what we're trying to change is to extend those rights to, firstly, the children of same-sex couples, and secondly, the obligations as well as the rights to same-sex couples. I think that's an important distinction. One goes together with the other; you can't separate the two. It's important that we understand that.

My colleagues have made the point with respect to what the amendments attempt to do. I understand the honest intent behind these amendments, and we are trying to grapple with a difficult issue. We are trying to arrive at an objective, though by different routes, and I take the amendments that are made in that context. However, there is a flaw in the amendments, and that flaw is as follows.

What we have currently are two categories of couples in the family relations legislation -- that is, the ordinary married couples and common-law couples. What we will have, if we allow the "domestic partner" definition to be substituted for these changes, is three categories. That point has been made. With the utmost respect, I want to say most humbly that that in fact entrenches inequality rather than provides equality.

The other point I want to make is that the definition of domestic partner that is provided for in the amendment is so onerous a definition that I'm certain that there are many married couples across this land, both common-law or legally married, who would not meet that test. If they were tested under that definition, the rights that ordinarily flow to them now under the current legislation would not flow to them at all.

Therefore I think there is an element . . . . I say this most humbly and I could be wrong, and this is not to be critical but it's my view. I believe that we are entrenching an element of discrimination by providing for gay and lesbian couples a higher onus, a higher burden, to be able to gain some of the rights that might flow from meeting that test.

I want to say as well: let's assume that there is not a higher test; let's assume that it's the same test that other couples have to meet under those different

definitions. I believe, given the most liberal

interpretation of the amendment, that this amendment truly describes all the attributes of a marriage and of what spouses are to each other: how close they are; how interdependent they are; how emotionally linked they are; how physically intimate they are.

If this definition prescribes the attributes of spouses or a spousal relationship, then I believe we should have no hesitation in really going with the definitional changes that we have currently before the House, without the amendment. We should then in fact have the obligation to call a spouse a spouse and let the legislation proceed as it's presented, without the amendment. If we allow the amendments to proceed, it would, as between common-law couples and same-sex couples, provide for different tests.

I suggest and I submit that that is not a reasonable approach for that reason. I believe what we're trying to do is right a wrong and move in a positive direction. It is a difficult issue. We're all trying to wrestle with it, and I'm not suggesting that our approach is inherently better. I've basically indicated to you, the hon. opposition, that we believe, having considered all of what's presented by the amendment, that it is appropriate to reject the amendment and press on with the legislation -- this

section -- as it's presented.

G. Plant: I did want the opportunity to speak one more time, because frankly, before now, I had not heard from the other side of the House on the arguments they would put forward as to why the amendment does not do the things that they think it ought to. I want to spend a minute or two dealing with those arguments, now that I've heard them.

The first point I want to make is that the argument that this amendment represents an exercise in appeasement is not an argument that I find convincing on any level I choose to examine it. It seems to me an argument that calls into question the good faith of the amendments, and frankly, I don't find myself assisted by having to engage in a debate on whether something is in good faith. I think that argument is unhelpful and unnecessary.

Let me deal with some of the points made by the Attorney General and others as to the issues that are of concern to them. One of the points made is that this amendment would create a separate category and that that in itself is wrong. To that argument, I say with the greatest of respect and in all humility that that is to confuse form with substance. That is, it is the intention of this amendment to focus on substance rather than form.

I was much struck by the force of the points made yesterday by the member for New Westminster, when he said that we should look not at the details -- not look at this as lawyers -- but rather from the point and perspective of the value statements and the principles it represents. That is a point I find helpful in this context.

Yes, it would create a separate category of individuals in a statute -- again, I say with respect to the Attorney General, and notwithstanding what he says -- which is in fact filled with multiple categories of individuals. Step-parents of different forms, biological parents, adoptive parents, spouses of different forms, people who are parents and not step-parents -- there are lots of different classes of people.

There are lots of different legal statuses created in this bill and in other bills. I think that the creation of a different one -- one more category -- is not an expression in any way of a lack of equality or a further discrimination but is rather simply a device that is intended to give effect to equality in substance. I understand that point, but I don't accept it.

The next point that's made is that the test that would be required for someone to demonstrate that they are a domestic partner is too rigorous. I actually don't think that that statement is true, because what we will find when the courts of British Columbia eventually have to grapple with the phrase "marriage-like" -- which they're going to have to do if this bill passes in its present form -- what they're going to do is look to the decisions of other courts in other places, having to wrestle with what it is that's at the essence of these relationships.

