1984 Legislative Session: 2nd Session, 33rd Parliament

HANSARD

The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.

The printed version remains the official version.

Official Report of

DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(Hansard)

FRIDAY, MAY 4, 1984

Morning Sitting

[ Page

4533 ]

CONTENTS

Routine Proceedings

Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 1), 1984 (Bill 21). Second reading 4533

Builders Lien Amendment Act, 1984 (Bill 9). Committee stage. (Mr. Pelton)

section 4 –– 4533

Mrs. Wallace

Ms. Brown

Third reading –– 4534

Human Rights Act (Bill 11). Committee stage. (Hon. Mr. McClelland)

section 1 –– 4534

Mr. Gabelmann

Ms. Brown

Mrs. Wallace

Mr. Skelly

Division on amendment

section 2 –– 4540

Ms. Brown

Mr. Gabelmann

Mrs. Wallace

Mr. Skelly

Division on amendment

section 3 –– 4544

Mr. Gabelmann

Ms. Brown

Mrs. Wallace

Mr. Cocke

FRIDAY, MAY 4, 1984

The House met at 10:09 a.m.

[Mr. Strachan in the chair.]

CLERK OF THE HOUSE: The House is advised of the unavoidable absence of Mr. Speaker.

Prayers.

HON. MRS. McCARTHY: Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the

House to welcome a couple who are in our House today visiting from the

great constituency of Vancouver–Little Mountain, in that great city of

Vancouver. Would the House please welcome Carla and Bob Palmer.

HON. MR. GARDOM: Mr. Speaker, it's an honour for us to have

in our galleries today Mr. Finn Olesen, who is the head of the press

and information delegation of the European Communities to Canada, now

stationed in Ottawa. I'd like all hon. members to bid him a most

cordial welcome to British Columbia.

Orders of the Day

HON. MR. GARDOM: I think perhaps the first order of the day

should be to welcome the Clerk-Assistant back to British Columbia.

We're delighted to see him.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Hear, hear!

HON. MR. GARDOM: Mr. Speaker, I ask leave to proceed to public bills and orders.

Leave granted.

HON. MR. GARDOM: Mr. Speaker, on behalf of my colleague the

Attorney-General (Hon. Mr. Smith), I would call second reading of Bill

21, with the usual understanding that this being a miscellaneous

statute, there will be full opportunity for debate during the committee

stage.

[10:15]

MISCELLANEOUS STATUTES

AMENDMENT ACT (NO. 1), 1984

MR. COCKE: Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to hear the House Leader

indicate that there will be the usual understanding. The usual

understanding is that we debate each

section in principle as you would

in second reading. Last session I remember having a little argument

with respect to somebody in the chair who wasn't quite responsive to

that particular agreement. It worked out, and we will work it out this

time.

HON. MR. GARDOM: I move the bill now be read a second time.

Motion approved.

Bill 21, Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 1), 1984, read

a second time and referred to a Committee of the Whole House for consideration

at the next sitting of the House after today.

HON. MR. GARDOM: I call committee on Bill 9.

BUILDERS LIEN AMENDMENT ACT, 1984

The House in committee on Bill 9; Mr. Pelton in the chair.

section 1.

MR. COCKE: I seem to recall that there's a back-bench member

shepherding this bill through the House. I looked for him here, and I

couldn't find him until I looked at the Chair.

Sections 1 to 3 inclusive approved.

section 4.

MRS. WALLACE: Mr. Chairman, I note that my colleague has an

amendment to

section 4 on the order paper. She is not in the House at

the moment; she has gone to get her material. Is it permissible for me

to move the amendment that stands in her name?

AN HON. MEMBER: Yes.

MRS. WALLACE: Then I move the amendment that stands in her

name, and I would like to speak in support of it. The amendment has

been requested by the people who rent equipment, who have been excluded

from this act. When we noted on the order paper that the member for

Dewdney (Mr. Pelton) was intending to move an amendment to this bill,

we believed that perhaps the government was in fact prepared to move in

that direction. Unfortunately, that amendment was never placed.

Interjection.

MRS. WALLACE: He has placed it? I see.

My colleague is now here and would probably be prepared to speak in

support of her amendment, but I want the House to know that it has my

wholehearted support too.

MS. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, maybe you can tell me whether this amendment is similar to the one we accepted yesterday. I think it is.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: In substance, hon. member, it is identical.

MS. BROWN: Yes, that's right, and I supported it yesterday, do so today, and will tomorrow too.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: In view of that, hon. member, would you be prepared to withdraw your amendment?

MS. BROWN: Yes.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: All right, the amendment is withdrawn.

Section 4 as amended approved.

[ Page 4534 ]

Sections 5 to 12 inclusive approved.

Title approved.

HON. MR. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, I move the committee rise and report the bill complete without amendment.

Motion approved.

The House resumed; Mr. Strachan in the chair.

Bill 9, Builders Lien Amendment Act, 1984, reported complete without amendment, read a third time and passed.

HON. MR. GARDOM: Committee on Bill 11, Mr. Speaker.

HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

The House in committee on Bill 11; Mr. Pelton in the chair.

section 1.

MR. GABELMANN: I would like, first of all, to move the amendment which I have...

AN HON. MEMBER: ...standing in your name on the order paper.

MR. GABELMANN: No, it's not standing on the order paper in my

name, unfortunately, because of the speed with which we are proceeding.

But the amendments have been given to the Clerk, and I'd just like

to....

HON. MR. GARDOM: Could we have a copy, Mr. Member, for the minister, please?

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, in order to facilitate the

process, since we are going through this bill so quickly, preventing

the opportunity to have these amendments — the minister's as well as

our own — printed on the order paper, I will read the amendment that I

would like to introduce. It would add the following

definitions to the

interpretation section,

section 1: 'Family composition' includes a

family composed of one or more parents and one or more children. 'Sex'

includes the condition of pregnancy or pregnancy-related illness, and

'sexual harassment' constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.

'Physical or mental condition' includes a condition limiting or

perceived or believed to limit the performance of normal activities by

a person who is or is believed or perceived to be suffering

significantly and not temporarily from a physical or mental limitation,

disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement, and, without

limiting the generality of the foregoing, 'physical or mental

condition' includes epilepsy and any degree of paralysis, amputation,

lack of physical coordination, deafness or hearing impairment, muteness

or speech impediment, physical reliance on a dog guide or wheelchair or

other remedial appliance or device, a mental disorder, mental

retardation or impairment, or a learning disability or dysfunction in

one or more of the processes involved in understanding or using symbols

or spoken language.

In moving this amendment we are attempting to make clear some other

definitions in order to overcome problems inherent in the bill

primarily in respect to the absence of a reasonable cause provision. I

want to deal with this very quickly, and I believe some of my

colleagues may want to participate as well in each of these three

additional

definitions.

The definition of family composition is necessary; this should be

added as a prohibited ground of discrimination to protect single

parents and families with children. The definition that I'm proposing

is based on the 1983 recommendations of the B.C. Human Rights

Commission. There is unquestionably immense discrimination in a variety

of areas — particularly, as the member for Burnaby-Edmonds (Ms. Brown)

pointed out last night, in the area of accommodation. Women who are

single-parenting are frequently discriminated against on the basis of

their particular family structure.

I think we recognize in this age and era we're in that the family is

not always any longer the traditional nuclear family. It has a variety

of expressions, and as has been pointed out many times in this debate,

we need human rights legislation to keep pace with changes in society —

to make sure that as the changes occur and different institutions and

organizations develop, the human rights legislation is broad enough to

cover those circumstances. Clearly, one of the changing features of our

society, whatever one thinks of the fact of that change.... A major

group of people in our society no longer fits into the traditional

family model. For that reason we wanted to echo and include in the

legislation the recommendations made by the Human Rights Commission in

1983 in the matter of defining family composition.

The definition of sex we wanted to include in this

section because

there is some considerable doubt, to put it in its best light, as to

whether pregnant women are in fact protected by the Code. Opinion has

been voiced on both sides of that issue, and I suspect that it's one of

those issues that would take some time to resolve, probably inevitably

in the courts. We could solve that whole process by doing in relation

to pregnancy what we're doing, hopefully, later on in terms of intent:

that is, just to make clear, to specify, that discrimination on the

basis of sex also includes the condition of pregnancy or

pregnancy-related illness. We also want to include in that

section

matters relating to sexual harassment.

In the debate in second reading there were a number of interjections

by the minister suggesting that in fact sexual harassment would be

covered by the legislation. I don't believe that to be the case. Again,

there's some considerable doubt. The easy way to resolve that, if in

fact we want to make sexual harassment illegal under the Code, is to

change the definition so we make clear that discrimination on the basis

of sex includes also discrimination on the basis of sexual harassment.

The third definition of physical or mental condition is to attempt,

by being as specific as we are in that particular amendment, to make

certain that the definition relating to mental and physical condition

is interpreted liberally so that there is not any doubt at all as to

what is included. That, too, is a recommendation in 1983 of the B.C.

Human Rights Commission.

I just want to say in concluding my opening remarks on this that

these are not radical concepts. These are, I think, amendments that the

government and the minister should be happy living with. It deals with

the changing nature of the family; it broadens the definition of

discrimination in respect

[ Page 4535 ]

of sex, and it also makes clear what we mean by

physical or mental condition in the legislation. Those amendments are

perhaps not written in precisely the language that the minister would

choose if legislative counsel were involved. Quite frankly, Mr.

Chairman, if the minister would indicate that he agrees with the

premises and the philosophy behind these particular amendments, I would

be delighted to withdraw the amendment, given an assurance and an

undertaking by the minister that he will bring in similar amendments to

section

[10:30]

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, I have the amendments that

we were going to propose, and I'll be sending them over in a moment for

the opposition.

While I can appreciate the member's concerns and the reasons for

putting forward these amendments, I must say that the government must

reject them at this time, with the assurance that if in some way we

find that the problems that these amendments are designed to correct

are not already covered under the proposals that we're making, then I'd

be prepared to reconsider. But at this time I believe that the matters

which the member is most concerned about are covered under the current

terms, and simply to put those words in the legislation is not

necessary.

For instance, I might just say that we've broken some ground in

terms of what some of the human rights inquiries have now decided. In

terms of pregnancy, for instance, it's only weeks ago that a human

rights inquiry ruled that an employer terminating this particular woman

because she returned to work after pregnancy was discrimination on the

basis of sex. So there have been some precedents. We have now appointed

a board of inquiry into a sexual harassment case and I believe there

will be some precedents set there as well. So those two important

terms, I believe, are already covered under the terms of the act. I

don't think we need the specific words to do that. But I give the

assurance to the member that if it proves that that's not the case,

we'll take further action.

MS. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, the route through which sexual

harassment and other things not specifically spelled out in the act

were dealt with by the commission and the Code was through "reasonable

cause" and that's gone. If "reasonable cause" is back in the

amendments, then we're at a severe disadvantage, because we have not

had an opportunity to see the amendments which the minister is bringing

in.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: It's not to do with reasonable cause.

MS. BROWN: There is none with "reasonable cause?"

Reasonable cause was the route through which women could file

complaints dealing with sexual harassment, the pregnancy question, the

business of welfare recipients being refused accommodation and

single-parent families being refused accommodation. Reasonable cause

was the route they used to do that. That's been removed, and nothing

has been placed in the act to ensure the protection of these particular

groups.

