First Session, 43rd Parliament

Official Report

of Debates

( Hansard )

Thursday, November 27, 2025

Afternoon Sitting

Issue No. 109

The Honourable Raj Chouhan , Speaker

ISSN 1499-2175

The HTML transcript is provided for informational purposes only.

The PDF transcript remains the official digital version.

Contents

Routine Business

Introductions by Members

Tributes

Frederick “Fred” Muzin

Hon. Jennifer Whiteside

Point of Order (Speaker’s Ruling)

Orders of the Day

Committee of the Whole

Bill 29 — Child, Family and Community Service Amendment Act, 2025 (continued)

Rosalyn Bird

Hon. Jodie Wickens

Heather Maahs

Peter Milobar

Amelia Boultbee

Royal Assent to Bills

Bill 20 — Construction Prompt Payment Act

Bill 21 — Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act (No. 2), 2025

Bill 25 — Housing and Municipal Affairs Statutes Amendment Act, 2025

Bill 30 — Employment Standards (Serious Illness or Injury Leave) Amendment Act, 2025

Bill 31 — Energy Statutes Amendment Act, 2025

Proceedings in the Douglas Fir Room

Committee of the Whole

Bill 32 — Mental Health Amendment Act (N o . 2), 2025 (continued)

Claire Rattée

Hon. Josie Osborne

Rob Botterell

Thursday, November 27, 2025

The House met at 1:02 p.m.

[The Speaker in the chair.]

Routine Business

Introductions by Members

Hon. Josie Osborne : I’d like to ask the House to please join me in wishing Nabiha Sheikh a very happy

birthday.

Nabiha is a dedicated respiratory therapist who moved from Alberta to British Columbia

last year, and she now serves on the front lines at Royal Jubilee Hospital. Her commitment

to patient care is matched only by her warmth as a great wife — not my wife but the

wife of my very talented staffer Hasham — and her talent as a baker.

Would everyone please join me in wishing her a very happy birthday.

Harwinder Sandhu : It’s always inspiring to recognize homegrown success stories, and Kal Tire, which

many of you know, is one that we’re so truly proud of.

Rooted in Vernon, Kal Tire has grown into a global leader while supporting the mining

sector and helping create thousands of well-paying jobs across Canada.

A special shout-out to the Ford family, founder family of Kal Tire, for their tremendous

generosity and work in the community to uplift many organizations in our community.

Yesterday their team had an amazing and informative display at the mining reception,

showcasing the innovation, sustainability and expertise that make Kal Tire truly world-class.

I am thrilled to welcome here today my constituents and representatives of Kal wTire

and the mining community: Christian Erdelyi, director of technology services; David

Steinmetz, director of recycling services; and, last but not the least, Kevin Frame,

western Canada mining services manager.

May I ask the House to please join me in welcoming my guests today.

Tributes

Frederick “Fred” Muzin

Hon. Jennifer Whiteside : I rise this afternoon to pay tribute to Frederick Muzin, who died on September 5,

2025, at the age of 75.

Fred was born in Montreal. He dedicated much of his career to health care in British

Columbia before retiring and moving to Courtenay.

He leaves behind his girlfriend, Heather Bould; his stepdaughters Alana and Karen;

his sisters Sandi Shapira and Marlene Wiseman; and his brother-in-law Phil.

[1:05 p.m.]

Fred was the president of the Hospital Employees Union for 15 years during a very

tumultuous time in health care. It was his leadership and vision that shaped the union

and left a lasting legacy in the labour movement and, indeed, across the province.

Fred first became active in HEU as a biomedical engineering technologist at St. Paul’s

Hospital. His commitment to fairness, solidarity and public health care quickly made

him a respected leader among his co-workers and fellow union members.

In 1993, Fred was elected provincial president of HEU, a position he held for 15 years

until his retirement in 2008. During that time, Fred was there for both the victories

and the struggles that defined an era for HEU members. He was part of the leadership

team that delivered huge gains in pay equity for HEU members as well as the landmark

health accord in the 1990s under the B.C. NDP government.

But he also stood firmly and resolutely with members through the B.C. Liberals’ unprecedented

privatization, mass layoffs and wage rollbacks of the 2000s, always emphasizing solidarity,

resilience, social justice and rooted in community.

I will remember him as a leader who didn’t stay behind a desk ever. I can still see

him now, with a megaphone, leading members on picket lines in protests. He believed

in being on the front lines with members. In 2002, he was arrested alongside other

HEU leaders in the Chilliwack laundry blockade, defending the very jobs of health

care workers and taking a stand for public health care.

For Fred, union work was always connected to community and to a larger fight for social

justice. His voice carried beyond the health care worksites, into campaigns for peace,

equity and for global solidarity.

Through good times and hard times, Fred helped ensure HEU emerged as a stronger, more

stable and more united organization. His example continues to inspire generations

of activists to stand up for what’s right, to care for one another and for a better

world.

One of the ways he expressed his solidarity with people was through his commitment

to blood donation, a practice that he began in 1968 while he was at university. In

fact, he gave his 200th blood donation on his 70th birthday.

I will always remember Fred as a fair but firm convention chair, inspiring loyalty,

if not always discipline, amongst HEU members. His legacy lives on in his commitment

to social justice and in the countless lives he touched with his courage, his advocacy

and his solidarity. He will be missed.

Point of Order

(Speaker’s Ruling)

The Speaker : Before we move to the next item on the agenda, I would like to share my ruling with

the House.

Hon. Members, on Monday, November 24, the Government House Leader raised a point of

order regarding the admissibility of Bill M219, intituled Health Authorities Amendment

Act, 2025, standing in the name of the member for North Island.

The Chair thanks the Government House Leader and member for Kamloops Centre for their

submissions. The Chair has examined the submissions and the bill and is now prepared

to rule on the point of order.

With respect to the direction being sought on the application of Standing Order 66,

which pertains to the consideration of motions by the House, the Chair will not provide

a ruling, as Standing Order 66 is not applicable to the matter at hand, being Bill

M219. Generally, Standing Order 66 applies to motions in the way that Standing Order

67 applies to bills.

Standing Order 67 provides: “It shall not be lawful for the House to adopt or pass

any vote, resolution, address or bill for the appropriation of any part of the public

revenue or any tax or impost to any purpose that has not been first recommended to

the House by message of the Lieutenant Governor in the session in which such vote,

resolution, address or bill is proposed.” As previously noted by the Chair, this stems

from constitutional provisions that the House is bound by.

[1:10 p.m.]

The Chair must decide whether Bill M219 is a money bill, thereby offending Standing

Order 67 without an accompanying message of the Lieutenant Governor or royal recommendation.

As the Chair noted in previous guidance to the House, a royal recommendation is required

if any provision in a private member’s bill would authorize a new and distinct charge

to be effectively imposed on the consolidated revenue fund.

In examining the contents of Bill M219, the Chair’s read is that the bill requires

the health authority boards to determine time periods for a patient to receive certain

forms of medical care and provide notice to patients when that time period cannot

be met, and it mandates related public reporting. The Chair must assess whether these

requirements infringe on Standing Order 67.

The matter before the Chair is not clear-cut. Members will appreciate that the Chair

took an unusually extended time to return to the House with a ruling as the Chair

wanted to become better acquainted with the existing statutory framework that Bill

M219 seeks to amend.

On an annual basis, this House approves an appropriation for the withdrawal of funds

from the consolidated revenue fund for the Ministry of Health, which provides funding

to the health authorities. The funds a health authority receives fall under the control

of its board, which has discretion on how those funds are used, subject to the statutory

and regulatory regimes those boards are bound by. Bill M219 prescribes actions that

the board must mandate within its health authority and obligations for the responsible

minister to report to the House on data transmitted by each board.

In the Chair’s view, Bill M219 does not prescribe or impose in any specific terms

required spending that would clearly constitute a new and distinct charge. The bill

appears to mandate health authority boards with functions that align with those already

permitted in the Health Authorities Act.

In consideration of the above and based on available information and submissions presented

to the Chair at this time, it is the ruling of the Chair that Bill M219 does not appear

to offend Standing Order 67. As such, the bill will be permitted to proceed.

However, as a bill advances through the legislative stages of consideration, the Chair

may again receive submissions on the admissibility of a bill reported from committee,

specifically in its reported form.

Orders of the Day

Hon. Mike Farnworth : In this chamber, I call continued committee stage on Bill 29.

In the Douglas Fir Room, I call

Section A, continued committee stage on Bill 32.

The House in Committee,

Section B.

The committee met at 1:15 p.m.

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

Committee of the Whole

Bill 29 — Child, Family and

Community Service

Amendment Act, 2025

(continued)

The Chair : All right. I’ll call the House to order. We’re continuing committee stage on Bill

29, Child, Family and Community Service Amendment Act, 2025.

On clause 3 (continued) .

Rosalyn Bird : Before we finish our conversations from this morning, I actually would like to table

an amendment.

[ CLAUSE 3, in proposed

section 19.2, by deleting the text shown as struck and adding

the underlined text as shown:

Parties to safety plan agreement

19. 2

(1) Subject to subsection (2), the following persons must be parties to a safety

plan agreement:

(

a) a director;

(

b) each parent who , in the director’s opinion, meets all of the following criteria:

(

i) the parent is apparently entitled to custody of the child to whom the agreement relates;

(ii) the parent has rights and responsibilities as a parent with custody that may be affected

by the agreement;

(iii) the parent can be located;

(iv) the parent is able and willing to exercise the rights and responsibilities of a parent

with custody.

(2) If a child has no parents as described in subsection (1) (b), then the first of the following that applies at least one guardian with care of the child to whom the agreement relates must be a party to a safety plan agreement:

(

a) at least one parent who, in the director’s opinion, would be a parent under subsection

(1) (

b) except that the parent has no rights or responsibilities as a parent with

custody that may be affected by the agreement;

(

b) at least one parent with care of the child to whom the agreement relates.

(3) A parent described in subsectio n (1) (

b) ma y only be a party to a safety plan agreement if, in circumstances in which the child

is of an appropriate age, the child has been consulted. ]

The Chair : Okay. We’ll just go into a short recess and have copies made of the amendment and

circulated. Then we’ll hear from the member on the amendment. It’ll be a few moments.

The committee recessed from 1:16 p.m. to 1:19 p.m.

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

The Chair : Okay. Everybody has got a copy of the amendment. I’ll call the House back to order.

On the amendment.

Rosalyn Bird : I know we talked about this extensively yesterday, and we’re going to agree to disagree,

Minister.

[1:20 p.m.]

I wanted it on the record. I have serious issues with “in the director’s opinion.”

If the language had been different in regards to the process or the evidence-based

decision-making model that we have talked about, I would have been happy with that.

But “in the director’s opinion” raises massive concerns for myself and parents that

I have spoken with.

Also, I know yesterday that you were not happy with that addition. However, if you

have semi-adult children — I would say actually any child above the age of 12 that

is bright and cognizant and part of the plan — I actually think that strengthens the

plan. I don’t think it takes away from it in any way, shape or form. So that is why

I added para (c).

Hon. Jodie Wickens : The 19.2

section 1(

b) around “in the director’s opinion” has been debated extensively.

I continue to not support this amendment for the reasons that I have outlined numerous

times.

The addition of the last point is problematic for a number of reasons.

Firstly, paramount in the act is that a director will take into consideration the

views of a child, but putting it in as “must” also ignores the paramount consideration

of the best interest of a child. If a child may potentially be traumatized by being

included in a safety plan, that is not the best interest of a child. So this amendment

ignores the paramount considerations in the act already.