[ Page 5746 ]

Frankly, they will find all of the terms that are in my amendment to be the very indicia of the nature of a relationship which is sufficiently serious, sufficiently important, sufficiently permanent and sufficiently stable to warrant the law stepping in and then imposing on the partners and members in those relationships serious and significant legal obligations. To put it more simply, the phrase "marriage-like" is, in effect, a synonym for that which I have said in my amendment. The Attorney General has his point of view on that; I have my point of view. I suppose time will tell, and we'll see. I think that that is the answer to the position of onerousness.

The last point I want to make, then, is a point about compromise. It is a point about how compromise is both real and difficult. Compromise is about recognizing that a sentence that begins with the words "I want" is not a sentence that necessarily leads to the conclusion "therefore I get." It is an exercise in realizing that sometimes we do not always get what we personally want. It is an exercise in realizing that we all have to sometimes compromise, take steps away from our personal set of values and beliefs towards the recognition that others believe strongly and in good faith in other propositions. If we do not attempt a bridge between them, then we're not doing our job.

[4:15]

In that connection, I want to read a few words from a very wonderfully interesting book called Risking Utopia by Irshad Manji. She asks this question:

"What can be reasonable hoped for? Recognizing that our aspirations wrestle with our limitations, this question asks what can be done in the here and now. It is about strategies as much as solutions.

"A growing segment of our world calls itself, or could be called, marginal: it does not easily fit into the mainstream. To fashion a genuinely civil and democratic society, the marginal must interact with the mainstream. As important, they must perceive themselves to be interacting -- that is, to be taken seriously."

I pause to say that the marginal may be the marginal on any side of any number of issues.

"But they are currently caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, the mainstream does not always accept their efforts. If the marginal want to belong, they have to bend so much that they cannot remain true to themselves. They are forbidden from bringing anything truly new to the table, so their participation is negated. On the other hand, if the marginal refuse to bend, and retrench into identity cliques as their only source of affinity, society will never be transformed. It will hurtle further toward calcified borders, a cynical public, unresponsive institutions and poisoned daily politics."

So compromise is difficult. This amendment is, in some respects, about compromise. In fact, that is primarily what it is about. It is about an attempt to find an accommodation between diverse points of view. I urge it upon the government as being a positive and constructive way forward through what has been acknowledged here to be a difficult and often emotional debate.

G. Wilson: Before voting on this amendment, I wonder if I might get a clarification from the Attorney General. I understood him to say that the marriage of people was something that was constituted federally and that the province had no ability to amend or change that. I wonder if the Attorney General might explain what he meant by that in light of

section 20 of the Marriage Act, under civil marriage, which reads:

"A marriage may be contracted before and solemnized by a marriage commissioner under a licence under this Act and on payment of a prescribed fee if (

a) the marriage is contracted in a public manner in the presence of the marriage commissioner and 2 or more witnesses, (

b) each of the parties to the marriage in the presence of the marriage commissioner and the witnesses declares, 'I solemnly declare that I do not know of any lawful impediment why I, A.B., may not be joined in matrimony to C.D.', and (

c) each of the parties to the marriage says to the other, 'I call on those present to witness that I, A.B., take C.D. to be my lawful wedded wife (or husband).' "

Furthermore, under

section 30, which is the validity of marriages preserved;

section 31, which is the appointment of the issuer of a marriage licence, which is done by the province;

section 32, under which the marriage commissioner is provided; and

section 34, under which certificates of evidence . . . . All of this would tell me that on a change of definition with respect to what constitutes husband or wife, which is removed by the bill that is before us right now, that in fact will, I would think, provide significant recourse to those who wish in a court of law to provide that the Marriage Act is no longer valid if it prohibits same-sex marriages.

Hon. U. Dosanjh: The remarks that I made earlier were in fact borne out by the sections the hon. member refers to.

Section 20 essentially prescribes a procedure for this marriage, and then

section 34, about the certificate of marriage . . . . That is simply so that a certificate can be produced as evidence in court of marriage having occurred pursuant to this act.

This act deals purely with how, where and when a marriage can be contracted and under what conditions. Capacity to marry cannot be given or bestowed upon anyone by the province. Inherent capacity to marry . . . . Whether I, as a man, could marry another man -- that goes to capacity, not to procedure. That is not something within the powers of the province to do.

