Proceedings in the

Douglas Fir Room

The House in Committee,

Section A.

The committee met at 2:53 p.m.

[George Anderson in the chair.]

Committee of the Whole

Bill 9 — Freedom of Information

and Protection of Privacy

Amendment Act, 2026

(continued)

The Chair : Good afternoon, Members. I call Committee the Whole on Bill 9, Freedom of Information

and Protection of Privacy Amendment Act, 2026, to order.

We’re on clause 2.

On clause 2 (continued) .

Hon. Diana Gibson : I would like to move an amendment to clause 2 standing in my name on the orders of

the day.

[ CLAUSE 2, by deleting the text shown as struck out:

Section 5 (1) (

a) is repealed and the following substituted:

(

a) in the opinion of the head of the public body, provides enough detail to enable an experienced employee of the public body, with

a reasonable effort and in a reasonable amount of time, to identify the record sought,

. ]

The Chair : Would you like to speak to the amendment?

On the amendment.

Hon. Diana Gibson : The initial wording was wording that exists elsewhere in the act and was consistent

with wording elsewhere in the act. Also, it continued to be under the oversight, as

per

section 42 of the act, of the commissioner.

[2:55 p.m.]

In engaging with members, we discovered that it was causing substantial misunderstanding

and concern and have proposed that it be removed for better clarity of the oversight

of the act.

Rob Botterell : The removal of “in the opinion of the head of the public body,” this amendment, certainly

is an improvement but does not address other weaknesses with the clause.

The question I have is: could the minister elaborate on why the phrase “in the opinion

of the head of the public body” was proposed to begin with so we can understand more

about the rationale for amending it to remove it?

Hon. Diana Gibson : This was about providing clarity. The “head of the public body” is where responsibility

sits for the determination and is consistent with language used elsewhere in the act.

However, because of misinterpretation of what the intention of that was and lack of

understanding about the oversight of the act by the Privacy Commissioner as per clause

42 we have proposed to amend it.

Rob Botterell : The “in the opinion of the head of the public body” would suggest with its removal

that it’s unclear who the decision-maker will be in this clause. Through the Chair

to the minister: could you clarify the specific

section of the act that outlines who

is responsible for making this determination?

In a decision of Celia Francis in February 29 of 2024, it was made clear that the

process involves a number of steps. It would be helpful just to be able to alert the

public and those that are reviewing Hansard at a future date where the specific clarity comes, in terms of making this particular

decision, right at the beginning of the request process.

[3:00 p.m. - 3:05 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Although I’m not familiar with the case being referred to specifically, what I can

say is that if that complaint was made under the prior wording, with our amendment,

that existing wording would stand, which means jurisprudence…. I’m assuming you’re

referring to a decision of the OIPC, though I don’t know the case you’re referring

to specifically. Jurisprudence on the existing wording would apply as, with the amendment,

the existing language would apply.

The Chair : Shall the amendment pass?

A Voice : Division.

The Chair : Pursuant to the motion adopted by the House on May 19, the division on the amendment

to clause 2 is deferred until the start of orders of the day of the next sitting.

Clause 2 is stood down pending the division. We will move on to clause 3.

Point of Order

Kiel Giddens : Point of order. I would like to have a ruling from the Chair on the proposed amendment

to clause 3 that was listed on the order paper. The motion that was provided says

“by deleting clause 3.” I’d like a ruling from the Chair whether this is the correct

process for it, to have it on the amendment or on notice, or if it should have been voted down in a duly voted Committee A process.

The Chair : Thank you very much, again, for your point of order. Yes, the correct procedure would

be to defeat the clause and then bring forward the amendment. But that being said,

we appreciate the fact that the minister has brought forward the intention to have

the clause defeated. With that being said, I think it’s fine.

Kiel Giddens : Just to understand the ruling from the Chair, as the amendments are included on the

order paper, is that in order or not, or are we voting on clause 3 as is?

The Chair : Again, I appreciate your question and the point of order that’s been raised. At this

point, the amendment hasn’t been moved, so there’s not really a discussion to be had.

We are on clause 3.

[3:10 p.m.]

Rob Botterell : I’m asking for a point of clarification. I am ready to speak to clause 3. But on clause

2 and the amendment, now…. The division is deferred, and then after the division,

the vote will come back to clause 2?

Correct. Thank you.

Kiel Giddens : Point of order again. Just on the motion to defer the vote, it says, from the Government

House Leader…. He moved that pursuant to standing order 16.4, division call in Committee

of the Whole on Bill 9, intituled Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy

Amendment Act, 2026, that an amendment standing in the name of the Minister of Citizens’

Services on the order paper be deferred until the start of the orders of the day of

the next sitting.

Just to understand the voting procedure, I think…. Given that it is not necessarily

required for it to be included on the order paper, the correct vote would be for that

to occur in Committee A here, as opposed to in the main chambers, just given that

it was not a requirement to have it an amendment or on notice in this case.

Can I get a ruling from the Chair on that?

The Chair : The House Leader is very clear that pursuant to the motion adopted by the House on

May 19, the division on the amendment to clause 2 is deferred until the start of orders

of the day of the next sitting. That is very clear, and you understand that. Yes,

you may have a view that it should be in this committee, but that’s what was voted

on and the House adopted.

Debate Continued

The Chair : So we’re on clause 3.

On clause 3.

Rob Botterell : This

section of the act sets a standard for response which is without delay. This

was intentional. The 30-day response time limit is intended to be an outer limit.

If some or all records could be released before the 30-day time limit, then this

section

requires that every reasonable effort be made to do so. Why is the amendment…? “Without

unreasonable delay” — why is that proposed?

[3:15 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you to the member opposite for the question. The wording here of “without delay”

is something that is different in the context today than when the bill was initially

drafted. It implies that someone is going to get a 2,000-page personal, complex file

full of third-party information immediately. What has changed since the act, of course,

is the volume and complexity of information and also people’s expectations of what

“without delay” means in a time of instant email and communication. This creates unrealistic

expectations.

Elsewhere in the act, the duty to assist and the time limits apply. This change was

never going to change the duty to assist or the time limits and wasn’t meant to. However,

because of misunderstandings around what this could have implied for people and the

failure to understand the duty to assist and time limits and oversight that is elsewhere

in the act, we have proposed an amendment to remove that wording.

I would move the amendment to clause 3 standing in my name on the orders of the day

so there are no changes in

section 6(1):

[ CLAUSE 3, by deleting clause 3. ]

The Chair : The amendment as presented is not in order, so we’ll continue with the clause as it

is.

We’re on clause 3.

Amendment ruled out of order.

Rob Botterell : The explanation given by the minister raises additional questions with respect to

clause 3 in its unamended form, which is: to respond “without unreasonable delay.”

The apparent explanation provided for inserting the word “unreasonable” was that the

world has changed, and perhaps those of us who spend our days reading legislation

— which is, I think, actually a small percentage of British Columbians — would somehow

be reassured.

[3:20 p.m.]

For applicants, I think the expectation of the legislation under clause 3 is “without

delay.” Inserting “unreasonable delay” creates exactly the uncertainty that British

Columbians and applicants worry about. Adding “unreasonable” suggests that the test

is no longer without delay, and meaning has to be given to “unreasonable.”

I’m curious, when this clause was originally drafted, how the minister defined “unreasonable”

for the purposes of this clause and what it adds to the test. It would be helpful

to have a definition of unreasonable in the context of this clause. The minister must

have not unreasonably expected that it would change in some fashion or another the

test in clause 3.

[3:25 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you to the member opposite. For clarification again, this is being introduced for clarification only, to avoid

the mis-expectations of something being immediate that may involve a significant amount

of work and time. The reasonableness test, as we’ve discussed and canvassed in this

House already, is a high bar set by the Privacy Commissioner’s office. That test would

continue to apply.

Additionally, clauses 6 and 7 — clause 6, the duty to assist, and clause 7 on time

limits — already also cover the high bar set in terms of the obligation to assist

in a timely fashion.

So this was intended as clarification, and because it’s causing such misunderstanding

and concern, it was suggested to be withdrawn.

Jody Toor : I hear that the minister just says that this clause means that the government was

just trying to amend so that there was more clarity, removing misunderstanding.

My question is: why did the government originally propose replacing “without delay”

with “without unreasonable delay”? What problems was government attempting to solve

through that wording change?

Hon. Diana Gibson : As has been discussed already today, this was for a point of clarification. The problem

trying to be solved and the rationale has been explained already.

Jody Toor : The minister just mentioned…. Just for clarification, was the existing obligation

to respond without delay unclear?

[3:30 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : As has been stated previously, this change was intended to provide clarity, not to

change obligations covered elsewhere under

section 6(1). Misunderstanding around this is why we propose it be withdrawn.

Jody Toor : I think what is important here is not that the government removed the phrase “without

unreasonable delay” but that the government has proposed the change in the first place.

So that’s why these questions are coming up. I get it that you have the clarity and

you’re trying to give us that information of the misunderstanding.

The concern that many British Columbians have shown, not just to probably the government,

but to myself…. I had about 10,000 people sign a petition that was handed and I presented

in the House. Replacing the obligation to respond without unreasonable delay shifted

the standard away from the firm obligation and towards a more subjective framework.

The fact that the government is asking that we remove the language suggests that these

concerns were major and legitimate enough to warrant reconsideration.

So while the wording may no longer remain in the bill if it gets amended, I believe

it is very important for this committee to understand why the change was proposed

originally and what problem the government was attempting to solve through that wording.

[3:35 p.m. - 3:40 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : This change was introduced for clarification to help manage public expectation where

it could be misunderstood as to how immediately a response — even submitted, say,

online in the middle of the night…. The threshold for interpreting “reasonable” is

a very high bar set by the Privacy Commissioner’s office. However, misunderstanding

around that oversight has caused concern that led us to remove this, to not pursue

this amendment.

Jody Toor : What evidence from the public body operations justifies weakening the existing without-delay standard, and how will this change be tracked through the ministry to ensure it does

not lead to longer overall response times?

Hon. Diana Gibson : We are no longer pursuing the change.

Sheldon Clare : I think one of the key aspects of this particular clause that is a point of concern

and difficulty is the word “reasonable.” When we’re trying to comprehend this clause,

if we can get our minds around exactly what reasonable means, then we’d have a better

understanding.

Would the minister be able to define for the House exactly what is meant by the term

“reasonable,” including all of the legal ramifications thereof?

Hon. Diana Gibson : As has been discussed, the Privacy Commissioner’s office sets a high bar for defining

“reasonable.” However, we are no longer pursuing this clause.

[3:45 p.m.]

Sheldon Clare : In terms of the clause, was the government attempting to provide ministries with greater

discretion regarding delays? Delays are often an issue when people are seeking access

to information. What was the goal here? Was this about giving the government more

ability and flexibility? Or is it about giving more access to citizens? What’s going

on? Is this greater discretion regarding delays, or is this better access for citizens?

Hon. Diana Gibson : We are no longer pursuing this change in this section.

Clause 3 negatived.

On clause 4.

Jody Toor : Why was it necessary to change the wording from “a request described in

section 5(1)”

to “a request that meets the requirements of

section 5(1)”?

Hon. Diana Gibson : The purpose of this clause is to clarify that when requests do not meet the requirements

section 5, the time limit for response will not begin until those requirements

section 5 are met.

Jody Toor : Does this amendment create a stricter procedural threshold for applicants?

[3:50 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : No, this does not make stricter procedural thresholds for applicants.

Sheldon Clare : In clause 4, it requires that the applicant have written proof of their authority

to ask a question. Does not any citizen, by virtue of their citizenship, have the

authority to ask a question of the government regarding access to information and

a freedom-of-information request? What special authority is required? What determines

that, and how is that adjudicated? Does not being able to provide some sort of authority

to ask the request mean that the request is automatically denied?

[3:55 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : What the member, I think, is referring to is

section 5 of the act, which refers to

the criteria for which a person can act on behalf of another in cases such as a minor.

The criteria for this is laid out in regulations, which we are not changing.

Sheldon Clare : How will the wording affect applicants in practice? Will public bodies be required

to provide detailed written responses when they determine that the request meets the

requirement of

section 5(1)?

Hon. Diana Gibson : In terms of how this applies to the applicant in practice, this clarifies that when

requests do not meet the requirements of

section 5, the time limit for response will

not begin until the requirements are met. In terms of the written reporting, we are

not changing the procedures for criteria under 5.

Jody Toor : Would this new wording in

section 7 make it easier or more difficult for the Privacy

Commissioner to review a public body’s decision? As well, why is the ministry so intent

to make it easier for ministries to dismiss FOI requests right at the door?

[4:00 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : This does not change the oversight of the Privacy Commissioner, nor does it pertain

in any way at all to dismissal of requests.

Jody Toor : What safeguards prevent pressure on applicants to consent to long extensions? By changing

the language in

section 7 to “a request that meets requirements of

section 5(1),”

does the amendment expand the head’s power on the determination of a request?

Hon. Diana Gibson : The member opposite is referring to something that is in a later clause. We’re on

clause 4.

and toward procedural compliance? I wonder. Is the government concerned that ordinary

citizens may now feel that they need legal or institutional expertise to successfully

file requests?

The process seems to increase the burden upon people wanting to file requests. I suppose

the concern could be that the ministries could use procedural requirements as a way

to manage workload pressures rather than to improve or assist in transparency. We

have heard that workload is an issue in this, and we’re wondering. Is this a factor

as well?

compliance, and does this give people the need to have legal or institutional expertise

to be successful in filing requests? Is this also about workload pressures rather

than improving transparency?

[4:05 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Not at all. This is about helping people to get the information they need, helping

us to find that information and clarify their request. It has to be read in the context

of the broader act, which includes the duty to assist, which sets a very high bar.

Also, of course, the oversight of the OIPC is retained, which sets a very high bar

as well.

Sheldon Clare : Thank you to the minister for the response to the question. I thought that was quite

helpful.

My next question is: why is there an appearance, at least, of government strengthening

procedural thresholds instead of strengthening FOI staffing and response capacity?

There is an appearance that what this change does is exactly that.

I wonder. Does the government acknowledge at least the concern that clause 4 operationally

reinforces the broader discretionary authority that was introduced in clause 2?

[4:10 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you, member opposite, for the opportunity to speak to the work our government

has done to improve service delivery, investing in new technology and new staff and

proactive disclosure — 17 categories already and a new one in Bill 9.

Our government has shown ourselves to be looking for every innovation to ensure we’re

delivering for British Columbians. Also, the oversight for this, as has been discussed previously, is continuing under the clause that pertains

to the oversight by the Privacy Commissioner’s office that continues to maintain that.

So it does not introduce that discretion.

Clause 4 approved.

On clause 5.

Jody Toor : The proposed change in clause 5. Clause 5 amends

section 10 to allow the head of

a public body to extend the time for responding to an FOI request if the applicant

consents to the extension in the prescribed manner. The clause also removes subsection

10(1)(

d) and updates related reference throughout

section 10.

I have concerns that I can go into my questions with. Some of them are regarding:

applicants may feel pressure to consent to extension, operational delays may become

normalized, ministries may increasingly rely on extensions rather than improving response

capacity, consent may not always reflect equal bargaining powers. It could weaken

urgency around timely disclosure.

I want to explore whether voluntary consent becomes operational pressure on applicants

to accept delays, rather than the government improving FOI response performance. The

key concern that I have here is whether the applicants are truly consenting freely

or whether they are being placed in a position where refusing extension can cause

risks such as slower cooperation, narrow searches or stalled processes.

So my question to the minister is: why was it necessary to create additional authority

for applicant consent extensions?

[4:15 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : It’s important for the member opposite to know that consent has been in the legislation

for years. What this change does is reduce administrative burden, making it more efficient

and us better able to better serve the applicant.

Jody Toor : If a governing body seeks consent to extend the time to respond and the applicant

doesn’t consent, what happens then?

Hon. Diana Gibson : In that case, the criteria for an extension is laid out in

section 10.

[4:20 p.m.]

Jody Toor : Does the government acknowledge that applicants may feel pressure to consent to delays

in order to maintain collaboration within the ministries?

Hon. Diana Gibson : It’s important to note that the circumstances for an extension are quite limited where

it would be permitted by the Privacy Commissioner — that they would need to seek approval

from the Privacy Commissioner, and those circumstances are limited. If the consent

isn’t there and those circumstances aren’t met, the extension would not be taken.

The provisions for procedural fairness and duty to assist ensure that public bodies

would not be putting on that pressure. However, if an individual didn’t feel they

were being treated fairly, they would have recourse to the Privacy Commissioner’s

office, which sets a very high bar.

[4:25 p.m.]

Rob Botterell : In that circumstance, how are applicants advised of their rights to appeal to the

commissioner? What steps are taken beyond simply providing them a letter?

[4:30 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you, member opposite. This is an important question and one that we take very seriously. Complaint

information is shared at each stage of the process with the applicant, including their

process of seeking consent and as per the FOI procedures and agreement with the Privacy Commissioner’s office.

The Chair : Thank you, Members. This committee is going to take a short ten-minute recess and

will return at 4:45 p.m.

The committee recessed from 4:32 p.m. to 4:44 p.m.

[Susie Chant in the chair.]

The Chair : Okay, I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 9, Freedom of Information and Protection

of Privacy Amendment Act, 2026, back to order. We are on clause 5.

[4:45 p.m.]

Rob Botterell : I have a series of questions on clause 5, which allows the head of a public body to

extend the time for responding to a request by a period consented to by the applicant.

I just want to confirm my understanding of some aspects of the clause, then I’ll have

some questions.

This

section of the act, as I understand it, sets out the circumstances in which the

30-day time period for response to a request may be extended by up to 30 days, and

the amendments provide for longer extensions with the consent of the applicant.

My initial questions are: am I right? Is that correct?

Maybe it would be helpful if you could recap the reason for making this particular

amendment.

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you for the question. The purpose of this is to enable public bodies to extend

the time limit for responding to FOI requests when applicants consent without also

requiring approval from the Information and Privacy Commissioner. This is about reducing

administrative burden, making it more effective for applicants by improving the service

through reducing administration and burden.

The Chair : If I can remind all members of the committee that when the minister or the member

is speaking, I’d really be a lot happier if everybody else was biding quiet, please.

I don’t mind you speaking while everybody’s thinking — great. When the member or minister

is speaking, if I could have it fairly quiet in the room, I’d appreciate it. Thank

you so very much.

Interjection.

The Chair : Are you challenging the Chair?

Interjection.

[4:50 p.m.]

The Chair : Very good. Thank you so very much.

Rob Botterell : My next question is: who did the government consult with, and did the government consult

with applicants using the legislation regarding this change? If you could elaborate.

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you, member opposite. This change does not affect the applicant experience.

It doesn’t change the applicant experience. What it does is the change affects the

OIPC and consultation with them under this clause. We consulted and engaged extensively

with the OIPC in the process.

Rob Botterell : Thank you, Minister.

The step that this change creates or eliminates is the step requiring the approval

of the Information and Privacy Commissioner. So the effect of that is that the applicant

no longer has the knowledge or has the understanding or has the assurance that the

Information and Privacy Commissioner has approved the extension.

My question to the minister is: does that not change the applicant experience? I mean,

the applicant now is dealing with the public body to determine whether to consent

to an extension beyond the 30-day extension without the knowledge that the Information

and Privacy Commissioner has been involved.

[4:55 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : It’s important to recognize that consent was already a part of this provision, this

clause. We’re not changing that. This is about the back-end administrative procedure.

It is about reducing the administrative burden and increasing efficiency.

The OIPC was engaged extensively and retains oversight if there are any concerns.

This is going to help streamline the process.

Rob Botterell : If my understanding is correct, the commissioner will not be involved in the extension

request. That will now occur between the applicant and the public body to effectively

reduce the administrative burden on the Information and Privacy Commissioner for reviewing

these.

[5:00 p.m.]

How does this change interact with the balance of

section 10? What steps will be in

place for the applicant to receive information on the reason for the extension? When

can a response be expected, and what sections give the applicant the ability to complain

to the commissioner…?

[The bells were rung.]

The Chair : Division has been called in the main chamber. We will recess. I expect everybody back

in their seats at approximately — and do not take my approximately long — 5:20, please.

Thank you so much.

The committee recessed from 5:01 p.m. to 5:20 p.m.

[Susie Chant in the chair.]

The Chair : Thank you so very much, committee, for getting back here. It’s appreciated. I call

Committee of the Whole on Bill 9, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy

Amendment Act, 2026, back to order. We continue on clause 5.

Rob Botterell : My question is: how many FOI requests in 2024-25 exceeded the 30-day extension time

limit in

section 10(1), and what other metrics are available in relation to this category

of requests in ’24-25; i.e., response time exceeds 30-day extension time, pages, processing

days?

I understand the ministry and the government keep statistics on FOI, so I’m interested

to know the volume of requests that exceeded the 30-day extension time limit and any

other metrics that are available.

[5:25 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Timelines and processing days are in the FOIPPA annual report, which is available

publicly.

Rob Botterell : Can the minister refer me to the page in the annual report that actually provides

the answer to my question?

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you, member opposite. The specific raw data in the FOI report can be found in the appendix, which is on

pages 13 to 17.

Rob Botterell : I have an FOI request from an applicant that made a request last summer in relation

to the incorporation of Okanagan Falls. They’ve given me permission to share their

experience in relation to their request. I’ll give you a sense of their experience,

then I’ll get to some questions about this that relate to clause 5.

Recognizing that there’s a principle, certainly, that guides freedom-of-information

legislation that access delayed is accessed denied, here’s an overview of the timeline

and extensions that have occurred.

On August 8, 2025, the initial request was made. A tentative response date was provided

of September 19, 2025. On August 20, 2025, freedom-of-information fee payment was

issued of $420. Then on September 20, 2025, that fee was paid in full by the applicant.

Then on October 16, 2025, an FOI extension request was considered and was approved

and extended until December 2, 2025. Then on November 28, 2025, the FOI extension

request was extended to January 16, 2026. Then on January 20, 2026, an FOI extension

was granted and extended to February 13, 2026. On February 11, 2026, an FOI extension

request was extended to March 9, 2026. Then on March 9, 2026, an FOI extension request

had the request approved to be extended to April 22, 2026.

[5:30 p.m.]

Then on April 20, 2026, an FOI extension request was approved, extending the request

deadline to June 4, 2026. So we’re well on the way to having an August 8, 2025 request,

which the act envisioned would be responded to within 30 days and a 30-day extension,

being up to a year and still no response.

There’s a number of concerns here. I certainly feel this level of delay seems unreasonable.

What we should be seeing in this

section is changes to legislation that would fix

situations like this. As far as I can understand so far, subject to the minister’s

questions, it would only make this situation worse.

I have a series of questions. In relation to this clause and the potential for extensions

to be longer than 30 days without approval of the Information and Privacy Commissioner,

can the minister speak to how this change would impact a request like this and how

this change would result in a request like this being dealt with more quickly?

[5:35 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : I don’t know the details of the specific case being referenced. It would be highly

inappropriate for me to comment.

But what I can say is that the clause we’re discussing here at this moment pertains

to the situation where an applicant has consented to the extension, and a reminder

that the Privacy Commissioner’s office has oversight of all aspects of the act, including

extensions.

Rob Botterell : This is not a hypothetical. I have the consent of the applicant to share any information

the minister would like.

The fact is that we have

an act that was intended to see requests responded to in

30 days, without delay. Part of the reason for the “without delay” is that if there

is some information that was available before the whole filing cabinet was available,

you would have that information provided.

So here we have an applicant — and this does relate to this

section — that makes a

request on August 8, 2025, pays $420 in fees, and here we are in May of the next year

and there’s still no response.

When we look at this amendment, which deals with extensions, and realizing that this

amendment has not passed yet, whether it will pass or not…. We’re dealing with the

old regime, where it’s the approval of the Information and Privacy Commissioner to

extension…. The Information and Privacy Commissioner has repeatedly approved extensions

and, in doing so…. There should be information about when a request can be responded

to, the reason and so on.

Here we have an example of a problem request, certainly from a freedom-of-information

point of view, that this clause, as far as I can determine, will have no impact on

addressing the delays that this applicant has….

So what does that mean? That means that we’re addressing the administrative burden

on the Information and Privacy Commissioner so that the applicant can deal directly

with the public body, and in so doing, relieve some administrative burden on the information

privacy. But I don’t see how that in any way addresses the delays that we see here.

It just facilitates them by eliminating administrative burden on the commissioner.

When this amendment was drafted, there’s no outer limit for any request. This could

be on the never-never plan for years. I can’t imagine most applicants would freely consent to the government

taking longer to share information than they have requested.

[5:40 p.m.]

Can the minister speak to how this amendment will ensure that an applicant is not

coerced into accepting a delayed timeline, and is there any accountability in this

act, as amended, to prevent other applicants experiencing this delay, which is almost

a year?

[5:45 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you to the member opposite.

Just a reminder, this is about the situation where an applicant has consented already

to the timelines, to the extension. Just to correct something that you said, the applicant

does not deal directly with the OIPC presently. The applicant deals with the public

body. After consent has been given for an extension, the public body would then need

to seek approval of the OIPC for that extension, which has already been agreed to

by the individual.

That’s the step we’re looking to remove, not just to reduce administrative work for

the OIPC but also the public bodies in terms of that extra process, so that we can

streamline the process to better deliver for individuals.

There are guardrails in that it is subject to the oversight of the OIPC. The duty

to assist applies. The high bar that the OIPC holds public bodies to would continue

to apply. They oversee every clause of this act and have the right to investigate.

That ensures that people who are not feeling it’s fair have recourse and that the

public bodies are being held to a high standard.

We’ve talked elsewhere today about the work we’ve been doing to improve FOI timeliness

through things like new innovative technology, innovations in proactive disclosure,

additional staff. That’s a separate conversation. What we’re discussing today is one

step of administrative process that we wanted to remove.

Rob Botterell : Thank you, Minister.

You just mentioned, Minister: “better deliver access.” What this amendment would do

is eliminate the requirement of the public body to seek and obtain the approval of

the commissioner’s office for extensions.

I thought you’d have it at your fingertips. I haven’t looked at the annual report,

but I do know from an appeal order, district of Summerland, Celia Francis, adjudicator,

February 29, 2024, order F24-15…. I do know from reading this particular order that

when dealing with the matter, the applicant to the commissioner’s office provided

detailed information on the hours that were involved and the dollars that would be

expended in dealing with a particular request. The district of Summerland was able

to provide fairly detailed information, not high-level boilerplate statistics.

[5:50 p.m.]

The question I have is: with this proposed change, what is the forecast reduction

in administrative burden that is so enticing to make this change? The reduction in

administrative burden on both the commissioner’s office and public bodies, what is

your forecast in terms of dollars saved, hours saved, FTE savings? Because I’m sure

you wouldn’t, with respect, Minister, propose a change where you didn’t have a forecast

outcome for the change to justify all the work that is being done, so I’m curious.

To summarize: what is the forecast savings in administrative burden on the commissioner’s

office and on the public bodies subject to the act of this proposed change?

The Chair : Member, I’m just going to remind you to try and not use “you.” If you could say “the

minister” or…. Thank you. I appreciate that. That just makes it going through the

Chair. Thanks so much.

[5:55 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : I want to correct something that the member opposite has stated — that no longer would

there be a need to seek approval from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for extensions.

That is not the case. This, we’re discussing, of not needing to go and seek that approval

is only in the case where an individual applicant has already agreed to that extension.

The procedures for approval and extension circumstances would otherwise be the same

as they are today. People do consent often. Applicants often consent, but they don’t

have to, as is clear in the discussion we’ve had already.

This is about deploying resources as efficiently as possible.

Rob Botterell : Through the Chair to the minister, my question was: what are the forecast savings?

Most of these sections that we’ve been looking at look to me more like an administrative

burden reduction cost-savings exercise as opposed to improving access to information

for applicants, which I have a fundamental issue with.

But leaving that aside, back to my original question. What are the forecast savings

from making this change?

[The bells were rung.]

The Chair : Committee members, division has been called in the chamber. We will recess from here.

I’m hoping everybody can be back by 6:20. Thank you so much. We will see you shortly.

The committee recessed from 5:58 p.m. to 6:15 p.m.

[Susie Chant in the chair.]

The Chair : I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 9, Freedom of Information and Protection of

Privacy Amendment Act, 2026, back to order. We are on clause 5.

Rob Botterell : I believe we are awaiting a response to a question, from the minister.

Hon. Diana Gibson : We are doing the work to ensure that resources are being used as efficiently as possible

and determined that this step would be something that would help with being able to

deploy resources more effectively.

Rob Botterell : I’ll just note for the record that public bodies and businesses and entities that

are either, in the case of the business sector, using shareholders’ money to do work

or, in the case of government, using taxpayers’ money to do work would normally —

in the case of changes to legislation, changes to policy, changes to program — be

expected, at Treasury Board, to explain the benefits that would come from a particular

change to legislation in much more concrete terms.

In this environment of a $13 billion deficit, respectfully, I would’ve expected more

detail, and, if there wasn’t more detail forthcoming, that there would be a clear

explanation of a plan to have that greater detail in effect, because we are effectively

changing the system on the basis of cost savings and on the basis of reduced administrative

burden on the commissioner’s office without any concrete information about what we’re

actually hoping to achieve. In the world that I’ve been in for many years, one would

expect much more detail.

[6:20 p.m.]

That is only part of the issue with this clause.

In this specific case, the information that the applicant is seeking is time-sensitive

for their community decision-making in relation to the incorporation of Okanagan Falls.

So with this proposed clause, how does the minister propose to ensure that applicants

that are seeking current information are served rather than receiving the information

after multiple extensions? That is perhaps of historical interest, rather than the

purpose for which this act was created: to enable the applicant to have the information

the applicant deems necessary to hold a public body to account or to otherwise participate

in issues.

So this goes to a specific question related to this clause, which is: how does this

clause and the amendment help to ensure that applicants receive information in a timely

manner? Further, what controls or guidance or protections are there when the applicant

and the public body are discussing an extension? What resources does the applicant

have available to them when they make the decision either to accept an extension or

decide to appeal it to the commissioner?

My final

part is a three-part question. What accountability does the commissioner

have to make a timely decision if there is an appeal made to the commissioner on an

extension request?

Those are my questions.

[6:25 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : In terms of the questions the member opposite has asked, the issues around OIPC oversight

and guardrails have been asked and answered. The questions pertaining to this clause

have been asked and answered, and the balance are dealt with elsewhere in the act.

The Chair : Shall clause 5 pass?

Division has been called.

[6:30 p.m.]

The Chair : If the committee is agreeable, we will waive the time. Is there agreement that we

can waive the time?

Leave granted.

The Chair : Thank you so much. Before putting the question, I remind all members that only the

members of

Section A or their duly appointed substitutes are authorized to vote, and

your Whips have taken care of that.

The question is: shall clause 5 pass?

Clause 5 approved on the following division:

YEAS — 5

Routledge

Parmar

Sandhu

Sharma

Gibson

NAYS — 5

Banman

Dew

Botterell

McInnis

Maahs

The Chair : Members, there being an equal number of votes for and against, the Chair must make

a casting vote. The Chair votes in favour of clause 5 to keep the bill intact in its

original form and as adopted at second reading. Clause 5 has passed.

If I could have quiet in the committee room, please. We are proceeding.

On clause 6.

Jody Toor : Clause 6 proposes changes. Clause 6 removes lack of detail as a formal reason for

extending response timelines under

section 10.

When reading clauses 2, 4 and 6 together, my concern is that the structure of the

FOI process appears to be shifting away from assisting applicants in clarifying requests

and towards stronger procedural gatekeeping over whether requests proceed at all.

Under the previous framework, if a request lacked detail, ministries could work with

applicants through clarification and extensions. However, with the increased attention

on whether requests meet the requirements and the expanded choice given to the ministries

regarding sufficient detail, I believe it is important for this committee to understand

whether these amendments are creating additional procedural barriers for ordinary

citizens seeking access to information.

[6:35 p.m.]

I have some concerns that I can mention, and then I’ll ask some questions. Interact

with clause 2 to create stronger upfront procedural barriers…. Requests may now face

rejection or procedural challenge rather than extension and assistance. This could

also reduce incentives for ministries to work collectively with applicants and shift

focus towards the procedural instead of facilitating access.

One of my questions: why was lack of detail removed as a reason for extending timelines?

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you, member opposite.

I want to clarify that this is about a redundancy now, because it’s already addressed

in an earlier clause that clarifies that public bodies can pause the time limit for

responding while seeking clarifying information from the applicants. There’s no need

to retain the public body’s ability to extend the timeline for the same reason.

Rather than the concern the member opposite has around increased procedural barriers,

this in fact actually prevents that. Leaving it herein would have enabled additional

delay, which we didn’t want.

Clause 6 approved.

On clause 7.

Rob Botterell : Clause 7 is a new

section of the act that creates a new discretionary “may,” class-based exemption from disclosure regarding judicial comments on legislation

and policy. This is a new exemption. Imagine that. A new exemption.

My question is: what other jurisdictions in Canada have this exemption?

[6:40 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Already, under

section 3 of FOIPPA, almost all judicial records are excluded. There

is some potential ambiguity, which this clause is about clarifying. The purpose is

to ensure the independence of the courts, which is a cornerstone of our democracy,

and allowing public bodies to have full and frank discussions with the judiciary.

Noting the hour, I move the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The Chair : This committee stands adjourned. Thank you very much for your efforts this afternoon.

The committee rose at 6:45 p.m.