For those reasons, I do not support the amendment.

Heather Maahs : Well, with all due respect, I guess that’s what this is all about. We disagree, you

disagree, and we go back and forth, and that’s what this is all about.

I think this — if the child has been consulted and is deemed of an appropriate age

by the director — is absolutely necessary. There are too many situations where children

are left out of the equation, and this is…. I actually believe that it would be negligent

for this not to be a “must” for a child to be consulted.

Rosalyn Bird : I have a clarifying question, actually. I just don’t know how they work, subamendments.

Am I allowed to ask the minister, through you, if she would be open to a subamendment?

I don’t know how that works.

The Chair : Okay, Member. Yeah, proceed and speak to that, and we can hear from the minister.

Rosalyn Bird : The only thing I would ask the minister…. If she and her staff would actually consider….

Based on the information that she provided, I can see where there would be instances

where that would be problematic. However, would the minister consider adding that

as a “may”?

[1:25 p.m.]

I think it’s extremely important in a lot of cases when children are consulted that

they be participatory in a process for their family.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : I do not support that. It would be redundant. It is already assumed in the act by

the guiding principles.

The Chair : Seeing no further speakers, I’ll call the question on the amendment to clause 3 moved

by the member for Prince George–Valemount.

Division has been called.

[1:30 p.m. - 1:35 p.m.]

Members, we’re voting on an amendment to clause 3 of Bill 29, moved by the member

for Prince George–Valemount.

[1:40 p.m.]

Amendment negatived on the following division:

YEAS — 37

Wilson

Milobar

Banman

Wat

Kooner

Halford

Hartwell

L. Neufeld

Van Popta

Dew

Clare

K. Neufeld

Brodie

Armstrong

Bhangu

Paton

Gasper

Chan

Toor

Hepner

Giddens

Rattée

Davis

McInnis

Bird

McCall

Stamer

Day

Maahs

Kealy

Boultbee

Williams

Loewen

Dhaliwal

Doerkson

Luck

Block

NAYS — 47

Lore

G. Anderson

Blatherwick

Routledge

Chant

Toporowski

B. Anderson

Neill

Osborne

Brar

Krieger

Davidson

Parmar

Sunner

Beare

Chandra Herbert

Wickens

Kang

Sandhu

Begg

Higginson

Phillip

Lajeunesse

Choi

Rotchford

Morissette

Popham

Dix

Sharma

Farnworth

Eby

Bailey

Kahlon

Greene

Whiteside

Boyle

Yung

Malcolmson

Gibson

Glumac

Arora

Shah

Chow

Dhir

Valeriote

Botterell

The Chair : We’ll take a short recess while we’re clearing out.

The committee recessed from 1:42 p.m. to 1:45 p.m.

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

The Chair : I’ll call the committee back to order and continued discussion on Bill 29, Child,

Family and Community Service Amendment Act, 2025, on clause 3.

Rosalyn Bird : I just sort of wanted to revisit where we had left off. I just wanted to re-ask the

question that I had asked shortly before lunchtime, indicating that delayed and incomplete

disclosures impact procedural rights and access to justice in the children and family

services system. Notably, parents’ counsel are hindered in their ability to provide

effective legal advice to the parents, and they are hindered in their ability to make

informed decisions.

I asked the minister, and I will ask again. How does the minister reconcile with the

fact that a piece of legislation has been tabled without protections for parents in

standardized disclosure practices across B.C.?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Disclosure of files has nothing to do with safety planning and has to do with court

proceedings, so it is not relevant to this bill.

Rosalyn Bird : That is absolutely not…. That is actually not true.

Safety plans can have massive ramifications on families, and you know that. You recommend

that families request legal advice. In fact, you highly suggest it. If the information….

Interjection.

Rosalyn Bird : I beg your pardon?

The Chair : Hold on, hold on.

Member, just a reminder, remarks through the Chair. You don’t directly address the

minister. It’s through the Chair.

Rosalyn Bird : Okay, my mistake. I apologize.

Chair, I have a huge issue with this. Safety plans have massive ramifications for

families. They can involve removing a child. They can involve removing a parent. They

can involve a number of things. They can request a parent attend recovery. They can

request lots and lots of things that parents or children may find extremely egregious.

The reason that we ask for legal advice on these types of things is so that parents

completely understand what it is that they’re signing. The fact that they are not

getting all of the information or their legal counsel has not received all information

regarding a situation makes it extremely difficult for somebody to make an informed

decision about something. So I disagree with the minister entirely.

I would like to hear from the minister how she expects families to make informed decisions

if they don’t have or if their counsel does not have all of the information that is

applicable.

[1:50 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : There were a number of gross assumptions made in that question that I don’t believe

are helpful in the debate of this bill. I have outlined a number of complaint processes

that families can take in the process of not agreeing with the director. I have outlined

a number of support services that a director may take to support a family with respect

to accessing legal counsel.

I need to remind the member that what we are talking about in this bill around safety

plans are voluntary arrangements. They are voluntary plans. There are no removals

in a safety plan. There is no removal of a child from the custody of a guardian in

a safety plan.

The concerns that the member is bringing forward with respect to disclosure are about

court processes and court orders, and they are not relevant to this bill.

Rosalyn Bird : Again, I completely disagree.

I dealt with a file this morning. I had a parent contact me. Their safety plan is

supposed to be coming up for review, although the ministry has not confirmed that.

They’ve asked for advice — they actually have obtained legal counsel — and were told

by their lawyer that he cannot give advice on whether that plan should or shouldn’t

be amended and/or extended without getting information regarding the file. This absolutely

does apply, 100 percent. It may not apply in every situation.

I wasn’t suggesting that safety plans said that children are removed. However, I have

had parents tell me that they have been told that if they do not sign a safety plan,

the child will be removed from their house. This is a document that you say is voluntary.

It should be voluntary, and it should be collaborative, but that isn’t always how

it works. So I have huge concerns around this.

Again, I expressed earlier that I don’t like paintbrush-type solutions. I don’t like

paintbrush-type responses.

There are definitely multiple families across this province — probably dozens, probably

hundreds, quite frankly — that don’t have all the information they need in regard

to what is happening with their family, and they are not getting proper legal advice.

So I completely disagree with what the minister has said here.

I would actually like to ask the minister: do you honestly believe that that is true,

that your ministry is operating to…?

The Chair : Member, just a reminder….

Interjections.

The Chair : Folks. Members.

Just a reminder, through the Chair, not to refer to “you.” Thank you.

Rosalyn Bird : I’ll rephrase the question. Thank you, Chair.

I’m extremely frustrated that this is not…. You just threw out an answer saying that

this doesn’t apply to safety plans. That astounds me. That answer absolutely astounds

me.

I’m going to ask the minister again, through you, Chair, if she…. Maybe I’ll rephrase

the question. Is the minister aware of any children that were removed from a home

because a safety plan was not followed?

[1:55 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Chair, I have spoken at length about the guiding principles of this act.

I encourage the member to read the guiding principles of the act. Asked and answered.

Rosalyn Bird : I’m going to ask the question again. It was a fairly straightforward question. Is

the minister aware of any child that was removed from their family because a safety

plan was violated or not followed?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : What the member has asked me is if I know of any individual case where something

has occurred. What I’ve expressed to this House, at multiple times, is that any information

that I obtain under the Child, Family and Community Service Act I cannot disclose

to anybody in this House.

So I cannot answer that question, but I will reiterate, as I have answered multiple

times through this process, that directors use structured decision-making tools to

make evidence-based decisions about the safety and well-being of children in many

different situations.

Rosalyn Bird : I want to clarify. Is the minister telling this House that her ministry is unaware

of children in care that have been removed from their families?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : It is not relevant to the bill.

Rosalyn Bird : It is 100 percent relevant to the bill. What I asked was…. I didn’t ask about a specific

case. The minister said to me that she cannot give me that information because it

is privileged through the act. These are statistics that the RCY publishes annually.

They are statistics the ministry should be publishing annually. So the question is

relevant.

If in fact a parent violated or something happened with a safety plan and it escalated

and a child was removed because that parent may or may not have had the correct information

disclosed to them through the ministry, it is 100 percent applicable. We are talking

about safety plans. The results or the ramifications of safety plans are significant,

including possibly having a child removed.

To point to the principles of the act…. I’m quite aware of what the principles of

the act are. If I didn’t care about the principles, quite frankly, I wouldn’t be standing

here in committee asking questions about this bill, and my caucus members wouldn’t

be here to support me.

Once again, I will ask if she is aware of any children in this province — not a specific

case — being removed from their family home because there was a violation or a particular

piece of a family plan that was not followed.

The Chair : Member, you’ve asked that question a number of times. We’ve heard the response from

the minister. I know we may not have agreement on that, but just in light of not having

a repetitive discussion, I’ll ask you if you have additional questions.

Rosalyn Bird : I’d like to take a five-minute recess, please.

The Chair : Okay, yeah. We’ll have a five-minute recess.

The committee recessed from 2:00 p.m. to 2:13 p.m.

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

The Chair : Okay, we’ll call the committee back to session.

I have made some remarks in terms of questions being repetitive. I recognize that

it’s very passionate, a lot of interest on this bill. And I give the opportunity for

the minister to respond, if she wishes.

Just in terms of direction, moving forward, I remind everyone to try and keep questions

relevant to the clause that’s being debated.

Peter Milobar : Madam Chair, I was hoping to seek a little further clarification from what you just

said actually.

Our understanding…. This is not a brand-new piece of legislation where we are dealing

with

an act that didn’t previously exist. This is amending legislation to amend certain

provisions within an existing framework and legislation. Therefore, the questions

we’re asking about safety plans directly tie into existing legislation and how they

have been used in the past and how safety plans under these amendments may or may

not be impacted.

We are very mindful that we cannot ask about specific files, let alone identifying

casework or anything like that. The questions we are trying to ask that may seem repetitive

at times are simply because the minister is refusing to answer said questions, not

because we seem to be out of the purview of what the bill itself is trying to accomplish.

Again, we are looking at amending legislation. To not understand how that amendment

will impact the functionality of existing legislation makes it very, very hard.

[2:15 p.m.]

If the government’s premise is that they can’t answer any questions, based on the

facts that it’s to do with the act and it’s child welfare at stake, we might as well

find a way for the government to take all of these proceedings in camera so we can

at least, as opposition, do our job to find out what the changes to the act will actually

mean to people in their daily lives.

That is, I think, the premise and the basis that these questions are being asked on.

Repetition only results when they are valid questions because a minister is refusing

to answer the question, not because the opposition has asked the same question 16

times with 16 succinct answers.

The answer we’ve been getting back is, “I can’t talk about that,” where, in fact,

there needs to be a mechanism for the government, when we’re asking non-identifying

questions about existing legislation and how this amendment will impact that existing

legislation, to actually answer in this place. For if they’re not, I’m not sure what

the role of opposition is supposed to be when it comes to legislation if that’s the

out that government is able to take.

I guess we just seek a little further clarification, but you did seem to cover it

off with your previous comments.

So I just wanted to make sure that the Chair understood where we were coming from

as opposition. We’re not trying to be obstructionists. We are not trying to be argumentative

or repetitive, but we do need the minister to cooperate in that regard.

We are very mindful and will be very mindful moving forward that we cannot have identifying-type

questions that we are asking for clarification for the impact of this amendment with

the existing legislation as it stands.

The Chair : Minister, do you wish to respond to the previous questions?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : I just want to, for the record, make it very clear that I have only cited privacy

of the act one time during this debate, which I felt was important to highlight, and

that when I have referenced things that we have talked about in previous clauses,

it’s because I’ve answered similar questions in previous clauses and find the question

has been already answered.

But with respect to the privacy that is required under the Child, Family and Community

Service Act, this is the very first time that I have spoken to that.

Rosalyn Bird : I’ll carry on to a different question.

To the minister: did your office, in December 2024, receive a letter regarding a survey

that 25 parents’ counsels participated in?

[2:20 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : This line of questioning is not relevant to this amendment to the CFCSA. The clause

that we are on is clause 3: “Making a safety plan agreement.”

Rosalyn Bird : I disagree. In clause 2, it says: “As applicable, the parent may seek independent

legal advice at any time with respect to the agreement.” That’s what we are talking

about, actually being able to get legal advice and whether or not that legal advice

is accurate.

So I will ask the minister. In the letter that I have no idea if the minister’s office

did or didn’t get, because she did not answer the first question…. If she is reminded

of the letter, did that letter state that parents’ counsel do not always receive complete

disclosure, even in cases where requests for specific records have been made to the

director’s counsel?

Again, this particular information that I’m asking about actually does apply to safety

plans. A parent cannot get legal advice from counsel if they have not been given all

the information from the minister. So I will ask the question again. Did the letter

that the minister’s office received contain information that parents do not receive

all of the information from counsel that they have requested?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Court proceedings and disclosure are not a part of safety planning. They are a part

of a different part of the Child, Family and Community Service Act.

Rosalyn Bird : I will move on to a different question, because, clearly, the minister is not wanting

to answer any of the questions regarding legal counsel that her ministry is not only

encouraging but requesting that parents signing a safety plan get.

Para 3 states: “As soon as applicable after making a….”

The Chair : Member. I just want to recognize the member from Penticton-Summerland.

Amelia Boultbee : Thank you so much.

I apologize to the MLA for interrupting her.

If I may just ask a clarifying question of the minister.

The Chair : I thought you were asking for leave. We’ll hear the question from Prince George–Valemount,

and then, after that, we’ll recognize you.

Rosalyn Bird : Paragraph 3 indicates: “As soon as practicable after making a safety plan agreement,

the director must do all of the following.” Can the minister provide, using the terms

“as soon as practical” and “reasonable effort”…? Does the minister have benchmarks

for what is practicable and reasonable?

[2:25 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : “Practicable” and “reasonable” are common terms used in law, and they are used in

various places in the CFCSA. They’re used because there is a need for a certain amount

of flexibility with respect to the work that’s done.

For an example, there are certain places in this province where it may take three

hours for a protection worker to get to a family and back again,

whereas in other

places it may take 20 minutes. So “practicable” and “reasonable” are common terms,

and child protection workers do everything that they can to make sure that they are

working quickly with families and providing them with support and information in the

fastest ways so that they keep children safe.

Amelia Boultbee : If I may just ask a generalized clarifying question of the minister. Is it the ministry’s

position that disclosure is not mandatory under this

section because the safety plans

contemplated here are purely voluntary?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : I’ll try and provide some clarity. They are two separate issues. Providing, obtaining

particular legal advice in relation to a short-term voluntary plan is different than

file disclosure to support a court proceeding.

Rosalyn Bird : I apologize for the pause. I thought there was going to be a follow-up question there.

Safety plans under the current policy….

Chapter 3, 3.2, states that they have to be

approved by a supervisor and documented within 24 hours after they have been completed.

Will the minister explain why the bill does not specify a 24-hour time frame currently

being used within policy?

[2:30 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : I just gave an example in my previous answer and just answered this question.

Rosalyn Bird : I want to understand this, because I’ve heard from the minister a number of times

over the debate of this bill. She has stated that when a safety plan is being considered

— we are talking about making safety plan agreements — there are a number of things

that happen within the family unit.

Obviously, there’s been a report made that there is a concern within a family — one

child, multiple children. It could be egregious; it could not be egregious. But it’s

concerning enough that the ministry wants to examine it.

My understanding is they will make a visit to that house, that they will interview

the parents, will talk to children if they are of appropriate age. They may have a

look around the house to see if there are things that are concerning. There may or

may not be enough food. Do they have a washer and dryer and are able to wash their

clothes? Do they have running water? Do they have electricity? All the standard things

that people would look at when they’re considering safety of children.

The regulation also states that the directors or the person working with the family

needs to contact any community agencies that the family may or may not be involved

with that could help with the safety plan. It directs that you should contact other

family members to ask about concerns around that. So there’s a lot of information

that is taken into consideration prior to determining what a safety plan looks like.

When the director comes back or the social worker or whoever it is that is going to

be engaging with this family in this collaborative, supposed voluntary process, why

is a safety plan not actually documented at that time with family members? And if

it’s not documented, why can it not be documented within the 24-hour time frame that

is actually currently in the policy that is being followed?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Asked and answered.

Rosalyn Bird : Well, it is apparent that there’s a lot of vagueness that goes on in this ministry

in regards to safety plans, which I was hoping was going to actually be rectified

with this bill, although I have more concerns now than I had before.

The current policy also states, “affirm parents are informed” and “voluntary consent

to the safety plan.” Will the minister confirm that this is the intent of paragraph

(c)(ii)?

It says that a signature is required on the agreement and “written confirmation that

to.” Is it the minister’s purview that that signature is voluntary?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Yes.

Rosalyn Bird : Parents frequently report that being told refusal to sign a safety plan will, in

fact, result in apprehension of a child. The power imbalance, the urgency and the

fear of losing a child mean that consent may be formal but not truly voluntary, raising

fundamental justice concerns.

[2:35 p.m.]

How will the minister protect families from feeling coerced into signing agreements

that threaten a child or a parent being removed from the home or for another violation?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : This is exactly why it is important that we are putting safety plans explicitly in

the act and enshrining them in law. Providing procedural safeguards in the act is

the reason why we’re doing this, to ensure that it is explicit in the legislation

that these are voluntary.

The director must communicate with prospective parties in a manner that is appropriate

the safety plans, including the right to withdraw. Before entering into the agreement,

the director must also inform parents that they can seek legal advice at any time.

The director must make all reasonable efforts to confirm the agreement in writing.

The written agreement must include an acknowledgement that parties can seek legal

advice. The legislation makes it clear that parents and others who are parties to

the safety plan may withdraw from the agreement within a set number of days described

be revisited if a party no longer agrees to them.

In addition, I have spoken previously in this debate around all of the other actions

that are explicitly outlined in policy for directors to take if there is a disagreement

with a family around the safety plan. They could take an arrangement for the child

or youth to live with an extended family member. They could create a support service

agreement with a youth or a child.

Safety planning is looked at as the least disruptive measure available through policy,

but there are a number of tools available to directors should there be a disagreement

with themselves and the parent caregiver.

Rosalyn Bird : A clarifying question. I believe this is what I just heard. The minister said that

safety plans are apparently voluntary.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Safety plans are voluntary.

Rosalyn Bird : With all due respect to the minister, based on the conversations we’ve had this afternoon,

safety plans are apparently voluntary.

On the date…. Actually, I’m going to go back to (3)(b), and (3)(

b) states: “Make all

reasonable efforts to provide a copy of the written agreement to each party.”

Can the minister provide an example or a reason why every party that is involved in

an agreement would not receive a copy of that agreement?

[2:40 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : I just want to reiterate what it actually says in the clause. As soon as practicable

after making a safety plan agreement, the director must do all of the following: “(

b) make all reasonable efforts to provide a copy of the written agreement to each party.”

Rosalyn Bird : I understand what the clause says. My question to the minister was why would a written

agreement not be provided to one of the parties?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : I will try and give a real-life example, and hopefully that will be helpful. In the

unfortunate time when Lytton burned down in our province, child protection workers

quite literally had to interact with children and their families and make plans on

the spot. Some of those things were verbal agreements. Because of that environment

and because of what was happening there, they were not able to then provide a written

document in the timeline.

So there are real circumstances where things like this occur. Internet is down. We

have extraordinary events that happen. There are a number of things that could happen

where this circumstance would take place.

Rosalyn Bird : I wouldn’t disagree in those circumstances at all, but I would assume that after

things had sorted down and people had been evacuated from Lytton and you made sure

that children and families were reunited, you’re going to, obviously, put together

an agreement to make sure they continue to be supported and protected if they were

at risk because they’ve lost their home.

They’ve lost their…. Of course, I would not have any argument with that whatsoever.

However, at some point you would have sat down with those families, even from Lytton,

and you would have actually signed a formal agreement.

So my question was: why would a parent not get a copy of a written agreement?

[2:45 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : When there is a verbal agreement, it is followed up as quickly as possible with a

written agreement.

Rosalyn Bird : Again, that didn’t answer the question, but I’ll move on to something else.

This states that there has to be a signature on the agreement. My question would be:

if a member or a party of the agreement doesn’t actually get a copy of said agreement,

how would they sign said agreement?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : I mentioned that when a verbal agreement is made, it is followed up with a written

agreement. It says at (3)(c)(i): “signature on the agreement, or (ii) written confirmation

agreed to.”

out that the party has agreed to, are you referring to an email? Can you specify what

you’re referring to there?

[2:50 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Yes, it could be an email.

Rosalyn Bird : Paragraph (4)(

a) states: “on the date on which all parties agree to the terms and

conditions of the agreement.” Can the minister provide an explanation of how a director

or a social worker would…? I’m trying to figure out…. If a verbal agreement was made

originally, and it was put into a written agreement, but a party of that safety plan

didn’t actually get in agreement, am I to assume that…? I don’t understand how this

clause works actually.

Actually, I’m going to move on to (4)(b). It states that whether or not the party

or any other party signs a written agreement or gives written confirmation, as described,

then the safety plan agreement is in place. But if you go back to the previous paragraph,

in (3)(c), it says there has to be a signature on the agreement. So if nobody has

signed the agreement, I don’t know how the agreement can actually be in effect. If

the minister could clarify that, through the Chair.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : So (4)(

b) allows for the verbal plan to be in effect, and then we follow up with

written confirmation as soon as practicable.

Rosalyn Bird : Can the minister just, and I hope it’s not the complaint process, please explain

what a family has the ability to do if the verbal agreement does not actually reflect

in the written agreement that they receive to sign?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : The family can refuse to provide written confirmation if there is a disagreement,

and then the director can work with the family on other least intrusive measures,

or they can work with the family on a different written safety plan agreement.

Rosalyn Bird : I just want to go back to…. You’ve stated a couple of times through the debate that

if there is a disagreement with a safety plan, and in making a safety plan, and there

is something within the process that they’re not happy with during the safety plan,

including the inability to collect enough information to get proper legal advice….

You have indicated that a family can initiate a complaint process through the complaint

department.

My question is: if that process is actually initiated, what happens to that safety

plan in the interim?

[2:55 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : If the family is unhappy with the terms of an agreement or the process that has been

undertaken, they can seek to explore other least intrusive measures. They can seek

to explore other terms of the agreement and take the same measures that I just listed

in the previous question.

Rosalyn Bird : I’d like to go back to a previous question. I want to make sure that…. I’m pretty

sure this is what the minister said, so I need clarification.

I asked her earlier if (3)(c)(ii) — written confirmation that terms and agreements

and the conditions set out — was, in fact, the clarifying document or clarifying piece

that makes these agreements voluntary. Can the minister confirm that’s what she said

earlier?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : All aspects of safety planning are voluntary. The terms of the agreement, what is

in the provisions, the agreed-upon timelines, written confirmation, the whole aspect

of safety planning is voluntary.

Rosalyn Bird : Again, paragraph (4) states that a safety plan agreement is in effect as it applies

agreement, whether or not the party or any other party signs a written agreement or

gives written confirmation as described in

section (c). So I am just again….

I am sure the minister is going to say to me that this is in regards to a verbal agreement

and that’s why this clause is in here. Yet further up in the clause, it states that

a verbal agreement actually has to be put in writing.

So as I understand this amendment or the way it reads…. And I’m not going to be the

only person reading this. There are going to be, probably, thousands or, at least,

hundreds of social workers across the province that are going to be referring to this.

So I’m very concerned about the language.

Again, my question is…. In section (4), if you have not received a signature and you

can actually be in effect.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : I have already answered this. I’m going to try to answer it one last time.

There is a period of time between which a verbal agreement is made and a written confirmation

happens. So (4)(

b) allows for that to take place.

Rosalyn Bird : That is not a clear answer, but it’s clear I’m not going to get a clear answer, so

I would like to table an amendment.

[ CLAUSE 3, in proposed

section 19.4, by deleting the text shown as struck and adding

the underlined text as shown:

Making a safety plan agreement

19. 4

(1) A safety plan agreement may be made verbally or in writing.

(2) Before making a safety plan agreement, the director must inform each parent who

is proposed to be a party to the agreement under

section 19.2 (1) (

b) or (2), as applicable,

that the parent may seek independent legal advice at any time with respect to the

agreement.

(3) As soon as practicable Within 24 hours after making a safety plan agreement, the director must do all of the following:

(

a) if the agreement was made verbally, prepare a written copy of the agreement;

(

b) make all reasonable efforts to provide a copy of the written agreement to each

party;

(

c) for each party referred to in

section 19.2 (1) (

b) or (2), as applicable, and

section 19.2 (4), if any, make all reasonable efforts to obtain the party’s

(

i) signature on the agreement, or

what the party has agreed to.

(4) A safety plan agreement is effective as it applies to a party on the date on which the agreement as been signed by all parties.

and

(

b) whether or not the party, or any other party, signs a written agreement or gives

written confirmation as described in subsection (3) (c). ]

The Chair : Member, while we’re getting copies, would you like to speak to your amendment?

On the amendment.

Rosalyn Bird : We have gone back and forth and back and forth. I made it quite clear at the beginning

of this

section that I had serious reservations around verbal agreements, and this

is why.

[3:00 p.m.]

I have talked to lots of parents and advocacy groups that have massive concerns about

verbal agreements. They also have huge concerns about how these agreements go from

being verbal to being in writing. They also have concerns about how and whether or

not these are or are not voluntary, specifically around the legal piece.

The minister’s office has received multiple letters containing information and concerns

that I have voiced here today.

I have huge issues with the way that this particular

section has been laid out. I

do not think it is protective for parents, and I do not believe that it is a voluntary

process under the guise of the way the legislation is currently written, so I have

tabled an amendment.

The Chair : Thank you, Member.

We’ll take a recess as we make some copies and distribute to all members.

The committee recessed from 3:01 p.m. to 3:08 p.m.

[Lorne Doerkson in the chair.]

The Chair : Members, we will call this House back to order.

We are considering an amendment on Bill 29 to clause 3,

section 19.4(3), where we

will be proposing removal of “as soon as practicable” to “within 24 hours.” Also,

under (4), there will be a proposed change to (

a) and (b), and that change will be

“on the date which the agreement has been signed by all parties.”

The motion is in order.

Minister, would you like to take an opportunity to speak to this amendment?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Yes. I do not support the amendment for a number of reasons that we’ve discussed.

I’m really hoping…. I’m happy to talk to the member at length at another time, but

in both cases of these amendments, what the member is doing is removing the ability

to be flexible at all. In any extenuating circumstance, it would remove the ability

for a verbal agreement, which means that a child protection worker would not be able

to be responsive and act in the best interests of the child in the middle of the night

or in a remote location.

It would essentially create a situation where the guiding principles of the act could

no longer be paramount in an interaction. For that reason, I am not in support of

the amendments.

[3:10 p.m.]

The Chair : Seeing no further speakers, the question is the amendment as proposed by the member

for Prince George–Valemount.

Amendment negatived on division.

The Chair : Members, we are continuing our committee stage. Are there any further questions on

clause 3?

Rosalyn Bird : Currently the policy regarding safety plans uses them as a transitional tool prior

to moving to more aggressive options, such as court orders, to protect children or

youth.

I go back to the language “must” and “may” under this section. I’ve looked at this

a number of times, and once again, we’re going to be back looking at 19.5(1) and (2).

I’ve raised a number of concerns in regard to that. So 19.1 says a director “may,”

but this one says they “must” withdraw from a safety plan.

I can assume, the way that this has been written, that paragraph 1, at least, is applying

to the actual times when a director may have made a safety plan in regard to the circumstances

or the pieces that have been laid out in paragraph 19.1(2). Is that actually the case?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Yes, that is correct.

Rosalyn Bird : Is there not room…? In my understanding, there is room.

Again, she just said, in the spirit and the principles of the act, that there can

be a desire to have greater safety concerns addressed through a court proceeding or

a judicial proceeding, which is why a director, or somebody that is working the front

line, would submit an application or request a court date. Still, this says that a

director may, under those circumstances, have a safety plan.

My question to the minister is: are there not circumstances where you have both a

court order or a judicial proceeding coming up and a safety plan?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : It depends on the court order.

[3:15 p.m.]

Rosalyn Bird : That’s an odd answer. If the minister could elaborate on what exactly she means by

that.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : You may have a safety plan in place when there is a court proceeding or a court order

if a parent was arrested and you had a safety plan in place with another parent who

is a protective parent.

A safety plan cannot be in place if there is a different type of court order, like

a supervision order.

Rosalyn Bird : I want to make sure I’m clarifying. Did you say that there wouldn’t be a safety plan

in place if you had a situation where a parent was under a supervision order but the

other parent wasn’t?

I’m a bit confused. You could have two different parties from the same family living

in different places. There could be concern with one parent being around children.

So there’s a supervision order for whatever purposes, for the moment or for a specific

amount of time, that that parent is not allowed to be around those children.

I would assume that a safety plan would be in place with the parent that has custody

of those children, to ensure that their living situation, their safety and their feeling

of safety are being looked after or being considered while these processes take place.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : I think I’m understanding what the member is trying to ask. If there are two separate

homes and there are two separate, complete, different concerns in each one of those

homes, theoretically, you could have a safety plan in one home and a supervision order

in a different home — if they were completely separated and there was a child that

was living in both of those homes.

Rosalyn Bird : That’s actually almost exactly what I was asking. Thank you for clarifying that.

The reason I’m asking the question is because in 19.1 — the reason I’m referring to

that and not 19.5, is because they’re related, are talking about the same paragraph

— it says “(

b) further to an assessment or investigation…the director has applied

under the act for a court order….” I’m going to assume a court order could be a supervision

order. It could be any number of types of orders that the court delivers.

[3:20 p.m.]

My question around that…. I would assume that, as part of the assessment phase, a

safety plan would be initiated during the assessment and the assessment phase would

not actually be completed until that court proceeding was finished. The result of

that court proceeding would then either change, terminate or extend the safety plan

that had been in place.

Is that the case, Minister?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : If a court order is made, the safety plan ends.

Rosalyn Bird : I have further questions regarding clause 3, Chair. I’m confused by what the minister

just said.

Again, in clause 2, it states that a director may make a safety plan while there is

an assessment going on or an investigation or further to an assessment or an investigation,

the director has applied for a court order.

She just stated that if there is a court order, the safety plan terminates.

I’m not sure if I’m misunderstanding, but can you clarify that please, Minister?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Because the court has made a decision, the safety plan would be over.

Rosalyn Bird : Okay, so the safety plan terminates when the court has made their…. It’s not while

the court proceedings are awaiting. So I was correct. The assessment piece does actually

take into consideration or doesn’t finish until the court proceedings are done. Then

the safety plan terminates because of a court decision.

I have some questions around that. So if we go back to the example that you used,

where you have two households, parents living in separate places. They do have or

had shared custody of a child. There were concerns raised in one household but not

another household.

My question is: why would a safety plan from the first household be negated or terminated

once a court decision had been made? I’m not clear on how the safety of the child

has…. It doesn’t necessarily mean with a court order that the child is automatically

safe. That’s not what court orders necessarily mean.

I’m confused as to why that would be, when you stated earlier that you can have both

at the same time.

If the minister could clarify, please.

The Chair : Thank you, Member. Just a reminder about the word “you.”

[3:25 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : There are a couple of things here.

In the example that I gave before, we had two distinct, separate situations. We had

one parent and another parent. Each parent had two separate processes happening. One

parent had a safety plan in place. Another parent maybe had a supervision order in

place. Those are two separate scenarios, and one would not negate the other or influence

the other. They would have two separate processes with respect to how a director would

interact with either one of those parents.

Rosalyn Bird : I understood that part. I’m not confused on that issue. What I am confused about

is…. Actually, maybe I can ask a clarifying question.

Let’s take something…. And we’re going to go back to…. I hate bringing this up because

it’s not pleasant for anybody to hear. But if you’re talking about a child where you

have a parent and sexual assault or sexual inappropriateness has taken place…. I mean,

we never want to see that, but unfortunately, it is something that we have to deal

with.

I need to understand the assessment and the investigation period. So investigating

something like that, there is the director’s investigation, and then there’s the entire

investigation that takes place outside of MCFD with the police forces, with the courts,

with all of, sort of, that piece.

Does the investigation or the assessment that the director is making in regard to

a child in a situation of that type…? Are the investigations…? Do they align with

each other? Or if there’s still something continuing outside of MCFD, like I said

— that the assessment remains in place until the final determination of that situation

has been made.

[3:30 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : A couple of things with respect to the example that the member brought forward. When

a protection worker gets called on a concern for the safety of a child and that concern

is the concern that the member outlined and that concern is found to be a credible

concern, the protection worker would call the police right away, as you discussed.

We have structured protocols between MCFD protection workers, MCFD staff and police.

They are distinct processes that occur.

That’s the first step. Then a child protection worker could work with the non-offending

parent on a safety plan, if that was an appropriate tool to use, while they also,

as quickly as possible, sought a protection order against the offending parent. There

would be a lot of moving parts and different competing pieces of information, so it’s

hard to really speak to specifics on a situation like that. A safety plan could be

in place. Staff would work with police. We’d work to get a protection order as quickly

as possible and then the process would unfold after that.

Rosalyn Bird : That was my understanding of the process also, which is really one of the reasons

that I’m actually asking the question. When we are talking about children that are

in…. Say there’s been an accusation or there’s been a report filed but somebody actually

hasn’t been found guilty of what it was that they were accused of and that process

is ongoing….

The process that you laid out makes sense to me, but in regard to your point that

you made earlier about being flexible and being able to move and pivot and ensure

that families are being kept safe…. If a safety plan was in place, my question is:

what if a director wants to withdraw that safety plan, but the family wants it to

remain in place because they don’t feel secure while there is a legal or an investigation

going on outside of MCFD’s purview?

I’m trying to figure out…. These two things can actually cohabitate together. I want

to make sure that the flexibility is actually built into the bill, and I’m questioning

that at the moment. I’m not saying that was your intention, but the way that it has

been worded is where my concern lies.

[3:35 p.m.]