G. Wilson: I understand that point; however, the important issue is with respect to

section 20(c), which reads: " . . . to be my lawful wedded wife (or husband)." Under the act that is before us now the definition of spouse, which currently reads "wife or husband" is removed. At that point the person under the new definition of spouse is put in place. Hence what I'm suggesting is that by virtue of the amendment that is before us, surely that changes a definition which currently speaks to it. I recognize that doesn't automatically amend the act. What I'm saying is that that surely provides opportunity for legal argument that would say, thereby, that this act is essentially no longer applicable.

Hon. U. Dosanjh: The answer is no, not true. Obviously one act doesn't automatically change another. That's true. The definition that is going to be changed in the Family Relations Act would apply for the purposes of that act to define those relationships for certain rights to flow from those relationships. The right to marry is not one of them.

G. Wilson: This is my last question on this, because we can better deal with this when we get back to the bill itself. Surely what the minister is saying, then, is that all of the rights and obligations are going to be provided to this new definition of spouse, which will include same-sex couples. So in effect, they will be under all the legal obligations of any married person, except that they don't have the right to marry. Clearly that is something that is going to have to be addressed.

Hon. U. Dosanjh: The Attorney General doesn't usually give legal advice, but I will do my best to simply say to you that the Family Relations Act definition does not apply to any other piece of legislation in British Columbia except for the rights that flow from these

definitions within the context of

[ Page 5747 ]

this legislation, unless the Family Relations Act is specifically mentioned somewhere else. By reference, those rights can be incorporated elsewhere; otherwise they can't be. Therefore there is no danger. In fact, I can tell you -- I said this yesterday and I've said this before -- that I am going to be ordering a comprehensive review of all of the legislation in British Columbia to make sure that we may proceed towards full equality. Even if we do so, we still will not be able to provide the right to marry; that's federal.

The Chair: Seeing no further speakers, I will put the amendments to the assembly. The amendments are to sections 1(a), 1(

c) and 1(

d) of Bill 31. I'm going to be dealing with them all together, but I want to make sure that the members know that all those three will be done in one vote now.

[4:30]

Amendments negatived on the following division:

YEAS -- 28

Dalton

Gingell

Campbell

Farrell-Collins

Plant

Sanders

Stephens

de Jong

Coell

Anderson

Nebbeling

Whittred

Thorpe

Penner

Krueger

McKinnon

Masi

Nettleton

Coleman

Chong

Weisbeck

Jarvis

Abbott

Hawkins

C. Clark

Hansen

Reitsma

J. Wilson

NAYS -- 34

Evans

Zirnhelt

McGregor

Boone

Hammell

Streifel

Pullinger

Farnworth

Kwan

Waddell

Calendino

Stevenson

Bowbrick

Giesbrecht

Walsh

Kasper

Orcherton

Hartley

Petter

G. Clark

Dosanjh

MacPhail

Cashore

Ramsey

Sihota

Randall

Sawicki

Lali

Doyle

Gillespie

Robertson

Smallwood

Janssen

G. Wilson

The Chair: I declare the amendment lost. That will also affect the amendments to

section 1.1 and sections 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 18 and 22, which are therefore out of order; they are consequential amendments.

G. Wilson: I'm assuming, and I'd like confirmation, that because we are adding the

section that deals with the definition of child support guidelines which reads, " 'child support guidelines' means the child support guidelines established by regulation under

section 129 for the calculation of maintenance awards," there are other areas in which Bill C-41, which is a federal statute, is now applicable with respect to the Family Relations Act and the Family Maintenance Enforcement Act, and that the new calculation that is talked about here brings into conformity the grid that is established in Bill C-41. I wonder if the minister might confirm that.

Hon. U. Dosanjh: I didn't catch the question completely, but if the hon. member's question is what those regulations are going to be, at this time we are going to be incorporating into the regulations the federal child support guidelines pursuant to the Divorce Act.

G. Wilson: So the answer to my question is yes, it will include the grid that is established under Bill C-41. It then brings into conformity the provincial Family Relations Act with the Divorce Act -- something that is not a bad thing. If we can look to the good things, that's not necessarily a bad thing, although that doesn't mean that we like the federal bill, which is another issue.

Given that it does bring it into conformity, there are a number of areas within Bill C-41 -- and I will leave it to your ruling how far we want to stray into debate on a bill that has already passed the Commons and is in effect now -- where, particularly in the application of variance orders, the grid can be varied on the basis of a number of different circumstances. That becomes very complicated when you look at our Family Relations Act, but more particularly the Family Maintenance Enforcement Act, which we have here.

