First Session, 43rd Parliament

Official Report

of Debates

( Hansard )

Thursday, November 20, 2025

Afternoon Sitting

Issue No. 102

The Honourable Raj Chouhan , Speaker

ISSN 1499-2175

The HTML transcript is provided for informational purposes only.

The PDF transcript remains the official digital version.

Contents

Routine Business

Tributes

Chris Allnutt

Hon. Jennifer Whiteside

Orders of the Day

Committee of the Whole

Bill 20 — Construction Prompt Payment Act (continued)

Steve Kooner

Hon. Niki Sharma

Misty Van Popta

Kiel Giddens

Reporting of Bills

Bill 20 — Construction Prompt Payment Act

Third Reading of Bills

Bill 20 — Construction Prompt Payment Act

Committee of the Whole

Bill 21 — Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act (N o . 2), 2025 (continued)

Hon. Niki Sharma

Steve Kooner

Proceedings in the Douglas Fir Room

Committee of the Whole

Bill 25 — Housing and Municipal Affairs Statutes Amendment Act, 2025 (continued)

Linda Hepner

Hon. Christine Boyle

Lynne Block

Ward Stamer

Tony Luck

Trevor Halford

David Williams

Thursday, November 20, 2025

The House met at 1:01 p.m.

[The Speaker in the chair.]

Routine Business

Tributes

Chris Allnutt

Hon. Jennifer Whiteside : I rise in the House today to pay tribute to a person who was just a gem of a human

being and who worked tirelessly for the common good in our province, leaving a significant

legacy to British Columbians. Chris Allnutt will be remembered as a loving husband

and father, a wonderful friend and colleague, former HEU secretary–business manager

and project director at Rainforest Solutions Project.

Chris’s wife, Jean, and their son, Patrick, join us in the gallery today.

I also want to really extend my gratitude to my colleague the member for Oak Bay–Gordon

Head for her support to Chris and Jean and their family in his later years.

Chris was a key figure in his role as the chief spokesperson and chief negotiator

for HEU in advocating for health care workers and for our public health care system

in a time of great change in the 1990s. That was a very heady time as the NDP government

of the day began to implement a more community-focused public health care service

model. A new B.C. health accord would pave the way to bring together unions, employers

and government to craft this new vision of how we care for British Columbians together.

Chris had such a unique combination of serious policy chops, a keen strategic vision

and a moral compass absolutely dedicated to standing up for working people. His skills

and his values helped bring the accord to life, a completely innovative agreement

that provided stability and security for health care and health care workers in a

time of profound change.

He led the fight for pay equity for the predominantly female health support services

workforce. In 2002, when the B.C. Liberal government of the day introduced the most

draconian and cruel bill, with the intended purpose to privatize health care services

and break the union, he led health care workers into the fight of a lifetime, against

Bill 29.

By the time of the landmark 2007 Supreme Court decision ruling Bill 29 unconstitutional,

Chris had moved on to work on another massive campaign so close to his heart and so

deeply embedded within his values. He joined the Rainforest Solutions Project as its

project director. His incredible work, again bringing together different groups to

a common table, resulted in a tripartite agreement between the provincial government,

First Nations and corporate interests in 2016, and it has been heralded as a breakthrough

in land use and shared futures.

[1:05 p.m.]

For my part, I just feel very lucky that he took a chance on a young CUPE activist

and hired me to work at HEU in the late 1990s. It was an honour to work with him,

and I will always remember his ability to listen, his open door and his calm, resolute,

principled leadership.

After suffering from Parkinson’s disease for more than 15 years, he opted for MAiD,

medical assistance in dying, on September 21, at age 74.

He leaves behind his beloved wife, Jean; their beloved son, Patrick; family and many

friends and colleagues with whom he helped shape a better world.

He will be remembered, and we miss him.

The Speaker : Thank you, Minister. I also had the opportunity to work with Chris for many, many

years when I was with the HEU. I fondly remember working with him.

Orders of the Day

Hon. Mike Farnworth : Before I call the orders, I just want to notify the House…. I know that often this

time of the year, there is an issue of will we finish early, or will we be sitting

till the full December 4. I know that there is often the discussion in the halls,

but I will inform the House today that sometimes things are unavoidable. The government

will be tabling one more piece of legislation on Monday of next week, so there will

be plenty of work to keep us occupied until the fourth of December.

With that, I call, in this chamber, continued committee stage on Bill 20.

In the Douglas Fir Room,

Section A, I call continued committee stage on Bill 25.

The House in Committee,

Section B.

The committee met at 1:09 p.m.

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

Committee of the Whole

Bill 20 — Construction Prompt

Payment Act

(continued)

The Chair : Members, I’ll call the committee to order. We’re continuing Committee of the Whole

for Bill 20, Construction Prompt Payment Act, on clause 44.

Clause 44 approved.

On clause 45.

Steve Kooner : Clause 45 refers to immunity of adjudicators. I’ll just read this clause for the

record: “Subject to subsection (2), no legal proceeding for damages lies or may be

commenced or maintained against an adjudicator because of anything done or omitted

in the exercise or intended exercise of a power under this Act, or in the performance

or intended performance of a duty under this act. Subsection (1) does not apply to

an adjudicator in relation to anything done or omitted in bad faith.”

[1:10 p.m.]

Perhaps the Attorney General can explain the intent of clause 45.

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is a pretty common protection for decision-makers in a dispute. It has the added

benefit of ensuring that there isn’t an expansion of the disputes that are related

to this, because the whole point is for it to be efficient and effective and narrow.

So it protects the adjudicator, except if there’s anything done or omitted in bad

faith.

Steve Kooner : In regard to the last few words there, I think it’s important to know, when we’re

talking about bad faith and there’s an exemption for bad faith, for adjudicator immunity….

What does that mean — bad faith?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is another one of these common legal terms that have a lot of meaning in adjudication.

It’s pretty common to have these terms like “bad faith.” An example of that would

be if an adjudicator operated or took conduct of a matter but they were in conflict

of interest and they shouldn’t have done that.

Steve Kooner : The Attorney General rightfully pointed out that this is a common legal term that

is often discussed in the general sense, bad faith. But with this term, also, sometimes

there are similar words used, such as “negligence” or “incompetence” or “being reckless.”

This specifically carves out if there’s bad faith. An adjudicator knowingly does bad

conduct, and then they get exempted from immunity.

Could there be an explanation why we’re not talking about negligence, reckless behaviour

or gross negligence? I guess, rather than negligence, we should be talking about gross

negligence and recklessness. Both of those….

When we’re talking in the criminal legal sphere, when we’re talking about gross negligence

and talking about recklessness, sometimes that amounts to behaviour of conduct unbecoming

or even borderline, maybe, perhaps at times, criminal or quasi-criminal.

Is there a reason why only bad faith was considered here and gross negligence was

not, or being wilfully blind?

Sometimes people know the circumstances. They just don’t want to turn their mind to

something. They just don’t want to know about it, because they know there’s something

wrong with it. Then if they turn their mind to it, they know they’re going to be accused

of bad faith.

So wilfully blind, recklessness, gross negligence — why was that not all included

here?

[1:15 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is a very common…. It is the protection that we use for decision-makers in B.C.,

the standard of bad faith. Just for clarity, that means things like fraud or malicious

conduct, things that are of that kind of nature. It’s part of the spectrum of protections

to make sure that the adjudicator has the integrity that they need.

I think we talked about some of the other ones previously, about the code of conduct

being an important way of whether you’re rostered or not and the judicial review procedures

that are there to challenge if there are breaches of rules of procedural fairness.

It’s a range of protections against, really, adjudicators that probably shouldn’t

be adjudicating.

Clause 45 approved.

On clause 46.

Steve Kooner : For the record, I’m just going to read this clause out. This clause has to do with

testimonial immunity: “An adjudicator may not be compelled to give evidence in any

action or other proceeding in relation to a dispute that was the subject of an adjudication

that the adjudicator conducted.”

Can the Attorney General please explain this clause?

Hon. Niki Sharma : It’s an additive of the type of immunity in the previous provision, and it extends

to testimonial immunity. So it protects adjudicators from being drawn into prolonged

legal disputes over their determinations.

Steve Kooner : Perhaps the Attorney General can confirm or deny this. This is a fairly common provision

for arbitrators, quasi…. Judges are usually not called for testimony, correct?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Yes.

Clause 46 approved.

On clause 47.

Steve Kooner : We’re moving on to a different part,

part 6, “General.” Each piece of legislation

usually has some general provisions towards the end, so we’re getting there.

Clause 47 states: “Section 14 (2) of the

Interpretation Act does not apply in relation

to this Act. A provision in a contract that provides that this Act is not to apply,

or that the remedies provided by this Act are not to be available for a person’s benefit,

is void.”

Perhaps the Attorney General can explain this clause.

[1:20 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : Just to explain the two clauses here. The first one makes it very clear by exempting

section 14(2) of the

Interpretation Act that government and government projects are

part of this act because it exempts that provision of the

Interpretation Act. And

the second one just makes sure that parties can’t contract out of any of the application

or parts of this regime.

Clause 47 approved.

On clause 48.

Steve Kooner : The next clause here deals with the application of the Offence Act. This is a very

important part of the bill. It deals with if there are any penalties as a result of

any contraventions within this piece of legislation. “Application of Offence Act,”

clause 48, states: “Section 5 of the Offence Act does not apply to this act or the

regulations.”

Can I first get an explanation of this?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is to ensure that the prompt payment regime that’s put in here remains a civil

matter and doesn’t become an offence.

Steve Kooner : I understand that it may not involve the Offence Act. There might not be a criminal

issue or quasi-criminal issue, but sometimes there are civil remedies, as well, that

involve fines, and that’s relatively a civil matter too, I would assume.

Most acts do have some sort of element of a fine or something. How come the fine…?

Nothing like that was put in here, when specifically we did in a previous clause talk

about bad faith, where certain adjudicators would not get immunity if they exhibit

bad behaviour. So would there not be any repercussions for bad behaviour if you are…?

On one way, you’re saying that they’re not exempted if they do bad faith. So if they’ve

done bad faith, there’s nothing to kind of deal with those bad actors?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Just to say that if an adjudicator operates in bad faith or does something, they

may be subject, depending on the nature of it, to criminal offences or civil remedies.

That is possible.

The purpose of this clause is to make sure that if there’s a breach of a part of this

act, like, for example, failure to pay on time, there’s nothing…. All of the remedies

contained in the act are the remedies that that person has. They can’t look to the

Offence Act and create a parallel line of seeking that remedy. This is the regime.

Clause 48 approved.

On clause 49.

[1:25 p.m.]

Steve Kooner : We are now into regulations. We’ve spent a lot of time deferring a lot of questions,

and we’ve had a lot of discussion over regulations over many other clauses. Now we’re

here, so it’s important to go through this clause. But I’d like to go through each

subclause, because it actually covers a lot. There are a lot of subclauses here, and

it’s a few pages long, so I want to make sure that we’ve got an accurate understanding

of this whole clause for the record.

The first one, the first subclause, (a), deals with that the Lieutenant Governor in

Council may make regulations referred to in

section 41 of the

Interpretation Act.

Maybe the Attorney General can explain that first.

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is a convention in our legislative drafting in B.C. where this provision in

reference to

section 41 of the

Interpretation Act is included in all statutes of regulatory-making

power. If you refer to that section, it allows for regulations that are considered

necessary or advisable or ancillary or not inconsistent with the act and many other

subsections.

Steve Kooner : Thank you for that explanation.

Now we get into subclause (2), which reads: “Without limiting subsection (1), the

Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations as follows: respecting any matter

for which regulations are contemplated by this Act; (

b) respecting whether a person

is an owner, contractor or subcontractor for the purposes of this Act; and (

c) respecting

agreements for the purposes of

section 3 (substituted owners), including, without

limitation, respecting the contents of agreements or respecting who may or may not

enter into an agreement.”

