Hansard Blues

Committee of the Whole –

Section C

Draft Report of Debates

The Honourable Raj Chouhan, Speaker

4th Session, 42nd Parliament

Thursday, November

9, 2023

Morning Sitting

Draft Transcript — Terms of Use

PROCEEDINGS IN THE

BIRCH ROOM

Committee of the Whole House

BILL 43 — MONEY JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT

CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS AND

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS ACT

The House in Committee of the Whole (Section

C) on Bill 43; J. Sims in the chair.

The committee met at 11:18 a.m.

On clause 1.

The Chair: Good morning, Members. I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 43, Money Judgment Enforcement

Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions Act.

Hon. N. Sharma: I just want to start by thanking my team that's here, Natalie Barnes and Tyler Nyvall,

also, probably, all those people that are watching right now that have contributed

to this piece of legislation and the good work they've done.

M. de Jong: A couple of things. I don't know that we are necessarily going to be too long on the

bill, but maybe I can take advantage of clause 1 to say a few preliminary things,

the first being….

I'm assuming it was unintentional. Sometimes things occur quickly around here.

[11:20 a.m.]

I hope the Attorney will agree that in the time that she has been the Attorney General

and I have been the designated opposition critic, I've tried to be…. We won't always

agree, but I've tried to be collegial and civil, as I think we always should be around

this place.

I was a little surprised and disappointed when, at second reading…. Not that I had

a lengthy dissertation in second reading on the bill, but I had stepped out of the

House for a moment to deal with a follow-up from question period. When I rushed back

in, second reading was over. Now, I understand the Attorney's remarks were brief,

and that's for reasons that we will discuss, but it did surprise me.

I assume it was unintentional on her part. Not a particularly big deal with respect

to this piece of legislation, but that respect we have for one another and procedural

respect sometimes…. Well, hopefully, it will flow both ways. There. I've said it and

got it off my chest.

The general question about the piece of legislation…. We, of course, debated the Money

Judgment Enforcement Act several weeks ago. We took a fair amount of time to go through

it in detail. I thought it was a good discussion and appreciated the answers from

the Attorney and the clarification on some of the points.

It's not unheard of to have a secondary piece of legislation to deal with consequentials

and transitional measures. It is unusual. In this case, we have upwards of, I think,

74 sections.

I'm probably less troubled about the fact that we have a secondary piece of legislation

with the transitional provisions and consequential amendments than I am with the fact

that…. Maybe it's my fault. Maybe I'm supposed to ask the specific question. But I

don't recall, at any point in the conversation we had about the main body of legislation,

the Attorney offering up that piece of information that there was a secondary piece

of legislation — a fairly sizable piece of legislation — that was going to amend a

subsequent 74 sections dealing with consequential amendments.

Now, if the Attorney is going to remind me that at some point, that was revealed in

the course of the discussion, fair enough. I don't recall it being said. Again, it

strikes me that to facilitate a useful and productive conversation in these forums,

there was nothing to be lost or gained by merely pointing out, because surely the

Attorney would have known, that there was a second bill dealing with consequential

and transitional measures.

Those are my two preliminary matters that I'll deal with in

section 1.

Hon. N. Sharma: I want to start by thanking the member. I do agree that we had a really collegial

debate last time and thought it was productive. Just to acknowledge that I was not

aware the reason for the member leaving was because he was coming back to speak, or

he didn't have anything to say given the nature of this being a consequential statute.

I just want to say that about the second reading.

[11:25 a.m.]

With respect to the consequential and transitional provisions, I believe it did come

up in debate, but I know that we signalled it — when it comes to the release of this

legislation — that there would be consequential and transitional provisions that were,

obviously, associated with the big piece of work.

M. de Jong: Well, let's get to it then. Thank you for that.

On clause 1, I just want to confirm. We're dealing now with the Civil Resolution Tribunal

Act, 56.92. Is it 56.92(3)? Is that the extent of the change? Is that the consequential

change that flows from the original legislation?

