Proceedings in the

Douglas Fir Room

The House in Committee,

Section A.

The committee met at 2:52 p.m.

[Rohini Arora in the chair.]

Committee of the Whole

Bill 9 — Freedom of Information

and Protection of Privacy

Amendment Act, 2026

(continued)

The Chair : Good afternoon, Members. I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 9, Freedom of Information

and Protection of Privacy Act, 2026, to order.

Clause 9 approved.

On clause 10.

Jody Toor : While the amendment may appear technical on its surface, I believe it is important

for this committee to recognize that even small wording changes can carry major legal

and operational consequences over time, particularly when limiting language is being

removed.

My concern is that by removing the phrase “the research purpose….” This committee

needs to clearly understand whether the scope of disclosure authority is being broadened

in practice, whether the existing safeguards are being weakened and, more to the point,

whether this creates greater flexibility for the future beyond what was originally

intended today.

I also believe it is important to examine whether this amendment could gradually expand

authority through operational policy or future practice without those changes being

clearly visible to the public. Technical amendments should not be simple, be assumed

to be administrative housekeeping when they may alter how privacy protections and

disclosure limitations function in practice. For that reason, I believe that this committee deserves a clear

and detailed explanation regarding why this wording was removed, what legal effect government believes it creates

and whether any privacy or oversight concerns were raised during the drafting of this

amendment.

My question was: why was the phrase “the research purpose” removed from this section?

What concern or operational issue was government attempting to address through this

wording change? Was the existing language considered too restrictive?

[2:55 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : As to the question specific to the reason for clause 10 asked by the member opposite,

the amendment allows the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner to focus

on their core responsibility, which is evaluating the privacy implications associated

with using personal information.

This change allows the decision about research purpose to be with research ethics

boards, who are better positioned to assess research purposes, which they already

do in parallel to the commissioner’s approval, and they have rigorous processes for

meeting ethics review.

[3:00 p.m.]

Jody Toor : What legal or operational effects does government believe removing this wording creates?

Has government conducted any analysis regarding how this amendment changes understanding

in practice?

Hon. Diana Gibson : This is an operational change which has an impact on the Office of the Privacy Commissioner,

which was consulted. Again, to clarify, this is about ensuring the Privacy Commissioner’s

office can focus on their core area of responsibility, which is privacy implications,

and that research purpose can be reviewed by research ethic boards, which is their

core area of expertise and where rigorous processes are in place.

Jody Toor : Does this amendment broaden the disclosure authority in any way? If government believes

it does not, what particularly prevents broader understanding in the future?

[3:05 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : No, this does not broaden scope, because this is about a duplicate process, where

the research ethics boards already do the review through their rigorous processes.

Also, it’s very clear in this clause that the Privacy Commissioner maintains oversight

of the privacy implications.

Jody Toor : If this amendment is purely technical or administrative, why was a legislative amendment

necessary at all? Could the same objective have been achieved through the policy or

operational guidance instead?

The Chair : Members, just a reminder, through the Chair.

[3:10 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Because it is stated in this clause, “the research purpose,” and that’s a duplicate

process, it needed to be addressed through a legislation change.

Jody Toor : Through you, Chair, to the minister: could future governments rely on the removal

of this wording just to justify broader disclosure practices than what may currently

be intended? What safeguards prevent that from occurring?

Hon. Diana Gibson : As has been stated already, clearly, the Privacy Commissioner’s office retains oversight

of the privacy implications. So the answer to that question is clearly no, and because

the safeguard is that the Privacy Commissioner retains oversight of any disclosure

and privacy implications.

Jody Toor : What measures are being undertaken to prevent personal information disclosed for research

under this streamlined process from being used for secondary purposes?

[3:15 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : I think it’ll be helpful to clarify for the member opposite that this doesn’t address

scope of information-sharing for research purposes, which is dealt with elsewhere

in this clause. What the clause we’re speaking to is about is use of information for

the purpose of contacting a person to participate in research, and the commissioner

retains oversight, which is the safeguard.

Let me read it as it would stand amended. “The commissioner has approved the use of

the information for the purpose of contacting a person to participate in research

and the manner in which contact is to be made, including the information to be made

available to the person contacted.” That is specifically what we’re speaking to here

today.

Jody Toor : Do other provinces require commissioner approval of research purposes for similar

disclosure? Does B.C. follow suit?

Hon. Diana Gibson : The majority of jurisdictions across Canada do not require OIPC approval of research

purpose.

[3:20 p.m.]

Rob Botterell : Why are the other provinces taking a different approach, or alternatively, why is

B.C. taking a different approach than all the other provinces?

Hon. Diana Gibson : Just for clarification for the member opposite, the choice that we’re making to amend

this clause aligns with the vast majority of other jurisdictions. It will align us

with them who have taken the same approach as us to not have the OIPC approve research

purpose.

Clause 10 approved.

On clause 11.

Jody Toor : My concern with this clause is that it appears to create major expanded authority

for a connected services provider and a public body to disclose personal information to one another

within connected government systems.

While government may frame this as a modernization or improved service delivery, I

believe this committee must carefully examine the scope of these disclosure powers,

the safeguards protecting personal information, the level of citizen awareness and

consent involvement, and what limits exist to prevent the gradual expansion of information-sharing

across ministries and connected platforms over time.

Some of my concerns I’ll go over just to keep on record, and then I’ll get into some

of my questions. My concern is that this clause majorly expands authority to disclose

personal information between connected government systems. I’m concerned that it creates

broader infrastructure for data sharing across ministries and public bodies.

I believe the long-term scope of these disclosure powers remains unclear and may expand

over time. I’m concerned these provisions may lead to increased sensitivity of personal

information across connected systems. I believe many citizens may not fully understand

how widely their personal information could circulate under this framework.

Why is the government creating new authority for connected services providers and public bodies to disclose personal information to one another?

[3:25 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : In answer to the question of why this change is being made, currently people must

same information. Connected Services is an option for people who would choose to access a digital platform to get

their services faster and in a more seamless way. It remains opt-in only. People who

choose not to use it can continue to access their services in the way they do today.

Jody Toor : What digital services or functions under

section 69.3 will these new disclosure authorities

in subsections (10) and (11) support? What categories of personal information may

be disclosed under this new framework?

[3:30 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you, member opposite. I want to remind the member opposite that the data governance

would still be under the general principle of public sector privacy, which is that

the data has to relate directly to and be necessary for the program or service that

it’s being collected or disclosed for.

Jody Toor : Could sensitive information such as health, disability, housing, education or income-related

information eventually be shared under these provisions?

[3:35 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : In the case where an individual chooses to use this platform to access a program or

service, then either they would be giving information directly related to and necessary

for that program or service or agreeing for it to be shared in applying for a new

program or service.

[Debra Toporowski / Qwulti’stunaat in the chair.]

Again, the limit here is that it is a program they’re applying for. The information

has to relate directly to and be necessary for the program or service they are applying

for. It, of course, continues to be under the oversight of the Privacy Commissioner’s

office.

Jody Toor : Can citizens request a record showing where their information has been disclosed?

[3:40 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : The program will be designed to be transparent for the user.

Jody Toor : My question was: will the citizens be able to see where their information has been

disclosed? What independent oversight exists regarding disclosure practices under

connected service systems? Can future governments expand disclosure authority through

regulation or ministerial direction?

[3:45 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : There were a number of questions asked. I’m going to address them separately.

First, with regards to citizens knowing where information is disclosed, this is a

people-driven process. They are coming in and applying for the service or program.

They will know what’s being accessed and shared, because they are applying for that

service or program.

With the question about independent oversight, we have thoroughly canvassed, in this

committee already, the independent oversight by the Privacy Commissioner’s office

of every clause of this agreement. That should be very clear to the members opposite

at this point.

Also to, “Can disclosure be expanded?” the answer is no. That’s why we’re putting

this in legislation.

Rob Botterell : Thank you to the minister for the answer to that question of my colleague.

Just moments ago, my colleague asked: “Can citizens request a record showing where

their information has been disclosed?” The minister indicated that the process was

transparent and then, in the recent answer, indicated that citizens would know what

information they’re providing because they’re authorizing the provision of that information

or the use of that information.

When you describe the process as being transparent, I think citizens would want to

be able to know, say, if they provided authorization for some health care information,

that if they requested, they could be provided with a simple

summary of where that

health care information was shared across government. So they would know which ministries

have it, which entities have it and be able to have an overview of where their personal

information went after they authorized it.

Is that type of transparency going to be available to citizens?

[3:50 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Yes, an employee can ask for a record, but to remind and help clarify the members

opposite on this, if information is given for a particular program or purpose, it

doesn’t get shared unless there is another program or purpose that the individual

is accessing and choosing to access that also requires that information — it is necessary

and required for that program or purpose. So the limits on how their information gets

shared is tied to a program or service they are accessing that requires and for which

that data is necessary.

Jody Toor : Does government acknowledge concerns that this creates a framework for centralized

intergovernmental information-sharing beyond traditional ministry boundaries?

Hon. Diana Gibson : We have been very clear in previous questions that this is not about creating a centralized

data system and centralizing data. So the answer to the question is no and, again,

that the accessing of data and information is tied very closely to and limited by

it being required and necessary for the program or service that the individual is

choosing to access.

The Chair : Committee, we will take a short recess, and we’ll be back at 4:05.

The committee recessed from 3:55 p.m. to 4:06 p.m.

[Debra Toporowski / Qwulti’stunaat in the chair.]

The Chair : Good afternoon, Members. I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 9 back to order. We’re

on clause 11.

Clause 11 approved.

On clause 12.

Jody Toor : My concern with this clause is…. Understanding how broadly these information-sharing

agreements may eventually operate, what safeguards exist around the exchange of information

between jurisdictions and oversight bodies in how government intends to protect transparency,

privacy and public accountability as these coordination powers expand?

Why was it necessary to expand authority for information-sharing agreements between

oversight bodies? What operational gap existed under the current framework? And why

were existing coordination mechanisms considered insufficient?

[4:10 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : The purpose of this clause is to enable the Privacy Commissioner to engage across

jurisdictions on emerging privacy issues. A glaring example of this, of course, right

now would be AI. This enables the Privacy Commissioner to engage, through information-sharing

agreements, with other access-and-privacy regulators within Canada.

The second half of this clause, the second part of it, deals with the guardrails,

which are the conditions under which they cannot share information and the kind of

information they can’t share. Just as a note, I think it’s important and relevant

to the members opposite that this does come as a special committee recommendation

from the committee where broad engagement was done.

[4:15 p.m.]

Jody Toor : What categories of information may be exchanged under these agreements? Could personal

or sensitive investigated information be included? Are there categories that are prohibited

from this exchange?

Hon. Diana Gibson : It’s clear in the new subsection (1.1), which specifies that the commissioner may

not exchange information that they received to review a complaint related to an access

or correction request.

Sheldon Clare : Thank you for the answer to the question.

Next question is about statutory limits. You sort of hinted at this in the last response,

but are there other statutory limits governing what information may be shared? Where

are those limits written, and are they policy, legislation or by agreement?

[4:20 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : The statutory limits are set through this clause as well as further set through the

information-sharing agreements that are referenced in this clause and elsewhere in

the act.

Sheldon Clare : To the minister: you said elsewhere in the act, but where else in the act?

Hon. Diana Gibson : The information-sharing agreements?

Sheldon Clare : Yes. Thank you.

Hon. Diana Gibson : Most relevant to this clause would be the definition in 69(1).

Sheldon Clare : Is it possible that personal information obtained during investigation could eventually

circulate between jurisdictions, and will citizens be notified if this occurs? Would

individuals be able to request records showing where their information has been shared,

and would there be a response forthcoming?

[4:25 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : The answer to your question is no because section (1.1) of this clause includes the

prohibition of sharing, and it includes information obtained as part of a review under

section 52(1). And just to re-clarify what the purpose of this is, it’s to facilitate

collaboration and knowledge-sharing between jurisdictions.

Sheldon Clare : To the minister: thank you for the response to the question.

In terms of protecting privacy and the safeguards within these agreements, are there

mandatory security, retention or destruction standards, and who verifies compliance

with those standards?

[4:30 p.m. - 4:35 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Just a reminder, as we’ve discussed,

section 1.1 of the clause we’re discussing sets

clear boundaries around the disclosure of personal information obtained as part of

a review, so this wouldn’t really apply. But it’s important for you to know also that

the elements you’ve discussed are standard language in information-sharing agreements.

Sheldon Clare : Thank you for the response.

Will these information-sharing agreements be made publicly available, and if not,

how would citizens understand how their information may circulate? In that case, what

transparency mechanisms are in place?

Further to that, and I guess it’s a related question, so I might as well put it on

the record at the same time: who approves the terms of these information-sharing agreements?

Is there any independent body that reviews or approves them? And is the legislator

informed of these agreements?

[4:40 p.m. - 4:45 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : First, it’s worth noting that the Office of the Privacy Commissioner has guidelines

for information-sharing agreements that are publicly available and that include the

elements that have been discussed.

A reminder again that

section 1 sets out the limits as to information that cannot

be shared, which includes information acquired as part of an investigation, under

section 52(1).

Also important is that this clause also has guidelines around with whom the Privacy

Commissioner can share information, which is information-sharing agreements with other

access and privacy regulators within Canada — also recognizing that the Privacy Commissioner’s

office is an independent office whose mandate is to protect privacy.

Sheldon Clare : Thank you for the response to the question.

You mentioned that this covers jurisdictions within Canada. Are there any situations

in which jurisdictions outside of Canada might be included in these information-sharing

agreements, and if so, how would they be controlled, audited or examined?

Hon. Diana Gibson : The language of this clause is very clear that the answer to this question is no.

It’s articulated in clause (k): “under the legislation of another province or of Canada.”

Sheldon Clare : Thank you to the minister for the nice, clear response.

My next question is about oversight. What oversight mechanisms govern information

exchanged across jurisdictions, and can these agreements be independently audited,

and what recourse exists if information is mishandled?

[4:50 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : I remind the member opposite, in terms of the clause, that it is tightly constrained

to only others similar to the commissioner that have the powers and duties of a commissioner.

It already exists as a provision under the privacy act, and it was a recommendation

of the special committee.

The Chair : Just a reminder to all members to direct your questions and responses through the

Chair.

Sheldon Clare : Thank you, Madam Chair, and through you to the minister: could future agreements extend

beyond the current intended scope, and what safeguards would be in place to prevent

any gradual expansion over time?

One wonders if future governments would be able to broaden these agreements without

legislative amendment.

[4:55 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : The answer is no. The statutory limitations in this clause are designed to prevent

that.

Sheldon Clare : This question is about the origin of these expanded authorities. Did the Privacy Commissioner

request these expanded authorities? If so, what specific concerns or operational needs

were identified? And if not, who, then, initiated these changes and why?

Hon. Diana Gibson : The origin of this clause came from the special committee, based on a submission by the independent Office of the Privacy Commissioner, and is

designed to facilitate the tightly scoped collaboration and knowledge-sharing between

jurisdictions.

Sheldon Clare : To the minister: thank you for the answer to the question.

In the discussions regarding this clause, were any concerns raised regarding interjurisdictional

privacy risks, were any recommendations made to strengthen safeguards, and how were

those concerns addressed?

Hon. Diana Gibson : As we’ve canvassed fairly thoroughly already in this discussion, the safeguards are

built into this clause.

[5:00 p.m.]

Sheldon Clare : Does government acknowledge concerns that increasing information exchange capacity

may gradually broaden the circulation of sensitive information beyond what citizens

reasonably expect? How does government define reasonable public expectation in this

context? What safeguards ensure information-sharing does not gradually exceed the

original intent of this legislation?

Hon. Diana Gibson : Asked and answered.

Clause 12 approved.

On clause 13.

Rob Botterell : I rise to move an amendment to clause 13. I’ll just provide a copy to the Chair.

[ CLAUSE 13, by deleting the text shown as struck out and adding the underlined text

as shown:

Section 43 is amended by adding the following paragraph:

(

a) by adding the following paragraph:

(a.1) the behaviour of the applicant is abusive or malicious, , and .

(

b) by striking out “ or ” at the end of paragraph (

b) and by repealing paragraph (

c) and substituting the following:

(

c) responding to the request would unreasonably interfere with the operations of

(

i) the public body, or

(ii) the government of British Columbia, or

(

d) the request is

(

i) an abuse of the right to make a request under

section 5 or 29 because the request

is repetitious or systematic, or

(ii) excessively broad. ]

The Chair : Would the member like to speak to the amendment?

On the amendment.

Rob Botterell : This amendment responds to the need for tools to address the concerns regarding aggressive

behaviour from applicants. While I do have some hesitations on the appropriate oversight

of how determinations will be made on what is considered abusive or malicious behaviour,

I can support this part of the change.

This amendment also removes

section 13(

b) that grants the government additional powers to disregard requests that “unreasonably

interfere with the operations of (

i) the public body or (ii) the government of British

Columbia.”

I do believe that we need tools to address bad behaviour, but I do not believe that,

as written, there is enough justification for the broad overreach in 13(b). That is

why I am proposing this amendment to clause 13, which only keeps the changes related

to abusive or malicious behaviour and removes the rest.

The Chair : Members, the amendment is in order. We will take a very short recess to make copies

for all the members to read.

The committee recessed from 5:03 p.m. to 5:11 p.m.

[Debra Toporowski / Qwulti’stunaat in the chair.]

The Chair : Okay, Members, I call the Committee of the Whole back to order.

Hon. Diana Gibson : We do not support this amendment.

Rob Botterell : By way of further explanation of the amendment, there are really two components. One

is to ensure that the amendment covers the behaviour of an applicant that is abusive

or malicious.

The second

part is to remove

section 13(b). For the past 34 years, when a public body

asked the commissioner to authorize the public body to disregard a request under

section

5 or 29 and the grounds are that responding to the request would unreasonably interfere

with the operations of the public body, there is an additional test because the request

is excessively broad or is repetitious or is systematic.

The effect of not making this amendment would be to give current and future Information

and Privacy Commissioners an additional ground on which to authorize a public body

to disregard a request and in doing so deny an applicant the legal right of access

to records enjoyed by others.

So this additional ground has, as we’ve talked about in other sections…. There’s been

lots of discussion about checks and balances on unreasonable interference with operations.

In this section, if it weren’t amended, those checks and balances would be removed

and it would be no longer necessary to have a reason that the request is too broad

or repetitious or systematic.

Those tests have stood the test of time for 34 years, and it will not be difficult

for a public body to construct an argument that responding to a request unreasonably

interferes with the operations of a public body or the government of B.C., especially

in these times when there’s a large deficit and government chooses to prioritize other

programs and services. And yes, it is true that the commissioner oversees this, but

the commissioner is bound to administer the legislation as written.

With this amendment, the

section is restored so that there actually is a test that

the request has to both have an unreasonable impact but also be too broad or repetitious

or systematic.

[5:15 p.m.]

Further, without this amendment, there will be no guidance given to the Information

and Privacy Commissioner. It is equivalent to giving the commissioner a blank cheque

in terms of how the commissioner applies it. That’s going too far, and, frankly, this

opens up all sorts of different reasons than the request is systematic or repetitious

or excessively broad.

We need to find other ways to address concerns rather than giving the commissioner

a blank cheque that has no checks and balances. That’s why I’m supporting this amendment

to go back to the original language, because the original language has stood the test

of time, and there’s no justification for creating such a great big loophole in this

act.

The Chair : Seeing no further remarks on the amendment, the question is the amendment to clause

13. Shall the amendment pass?

Division has been called.

[5:20 p.m.]

Members, is there agreement to waive the time?

Leave granted.

The Chair : Before putting the question, I remind all members that only the members of

Section

A or their duly appointed substitutes are authorized to vote. The question is on the

amendment to clause 13 of Bill 9 moved by the Third Party House Leader.

Amendment negatived on the following division:

YEAS — 5

Clare

Botterell

Maahs

Stamer

Luck

NAYS — 5

Routledge

Dix

Kahlon

Gibson

Shah

The Chair : Members, there being an equal number of votes for and against, the Chair must make

a casting vote. The Chair votes against the amendment to keep the bill intact in its

original form and as adopted at second reading.

Hon. Diana Gibson : I move the amendment to clause 13 standing in my name on the orders of the day.