I wonder if the minister might tell us how much consultation took place with the province in advance of establishing the grid, how much input we had into the setting of the rates within the grid and whether or not he has an opinion as to how much autonomy the province might decide to show in relation to variance orders that are more properly governed, I think, under our Family Maintenance Enforcement and Family Relations acts.

Hon. U. Dosanjh: The courts will have some jurisdiction to vary those orders from those guidelines.

Interjection.

Hon. U. Dosanjh: Deviate is not the appropriate word; courts never deviate. Courts will have some jurisdiction to vary their orders or make their orders different from the guidelines if they so choose, based on the factors that are enumerated in our legislation.

We are going to be monitoring the guidelines that we append to this legislation, at least for a year or so, to see if we need to make some changes. At this time, for the sake of uniformity, we are going to be completely incorporating those guidelines into our legislation.

Yes, we were involved right from the beginning in terms of drafting and considering those guidelines. There may be several concerns with respect to those guidelines. One of them comes to mind -- that is, what may be an appropriate amount in the lower mainland may not be an appropriate amount somewhere else in the province. So we're going to monitor the application of these guidelines for a year or so and see if we need to make any significant changes.

G. Wilson: I'm just trying to establish some baselines under this particular section, because I think the whole issue needs to be more thoroughly debated under

section 93. I think that's probably a more appropriate place to pick this up.

The minister does make reference to some of the many concerns there are with this: the whole question of differential support payments on the basis of where one lives and also one's occupation in terms of seasonal employment. Those sorts of things are issues of concern. I'm interested to hear that there was wide consultation with the government. I'm now questioning how much consultation the government had with family lawyers and also with more broadly based

organiza-

[ Page 5748 ]

tions within the community who have been established to monitor, to make reference and to provide advice on these matters.

Hon. U. Dosanjh: I understand that the federal government consulted with all of those groups as they were developing these guidelines, and they consulted with us, as well. Now I see the hon. member is shaking his head. Obviously we're not going to resolve that issue here.

We have determined that those guidelines are the appropriate things to incorporate. The family lawyers are aware of these guidelines. They were in fact waiting for these guidelines to be implemented. We are late in bringing in this legislation.

The guidelines have been effective, pursuant to the Divorce Act, as of May 1 this year. I haven't come across much criticism of the guidelines, except that I attended the family law conference on Friday and one of the lawyers talked to me afterwards and indicated that there might be some problems with respect to these guidelines. I gave her the same answer as I'm giving you -- that is, we would be monitoring the implementation of these guidelines across the province and see what changes we might need to make next year.

G. Wilson: I doubt that you will get much complaint from the lawyers. The people who are going to have concern are the people who are subjected to pay them. That's not the lawyers. In fact, lawyers get paid for arguing to get the maintenance paid, if you follow my reasoning.

Clearly the guidelines and the amount of dollars that the guidelines require are the subject of another bill. It's not an issue that we can get at too deeply here, and again, perhaps the proper place to do that is later in the bill rather than under this definition -- except to say that by introducing by regulation, I'm pleased to hear that there is going to be a period of review. That gives little comfort, however, to people who are on the list of lawyers lined up to take back variance agreements, as has occurred in other provinces where this bill has been put forward.

Under the guidelines, what is provided now is that for existing maintenance orders -- maintenance orders that are currently in place on the application of one party -- the lawyer may go before the court and simply have that new grid applied, even though there is an established maintenance order in place and even though that maintenance order may have been completely complied with without complaint.

So this is simply a ticket for one party or the other to increase the amount of revenue they get, if they look at the guidelines and see that under the new grid they're "entitled" on the basis of a Commons committee to get more money. That has occurred certainly in the other provinces, as we've monitored it. It gives little comfort to those people who will be subjected to that, even though a judge presumably has made an award with respect to support on the basis of what the judge believes is in the best interests of the children and is affordable by the non-custodial parent. I wonder if the Attorney General might have a comment with respect to that.

Hon. U. Dosanjh: I can understand the hon. member's concern. Whenever there is a change in procedures that have been followed for years by lawyers or clients -- people involved in these disputes -- there is a certain degree of discomfort. I can appreciate that there would be that degree, if not more, of discomfort around these changes.

The decision has been made for reasons of uniformity. I'm hoping that once this regime kicks into effect in British Columbia, we may have fewer applications before the courts to have orders made and varied by the courts. In many instances, for people who are earning a living, it is very easily quantifiable as to what their income is. Any individual can look at the table and decide what should be paid under these guidelines. We're hoping that it will lead to less court activity and less fees for lawyers like me, which is a good thing for people. I think that's the intent here. I know there is a certain degree of discomfort, and I appreciate that.