Hon. N. Sharma: I'm just told by one of my staff that all of the amendments are important. But I think

the member does point to the most significant one in this clause — subsection

(3) — which brings it under the Money Judgment Enforcement Act. That's correct.

Clause 1 approved.

On clause 2.

M. de Jong: My question for clauses 2 and 3 is the same. So I'll ask it, and if the Attorney is

able to answer, then it will allow us to expedite the proceedings.

When I compared the original 57 and 58.1 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act with

what we see here, the substantive change seems to be the reference to a judgment statement,

which is a defined term and document that flows out of the Money Judgment Enforcement

Act.

So I guess the question is, both in clauses 2 and 3, the inclusion of the…. The purpose

seems to be to include reference to a judgment statement in both of those referred

to provisions.

Hon. N. Sharma: That's correct.

Clauses 2 and 3 approved.

On clause 4.

M. de Jong: When I read clause 4, the purpose seems to be to allow the Civil Resolution Tribunal

the option of registering orders with the money judgment registry on its own initiative.

I made that as a statement. It's a question. Am I correct in interpreting the provision

in that manner?

Then secondly, is that an option that the Civil Resolution Tribunal presently has

under existing enforcement mechanisms?

Well, let me start with those two questions.

Hon. N. Sharma: So yeah, it is at the request of the party, as the member described. The second part

of the question was: is that a power that exists already? The answer is no.

[11:30 a.m.]

M. de Jong: We went through the staged process for a judgment creditor to enforce a judgment registration

with the registry.

Is that the usual mechanism for registering? My recollection or assumption, perhaps

incorrect, is that it was the judgment creditor who took the step of registering the

judgment. This seems to me, then, to be a little bit different in so far as it's the

actual tribunal performing that registration function on behalf of the creditor.

Is there a distinction there? Or am I misunderstanding that?

Hon. N. Sharma: This is an example of the approach that we took in setting up the processes and the

new powers and procedures to make it easy for a judgment creditor. This is a new ability

for them, likely by just a click. If they go to the CRT website, they can request

the tribunal, for example, to register it.

It's to make sure our systems are working together and to have people have access

to justice in the systems that we're setting up.

M. de Jong: Okay. Thank you. That's helpful.

Just to follow this through, then. I am an individual who has taken a matter to the

Civil Resolution Tribunal. I have secured a judgment in my favour, which now creates

me as a judgment creditor. I'm at home. I want to register that money judgment with

the money judgment enforcement registry. I signal, most likely electronically, the

Civil Resolution Tribunal. "Yes, I want to do that." They do it for me.

Is that the way this is intended to work?

Hon. N. Sharma: That's correct.

Clauses 4 and 5 approved.

On clause 6.

M. de Jong: Just to confirm, this refers to a certificate for costs. That is a certificate for

costs related exclusively to proceedings before the Court of Appeal. Is that correct?

Hon. N. Sharma: That's correct.

Clause 6 approved.

On clause 7.

M. de Jong: Clause 7 of this bill deals with

section 3 of the Court Order Enforcement Act. The

main body seems to be contained within sub-subclause 7(b)(2).

What is being changed? What is this amendment accommodating? What is the actual consequential

change that is occurring here?

[11:35 a.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: This is obviously a consequential amendment that's necessary, given the new regime

we have. What this provision does is to preserve pre-judgment garnishing orders and

the ability to do that.

Previously, it was pre- and post-judgment garnishing orders that were preserved. For

example, if somebody owed you $10,000, you'd ask a court to take that money and hold

it so that it doesn't go somewhere else. That's before a judgment; that's an ability

that we want to preserve. But then after, or post-judgment, of course, the whole regime

that we have introduced has a whole bunch of tools for that creditor to collect.

Clauses 7 to 11 inclusive approved.

On clause 12.

M. de Jong: Just to confirm, we see lots of regulatory enabling provisions in the original act.

I think at one point we commented that there were three pages of regulatory enabling.

This is yet another.

To be fair, my recollection of the act is that this regulatory provision was tacked

on at the end of

part 5. When the provisions of

part 5 were deleted, as they are in

the previous clause, clause 11, it was necessary to preserve that regulatory provision

by creating a separate

part 6. Have I got the mechanics correct, of why this sort

of orphan regulatory power will exist in the way it does?

Hon. N. Sharma: That's correct.

Clauses 12 and 13 approved.

On clause 14.

M. de Jong: I understand why the provision is here. I disagree with it, and I'm going to register

that disagreement.

Clause 14 approved on division.

[11:40 a.m.]

Clauses 15 to 26 inclusive approved.

On clause 27.

M. de Jong: Under the Law and Equity Act,

section 55 refers to art or cultural objects that are

"brought into British Columbia for temporary…exhibit." Under the provision, they were

exempt from seizure.

My question is: after this consequential amendment, can they now be seized?

Hon. N. Sharma: Yes.

M. de Jong: Perhaps the Attorney can just put on the record what the…. I'm not sure I agree or

disagree with that. I wanted to verify what the effect of a fairly innocuous-looking

amendment might be.

What's the rationale for that change?

Hon. N. Sharma: The rationale is based on, I think, some of the lengthy discussions we had on the

meat of the bill, related to what should be an exemption and what shouldn't when you

are somebody who owes money to somebody. It's determined that art shouldn't be in

that category, because it's not necessary to maintain a reasonable standard of living,

as the exemptions that we went over on at length last time.

Interestingly, the provision — I don't know the history of it; we'd have to dig into

it — seems to be, potentially, related to something very specific at the time. That's

the reason behind the change.

M. de Jong: Let me ask a couple of questions. I appreciate the information and the reply.

Say I'm a judgment creditor, and I'm a contractor. I have done work at the Vancouver

Art Gallery. A dispute has arisen. I haven't been paid. It could be sizable these

days. Any kind of renovation or work can run up a sizable chunk of money.

If I wait until the Van Gogh exhibit rolls into town for a temporary showing, as a

judgment creditor, can I grab Lilies in the Field ? Is that now exigible in ways that it wouldn't have been under the previous regime?

Hon. N. Sharma: I think in the scenario described by the member, it wouldn't be a scenario where the

Vancouver Art Gallery owned that property. They wouldn't, I'm assuming, own the Van

Gogh that was travelling through, unless they're purchasing it. But that's another

story. So that wouldn't fall in the category of this provision.

M. de Jong: All right, it's a change. I want to just take a moment to ensure that we understand

— or at least that I understand — the implications of the change.

Let's take an example, then, of a circumstance where I've obtained a judgment against

a First Nation for work performed in a contractual relationship.

[11:45 a.m.]

It may be a First Nation elsewhere in the country. But I have a judgment, and an item

comes into British Columbia where I have registered my money judgment. Is that cultural

artifact now exigible, seizable?

Hon. N. Sharma: An interesting question.

I think I would start by saying that we talked at length about the regime that's in

place. That is about an enforcement officer coming and determining which types of

property the person has, so for a judgment debtor — I'm assuming it's something of

really important cultural significance — there would be many other ways for them to

figure out how to fulfil what they're due in that scenario, if it's of cultural importance

to that person. I think there's a whole process that we talked about at length last

time, about the enforcement officer and how that regime will work.

In the scenario where it's the only piece of value that that person has and where

it's of cultural significance, it may be seized, but whether it's sold is another

level of that person being able, potentially, to pay their debts in order to recover

it.

I guess with that, I will move the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to

sit again.

Motion approved.

The committee rose at 11:48 a.m.

Top

NOTICE: This is a DRAFT transcript of debate in one sitting of the Legislative Assembly of

British Columbia. This transcript is subject to corrections and will be replaced by

the final, official Hansard report. Use of this transcript, other than in the legislative

precinct, is not protected by parliamentary privilege, and public attribution of any

of the debate as transcribed here could entail legal liability.

Copyright © 2023: British Columbia

Hansard Services, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada