1987 Legislative Session: 1st Session, 34th Parliament

HANSARD

The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.

The printed version remains the official version.

Official Report of

DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(Hansard)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1987

Morning Sitting

[ Page 2681 ]

CONTENTS

Routine Proceedings

Tabling Documents –– 2681

Health Statutes Amendment Act, 1987 (Bill 34). Committee stage. (Hon. Mr. Dueck) –– 2681

Mrs. Boone

Ms. A. Hagen

Mr. Jones

Hon. Mr. Brummet

Ms. Campbell

Mr. Sihota

Mr. Gabelmann

Mr. Clark

Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 4), 1987 (Bill 59). Second reading

Hon. B.R. Smith –– 2691

Mr. Lovick –– 2691

Appendix –– 2692

The House met at 10:09 a.m.

Prayers.

MR. ROSE: It is my pleasure today to

introduce in the gallery newly re-elected Art Wilkinson. alderman in

Port Moody, and Mrs. Wilkinson. Would the House welcome them please.

MR. JANSEN: On behalf of my colleague the

Minister of Finance and Corporate Relations (Hon. Mr. Couvelier), I

would like to ask the House to welcome to the Legislature a group of

grade 2 to grade 7 students and their teacher, Mrs. O'Sullivan, from

Elk Lake Elementary School. These students have taken time from their

classroom studies to tour the parliament buildings and observe the

session. Would you please join me in welcoming them.

Hon. Mr. Veitch tabled the thirty-second annual report for the

business done in pursuance of the Legislative Assembly Allowances and

Pension Act,

part 2, for the year ended March 31, 1987.

MR. ROSE: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a question

of privilege. It has to do with some answers given by the Minister of

Agriculture (Hon. Mr. Savage) in question period yesterday. I advised

the Minister of Agriculture that I intended to bring this up, and I am

pleased that he is here.

It concerns five milk producers without quota who were seeking

to re-enter the industry, as the minister said, in the same way as

other milk producers. I am advised that these milk producers are indeed

being treated differently, in the following respects: (1) while 100

percent of the levy is payable immediately, the Milk Board retains 25

percent of it and refunds 75 percent to the producers; (2) the 25

percent retained by the board is being used to help finance the

purchase of quota; (3) if quota is purchased, all the levies payable

from September to April 30 will be due and payable; and finally, the

Milk Board will allow the levy to be amortized over five years.

This is highly technical, Mr. Speaker, but I think it is

important. The minister told the House that these five producers were

being treated "on the same basis as every other producer who enters the

industry, the only exception being that they are to buy a minimum

amount of qualifying quota, which is 100 litres."

I believe the Milk Board collects levy on over-quota

production the same day that milk is shipped. There is no deferral or

amortization arrangement for the ordinary person wishing to get into

the dairy industry, which appears to be what is available to these five

who once sold their quota, challenged the system in court and lost, and

now apparently are being rewarded for breaking the law by having their

way eased back into the system.

If these facts upon which I rely are established, then it

appears the minister has misled the House, which would be, by

definition, a breach of privilege. If the Speaker, Your Honour, so

rules, then I have the appropriate motion prepared. I won't read the

motion, but I will offer, in terms of its content, that we establish a

special committee of privilege to consider the matters which I have

raised.

MR. SPEAKER: I thank the hon. member for

giving me advance notice, and I will reserve decision.

Orders of the Day

HON. MR. STRACHAN: Committee on Bill 34,

Mr. Speaker.

HEALTH STATUTES AMENDMENT ACT, 1987

(continued)

The House in committee on Bill 34. Mr. Pelton in the chair.

[10:15]

MR. CHAIRMAN: When we closed yesterday, we

were dealing with

section 32. We also have

section 8. which was

postponed and will be dealt with in the course of our proceedings here

today.

Section 32 approved.

section 33.

MRS. BOONE: I just have a few questions for

the minister with regard to 8.31 (6), which provides that "An order

under subsection (1) may include a requirement to pay the costs, or

part of the costs, of an investigation and of a hearing." I don't know

of any other organization or any other area where a group or a person

is required to pay the costs of an investigation. I was wondering if

the minister can tell me what the reason is for this and if there is

any other area where a group is made to pay the costs of an

investigation. It doesn't seem to be a reasonable thing to do.

HON. MR. DUECK: That is true, they are

paying their own costs. In other words, the lawyers will be paying for

their own costs if there's an investigation. I understand it's quite

common. It's also the case with the Law Society, the College of Dental

Surgeons and so on. So it's not unusual at all, when there's an

internal hearing of their own, that they will pay for the costs of that

hearing.

MRS. BOONE: I understand that they pay the

costs of their own lawyers and what have you, but are they responsible

for the full cost of the investigation, meaning the cost of the

ministry's investigation, all of the costs incurred by the

investigation? Perhaps I'm wrong but I don't believe that this is a

precedent that's set in any other areas.

HON. MR. DUECK: Mr. Chairman, they may well

pay for the whole cost depending on whether they're at fault or not,

but it's not unusual. They agree with it, it's common practice, and

that's the way we are going ahead with this. It's been agreed upon by

the people involved.

MRS. BOONE: I don't think it has been

agreed upon, and I have information from Dr. Jones indicating that he

is very concerned about this aspect and that he doesn't think it's a

fair practice. I don't know who you've been speaking with regarding the

agreement, but I don't believe that it has been agreed upon, and it

doesn't seem to me to be a fair way to deal with this. I can accept

that they pay their own costs, but I find

[ Page 2682 ]

it difficult to accept that they pay the costs of all the

investigations. Court costs are a different matter. I'm talking about

the investigation costs.

HON. MR. DUECK: Yes, I deal with Dr. Jones,

and he has not pointed out in the correspondence I've had from him that

that particular

section worries him. It may be that he's not completely

happy with it, but he hasn't raised that as a point of contention, nor

has he asked us to look into it further. It is, certainly, a practice

with the Law Society and the dental surgeons. And Dr. Finlayson, the

executive secretary, has not raised it in the last correspondence we've

had about the bill coming forward.

Sections 33 to 46 inclusive approved.

section 47.

HON. MR. DUECK: I move the amendment

standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]

Amendment approved.

Section 47 as amended approved.

section 48.

HON. MR. DUECK: I move the amendment

standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]

Amendment approved.

Section 48 as amended approved.

MR. CHAIRMAN: There are actually two

amendments to

section 48. Was everyone aware of that? Everyone seems

to be aware of it, so we'll move along to

section 49.

section 49.

HON. MR. DUECK: Mr. Chairman, I move the

amendment standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]

Amendment approved.

Section 49 as amended approved.

section 50.

HON. MR. DUECK: Mr. Chairman, I move the

amendments standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]

Amendments approved.

section 50 as amended.

MS. A. HAGEN: Mr. Chairman, I am really

pleased that there have been the amendments right through this

section

to more specifically define the qualifications of physiotherapists who

are receiving a temporary registration. I want to speak very simply on

the matter of temporary registrations at this time: I know I'm

stretching the rules a little bit, but I won't bend them for long. I

think it is unfortunate that here, where we have literally hundreds of

young people who are seeking opportunities to receive training in

fields of work where their skills and services are required, we are not

providing sufficient training within the province.

I want to have on record that although this does deal with a

very real need in certain parts of the province, our need is to train

people within the province. I know that if that training is available,

we will have people who will go to any length and breadth of our

province to work. I hope that the minister will continue to urge his

colleague in the Advanced Education and Job Training ministry to

recognize that we owe our own people the opportunity to get training in

skills that we need in this province. We shouldn't be relying on

importing people from other jurisdictions where they've spent dollars

to train people that they need. We shouldn't be relying on that

importation of skills; we should be providing the training and

providing the opportunity for our own young people to work in British

Columbia.

Section 50 as amended approved.

Section 51 approved.

section 52.

HON. MR. DUECK: I move the amendment

standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]

Amendment approved.

Section 52 as amended approved.

Section 53 approved.

section 54.

HON. MR. DUECK: Mr. Chairman, I move the

amendment standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]

Amendment approved.

Section 54 as amended approved.

section 55.

HON. MR. DUECK: Mr. Chairman, I move the

amendments standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]

Amendments approved.

Section 55 as amended approved.

Sections 56 to 62 inclusive approved.

section 63.

MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, sitting on this

side of the House, the government-in-waiting until the next election,

it's always interesting to study and see how government operates,

particularly when there are difficult situations that require sensitive

treatment. I know that it's not always easy to govern. It's at times

very difficult, particularly when the Minister of Health has the

Premier and the Minister of Finance (Hon. Mr. Couvelier) nipping at his

heels. It's even

[ Page 2683 ]

difficult for sincere ministers like the Minister of Health

and the Minister of Education (Hon. Mr. Brummet).

We do have a difficult situation in

section 63. We have the

question of a title to a profession. I know that the minister and

members of this assembly have received correspondence on this item

indicating that it is a controversial item, and there are compelling

arguments on both sides of the argument.

I'd like to go back to the Hansard of April 1, 1977, when the

B.C. Psychological Association was established. The minister's

predecessor at that time said:

"There has been considerable evidence of

serious abuse of the public by persons who are unqualified but who

offer psychological services.... There has been no way in which a

responsible solution to these complaints could be achieved due to the

absence of statutory control over the practice of psychology."

So we set up the Psychologists Act; we gave that profession

the protection afforded other professions in this province. And now we

have an amendment to that act that excludes a group of those

practitioners. We have roughly a thousand practitioners in the

province, maybe half of whom have doctoral degrees, the others having

master's degrees. Many of those people — the vast majority of them —

are members of the B.C. Psychological Association. and they believe

that all people who are practising psychology in this province should

have a doctorate.

But we have an anomaly. We have another group who are

practising psychologists within the school system. the school

psychologists. Over the years they have unsuccessfully sought

affiliation with the BCPA. They now want their own association; they

want to establish their code of ethics and practice and have an

organization that can meet their needs as professionals. However, they

were prevented by an injunction from so doing, and the courts must have

suggested that if they want to use the term "psychologist," then it

would be improper for them to do so, not having the kinds of

requirements that the B.C. psychologists' association suggests are

necessary in order for them to use that title.

[10:30]

So what's happening here is that we see an end run around the

courts by this intervention on the part of government. I appreciate

that it's not easy. There are compelling arguments on both sides, but

it seems to me there's a much better way to handle this situation. It

wasn't handled delicately. There wasn't consultation prior to the

amendment with both parties to the dispute. We see a one-sided

situation, and as indicated in the Times-Colonist

of July 14, 1987, ironically the adviser to the Education minister

(Hon. Mr. Brummet) on the issue was the vice-president of the school

psychologists' fledgling association. That person said: "Sure, I was

biased. The Education ministry hired me for my expertise, I was asked

for my comments on the issue and I passed them along."

So we see a controversial situation with compelling arguments

on both sides, but this government is not consulting with one side, not

trying to work out an amicable solution acceptable to both parties. I

think the seeds of a solution were there, both in terms of a survey of

the members of the BCPA and in terms of the school psychologists trying

to achieve affiliation with that group. We saw on November 10 a

compromise suggestion from the BCPA, a suggestion that the term

"psychological assistant" be the one that's used for school

psychologists.

Perhaps that's not an acceptable compromise to the school

psychologists of the province, but it is a compromise. I think we have

to ask ourselves, since we've seen other professional bodies being

allowed to determine their standards, being allowed to set the kinds of

standards and requirements for entry into that profession.... We've

seen it with the engineers, and I'm sure the member from Vancouver

South and the Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources would

not want to see their professions diluted by having other practitioners

use the title "engineer." The argument on behalf of the BCPA suggests

that we can't have a school nurse suggesting that she be called a

school physician.

I don't know whether the Government is opposed to PhDs unless

those PhDs are working for the Fraser Institute. I don't know whether

there's a fear of increased cost to the school system if the

requirement for school psychologists is a PhD. I think we've seen many

examples in the courts of trade names like McDonald's not being able to

be encroached upon. I think the government leaves itself open to the

accusation of dilution of standards. I think it is a shame that when

the parties involved are very close to an amicable resolution, the

government does not use its good offices to facilitate that resolution.

Instead, they allowed the end run around the courts, and they

allowed one side of the argument, when both sides are compelling, to

win the day, upsetting some 800 members of the BCPA who are merely

trying to do what other professions in this province are doing. It is

no wonder, when we see this kind of approach on the part of government,

that television is not allowed in this Legislature, because I think

what the government is doing in this situation is a shame. I think it

is another example of government bungling.

HON. MR. DUECK: This is requested of the

Ministry of Education more than the Ministry of Health. However, I

would like to point out just a few things that were mentioned by the

opposition member, who said that the sides were not consulted. They

were consulted. I know I've met with them numerous times and we

certainly have correspondence. In person....

As for saying that perhaps they do not agree with the PhD

versus the master's degree, I don't know how many members of the

association haven't got PhDs. So you can't say they don't agree. They

are fully qualified psychologists with a master's degree.

We are not speaking of bringing another class of psychologists

into the general marketplace. We are speaking about people who are

exempt from the Psychologists Act, inasmuch as they are serving in the

provincial government, where many of these people work, and also in

schools. So it is not something new: they are there now and they are

doing a tremendous job. I can use all sorts of examples and cliches

also. It is like saying: would you want a PhD to teach your grade ones?

There are degrees of qualifications, and I think the jobs that

the people with the master's degrees do in the schools is certainly

adequate — not only adequate, but I think they are doing a fantastic

job. It is up to the school districts and the board to make sure that

the people they put in as psychologists with master's degrees are in

fact qualified and doing the proper job. If that were not the case. I

would certainly have to agree with you that we have people working in

that area — perhaps helping disturbed children — who are not qualified

to do so.

I understand that these people are qualified in that capacity

for that particular job. and we are saying that they should

[ Page 2684 ]

be allowed to call themselves school psychologists rather than

counsellors, consultants or assistants. Having said that, perhaps the

Minister of Education would like to add to it.

HON. MR. BRUMMET: I am sorry; I just heard

the last part of what my education critic was saying. I am appalled by

what sort of

interpretations he is placing on that: statements such as

"Is the government afraid of PhDs?" or that we are trying to open the

door for other practitioners to call themselves psychologists.

Both those statements have to be considered erroneous, if not

ludicrous, if you took at what this legislation is actually doing. The

present legislation says that these people who are employed "by a

Provincial, federal or municipal government or government agency, where

qualifications in psychology are a condition of such employment." We

are simply inserting through this legislation "or a school board." We

are not taking out "where qualifications in psychology are a condition

of such employment."

I don't know how often it has to be repeated that the same

person, with the same master's degree which school boards require

before people can practise as school psychologists.... That same

degree, if that person is working for a municipality, a government

agency or the federal government, may say: "I am a psychologist." But

if, because of an omission in the past legislation, that person happens

to be working for a school board with the same qualifications, he may

not use the terms "psychologist" or "psychological testing" or that

sort of thing. That is what I can't understand: how my critic can

suggest that the government is ashamed of providing equity to people on

the basis of their qualifications and taking away an exemption because

they happen to be working for a different employer. If you read the

section, it says: "Nothing in this Act prevents a person to whom

subsection 1(b)... applies...... It means that 1(

b) still requires

that person to have all of the qualifications and the rights to

practise as a psychologist.

I don't know how this can be interpreted as opening the door

for other practitioners or that it is somehow interpreted as government

opposition to degrees; that is ridiculous. As I think we pointed out in

second reading debate, almost 45 percent of the people in the

psychologists' association now have master's degrees. So the rest of

the people who have master's degrees who choose to work with children

in this province.... That's why it surprises me that my education

critic would be making this point so strongly: that those people who

get the qualifications, get their master's degree and choose to work

with children in this province through the school board employment

should not be able to call themselves what they are.

Certainly I support this section, and I think it is highly

overdue that this one group, school board employers, be now included

along with the others and provide the equity to these people that they

are entitled to on the basis of their qualifications.

MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, in response to the

Minister of Health's comment about consultation, it's my understanding

from Patricia Wilensky, executive director of the B.C. Psychological

Association, that there was no consultation with that organization

before the amendments were tabled. I'm sure there's been consultation

since; we've all received a good deal of correspondence on this issue.

I suppose the ministers, the Minister of Education and the

Minister of Health, are very busy people and perhaps consider this a

minor

section and therefore don't listen to the kind of argument I was

suggesting. I was merely suggesting that this is a difficult situation

and that there are compelling arguments on both sides. The courts chose

one side, the government has chosen the other side. I don't need to

hear all the arguments in favour of the school psychologists, because I

think they are compelling arguments. You don't need to repeat them to

me; I've read them all. I'm concerned about them. I don't necessarily

disagree. But we have a family of psychologists out there. We have an

organization that represents psychologists in this province, set up by

this government. There is a family dispute there. There have been

attempts at affiliation for a number of years with the school

psychologists and the BCPA. There was an injunction to prevent school

psychologists from using the title psychologist. There has recently

been an overture on the part of the BCPA to allow affiliation with a

certain title. They are very close. Perhaps within a year or so the

BCPA would fully agree with the kind of thing the minister is doing at

this time, but this isn't the time for this legislation.

I could go on the compelling arguments of the BCPA and argue

with the Minister of Education and bluster like he does, but that's not

the point. The point is that there are compelling arguments on both

sides. It is a family dispute. The courts ruled one way; the government

has now jumped in, in its typical interfering fashion, and come down on

the other side. Why not use the good offices of government to get these

people together to come to an amicable reconciliation among themselves?

They're all psychologists. The government is ramming the use of the

term psychologist down the throats of the BCPA, who at this point in

time — maybe next year they'll change — say that they shouldn't be

using that term.

We do have the opportunity for certain people and certain

firms to use certain names, and the courts agreed with that. I think

it's improper for the government to interfere in this way, to take one

side of the argument when there are compelling arguments on both sides.

We don't need to hear the school psychologists' arguments; I

agree with you that they are good arguments. They are good people, and

they're doing a good job in the schools, and I'm pleased about that

too. We're talking about the use of the term psychologist. If it's too

difficult for this government to use its good offices to try to get

parties together and resolve problems rather than creating more

problems and alienating the BCPA, then I guess it's too tricky for this

government.

HON. MR. BRUMMET: Mr. Chairman, I think for

the benefit of all a couple of things should be straightened out. My

critic suggested that the court ruled one way and the government has

made the decision the other way. The court, because of the flaw in the

legislation, could only rule on the basis of the legislation, so the

legislation is being corrected.

About consultation. There has been consultation. I don't think

the government is taking sides here, other than to say: why would

someone with the same qualifications who happens to work for a

government agency be entitled to use the term "psychologist," while if

he or she is then employed by a school board, all of a sudden those

qualifications are invalid? That is what we are talking about — not

ramming it through, not accepting the position of the psychologist. It

has nothing to do with qualifications. It depends on who you work for.

We're simply removing the "depends on who you work for,"

[ Page 2685 ]

and saying that the qualifications remain intact. You could

consult forever and still arrive at: "since it isn't there

now,

therefore it should never be in there." The argument, I know, has been

used — which I consider invalid — that we're trying to water down the

qualifications; yet nowhere is there any evidence that the

qualifications are being watered down. It simply makes it possible for

those people with the right qualifications to be called psychologists,

and those who happen to work for school boards may also use the same

title as people who are working in any of the other agencies specified.

[10:45]

MR. JONES: I don't know whether it's

worthwhile to rise and debate the point. We could do this all day; I

don't think the minister is listening.

This legislation is only necessary because of the court

injunction. Those people could call themselves psychologists if the

psychologists in this province allow them to do so. They're prevented

from doing so, at this time, by the injunction of the courts. This is

an end run around that injunction. When you do that, when you take one

side in an argument like this, you leave yourself open to the criticism

that you are diluting standards. that you're not in favour of PhDs, and

all these kinds of things. You've left yourself open to that criticism

by doing this end run.

MS. CAMPBELL: Mr. Speaker, I hate to

prolong this debate, but I think I have to respond to the

extraordinarily arrogant comments by the member for Burnaby North with

respect to this legislation. He has recognized the....

MR. JONES: You should know arrogance.

MS. CAMPBELL: Yes, I see it very much on

your side of the House, every time I sit in here, hon. member.

The hon. member has made it very clear that he appreciates the

difficulty of the situation, as we all do. We have all listened with

great interest and concern to the members of the British Columbia

Psychological Association. But I would point out two factors which the

hon. member has not addressed.

The actors in this particular situation are not simply the

psychologists; they're not simply those who work for the schools as

psychologists; they are the school boards around this province who hire

these people. They have an interest as well.

To suggest that creating a statutory remedy to a court

decision is improper is, in my view, a reflection of such profound

ignorance as to be shocking in this House. It is perfectly legitimate

for this Legislature to create statutory remedies for situations which

the courts have created. It is perfectly proper to address the question

of an injunction. It is our duty as legislators. The arrogance of the

hon. member to suggest that the minister hasn't been listening is just

impossible to take.

I would point out that the statute makes very clear the great

concern.... The concern that I had for the psychologists' association

was that we should not undermine the profession of psychologists. as

we've established in this province, and that we should not allow people

who do not meet the statutory requirements in the Psychologists Act to

hang out their shingles as psychologists for the public at large. We

have created that protection. But this amendment does not do that. This

amendment exempts those people only in the course of their employment,

so that no one who identifies themselves as a school psychologist can

go out and hang up their shingle to the public at large. The public is

still protected, and that is the basic thrust of the concern of the

psychologists' association: that they wish to establish a profession

whose standards are recognized.