The minister says that precedents are going to be established. On

what grounds can someone now lay a complaint before the commission?

There is certainly nothing outlined in the act whereby a person can

file a complaint of sexual harassment. It doesn't come under any

sections in this present act and there isn't the reasonable cause

umbrella. So the precedent which the minister is speaking about is not

going to apply to this act. The precedent applied to the existing act

because reasonable cause was in it. It's not in this act. That's why it

needs to be spelled out.

Also, the minister did not comment on the issue of welfare

recipients, more and more of whom are finding that landlords are

refusing to rent to them simply because they are single-parent families

in receipt of income assistance. They have no protection at all. The

minister doesn't go to bat for them, doesn't fight for them. And the

Human Rights Commission can't because they are no longer covered by

this act.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, for the minister's comments to

apply that sexual harassment would in fact be covered under this bill

that we're debating requires, as I read it, that the definition of

sex.... It says, for example, in

section 3 — "or sex of that person" —

that that includes sexual harassment. I think it takes a leap of faith

more than I am able to make to have the definition of "sex," which is

usually interpreted as gender... and I suspect that's the way it will

unfortunately be interpreted. You can't discriminate against someone

because they're female; or because they're male doesn't deal with

sexual harassment. That language in the Human Rights Code was not the

basis, as I understand it, for complaints about sexual harassment.

Sexual harassment was dealt with through the reasonable cause

provision, not through the specific naming of sex as an area in which

discrimination cannot take place. It does not deal with that.

It is arguable about pregnancy, and I would hope that a judgment

about this bill, when it becomes law, would argue that if you

discriminate against a pregnant woman you are therefore discriminating

on the basis of sex. I would concede that that is an arguable point.

I'd like to make it clear by being specific and naming it, then there

is no discussion, no argument, and no need to go to court to resolve

it. But clearly, in the case of sexual harassment, it is not covered.

The minister can't cite precedents, because the precedents we have

regarding sexual harassment deal with the Human Rights Code, which

included the reasonable cause provision.

I'd like the minister to stand up and offer us an explanation of how

he perceives that sexual harassment will be covered by the provision in

various sections of the words, in effect, that you can't discriminate

on the basis of sex. How does that prevent sexual harassment?

MRS. WALLACE: In his earlier remarks the minister indicated

that there was plenty of precedent set and that sexual harassment was

covered. He was sure that it was covered, and if it wasn't covered he'd

do something about it. I don't think that's good enough, because the

precedent that's been set was set under the old Code, which allowed

that to happen under the reasonable cause section. Now he is wiping

that out, so as a result he is wiping out that precedent and any

grounds or basis for that precedent. What he is doing is completely

eliminating any opportunity to ensure that pregnant women, or women who

have pregnancy- related illness, or any women or men who face

harassment as a result of sex.... There is no provision in the wording

of the new bill that provides for that. That has been borne out by

reports that have been written in his own ministry. I don't know why he

doesn't read his own ministry’s reports. I was quoting a

[ Page 4536 ]

report yesterday that was written by the commission, which he didn't seem to know anything about.

There has been another report written. The material was prepared by

the chief officer of the old human rights branch who has pointed out

this very thing and has indicated that the greatest number of cases

that the commission had to deal with, the single largest category of

incidents, was sexual harassment, and yet that is wiped right out.

There will not be an opportunity under this new bill for that to take

place.

The composition of the family is another one that's very important.

It was only when we got the Human Rights Code that a woman was

seriously considered for a mortgage, and I know of a case in point. It

was extremely difficult for a woman to get a mortgage; it was also

difficult for her to get a lease or to rent accommodation. It was

extremely difficult for her to get a mortgage if she wanted to buy her

own home. A woman, as the head of a household, was not accepted by

mortgage companies. That family composition is an important thing to

have included here. I don't know what the minister's objection is. If

he really believes that this bill is such an advanced piece of

legislation, why does he object to ensuring that it includes these

possibilities? Why does he object to including a family composition

definition, the sex definition, or physical or mental conditions or

some attempt to describe that particular area?

I just don't understand his reticence to accept these kind of

suggestions, if in fact he really believes that this is an all

encompassing piece of legislation — landmark legislation — that's going

to do such a great job for human rights. His failure to accept these

amendments indicates to me that he's really trying to make it less

broad, and that he's really trying to remove the opportunity for this

largest single category of incidence of complaints relative to sexual

harassment. He wants to protect those people who are involved in that

type of sexual harassment from being brought up before the courts under

the human rights bill. It seems to me that that is his intent if he

refuses to accept this kind of amendment or refuses to include the

reasonable cause

section in the bill.

MS. BROWN: Again in support of the comments of my two

colleagues, I have a quote here from the chief complaint officer of the

human rights branch, Ms. April Katz. In April 1983 she said:

"The reasonable cause provision as a catch-all for

group characteristics not specifically named in the legislation is

unique to British Columbia. The provision has allowed complaints to go

forward on the basis of such group characteristics as physical or

mental condition, sexual orientation, family status, ages under 45,

ages 65 and over, sexual harassment, racial harassment and pregnancy."

She then went on to say that the single largest category of

incidents of complaint has been in the area of sexual harassment. This

was the route they used: the reasonable cause. Reasonable cause has

been removed from this bill; it's no longer there. Therefore this

unique provision which made sexual or racial harassment, pregnancy and

mental and physical condition able to be dealt with by the Code and the

commission is no longer there. That's the only reason that the

amendments dealing with the spelling out of these characteristics are

being proposed today. If the minister in response would either indicate

that reasonable cause is going to be reintroduced or some other way of

spelling out the specific protection for these groups, we'd be very

willing to accept that.

[10:45]

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Again, in our opinion it isn't necessary

to spell them out. As I understand it, no other province except

Manitoba has a reasonable cause provision now. They've just recently

introduced theirs. Yet the matters of sexual harassment, pregnancy and

others are all dealt with as human rights activities, and it has been

found across Canada that they are discrimination on the basis of the

various codes of the country, including ours.

You can read little quotes out of context all over the place. The

fact is that on investigations carried out by the human rights branch,

for the last annual report, 1982, the largest number.... You say that

sexual harassments are the largest number of complaints.

MS. BROWN: Under reasonable cause.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Well, 63 of the 1,065 investigations in

that year were for sexual harassment; that's not the largest component.

If you'll look at the 1980 report, you will find that sexual harassment

cases were normally handled not under reasonable cause at all but on

the basis of discrimination by sex. Of the 303 complaints on the basis

of sex — I must apologize; I have to get farther away from my eyes as I

grow older — 36 of them were on the basis of sexual harassment under

discrimination on the basis of sex. It's well established, and I don't

think it's necessary.

Again, precedent isn't being abolished because of this bill. We

deliberately moved into boards of inquiry far more quickly than did any

of my predecessors, including the NDP predecessor. I'm not saying this

to blow my own horn, but I've appointed more boards of inquiry on human

rights than any of the ministers involved since the Code was

established. Many of them, physical and mental disability for instance,

were found not under reasonable cause but rather on the basis of

discrimination under the way the act was written. In 1979 I think we

had seven complaints referred to the board of inquiry; in 1980 there

were three; in 1983 there were 43. We've established some very

important precedents. Some of the inquiries which have not yet been

completed will also establish some very important precedents, including

the matter of height and weight, which is one of the most important

ones that has ever been held in this province, in my opinion. So those

precedents are going to be there.

We talked about this with all of our legal advisers and others. I

don't believe in putting words in a bill just to make people feel more

comfortable. I think we need to be very specific, clear and simple so

that the public doesn't misunderstand what we're doing and people who

are asked to adjudicate know exactly where they're supposed to go.

That's what we tried to do in this bill, and I believe that we've

achieved it.

MS. BROWN: I want to get it absolutely clear from the

minister that under the bill as it exists a single-parent family

refused accommodation on the basis that they are in receipt of welfare

can file a complaint.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Not on that basis.

[ Page 4537 ]

MS. BROWN: That's why we are asking about family composition;

that's the whole point. How would that be dealt with? Would the

minister explain to me how a single-parent family in receipt of income

assistance which has been refused accommodation by a landlord or a

landlady for that reason can file a complaint of discrimination?

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, I would expect that that

single parent — and possibly the overwhelming majority would be female

— would file under discrimination on the basis of sex.

MS. BROWN: But the landlord or landlady is absolutely

specific: "I do not rent to welfare recipients." What does a welfare

recipient who happens to be a single parent say to that? The landlord

or landlady would say that it has nothing to do with her sex: "I just

do not rent accommodation to welfare recipients, and I don't like

families that have only one parent and a group of kids."

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, I think the case would

have to be proved as it would have been under the Code — that the

service was not being provided on a basis listed in the Code, and it

would have to be on the basis of sex.

MS. BROWN: Let's try a single parent who is a man.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Same thing.

MS. BROWN: He's being discriminated against on the basis of sex too?

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Sure.

MS. BROWN: In recommending the inclusion of family

composition, my colleague from North Island (Mr. Gabelmann) was trying

to deal with this age-old problem which none of the human rights codes

have dealt with to date, except through the reasonable cause provision.

You have a landlord or a landlady who says: "Regardless of your sex, I

do not like single-parent families, and I especially do not like it

when they are dependent on income assistance. I don't care what sex you

are. I don't like renting to single-parent families, and I don't like

the fact that a single-parent family in receipt of welfare wants to

rent my accommodation." How does that single-parent family file a

complaint? Under what provision?

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Under the sections that are available to

us at the present time. It can be sex or marital status. If they are

single parents, that's marital status.

MS. BROWN: In receipt of welfare?

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Marital status.

Section 3.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, presumably the minister is

talking, in this particular respect, of

section 5. You can't

discriminate in respect of tenancy premises on the basis of various

things. It says "marital status," and it includes sex. It does not make

any reference whatsoever to source of income. Clearly, people in this

province, regardless of their gender, are discriminated against because

of their source of income.

[Mr. Strachan in the chair.]

We could find any number — dozens and hundreds, perhaps — of similar

cases of discrimination. For us to write in in this particular

section

and others "source of income" would not be the most appropriate way of

dealing with it, because there are so many issues of that kind. So the

way you deal with it is by including a reasonable cause provision. You

can now discriminate on the basis of source of income. It so happens

that that is usually discrimination against single women with children,

but it is not a sex-related discrimination. It's not a

marital-status-related discrimination, because the landlord or landlady

would say: "I don't mind whether my tenants are married or not. I don't

discriminate on that basis" — and in this case that would be so. "I

don't discriminate on the basis of whether the prospective tenant is a

woman or a man." In the case so cited that would be so. Discrimination

in this case would be on the basis of the source of income of that

individual. The case we're talking about relates, as I said, primarily

to women; some men too. It's an issue that many of us are concerned

about because it's yet another example of discrimination in areas that

aren't traditionally thought of as areas of discrimination — source of

income. The only way you can deal with that — unless you are so

omniscient that you can think of every single category of potential

discrimination and write them all down, which I don't think any one of

us could ever do — is to have a clause or phrase in the bill which

allows the council to deal with discrimination on a reasonable cause

basis. It is not reasonable, by any standard that I think anyone would

accept, to discriminate on the basis of source of income, yet it

happens daily in this province. It happens constantly in this province.

Any MLA who does their job knows of constituents to whom this has

happened. I certainly do. You can't deal with it by including the

phrase "source of income." You deal with it by including the reasonable

cause provision, which we've had for 10 years and has worked well, and

which people in both the branch and the commission have said has

enabled them to properly administer the Code, to properly administer

justice in this province. If the minister can find another way to make

sure that unnamed acts of discrimination are covered, then fine. I'm

not wedded to "reasonable cause" if there's a better way of doing it,

but this bill doesn't do it. You can now discriminate against an

individual who wants to rent — to pick one example — because of their

source of income, and that's wrong.

MR. SKELLY: Mr. Chairman, I'm wondering why the minister is

so reluctant to include in the act these more specific

definitions of

sex, physical and mental condition and family composition. He says it's

just so many extra words and that many people are protected under

specific wording in the act such as "sex" or "physical and mental

condition." It's interesting that the Human Rights Commission

recommended — last year I guess it was — that the act be made much more

specific in addition to leaving in the reasonable cause clause. I'd

like to quote from page 18 of their February 1983 report, "I'm Okay;

We're Not So Sure About You."

"Despite the continuing utility of the 'reasonable

cause' concept and the need for its extension into other areas, it was

repeatedly emphasized in submissions at hearings that the protection of

the Code must be expanded to explicitly prohibit discrimination against

certain groups. The explicit injunction against

[ Page 4538 ]

discrimination is crucial in informing both the public and the

victims of discrimination of what constitutes public policy and what redress

is available. Most people don't knowingly break the law. If they are informed,

for example, that the Code precludes the denial of accommodation to the disabled,

this sensitizes them to their obligations in this regard."

I think what we're trying to do here, in making these

definitions

much more specific in their terms, is to attempt to educate the public

that these categories of persons cannot be discriminated against and

that those categories or disabilities are listed under the definition

section of the Human Rights Code. Essentially, Mr. Chairman, we're

doing what hundreds of groups and individuals around the province

recommended to the Human Rights Commission and what the Human Rights

Commission in turn recommended to the minister on numerous occasions:

that if we are to make this Code effective, if we are to broaden the

coverage so that many groups and individuals in the province who should

be covered under this Code are covered, then we must make the Code more

specific. So if somebody feels that they're discriminated against....

For example, a woman who is fired from her job because she is pregnant

or suffering from a pregnancy-related illness picks up this Code and

says: "Possibly I can hang my case on a discrimination against sex,

possibly not. The definition is not that specific." But if we include

in this Code a specific bar against discrimination based on firing

somebody because of pregnancy or a pregnancy-related illness, then that

person who is discriminated against will see clearly that this act

protects her and will be able to take the case to the proper

authorities.

[11:00]

What the Human Rights Commission recommended is that the Code be

made much more specific in the terms that it uses so that people around

the province will know what behaviour constitutes discrimination, and

persons who are discriminated against can then use the Code to find out

if their particular case can be taken to the authorities with some hope

of redress. I think that what we must be doing in this definition

section — and I hope that the minister will change his mind about this

— is making it far more specific so that the people of this province

are much better protected and much better educated as to what

constitutes discrimination under the Code.

I think we should also include the reasonable cause provision. The

minister says Manitoba is the only province that has a reasonable cause

provision. Why is this government always concerned to be the worst

province? Why can't we include everything to make sure that we have the

broadest possible protection of human rights? We refuse to put the

reasonable cause

section in our Code because only Manitoba has it. If

Manitoba has it, and it provides much better protection on human rights

in Manitoba, by all means let's put it in our Code. If other provinces

have specific bars against certain classes of discrimination, by all

means let's put those specific bars in our Code so that our Code

becomes the best in Canada, and we become the example to other

provinces in Canada and to Canada itself. I think the Code should be as

specific as possible to protect as many people as possible and to

educate as many British Columbians as possible as to what constitutes

discrimination so that we can stamp it out in as many cases as possible.

MS. BROWN: I am hoping that the minister is thinking about

the arguments that are being raised at this time in support of these

amendments we are submitting. I mentioned last night and earlier that

it is not possible to draft a piece of human rights legislation which

can ever completely anticipate every form of discrimination that any

group or individual in our society is going to experience at some time

or other. That's not possible. What is considered to be discrimination

today was not even thought about 10 or 15 or 20 years ago. Back in the

old days of 1969, when the first act was introduced, no one even had

coined the phrase "sexual harassment." A human rights code has to be

flexible, fluid and dynamic. It has to be able to adjust itself to a

raised consciousness and our changing perception as time goes on. Other

than that it's totally useless.

There are two ways of doing this. One way is to open the Code every

single time an issue is raised and brought to the attention of the

government and be specific about it in terms of coverage. The other way

is to use the kind of protective shield which "reasonable cause"

represents. What reasonable cause does is give access to the Code

through which a new group, a new idea, a new concept can be tested and

the precedents established. Through reasonable cause things like sexual

harassment, racial harassment, assault on one's dignity in one form or

another was able to be entered into — accessed — to the Code, and then

the boards of review were able to establish their precedence.

We have no idea what the future may hold in terms of discrimination.

We know that the Code still does not address itself to the concept of

sexual orientation. We know that. We know it is still not addressing

itself to the concept of source of income. At a time when there are

more people in this province in receipt of welfare than ever before,

discrimination against them on that ground is still not being addressed

by the Code. For the precedents to be established, they first have to

have access under which to lay their complaints. You can't lay your

complaint on a marital status. Marital status means: are you married or

are you single? That's what marital status is. It has nothing to do

with whether you receive income assistance or not. You can't have

access through sex, because the landlords and landladies are

discriminating whether you're male or female, or anything else for that

matter. We still have landlords and landladies in this province who

discriminate against people who have children. They say: "No children

allowed." We still have that. How are you going to test that? You can't

test it on marital status. You can't test it on sex or political

affiliation. What are you going to test it under — disability? Are we

going to have to take children under disability in order to test that

and bring to the attention of the minister and the government that

discrimination in this area exists? We are struggling to deal with the

fact that the minister is determined to remove the protective shield

which reasonable cause made possible. So we are trying to help the

minister make the Code better by suggesting that the term "family

composition" is certainly something that should be looked at, and a new

definition for "sex," which would specifically include pregnancy and

sexual harassment, is also something that should be looked at. The

definition of physical and mental disability or ability should be dealt

with.

We are trying to struggle with the fact that the minister is taking

away the protective shield that reasonable cause made possible. I am

hoping that the minister is listening to us, because there are real

problems out there. As each group becomes more aware, and as their

consciousness becomes

[ Page 4539 ]

raised, they are beginning to say: "My rights are

being abrogated because...." As their voice is being raised, we have to

listen to that. That's our responsibility as decision-makers. We have

to listen to groups of welfare recipients who are saying: "This is an

infringement on my rights. I can't live where I want to live because I

am poor and dependent on the income assistance system." We have to

ensure that those people's rights are protected. That's what we're here

for, and it's not happening, as a direct result of the way this bill is

being amended.

I hope the minister is at least willing to accept that reasonable

cause should be returned, even for six months, until he and his

assistants have had an opportunity to look at the ways in which the

bill needs to be made more flexible, more responsive, more dynamic and

able to be changed; or he should at least accept these amendments,

which are very specific about the groups which should be included in

the Code at this time.

MRS. WALLACE: I want to carry on in the same direction in

which my colleague has been speaking, relative to family make-up.

Somehow the minister is confusing marital status with family make-up.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: No, I'm not.

MRS. WALLACE: Well, you have indicated, Mr. Minister, that a

complaint relative to the make-up of the family could be filed under

marital status. That is not the case. Marital status relates to whether

you're married or single or have a live-in mate.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Single parent.

MRS. WALLACE: No. Marital status has nothing to do with

children. Marital status relates to the relationship between two people

or to a person living singly. So what we're talking about here is a

different issue: what happens when there are children involved who

happen to have a single-parent family?

Interjection.

MRS. WALLACE: Yes, that's right. Either we need this — the

family unit — or else we need a definition of marital status in the

Code, because the way it stands now there is nothing relative to

children. Children have nothing to do with marital status.

[11:15]

Amendment negatived on the following division:

YEAS — 10

Macdonald

Cocke

Lank

Gabelmann

Skelly

Brown

Hanson

Wallace

Blencoe

Mitchell

NAYS — 27

Chabot

McCarthy

Nielsen

Gardom

Smith

Bennett

Phillips

McGeer

A. Fraser

Davis

Kempf

Mowat

Brummet

Rogers

McClelland

Heinrich

Hewitt

Richmond

Ritchie

Pelton

Johnston

R. Fraser

Campbell

Veitch

Ree

Parks

Reid

An hon. member requested that leave be asked to record the division in the

Journals of the House.

MRS. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to make an introduction.

Leave granted.

MRS. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chairman, in our gallery, we have Mrs.

Witty and ten girls from the 24th Surrey Girl Guides. I would ask the

House to please welcome them.

section 1.

MRS. WALLACE: Back in 1981 this government brought in an

amendment to the Human Rights Code, and the result of that amendment

does not seem to appear anywhere in the new bill as before us now. The

only place I can see where I can raise this is under the

interpretation

section, because that 1981 amendment did in fact make an

interpretation. It repealed

section 19(2) of the Human Rights Code and

replaced it with the following: "An act or thing done or omitted by an

employee, officer, director, official or agent of any person within the

scope of his authority shall be deemed to be

an act or thing done or

omitted by that person." The

interpretation of that is that an employer

was responsible if his employees on his behalf committed an offence

under the Code. That was the intent of that amendment brought in by

this government in 1981.

Now that is nowhere in this bill, and I'm wondering whether or not

the minister would be prepared to include in the

interpretation

something that would indicate that an employer is in fact responsible

for the actions of his employees in the field of human rights. That was

obviously the feeling of the government of the day in 1981, which was

that minister's government, when under the Miscellaneous Statutes

Amendment Act (No. 2), 1981, they moved to bring in that particular

change to the Code. It was something that they felt was missing from

the old Code and was an amendment that they brought in only three short

years ago. I'm wondering whether the minister is prepared to either

assure me that it is adequately covered somewhere else in this bill, or

will he bring it in under the

interpretation section.

[ Page 4540 ]

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, I'm quite sure that the

matter the member raises is covered in the bill.

Section 21 says: "An

act or thing done or omitted by an employee, officer, director,

official or agent...shall be deemed to be

an act or thing done...."

MRS. WALLACE: Thank you.

Section 1 approved.

section 2.

MS. BROWN: Mr. Speaker, what I'm trying to do with the

amendment which I have tabled with you — and a revised copy, because

there were some typing errors in the other one and omissions on my part

— is to really concentrate on the affirmative or positive aspects of

the Code, rather than simply concentrate on the discriminatory aspects.

That

section as it now reads states that: "No person shall publish

or display before the public, or cause to be published or displayed

before the public, a notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other

representation indicating discrimination or an intention to

discriminate against a person or class of persons in any manner

prohibited by this act." What I have done, Mr. Chairman, is to look at

other legislation. I found that the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code

really deals in a more positive way with the real issue of what a human

rights code is supposed to do. So I have submitted an amendment, lifted

almost verbatim, except I've tried to deal with the sexist language of

that, from the Saskatchewan Code. It reads as follows: No person shall

publish or display, or cause or permit to be published or displayed, on

any lands or premises, or in a newspaper, through a television or radio

broadcasting station or any other broadcasting device, or in any

printed matter or publication, or by means of any other medium that he

or she owns, controls, distributes or sells, any notice, sign, symbol,

emblem or other representation, tending or likely to tend to deprive,

abridge or otherwise restrict the enjoyment by any person, or class of

persons, of any right to which they are entitled under the law, or

which exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or

otherwise affronts the dignity of any person, any class of persons or a

group of persons because of their race, creed, religion, colour, sex,

marital status, physical disability, age, nationality, ancestry, sexual

orientation or place of origin.

What the amendment does is close every possible loophole that could

exist, either through the use of video cassettes, the television media

or the radio, not simply of material which discriminates against any

group in society, but against the display or use of material which

abridges that particular group or individual of their right to dignity

at all times — exposing to ridicule, advocating hatred of that person,

or in any other way affronting that person's or class of person's

dignity.

[11:30]

The reason why I'm introducing this amendment — and I'm hoping that

the minister will recognize the importance of it — is because there

really is no other legislation which addresses itself to these

particular aspects of the Human Rights Code. We have a Civil Rights

Protection Act in this province which deals with the written or

expressed position in the way of hatred, but it doesn't deal with

belittling or ridiculing, or with the affront to a person's dignity.

In Saskatchewan in 1980, I think it was, a complaint was filed by a

group of people at the University of Saskatchewan — women as well as

men — against a newspaper published by the engineering students, called

the Red Eye , which is very similar to the Red Rag

published by the engineering students at UBC. It too is racist, sexist

and defamatory. It advocates hatred and violence against people of

different races, different religions, and certainly against women. It

is a newspaper that affronts the dignity of all people, regardless of

their race, religion, sex, creed — whatever. Under the Code, under this

particular

section of Bill 11 as it now stands, it is not possible to

file a complaint against the Red Rag here in British Columbia.

[Mr. Ree in the chair.]

However, in Saskatchewan the members of the university community,

male and female, were successful in filing a complaint under their

Human Rights Code against the Red Eye ,

using the

section dealing with abridging or otherwise restricting the

enjoyment by any person or class of persons of any right to which they

are entitled under the law or tending to expose to hatred, ridicule,

belittling, or otherwise affronting the dignity of any person or class

of persons. When they filed the complaint, the attorney-general of the

day, Mr. Roy Romanow, introduced a board of review to deal with the

complaint. After listening to a number of petitions, also to the lawyer

for the university as well as the lawyer for the engineering students'

society, the Human Rights Commission brought down a rather lengthy

judgment, which I'd be very happy to table with the House and share

with the Minister of Labour if he has not already seen it. A

precedent-setting decision was made in which the Human Rights

Commission ruled that in fact the Red Eye

did indeed affront the dignity of a special class or group of people,

and did indeed abridge their right to dignity and enjoyment, and expose

them to hatred, ridicule and belittling. On that basis, a judgment was

brought down.

The reason I'm suggesting this amendment at this time is because we

sorely need to have that kind of access to the Code here in British

Columbia, not just in order to deal with the Red Rag

— which is indeed a rag — but also to deal with the incredible

proliferation of pornographic material which we are experiencing in the

province today. It cannot be dealt with under any other piece of

legislation, because the Attorney-General keeps insisting that the

federal jurisdiction does not give him the power to do so. A complaint,

however, could be filed under a human rights code if the code included

the sections I have proposed in this amendment. Mr. Chairman, that is

why I am submitting to the Minister of Labour that he at least read the

amendment I've submitted and give it some serious consideration,

because it is very sorely needed at this time.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: I certainly appreciate the comments from

the member who has just taken her place, and I agree with most of them.

But we had this debate in 1981 when we were talking about where that

kind of protection should be built. At that time we decided in this

Legislature to pass the Civil Rights Protection Act under the Ministry

of the Attorney-General, rather than include those protections in the

Human Rights Act — a lot fewer words, but everything is covered in that

act, as far as I'm concerned. It does deal with anyone who conducts or

communicates in any way....

[ Page 4541 ]

We didn't go into all the words, but it says: "...conduct or

communication" with regard to "(

a) hatred or contempt of a person or

class of persons, or (

b) the superiority or inferiority of a person or

class of persons in comparison with another or others...." I'm

surprised that if there is that much passion about a publication of the

University of British Columbia, some action hasn't been laid under that

act. Perhaps that advice should be given. But we've had that debate,

and it was decided to go that route, and I believe that there is

adequate coverage in British Columbia at this time. I would sure like

to see it tested.

MS. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, the reason that an action hasn't been laid under the act is that the act really doesn't deal with it. The Red Rag doesn't discriminate against women; there's nothing but women of different colours in the Red Rag . What the Red Rag

does is ridicule, belittle and affront the dignity of.... The Civil

Rights Protection Act doesn't deal with that; it is restricted to

discrimination and the advocation of hatred — as you said — on the

basis of colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or place of origin. It

doesn't include gender — my colleague is reading it — because we looked

at it very carefully. That's the only reason that the complaint hasn't

been laid under that act. The act doesn't include gender; it doesn't

include sex. It doesn't deal with ridicule, it doesn't deal with

belittling and it doesn't deal with affront to dignity. It doesn't deal

with depriving, abridging or restricting the enjoyment of any class of

person...etc. The act doesn't do it, but the Human Rights Code could.

The Civil Rights Protection Act is a very restrictive act. We've looked

at it. If it were possible to file a complaint under it, believe me, it

would have happened. But it doesn't do it. That's why we're appealing

to you.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: I understood the member to say that the so-called Red Rag ....

I've never seen it so I don't know what it does, but I understood the

member to say that it was racist. So there is a basis there. I would

suggest to the member that perhaps it would be better at some point

during the Attorney-General's estimates, or in one way or another, to

seek to amend the Civil Rights Protection Act to make sure that it

covers the questions the member is concerned about.

MS. BROWN: What is the Human Rights Code supposed to do? What

is the nature of human rights legislation? It's supposed to protect

from discrimination, and it is supposed to affirm. It has two roles: a

protective role and an affirmative role. Why do we have to go to the

Attorney-General? The Minister of Labour, who is responsible for the

Human Rights Code, has opened the Code. It is being redrafted. He's

listening to amendments. He is himself introducing an amendment. Here

is an amendment which will enhance and enrich the Code, will make it

more relevant, will make it a better Code. What is wrong with the Human

Rights Code having included in it this affirmative statement about

protecting the rights and the dignity of classes of people from

ridicule, belittling, advocating hatred and that kind of thing? Why

should I go to the Attorney-General? We're dealing with human rights.

This is a human right that I'm talking about. Would you explain to me

why you are reluctant to deal with it?

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, we had this debate three

years ago, and it was decided by this Legislature that the issue was

important enough that there should be a specific act dealing with civil

rights protections. This Legislature passed that act. The act is here;

it's in place. It comes under the jurisdiction of the Attorney-General.

It's not my act, and I can't reflect on what this Legislature decided

to do.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, the context in which the Civil

Rights Protection Act was introduced, debated and passed was the

increasing visibility and organizational activities of the KKK. What

the member for Burnaby Edmonds is talking about is another matter

altogether.

The minister is suggesting that this isn't an appropriate debate

because, in effect, it's covered by other legislation. It isn't. The

minister has in effect admitted that, although he hasn't put it in

clear words. The only prohibited categories of discrimination in the

Civil Rights Protection Act are colour, race, religion, ethnic origin

or place of origin: basically, what your beliefs are and what your

colour is and not much more. What the member for Burnaby-Edmonds is

talking about is an entirely different matter, one in which other

groups in society — whether they be women, gay or a whole variety of

other categories who are not covered by the Civil Rights Protection Act

or intended to be or likely ever to be — are more appropriately covered

in this act. I concede that the Legislature in its majority, for

reasons that I think were more to do with the time than very much more,

did in fact decide to construct alternative legislation. It doesn't

mean that that's the appropriate way to go. Given a calm climate in

which to argue, I would say that we should do all these things within

human rights legislation and have one law — one administration of that

law — so that people know where to go. Among other things the Civil

Rights Protection Act has its remedies in the courts. One of the

strengths of human rights legislation for the most

part is that the

remedy is outside the court system so that poor people have access as

well.

For the minister to say that the discrimination that occurs in a magazine or a newspaper like the Red Rag

— which is largely sexist discrimination; it's other things too, but

it's largely sexist discrimination — should be dealt with somehow by

the Attorney-General through the Civil Rights Protection Act is

ludicrous. He's not going to. I doubt whether the Legislature would

want him to. But what we and, I expect, the majority of the public

would like is for this kind of activity to be precluded in the Human

Rights Act. That's where it belongs. Introducing the Civil Rights

Protection Act is a red herring.

MS. BROWN: Under Bill 11 as it now stands, the council could

decide not to proceed with an investigation on the grounds that it is

frivolous and trivial, and that's not as far-fetched as it sounds. When

I raised the issue of the Red Rag

under the estimates of the Minister for Universities, Science and

Communications (Hon. Mr. McGeer), who is responsible for it, he said:

"That's nonsense. Boys will be boys. Don't bring a frivolous issue like

the Red Rag onto the floor of

the Legislature." That's what he said when I raised it. He decided it

was frivolous. What guarantee do women have that the minister

responsible for the Human Rights Act wouldn't say the same thing?

[11:45]

When I raised the issue of pornography, the member for West Vancouver–Howe Sound (Mr. Reynolds) said: "That's

[ Page 4542 ]

ridiculous. That's frivolous. You're wasting the taxpayers' time. Some of us don't think that Hustler

magazine is pornographic. Why are you bringing that here? That's no big

deal." So the council would very likely, under the minister's

instructions, decide that it was a frivolous issue and should not be

dealt with by the Human Rights Council. That would be the end of it.

But if in the event of a miracle the council did decide to deal with

it, on what grounds would they deal with it? Because under the act as

it is written the abridgement of dignity, belittling and ridiculing, is

not included. The council would have to say: "Under the act as it is

written we have no powers to deal with this issue." First there is the

battle not to get it ruled frivolous and trivial, and then once it's

accepted for the council or the boards of review to look at it, they

look at

section 2(1) and say: "There is no indication of intention to

discriminate, and there's no discrimination. That's the only thing that

we can deal with. Sure, it abridges your dignity and ridicules women

and belittles them and proscribes their right to enjoyment and respect,

but we can't touch it because there's nothing under the act that gives

us the right to do that."

That is the situation that we are faced with. Under the act as it

now stands, they couldn't deal with it even if the council.... The

minister recognizes that, which is the reason why he is suggesting that

the Attorney-General should deal with it. There is an intrinsic

difference between one's civil rights and one's human rights.

Protection for one's dignity is something that the Human Rights

Commission and human rights legislation and the minister responsible

for such legislation should be addressing and should be seeing as their

mandate. So to say that the Attorney-General should be dealing with

this.... The Attorney-General has nothing to do with this. This is a

human rights issue, and this is where it should be dealt with.

The Code, if it's at least going to attempt to respect all groups of

people in the community, has to deal with this very serious issue we

are facing today. That's the point I raised earlier. The kinds of

things which one perceives to be an abrogation of one's rights or an

infringement on one's rights change. That's why the Code has to be

flexible — fluid enough that it can deal with these kinds of things. In

the history of our nation, we've never before experienced this kind of

proliferation and onslaught of violent pornographic material in every

form of media — written, visual, audio, or whatever — that we are

experiencing today. Whether it's on the television or radio, on your

video cassettes, or in newspapers, books and magazines, it has never

happened in the history of the world before. Never has it been as bad

as it is now, and never has it escalated as rapidly as it is at this

time. We've got to address ourselves to it.

The Attorney-General (Hon. Mr. Smith) says the federal government

has to tighten up the Criminal Code and then he'll be able to do

something. In the meantime, we have an opportunity through the Human

Rights Code at least to make a public statement saying that in this

province this government will not tolerate affronts to the dignity of

women and children in this way, and to lay complaints. That's all we're

asking the minister to do. It's not going to cost anything. He can't

use it as a restraint measure and say that to balance the budget we're

going to have to bargain away the dignity of women and children. It's

not a restraint measure; that can't be the excuse.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: I'm not sure what more I can say, except

to repeat that this Legislature decided that the way in which the kinds

of civil rights protections the member talks about would be protected

would be under a different act. Looking at the records of the House, I

note that there was no recorded vote taken, but I assume that means

that no one voted against that act and everyone here voted in favour of

that route. I don't agree with the member for North Island (Mr.

Gabelmann) that we reacted to some individual group. I think that this

Legislature was vitally concerned about civil rights protection, not

just from one group but from anybody who violated those civil rights.

So we took that route, and I just think that it's inappropriate to

discuss this matter in this context. I can't say anything more than

that, except that, for the member's information — in case she doesn't

already know — I'm told by one of my staff people that the Red Rag

is no longer publishing, that the university withdrew permission to

have it published as a result of some earlier discussions that went

back, I'm told, to about 1979. Today, that publication is not being put

out. That's just as an aside, Mr. Chairman.

MS. BROWN: Well, I don't want to get into a debate over the Red Rag , because the university has withdrawn its permission, but the Red Rag is still being published, and we're fighting the Red Rag every year. When Lady Godiva rides, the Red Rag comes out. If you want last year's copy of the Red Rag , I can let you have it, because the women's office at the university is still fighting the Red Rag . The university is doing everything it can, but the Red Rag is still being published. We've got to be able to file complaints.

MRS. WALLACE: The minister is trying to tell us that it's

inappropriate for us to be discussing this because we supported the

Civil Rights Protection Act. I think it's inappropriate that that

minister is not able to recognize the difference between the items

covered by the Civil Rights Protection Act and the items being talked

about in this amendment. They are entirely different issues. There is

no way, under the Civil Rights Protection Act, that the kind of things

proposed in this amendment could be dealt with. These are two different

items entirely. This is a human rights issue. It's an issue that is

very drastically affecting women and children in this province. It's an

issue that is on the upturn, that comes to the fore in times of

economic downturn. It's an issue where big bucks are being made by

certain groups and promoters, and it's an issue that is definitely an

infringement of the human rights of certain people within society,

rights which cannot be dealt with under the Civil Rights Protection

Act. That the minister stands up and tries to throw a fog over the

debate and tell us that it's improper for us to be debating this is to

me just a complete failure on his part to recognize what human rights

are all about.

MR. SKELLY: I'm concerned, Mr. Chairman, that the minister

has no response to this. It's a very important issue and one that has

been addressed by the Saskatchewan government through their human

rights legislation. The idea is to prevent the use of media, through

radio broadcasting and television, for attacking certain groups in our

society through the use of information which encourages hatred of that

group, or which ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity

of that group. If we are to retain that education component of the

Human Rights Code.... What we are doing here is allowing the absolute

opposite to take place. If we don't specifically restrict this type of

behaviour and transmission of

[ Page 4543 ]

hatred and ridicule against certain groups of

people, it undermines the effect of the act. I think the minister

should take a careful look at this amendment, go back to his advisers

and bring this amendment back in in its proper form — again, in the

form in which it exists in Saskatchewan.

There seems to be a belief in this province that wherever there is

better legislation.... For example, if Manitoba has a "without

reasonable cause" clause, and Saskatchewan has a much better method of

preventing the dissemination of literature and media broadcasts which

belittle, ridicule or hold certain groups, races or cultures up to

ridicule, then we should have something that is second best. This

province should have the best record of human rights, the best

legislation on human rights and the best administration to protect

human rights of any province anywhere. We should be the people who set

the example for the rest of the country, hemisphere and world. That's

something that makes people proud to be British Columbians.

This is a multicultural society in which we live, and everybody

should enjoy equal rights and protection under the law. An amendment

such as this would improve the enjoyment of those rights and

protections. Yet the minister, knowing that this much-improved

section

exists in Saskatchewan, has rejected it completely. People are covered

under his legislation — if it can be enforced. They are covered from

the use of ridicule by signs, symbols, newspapers, etc., but they are

not covered in other media that are equally important — perhaps in this

era of mass communications even more important in communicating hatred

and ridicule and belittling of other groups in society. The minister

refuses to take any action, even though other provinces in Canada have

established the precedent. I can't see why this minister always has the

desire to be second best, or even worse. What we should be doing is

taking the best that we can find anywhere — the best protection and

educational devices in the field of human rights that we can find

anywhere, and improving our statute by incorporating them into it, so

that our people become the best protected anywhere, and our statute and

administration becomes the symbol and beacon for people all over the

world. What is wrong with that?

British Columbia used to be proud of the fact that we were leaders

in the world in many things. We had the fastest growing employment, we

were a developing economy, and we were improving social services. Now

we seem to have a desire under this government to be second best or

worse, and to treat our people second best or worse. Why does the

minister not pick up on the good ideas that Saskatchewan and Manitoba

have and good ideas from all over the world and incorporate them into

our statute and even improve it to protect our people much better? Why

does the minister always want to be second best? I would encourage the

minister to change his mind on this, to consult his advisors on this,

and to accept this amendment. I think this is a fine amendment, and I

encourage it to the minister.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, I find this quite

interesting, because it is the first time since I've been in this

Legislature that we've been debating a bill which is not on the floor

of the House, and that's what we're doing. We're debating the wrong

bill. This Legislature decided that the way in which these rights were

going to be protected was through the Civil Rights Protection Act. If

you don't think it goes far enough, then you should amend that act. It

deals specifically with the kind of thing that member is talking about,

and perhaps it should be broadened. I'm not arguing that it shouldn't

be, but it's not this bill. In fact, I think this whole debate is out

of order.

[12:00]

MS. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, this amendment covers two separate

issues, one of which the minister addresses himself to: the question of

human rights being covered by civil rights legislation rather than

human rights. The second issue is why the protection against

discrimination is not extended to radio, television and other forms of

electronic media. I wonder if the minister would respond to that

particular

section of the amendment. He's being interrupted by the

government Whip, so I'll just....

MR. CHAIRMAN: You will appreciate, Madam Member, that when

one is standing at their place, another member cannot stand except on a

point of order.

MS. BROWN: Yes, I appreciate that, but the minister wasn't

prepared to stand yet, so I thought I would just hold his place for

him. My question was, would you explain why the protection against

discrimination in this

section deals only with the printed media,

written or signed? Why is it not extended to protect us in terms of the

electronic media — radio, television and video? The minister himself

uses television to tell us that we all should love each other, but in

the

section it isn't there.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: No, Mr. Chairman, I disagree, The

interpretation of "publish" today includes all form of media — any kind

of publish, as long as it's put before the public.

MS. BROWN: So that would include television, radio and every

other form of broadcasting device. I just wanted that to be on the

record, to be absolutely sure. The whole issue of human rights in the

context of belittling, exposing to ridicule and affronting of dignity

is not going to be dealt with by the Human Rights Commission or human

rights legislation. Is that what the minister is saying?

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: We're not prepared to accept the amendment.

MS. BROWN: I'm sorry, I can't hear the minister's response.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: I have no further response.

MS. BROWN: I want the record to be clear, Mr. Chairman, as to

whether the minister is saying that the human rights legislation and

the minister responsible for human rights is not going to be dealing

with human rights issues of ridicule, belittling and affronting the

dignity of people, classes of people or groups of persons. That's what

I am asking.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, the government is not prepared to accept the amendment put forward by the member for Burnaby-Edmonds.

Amendment negatived on the following division:

[ Page 4544 ]

YEAS — 8

Macdonald

Cocke

Gabelmann,

Skelly

Brown

Hanson

Wallace

Blencoe

NAYS — 25

Brummet

Rogers

McClelland

Heinrich

Hewitt

Richmond

Ritchie

Pelton

Johnston

R. Fraser

Campbell

Strachan

McCarthy

Nielsen

Gardom

Smith

Bennett

McGeer

A. Fraser

Davis

Kempf

Mowat

Veitch

Parks

Reid

An hon. member requested that leave be asked to record the division in the Journals of the House.

MR. COCKE: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I noted that

the member for Prince George South (Mr. Strachan) voted in the

assembly, after the assembly having been acquainted of the fact that he

has been temporarily appointed Speaker because of the unavoidable

absence of the Speaker. I refer you to sections 11 and 12 of our

standing orders.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Member, I'm sorry, but your point of order

must fail;

section 12 of our standing orders refers to proceedings in

the House and not in committee.

Section 2 approved.

section 3.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, I want to introduce the

amendment that I had supplied to the table earlier. Inasmuch as it's

not printed, I will read the amendment that we're proposing. It is,

first of all, to delete

section 3 of the bill and substitute the

following: 3(1) No person shall (

a) deny to a person or class of

persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to

the public; or (

b) discriminate against a person or class of persons

with respect to any accommodation, service or facility customarily

available to the public unless reasonable cause exists for the denial

or discrimination.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), (

a) the

race, religion, colour, ancestry, place of origin, marital status,

physical or mental condition, sexual orientation, political belief,

age, family composition, source of income or language normally spoken

shall not constitute reasonable cause; and (

b) the sex of a person

shall not be reasonable cause unless it relates to the maintenance of

public decency.

[12:15]

[Mr. Pelton in the chair.]

Mr. Chairman, in

section 1, the definition section, we have

canvassed at some considerable length the issue of reasonable cause,

which is certainly a major component in this particular amendment. I

don't see any purpose in repeating those arguments now, but I want to

suggest that that is a major and an essential element of this

amendment: that is, the introduction of the reasonable cause provision.

May I remind the House that the provision has been proposed not only by

the commission in 1983, as I mentioned earlier, but also by the B.C.

Civil Liberties Association and the B.C. branch of the Canadian Bar

Association. It is not a left-wing, radical human rights activist type

of amendment. We're talking about something that is widely supported by

a disparate group of people in the community.

Dealing briefly with the reasonable cause provision, it's important

for a variety of reasons, among which is the fact that the application

of the Code can expand as community attitudes change. Perhaps the best

example — which we alluded to before — is that even though the Human

Rights Code of 1974 did not include a reference to physical or mental

disability, we were able to protect people under that Code as a result

of the reasonable cause provision. What happened in that legislation

was that it didn't properly deal with issues that might have been

present then but which weren't considered to be issues that should be

dealt with. But as community values and attitudes changed, it was

perceived that mental and physical condition should be covered by the

legislation. Because of the reasonable cause provision, those people

who were discriminated against on that basis were protected. Similarly,

no doubt other issues will develop and attitudes will change in the

coming months and years, and the flexibility would then be built in if

a reasonable cause provision exists. In this particular amendment, of

course, we're dealing with public facilities.

The other value of the reasonable cause provision relates to the

question of intentional as well as unintentional discrimination. We'll

get to

section 9(1) later and deal with that issue at that time.

Nevertheless, the reasonable cause provision has been used to allow for

coverage of unintentional discrimination.

The reasonable cause clause also helps to ensure that technicalities

don't get in the way of proper human rights protection. For example, it

was once argued that discrimination against immigrants was not

discrimination on the basis of place of origin. That was solved by a

board of inquiry deeming that it was discrimination without reasonable

cause. We've had those kinds of examples in the past, where reasonable

cause does allow for the kind of protection that the government at

least talks about wanting to provide, but doesn't in this legislation.

That, I guess, is the essential element of all of our arguments

relating to the reasonable cause protection.

We have argued before, and I make the argument again now: under this

legislation people under 45 have no protection vis-à-vis their age;

gays and lesbians have no protection; language minorities have no

protection; and there is at least some very reasonable doubt as to

whether pregnant women and sexually harassed individuals have any

protection. It could be so simply remedied by the inclusion of

reasonable cause language.

The amendment also deals with the issue in the last few words of

section 3 relating to premiums or benefits under contract of insurance.

When the Code was amended in 1974 to deal with this particular problem

of overt and deliberate discrimination in matters of insurance relating

to sex or gender, it was made clear that that was temporary. When a

thorough examination and study took place as to how to avoid this kind

of discrimination, then there would be amendments brought in to remedy

the problem. The fact is that we've neither had the remedy in

legislation nor ever had the studies.

[ Page 4545 ]

Can the minister table with the House, when it later reconvenes, or

provide information as to the studies that his ministry has conducted

in respect of discrimination relating to insurance? I don't believe

that has actually happened.

The way the legislation is written now allows for discrimination

against groups or individuals in matters of insurance that have nothing

to do whatsoever with the particular experience of that group. There is

no protection whatsoever. You can now say under this legislation that

all women should pay twice as much fire insurance as men. That will be

legal. You can now say, for example, that travel insurance can be made

twice as expensive for women as for men, despite the fact that that

would be a discriminatory act and despite the fact that you wouldn't be

able to produce evidence that women run twice as much risk while

they're travelling. It would be legal, under this legislation, to levy

those kinds of discriminatory premiums. Any number of examples can be

cited, and I won't do that, but I make the point that a serious

philosophical problem exists in relation to this issue, one that I'm

not sure has been thoroughly canvassed by anybody in this province in

terms of the philosophical underpinnings of that concept of different

rates of premiums. I'm not making the argument at this time, because I

haven't done a thorough enough evaluation of the question.

As one individual in this House, I'm not making the argument that

there should be no discrimination on the basis of perhaps gender or

some other category in respect of insurance. That argument can be made.

It most likely will be made, but I'm not making that. I'm making the

other kind of argument; by including language like this, the minister

not only accomplishes that limited objective which the insurance

companies have lobbied him to accomplish, but it also opens the barn

door wide open for any other kind of overt discrimination, on any

basis, in respect of insurance premiums or benefits. That must be dealt

with. We deal with it in our amendment simply by not making it an

exemption.

I concede that our amendment may not meet all of the concerns that

could be expressed about this, but I would rather have it limited, in

the way that our amendment limits it, than to have it wide open for any

kind of discrimination on any basis whatsoever, as will now be allowed

section 3 of the Human Rights Act.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, I don't know that there's

much more that I can add to what has been debated on a general basis in

second reading. This amendment goes really to the heart of the matter

of where we differ, and that difference is obviously going to stay. I

don't agree with one of the member's earlier comments — and I believe

of the member for Burnaby-Edmonds (Ms. Brown) as well — about

flexibility in this bill. I don't think it should be flexible. I think

it should be very specific so people in the community understand what

they can't do and what is against the law. One of the problems has been

that people didn't understand what was discrimination in this province.

There were no clear guidelines, no clear routes to follow; that's one

of the reasons it took so long for the resolution of disputes in

British Columbia. And you — the generic "you," the people on the other

side of the House — obviously also believe that the government can do

everything. I don't. I don't believe the government can do everything,

and I don't think it should even try; but it should identify very

serious problems and then move in and attack those problems, and I

believe that's the route we're going.

So as far as the reasonable cause provision goes, the government is

not going to accept that reasonable cause be reintroduced into the

bill, and I think that to recanvass the whole argument of the last

couple of days would not be proper.

MS. BROWN: First of all, I want to respond to the minister,

who is saying, at 25 minutes after 12, the very opposite to what he

said at 25 minutes after 10. When my colleague from North Island said

that

section 1, the

interpretation section, had to be specific so that

people would know precisely who was protected against discrimination

and what issues were covered by the act — such as sexual and racial

harassment, pregnancy and those kinds of things — the minister said:

"No, I don't believe the Code should be that specific." Now, two hours

later, when we're dealing with

section 3, he says: "I don't believe we

should be general, and I don't think we should be flexible. I think we

should be specific." If we're going to be specific, let's go right back

to the beginning and start all over again, because the

interpretation

section of the Code is not specific enough. For example, your

definition of marital status is one that we'd like to have included in

the Code. Your definition of marital status is new and unique and

different, because it includes children. It says that a person who has

children is deemed to have a different marital status than a person who

doesn't. The rest of us thought it had to do with being married or

unmarried.

You said you don't need to be specific about such things. Now, in

this section, you are saying that you need to be specific. You can't

have it both ways. That's what this bill is trying to do. It's not

specific in the areas where it should be specific, and it's specific in

other areas where it limits the coverage and the groups of people who

can be covered by the legislation. That is the gist and the intent of

the amendment submitted by my colleague. The new wording of the act

would ensure that nobody falls between the cracks, that nobody is left

unprotected as a direct result of your failure to be more specific in

this section.

I know my colleague from Cowichan-Malahat is going to deal with this

in more detail. The

section dealing with the insurance companies is one

which we are not going to accept, but I'm going to allow my colleague

for Cowichan-Malahat to deal with that.

MRS. WALLACE: Before dealing with that section, I want to

deal a little more with this reasonable cause thing. The minister said

it very well: we have a difference of opinion. He does not believe that

there should be justice for human rights if there is reasonable cause.

He only believes that there should be provision for hearings to take

place if they fall within some specific categories that he has named

within this bill. If they don't fall in there, then he does not believe

that you should have any opportunity to justice as far as human rights

go. That's what he said.

[12:30]

Age, for example. If you're between 45 and 65, you have some

protection. You and I, Mr. Chairman, might find ourselves out of a job

if the government should determine that we were not entitled to sit in

this House because of our age. We would have no right to appeal under

this particular bill. If you're under 45, it's the same thing. Suppose

you're 25, 30 or even 40, you want to apply for an apprenticeship and

you're told you're too old; you have no room for appeal, no matter how

well qualified or well suited or how great your

[ Page 4546 ]

need — in case of an industrial accident or

something like that and you want to apprentice for a different job.

There's no provision under this code.

Yes, I do want to talk about the insurance thing, because it

certainly affects a great many people, and it could particularly affect

women. It allows discrimination on the grounds of sex and physical or

mental disability with respect to premiums or benefits under contracts

of insurance. If I want to insure my house, am I going to have to pay

more because I'm a woman or because I have some disability? Does it

make any difference to the company what my sex is if I want to insure

my house? Does it make any difference to an insurance company whether I

have some disability if I want to insure my house against fire or

insure something against theft? Under the provision that the act would

have, it would allow an insurance company to make that kind of

discrimination. You know and I know and the minister knows that

insurance companies have actuarial tables. They establish rates based

on certain facts. That's the way it should be — certain historic data —

but not based on the fact that I'm a woman or have a disability, either

physical or mental.

Interjection.

MRS. WALLACE: That's a different thing. If they want to talk

about smoking and charging different premiums for smokers and

non-smokers, that makes good sense. There are actuarial tables that

show that smokers are more apt to burn down their houses. There's no

problem with that. But just because I am a woman, or because I'm a man,

or because I have a physical disability or mental impairment, an

insurance company can charge me more to insure my house? That just

doesn't make any kind of sense. Travel insurance could be two or three

times as expensive, and I would have no way of appealing that under

this bill. That's what this amendment is all about. It's about the

reasonable cause, and it's also about this very strange provision about

insurance that the minister has seen fit to write in here. It makes no

sense whatsoever. Actuarial tables are the things that should be used,

and if they're not used then I should have the right to appeal under

the human rights legislation. I will not have that unless this

amendment is included in this bill, because what the minister is

proposing leaves it wide open with no opportunity. I am sure that if

the minister thinks twice about it he will realize that that is not the

route to go, and that he needs to change that

section relative to

insurance to allow the kind of protection that we're talking about on

this side of the House, the protection that the amendment suggested by

my colleague the member for North Island (Mr. Gabelmann) would put into

place.

[Mr. Ree in the chair.]

MR. COCKE: Mr. Chairman, it strikes me as a mite strange that

the minister hasn't got up and at least explained the last part of this

clause: "...In the case of physical or mental disability, to the

determination of premiums or benefits under contracts of insurance."

There are many contracts of insurance, and if this applies to all

contracts of insurance, then it's the most ridiculous thing that I've

seen. It says right here that we will permit those powerful insurance

companies to discriminate where others can't. It strikes me that if

there were good reason.... For instance, in terms of life insurance,

there's no question that people with certain physical or other

illnesses are not eligible for the same quality of life insurance that

others would, just by virtue of the statistics, and unless you have a

universal kind of insurance program that has been the case for a number

of years. This is so all-encompassing it means, for instance, that if I

wish to insure my house, automobile or anything, all these matters can

be taken into account as part of the determination of my premium. I

suggest, Mr. Chairman, that this part of an otherwise relatively bad

section is about the worst of all, because not only is it saying that

we're going to assist the insurance companies to discriminate, but it

is almost insisting they do.

I have had a fair amount of experience with insurance companies over

the years, and I'm sure that they're dancing with glee over this

particular section. I suggest that over the years insurance companies,

particularly casualty companies, have tended to "cream." That's a word

that's used in the industry for those who just take the very best

available and leave whatever else to somebody else. One of the reasons

why this province got into the ICBC situation in the first place was

because of creamers. They discriminated through age and sex, and in

every way possible, to the extent that a number of years ago, before

1974, there was what they called assigned risk in this province. There

was a whole class of people who couldn't buy insurance except through a

compulsory category insisted upon by the government of this province,

because the government had said that it's mandatory that you have

insurance when you drive an automobile.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: And expanded on with our FAIR program.

MR. COCKE: Yes.

So, Mr. Chairman, what we're doing here is outside of the automobile insurance thing.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: I'll answer this for you.

MR. COCKE: You will? Okay. I'd be interested in the minister's answer to that particular question.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, I think the members

opposite have made an extremely good point on the matter of the

insurance. I would be prepared, at an appropriate time after we've

dealt with the amendment we're speaking to now, to put in some words,

which I'm going to go get now, basically saying that this

section would

only apply to life or health insurance.

MRS. WALLACE: I do have some questions about the life aspect of that.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: You can't debate that now.

MRS. WALLACE: I am debating this

section and I would like to

point out, Mr. Chairman, for edification of the minister, in case he is

going to draft some kind of an amendment, that relative to life

insurance, actuarial tables show that there is a difference in life

span between males and females. If in fact a company is allowed to

discriminate on the basis of sex, they can then disregard that

difference in drawing up any life insurance premium rates. I would have

some very serious....