[ CLAUSE 13, by deleting the text shown as struck out and adding the underlined text as shown:

Section 43 is amended

(

a) by adding the following paragraph:

(a.1) the behaviour of the applicant is abusive or malicious, , and

(

b) by striking out “ or ” at the end of paragraph (

b) and by repealing paragraph (

c) and substituting the

following:

(

c) responding to the request would unreasonably interfere with the operations of

(

i) the public body, or

(ii) the government of British Columbia the ministry of the minister responsible for this Act , or

(

d) the request is

(

i) an abuse of the right to make a request under

section 5 or 29 because the request

is repetitious or systematic, or

(ii) excessively broad.]

[5:25 p.m.]

The Chair : Is there any debate?

On the amendment.

Rob Botterell : Madam Chair and members of the committee, this amendment has not…. There’s been no

justification provided for this amendment. So procedurally, at what point will we

hear from the minister on the detailed rationale for this amendment?

The Chair: The minister is welcome to make a remark.

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you, members opposite, for the opportunity to speak to this clause. Clause 13

is about ensuring that malicious or abusive behaviour towards public employees can

be addressed, and this is about the health and safety and safe workplaces in public

bodies. As we’ve seen across many parts of our society, there has been an increase

in the mistreatment of people, and this includes violence, threats and extreme mistreatment

of public workers. So that’s part of what clause 13 is doing.

The piece addressed in this amendment is about extending the ability to seek relief,

under clause 13, to the government of British Columbia when unreasonable interference

is experienced across multiple ministries. This speaks to the second part of what

this clause is doing, which is ensuring that where requests are excessively broad,

repetitious or systematic, public bodies are able to seek relief from the Privacy

Commissioner.

Demonstrating these in combination makes accessing that relief unjustifiably difficult

and has dissuaded public bodies from applying. So the amendment to the amendment is

about ensuring that the government of British Columbia, when multiple ministries are

experiencing these challenges, can seek relief as well.

Rob Botterell : My understanding of the amendment, as I read the order paper, is that under…. So clause

13 is amending

section 43. In subsection (c), the phrase “the government of British

Columbia” is repealed or deleted, and the “ministry of the minister responsible for

this act” is substituted.

I’d appreciate an explanation, because that is the substantive amending change that

I see. I don’t understand the rationale for that proposed amendment.

[5:30 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Through thoughtful discussions with other members of the Legislature about the government’s

intent on the updates to the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act, and this clause

in particular, it was identified that there was some concern with this clause as proposed,

and while maintaining the intent of the clause, this proposed further amendment brought

forward provides additional clarity.

Rob Botterell : What is the difference between “the government of British Columbia” and “the ministry

of the minister responsible for this act” and the rationale for changing the term?

Before the minister responds “asked and answered,” the answer previously provided

did not provide an explanation of “why make this change?” other than “some MLAs somewhere

in this Legislature asked for it.” That raises some additional questions.

My first question is: why? Why make this change? What is the effect on the operation

of this

section of making this change?

Hon. Diana Gibson : The intent of this clause has been described already, but I’ll reiterate it again

because it seems to be not fully understood.

The intent of this change is to ensure that those working on FOI within the government

of B.C. can have the ability to seek relief under this clause when unreasonable interference

is experienced across multiple ministries.

The wording here in the amendment to the amendment tightens the scope such that it’s

very clear where that responsibility sits, and it continues to achieve what was our

original intention with clause 13 while tightening the scope of it to avoid the misinterpretation

and concerns that were being raised and that we were hearing from MLAs.

Sheldon Clare : The minister mentioned that there were concerns raised, but we didn’t hear what those

concerns were. What specific concerns were raised about the clause as it stands that

necessitate this change?

[5:35 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : The amendment that we’re speaking to provides more precision on the intent of the

provisions outlined in the bill. It tightens and narrows the scope while maintaining

the intent of the clause as it had been designed.

Rob Botterell : If this amendment were to proceed, the clause would then read: “responding to the

request would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the ministry of the minister

responsible for this act.”

Can the minister explain what it means for a request to unreasonably interfere with

the operations of the ministry of the minister responsible for the act and illustrate

the answer with some examples?

[5:40 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : Our government has a centralized FOI service that supports ministries. This change

allows that branch to be considered under this clause.

Amelia Boultbee : This amendment appears to reflect some feedback that, if I’m not mistaken, was reflective

of conversations that I had with the minister and her staff, so I’d like just to clarify

the operation of that.

Taking a look at the original clause 13, my understanding is that the way it’s worded,

the entire government of British Columbia is captured in the original, which, to my

mind, was too broad. Is it correct that the amendment reflects splitting it into a

much narrower two-part piece, which is the ministry itself and whatever ministry or

public body is actually receiving the FOI?

Hon. Diana Gibson : Thank you to the member opposite for the clarification. This does narrow this clause

from the government of British Columbia to the ministry of the minister responsible

for the act.

It tightens the scope, and I want to take a moment to thank the MLAs who engaged,

in good faith, on improving this legislation.

Rob Botterell : I would like to return to an earlier question, part of which was not answered. This

clause, with the amendment, would enable the ministry of the minister responsible

for this act to apply to the commissioner for approval not to respond to a request

because it would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the ministry of the

minister responsible for this act.

My earlier question…. I’ll just rephrase it. Can the minister provide some examples

of circumstances in which the minister’s ministry would apply to the commissioner

for approval to disregard a request because it would unreasonably interfere with the

operations of the minister’s ministry?

[5:45 p.m. - 5:50 p.m.]

Hon. Diana Gibson : I think it’s important to clarify that this clause is under the oversight of the independent

Office of the Privacy Commissioner, who would authorize this request.

“Unreasonably interfere” is already in that act. There is existing language, existing

jurisprudence criteria already established. This is about just ensuring that the hard-working

staff in the centralized FOI team are considered in that.

Rob Botterell : Thank you to the minister.

We’re dealing with the amendment, and I can see a full day of questions coming once

we deal with the amendments, back when we get to whatever the ultimate form of this

clause is. So I’ll save some questions for that day.

The question I have here relates directly to the amendment, to understand the clause “the ministry of the minister responsible for this act,”

because that is the proposed amendment.

My question is: what does “the ministry of the minister responsible for this act”

add to the wording that is in place now?

In the normal course of events, if a public body’s operations were being unreasonably

interfered with and the commissioner decided that the request could be disregarded,

surely that would end and eliminate the workload on the ministry of the minister responsible

for this act. If the FOI request is stopped by order of the commissioner, then indirectly

and immediately any workload of the ministry of the minister responsible for this

act effectively ends because the request no longer….

My question is: why is this needed, this amendment, at all?

Hon. Diana Gibson : It might help to clarify a little bit where the centralized FOI team sits. They sit

under the ministry responsible for the act. If an FOI is directed to a particular

ministry, their hours would not be considered in that, under this clause.

This change enables them to be considered by the OIPC under this clause.

Rob Botterell : Thank you, Minister.

The earlier question, which I’m still seeking to have answered, is not whether there’s

oversight of the commissioner or whether the commissioner actually decides which requests

can be disregarded and which ones can’t. But I come back to my question. Can the minister

provide some examples of where the ministry, the centralized part of government dealing

with this act, would request the ability to disregard a request to the commission?

I’m not asking about what the commissioner may decide and the commissioner’s oversight.

I understand all that, although I’ll raise some more questions about that. I’m interested

in just some examples so that British Columbians can understand and have an example,

a potential example.

[5:55 p.m.]

What are the circumstances? Up until this amendment, there was an additional set of

tests — repetitious, systematic or broad. So my question is: what are some examples?

Hon. Diana Gibson : By way of an example, any ministry accessing this clause presently…. Without the amended

language, the work of the centralized FOI team would not be considered.

Rob Botterell : Can the minister provide some examples of the centralized work that would support

a request to have an FOI request stopped in its tracks to the commissioner?

Hon. Diana Gibson : I’m going to reiterate that there is existing language, existing criteria under the

OIPC in jurisprudence. I have nothing more to add.

Rob Botterell : Yes. On the amendment to clause 13, very briefly, tomorrow I will want to raise questions

about the centralized ministry structure and how it relates to this amendment.

Hon. Diana Gibson : I move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The Chair : This committee stands adjourned.

The committee rose at 6:00 p.m.