I think the hon. member has failed to acknowledge that, and

failed to acknowledge the difficulty of the 75 school boards in this

province who are faced by the threat of court action if they call

"school psychologists" those who do perform the psychological function

for them. I commend the government for responding to that problem.

MR. JONES: I'm sure the new minister of

defence, the first minister for Vancouver-Point Grey, as a lawyer,

would appreciate whose responsibility it should be to define who can

call themselves what professional title: it should be the profession.

I'm sure that that member would not want bodies other than lawyers

suggesting who could be called a lawyer. It's very simple that that's

what's happening. We're talking about who is entitled to call himself a

psychologist. It's not being determined by the psychologists of this

province; it's being determined by an adviser to the Minister of

Education who admits he was biased. That's what's at issue here. That's

why the government has bungled this

section of the legislation.

HON. MR. BRUMMET: I'll make just one

concluding point. I don't think any of us are arguing the right of the

profession to determine the qualifications regarding who can call

himself a psychologist. Nobody's questioning that right. All we're

saying in this legislation is that if those qualifications are

acceptable if you work for A. then those same qualifications should be

acceptable if you work for B. That. to me, seems eminently fair.

MRS. BOONE: Just in following what the

minister has said, it goes without saying that if you think that those

qualifications are okay for A, then for B, then why not for C? Will

the government be saying at some point that obviously if these people

are psychologists and are able to function in the school system and

call themselves psychologists and be acknowledged by parents as being

psychologists — which is what is going to happen, because they're not

going to be able to discern any difference there.... Who is to say that

the government at some point is not going to say: "Well, obviously

these people are psychologists. We ought to allow them as well to hang

up a shingle and practise as psychologists"? You are having the

dilution of standards here.

We have seen legislation in this House that has acknowledged

the rights of the engineers. I know that the Minister of Health is

currently negotiating with the nurses, and we support their stand to

establish protection of their title of nurse. Those people will be

acknowledging that some of those nurses will not have registered-nurse

standards, and yet we accept that the profession has the right to

establish the standards. This is what we are doing.

We do not deny that this group needs to have an association.

We don't deny that a master's level may be appropriate for the handling

of psychology in the schools. What we're saving is that there

are other ways of doing this. You can find another title that does not

infringe upon the title of the

[ Page 2686 ]

psychologist. The psychologists have suggested "psychologist

assistant." Why would we not allow them to call themselves psychologist

assistants, which would allow them to have some protection within the

association? Why not give them a title that does not say they are

psychologists, which is what you are doing here? You are not saying

they are school psychologists. You're not saying they are

parapsychologists. You're not saying they are any of those things. You

are saying they can call themselves psychologists if they have a

master's, although the association for the psychologists have

themselves established the practice of saying that they need a PhD.

Why are you allowing the dilution of their standards? This is

what you are doing. You are undercutting that association. As I said,

we do not disagree with the whole process of establishing a different

level of standards for the schools so that people can practise and

exist in the schools and so that they can organize and develop

associations. That is one of their main problems: they want the ability

to organize and have associations and standards of their own. But right

now we are totally ignoring the whole psychologists' association and

saying: "You have no right to set standards on what your profession is

called." That is what you are doing. You are telling the psychologists

that people who do not have the proper qualifications according to

their standards are able to call themselves psychologists. That is an

attack on the association. It is an attack on the standards, and it's

something that I haven't seen happen in other legislation that we've

seen in this House. I don't understand why in many cases you are

protecting titles, associations and standards, and on the other hand

are undermining this one association. It just doesn't make sense at all

to me.

MR. JONES: The Minister of Education was

referring to A and B, and I was just trying to envision the next C. I

think the next exemption to this Psychologists Act will come when we

have a group of school counsellors who have one or two courses in

psychology and seek affiliation with the B.C. school psychologists'

association, and are denied that.

They now call themselves school psychologists. We see an

injunction to prevent school counsellors from calling themselves school

psychologists, and then they appeal to government. We get good

arguments from the school counsellors and good arguments from the

school psychologists, and the government comes down on one side again,

and now we have counsellors calling them school psychologists.

You can see what's happening by that example — the kind of

thing this legislation is doing. There was another course; there was a

reasonable, rational, logical course to take, and that was to have the

family of psychologists work out their internal problems rather than

big brother government coming in and intervening in a family dispute.

HON. MR. BRUMMET: I don't know whether the

critic is being obtuse or just chooses to be difficult by saying that

standards are being changed here, that school counsellors could want to

call themselves psychologists and then could end up doing so.

Have you not read the legislation, the amendment and the

previous legislation which clearly indicates that they must meet the

qualifications to call themselves psychologists? All this is correcting

is that they may do so with those qualifications, whomever they work

for, right now. There is nothing here watering down qualifications or

standards, nothing whatsoever, because it does clearly say that where

qualifications in psychology are conditions of such employment, those

qualifications at this point are not below a master's degree.

I don't know whether the member can't simply understand that

if the person in the psychologists' association has a master's degree

and works for the government, he may call himself a psychologist. But

if he has a master's degree and works for the school board, then he may

not use that title. Obviously the court could only rule one way on the

basis of legislation.

So this is closing that gap, but it is not changing

qualifications. It is not changing standards; it's simply including

another employer. How you can get that through to people who have

chosen to say or give the impression that this is a watering down of

standards or this is opening the door for C to call themselves C, D, E

or F as an employer...should still allow them the right to call

themselves psychologists if they meet the proper qualifications.

Does it matter who they work for? That's why I find it so

strange. The opposition seems to be arguing that if these people have

the qualifications, but choose to work for a school board, then they

should not have the same rights as if they work for other employers

which are defined here. I almost can't believe your arguments.

[11:00]

Section 63 approved on the following division:

YEAS — 38

Brummet

Savage

Rogers

L. Hanson

Dueck

Richmond

Parker

Michael

Loenen

Crandall

De Jong

Rabbitt

Dirks

Mercier

Long

Veitch

Strachan

B.R. Smith

Couvelier

Davis

Johnston

R. Fraser

Weisgerber

Jansen

Hewitt

Gran

Chalmers

Mowat

Ree

Bruce

Serwa

Vant

Campbell

Peterson

Jacobsen

S.D. Smith

Messmer

Gabelmann

NAYS — 16

G. Hanson

Marzari

Rose

Harcourt

Stupich

Boone

Blencoe

Cashore

Guno

Smallwood

Lovick

Sihota

Miller

A. Hagen

Jones

Edwards

Section 64 approved.

THE CHAIRMAN: Shall sections 65 and 66 pass?

MRS. BOONE: I'd like to move an amendment

after

section 65.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Do you want to speak to

section 66, hon. member'?

[ Page 2687 ]

MRS. BOONE: No, I want to move an amendment

after

section 65.

MR. CHAIRMAN: To

section 65?

MRS. BOONE: No, after

section 65. I want to

move a consequential amendment.

MR. CHAIRMAN: All right.

Hon. members, shall

section 65 pass?

Section 65 approved.

MRS. BOONE: I feel it's necessary at this

time to protect those people that this legislation may put in jeopardy.

I feel it's really important, given the fact that in yesterday's

discussion of the bill the Minister of Health was unable to guarantee

that his ministry could protect the rights of people who suffered from

various medical conditions. He said: "If someone wants to rent a

premises and that individual does not allow such an individual in the

house, I don't think that I have the power to do that." He says he

thinks it comes under the Ministry of the Attorney-General. I'm not

sure whether that ministry has the power to do that either. The Human

Rights Act that we have at the present time does not in any way protect

the rights of individuals who have medical conditions.

I would like to move an amendment by inserting a new section,

section 65.1 — a consequential amendment — which provides that the

Human Rights Act, RSBC, 1984, c. 22, is amended by inserting the words

"medical condition" in sections 3 to 9 inclusive after the words

"marital status."

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, hon. member, for

your proposed amendment. The Chair has examined this and it would

appear to be beyond the scope of the act that is before us. I'm afraid

I'll have to rule it out of order.

MR. R. FRASER: Mr. Chairman, may I have

leave to make an introduction?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Please proceed.

MR. R. FRASER: Mr. Chairman and members of

the assembly, it gives me great pleasure to introduce Mr. Vic Barber

and students from Magee Secondary School who are visiting Victoria

today to see the operation of the Legislative Assembly, and believe me,

you're going to have an exciting day today.

One of the things I want to bring to the attention of the

House is that Magee Secondary School, through its students and

teachers, has developed a very interesting program about parliamentary

procedure. The classes have elected a prime minister and leader of the

opposition; they have a press gallery and a Speaker. They've gone

through the whole performance, and they understand how you can raise

tensions between people on different sides of the House. It's been a

very interesting and exciting experience. Because it was so good and

because I had the pleasure of talking to the class myself recently, I

would be very grateful if you would all show your appreciation of the

visit of this student group from Magee Secondary School.

Sections 66 and 67 approved.

On the amendment to

section 8.

MRS. BOONE: After discussing it with the

minister yesterday, I went back and looked at my amendment again, and I

am still convinced that it is necessary. The amendment before us gives

the individual due process of law after an order is given. As it stands

at the moment, due process is available only if an individual who has

the order placed on him has contravened that order. This amendment

would allow the recipient of the order to have process in the courts

before the contravention, so it is not necessary for a person to break

the law before actually having due process.

I believe this is really essential, given the fact that this

legislation enables people to be put into isolation or into quarantine

just from having come in contact or having been exposed to a virus or a

communicable disease, or somebody with a communicable disease. For that

reason, I believe that this is essential to ensure that all individuals

in this province have the right to have their say and have the right to

have an order rescinded. I am especially concerned, as I don't believe

that the rights of individuals are protected through the human rights

legislation that we have right now, and I am very concerned that there

will be abuse of the rights of individuals after this legislation is

passed.

HON. MR. DUECK: The proposed amendment was

considered by us, and we feel that because of the particular importance

of this part of the legislation, we cannot accept the amendment. Time

is of the essence, for one thing, and we believe it's unnecessary

because it's time-consuming, with no advantage whatsoever. Everyone is

satisfied on the process — what we are doing.

I would decline to support the amendment proposed because it

duplicates protections that will be established in the new

section 7.

Even before an order is ever made under this section, the medical

health officer, reviewing his concerns privately with the individual on

an informal basis.... There is ample opportunity to dispute the

necessity for an order at this time, with or without counsel. If an

order is made by the MHO, it has no legal consequence at that point,

and it requires voluntary compliance on the part of the affected

individual. If the MHO wishes to seek court enforcement of his order,

he must first obtain the approval of the provincial health officer —

the senior public health official in British Columbia, in other words.

This process involves an internal review, again, that could include

consultation with the individual. The laying of an information will

then result in a full bearing, with counsel, before a provincial court

judge. The judge has the authority to confirm or vary the original

order, as he deems appropriate, based on all the evidence presented to

the court. In addition, the order of the provincial court judge can

itself be appealed to the county court.

[11:15]

Furthermore, this amendment has been vetted by many people,

including the civil liberties group, who state in their letter: "Our

concerns re procedural safeguards for persons to whom orders are given

were fairly met by the advice of.... " — our people — "...concerning

the general provision of full and fair appellate procedures to all

persons affected by any authoritative action taken by public health

officers under the powers vested in them by the Health Act."

So we feel it is not necessary. As a matter of fact, it would

be a disadvantage to the health officer and to everyone concerned

because we are dealing not just with AIDS but with

[ Page 2688 ]

infectious diseases — and there could be others — where time

is of the essence. I don't think this procedure in any way precludes a

fair and proper hearing for the individuals involved.

MR. SIHOTA: Mr. Chairman, I rise to debate

this issue in keeping with what the Minister of Health had to say. I

know there are other issues that some of us here would want to get on

to and I don't want to detract from that. However, I think this is an

important issue that needs to be dealt with.

As I understand it, through my reading of

section 8 — and if

my assumption here is wrong I'm sure the Minister of Health will

correct me — a medical health officer, when he has reasonable grounds

to believe that a person has one of these diseases, may order one of

these persons to do a number of things which are contained in clauses

8(c), (

d) or (e), and (

e) of course involves isolation. Only when —

this

is where the assumption has to be tested — an individual contravenes

the order of the medical health officer will the matter then go to the

provincial court. I see the minister nodding in that regard, so it

seems to me that that pivotal assumption is true. I think that's where

we have difficulty with the

section and with the minister's statements,

and in light of that difficulty we're proposing this amendment to the

bill.

Let me now explain what I mean by that. The minister may or

may not be aware of the provisions of the Family and Child Service Act.

I'm going to use that as an example because I think it is the most

salient example of another piece of similar legislation. I see the

Minister of Social Services (Hon. Mr. Richmond) sitting there, so he's

familiar with the legislation as well.

In my view, an order to isolate is equivalent to an order to

apprehend a child. It involves a detention of an individual's rights,

one way or the other, to place a child under apprehension or to order

for isolation. If the individual has objections to being isolated, the

choice he or she has is to contravene that order. First of all, I don't

know how, in practical terms, you contravene that order if you're

isolated. I guess you've got to find a way to escape from the area that

you're confined to.

In any event, you have to contravene the order in order to get

in front of the court to argue whether or not the order had merit in

the first place. Therefore the focus of debate in front of the court

will undoubtedly be whether or not the order of the medical health

officer was contravened. The focus of debate will not be whether or not

the person has this communicable disease. Of course, it tilts the

balance and puts a different spin on the matter before the court, if I

can put it that way, if the matter is before the judge solely because

someone contravened an order.

What we've done under the Family and Child Service Act is

we've said — quite properly I think — that in the event that someone is

apprehended, they don't have to breach the apprehension order to get

back into court. They have the right to put an argument in front of the

court as to why the child should not have been apprehended, and the

state has an obligation to put forward its case as to why the

apprehension should have occurred.

To draw the same analogy with respect to this legislation,

what ought to happen in order to preserve those rights is that the

individual ought to have the right to challenge the decision of the

medical health officer. That's what the amendment speaks for — not to

turn around and say I have to contravene it in order to get into court.

I think the minister can appreciate that that puts a different spin on

it.