Can the Attorney General explain this clause?

Hon. Niki Sharma : That subsection (

c) has a very particular purpose. If we refer back to clause 3,

this was a clause that had a power to make substituted owners. So we can imagine in

very complicated structures…. The act is very…. The trigger is you need to know who

the owner is, and then it triggers that pyramid that we talked about at the very beginning

of our debate, our committee stage.

[1:30 p.m.]

You need to know who that is, but there is in complicated structures this idea that

maybe somebody just needs to be designated as the owner somehow. So substitute owners

is that provision that allows for that. But in the operation of that, you want to

make sure that it’s not being used to kind of run afoul of the purpose of the act

— for example, substituting an owner or picking the owner that, I don’t know, in one

scenario, doesn’t have all the money or something that makes it so it’s actually doing

the opposite of what we intend it to do.

So in the wisdom of the policy team and the drafters, they put in a regulatory-making

power there, in the case that clause 3 was used in a way that it wasn’t intended.

Steve Kooner : Yeah, I remember that clause. It was really complicated to understand because there’s

a chain of, I guess you can call them, parties or actors. Once you get the general

contractor, then you have the subcontractor, but then that subcontractor might contract

to another subcontractor, and it just continues and continues. I remember, from back

then, in that clause, there’s a certain time limit to kind of get everybody paid.

It was a little bit complicated to understand. So I think it’s important to, kind

of, have shed some light in terms of having a further clause here that actually speaks

about that and that particular chain, as well, here.

I don’t really have too many other questions on this. Well, I don’t have any other

question on subsection (2), so I’m going to move on to the next part of it.

I guess the answer that was supplied was to like (a), (

b) and (c). I’d just like to

get some light shed on (d): “respecting whether something is a service or a material

or whether or when a service or material is supplied for the purposes of this Act.”

Now, this is a very important thing, because this is all about services and materials.

You have the parties. That’s one important thing. And the second important thing is,

“What’s the dispute about?” — services that are supplied, materials that are supplied.

Now, this talks about that second important thing. It’s important to know what the

regulation would do in regards to the services and materials that were supplied now

that they’re in dispute.

Maybe we can get elaboration of this.

Hon. Niki Sharma : Yes. That subsection is to…. We had an earlier discussion related to the definition

of service and material. We talked about that, I think, at the beginning, how it’s

meant to be in the broadest term. And there were some questions related to it. Is

an IT included in that?

And yes, we’ve designed them to be the broadest categories of things for service or

material. But in the case there’s any confusion of what is a service or material,

and we’re seeing that show up in the system, we have a regulatory-making power to

remedy that, to list it as a service or maybe not as a service.

Steve Kooner : That was helpful.

This next subclause is, I guess, the most…. It touches on an area that was probably

the most confusing for me when I was trying to understand this piece of legislation.

That was the calculation of when you had to deal with a subsequent subcontractor.

This subsection (

e) actually deals with a calculation and those time periods. So (

e) reads: “respecting the calculation of days for the purposes of this Act.”

Maybe the Attorney General can shed some light on this and add an example of how it

would work for those subcontractors that are in line. How would this work?

[1:35 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : The default for calculation of days is found in the

Interpretation Act, and that,

barring any regulation made under here, would be how you would calculate the days.

We talked about how, in phase 2 of the implementation phase, we’re going to be talking

to industry, and this is one of those areas where we will gather information from

industry on whether or not we should stick with the

Interpretation Act for the calculation

of days or if there’s a particular calculation of days that would be better for the

industry in this area.

For example, I think in some systems they don’t include the end of December as days

that could be calculated — things like that that you could put through regulation.

Steve Kooner : That’s very helpful because, like I said earlier, this is probably the most confusing

part, in terms of calculation of days and all that. Although it’s the most confusing

part, it’s probably the most important part of this legislation, because this whole

legislation is about prompt payment. It’s about how fast you can get that payment.

Calculation of days will play a significant role.

It’s good to hear that the Attorney General’s department will do some further consultation

with the industry to figure out what would work for the industry in terms of timing

and calculations and stuff. That’s helpful.

The next subclause is (f): “respecting when a record is given or issued or a payment

is made for the purposes of this Act, including, without limitation, providing when

a record or a payment sent, transmitted or delivered in a specified manner is deemed

to be given, issued or made.”

Perhaps the Attorney General can elaborate on that.

Hon. Niki Sharma : Another important regulatory-making power, because it’s related to the trigger of

delivery, so when somebody has received a proper invoice. This will give the regulatory-making

power, again, once we talk to the industry to see what’s the best way to do this,

so that we can make it very clear when a record is given or issued or a payment is

made for the purpose of this act and how it’s transmitted, sent or delivered — and

specify the manner.

It’s a very important part to bring clarity to the whole system.

Steve Kooner : That was helpful, that information.

Subclause (

g) refers to “respecting the preparation of proper invoices for the purposes

section 7 [proper invoices], including, without limitation, respecting whether

amounts are to be included in an invoice or prescribing information for the purposes

of subsection 7 (1) (a) (viii).”

Perhaps the Attorney General can elaborate on this.

Hon. Niki Sharma : We talked in

section 7 about how important the proper invoice was. In that

section

are listed some of the elements. Of course, in order to add some flexibility in case,

in the operation of this once it’s out there, you need to add something, then we have

the regulatory-making power to do that.

[1:40 p.m.]

Steve Kooner : Yes. I can agree with that. When you’re talking about invoices, that really triggers

calculations of days as well. It’s important to have more of an enforcement in terms

of meaning behind it. It’s important, probably, to elaborate on that discussion with

the invoices through the regulations. I find that was helpful as well.

The next subclause is (h). It refers to “prescribing information for the purposes

section 12 (1) (

c) or (2) (right to information), including, without limitation,

(

i) the amounts paid to the contractor in relation to the invoice, the dates payments

were made or any information necessary to apply

section 10, [prompt payment – partial

payment], or (ii) information about adjudications, including, without limitation,

whether a notice of adjudication has been given or a deadline has been extended under

section 30 (2) [determination by adjudicator].”

Perhaps the Attorney General can elaborate on this.

Hon. Niki Sharma : Again, this is a similar flexibility through regulation to make sure that the clause

has that support of being able to add things if it’s not working. This was the asymmetry

of information that we were trying to correct with the right to information, and this

regulatory-making power will allow us to, if needed, clarify the types of information

that are required under that clause.

Steve Kooner : Subclause (

i) states: “requiring information to be provided under

section 12 (1)

or (2).” Can we get elaboration on that, please?

Hon. Niki Sharma : There’s a subsection in those clauses that says “any prescribed information,” so

that gives the regulatory-making power in the clause. Then this is a way to close

the loop related to that, so the regulatory power is listed in the regulations section.

Steve Kooner : So (

j) states: “prescribing a rate of interest or the manner in which a rate of interest

is to be determined for the purposes of

section 15 (

a) or 38 (1) (a) [interest on

late payments].” Can we please get an elaboration on that?

Hon. Niki Sharma : It’s as it says. It’s to prescribe the rate of interest. That was another clause

that I think we talked about earlier on, about how it would be set down through regulation.

Steve Kooner : Subclause (

k) speaks about “respecting procedures for the purposes of

section 17

(1) (a) [adjudication procedures].” Could we please get an elaboration on that?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Those clauses rightly give the adjudicator conduct over the decision-making to do

with the adjudication, but the reasons it’s subject to regulation is in the instance

that we want to step in at all and set out any procedures that are required under

that section.

Steve Kooner : Subclause (

l) speaks of “respecting notices under

section 18 [notice of adjudication]

and responses under

section 26 [response to notice of adjudication], including, without

limitation, limiting the length of notices or responses or respecting timelines for

making a response.” Can we please get elaboration on that?

[1:45 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : The purpose of this is to…. With the goal of ensuring that the process is moving

quickly and that none of the elements of it actually could be used to delay or to

add complexity that’s not needed, it gives the regulatory-making power to limit the

length of notices or responses, and for timelines for making a response, so we can

make sure that we can step in through regulation if needed to make the process move

quickly.

Steve Kooner : Subclause (

m) states: “respecting the consolidation of adjudications for the purposes

section 21 [consolidation of adjudications], including, without limitation, whether

adjudications may be consolidated under

section 21 (

a) or (b), or procedures for consolidation

or consolidated adjudications.”

Can the Attorney General please elaborate on that subclause?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is an important regulatory-making power that allows us in the instance of complexity,

either multiple disputes for the same invoice or payment, or multiple parties or one

project…. It gives the power to consolidate the adjudications, again with the goal

of making sure that the process could be streamlined. So we have that regulatory-making

power if it’s needed.

Steve Kooner : Subclause (

n) states: “respecting fees under

section 24 (1) (b) (ii) [adjudication

fees] or

section 43 (1) [administrative fees].” Can we please get an elaboration on

that?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is the regulatory-making power that we talked about in the fee section. It allows

us to have that power to put in a regulation if we want to make sure…. If we’re not

seeing that the fees are accessible or fair or there’s something that we disagree

with or government disagrees with, they can make that fee schedule.

Steve Kooner : Subclause (

o) states: “limiting extensions under

section 30 (2) [determination by

adjudicator].” Perhaps we can get an elaboration on that.

Hon. Niki Sharma : To keep the process moving along, this clause 30 allows, by consent, for there to

be a delay in the issuing of determination and, again, that we want things to move

quicker, so this is a regulatory-making power. If we ever see that this is happening

a lot, where by agreement or things are being delayed or things are not moving in

a way that we want them to, we can have a regulatory-making power to limit any extensions

to the timelines in clause 30.

Steve Kooner : Subclause (

p) states: “respecting corrections that may or may not be made under

section

33 (1) (b) [corrections – oversights].” Can the Attorney General please explain that?

[1:50 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : The reason for the decision to put this regulatory-making power under the corrections

clause, under 33…. You’ll remember that clause was related to, within five days after

the determination, if somebody sees a typographical error or the determination has

something in it that has an injustice that was caused by an oversight. It’s meant

to be a narrow opportunity to fix something that should be fixed, but it’s not a reopening

of the matter.

One example would be that the adjudicator missed an invoice, so the calculation was

wrong, or they admit that something was wrong with the number that was provided. You

have those five days to go back after the termination to correct that.

In the case that, during the rollout of this, we see that people are using that inappropriately

to actually retry the case or reopen it or send it back to the adjudicator, we have

a regulatory-making power to add more limitations to make it clearer.

Steve Kooner : Subclause (q): “respecting the duties of an adjudication authority for the purposes

section 42 [duties of adjudication authority], including, without limitation, (

i) establishing requirements for the purposes of

section 42 (b) [qualification of adjudicators],

(ii) authorizing an adjudication authority to establish a code of conduct for adjudicators,

or (iii) conferring powers on adjudication authority.”

Perhaps an elaboration on that.

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is the regulatory-making power that will become, actually, quite important to

the functioning of the adjudication authority, because it has a clear ability to have

a regulation for the purpose of the qualifications of the adjudicators. This is what

we talked about earlier, about what the requirements are for getting in. Ten years

in the construction industry was an example from another jurisdiction.

And then authorizing the adjudication authority to establish a code of conduct for

adjudicators that they would have to abide by to be on the roster, and there’d be

a way to have oversight then and monitor if they were staying within it.

Then subsection (iii) is really to do with conferring any other power that we feel

like we need to give to the adjudication authority to oversee their functions.