If you could take some time with your staff and help me better understand that, because

it’s something that has been raised with parents that I have spoken to.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : I think this might help. There does not have to be a conviction of a crime or there

does not have to be police involvement for MCFD involvement or to respond to concerns.

So the threshold is not the same.

If a family continues to have concerns, the ministry will not walk away in any case

where courts or other processes are underway and have made different decisions. If

a safety plan is in place, if an assessment is still ongoing, if there are still ongoing

concerns, the ministry will continue to work with a family around those concerns.

I’m not sure if I answered the question.

I would like to ask for a bathroom break, if that would be okay, Chair.

The Chair : Absolutely, Minister. We will consider a recess for ten minutes.

The committee recessed from 3:38 p.m. to 3:45 p.m.

[Lorne Doerkson in the chair.]

The Chair : Thank you, Members. We will call this chamber back to order, and we will recognize

the member for Prince George–Valemount on clause 3 on Bill 29.

Rosalyn Bird : Again, to go back to paragraph 1, I actually think we could almost agree on this

one as we’re trying to remain flexible for children, youth and families.

I have a couple of concerns around this. Some of the ones we’ve discussed. The other

challenge that this brings for me is we have a number of communities around the province

that don’t have the right number of social workers or MCFD workers in place.

It raises concerns about how files are handled, how they’re processed, how assessments

actually get completed and the time it takes those assessments to get completed, especially

if it’s a community that is fairly rural or fairly remote. It complicates things again.

It probably doesn’t happen very often, but in a circumstance like that, you could

actually have the results of a court proceeding before you finished an assessment,

which raises questions about the safety plan that should have been put in place when

that assessment was initiated.

I would like to ask the minister — it’s not the child’s fault, not the parent’s fault;

it’s just the unfortunate situation of the system and where we’re sitting currently

at the moment — how we would deal with a situation like that in regard to the context

of paragraph 1.

[3:50 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : There would not be a situation where a court would make a decision about a safety

concern where an assessment or an investigation was not complete. If there was a safety

concern, there would be an assessment. There would be an investigation. If a court

order happened in relation to that safety concern, the order would not come before

the assessment was complete on that safety concern.

If it was a separate concern, the safety plan would be in place with respect to the

original safety concern.

Rosalyn Bird : I just want to clarify that.

The community of Mackenzie — unfortunately, there are a number of MCFD cases there,

but the staff is just not there. They’re not on the ground. That is not something

parents or children can control.

Often in MCFD cases, there are multiple things going on at the same time. Like you

said, these cases can be extremely complex. There are probably circumstances that

could have court decisions made prior to an assessment completely being finished —

specifically, an investigation being finished.

When you’re talking about a community that has nobody on the ground, if there’s an

investigation going on outside of MCFD — with the police, with courts, with that type

of thing — if a decision has been made, particularly if somebody has been abusing

a child physically to the point where charges have been laid and Crown has decided

to proceed or, again, if we’re talking about a child that, unfortunately, is experiencing

some kind of sexual assault or something like that, it is possible in those circumstances

that that investigation actually could complete and a ruling be made that Crown is

going to follow through with charges.

In that case, I would assume that if the assessment had been completed or there were

people on the ground, that the assessment would take all that into consideration.

The safety plan would be amended. All of those things would be taking place. But if

you don’t have the actual staff in place to do those things, how do we continue to

protect or make families feel safe in circumstances like that?

[3:55 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : For the court to make a decision on a court order in relation to the CFCSA, they

must rely on the assessment or the investigation of a director. Investigations outside

of the CFCSA are outside of the parameters of the bill and are a separate process.

Rosalyn Bird : I’m going to try and give an example here. Maybe it will make more sense — to both

of us, quite frankly.

If you have a parent, the mother or the father, that has been accused of child abuse,

of physically abusing, and the court is looking at that…. There are proceedings taking

place. The court makes a decision, and they have determined for it doesn’t matter

what reasons that abuse did not happen.

However, the parent where the child resides, almost full-time, but the other parent

is now allowed to have that child back in their house…. If that parent still has significant

concerns around the situation of their children, but a court decision has been made,

what happens to the safety plan in a case like that? According to this, if I understand

this correctly, it terminates, and the director must withdraw from that safety plan.

Can the minister explain?

[4:00 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Just to be clear, a court order in our justice system does not have the ability to

terminate a safety plan. It is a separate court process. It is not the same as the

court order under the CFCSA.

So in the example that you provided, it would not necessarily terminate a safety plan

with a family. Our process would be under provincial court with respect to the Child,

Family and Community Service Act.

Rosalyn Bird : I’ll ask for leeway with the minister with this next question, because I just want

to clarify.

In paragraph (1)(c), it says that the court has made a decision with respect to an

application for an order described. So, specifically, what are those orders?

I believe you gave me a list — I don’t know how many hours ago — but I want to confirm

that we’re talking about the same types of orders, so that I can better understand

this. If you don’t mind, I would appreciate that.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : The vast majority of court orders would be the following: a supervision order, a

continuing custody order, a temporary custody order or a protection order.

Rosalyn Bird : I appreciate that again, for going through that list again.

I know there’s the family court process and MCFD, and they often, unfortunately, intersect

on a lot of cases. I’m trying to figure out in this situation….

I can think of a case, at the moment, actually, where the family court has decided,

based on the evidence that they received, that a parent again is allowed to now have

custody for a child. The other parent does not believe that that parent should, in

fact, have custody or, actually, even any sort of visitation over that child. The

one parent very much believes that the risk and safety of that child is still a huge

issue.

I’m trying to figure out if that type of court decision is captured inside this paragraph.

[4:05 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Regardless of any proceedings that happen in family law or any sort of custody order,

a child protection worker under the Child, Family and Community Service Act has the

authority to proceed under that act with actions with a parent.

In addition, I just wanted to add some information about how the CFCSA interacts with

family law.

Firstly, under

section 75 of the CFCSA, it closely restricts disclosure of information

obtained under the act, which would include information collected while developing

and implementing a safety plan agreement. If a parent sought to use a safety plan

agreement in a family law proceeding, it would constitute a breach.

That said, there is a potential pathway for lawful disclosure through the court. A

parent could seek a Family Law Act production order to require the director to disclose

information about the safety plan agreement. Such an application would need to be

served on the Attorney General. The director would then be able to consider what position

they want to take given the specific circumstance.

If a parent sought to rely on a safety plan agreement as evidence in a family law

proceeding, despite being unlawful unless authorized by the court, arguments as to

the weight of the evidence that would be given are dependent on the facts and would

likely focus on the short-term nature of safety plan agreements and circumstances

of a current or very recent child protection investigation or assessment of interim

period until a protective order could be obtained.

That’s a little bit about how they can interact.

Rosalyn Bird : I wasn’t suggesting at any time that somebody should use a safety plan as evidence

in family court. That’s not what I was getting at, at all.

I was trying to figure out if a decision was made in court, whether it was family

court or criminal court or any other court, and somebody had been accused, for example,

of abusing their child in any way, and the court decided that they hadn’t done that,

but there were possibly concerns or even evidence within an investigation through

MCFD that even they felt that that child still might be at risk, even though the court

has deemed that charges aren’t being laid, that they’re not guilty, for whatever reason….

I can’t presume what evidence would determine yes or no on those. Luckily, I don’t

have to look at those types of things. So in that case….

That’s what I’m concerned about. I’m not suggesting that family plans are being used

as evidence. It’s the complete opposite, actually.

I’ll use criminal court, because I believe that’s where you would try those cases.

If somebody was found not guilty, but even within your ministry there was information

that was still raising alarms for you, and you’re kind of like, “Hmm, something’s

off” — I know it happens — what happens with that safety plan and that assessment?

If I’m reading this correctly, it stops. It’s withdrawn. Honestly, in this, it’s almost

like if you had put “may” in (1) and “must” in (2), it actually would have made more

sense to me.

I apologize. I’m new to the role. MCFD is extremely convoluted, and I’m trying to

balance figuring this bill out with a very massive amount of information. I just simply

have not ingested all of it current to date.

[4:10 p.m.]

So if the minister could help me better understand, I’d be very appreciative.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : The “must withdraw” is in relation to court orders made with relation to the CFCSA

— continuing custody orders, temporary custody orders, etc. Court decisions made outside

of the CFCSA would not have bearing on a safety plan or actions of a child protection

worker.

I think there are probably examples where, you know, there is a stay of proceedings

or there may not be enough evidence in a situation. That is separate from the process

that’s undertaken in MCFD. If a director still has a concern about the safety and

well-being of a child, they still have to legally act on that concern.

Rosalyn Bird : Thank you for that answer.

I don’t know why it took us so long to get there, quite frankly, but that was the

answer I wanted. This is why I didn’t understand this section. I couldn’t figure out

what court orders or what decisions did apply, didn’t apply.

I still have some concerns around the language, only because multiple people are going

to be looking at this legislation within the act itself now, and I think there could

be confusion there. I hope, and I’m sure that that will be communicated through the

ministry, that this is really well understood — if families and children still feel

they’re at risk, even though court decisions have resulted in something that they

don’t agree with, that those plans would stay in place. So I very much appreciate

that answer.

Thank you, Minister.

I do have one question. When a director may withdraw…. The pieces here are fairly

clear, but when a director is withdrawing from a safety plan, can the minister help

me and explain to the public why that would not be put in writing along with the reason

for the withdrawal?

[4:15 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : In withdrawing from a safety plan agreement, there are a couple things. It depends

on the reason for the withdraw of the safety plan agreement. There are different ways

that a party to the safety plan agreement would be informed of that, based on the

reason for the withdraw.

For example, if the reason for the withdrawal is a court order, they would receive

that in writing. If the reason for the withdrawal is direct protection of a child,

they would be notified of that.

In every instance, a director will communicate in the best way that they possibly

can with the family, based on how the family receives communication best, and a family

can request that information in writing if they would like to as well. Also, all of

the reasons for withdrawal would be documented and would be uploaded into our integrated

case management system.

Rosalyn Bird : I want to just clarify what you just said at the end because it might have actually

answered my question. That was a good answer. There was a lot of information on the

front end there that was helpful, actually, for me.

Paragraph (2) says that a director can withdraw verbally, but it doesn’t state in

the following subparagraphs that that verbal withdraw actually has to be put in writing.

A minute ago, you just indicated that all of the reasons and the background information

for a withdrawal are actually written into MCFD documentation.

I just want to confirm that is what I heard, to the minister through the Chair, because

it doesn’t state that in the actual bill, that that happens.

The Chair : Just a reminder, again, about the word “you” and bringing those questions through

me to the minister, please.

[4:20 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : All of the decision-making of a director is documented in our integrated case management

system. If a director withdraws an agreement with a family and that withdrawal happens

verbally, the family can request that that withdrawal be documented and the reasons

for the withdrawal, and that can be provided to the family.

Rosalyn Bird : In a situation like that, if a family wasn’t in agreement with a verbal decision

or actually a withdrawal at all, you said that they could request the information

and it would be provided to the family. If, once they look at that information, they

have concerns, is there an ability to reinstate that? Does that process continue with

the worker, or is this a decision that is finalized by the director?

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : I think there are a bunch of different circumstances that could happen, and I think

I know where the member is going.

I think if a safety plan is in place, an assessment occurs, and the assessment ends

and there is no concern, or the director believes there is no longer a need for a

safety plan but the family or the parent still feels that supports are required, there

would be a different process that would be taken with that.

[4:25 p.m.]

If it was they felt that they still needed respite support or other parenting supports

to help them with their child, that would be explored in different ways, and the director

would continue to work with that family and that child.

If it was…. Sorry, I lost my train of thought there. I’m going to come back.

The Chair : Minister.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Sorry about that. I think it’s the longest time I’ve ever been speaking to anything

in my life, frankly.

If there continues to be a concern, and I think what the member is trying to get at

is a concern with one parent about another parent, and there is a disagreement, we

would expect…. The parent would have to undertake a sort of dispute resolution process

with the ministry, speaking with the team leader, the director of operations, filing

a complaint, filing for an administrative review and having their concerns looked

at through those processes.

Rosalyn Bird : I have one question about withdrawals from safety plans when it is specifically the

director. Is there any instance where that information of why the director actually

withdrew from the plan would be protected or not disclosed under

section 75 of the

act?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : This is covered in clause 4 of the bill. There are a couple of circumstances. The

circumstances would include if information included solicitor-client privilege.

I think this also might be helpful. While every party needs to know when a safety

plan ends, the actual reason the director is withdrawing could include personal information

that the parents don’t want the directors to share with others, that the director

does not have authority to disclose. So in some circumstances, a director could still

share this information with other parties — for example, if doing so is necessary

for the safety and well-being of the child.

[4:30 p.m.]

Rosalyn Bird : I just want to clarify what you just said. So the ministry…. If a director withdraws

from a safety plan, the reasons for that withdrawal may actually be provided to third

parties. However, they might not necessarily, based on some circumstances, actually

be provided to the parents.

Did I misunderstand that, or is that what you said, Minister?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : In

section 19.2, it was outlined that there are other parties that can be or may

be a party to a plan. For example, a grandparent could be a party to a plan. If the

parents in the safety plan don’t want that party to know about the reason for withdrawal,

then that information would not be shared with those parties.

Rosalyn Bird : I am a bit perplexed by this, because we had a rather heated discussion around whether

these plans are or aren’t voluntary.

So when people are participating in a plan of all parties…. I’m trying to understand

what that agreement looks like. If myself, my mother and my aunt want to participate

in a safety plan for my child, and we all agree to that safety plan….

Actually, this is a good question to start with. Does the withdrawal have to be agreed

upon by everybody in the safety plan?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : No, not all parties need to agree upon a director withdrawing from a plan.

Rosalyn Bird : I’m trying to better understand the information you provided earlier.

You said that if a director withdraws from a plan, the information regarding why they

withdrew from that plan may be available to a third party but may not be available

to a parent. You just indicated that a third party may be a grandparent. I’m trying

to figure out what the disclosure process is for all the individuals that are parties

to that plan.

When a director withdraws, I don’t understand why everybody that voluntarily signed

on to that plan wouldn’t be given all the information as to why that plan is now being

withdrawn.

Quite frankly, this may happen in a more collaborative process than I’m aware of,

and I just don’t understand how this happens. I’m looking for clarification from the

ministry.

[4:35 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : The director would notify all parties who are a part of an agreement that they are

withdrawing. The reasons for withdrawal…. The director has the obligation to notify

the mandatory parties to the agreement. The mandatory parties to the agreement are

outlined in

section 19.2(1)(b), 19.2(2).

I want to just put it on record that I did not say that information would be shared

with a third party.

Rosalyn Bird : I apologize. That’s why I asked the clarifying question. I wasn’t suggesting. I asked

the question to make sure I hadn’t heard what I thought I had heard. I apologize.

I didn’t mean any offence.

Why do parties have to inform the director within a number of days in advance of withdrawing

from their agreement, but the director doesn’t have to give advance notice to the

parties in the agreement?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : There are two parts to this answer.

The first is why the director may withdraw from the agreement without providing notice,

and this really has to do with risk. A director has a statutory duty to protect a

child. So if the safety plan is no longer protecting the child and that child is in

danger, the director must intervene.

[4:40 p.m.]

The director can provide advance notice in other situations, like if a safety plan

is no longer needed, but requiring notice in all situations would make them unable

to carry out their duties and functions in a timely, effective manner.

Safety plans are used when the director has concerns that a child may require protection

or where further assessments are required to decide whether a child may be in need

of protection. Parents and other parties are asked to provide some advance notice

to give the director the opportunity to assess the safety risk and step in to protect

the child if necessary.

Really, here the parents are being assessed. An investigation is happening, and if

the parent wants to withdraw, there needs to be some time to allow for the director

to assess whether that child is in immediate danger.

If a director deems, for the reasons I outlined, that a plan is no longer relevant,

they need to make that decision sometimes very quickly.

Rosalyn Bird : I would never, ever…. It was not my intention…. If a child is at imminent risk, then

absolutely, I know why they would withdraw without notice. No question there.

However, if we think about what this process looks like and the aggravation, the trauma,

all of the emotions that swirl around these types of agreements…. You know, we’ve

mentioned lots of times that families are very complicated. These situations can be

extremely convoluted. I understand that the family gives notice because the director

needs to reassess.

However, my concern is that if a director can withdraw without any notice, the other

side isn’t respected either. If a director makes a decision and says, “Okay, we’re

withdrawing from the safety plan,” and there’s no notice given, it doesn’t give the

family the actual ability to take 24 hours, 48 hours to consider the fact that they’re

no longer under what they probably consider to be almost a safe umbrella.

They’ve had a process or have had a number of processes in place where, hopefully,

there has been peace and harmony brought back to their home. But a sudden withdrawal,

without notice, from something like that, actually, could create some sort of distress

with the parents or even the children.

That’s why I was asking the question, in regard to it being a collaborative process,

as to why a director wouldn’t engage the parties and the family to say that they’re

very happy with what has happened over the last 30 days, 60 days or three months —

whatever it ended up being: “You have managed to achieve these goals and make these

markers. We can see it. We think that you’re ready, and we don’t need this plan in

place anymore.” But the parent may not feel the same way.

Now, that doesn’t mean that they can’t come to that conclusion, but that’s what my

fear is around a director having an immediate withdrawal from a plan. I would just

like to hear the minister’s thoughts on that. Was that considered when this clause

was put in the bill?

[4:45 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : This is outlined in (3)(b): a director may inform a party in advance of the director’s

intention to withdraw, if other things don’t apply. In practice, this is exactly what

happens. Directors, at first availability, will communicate with families. This is

a part of collaborative family planning.

I would say that with the safety planning process and protection involvement, typically,

families are not super happy to have this process happening. Many families are incredibly

happy when a director says: “There are no longer any concerns. We are withdrawing

the safety plan.” I think this is exactly what happens in practice all of the time.

Rosalyn Bird : I’m glad that this happens on a regular basis. That makes sense to me.

If we look at paragraph (c), outside of immediate risk to a child, when we’re escalating,

it says that if the party was not informed in advance, then you need to inform of

the withdrawal as soon as practicable. Is this clause in there strictly because…?

Basically, is it repeating (a)? That’s what I’m trying to figure out.

Because (

a) says “must not inform” if a child is still at risk or at increased risk.

Then (

b) says “may inform a party,” which you say happens very often. And then (

c) says that if they weren’t provided the information, they have to be given the information

as soon as possible.

I’m trying to figure out if we’ve repeated ourselves here. Or are there different

circumstances that I’m unaware of?

[4:50 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Paragraph (

c) is about withdrawal as soon as practicable. And (

b) talks about that

the director may inform the party, in advance notice, of the director’s intention

to withdraw if there’s not a serious safety concern. That would be like we’re informing

a parent that the concerns are no longer applicable. They’ve engaged in a parenting

program, things like that. Then (

c) is: “must, if a party was not provided information

in advance under paragraph (b).”

So let’s say a grandparent was not informed in advance. The director must inform the

party as soon as practicable, so as soon as they possibly can, that the safety plan

is no longer in place.

Rosalyn Bird : When we’re talking to parties that may be subject to the agreement, you had referred

to 19.2. Unless I’m not seeing it somewhere, and it’s very late, so I might not be

seeing it somewhere, quite frankly…. In 19.2, there are a number of scenarios, including

other parties that can be part of an agreement. Am I understanding you correctly in

that there is actually a single primary party within a safety agreement?

Although there are…. Say we have four people that are in an agreement — a mother and,

I don’t know, whoever else, three other individuals. Under 19.2(1), a withdrawal from

a safety plan that has four individuals, that notification would actually only be

given to anybody that qualifies to be part of a plan under paragraph 19.2(1)?

I just want to clarify if that’s what you just said. That’s how I understood your

response.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Yes, this goes to what I was speaking about before. All parties to the agreement

get to know that the agreement ends. Not all parties get the reasons for why the agreement

is ending. So there are, like I said before, mandatory parties to an agreement, and

then there may be other parties to an agreement.

The (3)(

c) and (

b) talk about the director’s withdrawal as soon as practicable.

Rosalyn Bird : I did understand in regards to why the withdrawal. You did explain that earlier,

and that

part I did get.

[4:55 p.m.]

What I’m trying to figure out is, if there are four people in an agreement, if it’s

only people that qualify under 19.2(1), which basically are only parents — if they’re

the only ones that get advanced notification that there’s going to be a withdrawal.

Or does every party within the safety plan get told the same thing?

It’s a collaborative process, so the director or the social worker or the caseworker

would contact everybody on that safety plan and say, “Let’s have a meeting,” and say:

“I intend to withdraw the plan at this date.” That doesn’t necessarily mean they’re

giving the reasons to all four people, but at least the notification of withdrawal

goes to all four people participating in the plan. That is the question I’m trying

to get clarification on.

Hon. Jodie Wickens : They could give advance notice to all parties.

Rosalyn Bird : Thank you, Minister. That’s what I was trying to determine with that paragraph.

I have one other question, actually, that we may have time for.

What is the process if any of the individuals that are parties to the safety plan

want a director or a social worker or a caseworker that is also a party to that safety

plan to withdraw? If a family has an issue with one of the parties within the safety

agreement, within ministry staff, is there a process that that family or the parties

of that safety plan can request a change?

Hon. Jodie Wickens : Mandatory parties of a safety plan can always revisit the terms of the agreement.

I move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The Chair : This committee is adjourned.

The committee rose at 4:58 p.m.

The House resumed at 5:00 p.m.

[The Speaker in the chair.]

Mable Elmore : The committee on Bill 29 reports progress and asks leave to sit again.

Leave granted.

Susie Chant :

Section A reports progress on Bill 32 and asks leave to sit again.

Leave granted.

The Speaker : Hon. Members, the Administrator is in the building, so we will be just waiting for

him to arrive shortly. Please remain seated.

His Honour the Administrator requested to attend the House, was admitted to the chamber

and took his place in the chair.

[5:05 p.m.]

Royal Assent to Bills

Clerk of the Legislative Assembly :

Construction Prompt Payment Act

Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act (No. 2), 2025

Housing and Municipal Affairs Statutes Amendment Act, 2025

Employment Standards (Serious Illness or Injury Leave) Amendment Act, 2025

Energy Statutes Amendment Act, 2025

In His Majesty’s name, His Honour the Administrator doth assent to these acts.

Hon. Leonard Marchand (Administrator) : Thank you. I know that you’ve all been working very hard on this legislation and on other legislation

and the people of British Columbia greatly appreciate the seriousness of your deliberations,

all of the hard work and the results of your hard work.

I know the session is not over. You have some more work ahead of you, but this is

the last time I’ll see you for probably quite a while. I wanted to wish everyone all

the very best for the upcoming holiday season. Thank you.

His Honour the Administrator retired from the chamber.

[The Speaker in the chair.]