Recognizing that none of us want to see people out on the

streets who have communicable diseases and can cause a public hazard,

the amendment tries to put down some good guidelines in terms of moving

the whole process along very quickly. It has to be within five days of

receipt of the order, within seven days of receipt of the written

notices, and so on. So the idea is to move as quickly as you can, but

to preserve those rights in the same way that this Legislature has

chosen with respect to the Family and Child Service Act.

The key to making the argument I've made is that pivotal

assumption. Assuming that I'm correct on that assumption, I think the

minister will recognize that there is a flaw here, and perhaps we

should rework this provision of the legislation. I look forward to the

comments the good minister may have in this regard.

MS. CAMPBELL: I wonder if I might address

this because the hon. minister is not a lawyer and I am. I'd like to

respond simply because I think I may be of some assistance to him. That

is because the hon. member for Esquimalt-Port Renfrew has drawn an

analogy between this act and the Family and Child Service Act. I would

submit with all due respect that it is a false analogy, and it is false

for this reason.

The provisions in the Family and Child Service Act empowering

the superintendent to apprehend a child do give the superintendent

binding authority to apprehend the child. Of course, the act quite

rightly has a requirement that the superintendent go before the court

within a given period of time in order to provide to the court's

satisfaction that the apprehension was correctly carried out. There is

no such compulsory power in this act; there is no power of physical

detention against the will of the individual identified in this act. It

is simply a power to identify someone who should come under the

authority of this act. If the person fails to comply with the order of

the health officer, the health officer, as the minister has just

stated, has the right to go to his superior, the provincial health

officer, to seek permission to make the order binding. The order is not

binding ab initio; it is binding only when it has been heard by a court.

With all due respect to the hon. member, I would suggest that

the focus of discussion in the court is not going to be whether the

order has been disobeyed, because I think the court is quite capable of

reading the act and appreciating that those orders are not binding;

there is no penalty for not complying with the order. The focus will be

on whether the grounds for issuing the order are correct, whether they

have been met — the criteria set out in the act that the person has,

first of all, got the disease and has been found to be wilfully,

carelessly or on the basis of mental incompetence exposing others to

the disease. That will be the focus of the discussion in court. If the

judge finds that, he may then make the order of the mental health

officer binding. If he finds that those criteria have not been

established to his satisfaction, then the judge may refuse to make the

order binding, and there is no compulsion on the individual.

Interjection.

MS. CAMPBELL: I believe the second member

for Victoria (Mr. Blencoe) has asked how we get into court. You get

into court by the permission of the provincial health officer when

somebody has not voluntarily complied.

The important point is that the acts are not analogous, and I

would suggest the hon. member perhaps ought to know

[ Page 2689 ]

what he is talking about before he makes his comments. I would

say with respect to the argument made by the hon. member for

Esquimalt-Port Renfrew that the analogy between those two acts doesn't

hold at all.

MR. SIHOTA: It's a good thing, Mr.

Chairman, that we weren't charged for that legal advice, because it's

hogwash.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Oh, oh!

MR. SIHOTA: I'm sorry to have upset the

jury so much over there.

Interjection.

MR. SIHOTA: With all respect to the hogs,

that's right.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Hon. member, I don't know

that "hogwash" is particularly parliamentary language.

Interjections.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Please proceed.

HON. MR. BRUMMET: Limited vocabulary.

MR. SIHOTA: The Minister of Education

should know something about limited vocabulary.

This is a critical issue in terms of rights. I don't think

this is a partisan issue. We're simply trying to improve the quality of

the legislation, fairly put. Accordingly, I would like to go back to

the comments made by the member who spoke before me, to try to

highlight my concern here.

The member clearly has not paid adequate attention to clause 8

(l) (

e) of the legislation, which allows the medical officer to order

that someone place himself or herself in modified isolation or

quarantine, as set out in the order. At that point there's an order the

person has to comply with. The person has a choice at that point to

violate that order. To argue that the focus of the debate is not going

to be with respect to the contravention of the order is being blind to

the provisions of

section 8(3)(c), which I quote: "Where a Provincial

Court finds that the person charged under subsection (1.1) ... has

contravened the order...." Clearly the court is going to have to look

at the contravention of the order as a variable in arriving at its

decision. Then the focus becomes on 8(c), not what the focus ought to

be on: 8(3)(

a) and (b). Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, in my mind, that

supports the contention for the amendments in this regard.

I and the member who spoke before me and, I'm sure, the

Attorney-General (Hon. B.R. Smith) could engage in lengthy debate as to

what the legal implications of this are. I think it's fair to say that

there is some dispute. I think the minister recognizes indeed that the

pivotal question I asked was answered in the affirmative. I think the

minister recognizes therefore that it's vital that people have some

other way of challenging the decision of the medical health officer,

without having to violate the order. There must be some other way in

which they can bring themselves before a court to fairly argue whether

or not the decision of the medical health officer made sense.

We can get into the Family and Child Service Act. Maybe it's a

good analogy; maybe it's a bad analogy. But it's the most convenient

analogy I can think of in terms of another process that results in

people coming before the courts without having to violate something,

without having broken a provision of the statute, without having to

offend a public official. We should try to take that colour away from

the appearance in court. To that extent, I trust the member who spoke

before me would agree on the need to take that quality out of the

legislation. We're not asking for much in the amendments we are putting

forward. They're quite sensible. Who knows how often they're going to

be used? But I honestly think that that additional safeguard should be

provided. I really make the comments in that spirit, trying to improve

this legislation as opposed to there being some partisan quality about

it.

[11:30]

MS. CAMPBELL: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I

might just clarify a point. I think the hon. member has once again been

in error. The act says that "where a Provincial Court finds that the

person charged under subsection (1.1) (

a) has a reportable

communicable disease or is infected with an agent that is capable of

causing a reportable communicable disease, (

b) is likely to expose

others to the disease or the agent," — and the standards for

establishing that have been established elsewhere in the act — "and (

c) has contravened the order of the medical health officer referred to in

subsection (1)," he may impose penalties. Those are conjunctive

requirements, which means that it is not sufficient for someone to have

contravened the order to be subject to a penalty of the court. That is

what I meant when I said that the focus of the discussion in the court

will be, first of all, whether the person has the disease, and

secondly, whether that person has wilfully, carelessly or by reason of

mental incompetence exposed others to the disease. Those are

conjunctive provisions, and I respectfully suggest that the hon. member

owes me an apology with respect to his characterization of my legal

acumen — but I will allow him to do that privately.

MR. SIHOTA: Mr. Chairman, the point here is

that the inclusion.... I agree it is conjunctive; I don't deny the fact

that you have to look at items (a), (

b) and (

c) as a package. In fact,

if you listened carefully to the comments I made a few minutes ago....

I referred very specifically to 8 (3) (a), (

b) and then (c). Therefore

I acknowledge that you have to also determine whether or not the person

is suffering from this disease and so on.

The point still remains that in order to bring themselves

before the court, they have to contravene the order of the medical

health officer, and the court has to make a finding of that. What I'm

saying is that that ought not to be the manner in which someone gets in

front of the courts — through contravening a provision in the

legislation or an order of the medical health officer. They ought to

have the right to be able to come to the court on their own and

say, "Look, I don't think clauses (

a) and (

b) apply in this instance,"

and they should not have to break the law in order to do that. That's

all we're asking. We're giving them an alternative avenue through the

provision of this amendment, which says: "If you feel offended by

what's happened, you don't have to contravene. Within five days of

receiving the order you can appear before the court and argue your

case." I don't see what's so difficult about that in light of the

precedents that exist.