Steve Kooner : Subclause 49(3):

“In making a regulation under this Act, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may do

one or more of the following: delegate a matter to a person; confer a discretion on

a person; make different regulations in relation to different improvements, contracts,

services, materials, persons, things, circumstances or other matters; or different

classes of improvements, contracts, services, materials, persons, things, circumstances

or other matters, including, without limitation, classes defined by reference to a

sector of the construction industry or public or private ownership, nature or purpose.”

[1:55 p.m.]

Perhaps we can get an elaboration on that.

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is a standard part of all legislation, and it’s to rebut the presumption that

it’s not permissible for a regulation to discriminate amongst the persons or things

it regulates without express authority. These are the kinds of things that are routinely

included in B.C. statutes.

Clause 49 approved.

On clause 50.

Steve Kooner : Now we’re in transitional provisions. Essentially, when there are gaps between different

legislations, we want to make sure everything is flowing properly and there is some

transitional link to link different pieces of legislation, just to make sure there’s

continuity. This seems to be getting into that part of the legislation.

Above

section 50, we see it’s written, “Transition – existing contracts,” and then

clause 50 reads: “This act does not apply in relation to a contract entered before

the date this

section comes into force or a subcontract that relates to a contract

referred to in paragraph (a).”

Perhaps we can get an elaboration on this.

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is a provision that provides certainty to the industry on the transitional period

so it’s just clear that those contracts or any related subcontracts that are already

underway at the time that the act comes into force are exempt from the application

of the act.

Steve Kooner : I think that’s the only question I had on 50, so I’ll wait till we get to 51.

Clause 50 approved.

On clause 51.

Steve Kooner : The title for clause 51 is “Transition – phased implementation.” It reads: “For certainty,

a regulation under

section 49 [regulations] for the purposes of

section 4 (2) [application]

may provide for the gradual application of this Act to different sectors of the construction

industry, or different classes referred to in

section 49 (3) (c) (ii) (B) [public

or private ownership, nature or purpose].”

Can we get an elaboration on this particular clause, please?

Hon. Niki Sharma : In our extensive discussions with industry, this is a provision that some sectors

have asked us for, and it allows for…. The intention is for it to apply to everybody,

but in the case where some sectors or individuals are asking us to create classes

or to differentiate somehow, it gives us that regulatory-making power.

Steve Kooner : I just have a few questions on clause 51 myself. I’m just going to go there.

I don’t know if this was answered, but what criteria will the government use to decide

which sectors receive prompt payment protections first?

Hon. Niki Sharma : At this stage, it’s like many of the provisions that we talked about with the regulatory-making

power and things like that. It gives us the flexibility to do that if needed.

At this stage, we have no decisions that were made on this, and I don’t know the framework

we would use, but it would be definitely guided by discussions that industry would

have with us.

[2:00 p.m.]

Misty Van Popta : Just a quick one on this one from me. How long may a gradual application take, and

is it negotiable as to the length of time?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is an important clause that builds in flexibility for a gradual application.

Once we hit phase 2, which I think we’ve talked about throughout the committee stage,

it’s going to take discussion with industry. It’s going to take setting up an adjudication

authority, setting other types of regulations that are going to be important to be

put in place and industry needs to be ready. I know we talked about that transition

period, so this was considered to be, in our discussions, an important part of how

we would think through it.

There is nothing I can offer about what a gradual application means and what that

timeline is. What it would be would be a discussion with the sector and with the associations

that we’ve been having all along to kind of understand…. The intention, I would say,

is to move quickly on everything and to get this up in place as quickly as possible

to everyone in the construction sector. But we also need to be continually talking

to our sector in B.C. to make sure we’re getting it right.

Clause 51 approved.

On clause 52.

Kiel Giddens : I appreciate the opportunity to join the committee stage deliberations on Bill 20.

I haven’t been asking questions so far, but I’ve been following along pretty closely

in the bill and appreciate the Attorney General and her staff — all of the effort

to answer these questions on behalf of the public, just making sure we have a good

understanding for the public record.

I’ve certainly been a proponent of prompt payment legislation for some time. I’ve

witnessed, in major project construction, the challenges for subcontractors when there

is a dispute between an owner and a prime contractor and how long that takes, and

this is important. But the consequential and related amendments, particularly to the

Builders Lien Act, I think are an important part of this.

I know we’ve talked about the Builders Lien Act earlier in the discussions on the

bill. Obviously, as we’re getting to now, the changes that will come to the Builders

Lien Act, I think it’s just important for the construction industry to know what those

are going to look like.

The Builders Lien Act itself. The Attorney General will recall that it has not had

a substantial update to that legislation since the 1990s. It is something that is

a little bit long in the tooth, I would say, in terms of legislation in the province,

but it is long-standing.

So there is a precedent of contractors who are used to using this process, of owners

who are aware of it. The legal community is very aware of it. It’s just important

to understand how the changes to the Builders Lien Act are going to work in practice.

With that, on clause 52, perhaps the Attorney General could just provide a brief update

on the addition of “‘any demolition or removal of any of these things and’ after ‘and

also includes.’” What’s the effect of that, just so that the construction industry

is aware?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Yes, I agree with the Builders Lien Act and its need of improvements as well, which

is obviously a bigger project. I’m glad we were able to move this prompt payment legislation

quickly, and we know there’s more work to do.

Just to say that the big change here is to ensure “any demolition or removal of any

of those things” is to include that demolition or removal workers are treated consistently

under the prompt payment framework. Adding that to the definition of “improvement”

ensures that so that the contractors and subcontractors carrying out these works on

the same construction project can rely on consistent treatment for prompt payment

and for builder lien purposes.

Clause 52 approved.

On clause 53.

[2:05 p.m.]

Kiel Giddens : For clause 53, the Attorney General can correct me on this if I’m wrong, but it’s

my understanding that this changes how lien claims are secured and how they’re prioritized.

So I think it is essential to confirm that subcontractors, and especially smaller

ones, don’t lose that protection when holdbacks may be released more quickly in some

cases.

I’m just wondering. Under the new

section 4(9), how will lien claimants be prioritized

when the holdback is released?

[2:10 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is a really important discussion. I appreciate the opportunity to clarify it.

This clause and the next clause are related to what is called a Shimco lien. Essentially,

it was from a decision in 2003, just to explain it, where the court said that you

can put a lien on a holdback.

Now, the issue with that was, unlike other liens, you couldn’t register it in the

Land Title Act. A Shimco lien against a holdback created a lot of uncertainty because

the holders of the holdback didn’t know when they could start paying or if there was

a Shimco lien coming, and it just created a lot of uncertainty on that side of it.

Because of the good work that we did on prompt payment to get money flowing through

the sector, it was seen as necessary to basically remove the Shimco lien. So these

amendments bring certainty to protect owners and contractors and subcontractors by

clarifying that there is no separate, independent lien against the holdback funds

and that the holdback funds are for the purpose of satisfying the claims of contractors

and subcontractors who remain unpaid for services and materials they provide to projects.

So it provides greater certainty as to when and how much a payer, such as an owner

or contractor, may pay out of the holdback after the holdback period. That was key

to providing what this whole thing is about, which is certainty and then money flowing.

Kiel Giddens : I appreciate the comments on Shimco liens. I certainly understand the challenges

that that particular provision has created. I know the Law Institute and other groups

have been wanting to have it removed because it has created a lot of complexity, a

lot of challenges — that dual lien structure.

I witnessed this on a linear project. The effect it has is it actually brings in,

at times, third-party landowners, when they have to be notified on a lien on a land

improvement, that really have no idea why they’re included in it. It has all kinds

of challenges. Then, as the Attorney General mentioned, the timing and waiting for

whether or not that’s going to happen creates confusion. I do understand that.

I guess maybe just to follow up on this, just to ensure that…. Obviously, these two

acts now will work together in tandem. The Builders Lien Act is still in effect. Just

to ensure for this new substitution that is being included here…. What’s the effect

of this new provision to ensure that subcontractors’ claims will be properly secured

and paid when the holdback funds do become available under the Builders Lien Act?

Hon. Niki Sharma : In terms of a subcontractor and any secured payments they would have or priority

in payment, it doesn’t change any of that.

[2:15 p.m.]

Really, the purpose of these amendments is to make sure that money can flow faster

to where it’s due and that you can avail yourself, if you’re a subcontractor that

has a payment that should be due, to the benefits of the prompt payment regime without

having any of this Shimco lien uncertainty on a holdback.

The only thing that it changes out of that subsection (9) in the Builders Lien Act

is that narrow wording about the Shimco lien.

Clause 53 approved.

On clause 54.

Kiel Giddens : I appreciate the response from the Attorney General. We’ll continue a little bit

more on Shimco liens here.

I think one of the calls from contractors that I have spoken with is really the idea

that a mandatory, progressive release of the holdback is something that is important

to them. Some of this is particularly for larger subcontractors in the payment chain.

It seems to be a big issue cash-flow-wise for them.

I’m wondering. On clause 54 and subsection (4.1), Shimco liens being abolished, working

together…. We’ve talked about the fact that 53 is connected, but so is all the way

through 56 here to an extent, I guess.

Do these amendments, particularly clause 54, effectively create a mandatory release

of the holdback, or is there still too much discretion for that?

[2:20 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : No, it’s not a mandatory release of the holdback. This is separate. It’s the ending

of the Shimco lien, which we think, like we talked about before, will help get money

from the holdback flowing faster into the system. Just to acknowledge, the Builders

Lien Act has probably a number of other things that we would need to update, because

it’s such an old piece of legislation.

I know that some parts of the sector have asked for something that’s more like a mandatory

release of that holdback. I’m told by my team that doing that would require a bigger

policy and legislative analysis of how that shows up in the sector. We’re always happy

to make things better and to have that discussion. But no, this doesn’t talk about

or require any kind of mandatory release. It’s getting rid of that Shimco lien that

was causing a lot of uncertainty on that holdback. So it gives that ability for money

to flow quicker.

Kiel Giddens : I would certainly agree that that broader discussion on lien act reform is still

going to be needed. I appreciate that there are limitations, in the context of the

consequential amendments to this bill, to what can be done.

I’ll just maybe quickly read into the record what the B.C. Construction Association

included in their press release on October 7: “The B.C. Construction Association remains

committed to working with the provincial government to deliver on payment certainty.

That includes lien act reform, which is absent from this legislation. A modernized

lien framework that includes progressive and mandatory release of lien holdback is

essential to ensure contractors and subcontractors receive payment in a timely manner.”

We do have agreement on the fact that further changes are going to be necessary. I

guess some of those changes that the B.C. Construction Association is looking at couldn’t

be completed in amendments that we’re talking about now.

I am just wondering if the Attorney General could offer some comments on the limitations

of Bill 20, on why, overall, more couldn’t have been done in the context of lien act

reform.

Hon. Niki Sharma : We’re in discussion with the construction industry and the construction association

quite a bit. They helped us a lot in sitting down with us on the prompt payment legislation.

I think in all the meetings that I’ve had, since becoming AG and a little before,

it’s been one of their top priorities to get a prompt payment regime.

With the resources of government, in terms of how we target something quickly and

how we get something out the door with our resources, we decided, after the working

group set up, that we would focus on a prompt payment regime in the province, thinking

that that would be the first ability to tackle prompt payment in the province and

putting the right tools in place.

[2:25 p.m.]

I’m really grateful for all the partners that came together with us to do the work.

That doesn’t mean there’s not more work to do. I would expect the construction association

would come to us with further issues, even in the rollout of this, or further things

that we could improve, including the Builders Lien Act and ways that we can do that.

At the time of doing it, it was really felt that if we tried to do both projects together,

the prompt payment and the Builders Lien Act, we wouldn’t be here today in terms of

being able to deliver on the prompt payment. We heard from industry that one of the

biggest issues they have is being able to have money flow through projects, so we

tackled that one first.

Kiel Giddens : I appreciate it. I think that satisfied it. Thanks to the Attorney General for letting

me ask just a general question there, because I think we can all agree that there

is more to do.

Pretty amazing advocacy that they have had in sticking on this issue for many, many

years now. That’s the B.C. Construction Association and the Electrical Contractors

Association. I’ll give a shout-out to Nicole Bryant from the Northern Regional Construction

Association, who has come to my office several times on this topic. I had chatted

with her before being elected, as well, about this topic.

As we get back to talking about Shimco liens and getting rid of them, obviously, there

are problems that we know — they’re difficult — about how hard they are to discharge.

People can circumvent time limits with this, so I understand why its removal is necessary.

Of course, when you have a long-standing policy in place, the contracting community

does get used to it, perhaps even relying on it, from a legal sense, in knowing their

rights.

Just a couple more questions on this topic. I’m wondering if the government could

just provide clarification. If subcontractors are concerned about removing Shimco

liens, removing this mechanism, if they’re worried about it exposing subcontractors

to a greater non-payment risk, especially in longer chains of contracting, what would

you say to those contractors who may be concerned about that?

Hon. Niki Sharma : We know that the industry has been operating under the current tools right now, and

they’ve been kind of unsatisfactory, as they tell me in making these changes, in getting

payments moving through the sector and projects on time. That has been a chronic thing.

[2:30 p.m.]

I understand there’s going to be a time period between when we get royal assent and

when it comes into force with regulation, some parts of it, because we’ll need to

educate the industry to let them know what changes are in place. That will require

a change in behaviour related to the reliance on Shimco liens. But I do believe that

they will now, when it comes into force, have far superior tools when it comes to

collection of payments.

To the question about subcontractors and non-payment, this will actually bring fairness

and transparency to all subcontractors. For example, a subcontractor has followed

the rules and filed liens in the right timeline. Then the Shimco lien comes in from

another subcontractor, and then you have the holdback that’s tied up and these other….

It can create a lot of unfairness or confusion in who gets paid.

We’ve actually given better tools to the system, we think, through this prompt payment

regime. But there will be an adjustment period that we expect where we educate the

sector on the new tools there.

The fairness and transparency aspects of this also will provide some contractors with

better information about payments and where payments are flowing, so they’ll be able

to understand when they can, if they need to, trigger a very quick adjudication of

a dispute to get paid on time.

So we believe that, on a whole, they’re far superior tools to the ones that are in

place right now, although we know there will be an educational period to adapt.

Kiel Giddens : Just to clarify, without Shimco liens in place, the adjudication would be a better

mechanism, especially when the holdback is released earlier, as a protection for those

subcontractors if they still require that in the value chain. Is that correct, or

am I confusing that?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This prompt payment regime provides that subcontractor with a whole bunch of new

tools with respect to getting paid on time. One of them is better information, depending

on where they’re sitting on the construction chain of payments, better understanding

of how payments are flowing through that, clearer timelines of when they should be

paid and when they can trigger a dispute — and all that clarity about when payment

is due and recourse if it’s not paid on time.

Clauses 54 and 55 approved.

On clause 56.

Kiel Giddens : We’re now on clause 56. We’re talking about the reduction of the holdback period.

There could be an argument, perhaps, that shortening the holdback period compresses

the time available to discover a non-payment or file a lien. In this case, I think

it would be important just to show that the faster release will not increase the financial

risk for small trades.

I’m wondering in that regard. Why was 46 days chosen as the new holdback period, and

how does this benefit to cash flow without increasing risk?

[2:35 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is another aspect of making money flow faster through the system. The existing

timeline, to the member’s question, doesn’t take away from the time period to file

a lien.

It’s 45 days under the Builders Lien Act, and that’s still there. But there was an

extra ten days, and the purpose of that extra ten days — it went to 55, which you

see there is being amended — was just in case it took longer for the lien to show

up in the Land Title Act. But that’s antiquated because actually, it’s pretty instant,

if something is filed, that you can see it. So it was actually wasted days for money

to be sitting there for those ten days, in the case that the holdback could start

flowing.

That’s why the timeline was changed to 46 days. It still preserves the right to the….

I guess it kind of abides by that time period of 45 days for the lien but doesn’t

allow that extra ten days that are probably not necessary, because you would know

right away after that 45 days what liens are on it.

Kiel Giddens : So it’s the 45 days plus a bonus day, I guess, is one way of looking at it. That’s

fair.

In an adjudication process, perhaps, is there any risk of someone arguing that there…?

Is the ministry confident that there’s not a risk of someone arguing that 46 days

is insufficient, given that new change from 55 to 46?

Hon. Niki Sharma : The B.C. Law Institute recommended actually just to stick to the 45 days, but we

decided to give an extra day in case there’s something that happened that…. You know,

give them an extra day in the case.

I think that because the goal of it is to move money faster through the system, sticking

to timelines is a pretty key part of this. Maybe there’ll be adjustments for behaviour

afterwards, but the end result will be better flow.

Kiel Giddens : Some anecdotal evidence has made it clear that on a complex project with many liens

filed on it, sometimes the 55 days was challenging to meet, and they would use the

land title piece of it as a sort of excuse to extend the time. So it was a bit of

a loophole more than anything. It is a bit of a…. We’ll have to wait and see on it,

perhaps.

[2:40 p.m.]

I’m wondering, when there’s payment from the holdback, how it will equal to the difference

between the holdback and the total amount of any claims of the lien. The new

section

8(4) — how will that work in practice, especially if all lien claims are not yet resolved

within the 46 days?

Hon. Niki Sharma : I think that the answer is found in clause 57. I’m happy to move on to that if we’re

done with clause 56.

Clause 56 approved.

On clause 57.

Kiel Giddens : Can I say ditto?

Hon. Niki Sharma : The way that it operated before is that if, let’s say, there was like $100,000 in

the holdback and there was $10,000 on a lien, then even if a portion of that holdback

was on a lien, no money would flow. You could freeze the whole holdback. This amendment

allows that to not happen. So the $10,000, in my example, that’s on the holdback or

on a lien can stay, but the rest of the money has to flow.

It’s another one of the measures to keep money flowing that’s available in the system

for a project. And if the amount of the lien is equal to the holdback, then of course

there would be nothing to flow, because they’re equal. But that idea of proportionality

and that you hold on to what you absolutely need to and you keep the rest, pay out

the rest to everybody else, I think, is what we were trying to capture here.

Clause 57 approved.

On clause 58.

Kiel Giddens : All right, so we’ve got through the consequential amendments on the Builders Lien

Act, and there’s just a little bit here on the Strata Property Act, again, probably

a contentious piece of legislation. If anybody has been involved in a strata, there

is no avoidance of disputes. And when it comes to construction or redevelopment or

certainly a major cost to fix a building, this is one that I think a lot of folks

will be looking at.

I picture buildings from the leaky-condo crisis era and the major construction projects

related to that. These are types of things that could have a lot of disputes between

contractors and a strata. The strata developer teams or their consultants may have

disputes in this, so it’s one just to be watching, certainly.

[2:45 p.m.]

Strata developments already do involve complex certification turnover processes, so

one could argue that the shorter holdback timelines may increase that risk of disputes

unless all of these groups, especially the strata developers or the construction firms,

can realistically meet these goals.

With that, I’m wondering if…. Given that we’re moving to a bit of a shorter timeline,

does the Attorney General’s ministry believe that all of these related groups — whether

they be consultants, payment certifiers, strata developers and various construction

firms — can realistically meet these deadlines without triggering more disputes or

adjudications that involve strata corporations?

Hon. Niki Sharma : The only changes to this one are in line with what we talked about before. So it

changes the day of 55 to 46 days, and it’s for the same reasons as the Builders Lien

Act and also removes Shimco liens and that concept. Those are the two key changes.

Otherwise, it doesn’t change anything else in relation to the Strata Act.

Kiel Giddens : Without having the full Strata Property Act in front of me…. Within the Strata Property

Act itself, it was referenced to the Builders Lien Act, and this change, in effect,

just aligns the two acts. Is that correct?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Yeah, there was mirroring language in the Strata Property Act similar to the Builders

Lien Act with the Shimco lien, and this would just remove it.

Clause 58 approved.

On clause 59.

Steve Kooner : This is the last clause of the bill. The act comes into force by regulation of the

Lieutenant Governor in Council. Was there a reason that there wasn’t any fixed date

put in here? I guess it’s just going to be by royal assent. It’s going to be on that

specific date of royal assent?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Not by royal assent but by regulation, so that allows us to have that time period

of phase 2 implementation. When we’re ready, when it’s ready to go and we’ve consulted

with the industry on some of the important regulations we talked about, we can put

it into force by those regulations.

Kiel Giddens : I certainly appreciate the critic for the Attorney General and very much so the Attorney

General and staff for all of the work to answer the questions, all of the work that

went into this bill. I think this is something that was a long time coming, and I

appreciate all the work that has gone into it.

It sounds like there’s an earnest effort to want to continue to consult with the construction

community in the province. Obviously, this bill allows for commencement by regulation,

so there’s still a lot of work to do. I’m wondering if the government, just at the

very end, will commit to that fulsome consultation with the construction industry

before all of these regulations come into force.

Hon. Niki Sharma : We got here today because of the advocacy and the expertise and the deep commitment

that…. We had our team work together with many parts of the industry. I’m grateful

for that, and we will continue that relationship in phase 2.

Clause 59 approved.

Title approved.

Hon. Niki Sharma : Before these two leave, I just want to thank Katie and Maria for their time and commitment

in helping guide me through answering this committee stage and all the team at the

AG that were involved in this for their excellent work in bringing us to where we

are today with this bill.

I couldn’t have done it without you, and I’m very appreciative.

I move that the committee rise and report the bill complete without amendment.

Motion approved.

The Chair : The committee stands adjourned.

The committee rose at 2:49 p.m.

The House resumed at 2:54 p.m.

[Lorne Doerkson in the chair.]

Deputy Speaker : Members, we’re going to call this House back to order, and we are going to have a

report.

Reporting of Bills

Bill 20 — Construction Prompt

Payment Act

Mable Elmore : The committee on Bill 20 reports the bill complete without amendment.

Deputy Speaker : When shall the bill be read a third time?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Now.

Third Reading of Bills

Bill 20 — Construction Prompt

Payment Act

Deputy Speaker : Members, the question is third reading of Bill 20, intituled Construction Prompt

Payment Act.

Motion approved.

Deputy Speaker : Members, Bill 20, Construction Prompt Payment Act, has been read a third time and

has passed third reading.

Hon. Jennifer Whiteside : I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 21.

Deputy Speaker : I understand that we are going to take a brief recess of about 15 minutes while we

prepare a new team for the upcoming bill and for its committee stage.

The House recessed at 2:55 p.m.

Committee of the Whole

Bill 21 — Attorney General

Statutes Amendment Act ( N o . 2), 2025

(continued)

The House in Committee,

Section B.

The committee met at 3:13 p.m.

[Lorne Doerkson in the chair.]

The Chair : Good afternoon, Members. We’ll call this House back to order, where we are going

to contemplate Bill 21.

We’ll be contemplating clause 6 at committee stage, but we’ll start with an introduction

from the minister.

Hon. Niki Sharma : It’s with great appreciation that I thank the members of my team that are sitting

beside me here today that will be offering me guidance on answering questions: Andrea

Buzbuzian, legal counsel, policy and legislative division, justice services branch;

and Jillian Stewart, legal counsel of legal services branch.

On clause 6 (continued) .

Steve Kooner : I’d like to start by thanking the Attorney General staff that’s here today to help

answer the questions. I know a lot of work goes into the legislation, and I, as the

critic for Attorney General, am very appreciative of the staff that are putting in

the work to kind of let us know and let the public know what these bills are all about.

So thank you for being here today and helping out in the process.

Also, I thank the Attorney General. I look forward to actually working through this

piece of legislation. I know it’s been a couple of weeks since we looked at it.

With that, I’ll start. I believe we’re on clause 6.4.

The Chair : Yes, we are, Member.

Steve Kooner : Now, 6.4 is under division 2, “Property Guardianship of Children.” The subheading

for this 6.4 is “Circumstances for property guardianship.”

This clause reads as:

[3:15 p.m.]

“The Public Guardian and Trustee is a child’s property guardian in the following circumstances:

when appointed by a court order, including a court order under

section 58 of the Child,

Family and Community Service Act; (

b) when appointed or otherwise authorized under

an enactment, including the following:

section 24 of the Adoption Act; subsection

50 (1) of the Child, Family and Community Service Act.”

The first question I have on this clause is: what was the intent behind this specific

clause?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is a

section that acts as a pointer for what the Public Guardian and Trustee

is as authority over property guardianship. The one change that is under this

section

from what already exists is (c)(ii), “as described in

section 6.5 (2) of the Act,”

and it will get to….

Section 6.5(2) of the act is the power of the Public Guardian

and Trustee to enter in agreements with Indigenous authorities, so it just brings

it under by referencing that clause.

Steve Kooner : I guess one more specific question is under clause 6.4(d), which refers to “when

property guardianship in respect of a child results from the circumstances described

section 6.6 of this Act.” Now, there’s a reference being made here to

section 6.6

of the act.

My question is: how does it make a difference, by connecting this up with

section

6.6? Say if

section 6.6 wasn’t there, what would be the logic of this section? The

substance of the answer will go to

section 6.6 — how that makes a difference here.

Hon. Niki Sharma : One of the reasons that there is such a

section here — and I think it’s worthwhile

to explain — is that it’s really also to put the framework of what the PGT can act

on as child property guardianship in one place. If you look at all the subsections

in this act, you’ll see it refers to other acts; it refers to other sections.

[3:20 p.m.]

For the purpose of clarity, there’s this list here that’s a pointer for what the PGT’s

authority is for property and guardianship and in what circumstances.

Subsection (

d) that the member is asking about is in

section 6.6, which was brought

in from the Infants Act to this act. We’ll talk about that when we get to it. It changes

something pretty minor, but it just makes sure that proper guardianship that results

in the circumstances in 6.6 is also under this

summary list that helps bring it all

together.

Steve Kooner : When we’re looking at the words “property guardianship” and it’s referring to clause

6.6, we see a specific elaboration on what that means, what property guardianship

means, and what sort of conditions, if you will, come as a result of that.

I think, earlier in the bill, we spoke about personal guardianship. Now, one of the

concerns I had was, sometimes…. I brought it up; I think we discussed it. The Attorney

General did provide some answers about the concern. Sometimes there’s an overlapping

of property guardianship versus personal guardianship, and then you’ve got to figure

it out.

We know what guardianship is. What seems to be happening here is that there’s a more

detailed explanation of what property guardianship is here. But we still want to be

in a position to make sure there are clear boundaries between the two, property guardianship

and personal guardianship.

What sort of oversight will there be? Although there’s a clarification to property

guardianship here, as it refers to 6.6, what sort of oversight will there be to make

sure that all the authority for property guardianship, as explained here, is being

given, say, to the PGT? What sort of oversight will there be to make sure that this

actually happens and that it just stays within that realm?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Each of the things that is listed here in referring to circumstances is a different

scenario and, potentially, arises from a court order or a decision from another actor

that triggers the PGT or sets up a process for the role of the PGT to step in as a

property guardian. The PGT is a statutory creature, so their authority is bound in

the statute of when they can step in. In that way, the role of the PGT in the province

is very clear.

[3:25 p.m.]

Steve Kooner :

Section 6.5, which is a portion of clause 6, talks about property guardianship by

agreement with Indigenous authority. This piece of legislation at 6.3 spends some

time to talk about respecting Indigenous customs, traditions in terms of considering

decisions about children as well.

We see a reference to Indigenous authority here. The subheading here states: “Property

guardianship by agreement with Indigenous authority.” This

section here states:

“The Public Guardian and Trustee may, in circumstances other than those set out in

51.1 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act, enter into agreement with an

Indigenous authority in relation to the Public Guardian and Trustee acting as a property

guardian for Indigenous children for whom the Indigenous authority has jurisdiction

to provide, and is providing, Indigenous child and family services under Indigenous

law.

“If the Public Guardian and Trustee has entered into an agreement with an Indigenous

authority under subsection (1), the Public Guardian and Trustee is an Indigenous child’s

property guardian when, in accordance with the agreement, confirmation is provided

in writing by the Public Guardian and Trustee and the Indigenous authority.”

Going into this, there seem to be some mechanics here for how this

section works.

Perhaps the Attorney General can take us through this particular

section in clause

6 and say how it works.

Hon. Niki Sharma : This provision will provide specific authority to the PGT to act as property guardian

for the Indigenous child for whom an Indigenous authority has jurisdiction, by agreement

with an Indigenous authority.

The first

section is really about that type of circumstance and setting up that agreement,

and section (2) is related to a particular child’s property. Remember the difference

between personal guardianship and property guardianship, which we talked about earlier.

[3:30 p.m.]

Steve Kooner : What are the circumstances where there would be concurrent responsibilities for the

children’s property in there being a property guardian under Indigenous authority

and the PGT?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is a decision that would be made by the Indigenous authority. Once they have

resumed jurisdiction over their children, they can decide whether or not they want

to use the PGT for property. In that circumstance, it would be the personal guardianship

in one place and the property guardianship under the PGT.

Steve Kooner : This

section here is discretionary on the part of the Indigenous authority, so it’s

not mandatory. The PGT only gets involved when the Indigenous authority states that

they need some help with property guardianship, correct?

Hon. Niki Sharma : The short answer is yes. It depends on the Indigenous authority, when and how and

in what circumstances they use the PGT, and it’s done by the agreements that are contemplated.

Steve Kooner : I think this is a very important point. The Attorney General mentioned that it depends

on the circumstance. Would there be a circumstance where the PGT can just get authority

for the property guardianship of an Indigenous child?

Hon. Niki Sharma : I’m told that the PGT is kind of always available in circumstances where they’re needed

or when nobody is acting. It’s like a default to step in for property guardianship.

Steve Kooner : But isn’t it by default that the Indigenous authority actually gets the guardianship

over property? My understanding is that there always will be an Indigenous authority.

Is my assumption incorrect? There might be circumstances where there may not be an

Indigenous authority?

Hon. Niki Sharma : It’s different in each part of the province, and we’ve made some really groundbreaking

agreements with nations for resumption of child and family services. There is an Indigenous

authority, and there is an established agreement, and in some parts of the province

that’s not the case. It’s the systems of MCFD and PGT that are there for those children.

Steve Kooner : Okay. Let me wrap my mind around this to make sure I’ve got it right. If there is

a situation of property guardianship and there is an Indigenous authority, automatically

the Indigenous authority will have authority over that property guardianship.

[3:35 p.m.]

But if we’re in an area where there is no guardian and there is no Indigenous authority,

then essentially, the Ministry of Families and Children will get the authority, and

then they will handle it, and then it’s up to…. How does this all kind of…? I am just

kind of trying to wrap my mind around this.

Hon. Niki Sharma : Okay. We talked at 6.4 about all the ways, by cross-reference, the property guardian,

as a statutory body, can take on the property guardianship of children. The circumstances

are lifted, and they’re varied. That is the statutory regime for the PGT.

What we’re adding is the ability, in circumstances where there’s an Indigenous authority

that’s resumed guardianship over their children, and that means both personal and

property guardianship, we’re giving them, in those circumstances, those authorities

the ability, if they want, to have an agreement with the PGT to have that entity take

over the property guardianship for Indigenous children that are under that authority.

That’s the change that we’re making through these sections.

Steve Kooner : So the prerequisite for this particular

section is that in the area that gets involved

and this legislation involves…. The prerequisite is that that area must have an Indigenous

authority. If there is Indigenous authority, that’s when this

section kicks in. That’s

the only time it kicks in.

Hon. Niki Sharma : Yes, this

section is only related to Indigenous authorities, so in the circumstance

where there is one.

Steve Kooner : I guess that would take me…. To understand this

section better, we’ve got to kind

of figure out when there’s Indigenous authorities, and when does this apply. We talked

about agreements with Indigenous authorities.

Can the Attorney General tell us how many Indigenous authorities currently deliver

child and family services and may potentially enter into agreements under this section?

How many of those?

[3:40 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : I’m told that there are lots…. We had to reach out to MCFD. There are lots of negotiations

going on, and it gets complicated, because sometimes jurisdiction shows up in different

phases through agreement. But I’m told right now that there are five that have full

jurisdiction over child and family services for their nation.

Steve Kooner : Did I hear the Attorney General correctly that there are five Indigenous authorities?

All right. Because we’re talking about agreements between Indigenous authorities as

well as with the PGT, will there be any resourcing to help facilitate the process

of making these agreements between the Indigenous authorities and the PGT to actually

switch hands for this property guardianship, pursuant to this section?

Hon. Niki Sharma : We can look at this as kind of a resource support for Indigenous authorities. If

they want to use the services of the PGT for property guardianship, then they can

do so by virtue of this legislation, if it passes.

The PGT is a self-funded organization. They run through, I think, a fees-for-service

type of model. I know, from meetings I’ve had with the PGT, they’ve been reaching

out to Indigenous properties, and they would take on the work of who is interested

in setting up these types of agreements.

Steve Kooner : In the next

section in this clause, just before that, there’s a title: “Property

guardianship if no other guardian or if guardian is dead, refuses or is incompetent

to act.” Then the

section under clause 6.6(1)…. Well, let’s just read 6.6 in its entirety.

[3:45 p.m.]

“Unless otherwise ordered by the court under subsection (2), the Public Guardian and

Trustee is the child’s property guardian, as circumstances require, when a child has

no other guardian responsible for legal and financial interests or if the guardian

appointed for that purpose is dead, refuses or is incompetent at law to act.

“

(2) In the case of a property guardianship described in subsection (1), if there

is a dispute or any uncertainty as to whether the Public Guardian and Trustee is or

is not the property guardian in respect of a child, the court may make an order declaring

whether or not the Public Guardian and Trustee is the property guardian of the child

on application by the Public Guardian and Trustee or a parent or guardian of the child.

“

(3) The fact that, in respect of a child, the Public Guardian and Trustee does not

apply to the court for a declaration (

a) does not affect the authority of a Public

Guardian Trustee as the child’s property guardian and is not evidence that the Public

Guardian and Trustee is not the child’s property guardian.”

This is a long

section here. Perhaps the Attorney General can explain first the intent

behind it.

Hon. Niki Sharma : This provision change is really for clarity. Under the Infants Act’s existing 51,

there was already a provision that you could consider a default role position. So

in the case where there’s nobody protecting the property interests of a child, the

PGT has a clear authority to step in for that property guardianship, just as that

safety net for every child out there. I think it was just hanging out there in the

Infants Act, so for ease of putting everything together in one spot, it was brought

through this bill to be put under the PGT Act.

There was one small change done to it, which is the removing of the director of the

Child, Family and Community Service Act as a personal guardian option for a child,

because there are other parts, and we talked about it in one of the other sections

in 6, that list where MCFD does have a role in that, and it was just to bring clarity

and just make sure that the PGT is the default.

Steve Kooner : If there’s some uncertainty whether the PGT has the authority to be the property

guardian and there are some issues related to procedure of whether that happened,

is the court the mechanism to actually clarify that, or is there another mechanism

pursuant to this section?

[3:50 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : Some of the other amendments in this provide real clarity in the case of uncertainty

related to it. There you could see, in that provision, that the Public Guardian and

Trustee can make an application to a court — sorry, it can be made either by the PGT

or a parent or guardian of the child — in the case that there’s any uncertainty related

to who the property guardian is for that child, and that helps to clarify the pathway.

Steve Kooner : I guess my question should have been: is that the exhaustive method of clearing up

that uncertainty? Is it that the only option to clear up the uncertainty would be

to go to court, or is there another option here?

Hon. Niki Sharma : The first line would always be just to sort it out amongst parties, without the guidance

of the court — to clear up that uncertainty amongst themselves. If that doesn’t work,

there is an ability to go to court to get that certainty.

Steve Kooner : If there are uncertainties and the parties have to go to court — say, for example,

there’s a parent and then there’s the PGT — who ultimately will have to be responsible

for the cost of that? A child is involved, and the parent may be trying to look out

for the interests of their child, but there is some uncertainty in the situation.

Who would pay for that cost ultimately?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is a pretty extraordinary circumstance that this would be necessary to put in,

in case there’s any uncertainty. It’s always in the jurisdiction of a court for costs.

If I were a party that felt particularly aggrieved that I had to go to court to clear

up certainty, then I would certainly make sure I asked the court for costs to cover

my expenses there. If it’s the PGT that goes to clarify that certainty — and I mentioned

before, that’s a self-funded organization — that would be there, too, in the interest

of that child.

Steve Kooner : The next

section within clause 6 here is 6.7, and the subheading is “Powers, duties

and functions when property guardian for children.”

Section 6.7 reads, for the record:

“

(1) When the Public Guardian and Trustee is a child’s property guardian, the Public

Guardian and Trustee has the powers, duties and functions under this act and any other

applicable enactment in respect of property guardianship.

[3:55 p.m.]

“

(2) The powers, duties and functions of the Public Guardian and Trustee under subsection

(1) include, with respect to a child, (

a) authority with respect to the following

responsibilities listed as parental responsibilities in

section 41 (

k) of the Family

Law Act: (

i) starting, defending, compromising or settling any proceeding relating

to the child; (ii) identifying, advancing and protecting the child’s legal and financial

interests, and (

b) to the extent necessary to facilitate the exercise of the responsibilities

described in paragraph (a) (

i) and (ii) of this subsection, the following responsibilities

listed as parental responsibilities in

section 41 (h), (

i) and (

j) of the Family Law

Act: (

i) giving, refusing or withdrawing consent for the child, if consent is required;

(ii) receiving and responding to any notice that a parent or guardian is entitled

or required by law to receive; (iii) requesting and receiving from third parties health,

education or other information respecting the child.”

And then further:

“

(3) For certainty, this

section does not affect the powers, duties or functions of

a child’s personal guardian.”

This is a very, very long section. Understanding mechanics of this…. Because there

is a lot of technical nature to how all this works out, perhaps the Attorney General

can take us through this

section and just kind of, from start to finish — how it’s

going to work and how it’s going to affect property guardianship.

Hon. Niki Sharma : The reason for this change is…. Because of the way the statutory scheme existed for

the PGT, and I think you can see it in the beginning of the changes of clause 6, it

pulls in from many different statutes, their authority. This was to give a very clear

section of powers, duties and functions of the PGT when they take on their role as

property guardians for children.

Steve Kooner : There are references to the Family Law Act. The first reference is under

section

6.7(2)(a): “authority with respect to the following responsibilities listed as parental

responsibilities in

section 41 (

k) of the Family Law Act.”

How does 41(

k) of the Family Law Act interact with this

section here?

[4:00 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is based on case law that referenced the Family Law Act. It makes sense that

this

section that’s referred to, 41(

k) of the Family Law Act, lists parental responsibilities.

It has a big list of making day-to-day decisions, all these kinds of things of what

you deem to be a parental responsibility, including stuff related to property of that

child.

The case law actually directly cross-referenced the certain sections of the Family

Law Act to say that if the PGT was acting as the property guardian of a child, these

are the kinds of things they would be able to do. So it makes sense that there’s a

parallel between that

section of the family law and the PGT.

So what this does to create the kind of legislative clarity that we’re looking for

here is it just kind of lists that all together in one spot.

Steve Kooner : In this section, 6.7, it seems to be referring to a court process: “starting, defending,

compromising or settling any proceeding relating to the child.” At times when you’re

involved with the court procedure…. When a child doesn’t have a representative, there’s

at times a court-appointed guardian. The court-appointed guardian has certain responsibilities.

My next question is: the responsibilities that the PGT will have in regards to the

child in terms of these court proceedings, will they be the same responsibilities

that a court-appointed guardian has?

[4:05 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : I’m afraid I’m going to have to ask for more assistance in the question as we’re

sorting through an answer. Maybe if the member could help clarify, is he talking about…?

What do you mean by a court-appointed guardian? Then we could help answer.

Steve Kooner : What I mean is that when there’s not representation for somebody that requires representation,

there may be some elements of having a court-appointed representative. Sometimes you

see personal representatives on court actions. People are able to do it themselves.

They’re like: “This child….” It’s very common when you have infant claims; the infants

are trying to sue somebody. They can’t do it by themselves. So they have…. Through

a personal representative, that’s how they make that claim.

Sometimes there is no personal representative, so at times, court may have to appoint

one. Then there’d be a court-appointed representative for, say, a child. There are

certain things that that court-appointed representative can do.

Now what we have here is we’re talking about court process with starting…. One of

the things is that to actually start a court action, you have to have that representative

for the child, right? So there are certain responsibilities that go with that, whoever

is acting as a representative, and sometimes you don’t have…. Somebody can’t find

a representative. It might be that the court has to appoint one.

The question goes to: if there is a court-appointed representative or a guardian to

handle that court matter, are these duties or these responsibilities for the PGT to

handle the court proceeding of starting, defending and compromising or settling any

proceeding similar to those duties, or would it be that the court would actually,

maybe…? If the PGT is not fully equipped, it might be that a different representative

still has to be appointed.

I just want to understand. When there’s a court action that often has to be made….

Sometimes lawyers do get involved, and they find a personal representative to file

that court action. But would the PGT be stepping in?

I have actually seen many cases where the PGT is involved. They just try to get approval,

and then there’s a legal counsel on the file, and they’re being guided by a personal

guardian. But personal guardians can also be created through the court as well. Then

there are specific duties that those personal guardians — or let’s just say there

could be a court-appointed guardian too — have to run the court action.

So would this PGT property guardian have that same responsibility, or would it be

that some of the responsibility will still have to be delegated? For example, they’ll

still have to appoint somebody on the record to act as a personal guardian that will

take that role for the court and be responsible to the court. Hopefully that clarifies

the question.

[4:10 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : I think this will help clarify the way that this would show up in the scenario provided.

If the PGT is the property guardian, you have a scenario where a lot of these provisions

are kicked in. The duties and functions here would also be of the litigation representative.

Those roles go together. Hopefully, that helps to clarify the question.

Steve Kooner : That really clarifies it, because this is talking about, essentially, a court proceeding.

It’s saying that the PGT has that role to start it, and usually it is the litigation

guardian who has that role. This clarifies the point that the PGT will be acting as

a litigation guardian, but there are many circumstances where PGT is more on the sidelines

and where somebody else is the litigation guardian.

It may not even be the parent. According to the court rules, it doesn’t even have

to be the parent. It could be a grandparent or somebody that’s willing to take the

responsibility. It’s important, when you have a

section like this, how it is going

to work, right? It’s important.

The next question I have on this particular section. Now, we’re talking about litigation

proceeding here. At least, that’s my assumption. I guess I’ll get that clarified.

It says “starting.” What does it mean by “starting any proceeding”? Starting what?

Hon. Niki Sharma : That’s just the ordinary meaning of the word, so starting a proceeding.

Steve Kooner : Would that be starting…? Say, it could be like filing a notice of civil claim. It

could be a petition. It could be, I don’t know, an application. It’s any type of proceeding?

Whether originating or interlocutory, it applies to everything across the board, correct?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Yes, it does.

Steve Kooner : The next word is “defending.” We used to have statements of defence; we no longer

have those. The court rules changed back in 2010 to change the forms. Now what we

have are responses.

When we say “defending,” does that include responses to civil claim and then, I guess,

responses to application? Is that defending? Would that be read in the same way?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Yes.

Steve Kooner : Then we have here “compromising.” Would compromising be a negotiated settlement?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Yes.

Steve Kooner : Then it states: “any proceeding.” Now, we’re talking about court, but there may be

other forms as well, in addition to the court. There could be a tribunal or something

that has some property rights. For example, there could be the residential tenancy

branch, or there could be some other board that you may have to go after to enforce

some of the rights in regard to the property.

Is this foreseen to include all proceedings, or is this just court-related?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Yes.

[4:15 p.m.]

Steve Kooner : Then the next part of this goes to (ii): “identifying, advancing and protecting the

child’s legal and financial interests.” Is that just the literal meaning of it? Whatever

those interests are, for the property guardian to be able to advance those? Why is

it separated from, say, (i)? Why not have just the one clause?

If that is the case, just to protect their interests, why can’t you just…? Instead

of having “starting, defending, compromising or settling any proceeding relating to

the child,” why don’t you just refer to “identifying, advancing and protecting the

child’s legal and financial interests” and just have authority as a result of that?

Why is there a distinction with the Roman numerals (

i) and (ii)?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Those subsections are found in the Family Law Act, and I mentioned that we cross-referenced

those specifically because of the case law that referenced them. They read a little

bit differently, too, just on what they’re meant to capture, I think. Sub (ii) is

broader.

Steve Kooner : Now, just going to subsection (b), we talked about 41(

k) of the Family Law Act. This

one talks about 41(h), (

i) and (

j) of the Family Law Act, in subsection (b). It refers

to parental responsibilities.

How do these subsections of the Family Law Act relate to this provision listed here?

Hon. Niki Sharma : The reference to the Family Law Act is also based on the case law and the guidance

that the court has provided about the PGT. You can read this subsection in context

of (a), in the sense where it starts off with “to the extent necessary to facilitate.”

The reason for that is because the ones in subsection (

b) could be seen to be potentially

also a role for personal guardianship, not just property guardianship. It’s clear

now, in the way it’s worded here, that it’s only to the extent necessary to facilitate

the powers, duties and functions that are listed above.

Clause 6 approved.

On clause 7.

Steve Kooner : Clause 7 starts by stating:

“Section 7 is amended

“(

a) by repealing subsection (1) and substituting the following:

“

(1) The Public Guardian and Trustee, when exercising the powers and performing the

duties and functions as a child’s property guardian, is a trustee of all property

that comes into the control of, or is eld by, the Public Guardian and Trustee on behalf

of the child, and

“(

b) in subsections (2) and (3) by striking out ‘young person’ wherever it appears

and substituting ‘child’ and by striking out ‘young person’s’ wherever it appears

and substituting ‘child’s’.”

That’s how section (7) reads. Perhaps the Attorney General can take us through this

section and explain the mechanics of the

section and the intent behind it.

[4:20 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : This was a necessary amendment because the existing version of this says: “If appointed

under a court order or an enactment as a young person’s property guardian.” But we’re

adding this ability to have agreements with Indigenous authorities, as mentioned previously,

so it was a necessary amendment to make it clear that the PGT has powers and performs

duties and functions of property guardianship of all properties that come in its control,

including by agreement with Indigenous authorities.

Steve Kooner : In subsection (

b) here, it refers to “young person” and “the child.” Where does “young

person” come from?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is a pretty minor change just for consistency. I’m told that in all the other

acts, the reference is “child,” and it’s also defined, but the definition and actual

content don’t change. It’s just for consistency’s sake. We want to make sure that

we’re abiding by the names used everywhere, so “child” is replacing “young person.”