G. Wilson: Well, I think we're going to avoid the latter part, because it gets into a debate that really doesn't have any bearing on this bill. It has more bearing on the dollar bill.

On the first point, as a point of law, I wonder if in establishing the regulations for this bill, the Attorney General considered that the province might exempt people of British Columbia, who have an established court order for maintenance payment and who have been making that payment, from essentially an application to the court by the party who simply wants to increase the amount, because a Commons committee which has absolutely no knowledge whatever of the salient points of the case at hand, which has no knowledge of why the judge made the award in the manner that the judge made the award, which has absolutely no knowledge of the individual circumstances of either the custodial or the non-custodial parent . . . .

A Commons committee came up with this arbitrary set of guidelines -- and it is arbitrary -- that now an established court order, which has been complied with in some cases for many years, can be varied simply because the province has decided to blend the Family Relations Act and the Divorce Act on this question. On a point of law, I wonder how the Attorney General feels about the Commons being able to essentially amend what is an established court order for payment.

[4:45]

Hon. U. Dosanjh: I don't believe the federal government is amending our legislation. We're doing it deliberately and consciously. The federal government amended their matters with respect to the Divorce Act and what follows therefrom, and they're at liberty and within their jurisdiction to do that. So that we're all uniform across the country, we are going to incorporate the same guidelines into our legislation.

What the hon. member is asking in terms of grandparenting existing orders would be something like this. If we were to bring in the Family Relations Act regime today and not 20 years ago when it was done, where there was no division of property available to women mainly, one could argue that we should grandparent all the couples who were married prior to that day and that they should have no right to division of property based on the new law. Only the new couples that get married should have that. I think that would lead to all kinds of inequities. When law changes, it changes for everyone.

I know that a certain destabilizing effect occurs, and that's inevitable, but we're prepared for it. We're going to have 20 family courts across the province assisting people with variations and the like that they need to make. I appreciate what the hon. member is saying -- that a policy decision has been made. If there are any difficulties that are major and significant, we'll deal with them.

G. Wilson: So on a point of law, what the minister is saying by way of his example -- which I don't accept -- and if I can use a comparison, is that if the posted speed limit was 60 in a zone up until Tuesday evening and on Wednesday they posted it to 40, those people that were travelling 60 previously

[ Page 5749 ]

were in violation of the new posting. I mean, it's a court order that has been established on the basis of some judge presumably sitting down and weighing the evidence in front of him or her and making an order with respect to a maintenance payment. Now, that judge has had the detail of the case in front of them. A court order has been made; full compliance has occurred. The only condition that has been required in order for that court order to be varied is the fact that this new grid is in place, and it provides for one or the other party to simply make application to the court to have the grid applied. That's the only reason. It has nothing whatsoever to do with the original order.

Hon. U. Dosanjh: We agree to disagree, and I've indicated all the reasons why we're doing this. But, in the example the hon. member gives, if you had a vehicle that was . . . . If the speed limit was 60, and you agreed with someone to have your vehicle fixed at 60 kilometres per hour, and you never went higher or lower than 60 kilometres per hour until the day a new law was changed, you would then have to change the speed of your vehicle when the law was changed. It's not that you were retroactively doing something wrong; it is that from the day the new speed limit comes into place, if you continue to go 60, you'd be doing something that's illegal.

I don't really want to get into this debate. I think it's appropriate that you raise these issues, and I've given you my concerns. No, those people who had orders made by courts, appropriately, were living within the law. Now the circumstances and the reasons and the guidelines would be changed as of the day this legislation, once passed, comes into effect. If they continue to do that by consent, the two parties to whom the order applies can actually, by consent, remain outside the guidelines. That's a provision that's available to them.

But one party cannot force the other party to not go and apply for a new order under the new guidelines. If you continue to provide the same amount of money that you were ordered to pay pursuant to a court order, and the court decides that you should be paying something different, from the moment the court decides that you should be paying something different, you would be violating the court order that would now be made pursuant to this legislation.

G. Wilson: So you're guilty of speeding unless everybody agrees it's okay. Let me stop the analogy and come back to this particular point. What the Attorney General is saying -- and I want this to be clear, because I think the record needs to say it; it's going to affect many, many British Columbians -- is that where a court order has been made on the basis of the detail that's in front of the judge, and when full compliance with that order has occurred, by virtue of this act and the regulations which will be brought in, which brings us into compliance with Bill C-41 . . . .

Well, the Attorney General is saying no. The fact of the matter is that in this act, we can say that within the province there can be protection for those people where there is an existing court order. We can do that.

Hon. U. Dosanjh: A decision has been made to not discriminate based on existing orders; the decision has been made to not grandparent existing orders. However, the day this law comes into effect, if and when it's passed -- and if we continue at this rate, it might be many days and weeks -- and receives assent and becomes the law, either party to that existing order would have the right to approach the other party to change the order, by consent, and failing that -- or without that, in fact -- can go to court directly to change the order. Once that order is then changed pursuant to the order, the new order obviously is in effect and the old order is null and void.

So it is not automatically that what you have been doing is wrong. It is that either party can go and have it varied pursuant to these guidelines, or change it by consent.

G. Wilson: Let's be quite clear. Where there are areas . . . . The truth of the matter is this: where conflict continues between spouses, and support payments that are being made are lower than what is in the grid, they're going to go back to court and get more money. They're going to say, "Pay me the money you owe me, because it's in the grid, or I'm going to go to the court," and unless there is a proof of hardship, the judge will really have no recourse but to assign the new grid.

Effectively, Parliament has imposed a support payment that overrules . . . . The Attorney General is saying that we're changing the rules. The point is that the rules previously were left to the discretion of a judge who presumably heard evidence. What Parliament has done is say: "Be damned the evidence; we're going to set this rate based on your income." That's exactly what Parliament has done, unless the minister is prepared to tell me that in British Columbia we are going to have, as part of the law, consideration of the income of the custodial parent. Are we going to have that?

Hon. U. Dosanjh: Yes, judges had discretion. Yes, they took into account the incomes, the needs, the tax consequences of both parties when they made those orders. Yes, the judges will not have as much discretion under these guidelines, and that's a deliberate policy on the part of this government and the federal government, because we want to make sure that we take away all of the aggravation and the frustration that's caused by unnecessary, numerous applications before the courts just to get some maintenance.

When people look at the chart, they know what they have to pay. That's how simple this is. I understand that the hon. member is saying that the previous process was different. Yes, but it doesn't necessarily mean that it was more just.

G. Wilson: You won't get an argument with me there, and I'm not sure that this is going to be any more just, frankly. Time will tell. I don't think any of us know whether or not this new system is going to be better or worse in terms of fairness in the system. I think what we have to do is wait and see how it goes, which is why I'm pleased that I heard that there was going to be a review.

The question that I asked is: in the deliberations that took place between the federal government and the provincial government in establishing the calculation for maintenance awards as put out in this definition here, did the provincial government at any time say that one of the issues that needs to be considered in the establishment of the grid is the income of the custodial parent?

Hon. U. Dosanjh: All of those permutations and combinations were obviously discussed by the group that dealt with this issue. Assumptions were probably made that both parties made the some amount of money; assumptions were also made that both parties made different amounts of money. At the end of the day, I think the rationale behind this approach is that if you are a non-custodial parent, you should be contributing proportionate to your earnings towards the well-being of the children.

The implicit assumption is that the custodial parent would obviously be providing a certain lifestyle for the children which is commensurate with his or her income added to the support and maintenance that he or she may receive from the non-custodial parent.

[ Page 5750 ]

Sometimes -- in fact, quite often -- we ignore the fact that without any orders being made, custodial parents contribute to the support, maintenance, guidance and welfare of the children -- perhaps much more than the non-custodial parents ever could. In fact, it is much easier, my hon. friend, to pay a certain amount of money than to look after children and to contribute even a minimal amount financially towards the well-being of the children, as well.

I can tell you. I have three sons and they're now 19, 22 and 23. It hasn't been easy for the two of us, my wife and myself, to bring up those children with relatively large amounts of money that both of us have been making, with the busy lives that we've been leading. In fact, the custodial parent is left with all of the responsibility -- financial as well as social and all of the other responsibilities. In fact, in many instances, if the custodial parent is also working in addition to looking after the children, there is no time on the hands of the custodial parent.

I don't really want to get into this debate of the non-custodial parent paying a large amount of money and therefore being somehow penalized. That is simply not acceptable to me. I have done enough family law to know how aggravating it is for custodial parents, mostly women, with the significant amounts of support that they receive in some cases, to make a go of their lives looking after their children.

G. Wilson: I'm tempted to get drawn into that debate. I'm not going to, because it will . . . . I'll just put this on the record and leave it: I don't know many non-custodial parents who have lost custody of their children and who think that's easier. I don't know very many of them that think