HON. MR. DUECK: Mr. Chairman, I thought the

two lawyers sparring was very interesting. It's like every case that

[ Page 2690 ]

you bring before the courts: you have two lawyers and they

never agree. However, I would side with our lawyer before I'd side with

the other one.

When we're talking about this disease or other diseases, it

always zeros in on one. We have far more problems with hepatitis and

tuberculosis. I don't think AIDS is really the issue in this particular

legislation, because we're saying there are people.... I'm just reading

here from Blatherwick's comments that he has a guy now with

tuberculosis who won't confine himself to a hospital and just keeps

leaving the place. "These changes would allow me to order him to stay

there." In other words, what we're saying is that it may never reach

the courts. The health officer may be in contact with the individual

who has hepatitis or tuberculosis and say: "Look, you must confine

yourself to certain quarters. You cannot go to bars and keep coughing

on people, because the risk is too great." Therefore it's giving that

individual a chance to deny or say: "Yes, I'll do this, or I'll do

something else." If that fails, the provincial health officer then must

again review the whole case, whether it is correct. If that fails, then

his relief is to the courts. At the court, the judge will sit on the

case, will look at all the sections of the act and see whether the

individual has been unreasonable and has acted against the order, and

then make his ruling.

I think it's fair and just. It's reasonable, and we do not

wish to change it. I think the groups we've had together with lawyers

all agree that this is good legislation. They all agree that we must go

forward with it, and that's what we intend to do.

MR. SIHOTA: I'm not going to get into a

debate at this stage of the discussion on this bill about whether we're

dealing with AIDS or hepatitis or whatever — that's probably better

left for the purview of our Health critic and the minister. I suspect

that that issue has been dealt with.

If I can refrain what I was raising, I don't know what is

patently unreasonable with the inclusion of a provision that says that

within five days of receipt of an order, under subsection (1), the

person who's in receipt of that order can request an oral hearing and

be legally represented. I don't see what's patently unreasonable with

that. Perhaps the minister could explain that to me. I don't quite

understand what's unreasonable about that provision.

HON. MR. DUECK: In my view, the legislation

is well balanced in favour of the individual who is perhaps carrying a

disease and also with the people we're trying to protect. We're talking

so much about the rights of the individual; we never talk about the

rights of the people who may be infected. For heaven's sake, those are

the people we're talking about also, but we concentrate constantly and

with vigour on the individual who is abusing his rights, and all the

others who also have rights are not being looked after at all. I think

it is time we looked after both parties, and that is what we are trying

to do. I think this legislation balances it very well. We are

protecting the people who are at risk, and we are also protecting with

a good process the individual who in fact has a disease.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, I would like

to ask the minister: how are the rights of the group, the rights of

society, offended by giving an individual the right to have his day in

court?

AN HON. MEMBER: It's the delay.

MR. GABELMANN: There is no delay. The

apprehension is made; the order is secured; the isolation is granted.

Within a certain period of time, there is an opportunity for that

person to appear in front of a neutral body — the courts — and have his

day in court. What is wrong in our society with an individual having

his day in court? How does an individual's right to have his day in

court transgress upon the rights of the majority or the rights of the

group? It doesn't.

There is no danger to society or the group or the collective —

however you wish to frame it — in having an opportunity for that person

who has been in isolation for perhaps five days to then be carried in

an ambulance, if necessary, or in some vehicle, to the court, with all

the proper protections that the medical authorities feel are required

in terms of society. What is wrong with that person then having his day

in court? How does that affect the rights of the majority? In fact, I

would argue that the rights of the majority are trammeled when you deny

an individual the right to have his day in court.

HON. MR. DUECK: I am not going to say much

more, except that that is exactly what our legislation does.

MR. CLARK: With all due respect — I wasn't

planning to get into this debate — it simply doesn't say that. What the

order says is that the individual has to violate the decision of

isolation. What our amendment says is not that he or she who is alleged

to have the disease can run around and infect people. It says that the

order stands that that person is quarantined, but that within five

days, he or she will have his or her day in court.

There is a fundamental distinction. I'm not a lawyer, but I

think it is quite clear that the court will look at the question of

violation in conjunction with the other tests as to whether or not the

isolation is warranted. It makes eminent sense not to place the onus on

the individual who is isolated to violate that order in order to get

his or her day in court.

Therefore I think the minister is absolutely incorrect in

saying that what the member for North Island (Mr. Gabelmann) said is

not what this legislation says. In fact, the amendments are reasonable

ones and not taken in a spirit of partisan debate, but taken to improve

the legislation in order to protect not only the rights of those who

could be infected but to protect the rights of the individual as well

to a hearing and to a fair day in court before the state can make what

is essentially a very heavy-handed or onerous test on the individual.

Amendment negatived on the following division:

[11:45]

YEAS — 18

G. Hanson

Marzari

Rose

Harcourt

Stupich

Boone

Gabelmann

Blencoe

Cashore

Guno

Smallwood

Lovick

Sihota

Miller

A. Hagen

Jones

Clark

Edwards

[ Page 2691 ]

NAYS — 38

Brummet

Savage

Rogers

L. Hanson

Dueck

Richmond

Parker

Michael

Loenen

Crandall

De Jong

Rabbitt

Dirks

Mercier

Veitch

Strachan

B.R. Smith

Couvelier

Davis

Johnston

R. Fraser

Weisgerber

Jansen

Hewitt

Gran

A. Fraser

Chalmers

Mowat

Ree

Bruce

Serwa

Vant

Campbell

Peterson

Messmer

Davidson

Jacobsen

S.D. Smith

MR. CHAIRMAN: The member for

Maillardville-Coquitlam wishes to make an introduction.

Leave granted.

MR. CASHORE: I would like to introduce Mr.

Gary Mauser, who is a professor at Simon Fraser University. He is a

recognized political analyst. Please welcome Gary Mauser.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The first member for

Vancouver South would also like to make an introduction.

Leave granted.

MR. R. FRASER: We had a class from Magee

Secondary School here, and this is another

section with their teacher,

Mr. Barazzuol. As I mentioned to the other section, you will see that

we talked about the course you were taking. Would the House kindly make

these students most welcome.

MR. JONES: I also would like to introduce a

member of the faculty of Simon Fraser University, located in the riding

of Burnaby North — Paddy Smith. Would the House please make him welcome.

Section 8 approved on division.

Title approved.

HON. MR. DUECK: Mr. Chairman, I move that

the committee rise and report the bill complete with amendments.

Motion approved.

The House resumed; Mr. Speaker in the chair.

Bill 34, Health Statutes Amendment Act, 1987, reported

complete with amendments to be considered at the next sitting of the

House after today.

HON. MR. STRACHAN: Mr. Speaker, I call

second reading of Bill 59.

MISCELLANEOUS STATUTES

AMENDMENT ACT (No. 4), 1987

HON. B.R. SMITH: Mr. Speaker, I won't make

a second-reading speech in introducing and moving second reading of

this broad, progressive and variegated piece of legislation.

MR. LOVICK: Interestingly enough, Mr.