Hon. Mike Farnworth : Hon. Speaker, I know we could do another 15 minutes, but I know the weather is pretty

miserable, and people are going to go to the ferry and drive carefully.

Hon. Mike Farnworth moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The Speaker : This House stands adjourned until 10 a.m., December 1.

The House adjourned at 5:08 p.m.

Proceedings in the

Douglas Fir Room

The House in Committee,

Section A.

The committee met at 1:13 p.m.

[Darlene Rotchford in the chair.]

Committee of the Whole

Bill 32 — Mental Health

Amendment Act ( N o . 2), 2025

(continued)

The Chair : Good afternoon, Members. I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 32 back from adjournment.

I will look to the member for Skeena.

On clause 1 (continued) .

Claire Rattée : Thank you so much, Chair. I’m wondering if you would indulge me so that we could

go back so that I could move an amendment before clause 1.

The Chair : Yes. Go ahead, Member.

Claire Rattée : I would like to move that we add a clause 0.01 prior to clause 1:

[ NEW CLAUSE .01, by adding the underlined text as shown:

.01 The Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 288, is amended by adding the following:

Mandatory training

8.1 The minister must ensure that directors are trained respecting the scope of authority

of directors in respect of the provision of a professional service, or care or treatment

authority under this Act, and applicable consent and capacity laws. ]

The Chair : Okay. You can speak to the amendment now.

Claire Rattée : Perfect. Thank you.

With the legal landscape changing, I believe it’s essential that directors actually

understand what they can and cannot authorize. I believe that training protects everyone

— patients, clinicians and the Crown — by reducing errors and unlawful decisions.

In my opinion, this is a basic competence and safety measure if the government plans

to change the law but not train the people applying it. I think this is a way that

we can prevent that from happening.

The Chair : We’re going to take a quick recess, and then we’ll come back to the amendment.

The committee recessed from 1:15 p.m. to 1:23 p.m.

[Darlene Rotchford in the chair.]

The Chair : Before I make any ruling, I would ask the member that made the amendment if there’s

anything else you would like to add in speaking to this amendment.

Claire Rattée : I don’t think so.

The Chair : It appears to the Chair that the amendment is beyond the scope of this bill, and

it is therefore out of order.

So we will return to clause 1.

Amendment ruled out of order.

Claire Rattée : Thank you, Chair. I appreciate that.

Next, I would like to ask a few questions with regards to other pieces of legislation

that kind of interact with this. I think it relates because I’m trying to understand

when this act is going to be applicable and when it is not.

I have some questions around the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission)

Act. I’m trying to understand when that act is relied on and when this one is relied

on.

So my first question would be if the minister agrees that repealing

section 31(1)

causes consent to default to the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission)

Act. I’m assuming it does not, but just for the record, please.

[1:25 p.m.]

The Chair : Member, to clarify, I think the question you just asked actually falls under clause

2, not clause 1.

Claire Rattée : We did discuss this a little bit earlier. Because these two clauses are really closely

linked, I’m doing my best to make sure that I have them separated to both clauses,

but it’s been a bit tricky because there are a lot of…. I understand this is a very

short bill. Many of the questions do kind of stray, if you’re looking at it in a very

narrow sense, but the context is important, I think, before making decisions about

changing this act.

The Chair : Okay. Thank you.

Hon. Josie Osborne : I’m going to repeat what I said in the closing of second reading debate.

[The bells were rung.]

The Chair : We will take a short recess, and then we will return.

The committee recessed from 1:26 p.m. to 1:45 p.m.

[Darlene Rotchford in the chair.]

The Chair : I will call the committee back. Again, we are on Bill 32, clause 1.

Minister, I will look to you to answer the question.

Hon. Josie Osborne : Just before we broke there, the question was around the Health Care (Consent) and

Care Facility (Admission) Act and, essentially, whether repealing subsection 31(1)….

Would treatment authorization default? Like, what is the relationship between this

proposed bill and the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act?

Section 2 of said act, the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act,

specifically says that the act does not apply to the provision of psychiatric care

or treatment of patients involuntarily detained under the Mental Health Act. So involuntary

treatment for involuntary patients cannot, by definition and operation of the legislation,

default to the HCCCFAA.

Claire Rattée : Thank you. That definitely helps to clear it up a little bit.

I’m not sure if this is an admissible question or not, but I’m wondering if the minister

might be able to provide for the record what the exact process is under the Mental

Health Act right now to obtain consent.

I understand that that’s not expected to change with these amendments, but I’m wondering

if we can have clarity on what that exact process actually looks like as dictated

by the Mental Health Act so that I can have a clearer understanding of whether or

not I determine that any of these amendments may potentially impact that.

[1:50 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne : I’m going to give a somewhat lengthy…. I want to give a detailed answer.

The authority for a director to authorize involuntary treatment is found in

section

8(

a) of the Mental Health Act, which describes the powers and duties of directors

of designated mental health facilities. For clarity, this

section states specifically

that each patient admitted to the designated facility is provided with professional

service, care and treatment appropriate to the patient’s condition and appropriate

to the function of the designated facility. For those purposes, a director may sign

consent-to-treatment forms for a patient detained under

section 22, 28, 29, 30 or

The authority for a director to sign consent-to-treatment forms on behalf of a patient

under the Mental Health Act does not come from

section 31(1). After a patient is involuntarily

admitted under the Mental Health Act and the director signs form 4.1, the first medical

certificate…. After an assessment by a physician or nurse practitioner, the person

is admitted for 48 hours if they meet criteria for involuntary admission. As soon

as possible after form 4.1 is signed, the treatment team develops a treatment plan.

Form 5 is the consent for treatment that we’ve discussed at least once today already.

In here, the treatment team will describe and explain the patient’s treatment plan.

They’ll discuss possible treatment options, and the patient has the right to know

what treatment they will receive and how it might affect them.

At this point, the patient is also advised that they have the right to access an independent

rights advice service. They’re advised of that right.

One of two things may happen after form 5 is completed.

First, the patient may understand the treatment plan. If the patient understands the

treatment plan, the patient can choose to consent to the treatment plan by signing

form 5.

If the patient declines to consent or the treating physician’s assessment finds that

the patient cannot consent to treatment, the Mental Health Act director of the designated

facility can consent to treatment on the patient’s behalf by signing form 5. If the

director consents on the patient’s behalf, the director that signs form 5 must be

a different person from the treating physician.

At this point, the patient would receive treatment. This is the first 48-hour period.

After the 48 hours, if the patient is admitted on form 4.2 and the second medical

certificate and treatment plan significantly changes, a new form 5 would be completed.

Form 4.2 continues the admission for one month if the patient continues to meet all

four of the involuntary admission criteria. It is at this point, as well, that the

patient can request a second opinion.

I understand that’s a detailed response, but I hope it outlines the process, and I’d

be happy to share more information in writing with the member afterwards.

Claire Rattée : Thank you. That does really help.

I’m curious. Does the Mental Health Act outline what the protocol is for determining

whether or not a patient is capable of making that decision about consenting to the

treatment plan or how a director or clinician is supposed to determine whether or

not they are?

[1:55 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne : No, the act does not outline that. This is an assessment that is made by the clinician

based on their professional experience, judgment, training and expertise.

Claire Rattée : I understand that this may be outside of the scope of what we’re supposed to be asking

questions about, but I’m hoping that the minister will indulge me.

What specific piece of legislation or regulation outlines those protocols — just so

that I can look it up for my own benefit — of how they make that determination about

whether or not someone can give their consent or is deemed incapable?

Hon. Josie Osborne : Yes, I think this is outside the scope of this bill for certain. But I would advise

the member that she could examine the credentialing and licensing that is undertaken

by the College of Physicians and Surgeons, in order to understand the specifics of

psychiatry — for example, to understand what the professional obligations, duties

and responsibilities would be of a psychiatrist who is making that type of assessment.

Claire Rattée : I appreciate that. So I would assume then that means that these decisions are essentially

left up to that physician, that psychiatrist, to make that determination based on

best practices of what they were taught in school and what their professional experience

is and that there isn’t specific regulation around that.

The reason that I’m asking that is because, obviously, we’re talking about applying

liability coverage for a physician that’s making that determination to treat somebody

involuntarily.

To put it simply, does the ministry believe that is best practices, to not have specific

guidelines? I understand that would be very difficult to craft, but to not have specific

guidelines dictating how those decisions are supposed to be made from a liability

perspective…. Or is this clause supposed to just provide liability coverage no matter

what, carte blanche? Because, you know, obviously, physicians can make mistakes.

So that’s why I’m wondering if it might be helpful to have some specific regulation

and guidance around making those determinations.

Hon. Josie Osborne : I’ll just repeat the answer that I gave yesterday in a line of questioning around

the fact that

section 31(1) currently is an implicit liability shield. We are proposing

to amend

section 16 to add an explicit liability shield for said health care provider,

but always with the condition that the care is provided in good faith and with reasonable

care. That is the test that is explicit in the act.

Claire Rattée : I think one thing that I would ask then is…. When I’m reading through these amendments,

I understand that this is to explicitly provide liability coverage. But should we

not also, then, have it worded that it is explicit only when that provider is acting

in good faith and without negligence?

Hon. Josie Osborne : I would say the act does just that already.

Claire Rattée : Sorry. Would I be able to have the specific part of the act that references that?

[2:00 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne :

Section 16 begins: “A person is not liable in damages as the result of doing any

of the following in good faith and with reasonable care.” Then the addition of clause

(b.4) would be: “providing to a patient a professional service, or care or treatment,

authorized by the director under this act to be given to the patient, including treatment

described in a consent to treatment form signed under

section 8 (a).”

Claire Rattée : So “in good faith and with reasonable care,” I believe, is what was said. Can negligence

still apply, though? Could a practitioner be acting in good faith with reasonable

care but still end up being negligent? My understanding is that they can. Again, I’m

just trying to determine whether or not these liability protections will protect against

negligence.

Hon. Josie Osborne : Coming back to the intent here, in the Charter challenge that’s before the court….

Should the judge decide that subsection 31(1), where this implicit liability shield

exists currently, is unconstitutional, we feel the best thing to do for patients,

for their families and for the health care workers is to ensure that they can continue,

under the operations of the act, to provide psychiatric treatment to patients who

are admitted involuntarily and to do so under an explicit shield that would be listed

under

section 16.

Now a health care provider who is providing said treatment in good faith and with

reasonable care has that protection that’s provided to them under the act. Should

somebody allege negligence and sue a health care provider — that can happen — it,

of course, would follow the due process in court, which would examine the situation

and the specific circumstances and make a determination in that case.

Claire Rattée : I appreciate that response. I think that starts to help to clear that up for me.

If I could go back really quickly, a thought popped into my head. With the Health

Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act, can I just get clarity on whether

or not, for a capable voluntary patient, that act applies to them? Or is it still

the Mental Health Act that applies, based on what was said already about the Health

Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act — that it doesn’t apply in any situation

where it’s a psychiatric patient? Or was it just if it was an involuntary psychiatric

patient?

Hon. Josie Osborne :

Section 2 of the Health Care (Consent) Act specifically says that the act does not

apply to the provision of psychiatric care or treatment of patients involuntarily

detained under the Mental Health Act. It’s a specific exemption in this case.

Claire Rattée : I appreciate that. I have so many questions on that. I know I can’t get into it,

because that’s not what we’re talking about, but I appreciate the clarity on that.

My next question would be: if an involuntary patient is capable but refuses treatment,

what happens under this proposed framework then? Does this default, then, to that

other act? Just so that I can clarify that.

[2:05 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne : No, it does not default to the act. Again, for a patient who is involuntarily detained

under the act — whether they provide consent or are deemed to be incapable of providing

consent to the treatment that is provided to that involuntarily detained patient —

the exemption, as outlined in

section 2 of the consent act, applies.

Claire Rattée : Just for clarification, even if they are deemed capable of making that decision but

are still being held involuntarily, their care would still be governed under the Mental

Health Act?

Hon. Josie Osborne : Yes.

Claire Rattée : Talking about the liability and litigation risks — I don’t know; this might just

be too broad, or it may be too difficult to answer — I’m wondering if there is a way

to get a list of, specifically, what conditions the clause 1 immunity would apply

under.

Hon. Josie Osborne : No. I don’t think that’s possible. Again, each situation is particular to that individual.

That’s why form 5, the consent for treatment form, describes and explains that specific

treatment plan for each patient. It wouldn’t be possible to outline every possible

scenario or condition.

Claire Rattée : Would it be reasonable to assume that, in a fairly simple term, it would be any treatment

that’s provided in accordance with that patient’s treatment plan and that it would

cover that for liability?

Hon. Josie Osborne : If I understand the question correctly, I’d just point back to the specific amendment,

the addition in

section 16 of (b.4): “providing to a patient a professional service,

or care or treatment, authorized by the director under this act….” That is a fairly

broad description of psychiatric care that could be applied under the act.

Claire Rattée : I think what I was getting at is that if something were done outside of the treatment

plan that had been signed off by the director to an involuntary psychiatric patient

— medication given, treatment given, something to that effect, something that was

outside the scope of what was deemed admissible in that patient’s care plan and authorized

by the director — would that still be covered, either in an emergency or in a non-emergency

situation?

Say that somebody accidentally gives somebody the wrong medication, for example, or

they think that this medication would be better but it wasn’t authorized by the director.

I’m just trying to understand in which conditions that would actually apply and then,

obviously, if it still applies in an emergency situation.

Say somebody becomes incredibly violent or they’re self-harming or whatever it is

and then a clinician needs to make a determination about administering medication

that hasn’t been authorized by the director at that point in time. Would they still

have liability coverage, as long as they were acting in a non-negligent manner, in

good faith and with due care?

[2:10 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne : I appreciate the member’s question here. I think getting at, for example, emergency

situations that could arise, emergency situations are dealt with distinctly and under

the common law.

Claire Rattée : Is that something that clinicians are advised on? Is that part of their training

materials so that they understand that in any emergency situation, effectively, it’s

governed and covered with liability through a different law? So they know where to

look for their coverage, I guess.

Hon. Josie Osborne : I think we are…. I mean, we’re veering into a place that is very detailed and specific

to how physicians are…. We’ve been discussing how they are trained, how they are certified

and licensed to practise what they do and, in the course of their decision-making

about what the best treatment is for a patient, how they are protected.

There are avenues outside of this act in which a physician or a health care provider

could be sued or investigated or some other process to look at the decisions they’ve

made.

Again, I just want to come back to the fact that under

section 16 of the Mental Health

Act, this pertains to a liability protection that pertains specifically to applying

treatment that is done in good faith and with reasonable care and that it is specific

to psychiatric treatment that is applied under the Mental Health Act to a patient

that is involuntarily detained.

I think, you know, just kind of…. We’re broadening out into other areas that don’t

specifically pertain to this bill.

Claire Rattée : I appreciate that response. I think maybe if I frame it in this way, it’ll make more

sense about why I’m asking.

What I’m concerned about is just ensuring, essentially, that a clinician will still

be covered for liability in an emergency situation. I guess another way to word it

might be: was there a determination about why we aren’t explicitly mentioning “in

an emergency situation” or “according to the care plan” or more specifics about what

is covered or what isn’t covered?

Is it just because this covers everything, and we don’t need to be concerned about

that? Could there be benefit to making sure that that is explicit?

I’m just trying to ensure that, still, clinicians will have that coverage that they

need, just given the fact that I think the understanding was always that they did

under the deemed consent portion. I just want to ensure that they will still maintain

that same level and that nothing is going to change.

[2:15 p.m.]

I understand the difference between implicitly implied and explicitly implied. But

when something is explicitly implied…. I just don’t know if it would be helpful to

have it explicitly applied so that it’s listed as what is covered or if this actually,

the way it’s worded right now, covers everything.

Hon. Josie Osborne : Again, this is moving an implicit liability shield from

section 31(1) to an explicit

shield in

section 16 for psychiatric treatment. I point to the definition of “treatment”

in the act, which reads: “Treatment means safe and effective psychiatric treatment

and includes any procedure necessarily related to the provision of psychiatric treatment.”

[2:20 p.m.]

Emergency health care is not explicitly stated in the current

section 31(1) nor in

section 16, the proposed amendment, because, again, it is dealt with distinctly and

under the common law.

Claire Rattée : Thank you. I really appreciate that.

Could the minister answer: does liability protection cover treatment that is later

determined to have lacked lawful consent? Lawful consent obviously meaning that the

person was capable of consenting, did not give consent.

Hon. Josie Osborne : The deeming of consent and the application of treatment are two separate things.

Under form 5, the consent for treatment, if the patient declines to consent or the

treating physician’s assessment finds that the patient cannot consent to treatment,

then the Mental Health Act director of the designated facility can consent to treatment

on the patient’s behalf. But remember that the director who signs form 5 must be a

different person from the treating physician.

So if the question is around the deeming of consent and that is found, through some

process, to be unlawful, as the member described, that is separate and distinct from

the physician’s treatment, and the treatment is still protected under the auspices

of the act.

Claire Rattée : Did the government receive any legal opinions on whether or not these changes could

increase litigation risk under any other statutes, given the removal of deemed consent?

And if they did, would I be able to know what the opinions on that were — about whether

or not there was any chance that this could increase litigation risk?

Hon. Josie Osborne : That is privileged information.

Claire Rattée : Will this change in any way potentially affect coroner’s investigations or patient

care quality office complaints?

Hon. Josie Osborne : The answer is no. It will not. This, again, is specific around liability and damages

for a specific court case, that court action brought against a health care provider.

Claire Rattée : Also, how many health care workers have ever been prosecuted for providing services,

care or treatment under sections 28, 29, 30, 42? Are there any instances in British

Columbia where that has happened? And if there are, have any of them been successful?

[2:25 p.m.]

Sorry, just to clarify. I just wanted to make it a bit clearer.

I’m not expecting to know every single time or the outcome of all of them, just a

general sense of whether or not this is something that happens frequently, recently,

and whether or not one has ever been successful. I don’t expect you to pull up every

single instance.

Hon. Josie Osborne : Yes, in 2018, the court here in British Columbia used

section 31(1) to defeat a battery

claim for a patient having to take drugs involuntarily.

Claire Rattée : I would like to move an amendment on clause 1 here.

The Chair : Please speak to the amendment, Member.

On the amendment.

Claire Rattée : I would like to amend clause 1 by adding the following subsection:

[ CLAUSE 1, by deleting the text shown as struck out and adding the underlined text

as shown:

Section 16 of the Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 288, is amended

(

a) by adding the following paragraph:

(b.4) providing to a patient a professional service, or care or treatment, authorized

by the director under this Act to be given to the patient, including treatment described

in a consent to treatment form signed under

section 8 (a); .

(

b) by renumbering

section 16 to

section 16 (1), and

(

c) by adding the following subsection:

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (b.4), “authorized by the director” means authorized

in accordance with applicable provincial consent and capacity laws, established clinical

standards and written protocols of the designated facility. ]

Speaking to it, I believe that this ensures that liability protection only applies

where directors act within the law and accepted clinical practice, not arbitrarily

or outside of proper processes. I think that it protects patients and clinicians at

the same time. Clinicians know when they are covered. Patients know when there are

guardrails.

[2:30 p.m.]

If this is an amendment that is deemed to be not necessary, I believe that with the

repeal of deemed consent, the meaning of “authorized” becomes central to this debate.

Leaving it undefined invites litigation and inconsistency. I think that this amendment

would be responsible and prudent.

I do have some concerns about some of the way that this is currently worded. As I’ve

stated previously, I do think it’s incredibly important that we make sure that health

care workers and clinicians have liability protection, especially if we want to be

able to ensure that involuntary treatment is still provided in this province and if

we want to avoid those situations of clinicians potentially hand-wringing and worrying

about whether or not they’re covered.

I do think it’s also similarly important that we ensure that it is clear when they

are covered and it is clear when they are not. Unfortunately — I wish it weren’t the

case — I do know of incidents where people have involuntarily received treatment that

was not appropriate. It doesn’t happen frequently, but it does happen sometimes. I

do think that if there’s ever negligence that is taking place, there should be an

option to patients to be able to ensure that they get some kind of justice in that

matter.

This can have very serious side effects and very serious harms for people. So I think

it’s important that we still make sure that we’re also maintaining the rights of a

patient, to be able to ensure that they are not going to be taken advantage of, that

there’s a mechanism by which they’ll understand there are certain guardrails for those

clinicians as well.

The Chair : All right. We’ll take a short recess, and then we’ll come back.

The committee recessed from 2:31 p.m. to 2:37 p.m.

[Darlene Rotchford in the chair.]

The Chair : I will call the committee back.

I have confirmed the amendment is in order.

I will look to the minister to see if she wishes to speak to the amendment.

[2:40 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne : Thank you very much to the member for putting forth the amendment.

I’m not going to support it, and the reason is this. First, the overall assumption

is that the director is already acting in accordance with the law and that it doesn’t

need to be explicitly stated. In fact, that would be outside of the standard practices

in legislative drafting.

It could conceivably add confusion by adding this to the act, as is proposed, in its

reference to other consent capacity laws, other documents, other protocols.

I would also say this. If a director had court action taken against them, the court

would consider all of those things — provincial consent and capacity laws, clinical

standards, written protocols of the facility — and they would consider whether those

actions were taken, again, as is explicitly stated in the Mental Health Act, in good

faith and with reasonable care.

In

summary, I don’t think that the amendment is necessary and therefore will not be

supporting it.

The Chair : Okay. We will go to a vote on the amendment.

Division has been called.

[2:45 p.m. - 2:50 p.m.]

The Chair : Does everyone agree to waive time?

Leave granted.

The Chair : We will go to the vote then. The question is on the amendment moved by Skeena.

Amendment negatived on the following division:

YEAS — 4

Botterell

McInnis

Mok

Williams

NAYS — 5

Routledge

Osborne

Morissette

Kahlon

Malcolmson

Claire Rattée : I’m wondering if the minister could provide some clarification around the use of

virtual psychiatrists as it relates to this act and these amendments. If a virtual

psychiatrist has to provide the director authorization, are they able to do that in

compliance with clause 1 and still have those liability protections if this is a decision

that is made through a virtual visit?

Hon. Josie Osborne : The answer is yes. That would qualify as a professional service or care or treatment

as stated in the proposed

section (b.4) under

section 16.

Claire Rattée : Then would clause 1 provide immunity for police or paramedics that are acting under

medical direction in psychiatric crises?

[2:55 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne : I think I’ll just come back to, again, the specific wording. Under

section 16, “a

person is not liable in damages as the result of doing any of the following in good

faith and with reasonable care.” Subsection (b.4): “providing to a patient a professional

service, or care or treatment, authorized by the director under this act to be given

to the patient, including treatment described in a consent to treatment form signed

under

section 8(a).”

So a professional service or care or treatment that’s authorized by the director under

the act is what this liability shield explicitly protects a health care