Steve Kooner : So it essentially has no meaning behind actually changing this? It’s just to make

language more consistent. There are no rights that are affected. There are no responsibilities

that change. Nothing gets affected.

Hon. Niki Sharma : Yes.

Steve Kooner : I think that’s it for that one.

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

It doesn’t affect any responsibilities, but is there any sort of transitional procedure

in place? Say if there are a lot of places that are using “young person,” and they’ve

just got to switch the language and agreements and all that kind of stuff, is there

a certain procedure to make sure that people have time to make these changes?

[4:25 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : There’s absolutely no change in the powers or meaning or definition, and I’m sure

that we wouldn’t do this amendment had we not been opening up the act to do more substantive

changes, like with the Indigenous authorities. It’s just a matter of doing this because

we are amending it.

Clause 7 approved.

On clause 8.

Steve Kooner : Clause 8 essentially takes out

section 7.1 and repeals it in the original act. Can

the Attorney General explain why we’re removing

section 7.1?

Hon. Niki Sharma : The

section is now the new proposed

section 8.2 of the act, which will come up under

clause 10.

Steve Kooner : If it’s the new clause 8, it seems like it’s procedural in nature. I just want to

confirm that it doesn’t affect any sort of substantive rights as a result of making

this change.

Hon. Niki Sharma : That’s correct.

Clause 8 approved.

On clause 9.

Steve Kooner : We are now on clause 9, which reads: “Section 8 is amended by striking out ‘young

person’s’ and substituting ‘child’s.’” We already dealt with this in another section.

Why place this again if we already changed the word? What’s the need for clause 9?

Hon. Niki Sharma : It’s the same change, for the same reason — just for consistency.

Steve Kooner : Once these changes are made, sometimes there are other statutes still hanging out

there that are using the old terminology, though maybe not in the PGT Act. Are there

any circumstances that the Attorney General’s department can think of where some other

legislation is still using “young person,”

whereas now this legislation is going to

be using “child”?

Hon. Niki Sharma : I don’t think that that’s a relevant question to this clause. I can’t get you an

answer, to search all statutes, to say where “young person” is made. I would say that

that would probably be not applicable to this.

What I can say is that the only reason these types of changes are happening is because

we were opening up this act anyway for other more substantive changes. Then the drafters

and the policy team decided that we should change “young person” to “child,” just

to be more consistent.

Clause 9 approved.

On clause 10.

Steve Kooner : Clause 10 is actually a very lengthy one. It deals with

section 8. It’s a couple

of pages here, actually. The first

section under clause 10 is 8.1, and the subheading

is “Powers for maintenance and education.”

[4:30 p.m.]

It reads: “If the Public Guardian and Trustee is the property guardian of a child,

the Public Guardian and Trustee may, for any money or other property of the child

held by the Public Guardian and Trustee or to the Public Guardian and Trustee’s account,

exercise for the benefit of the child the powers conferred on trustees by

section

24 of the Trustee Act and, without obtaining leave of the court, by

section 25 of

that Act.”

Now, perhaps the Attorney General can take us through this particular

section in this

clause.

Hon. Niki Sharma : For this clause, 8.1, there is no substantive change at all to this section. It is

found, again, like a previous clause in this bill, in the Infants Act. Just for consistency,

we’ve moved this from that to this act.

Steve Kooner : Chair, I see that we don’t have quorum in the House right now. Is that an issue?

The Chair : We have quorum, Member.

Steve Kooner : We do? Okay.

Under 8.1, how will the PGT ensure that exercising these trust powers aligns with

the child’s best interest and with the Indigenous law considerations for Indigenous

children?

Hon. Niki Sharma : We talked about this already under clause 6, “Best interests of child.”

The act as a whole, and certain sections of it, set out the duties and responsibilities

to act in the best interests of the child on the PGT.

Steve Kooner : The next

section here within this clause is 8.2. The title for this is “Use of trust

money.”

“If the Public Guardian and Trustee is acting as trustee under

section 6 (b) (

v) for

a person who has not yet reached 27 years of age and in respect of whom the Public

Guardian and Trustee was property guardian when the person reached 19 years of age,

the Public Guardian and Trustee may, during the term of the trusteeship, authorize

payment of all or part of the trust money for the maintenance, education or benefit

of that person.”

First, some specific questions on this one. When I first read this, 27 years, I was

just a little bit puzzled. I’ve never seen another statute that refers to 27 years.

You do see a lot of statutes referring to 19 and 18, but not a whole lot of statutes

referring to age 27. Was there a certain reason why age 27 was chosen as the upper

limit here?

[4:35 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : In the context of this bill, this is not a major change. The difference between what

is currently there and what’s here is, similar to a previous amendment, to make sure

that the PGT can act in this way for all circumstances, including the new agreement

ability with Indigenous authorities. That is the reason for this clause being amended.

The 27 years existed prior to any work that we’ve done, and the reason is because

children, after they reach 19, can ask for the PGT to stay helping them as a property

guardian until the age of 27, which in this circumstance is for trusteeship or authorized

payments of trust money, maintenance, education or benefit of that person. So that’s

the reason for that age thing, but it pre-existed these amendments.

Steve Kooner : I get that this pre-existed. I just would like to know. It seems like it’s wholly

discretionary on the part of the child. If the child doesn’t want it, this is not

going to go up to age 27. The child is going to be off the hook. They’re going to

get access to their property at the age of 19.

This is only if the child says: “Hey. I’ve reached 19, and I want all my property.

I can actually take it all. But if, by choice, I want you to still manage it for another

eight years, that can happen.”

There will be nothing stopping the child from just taking their property and handling

it on their own once they hit 19, correct?

Hon. Niki Sharma : That’s correct.

Steve Kooner : Now going into

section 8.3 of this clause, 8.3 actually deals with disclosure and

collection of information.

So 8.3(1) states: “Any person or public body may disclose information in the custody

or control of the person or public body to the Public Guardian and Trustee that is

necessary to enable the Public Guardian and Trustee (

a) to exercise the powers and

perform the duties and functions as a child’s property guardian or (

b) to assess whether

the circumstances for property guardianship referred to in

section 6.6 are present.”

I guess perhaps, if the Attorney General can just explain the first part of this section,

and then we can go into the next subsection after that.

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is an amendment that’s meant to be helpful to the PGT in their operations. Currently

it’s, I’m told, like a piecemeal situation of where they have an authority to access

information in their role of property guardianship for the child. So this just provides

a clear authority to disclose and collect information in their role in the act, and

I think it’ll be beneficial to the operation of the PGT.

[4:40 p.m.]

Steve Kooner : Then this next subsection, (2), reads: “The Public Guardian and Trustee may collect

information from any person or public body that the Public Guardian and Trustee considers

necessary (

a) to facilitate the exercise of the powers and performance of the duties

and functions as a child’s property guardian in all circumstances in which property

guardianship arises, or (

b) to assess whether the circumstances for property guardianship

referred to in

section 6.6 are present.”

Perhaps just elaborate on subsection (2), as well, please.

Hon. Niki Sharma : Subsections (

a) and (

b) cover two scenarios. The first one is pretty clear. It’s

that they are in the role of property guardianship and, in that way, have this authority,

then, that’s clear to disclose or collect information. Third parties can provide them

with information.

Subsection (

b) is in the scenario that was the kind of safety net provision that we

talked about earlier where, as a default, there may be circumstances where a child

is not getting the type of property guardianship that they should be getting, and

the PGT wants to assess whether that’s occurring. Then it gives them that kind of

pre-property-guardianship authority to take a look on behalf of the interests of that

child.

Steve Kooner : For me, some of the key words in this section, 8.3 of clause 10, have to do with

disclosing information and collecting information. In this day and era, collection

and disclosure of information has actually become a big deal. We hear a lot about

privacy. We hear a lot about protecting and data. We hear a lot about the integrity

of the information and making sure that it’s all protected.

What sorts of mechanisms would be here? I know the responsibilities would come out

to actually collect that information and disclose that information, but what safeguards

would there be to make sure the information will actually be protected and they’ll

be secure?

Hon. Niki Sharma : As a public body, the PGT would have all of the legislative responsibilities and

oversight that other public bodies have with FOIPPA and the Privacy Commissioner and

all those safeguards that are offered to British Columbians in the fact of collecting

very personal information.

The other side of that is the confidence that we have that the PGT has been operating

for many years with very sensitive information that they collect on behalf of children

that are very vulnerable, and they do so in a way that respects the privacy and the

interests of that child.

Steve Kooner : This is indeed a very important

section because there is a lot of confidential information

that even is involved with, like, property. If you’re doing a proceeding and you’re

seeking compensation, there might be, like, medical records that are disclosed or

collected that may have a lot of personal information of a child.

It’s very important that there are those safeguards to protect that kind of data,

especially and even more so because we’re dealing with children.

[4:45 p.m.]

The next question I have is: what type of informed consent would the PGT get to…?

Would they get any informed consent if they’re going to collect this information or

release it, or is it assumed that they just have the authority and they’re going to

operate that they have assumed consent? Or would they actually go get some consent

whenever they’re going to collect and disclose information?

Hon. Niki Sharma : There’s no legal requirement for a consent because they’ve taken the role of property

guardianship. As long as they’re operating, obviously, within their consent and authorities

and duties and that whole

section of best interests of the child, then the provisions

here about disclosure and collection of information could be done without consent.

I do think that there’s a requirement for medical evidence or records that if a child

is over 12, they consent for that. But other than that, I think that’s not required.

Steve Kooner :

Section 8.4 within clause 10 reads…. There’s a subheading.

The Chair : Member, just considering that everybody has a copy of the bill and also the public,

and it’s quite a long section, no need to read the whole thing if you just have a

specific question.

Steve Kooner : I’m going to seek some clarification. Do I have 15 minutes to ask a question?

The Chair : Yes.

Steve Kooner : Okay. When I do read it, there’s sometimes some

interpretation, things I’m asking.

So in order for me to be able to ask that question, I’ve got to be able to talk about

it. When I’m either reading it or talking about it, I’m kind of viewing it as the

same thing, right?

[4:50 p.m.]

I could be paraphrasing it or I could be talking about it, but it’s important that

I be able to read it because it helps me ask that question.

The Chair : Certainly. I’m just referencing that for everybody who has got a copy of it. But

continue.

Steve Kooner : Okay. Thank you.

The next clause has to deal with evidence of authority. The clause reads as follows:

“If the authority of the Public Guardian and Trustee as a child’s property guardian

arises from a source other than appointment by court order, a letter signed by an

authorized signatory of the Public Guardian and Trustee indicating that the Public

Guardian and Trustee is the child’s property guardian is conclusive proof of the Public

Guardian and Trustee’s authority in respect of a child’s property guardianship.”

Now, this particular clause deals with a particular letter, and it deals with an authorized

signatory, in terms of authorizing a letter, and then provides an avenue of conclusive

proof that the Public Guardian has trustee over a child’s property. I have some questions

in regards to the particular letter — a couple of questions, as follows.

Because it is a letter, I assume there’ll probably be a digital signature on this

letter. Will there be proper oversight to make sure that it goes out properly and

that there is proper oversight?

The rest of it talks about getting authority through a court order and getting authority

through the legislation, but then in this circumstance, we have a letter. A lot of

times when we see letters from government officials, a lot of them have electronic

signatures, and sometimes those are authorized through staff. We want to make sure

that when these letters are going to go out…. Because authority is going to be conclusive

proof, that letter actually gives authority to everybody else that the property guardianship

lies with the PGT.

Are there going to be any safeguards and oversights to kind of protect that and make

sure that process is an integral part and there are no issues and nothing falls through

the cracks?

[4:55 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : The purpose of this is to remedy a situation that causes a lot of, I guess, problems

for the PGT right now. If their authority, as mentioned in the different circumstances,

is that they can take over as property guardian of a minor, and it’s not based on

a court order, third parties rightly require something that shows them that.

Sometimes it’s hard for the PGT to piece together the different ways to show that,

so this just gives them that. There can be an official letter by an authorized signatory

of the PGT, so they can use that as their authorization to get evidence to third parties

that they are the property guardian of that minor.

I’m told by PGT that they have checks and balances that are built into their process

that are strictly controlling the e-signature and who has access to it, then executive

approval before any such letter comes out or the sign-off on it and a limited ability

to access the signature and the ability to make such a letter, once this bill has

passed.

Steve Kooner : Just a follow-up question in regards to 8.4, this section, in regards to the letter,

which would be signed by the authorized signatory. Because it’s going to be conclusive

proof that the PGT has authority, there might be other parties outside that look at

that, and they may think that’s not right or they may want to challenge that — for

example, the child’s family or current guardian from whom this authority is going

to be taken.

[5:00 p.m.]

Does the Attorney General’s department foresee any risk of challenge by a child’s

guardian or family coming as a result of now creating a procedure that this is conclusive

proof? A letter comes out; PGT has the authority. Has the Attorney General’s department

turned their minds to that?

Hon. Niki Sharma : The answer to this question is actually in many different pieces of legislation,

in different parts of it. I think the root of it is how you challenge the authority

of the PGT, and that is set out in other pieces of legislation, also dependent on

where the PGT gets the authority from. So I just refer the member to all those. I

think you can go back to clause 6 and see the different areas where that shows up.

This

section is simply isolated to the incidents where the PGT already has authority

somehow, and they want to be able to provide something to a third party that they

can rely on to say the PGT has that authority. In those circumstances, we needed something

more official that helped that third-party reliance for the PGT, when they already

had their authority but there was something to signify that.

Steve Kooner : Say if there’s a letter, and this letter is conclusive proof that PGT has the authority

over the property, as the child’s property guardian. If this letter is out there,

but there’s an error in that letter, what recourse is there, if there’s an error,

to rectify the situation?

Hon. Niki Sharma : I talked earlier about all the checks and balances that, I’m told, PGT has, including

executive sign-off for these kinds of things. So there are internal controls to prevent

such an error, if it was sent up.

We were trying to think about what the contents of the letter would likely be: some

way to identify the child, where the source of that authority is for the guardianship

and, maybe, what property they’re asking questions about or whatever. I’m sure if

there was an error, there would probably be a communication between the third party

and the PGT to try to rectify that if it was something related to the information

or a misspelling or something like that.

Steve Kooner : In

section 8.5 of clause 10, we start getting into when property guardianship terminates.

The

section reads: “Property guardianship in respect of a child terminates on the

earliest of the following as applicable: (

a) in accordance with the court order.”

So it can terminate in accordance of the court order.

Subsection (b): “when a court order declares that the Public Guardian and Trustee

is not the property guardian of the child.” Then, in accordance with the court order,

we get a declaration.

Subsection (c): “when an enactment provides for termination of property guardianship.”

So I take it this enactment also provides for termination.

Subsection (d): “in accordance with any terms or conditions that provide for termination

of property guardianship in an agreement.” We’ve spoken about agreements in the past,

specifically in regards to Indigenous authority.

[5:05 p.m.]

Then subsection (i): “ to continue property guardianship under

section 51.1 (2) of

the Child, Family and Community Service Act, or (ii) described in

section 6.5 (1)

or (2) of this Act.”

Then, finally, subsection (e): “the date the child reaches 19 years of age.”

In all of these circumstances, we have…. Either you could have a court order that

terminates; you could have an enactment, so legislation; you could have an agreement;

and/or you just go to the age of 19. But what’s important here is that there’s an

end in sight. When the end is in sight, there’s going to be certain property that’s

in control of the PGT.

The property…. Who knows how complicated it is currently to kind of hold on the part

of the PGT. But as soon as somebody reaches 19 years of age or an agreement happens

or something happens, it could be a pretty significant handover or a pretty significant

transition of control over the property. Specifically if, say, some child reaches

19, they might have problems.

We’ve dealt with one situation where it may be discretionary, where somebody wants

to kind of opt in, saying: “Well, for an additional eight years, until I turn 27,

I want to kind of have some extra guidance.” Other than that, is there anything else

that will make sure there will be a proper transition of that property, and they’ll

be well protected?

Otherwise, somebody is going to be left — there’s that uncommon word — cold turkey.

People use that word sometimes to refer to your….

You have all this hand-holding, and all of a sudden there’s a turn of events, and

you’re on your own after that. What we would want to make sure of is that a property

would not actually get affected as a result of there being a stop, either pursuant

to a court order or an enactment or an agreement or, say, the date of maturity, 19.

Is there something in place? I know there’s that one thing that’s a discretionary

thing. You can stay within the system until you’re 27. But is there anything else,

you know, some more proactive steps where…? I don’t know. Is the PGT going to send

out notices or something, some educational training to kind of make sure the child

actually is capable of handling that property?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This clause is particularly just there to provide clarity. It doesn’t add anything,

necessarily. It just says that it sets up all the circumstances where the PGT authority

as property guardian for a child ends. That’s the reason for this.

I’m told from the PGT that when that happens, and I think we’ll talk about some transitional

provisions coming up, they have a trauma-informed process, which includes financial

management help or assistance to that person at that time. There’s also the thing

that we talked about, the ability to have them act in a trust-like relationship after

19 up to 27, if the child wants it.

Steve Kooner : Thank you for that explanation. That kind of really added some context to help understand

what would be done.

So the next topic that comes up here under clause 10 is “Payment or transfer of property

after termination before child reaches age of majority.” This is 8.6.

[5:10 p.m.]

What’s discussed here is: “On termination of a child’s property guardianship before

the child reaches 19 years of age, the Public Guardian and Trustee, after deducting

any fees, commissions or other amounts payable, must pass the Public Guardian and

Trustee’s accounts under Supreme Court civil rules.”

When I read this, before reaches the age of 19, I think I need a further clarification

to make sure I am understanding it properly. Perhaps the Attorney General can enlighten

us on that.

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is a very rare occasion, I’m told, from the PGT, where the property guardianship

ends before the child reaches 19. In this case, there is a court oversight role associated

with that, as is written here, the types of accounts that are under the civil court

rules. That’s part of the transitional requirements when it’s terminated before 19.

Steve Kooner : Is this like a mechanism that the accounts have to be reviewed by the Supreme Court?

Is this what it is? The PGT is going to deduct their fees and all that, and they have

to get those fees always approved by the court. Does that mean that?

Hon. Niki Sharma : This is after deducting any fees, commissions or other amounts. They must pass their

accounts under the Supreme Court civil rules. So there’s court oversight in the whole

thing and, yes, including what they’ve deducted for their fees.

Steve Kooner : When this legislation is talking about accounts, it’s talking about what’s on the

ledger for the infant or the child. Is that correct?

Hon. Niki Sharma : Yes.

Steve Kooner : Just going a little bit further into the next

section here in this clause, it deals

with…. We’re talking about money matters still, payment or transfer of property after

termination when the child reaches the age of majority. Of particular interest to

me when I read this…. It has to do with the age of 27.

But before we get there, there are two defined terms in

section 8.7(1): “In this section,

‘individual’ means an individual who is under property guardianship when the individual

reaches 19 years of age.” Why did we have to define the term “individual” here?

[5:15 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma : This was a choice of our legislative drafters, and the reason behind that is upon

drafting of this section, it was clearer to have these defined terms for this section,

and it provides clarity for how to read it.

With that, I move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The committee rose at 5:16 p.m.

The House resumed at 5:16 p.m.

[The Speaker in the chair.]

Mable Elmore : The committee on Bill 21 reports progress and asks leave to sit again.

Leave granted.

Sunita Dhir :

Section A reports progress on Bill 25 and asks leave to sit again.

Leave granted.

Hon. Niki Sharma moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The Speaker : This House stands adjourned until Monday at 10:00 a.m.

The House adjourned at 5:17 p.m.

Proceedings in the

Douglas Fir Room

The House in Committee,

Section A.

The committee met at 1:09 p.m.

[Jennifer Blatherwick in the chair.]

Committee of the Whole

Bill 25 — Housing and Municipal

Affairs Statutes Amendment Act, 2025

(continued)

The Chair : Good afternoon, Members. I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 25, Housing and Municipal

Affairs Statutes Amendment Act, to order.

On clause 9 (continued) .

[1:10 p.m.]

Linda Hepner : Just before the break, we clarified that extraordinary circumstances would include

insufficient infrastructure, transportation, water, sewer. I believe my question now

to the minister is, what checks would be in place to prevent or safeguard this override

authority?

Hon. Christine Boyle : I am unclear what’s meant by “override authority,” so maybe the member can clarify

the question.

Actually I will say, just to clarify, before the break, we were talking about that

there are, as laid out in Bill 44 and also this legislation, extensions available

in situations around upgrades to infrastructure. More extraordinary circumstances

are a unique set of circumstances related to, as we spoke about, floods, wildfire,

etc. But infrastructure concerns were, again, in this bill, part of a reason for extensions.

There were 18 communities that were granted extensions under Bill 44. We don’t expect

many under this bill. So separate from what we talked about as extraordinary circumstances.

But if you could clarify the override in the question.

Linda Hepner : Maybe if we can clarify the answer, that would be helpful.

When we talked about what would be an extraordinary circumstance within a local government,

I wanted to hear that…. If they have insufficient infrastructure, does that count

as an extraordinary circumstance, and would that be considered under the exemption

or the request for an extension?

The same goes for insufficient water and sewer. Many places have old pipes or would

need upgrading of that kind of infrastructure. Does that qualify for an extension

as an extraordinary circumstance? Or if there is no transportation, and they can’t

densify on the basis of not having sufficient opportunities for people to get around,

in smaller communities, does that qualify as an extraordinary circumstance that you

could request an extension?

So looking for where it is that the province believes a local government has the opportunity

to say that this isn’t going to work because of these reasons, whether it’s well water,

whether it’s not enough capacity within their existing infrastructure.

I believe the minister was saying earlier that those would, in fact, be opportunities

to say: “We need an extension until this, this or this happens within our local communities.”

That’s what I took to understand. I was looking for confirmation that that was a correct

interpretation of what you were saying to me earlier.

[1:15 p.m.]

Hon. Christine Boyle : Happy to again clarify.

When the original small-scale, multi-unit housing legislation was introduced, extensions

were available for areas where infrastructure was being upgraded or where upgrades

were still required to avoid risks to health or public safety or the environment or

for extraordinary circumstances. Wildfire is an example of an extraordinary circumstance.

Local governments, if they feel there is an extraordinary circumstance, can make that

case to the ministry, and then we would talk with them and work with them to understand

if we’re in agreement that it should be considered an extraordinary circumstance.

But the infrastructure piece is its own category of consideration already outlined

for extensions.

I also think it’s helpful to again clarify that these rules only apply in urban containment

boundaries where existing single-family zoning is in place, so there is already some

level of infrastructure, road network, etc., and also only where connected to sewer

and water. Wells are not relevant to the zoning we’re discussing.

Linda Hepner : When you say “urban containment areas,” are those the more populous areas of the

province? There are many communities in British Columbia that are towns over 5,000

but that don’t define a containment boundary. Could you just clarify for me what you

mean by urban containment boundaries within all of British Columbia?

[1:20 p.m.]

Hon. Christine Boyle : Thanks for the clarification question. There are many shades here, so ha