Speaker, the Attorney-General makes the point that a number of us have

for a long time: that there are seldom real principles behind bills

coming from that government.

I want to just offer a couple of opening comments about Bill

Interjection.

MR. LOVICK: Oh my, we are feisty today, I

see, Mr. Speaker — members opposite.

My colleagues and I on this side of the House are

understandably and I think justifiably wary of miscellaneous statutes

acts, simply because they seem to be becoming more and more regular in

this Legislature. We question whether that is a good and legitimate

process, one that serves the people well.

The danger with omnibus bills is that they are rather like

omnibuses: they sometimes tend to carry some excess baggage.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Oh, oh!

MR. LOVICK: I'm delighted to see that you

people over there are indeed awake, for a change of pace. How

intriguing!

The issues in this bill, of course, as the Attorney says, are

many and varied: I believe he said variegated as well. That is the

case. Unfortunately. we also have some very clear errors in this bill.

One doesn't have to look very far into the bill to discover those

things occurring. Look at

section 1 — we got quite a way into the bill

before we discovered that there was something wrong.

Section 1, as we

know, is a housekeeping item, and we don't have any problem with the

intention of that housekeeping. The problem is that it seems the broom

is somehow defective in terms of this bit of housekeeping. I refer you

to the fact that in the note to

section 1, for example, we are told

that this is to deal with

section 53 of the Miscellaneous Statutes

Amendment Act (No. 2), 1987. But if one does any digging at all, one

discovers that

section 53 of Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No.

2), 1987, actually deals with libraries, not the Commercial Transport

Act. The predicament, of course, is that this bill, when passed by the

House, will also carry with it the error in that note.

I'm simply suggesting that we have legitimate grounds to be

somewhat apprehensive about the quality of the housekeeping if that

kind of error is made in the first

section of the bill.

We don't have to look too much farther to find another error,

which I'd like to draw your attention to as well. This has to do with

section

Section 17 of the bill is the Pension (Teachers) Act. The

intent of this particular

section is very clear, and we don't have much

problem there. The intent, we are told, is to correct an incorrect

numbering. Nothing, one would think, could be simpler. What a

marvellous irony, however, that the intention to correct an incorrect

numbering makes another incorrect numbering. What we discover, if we

look closely at it, is that "section 8(6) of the Pension (Teachers)

Act...is amended by renumbering it as

section 8(7)." But if we look

section 8 of the original act, we discover

section 8 (l), (2), (3),

(4). (5) — the end. There is, however, a statement in....

Interjections.

[ Page 2692 ]

MR. LOVICK: We have the existing

legislation here.

Interjection.

MR. LOVICK: The Provincial Secretary (Hon.

Mr. Veitch) is trying to suggest to me that I'm wrong. I'm suggesting

that on the order paper we have been presented with a particular bill

referring us to a particular statute. I look at that statute, and I

discover that there is no such thing as 8(6). It's not a big thing,

but I'm suggesting that it perhaps opens the door to some very

important questions: namely, whether the housekeepers are using a

serviceable and workable broom, or whether what we're seeing here is

something that may have been rather too quickly thrown together and is

full of other kinds of errors that might have somewhat more

significance and more importance.

Perhaps, Mr. Speaker, having made those few points about

housekeeping, about the apparent haste with which this particular

measure was created — and I emphasize apparent haste — I would suggest,

given the lateness of the hour, that it might be appropriate for us to

adjourn this debate until the next sitting of the House, at which time

I will deal with some more substantive issues in the bill.

The House resumed; Mr. Speaker in the chair.

The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to

sit again.

Hon. Mr. Strachan moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 11:57 a.m.

Appendix

AMENDMENTS TO BILLS

34 The Hon. P.A. Dueck

to move, in Committee of the Whole on Bill (No. 34) intituled Health

Statutes Amendment Act, 1987 to amend as follows:

SECTION 47 , in the proposed

section 5 (

c) by deleting "prescribed educational qualifications;" and substituting

"educational qualifications established under

section 25. I (1) (a);".

SECTION 48 , in the proposed

section 10 (1)

(

d) by deleting "prescribed educational qualifications;" and

substituting "educational qualifications established under

section 25.1

(1) (a) ;".

SECTION 48 , by deleting paragraph (

b) and

substituting the following:

(

b) by repealing subsection (2) and substituting the following:

(2) A person who

(

a) is a graduate in remedial

gymnastics and recreational therapy from a college specified under

section 25.1 (1) (b),

(

b) is practising in the

Province as a remedial gymnast on the date this subsection comes into

force,

(

c) meets the requirements of

subsection (1) (

a) to (c), (

e) and (f), and

(

d) completes any additional

training the council may require, is entitled to registration under

this Part, notwithstanding that the person does not have the

educational qualifications referred to in subsection (1) (d).

(3) Subsection (2) applies only to a person who passes the

examination referred to in subsection (1) (

e) before December 31, 1989.

SECTION 49 , in the proposed

section 14 (1)

(

d) by deleting "prescribed educational qualifications;" and

substituting "educational qualifications established under

section 25.1

(1) (a);".

SECTION 50 , in the proposed

section 17.1 (1)

(

a) in paragraph (

c) by deleting "prescribed requirements for

registration under this section, and" and substituting "requirements

established under

section 25.1 (1) (c),",

(

b) in paragraph (d) (iii) by deleting "a prescribed class of

persons." and substituting "a class of persons specified under

section

25.1 (1) (c) (iii), and", and

(

c) by adding the following paragraph:

(

e) the person has paid the fee.

[ Page 2693 ]

SECTION 50 , in the proposed

section 17.1 (2) (

b) by deleting "or restrictions".

SECTION 52 , in the proposed

section 20 (2)

by deleting ", the regulations".

SECTION 54 , in the proposed

section 25 (

g) by adding ", educational qualification assessment fees" after

"registration fees".

SECTION 55 , by striking out that

section

and substituting the following:

55 . The following sections are added:

Rules

25.1

(1) The council may make rules

(

a) establishing educational qualifications for the purposes

of sections 5 (c), 10 (1) (

d) and 14 (1) (d),

(

b) specifying colleges for the purpose of

section 10 (2) (a),

(

c) for the purpose of

section 17. 1

(

i) establishing the

requirements for temporary registration and renewal of temporary

registration,

(ii) defining a health care

facility, and

(iii) specifying classes of

persons,

(

d) establishing the conditions it may attach to a temporary

registration,

(

e) providing for the expiry of a temporary registration and

for the renewal, suspension, cancellation or reinstatement of a

temporary registration by the council, and

(

f) exempting an applicant who comes within a specified class

of applicants from

section 5 (d), 10 (1) (

e) or 14 (1) (e).

(2) A rule under this

section may provide for different

qualifications, requirements or conditions for different classes of

applicants or members of the association.

Power of minister to

request amendment or new rule

28.1

(1) Notwithstanding that a rule has

been approved by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, the minister may,

if he considers it to be in the public interest, request the council to

amend a rule or to make a new rule under

section 25. 1.

(2) Where the council does not comply with the minister's

request within 60 days after the date of the request, the Lieutenant

Governor in Council may amend the rule or make a new rule in compliance

with the request.

[ Return to Legislative Assembly Home Page ]

Copyright 1987, 2001, 2008: Hansard Services, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada