Hansard Blues

Committee of the Whole –

Section A

Draft Report of Debates

The Honourable Raj Chouhan, Speaker

4th Session, 42nd Parliament

Monday, October

16, 2023

Afternoon Sitting

Draft Transcript — Terms of Use

PROCEEDINGS IN THE

DOUGLAS FIR ROOM

Committee of the Whole House

BILL 27 — MONEY JUDGMENT

ENFORCEMENT ACT

(continued)

The House in Committee of the Whole (Section

A) on Bill 27; F. Donnelly in the chair.

The committee met at 3:03 p.m.

The Chair: All right. Good afternoon, Members. I'll call Committee of the Whole on Bill 27 to

order, Money Judgment Enforcement Act.

We finished off on clause 4.

On clause 4 (continued) .

Hon. N. Sharma: The member asked a question about the particular

section of clause 4(b), particularly

the suspended enforcement indefinitely.

In response to that, clause 4 does not give the court a greater ability to suspend

enforcement than it currently has, and there is no indication that the court has been

using powers that are similar, which have existed, inappropriately. Clause 4 merely

rewords an existing authority set out in

section 48 of the Court Order Enforcement

Act.

M. de Jong: Thanks to the minister for following through with that answer.

Is an order of that sort, pursuant to that section, appealable?

Hon. N. Sharma: I'm informed that would be appealable with leave.

M. de Jong: With leave of the Court of Appeal?

Hon. N. Sharma: Yes.

M. de Jong: I'm prepared to move on now to clause 6.

Clauses 4 and 5 approved.

On clause 6.

M. de Jong: This is a little bit of a point of departure, I believe, from existing legislation,

providing, as it does, for the specific prohibition on arrest or imprisonment. Maybe

I'll start there.

Am I correct? Is the inclusion of this language in this money judgment enforcement

legislation new?

Hon. N. Sharma: It's not new. It's essentially an update of old language that was used for similar

powers under

section 51 of the court order enforcement.

M. de Jong: All right. Well, let me try this. I'll try to think of an example.

In circumstances where a non-custodial parent, for example, is the subject of a….

[3:10 p.m.]

If the custodial parent has received a money judgment for the payment of support,

is the effect of this — and, apparently, existing legislation — to preclude, in circumstances

where the judgment debtor steadfastly refuses to honour that monetary obligation,

that judgment debtor from being arrested and, in a worst-case scenario, being incarcerated

for failure to honour, in the example I've used, the obligation to the child?

Hon. N. Sharma: The first part of it, just to explain, is that the purpose of this

section is to expressly,

I guess, displace a common-law principle. So it shows up in our legal regime in different

ways.

I'll start with the first one. The scenario that the member raised about non-payment

of child support — that would be wholly covered by the Family Law Act, and this doesn't

displace that.

Under that, sections 31 and 23, there is a power for order for imprisonment. There

is an ability to do that. Under the Supreme Court rules, no such ability would exist,

but under provincial small claims rules, a judge could find a contempt of court order

that might result in incarceration. So it depends where you are, but for the scenario

provided, it would be covered under the Family Law Act.

M. de Jong: There are, within the body of this legislation, numerous provisions that require an

application being made to the court. In a number of cases, it is the Supreme Court,

and we'll happen upon them as we move through this.

[3:15 p.m.]

The construct, if we look at it at a higher level, is that someone has a judgment.

There are provisions here that allow them to register that judgment. There are provisions

that allow them to seek information from the judgment debtor. If the judgment debtor

is uncooperative, there are opportunities to apply to the court. There are then seizure

provisions and a myriad of different possible applications that might have to be made

or could be made.

In circumstances where a judgment debtor is not just frustrating the entitlement of

the judgment creditor and their desire to realize on the judgment they've obtained

but is seeking to frustrate the effort of the court to assist with enforcing the entitlement

of the judgment creditor, am I correct, based on what the Attorney has just said,

that the Supreme Court of British Columbia will not possess any mechanism by which

they could make a finding of contempt of a judgment debtor — who is, for example,

steadfastly ignoring the orders of the court — and order arrest and detention?

Is that what I heard the Attorney say?

[3:20 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: Okay, so the general purpose of having provisions like this to displace the common

law is to prevent what the common law would allow for, which is that you could get

imprisoned just for existence of a debt. You owe money somewhere, and somebody finds

it, and it's automatic. You could get imprisonment as a result of that. What's constructed

here is, first of all, you displace that through legislation.

The second part of that is the question about the Supreme Court. Since it's displacing

the idea of incarceration for the simple fact of debt, what the Supreme Court would

then have the power to do is, just like the Supreme Court for any order with inherent

jurisdiction, to find contempt of court in the instance that there is a contempt of

any court order of that level of court and whether or not it's related to a debt.

Under small claims, there is a rule specifically related to non-payment of a payment

schedule. That is specifically because, under the small claims rules, a judge could

make an order for a payment schedule. They've taken the time to sit with the debtor

and say: "Well, diving into the facts, here's the payment schedule." That's an order

of that court. So it may be found to be contempt of court for non-payment of that

payment schedule.

M. de Jong: Okay, that's helpful.

Just to be clear, on the record, I am not suggesting that we should roll back the

pages of history to Dickens and Oliver Twist and recreate a debtors' prison. What I am asking, though, just to take a moment to

explore….

We recognize, in the way that the Attorney has pointed out, that we attach a special

importance to the enforcement of judgments and the collection of debts as they relate

to children through the Family Law Act and maintenance. And we do so, I think, for

a very sound policy reasons, social policy reasons.

All I want to suggest to the Attorney is that I have seen the impact firsthand that

the non-payment of what some might call a fairly modest debt can have on a family,

a small business family, who have been — I'll use the legal term — stiffed by some

nefarious character who doesn't want to pay his or her $5,000 or $10,000 bill. They

literally put people in the poorhouse.

It's one thing if we are confronted by a debtor who themselves is of extremely limited

means and wishes to pay that debt but can't. But we all know there are nefarious characters

out there who will manipulate in every way possible simply because they don't want

to pay the debt.

[3:25 p.m.]

It's ensuring there is a mechanism available to a court when it is confronted by one

of those people who acts in that way — who, despite having the means, arranges their

affairs in a way to shield it from any kind of collection activity — so the court

maintains an ability to say to that individual: "It's long enough. You've done everything

you can to frustrate this person to whom you owe money, because the court has determined

that you owe the money. You're not providing the information. You're not attending

as required for discoveries to provide additional information, and I've had enough."

Sometimes the only thing someone like that understands is when they have to spend

a few weekends or a few weeks as a guest of the state.

Again, we're not talking about the recreation of a debtors' prison, but I do think

it's important to preserve, and hope these provisions preserve, the right of a judge,

both at the Provincial and Supreme Court level, in those extraordinary circumstances

to impress upon a judgment debtor that there is an ultimate penalty still available

to the courts to remind them of what their obligations are.

Hon. N. Sharma: As I talked about a bit earlier, of course, some of the examples the member provided

are prime examples where a court may step in and say it's contempt of court for that

person not to adhere to court orders and rules, and to provide the reassurance that

a

section like this has been in place to displace the common law previously in this

particular piece of legislation.

It doesn't do anything extra to displace any court powers, and, of course, the inherent

jurisdiction of the court exists.

Clause 6 approved.

On clause 7.

M. de Jong: We're dealing here with a mechanism by which the application of the act may be altered.

In 7(1), there is a reference to waiving the application of parts of the act by written

consent of all persons.

I guess a couple of questions that flow from that. "All persons," I presume, would

include the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor, at least, and perhaps others,

although I'm not sure who that would be.

Then the second question flowing from that is: when must that written consent…? When

is it anticipated that that written consent would be obtained?

[3:30 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: As written in the construction of this provision, if there's a cause of action that

exists, that triggers that ability. If there's a cause of action that exists, it allows

"all persons," which could include — I think the member was right about the broadness

of it — debtors, creditors, third parties affected, acknowledged judgment creditors,

co-owners, people like that, to come up with a written agreement under this section.

So it encourages settlement outside of that. That's the purpose of that provision.

M. de Jong: Sometimes it's difficult not to overhear some of the conversation. I heard the term….

Someone anticipated, I think, what my next question was going to be, which is the

possibility of contracting out. It strikes me that, worded as it is — it's probably

not going to happen overnight — some clever lawyer is going to see the provisions.

I'll share with the minister a little bit of my concern here. In a lot of these contracting

relationships, you have unequal partners: one who is very sophisticated, one who is

not. The possibility of building into a contract a provision that says, "The following

sections of the Money Judgment Enforcement Act, the parties agree, do not apply…."

I think what I'm hearing the Attorney say is that that's not what the intention of

the

section is, but I'm not sure I agree, at this point, that it couldn't be used

for that. I'm not sure, the way the clause is written, that an existing cause of action

is a prerequisite to entering into the agreement.

So if I'm a judgment debtor, I'm going to point back to the contract that I signed

with the judgment creditor and say: "We agreed some time ago that these provisions,

or these particular seizure provisions, wouldn't apply. We're allowed to do that,

because clause 7 says we can."

I accept that's not the intention, but I wonder if the wording would allow for that.

[3:35 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: I'm just going to have to note my disagreement with the member on the reading of that

clause. I think the first

section is pretty clear. It says, "If a cause of action

exists that gives rise to a money judgment being enforceable under this Act…." This

would protect, I think, this

section from the conduct that he described.

M. de Jong: Well, I mean, there's nothing wrong with having a bit of an interpretive disagreement,

which I think we do, because I don't think it will be a stretch for someone to argue,

if they have built a waiver provision into a previous agreement…. I don't think "cause

of action" is a defined term in the act, so I'm not sure what would qualify or what

the triggering event would be.

I think I could argue in a fairly compelling fashion that the act contemplates the

existence of a waiver agreement with respect to certain enforcement provisions of

the act. Now, the Attorney says she's not concerned that the provision will be used

or attempted to be used or that the courts would be prepared to interpret the clause

in that way. I'm not so sure.

I'll be interested to hear her rationale for why she is more confident of her position

than I am of mine. She certainly has access to far more legal firepower than I do

these days. That is not lost on me.

Hon. N. Sharma: Okay. We did a bit of a deeper dive about the legislative drafting decisions that

formed this position in response to the member's question.

[3:40 p.m.]

The term is: "if a cause of action exists." So you can contemplate, in that scenario

of what a cause of action exists, it wouldn't be a scenario where you're just forming

a contract with somebody, because in that situation, a cause of action exists.

The term "cause of action" is used on numerous occasions and in many pieces of legislation,

so that is something that would be very familiar. It's also located at the very front

of that clause, so that is a way of drafting, in a sense, that gives it that temporal

aspect of it priority.

M. de Jong: Well, I guess this is one…. We will wait and see. I think what the minister has done

is laid on the record what the intention of the

section is and, to the extent that

courts refer back on occasion to these debates, that will be, perhaps, helpful from

a legislative

interpretation and judicial

interpretation perspective.

I had my little theory and concern about sub 7(1). I didn't actually understand what

the heck sub 7(2) was about, so I'll just ask the question under what circumstances

that comes into play: a "… measure taken by a civil enforcement officer for the purpose

of enforcing a money judgment is, with the written consent of all interested persons,

deemed to have been taken in accordance with this Act."

Is that just a presumptive clause that says that we assume the enforcement officer

is doing everything right?

[3:45 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: The policy that's meant to be supported by this

section is the ability of a civil

enforcement officer, in the fact-specific scenario that they're confronted by, to

come to a resolution of the matter potentially beyond the scope of this legislation

or outside of the scope of it.

For example, if the civil enforcement officer has an ability to seize and sell a property

but by agreement among the parties doesn't do that, then that's one example, or there

are provisions in here that are quite detailed about closely held companies and the

complexity of that. Even though the powers exist for civil enforcement to do certain

things, by agreement they can depart from some of those to resolve the matter between

the parties. So it's really a basis for that to happen if it's necessary.

M. de Jong: Is that, then, more applicable in a circumstance where the enforcement officer has

this whole body of potential remedies to effect collection on behalf of the judgment

creditor but, in effect, creates a structured settlement that engages the support

of the creditor and also the support of the debtor? Am I understanding that correctly?

Hon. N. Sharma: Yeah, that's correct.

M. de Jong: Sub 7(3) makes the point that a judgment debtor cannot waive an exemption claim. Does

that presumably also include a judgment debtor's dependent?

[3:50 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: Although it's not expressly named in there, a dependent doesn't have the ability at

all to waive an exemption claim under

part 13. It only has the ability under 160,

which I'm sure we will get to at some point, which allows them to make a claim like

step in and say the property should be exempt under that.

Clauses 7 and 8 approved.

On clause 9.

M. de Jong: Two questions here. First, I presume the upshot of the

definitions in

section 9 that

pertain to

part 3 capture all other provinces and territories in Canada. So an order

or judgment from a court in any one of the Canadian provinces or territories is covered

by this definition. Is that correct?

Hon. N. Sharma: Yes.

M. de Jong: The follow-up question. We have reciprocal enforcement agreements with some international

jurisdictions. Are they captured as well?

Hon. N. Sharma: That particular scenario where it's an international judgment is covered by another

piece of legislation, so that's why it's not in here.

We're just looking for confirmation of the name of that legislation. I'll give that

to you, I'm sure, after your next question.

M. de Jong: Right. My interest is as follows. The legislation comes to us, is commended to us,

as a means to reduce the burden facing a judgment creditor, and we're exploring the

ways it does and doesn't do that.

International transactions between British Columbians, British Columbian companies

and people, for example, in the state of Washington where I do think we have a reciprocal

agreement…. This is I think intended to operate so that if I have a judgment, I can

go register it.

[3:55 p.m.]

If, however, I have a judgment from the court in the state of Washington and still

have to go through a separate registration process of that judgment with, for example,

the B.C. Supreme Court, then I'm not really gaining anything. So that's where my level

of interest lies.

Have we eliminated a step by allowing people who have a judgment out of a court with

whom we have a reciprocal enforcement agreement to simply register that judgment?

Hon. N. Sharma: If we were following the pathway when it comes to international judgments, so let's

say a Washington example…. You have a Washington order that says somebody owes you

money. The way it would flow once this bill is passed is….

Part 2 of the Court Order Enforcement Act sets out how you seek to register your international

judgment in a local court, which is just part of our necessary jurisdictional procedural

things and long-standing law. Once it gets registered in a B.C. court, it becomes

a local judgment by virtue of the

definitions and sections and then gets fed into

the procedures that are laid out here in terms of enforcement.

M. de Jong: Thanks to the minister for confirming what I feared was the case. I say this respectfully.

The answer is: "Well, that's the way we deal with foreign judgments." But this was

intended to streamline, and presumably — I hope the Attorney would agree with me —

the requirements for taking a foreign judgment from the state of Washington….

As we talked about last day, I'm trying to think of examples that aren't fanciful.

There's a lot of commerce that takes place and a lot of trucking that goes back and

forth. So these disputes arise.

Maybe you're a trucking agent or supplier, and you've secured this judgment against

someone who may have some assets in B.C. I thought the intention was to be able to

take that judgment — which, in this example, is from a Washington court — and bring

it to the money judgment registry, who would presumably ask for all of the same things

that the Supreme Court registry would ask for to validate the judgment, to confirm

it's a valid judgment of a foreign court.

[4:00 p.m.]

So why wouldn't we simply, if we're serious about wanting to streamline, allow that

creditor, who we've just agreed can do it…? I mean, there's a way to do it, but we're

putting them to the cost and expense of an extra step.

Hon. N. Sharma: I'll start with the definition of local judgment, subsection (b). In the scenario

that the member raised about commercial agreements amongst parties…. As the member

likely knows, oftentimes these types of provisions are contracted as ways to resolve

commercial disputes, and that would automatically be under the definition of local

judgment under this section.

The second

part is: in the scenario where you have a foreign judgment and you're registered

here, you do benefit from the rest of the regime, which does make it easier and makes

the process easier in order to collect on your judgment.

Then the third

part is: the money judgment registry has no gatekeeping function. I

think the member talked about similar questions in the Supreme Court.

[4:05 p.m.]

It's a question of law whether or not that judgment is a valid judgment. The money

judgment registry does not do that analysis. In the scenario of a foreign judgment,

that process would be necessary in order for our enforcement provisions to kick in.

M. de Jong: I was about to move on until I heard the final part of the Attorney's answer. My understanding

of a foreign judgment from a jurisdiction with whom we have a reciprocal agreement

is that if the appropriate documents, properly certified as true copies, so on and

so forth, are presented, the registry accepts them.

I don't know that the Supreme Court of British Columbia relitigates matters, decisions

of foreign jurisdictions with whom we have a reciprocal enforcement agreement. The

litigants themselves might, but I don't think, in that case, the Supreme Court of

British Columbia is playing a gatekeeper role to determine whether or not they're

satisfied with the nature of the judgment.

If that is so, I don't get the distinction between…. I wasn't asking for the registry

to play any kind of a role other than to ensure that the proper documents are present

to confirm that it is a valid judgment decision from a foreign jurisdiction with whom

we have a reciprocal enforcement agreement in place.

Hon. N. Sharma: Under the current regime, there are still, even with reciprocating, as the member

states, that have agreements with us…. There are still things that the Supreme Court

will check, including whether the order has expired and whether it's been ten years

expired. There's a threshold that's reached through that process that is a part of

the process needed to have it become a local judgment.

Clause 9 approved.

On clause 10.

M. de Jong: The registry, obviously, is a significant part of the regime. The money judgment registry

is a key part of the regime. I just thought we'd take a moment for the Attorney to

give us a better sense of what that registry is going to look like. Where is it going

to be located? When is it likely to be established, assuming the legislation passes?

[4:10 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: The money judgment registry will be part of the personal property registry, and that

will be administered by the registry services of Citizens ’ Services .

We are expecting that it would take until early 2025 to have the entire regime that

will replace the current one in place. That's for a few reasons.

First of all, obviously, are the chief enforcement officers and the expansion of those

roles and that ability for them to be ready to go.

Also, the searching of the personal property registry will result in the addition

of commercial liens and judgments as part of that. So it's a one-stop search for the

personal property registry for all of those. These steps will take till then, but

we expect early 2025.

M. de Jong: How many additional people are the government expecting to hire to operate the money judgment r egistry?

Hon. N. Sharma: We'll obviously be watching this and adjust, if necessary, to make sure of successful

delivery.

At this point, we see it more as a transition. It's possible we may not have to add

any new people. It would just be a transition into this.

M. de Jong: The submission that was made in moving this through the various stages internal to

government did not include any recommendations or estimates about additional FTEs?

Hon. N. Sharma: Although I can't disclose what was in a confidential submission to a committee, I

can say that, at this point, we don't expect to have any more FTEs, as I mentioned.

M. de Jong: Are there any capital costs associated with the establishment of the registry? If

so, how much?

[4:15 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: We expect the expenses to be modest. The way we will approach it is to use existing

infrastructure and the teams that we have and just transition into this legislation.

M. de Jong: Does the Attorney anticipate that in establishing the money judgment registry, it

will be necessary to procure additional IT software?

Hon. N. Sharma: No.

Clause 10 approved.

On clause 11.

M. de Jong: In sub 11(1)(a), reference is made to the judgment statement that judgment creditors

will file. Is that anticipated? Will that be a prescribed document or a form document

that judgment creditors can fill out?

It may well be, I expect, in this age, a digital form, online. I presume we're not

asking judgment creditors to create their own format. There will be something for

them to fill in to provide the information required. Is that correct?

Hon. N. Sharma: Yes, it will be an online form.

M. de Jong: Of course, here we are again with the reference, as part of the registration process,

to fees or the making of arrangements referred to in

section 24. So I do need to ask

what the Attorney is contemplating with respect to the calculation of fees.

I expect she's going to say: "We haven't set the fee." But I think it is fair for

the committee to learn of the range that the Attorney and the government are contemplating

and, also, if there is a different methodology. By that, I mean: does she anticipate

that the fee will differ depending on the order of magnitude of the judgment itself?

I'm differentiating this question from something we touched on previously and that

we'll come to again, and that is what the enforcement officer may seek by way of expenses

associated with collecting. This, as I understand it, is purely a registration fee.

When you put your stuff online, you're asked to submit a fee. I'd be surprised if

it changed depending on the size of the judgment being collected, but I'm curious.

What I think isn't important. It's what we hear from the Attorney.

So a range of what the fee might be, and, secondly, will it be structured in a way

that differentiates depending on the size of the judgment being collected?

[4:20 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: Like a lot of work with access to justice, the principle behind any setting of fees

is to ensure that they are set at a level that's accessible and don't provide a barrier

or put up a barrier for people to access the services. Right now, although I don't

have a set amount of what that would be, we expect we will look to existing fees for

the PPR, personal property registry, which right now is set around $5.

To the second part of the question, that wouldn't change based on the size of the

claim.

M. de Jong: Would not change?

Hon. N. Sharma: Would not change. That's right.

M. de Jong: So 11(2), I think, makes it clear that if I am a judgment creditor, notwithstanding

the fact that the judgment debtor may have appealed the judgment, I am entitled to

register. Later, though, we will come to….

I just want to differentiate between the registration and enforcement mechanisms.

There is a mechanism by which, as I understand it, enforcement of that registered

judgment can be stayed pending the hearing of an appeal.

Hon. N. Sharma: Yes, that's correct.

M. de Jong: And 11(6) speaks to the circumstance where the registrar has presented with the two

or more judgments and registers them at the same time. I take it that this is a similar

test that is sometimes followed in a land title office where incumbrances are registered.

It kind of becomes a luck of the draw. The priority goes to the one the registrar

registered first, and the lower number wins in that case.

Hon. N. Sharma: That's correct.

Clause 11 approved.

On clause 12.

M. de Jong: Limitation periods referred to in 12(1). My sense is that virtually all Canadian jurisdictions

have moved to the standard two-year limitation period. Insofar as for extra provincial

judgments, that is relevant. Is the Attorney or her team aware of jurisdictions that

have a shorter limitation period than two years?

Hon. N. Sharma: No. We are not aware of any.

M. de Jong: In sub (5), a reference is made that a judgment creditor can't register a money judgment

more than 15 years after the date on which the money judgment was granted. Is that

an absolute limitation period that I am bound by? Once 15 years….

Let me ask this: does that limitation operate in a way where, sometime in 2025, I

register my judgment and it only remains in effect for 15 years, or is there a limitation

on my ability to register the judgment?

[4:25 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: That is consistent with the ultimate limitation, yes, that 15 years, but it only applies

in this section (2) when you can register the money judgment. You are able to renew

that, once registered, after that.

M. de Jong: And could renew it perpetually, well beyond a 15-year period?

Hon. N. Sharma: Yes, it can be renewed perpetually.

M. de Jong: In sub 12(1) and sub (3), there's a reference to the ability to register after a particular

date, on application by the judgment creditor. I'm trying to think of the circumstances

where that might be applicable. Who would be the parties? I presume the judgment debtor

would be the party. Would the registrars themselves have to be a party to that application?

Hon. N. Sharma: This is meant to mirror the law on the limitations period that is in the province.

That allows for scenarios where it might be unfair. For example, if the debtor was

in a coma for an extended period of time. That is one example. That would mean that

in such an application, all parties that were potentially affected would have to be

notified.

M. de Jong: The last part of my question was: would the registrar herself or himself be a party

to that kind of an application?

Hon. N. Sharma: No, they wouldn't be a party, but they would receive the order, obviously, once it

has been made, if it has been.

Clause 12 approved.

On clause 13.

M. de Jong: Sub 13(2) describes a situation in which a money judgment is to apply. The Attorney,

obviously, can read and knows her own legislation.

This notion of a money judgment that provides that the money judgment is to apply

solely to certain specified personal property held by the judgment debtor at the time

of registration…. How would that come about? Who does that? Does a judgment creditor

have the option of saying, when they register the judgment: "This judgment debtor

owes me 25 grand, but I'm going to limit…"?

Do you see what I'm asking? Why would anyone…? If you've got a judgment, why would

you limit what's exigible from the judgment creditor?

[4:30 p.m.]

[R. Leonard in the chair.]

Hon. N. Sharma: We don't anticipate this

section would be used very often. A scenario where it may

be used, for example, is if the parties want to maintain a business relationship that

is important, that drives their decisions, apart from what they might be entitled

to. Or for example, if there's an agreement from the debtor to sell something but

an encumbrance on that particular property would limit the ability to obtain what

was needed, that's another example. Or maybe it's just simply by agreement between

the parties, or there's another factor at play.

M. de Jong: But am I correct in surmising that the only person that could place that kind of a

limitation around the money judgment and the subsequent enforcement of the money judgment

through the registration process…? That could only happen with the agreement of the

judgment creditor? It's not the registrar who could say: "I'm going to place a limitation

on this." It would always require the consent of the judgment creditor.

Hon. N. Sharma: Yes, the member is correct that the judgment creditor would have to be the one that

did it in their statement that they filed.

Clause 13 approved.

On clause 14.

M. de Jong: So we're going to have this registry, the minister believes, by sometime in 2025.

In terms of the transition, are existing money judgments automatically registered?

What process…? If I have a judgment today, if I receive a judgment, are they automatically

registered? Am I going to have an issue with an expired limitation period if I want

to take advantage of the registry? How is that transition going to work?

[4:35 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: The principle we will be guided upon — and I think the member rightly points out —

is fairness in and ease of transition into the new regime. There would be no scenario

where anything contemplated in the legislation or in the transitional provisions that

we're working on would invalidate current right or order or proceeding.

We are going to be working, if the legislation passes, on transitional provisions.

We expect those transitional provisions will contemplate all the different scenarios,

and we expect that it will be, obviously, well before 2025 that those will be before

the House.

M. de Jong: A rough estimate. How many money judgments emerge from the B.C. courts — provincial

court and superior court — in an average year?

Hon. N. Sharma: I'm just going to suggest, as my team looks for the answer to the member's question,

if maybe I can give him that data once I obtain it from my team, and we can move on

if there's any other…. I'll make sure I get him that information.

M. de Jong: That's fine, because to allay any great suspense on the matter, I am curious about

the anticipated workload that civil enforcement officers are going to assume, which

is why I'm also curious about the number of existing money judgments and judgment

creditors that will wish, presumably, to take advantage of this.

I'm going to ask: if I have an existing judgment today or receive one in the next

year or year and a half, in order to register, does the Attorney anticipate that the

fee will be applicable or that there will be an automatic registration?

Hon. N. Sharma: I have a number for the member: 1,857 writs for the bailiffs executed on last year.

Your next question was…. First of all, I'll just put that placeholder discussion….

The member can come and ask me details about it, once we have the transitional provisions,

which we will work on. But the idea is to give that person that has an existing writ

the option to register in the new regime or pursue the course of whatever rights they

have under that writ. Then, I guess if they did want to register, the fee that would

be attached to that would apply.

M. de Jong: I appreciate the number — 1,857. Would that also include…? I'm thinking not, but does

it include…? This registry also potentially allows for the registration of orders

from tribunals and other adjudicative bodies. Would that be in addition to the average

number that the minister provided to the committee?

[4:40 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: The number I provided was inclusive of the tribunals. They would also apply for writs,

and they would fall under this category. So it is a pretty, I guess, reliable number

when it comes to writs in the province for this type of enforcement.

Clause 14 approved.

On clause 15.

M. de Jong: So 15 introduces this notion of an invalid registration on the basis of a seriously

misleading error. I circled this

part in advance. I was going to ask some questions

about it, and those questions were going to be about who determines that, how and

when.

I'm now thinking about that in the aftermath of the minister's comment just a little

while ago about the registry not playing a gatekeeper role. It seems, depending on

who has that responsibility, that perhaps the registrar is playing, is going to be

called upon to play, something of a gatekeeper role. But I suppose that depends in

part on the answer to the question about who is responsible for making an assessment

around this notion of a seriously misleading error.

Hon. N. Sharma: This provision would rely on a court application and a court decision.

M. de Jong: So the process, then, would be…. The registration would take place and could only

be deemed invalid for this reason following a subsequent court application?

[4:45 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: The purpose of this, generally, would be to protect a purchaser who has rightfully

purchased the property of a debtor, and they believe that they have and they need

to seek a remedy from the seizure of or the taking of that by the creditor. That would

be where this would come into play.

M. de Jong: That's helpful. I'm still curious, though, about this notion about how a finding of

a seriously misleading error comes about, because if we go down to sub (8), it talks

about "a proceeding in which it is alleged that an error in the name of a judgment

debtor is seriously misleading." It says that it is not necessary to prove that anyone

was in fact misled.

Mostly in this legislation, where applications to the court are complicated, it is

set out that one may make application to a court or the court. This is somewhat more

vague and talks about a proceeding, and it could lead one to conclude that what's

contemplated here is an internal proceeding, internal to the office of the registrar

and the registry in the absence of a specific reference to the need to apply to a

court. Am I misreading that?

Hon. N. Sharma: The registrar is a statutory creature that has no powers that are not given to them

except by statute. So if legislation is silent on that, then it would be the courts.

Clause 15 approved.

On clause 16.

M. de Jong: I just want to confirm that I am understanding this correctly and get the Attorney's

thoughts on what I think is a differentiation.

The idea behind the land title office, which continues to play a role in the collection

of money judgments, is that registration is deemed notice. If we are dealing with

a land asset and it's a purchaser or someone else who is seeking to take an interest,

it's their job, their responsibility, to check with the registry. It would appear

that that is pointedly not the case here — that registration is not deemed to be notice

to anyone of anything. What was the thinking behind that?

The Attorney has already, moments ago, mentioned the role of subsequent purchasers

of a property, and that may be part of it. But there does seem to be a very deliberate

differentiation between the role that the land title office plays and the role that

this registry will play with respect to money judgments.

[4:50 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: This is a continuation of the law under the PPSA,

section 47. That's in contrast,

just as the law has functioned for a long time, with the land titles office and registration.

The reason for that is because the registry for land titles is much more discerning

and defined and deals with a particular type of property;

whereas, what we will expand

upon and are contemplating under this registry and the existing registry is that personal

property is varied. It can cover many, many different things.

We're not of the view that it's reasonable to expect any one person to be aware of

the existence of the contents of a registered money judgment in the money judgments

registry just because the reason for it is that it's been registered.

Clauses 16 and 17 approved.

On clause 18.

M. de Jong: My interest in clause 18 relates to sub-sub 18(2)(b). I guess the short question is….

That clause, sub-sub 18(2)(b), suggests to me that a registered money judgment can

be transferred. Is it possible for me, as a judgment creditor with a registered judgment

at the money judgment registry, to sell my registered judgment?

Hon. N. Sharma: Yes.

M. de Jong: The ability of the person to whom I have sold that interest, my interest in the money

judgment, to pursue collection remedies then becomes dependent upon them registering

that transfer and amending the registration. Is that correct?

Hon. N. Sharma: Yes.

M. de Jong: And sub 18(5) relates to a judgment becoming unenforceable. It differentiates between

unenforceable and temporary unenforceability.

[4:55 p.m.]

The question I had: to whom, if anyone, does liability apply if the enforcement proceedings

are carried out on the basis of a money judgment that has become unenforceable, but

the judgment creditor hasn't submitted a change statement?

I'm thinking of the negative consequences that might befall a debtor and whether they

then acquire some right to compensation, and if so, against who.

Hon. N. Sharma: That particular scenario was covered way further down in the act, which I think we'll

get to in sections 206 and 207, where a failure to comply to something like the member

pointed out is actionable by the debtor.

Clauses 18 to 20 inclusive approved.

On clause 21.

M. de Jong: Dealing here with the effects of amending the registration, sub 21(2) speaks to the

amendment is effective…. A "money judgment in the money judgment registry is effective

from the date and time assigned by the registrar to the change statement."

Does that have the ancillary effect, potentially, if there were multiple money judgments

registered against a judgment debtor, of changing priority? Does a judgment creditor

who either wants or, perhaps, is obliged to register an amendment…? If I'm reading

that…. I might not be reading it correctly, but wouldn't the concern there be that,

suddenly, if my effective date is changing, I'm losing priority in terms of other

judgment creditors?

Hon. N. Sharma: No, that wouldn't impact the priority of the initial money judgment that was registered.

M. de Jong: I guess my question is: why is that so?

I'm just going to take a moment to reread the clause: "An amendment to a registration

of a money judgment in the money judgment registry is effective from the date and

time assigned by the registrar to the change statement."

[5:00 p.m.]

I think I understand it. It is the amendment that is…. The original money judgment

has not lost its priority. I think the Attorney is going to say that is correct.

Hon. N. Sharma: Yeah, that's correct.

Clause 21 approved.

On clause 22.

M. de Jong: I just want to take a moment here because this is one of those sections that refers

to a variety of things, but it's a particular thing that engages my interest. It's

the reference to the lapsing of a money judgment because of a failure to renew.

I think what I wanted to explore with the Attorney is: what are the requirements going

to be around renewal? This is all being presented, as we've talked about, as get your

judgment, register it, and away we go. Get your money. But it would seem that that's

not quite the case.

So how often…? I'm a judgment creditor. I've gone through the lengthy court process.

I've got my judgment. The court has agreed this person owes me $7,000. I've got my

judgment. I go down, I figure out the registration process. How often do I have to

renew? And what are the fees associated with renewal?

Hon. N. Sharma: This would be set up by regulation. We're contemplating it being a yearly renewal

with some options of longer. The purpose behind it being a process of renewal is to

make sure that the judgment creditor understands the importance of making sure that

their money judgment in the money judgment registry remains current and up to date

so that the registry remains relevant and useful.

M. de Jong: Right. Well, it's a balancing act, to be sure. But to get a judgment from the courts

in this province, particularly a superior court judgment, takes years. I say that

as a matter of fact, not to be argumentative. I think the Attorney understands that.

This legislation was presented, as we've said before, a simplification, a means of….

I think there was language at the time of a single enforcement instruction. The body

of evidence that runs a little contrary to that is beginning to build, particularly

if I hear, in response to my next question, that renewal comes with a fee.

[5:05 p.m.]

I'm hoping that the Attorney, having indicated that a judgment creditor now has to

renew each year, is going to say that there is not going to be a fee attached to that

renewal exercise. So I will listen with interest for what I hope will be that assurance.

Hon. N. Sharma: Actually, thanks for the further question. It gives me an opportunity to really dive

deeper into this. But I want to start by saying that nothing that we are engaging

in right now in the dialogue is in the act or contemplated right now. It all will

be by regulation, and the principles that we will be guided upon when drafting that

regulation will be about fairness, will be about ease, will be about making sure that

we're not overly burdensome to the creditors. So I'll start that up.

We are talking about examples that we may be able to use to contemplate how this regime

will work under the existing personal property registry. There is an ability to register

for multi-year, depending on that nominal fee, and there's an ability to contemplate

an indefinite registration, depending on the nominal fee that gets you there.

So we're a little bit talking right now in absence of the details of it. But I can

tell, I guess, people listening and yourself, the member, the principles that we will

be relying upon and some of the guidance we will take when developing that regulation.

M. de Jong: Thanks to the Attorney. It's all helpful, and for the very reason she has alluded

to, it's not in the act. In deciding whether or not to support the act, the committee

and the House…. This is the only chance we get to pose those questions about what

is being contemplated.

So here's what I think I heard. The Attorney, at this point at least, subject to finalizing

the applicable regulations, is contemplating a yearly registration for which there

would be a fee and the possibility of a multi-year registration for which there would,

potentially, be a different fee. I think she used the word an "indefinite" registration,

for which there could be a third fee. I assume the longer the registration period,

the greater the fee would be. Is that a fair assumption?

[5:10 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: It is a fair assumption made by the member in terms of it being a higher fee with

respect to indefinite or multiple-year registration. But I will stress that based

on what we're looking at and other models, it is a nominal fee by any standard.

The idea is to keep it at an amount that is based on cost but is not prohibitive.

The benefit of not having it in legislation and putting it into regulation is that

it gives us that flexibility to adapt it over time.

M. de Jong: I think one of the responsibilities of the opposition is to poke and prod and test

the relevant minister for what their definition of "nominal" or "modest" is. That's

one of the responsibilities that we have.

Before we move on and this comes up, I might as well ask it now. I was interested

to hear that with respect to the registry and the registrar, the Attorney indicated

there wasn't an expectation of having to hire any additional FTEs, no major capital

outlay for IT, technology and programming. So what's the fee for, if it's not going

to cost anything?

[5:15 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: I'll start with saying again we haven't set the fees. But as in the discussion we

had previously, we contemplate using similar fee structures that are existing, like

the $5 for registration I mentioned earlier. We're not contemplating increasing fees

or changing, and of course, those fees are partially a cost recovery for the service

that's provided but meant to be nominal.

Although I mentioned earlier we don't have to purchase new software, we expect that

there will be some costs associated with modifying existing software related to that.

The flexibility of the cost structure through regulation allows us to basically change

the costs over time, if once we review the fee structure, to make sure that we're

having that adjust to our costs over time.

Clause 22 approved.

On clause 23.

M. de Jong: Again, we've partially had a conversation revolving around the role of the registrar.

Here again in this section, it suggests to me, at least, that as it relates to removing

a registration and an amendment to a registration or a discharge of a registration

of a money judgment that was not made — and the words used are "in compliance with

the Act" — not only does an authority exist for the registrar to review these registrations

but perhaps even an obligation to do so.

So it suggests to me a somewhat more active role than perhaps just being the recipient

of information or overseeing an electronic database that others are accessing and

registering material on.

What would prompt the registrar to…? The

section doesn't suggest this is at any kind

of an application process. It suggests that the registrar has this authority, upon

review of registrations, to remove them in certain circumstances.

Does the Attorney believe that the registrar will be monitoring and reviewing each

registration of a money judgment for appropriateness and for compliance with the act?

[5:20 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: As we were discussing before, the registrar won't have a gatekeeping role per se.

Registration of a money judgment, according to the procedures, would get registered.

But if it comes to their attention that that money judgment that was registered is

fraudulent or problematic in some way, it gives them the power to remove them.

I'm told this did occur in the past, where — under the PPSA, as an example — there

were fake liens put against elected officials that were not proper money judgments.

So this kind of gives the powers, in that scenario, for them to remove it, but they

won't be actively monitoring or inspecting everyone.

Clause 23 approved.

On clause 24.

M. de Jong: All right. Another chance to talk about the fees generally. What we're talking about

here is the prerequisite to registration, and I'm making that point because, when

we get to enforcement, there's a whole different scenario and a whole different set

of considerations.

We're talking here about registration. It says here that that can only happen after

"the applicable prescribed fee has been paid" or — the other alternative — "arrangements

satisfactory to the registrar have been made for the payment of any applicable prescribed

fee." That second, sub (b), interests me because its presence suggests that perhaps

my notion of what is nominal might be different than the Attorney's. I don't think

you're going to have to make arrangements for a $5 fee.

I'm curious to know to what extent what's being contemplated here at registration

is an assessment that might be already taking into account the magnitude of the judgment

or the anticipated challenges associated with enforcement of that judgment, because….

The fact that there is statutory recognition for some longer-term arrangement or some

separate arrangement than just paying the fee tells me this may be a little more complicated

and a little more complex and, quite frankly, a little more expensive than we're being

led to believe at this point.

I'll leave it at that, and I'll have another question about that in a moment.

Hon. N. Sharma: Actually, I would say the opposite is true. The way these are structured is to give

flexibility to the registrar to contemplate fairness in fees in various scenarios,

and subsection (

b) precisely does that. For example, there might be examples where

there are multiple judgments that need to be registered.

So even with a nominal fee, it provides an ability for the registrar to take into

account the particular situation of that person and adjust accordingly.

[5:25 p.m.]

M. de Jong: Is the registrar empowered, and is the Attorney prepared, to endorse the equivalent

of a contingency fee arrangement?

That is: this is a money judgment enforcement registry with enforcement powers. In

the private sector, we see agencies who say: "You don't pay us until we collect for

you." Is that kind of an arrangement one that the Attorney is prepared to include

in the regulations or to otherwise authorize?

Hon. N. Sharma: Thanks for the question. The way that is drafted is broad. So nothing prevents the

registrar from contemplating the scenario the member suggests, in terms of an arrangement

with….

We feel like it'll more likely be used in scenarios where there are multiple judgments

that need to be registered, so there's a need to figure out a payment structure or

an arrangement for filing that fee with the creditor.

M. de Jong: I'll ask the second half of the question. The first part of the answer was very helpful:

nothing that precludes a contingency agreement. Is the Attorney prepared, as part

of this discussion, to indicate her support, in appropriate circumstances, for the

registrar to enter into a contingency fee agreement with a judgment creditor?

Hon. N. Sharma: I'm going to say again that it's not something that was contemplated under the structure

of these powers or this agreement. Nothing prevents it, as I said.

I think the key thing is that we need to ensure that the fee is nominal enough to

not be a barrier. There may be arrangements that are satisfactory to the registrar

and that are contemplated on a case-by-case basis. That will be something that we

will learn as this unfolds.

[5:30 p.m.]

Clauses 24 and 25 approved.

On clause 26.

M. de Jong: Clause 26 sets out, again, a collection of a fee as it relates to actually searching

the registry.

My question here: with a digital registry of this sort, can't people just search for

themselves?

Hon. N. Sharma: As the member knows, this gives the registrar the power to prescribe a fee with relation

to that. As mentioned before, we're contemplating what that looks like and if we will

do that by regulation.

Again, the principles that we will look at, and have looked at with these types of

fees, is to make sure that they're accessible and nominal in nature but have an element

of cost recovery. Right now, the personal property registry, for example, is set at

$7.

What we would contemplate under this, if there were a prescribed fee, is not to change

the amounts much but, under the action of this legislation, provide a broader service

to the public. It actually is, I think, beneficial to be able to search a broader

range.

M. de Jong: No one has ever accused me of being on the leading edge of the latest technology.

I appreciate what the Attorney said, but I think, with the greatest respect, she did

kind of sidestep my question a little bit.

[5:35 p.m.]

In this day and age, with an online digital registry of this sort, it is entirely

possible, as far as I know, for people to have access to that registry and do their

own work, whilst I understand that for those of us who may require the assistance

of the registry to conduct a search, a modest fee would be applicable. With the way

this is worded, I don't think there's the option of providing access. Apparently,

access to the registry for search purposes must take place in accordance with these

provisions.

That means I have to pay someone, because that's what the act says. Surely at this

point in time, with a tool of this sort, we would be prepared to consider the possibility

that people will just have access to it, especially when we consider — we've just

had a conversation about having to renew, having to keep it up to date — that every

time, people have got to go back and pay another fee to the registrar to conduct a

search.

Well, we have to move on. I don't want to want a big soapbox thing, but I think that

surely, at this point in time with the advent of technology and people's familiarity

with it, just giving them access to the registry to check these things…. But this

creates the monopoly. It says if you're going to have access to it, you've got to

pay a fee.

I'll let the Attorney respond, and then I have one other question about the section.

Hon. N. Sharma: I appreciate the member's admission about the technology. Certainly, technology and

our ability to access it change over time. Government is always adapting to the way

people want or need or can rely on government databases. I think the premise for subsection

(1) is that I wouldn't share that perspective. I think there are many examples where

the government doesn't choose to prescribe a fee for certain aspects of searches.

I think that that is a possibility in the future — right? — when we contemplate the

regulation where you could have certain access that doesn't have a prescribed fee

attached to it. There may be scenarios where there is a fee attached to it. I think

that's something where this gives you the power to be flexible.

M. de Jong: I think, aside from the fee discussion, my inquiry related to the fact that perhaps

we need to recognize that it is possible, in many cases, with the proper deployment

of technology, for people to have direct access without an intervening office of government.

In that case, if that is so, then we should allow that to happen. In all fairness,

I don't think the

section contemplates that at all.

A second thing about the section, though, that I wanted to ask about — in the sub

(2), it imposes on the…. Here again it's pretty clear that there is a role here. The

registrar is going to issue the certified copy of the results. In some cases, that

might be entirely necessary and appropriate; I'm not sure it will be a requirement

in all cases.

The part about this that interested me is the absence of a turnaround time. I know

that by government's long-standing tradition, they hate to impose deadlines on themselves,

but elsewhere in this act and in the discussion around it, timeliness is important.

[5:40 p.m.]

We're going to get to the end of this eventually. There are five pages of regulatory

authority, and there's not even a regulatory authority related to that, imposing some

kind of an obligation on time.

I'm not sure what it is. I'm not sure if it's 24 hours; I'm not sure if it's 72 hours.

But in a registry like this, sending the signal to those who are responsible that

the government attaches importance to the timeliness of service strikes me as being

a worthwhile endeavour, and it's not here. I think that, for the second reason I mentioned,

the

section is lacking in that regard.

Hon. N. Sharma: I'm happy to report, and the member may know this, that because of technology, our

service standards in this regard are very quick. We won't be contemplating a change

in the software that's currently existing with the registry that exists right now

in searches. I'm told that in multiple government registries, once it's searched,

it's a matter of minutes before it's in the hands of the person that searched it.

M. de Jong: But as we've also discussed, in this case, there is the role for the registrar, the

issuance of a certified copy. All of these are things that, operating at peak efficiency,

aren't a problem. In different circumstances, we don't know how many existing judgments

are going to be registered and what that's going to do in terms of the turnaround

time.

The best of intentions, I'm sure. But imposing either a statutory- or regulatory-based

requirement, a turnaround time requirement, in a case like this is I think worthwhile.

I'll leave it at that.

I'll register my concern here in a moment through the voting process.

Clause 26 approved on division.

Clause 27 approved.

On clause 28.

M. de Jong: I'll try to capture the essence of what my line of inquiry is here —and I suppose,

my concern. If I have a money judgment today, I can go to the land title office, and

I can register it. At some point, maybe the Attorney can remind me what the fee is

for that just so we have some sense of the order of magnitude.

Ironically, in this case, if I'm reading the act correctly, that process now gets

a little more complicated, not a little easier. Now in order to register at the land

title office, I first have to register with the money judgment registry. Have I got

that right?

[5:45 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: I guess, at the start of it, I would say that in order to unlock the full potential

of this regime that we will put in place, it's important that the money judgment registry

have the broadest ability to have every type of money judgment under it.

So yes, to the member's question, this is an extra step, but we think it's a valid

and important one in terms of our ability to not only see how it's working but to

understand how it's working against everything, including land.

It also, potentially, is a benefit to the creditor in the sense that there's likely

to be more than just land at play when it comes to the collection, and that lets them

also take advantage of all the other provisions that are existing within here.

You asked about the fee, and we looked into that, the Land Title Act. I think the

fee is $78.17.

M. de Jong: I thank the Attorney. That answer, though, has more to do about what government wants

and what government….

[5:50 p.m.]

I'm a creditor, a judgment creditor, and I have a judgment, but I know my judgment

debtor has got land that's exigible. I am quite content to register my judgment, because

I know that at some point in the next couple of years, that judgment debtor is going

to need a mortgage or is going to want to sell, and that's all I want to do.

It's one stop. It is actually one stop. Now the government has come along and said,

"Well, no. Actually, our notion of simplifying is to add another step," because you

can't actually do what you're doing today after this passes. It can be….

Let's not kid ourselves. I mean, we've talked about some of the documents. Depending

on the nature of the judgment, you've got to file a report and a request, and you've

got to pay a fee. We'll see how nominal it is.

I mean, it's fine for us to say: "Well, the government likes it because we like to

collect stats and we want to know what's going on." The act was presented as assisting

judgment creditors. This has the opposite effect.

This says to a judgment creditor, who could today take that judgment, go to the land

title office and register it: "You can't do that anymore." And I don't know that there's

any reason for it. I don't know that there's any legitimate reason to complicate something,

especially within the context of a piece of legislation that was supposed to simplify

it.

It's more of a statement than a question to the minister, but I read that, and I thought

it seemed purposeful, as opposed to inadvertent. But if it was inadvertent, I think

it's a mistake, because it is complicating something that didn't need to be further

complicated.

Hon. N. Sharma: I guess I will disagree with the premise that it's just for government's sake that

we would add this step. The purpose of government is to work on behalf of people,

and our ability to have money judgments, collect the data and understand how it's

showing up and working for all people in this province is an important aspect of that,

is an important driver of future policy and is of benefit to people of this province.

I'll start by saying that.

It's the same that was recommended as the Uniform Law Conference of Canada. I think

I've said, and I will say again, that the whole drive of this regime is to make it

easy, faster and less burdensome for people to collect. That includes the filing and

registration of money judgments in this registry.

Clauses 28 to 30 inclusive approved.

On clause 31.

M. de Jong: What interested me here and what I wanted to canvass briefly with the Attorney…. Again,

I presume this is purposeful.

[5:55 p.m.]

An owner of land believes that there's an erroneous registration of money judgment.

Then the owner of that land may demand in writing that the judgment creditor who registered

the judgment in the land title office take all measures necessary to remove it.

The judgment creditor receives that demand — this is sub 31(2) — and has to remove

the registration, "unless the judgment creditor does not agree…in which case the judgment

creditor may apply to the Supreme Court for an order…."

Any concern on the part of the Attorney? It strikes me that, again, in a situation

where you may have a more sophisticated debtor than a judgment creditor, it's not

a bad way to eliminate a registration against the land, because many judgment creditors

wouldn't be in a position to go to the Supreme Court.

The decision here has been to shift the onus to the creditor to defend the step they

have taken under the act, and the only way they can do that is by going to the Supreme

Court, which we all know is a horrifically expensive process.

The Attorney could say: "Well, it's equally true if a debtor, an unsophisticated judgment

debtor, was put to the onus." But it struck me that there must be a middle ground

here somewhere that didn't shift the onus completely to the judgment creditor to now

do…. Again, it's the opposite of streamlining the process. They've now got to go to

the Superior Court in British Columbia and prove the appropriateness of their registration.

Is that something that's concerning to the Attorney — that that onus is shifting now

entirely to the judgment creditor, to take that extraordinary and expensive step of

going to the Supreme Court?

[6:00 p.m.]

Hon. N. Sharma: I thank the member for raising the question and asking about my thoughts on this section.

The way that it's structured, when you go from (1) to (4) and to (3), it's not an

automatic removal of the registration. Let's say, in the situation provided by the

member of the judgment creditor, that there's a power imbalance and that the landowner

is making these claims or issuing that notice. It's not automatically, after those

15 days after receiving the demand, that the registration is removed or no actions

taken. The owner has to apply to a court in order to have the registration removed.

So what happens in that scenario is…. You think of all of the tools of a court to

ensure fairness in the process and to be the arbitrator of the facts brought forward

by the owner about that registration, or the ability to issue costs if there's something

at play there that's not right and ensure that the judgment creditor has the types

of notice that would be appropriate.

Clause 31 approved.

On clause 32.

M. de Jong: Sub 32 (1) suggests to me that what's contemplated here is the possibility, at least,

of an award of damages against a judgment creditor who has registered against property

improperly. The language that's used in here talks about the owner of that land sustaining

damage or incurred costs or expenses.

Am I correct? I've tried to think of a scenario. I'm the owner of land. A judgment

creditor comes along, registers against that land. In an age, a time of rising interest

rates, it takes me three to six months to get that straightened away. It's determined

that there never should have been a registration against my land, but now interest

rates aren't 6 percent. Now they're 7 percent, and I'm paying more.

Is that the kind of damages that are contemplated being compensated here?

Hon. N. Sharma: Yes.

Clauses 32 and 33 approved.

On clause 34.

M. de Jong: Along the same lines, when I got to 34 and saw the provisions of subs 34 (4) and (5),

it occurred to me that in this case, there is actually a time frame imposed on people,

not government or the land title office. I was trying to be fair, but I….

This could take some months. The land could be tied up for a period of time. That

can be really debilitating for the owner of the property where someone incorrectly,

falsely or fraudulently registers a judgment, an instrument against that property.

[6:05 p.m.]

Again the question I feel obliged to ask is whether the Attorney has any concerns

about the length of time it would take and the damage that would accrue to an innocent

property owner in circumstances where someone incorrectly or improperly registered

against their land, maybe their home for that matter, under these provisions.

Hon. N. Sharma: This

section is quite apart from the

section we were talking about previously where

there was a wrongful registration. This is to do with discharge in the sense of the

payment being fulfilled.

Clauses 34 to 41 inclusive approved.

On clause 42.

M. de Jong: Here we are dealing with, really, aside from the registrar, I suppose, but perhaps

even more important than the registrar, the folks that are going to determine the

success or failure of this endeavour, and those are the civil enforcement officers.

When I was reading through the legislation and coming to better understand the order

of magnitude…. We got some more information today about the numbers of judgments,

so we can add into that a percentage of the existing judgments that likely will be

registered.

The question needs asking: How many civil enforcement officers are we going to have?

Where will they come from? How many new hires is the Attorney contemplating to breathe

life into this money judgment enforcement regime?

Hon. N. Sharma: Right now, there are about 50 court bailiffs that would transition, we suspect, into

this. We don't expect at this stage, although we will watch to make sure the proper

implementation of what we're setting out here, that we would need further FTEs. But

certainly there will be a retraining and getting acquainted with the new piece of

legislation.

[6:10 p.m.]

M. de Jong: Let me test that. What I accept is the calculus that has gone on. If the underlying

logic with this whole package is that for judgment creditors today, it is very difficult,

it is very challenging, and this is going to make it easier…. I hope that's the case.

I've tried to point out some areas where I think that objective may be frustrated.

Then wouldn't it follow that…? First of all, the duties that today's bailiffs, tomorrow's

civil enforcement officers, are going to assume strikes me as pretty significant.

But if the objective is to make it easier and that objective is met, aren't we going

to have more judgment creditors taking advantage of this regime? Isn't the work going

to be…? By definition, for it to be better for the judgment creditors, the civil enforcement

officers are going to be doing more of the work.

Hon. N. Sharma: Thanks for the question. Obviously, all the time…. When this happens, when we embark

on a new program or service, it's not a perfect science when it comes to estimating

costs. But I take the point of us having to watch whether or not there are more money

judgment enforcements and judgments that come through the efficiencies in the regime.

Also, what we are going to be introducing is better process and efficiencies that

will help with the time it takes for the enforcement officers to do the job. So we

think, right now, that the 50 existing ones will do the job, but obviously, we will

monitor that. There's a contract of service that goes out — currently with the court

bailiffs and will be with the enforcement officers — that will set those kinds of

service delivery expectations.

M. de Jong: I'll keep it short. It doesn't sound like there is, at this point, built into the

implementation strategy an additional budgetary allocation to hire additional personnel.

If the minister can confirm that.

[6:15 p.m.]

If that is so, I will say this, and the minister can respond or not. I think the objectives

of the act will be frustrated, given the nature of the duties and the expanded duties

that are being created.

The question part of what I just said is for the minister to confirm whether or not

there is an expanded budget request that has been made or will be made to address

the costs associated with the civil enforcement officers.

Hon. N. Sharma: As mentioned before, I believe that we think 50 is what's there. But actually, the

flexibility of having a contracted service provider gives us the opportunity to set

contract service levels and ensure that they're meeting those levels through the work.

We will actively monitor that and see what resources are needed to pull it off.

With that, I move the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The committee rose at 6:16 p.m.

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