[ Page 4547 ]

Interjection.

MRS. WALLACE: Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is what this says. It

says that in the case of sex, the determination of premiums or benefits

under contract of insurance.... If I'm not reading that right, I'd like

the minister to explain what I'm reading wrong in there. If that

relates to life insurance, it means that they can disregard those

actuarial tables relative to longevity.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: No, it's exactly the opposite. Somebody

— I've forgotten whether it was the member for North Island (Mr.

Gabelmann) way back in the early stages of second reading — asked if we

had been heavily lobbied by the insurance industry. The answer to that

has to be no. We were not lobbied. We did get some correspondence from

the insurance industry which convinced me that if you want to do what I

think you want to do — that is, be allowed to spread the risk so women

would get cheaper insurance premiums because of those actuarial tables

— then that's what we want to do. I don't want to have more expensive

travel insurance because you might be in a wheelchair or something like

that. So I think that if we limit this specific provision to allow

those actuarial tables to be used in determining premiums for life or

health insurance only, I expect that will include group insurance....

The member for New Westminster will know more about this than I do, but

that's what we want to do, Madam Member.

[12:45]

MR. COCKE: Well, Mr. Chairman, I have had a fair amount of

experience in the industry and I can't imagine insurance companies —

let me put this into context — operating without access to actuarial

tables. I agree that there are many insurance companies who do not

provide a lower rate for women for their life insurance but at the same

time provide a lower pension because of their longer life expectancy.

So they are getting the best of both worlds.

What the minister is saying here is: make them compete in this

particular area. I say yes, absolutely. The question of life and

casualty I'm not opposing. Some of my colleagues are having difficulty

with it. The only thing that I am particularly opposed to...and if the

minister is prepared to bring in the amendment that would exclude the

other forms of insurance such as car insurance, house insurance and

general insurance, I think that would be fair enough.

You see, Mr. Chairman, the minister was talking about group

insurance. In group insurance, of course, what you do in order to

assess the group premium is evaluate all the risks within the group,

which include male, female, some with a higher morbidity expectation

than others and so on and so forth. Then that all has to be part and

parcel of the construction of that premium. So I agree that there's no

way, if we get too tight on this thing, that you would be able to

merchandise insurance as we know it today. We could stand here and say

that okay, we would prefer that everybody get universal....

MR. REID: You may have to go back selling insurance one day, so be careful.

MR. COCKE: I don't have to ever go back to selling insurance. Maybe you'll go back to selling cars someday.

In any event, I agree with this direction that the minister is

taking. I think it cleans that up to my fancy. Certainly I'll discuss

it with the remainder of my colleagues. At the moment I'm not speaking

for our whole caucus, because it's a new concept for some. But I do

think that if we can see the amendment, let's have an opportunity to

discuss it.

MS. BROWN: I need some clarification as to what the procedure

is now. Does this mean that

section 3 is going to be lifted from the

table and put aside while the amendment is being drafted?

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: No. Your amendment is still on the floor.

MS. BROWN: When that's disposed of, your amendment will be introduced?

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: One way or.... Yes.

MS. BROWN: Okay.

I would like to go back to discuss our amendment which deals with

reasonable cause. The amendment says that the groups which are not

specifically named in this particular

section of the act would still

have the freedom in the event of either intentional or unintentional

discrimination. Sometimes that does occur. Discrimination is not always

intentional. Occasionally someone who discriminates can plead and say:

"It wasn't deliberate. It was unintentional." As the act now stands,

that could not be dealt with under this present legislation. However,

under the amendment as it is written, unintentional as well as

intentional discrimination would be dealt with, because we would be

reintroducing the concept of reasonable cause to the legislation. There

would be no loopholes, no cracks for anybody to fall between. No one

who has not been specifically named, no group of people, such as

welfare recipients, who have not been specifically named.... They would

still be protected, because they would have access to the legislation

through the concept of reasonable cause. The amendment is more specific

in the long run in terms of areas of protection.

The minister is very involved in a serious discussion, so with your permission I will wait until he is free to listen.

Interjections.

MS. BROWN: Were you listening? Oh, I didn't realize that you could listen and talk at the same time.

Interjections.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Order, please.

MS. BROWN: I was speaking in support of the amendment and

suggesting to the minister that the wording of the proposed amendment

from my colleague from North Island is better and in many ways more

specific than as it is presently written in the act. The minister said

that he wanted to be specific, that he felt that the problem with the

earlier Human Rights Code was that it was not absolutely clear. A

number of people were confused as to just what areas they were and were

not permitted to discriminate in. I am suggesting that the amendment as

it is written, saying that no discrimination is

[ Page 4548 ]

going to be permitted under any circumstances

unless reasonable cause exists for the denial or discrimination, is

much better. It will ensure that no one falls between the cracks. It

will ensure that unintentional as well intentional discrimination is

dealt with. It will also ensure that a person would not be able to get

away with a discriminatory act based on a technicality.

I wonder if the minister would like to respond to the two issues

which I raised: that is, that dismissal on a technicality would not be

possible if the amendment were accepted; also, unintentional

discrimination would not be permissible if the amendment was acceptable.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: I don't quite understand the issue on

the dismissal by someone on a technicality. As long as it's covered

under the terms of the bill, the only way one could be dismissed would

be if it wasn't covered under the terms of the bill. Again, I say yes,

there may be some things which that member considers to be

discrimination that won't be covered, and I have admitted that. I can't

say much more about it. But the matters which are covered will, I

believe, be covered much more fully and much more competently.

On the matter of intent, I haven't canvassed legal people on whether

or not reasonable cause would handle the intent thing, but since I have

made it quite clear that the government will not accept the reasonable

cause concept, we....

Interjection.

HON. MR. McCLELLAND: My problem is that I flunked recess in school. [Laughter.]

On the matter of intent, I said last night that I fully intend to

deal with that. We'll make it clear, following words similar to those

which are in place in Ontario; that will come up at a later time during

the bill.

The House resumed; Mr. Strachan in the chair.

The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Divisions in committee ordered to be recorded in the Journals of the House.

HON. MR. GARDOM: Mr. Speaker, I move that the House, at its rising, do stand adjourned until 1:15 this afternoon.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: What?

DEPUTY SPEAKER: The motion is carried.

MS. BROWN: No, we're debating it.

MR. COCKE: Mr. Speaker, obviously it is the House Leader's

decision to continue this debate this afternoon on a bill before us

that has been handled very clumsily by the government. Last night until

sometime after 1 a.m. they used the typical bullying tactics to get it

through second reading. Now, Mr. Speaker, they're using the same

tactics to put it through the committee stage. This kind of tactic has

never produced anything other than sheer, utter animosity in this

House. Naturally members have made plans. There has been no

announcement of this particular situation. Members have made plans to

otherwise engage themselves this afternoon.

As far as we're concerned, we will guarantee that you will get this

piece of legislation through in terms of committee at exactly the same

time as you would have otherwise. I will tell you that that is an

undertaking from the opposition: an absolute assurance that we will

drag our feet, because of the lack of any kind of cooperation from this

government. There was no suggestion last night that there would be

work....

Members are human beings who make plans. Members are human beings

who know when adjournment time comes and are free to make plans

thereafter.

Mr. Speaker, those of us who remain — and we will remain — make

plans to drag our feet on this

section and the next section. You might

possibly get one more

section through. As far as I'm concerned, I'm

sick and tired of the bullying tactics of the Social Credit government,

and not just on the opposition; it's all those people who are affected

by this piece of legislation that we don't like at all.

AN HON. MEMBER: Was that a point of order?

DEPUTY SPEAKER: The debate is on the time.

MR. HANSON: It's apparent that the government has become so

heavy-handed, so contemptuous of this House, so committed to this

serial July 7 budget approach of last year, when they failed by putting

all the bills together in one package, that they're now pressing

forward by breaking all the standing rules of this House to achieve

their objective. It is grossly unfair to the people of this province to

have this bill rammed through the House when it could be taken forward

for public hearings in the community and so on. We do have standing

orders which outline the times that this House sits. Yet at the same

time we have a government so committed to a time

schedule of blasting

the labour movement, of disrupting and destroying human rights in this

province, that they want to do this bill so they can then bring in the

Labour Code amendments to hammer the labour movement in this province.

It just won't wash, Mr. Speaker. The people on this side of the House

are committed to fairness and justice in this province, and we will

stay here and fight this approach. Because of the contempt in which the

Social Credit Party holds this House, we must stand here and fight on

behalf of the people to have order in this House and a fair way of

making laws. That member sitting there who happens to be the Premier is

enthralled with the heavy-handed approach; he had a taste of it last

fall. He got a taste of the power of closure, of bullying tactics, and

now he's addicted.

[1:00]

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Order! Hon. member, parliamentary language is

always a hallmark of good debate, and I think we should avoid any

personal references to another member of this House. I would remind all

members that the debatable question before us is the time suggested in

the motion, which is 1:15. Please confine your remarks to that.

MR. HANSON: Mr. Speaker, the member for New Westminster (Mr.

Cocke) gave this House an undertaking: that is, that there will be no

shortcut by the time cuts of the Social Credit House Leader. We will do

our duty as members of this House and of the opposition, as we must. We

will carry forward in debate the clause-by-clause changes required to

[ Page 4549 ]

make this a just bill. We will not allow the

government to shortcut that circuitry. There will be no time gain by

Social Credit. All our members will stand in this House and ensure that

there is no time gain at all. The bullying tactics must be stood up to,

because it's getting worse every time we come into this House. He is

now at an addiction level for bullying tactics; he needs a bigger and

bigger hit of those tactics constantly to meet the threshold of his

physiology. It will not wash, Mr. Speaker; we will not go for it.

MR. R. FRASER: I would like to advise the House that the

member from the Okanagan is the Premier because he was elected by the

people on May 5, 1983, and the anniversary is tomorrow.

With respect to the hour, I suggest that I'm prepared to cancel my

weekend plans if the business of the House is more important. I'm

prepared to sit as long as the opposition requires to propose the

amendments and make all the suggestions and contributions they wish. I

can do that; it is my first priority, and will be as long as I'm a

member of the House. It may be 1:15, 2:15, today, tomorrow or Sunday,

Mr. Speaker.

MR. BLENCOE: Mr. Speaker, I really have to try to indicate to

the government and to this House that I thought we'd all learned some

lessons from the session last summer, where we had legislation before

us that created great consternation and concern and there was a

necessity for slowing down the process and for consultation, rethinking

and reflection. This side of the House has tried during this session to

accommodate the government in many areas. We have agreed on and are

participating in some reforms of this House. On a number of occasions

we have given leave to bring in legislation or to continue debate on

certain parts where it's not normal and we could have said no according

to the rules of the House. We are committed to trying to use this House

in a more respectful attitude. I think the people want both sides of

the House to have the opportunity to look at this kind of legislation

in a rational and intelligent way, not necessarily ramming something

through as quickly as possible, forcing the Legislature to work to wee

hours of the morning. Now, of course, having dropped the hoist motion,

this side of the House is offering the opportunity for a bipartisan

approach to this very important piece of legislation; an opportunity

for....

Interjections.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Order, please, hon. members.

MR. BLENCOE: That is exactly what I'm trying to talk about.

We have come to the end of the road, Mr. Speaker, in terms of how we

handle business in this House. Yes, it's time for some moderation and

compromise in this House, Mr. Speaker. We have offered a committee

analysis of this kind of bill. We have today offered some reasonable

amendments for discussion, and we have asked the government to consult

with interested groups. We have asked for a period of peace and

consultation on this kind of legislation, and yet we continue to get

the attitude and tactics that reflect the situation of last summer that

scared British Columbians — and we're about to start it again.

British Columbians don't want this kind of legislation and the

procedures that you continue to utilize. They want some reasonable,

intelligent and rational moderation, but we're not going to get that.

We're again going back to the old ways. Because of the kind of

legislation we're talking about, the kind of principles and ideals that

are involved in this kind of legislation, and the impact on all British

Columbians, we ask the government to deal with this issue in a

non-confrontational way. The method which is now being pursued.... It

started last night, and we're starting it again by forcing this House

to sit I don't know how long....

AN HON. MEMBER: We're not forcing you.

MR. BLENCOE: Oh yes, you are.

We're asking you to be reflective and reasonable about this kind of legislation and not force this House into crazy hours.

Interjections.

MR. BLENCOE: Here they are heckling someone who is trying to

ask for a different approach to this kind of legislation. This is

important, Mr. Speaker. It is important for a government that happens

to be part of a free and democratic western world to say what we

believe in, but yet think about those things clearly and take time and

support those ideals, hopefully in a non-confrontational process.

Pursuing this direction and forcing this House to meet beyond the

normal hours that have come to be expected is once again creating a

confrontation and is not going down the road to what British Columbians

want: reasonableness and moderation in how we deal with business. This

is unreasonable and will not achieve peace and harmony in our province.

It is time that we worked together and achieved some of that peace and

harmony. You pursue and push the hour past the normal time and you

create confrontation. I ask the government to rethink not only its

legislation but the time that it is pursuing in this kind of

legislation.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Before recognizing the next speaker, I would

ask all members to please retain order and decorum in the House. We

have a very simple motion before us; it deals with adjournment at this

specific time. It is the only debatable motion, and if we confine our

remarks to that concept, the Legislative Assembly will be well served.

MRS. JOHNSTON: Mr. Speaker, I'm speaking, of course, in favour of the motion.

If the members of the opposition really believe that this is an

important subject for discussion, why is it that we only have four of

them in the House at this time? Why is it that we had eight and nine in

the House last evening when we were discussing the subject? If it is

one of the most important matters to come before this House, why aren't

they in here giving us their opinion? I would hope that we would

support this motion, and that we will stay here so we can get the job

of the people done.

MRS. WALLACE: Mr. Speaker, nothing has changed. Last fall we

were here around the clock: legislation by exhaustion; dealing with

issues that were of grave concern to a great many of the people outside

this Legislature; dealing with issues that were so strongly supported

at that time that it was suggested that they be let die on the order

paper. It was suggested that the human rights legislation as proposed

at that time would die on the order paper, and that there would be

[ Page 4550 ]

consultation; that we would have a government that

was prepared to take a second look and to consider the concerns of the

individuals who would be so closely and severely affected by the

changes the government was proposing. The House adjourned at that time

— in that particular session — and did not reconvene for many months.

We finished that session and much of that contentious legislation died

on the order paper, or else it was.... After sitting around the clock,

to discuss some of that legislation, 24 hours a day, that very

legislation that was forced through the House was negotiated to be

non-effective on all public servants. That is the procedure we saw

then, Mr. Speaker. Now we are back at exactly the same place. Not only

are we back in a legislation-by-exhaustion situation in which this

House sits until 1:30 a.m., reconvenes at 10:00 a.m. and is now

proposing to carry on, probably through the rest of this day and this

night to force through the same bill...

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Different bill!

MRS. WALLACE: The same bill with minor, cosmetic changes.

... by sheer dint of numbers and through exhaustion.... Obviously

there has been time to reconsider that bill. There should have been

ample time for consultation. If that had actually taken place, would

the Minister of Labour find himself in the position he's in today? Two

specific suggestions from the opposition have caused him to say: "Hey,

wait a minute, I've got to change this. It isn't right." There's intent

and the matter relative to insurance. On both of those he said: "Look,

I've got to change it."

MR. PARKS: Mr. Speaker, I rise on standing order 43. I think

it's very clear from the last few minutes of supposed debate by the

hon. member that she has persisted in doing nothing pertaining to the

motion before us. Either it was irrelevant, to say the least, or

clearly tediously repetitious of previous speakers. I'd ask the Speaker

to bring her to order.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Thank you, hon. member. The point of order is

well taken. As the Chair has advised the House in just the last few

moments, the debatable motion before us is that this House do now

adjourn until 1:15 in the afternoon. If we can contain our remarks to

and remain within the concept of that motion, the assembly will be well

served.

MRS. WALLACE: Mr. Speaker, I believe my remarks relate very

directly to that. What is happening through this urgency, this rush,

this legislation by exhaustion, this need to reconvene within another

two or three minutes — to be back here to discuss this same thing....

After having discussed it for hour upon hour upon hour, the Minister of

Labour is not ready. He's not ready to carry on. He has amendments to

draft. He's listening to recommendations from this side of the House.

He needs to take more time to consider this. He should not be being

forced to be back here with these amendments, which will be hastily

drafted, which we haven't had time to even have a look at....

[1:15]

We're drafting legislation on the floor of this Legislature after

having sat through hours.... People are tired, and it is ridiculous to

come back here and carry on doing the same sort of debate and

discussion finding that the legislation is lacking in certain areas and

that the minister has to accept these changes, recognizing the fault of

the.... He's had long enough, but he hasn't done the job. Now we're

into exactly the same situation we were in last fall, with the same

type of legislation, attempting to force it through the House without

any consideration for the need for that consultation — which obviously

hasn't taken place or the minister wouldn't be in the position he is in

today. If ever there was a time when that government should take a

second look and not continue to force its will, just for the sheer sake

of brute force, now is the time. Obviously the minister needs to go

through that bill with a fine-tooth comb and see if there are other

areas.... Perhaps he needs to look at the amendments we're proposing,

so that he has a little time to review them and to discuss them with

his supporters and his advisers and decide whether or not there are

other areas that need to be changed, so we can have this on the orders

of the day, so we know what we're dealing with, so we have time to

prepare debates. We should not be rushing pell-mell through something,

forcing it through hour after hour — legislation by exhaustion —

something that should have gone out with the Dark Ages, something that

was supposed to have gone out when these rules were drafted, but that

this government continues to ignore.

HON. MR. NIELSEN: I am not wishing to continue much longer,

but I have just a couple of points. The legislation which is being

considered by the House was, I believe, introduced to the assembly

April 10. I think that the opposition may have had adequate time to

place their amendments on the order paper, which would have given the

minister an opportunity to read them and consider them, but I

understand the opposition has indicated they have not had time to do

that.

With respect to the time which is now upon us, I don't know if the

member who just took her seat believes she is going to persuade the

government differently than continuing with debate on this legislation.

I would humbly suggest that we'd be accomplishing a great deal more to

have debate on the legislation rather than to hear a silly argument of

why we shouldn't adjourn until 1:15 and perhaps spend an hour or two

arguing about whether we should sit again at 1:15 well after that time

is passed. That hour of debate with respect to the adjournment motion,

I think, would be much better utilized in discussing the sections of

the legislation before us. No wonder many citizens think that some

members on occasion in this House may not be utilizing their time as

MLAs most effectively.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Once again I'll remind the Legislative

Assembly that the Chair is not aware of any legislation before us. We

are discussing an adjournment motion.

MS. BROWN: I was here until 1:30 this morning; I was back at

10 o'clock; I'm here at 1:15; and I'll be here for as long as it takes.

Because we're not talking about trees or salmon or mines; we're talking

about people. A lot of us worked very hard and made a lot of sacrifices

so that we could have decent legislation in this province to protect

black people, women and the disabled. That legislation is now being

taken away from us. If we have to stay here after 1:15 today, after

1:15 tomorrow or after 1:15 on Sunday to debate that, we will do it,

because I have to be able to say to myself and to my children that I

fought a racist government. I didn't win, but I fought them. That is

the reason why it matters not

[ Page 4551 ]

whether this amendment passes or it fails as to

whether we stay here at 1:15 or past 1:15. The issue still remains that

a racist government is pushing through racist legislation on the floor

of this House.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Order, please.

MR. GABELMANN: First of all I want to make it clear that I

have no problems at all in being here this weekend. My constituents

will understand why I miss meetings with them tomorrow and again on

Sunday. That's not a particular problem. What is a problem is that

those people, numbering in the millions, who will be affected by what

we do this weekend will not have their lives well served by having laws

that govern their existence, their behaviour and their lives determined

through a process of exhaustion.

In order for me as one MLA to do an adequate and competent job in

attempting to improve the legislation in order that it be as good as it

possibly can be, I need to consider these things quietly, carefully,

and in the normal course of events, and within a timetable that the

public has come to expect. There is no doubt in the minds of those

people in the community who are concerned about this particular

legislation that we wouldn't have got to committee stage until next

week except for the decision last night to go to an all-night session.

We would have been finished today in second reading. We probably needed

a couple of days, in that neighbourhood, to deal with the committee

stage. If we had adjourned at one o'clock today and had come back at 2

o'clock on Monday, I would suspect that if not by 6 o'clock on Monday,

then certainly by some time on Tuesday we would have been able to

properly consider legislation, properly consider amendments that both

this side and that side would like to consider. We could have done

that, and the public who are going to be affected by this legislation

would have been well served.

They will not be well served by the acrimony that developed as a

result of this kind of tactic. That will impair the ability of this

Legislature to work cooperatively in order to get the best possible

legislation because we set up a "we-and-they" situation rather than an

"us" situation. That's not good, particularly for legislation of this

magnitude and this importance to people's lives.

The member for Maillardville-Coquitlam (Mr. Parks), at the beginning

of this debate when we reacted with horror about the 1:15, said:

"There's no problem — just withdraw all your amendments." What does he

think our responsibility is as legislators? It is to legislate. The

minister responsible for a particular bill isn't the only person

allowed to have some say about what legislation should be. That's why

we were elected. We were elected to put those amendments if we felt

they were proper. We didn't do it in a deleterious way; we've only put

in 14 or 15,

whereas we could have put in several hundred. We could

have. We considered it, and I've got them. I'm tempted now to do it.

Mr. Speaker, because we knew we would have time today and again on

Monday and Tuesday to do this properly — not a question of going

through all afternoon, all night, all day Saturday, all Saturday night

— we scratched more potential amendments than we have actually

prepared. But you know what? This forces me to consider going back and

doing that kind of delaying tactic.

We will be through this legislation for sure by Tuesday, whether we sit at 1:15 today or at 2 o'clock on Monday.

That's a reality. Why would the government want to do this? Why

would the government want the Legislature to sit this weekend? Is it so

afraid that public opinion is so massively opposed to them on this

issue that they don't want the public to know about it? The Legislature

has had Wednesday and Thursday and Friday so far to discuss this

legislation. This is the first time there has been publicity, in any

meaningful way, about this legislation. The public is now beginning to

understand that there is legislation on the floor of this House

relating to human rights that is the same as last summer's bill, and

the government is afraid that that learning will take place out there

in the public, given the time. That's why they want to got the bill

through on the weekend, rather than in the normal course of events.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Hon. members, once again I will remind the

assembly that the motion before us is an adjournment moti