British Columbia Hansard — Wednesday, May 16, 1984 — Morning Sitting (33rd Parliament, 2nd Session)
33p 02s 840516a
British Columbia — Debates (Hansard)
1984 Legislative Session: 2nd Session, 33rd Parliament
HANSARD
The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.
The printed version remains the official version.
Official Report of
DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
(Hansard)
WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 1984
Morning Sitting
[ Page
4797 ]
CONTENTS
Routine Proceedings
Labour Code Amendment Act (Bill 28). Committee stage
section 15 –– 4797
Mr. Gabelmann
Mrs. Wallace
section 16 –– 4798
Mr. Gabelmann
Mr. R. Fraser
Ms. Brown
Mrs. Wallace
Mr. Michael
Third reading –– 4803
Division
Education Statutes (Fiscal Year) Amendment Act, 1984 (Bill 27). Committee stage
On
Section I –– 4803
Mr. Rose
section 16 –– 4804
Mr. Rose
Ms. Sanford
section 17 –– 4806
Mr. Rose
Hydro and Power Authority (Land Transfer) Act, 1984 (Bill 25). Committee stage
On
Section I –– 4806
Mrs. Wallace
Third reading –– 4807
Hospitals Amalgamation Act (Bill 26). Committee stage
Third reading –– 4807
Health Statutes Amendment Act, 1984 (Bill 29). Committee stage
On
Section I –– 4807
Mr. Cocke
section 2 –– 4807
Mrs. Dailly
section 5 –– 4807
Mrs. Dailly
Ms. Brown
Appendix –– 4809
The House met at 10:02 a.m.
Prayers.
Orders of the Day
HON. MR. GARDOM: Leave to proceed to bills, Mr. Speaker.
Leave granted.
HON. MR. GARDOM: I call committee on Bill 28.
LABOUR CODE AMENDMENT ACT, 1984
(continued)
The House in committee on Bill 28; Mr. Strachan in the chair.
section 15.
MR. GABELMANN: My main concern on
section 15 is really a
question. I am curious as to why 83(3) was amended to include the
affiliation idea. Why wasn't it made 83(4)? Why has the health and
safety issue in the Code, which is 83(3) at the present time...?
What 83(3) says at the present time is that
an act or omission by a
trade union or by the employees shall not constitute a strike where it
is required for the safety or health of those employees. What the 83(3)
amendment does is to add the affiliation clause as not constituting a
strike except where 73(
l) is applied. The problem as I see it — and
maybe I'm misreading it — is that in 73(
l) reference is made to 83(3)
in its entirety. On a construction project which has been declared an
economic development project, a health or safety issue could develop
which transcends the development project. The right to strike under
83(3) is taken away between developments, from one development project
to the next; and the desire of the government — apart from what we
think about what you're doing — appears to be to make sure that the
affiliation clause wouldn't shut down the neighbouring economic
development project on that same greater site. But the way I read the
amendments, what you've done is to also preclude the right to strike
over the right to not work, or to not show up to work, over a question
of health or safety. It could be that the health or safety question
transcends more than one site. If, for example, it were an air quality
problem, it could simply have been handled by making this amendment
83(4) and referring, in 73(l), to 83(4) rather than to 83(3). Why have
you integrated the health and safety issue into 73(1) ?
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: I'm being slow to warm up now, because I don't
think I'm reading correctly what you're saying. Are you saying we should
have had a separate 83(4)? The amendment to
section 83(3) deals only with
non-affiliation clauses, not with health and safety. This is a positive amendment
in terms of what we're doing. What we intend to do in 73, as I said yesterday
afternoon, is simply to ensure that any economic development project is in a
mixed site. In terms of 83(3), which refers to non-affiliation clauses, those
non-affiliation clauses are protected on the site where the unionized contractor
is working. They can't be transferred across the project to other projects,
but we wanted to ensure that a worker, no matter where he is, can still down
tools for those important health and safety reasons, and that's what we've
done.
MR. GABELMANN: It may well be what has been done. One of us
is slow to pick this up, and it may be me. Let me come out in another
direction. When you refer to 83(3) in respect of 73(l), you're
referring to both the affiliation clause and health and safety, because
the new 83(3) includes both issues; 83(3) is amended to now read what's
in the Code plus what's in the amendment. That's where we should start.
We should make sure that we agree about that before we go any further.
Am I right in saying that the new
section 83(3), as amended, will now
refer to both the health and safety issues and the affiliation issue?
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: No, what we've done is just ensure that
despite the fact that the non-affiliation clauses are restricted to
that project within an economic development project, the opportunity
for the workers to express their dissatisfaction with health or safety
is not denied.
MR. GABELMANN: I think we might make more haste if we back
up. Let's just deal with the first issue first.
Section 83(3) as
amended will include references to both health and safety and
affiliation clauses. Right? We agree on that, I think.
Within an economic development project that is so named, or any
construction project that hasn't been designated an economic
development project, the right to down tools over health and safety
questions and over the affiliation clause is there.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: "Or, " not "and."
MR. GABELMANN: The fact is that you could down tools over the
question of health and safety; you can also down tools over the
question of the affiliation clause if no economic project has been
designated and if it is within the particular designation, but you
can't cross over into the next designated area.
My concern is that 73(
l) refers to the entire
section 83(3), thus, I
think, denying the right of workers in a neighbouring economic
development project to down tools over a health and safety question
that may transcend several of the projects. I wonder if that was your
intent. Is that what it means? That's how it reads. Is that what it
really does mean? I think there's been a drafting error. I think you
simply mean, in fact, to have a
section 83(4) — that this new
section
should be an independent subsection within
section 83.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't agree. The
words are "where it is required for the safety or health of those
employees or where it is permitted." So there are two separate intents
in that section. What will very likely happen is that there will be a
number of individual projects on Expo, because by having it on a mixed
site, Expo will have to be considered as a number of projects. We go
back again to the famous Tasmania pavilion. I would say that if that
were an economic development project, and, for instance, there was a
union contractor involved who had in his collective agreement a
non-affiliation clause, that non-affiliation clause would be honoured
on that project but nowhere
[ Page 4798 ]
else. The same would be true of a health-and-safety
issue; it would be honoured on that project. If that group, whether
union or non-union.... They're only covered under the Code if they have
a collective agreement in place anyway. If that group of employees had
a safety worry and felt sufficiently about that safety problem that
they wished to down their tools, they would be able to do it where that
condition existed. I don't think that's any different from what's
currently in place in the Code, where it says: "An act or omission or
by a trade union or by the employees shall not constitute a strike
where it is required for the safety or health of those employees." I
don't think there's anything different here, Mr. Chairman,
[10:15]
MR. GABELMANN: I think we're getting somewhere in terms of
the understanding of the section. My point is: what happens if the
Tasmanian pavilion and the New Zealand pavilion are side by side and
are designated separate economic projects; therefore the affiliation
clause in the Tasmanian pavilion won't allow the New Zealand pavilion
to be shut down.... I understand that. What happens if there's a health
or safety factor that applies to both of them at the same time? Each of
them could shut down separately within the.... What happens if the
health and safety hazard is caused at one pavilion but affects the
other? Would the workers at the other still have the right to down
tools even though the health and safety issue is caused at the next
site?
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: I can't think of something except that
maybe they were building something over the roof of a building, or
something like that. Should it happen, I would expect to see somebody
before the Labour Relations Board for some kind of declaration on a
matter like that. Conceivably that could happen, I'm sure, providing it
could be proved that there was a legitimate safety issue involved.
MRS. WALLACE: I have just a very quick question. Subsections
83(
l) and (2) relate to the employer. They're separate; they don't make
(2) an addition so they both relate to the employer. Why is the
minister including these both under the one?
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: What's wrong with it?
MRS. WALLACE: Just for the sake of consistency, it seems that
it would be better to number it (1), (2), (3) and (4) rather than to
throw all things relative to the employee into number (3) and leave
(1) and (2) separated relative to the employer. Each specific thing is
numbered. Why the decision? I guess I'm thinking there must be a reason
for wanting to lump it together, or else it would be separated.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Well, Mr. Chairman, we had many
sleepless nights over this one, wondering whether we should put in
another figure, number (4). It doesn't make any difference. All you'd
have is another number. The act is very clear. I don't know what the
big deal is.
Section 15 approved.
section 16.
MR. GABELMANN:
Section 16, Mr. Chairman, is the picketing
section, one that — in my view at least — is fuzzy in terms of its
implications. I guess I'll start this by asking some questions. First,
doesn't the wording in fact outlaw primary picketing in some cases? If
the IWA was on strike at MacMillan Bloedel in the forest industry, my
reading of this is that the secondary picketing at the pulp mills would
have to be approved by the Labour Relations Board. Is picketing at the
MacMillan Bloedel headquarters primary or secondary picketing?
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Are you waiting for that now?
MR. GABELMANN: I asked you a question.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Continue, please.
MR. GABELMANN: I guess I'll have to continue if the minister won't answer that.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Oh, no, I'll answer it. I just wasn't sure that....
No, I don't think that does limit picketing at the headquarters.
It's the same employer and the same business; it's an extension of the
primary site. If, for instance, MacMillan Bloedel had their head
offices in a shopping centre, they'd probably have to limit their
picketing to where that office was, but it wouldn't stop those pickets
from happening.
MR. GABELMANN: May I ask another technical question? If a
pulp mill is on a legal strike, and there's a legal picket line in
place around the pulp mill and everything is fine in terms of the law,
and there's a construction project within that pulp mill, is the
picketing of that construction project within that pulp mill primary or
secondary?
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, I believe it would be a
matter for the conscience of the people who were working on the
construction site as to whether they wanted to cross picket lines.
Second, it would be up to the employer to go to the board, I guess,
under common site or some area like that and apply, should those people
decide that they won't cross picket lines. I don't think there would be
anything different then than now. That's generally what would happen.
The employees — if they were union employees — obviously wouldn't cross
the picket line, and so the employer would go to the Labour Relations
Board and ask for some kind of a declaration, and they would have to
look at it. Certainly it could be classed legal, I would think.
MR. GABELMANN: I raise that question because some lawyers
have suggested to me that there is some very real doubt about what does
constitute primary picketing, particularly in the example I used of the
pulp mill. Clearly the workers on the construction project are not
producing pulp, paper or whatever. I think there is at least some
ambiguity.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: I don't think the situation will change,
Mr. Chairman. It still would come down to whether the board would make
a ruling. I'm just reminded that on several occasions, such as the one
you describe, in the past the board has, first of all, attempted to
determine whether it was a separate site and if there was a way of
gaining
[ Page 4799 ]
access without crossing picket lines. If the work
was unrelated to the manufacture of pulp, then they would create some
kind of a portal where there could be separate access maintained, and
the work could continue. But if the board could determine no way of
gaining that separate access.... The board has always and always will,
I'm sure, respect the right of the union member not to cross a legal
picket line.
MR. GABELMANN: If in fact it's a legal picket line around the project. I guess that's the question.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: No, not if it's the primary site. It would be....
MR. GABELMANN: I hope I hear the minister saying that primary
sites include the primary site. I guess my concern is that it may be
that the primary site is in fact more narrowly defined as a result of
these amendments. Be that as it may, it's a question that will be
determined when the first application is made to the LRB. I hope, when
the LRB has the hearing and writes its report, that it takes into
account the debate that happened here, and that there doesn't appear to
be any intention of....
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: I'll send them a copy of Hansard .
MR. GABELMANN: I'm sure they'll have one, just like the four federal ministers no doubt had access to the entire Hansard of that debate.
Mr. Speaker, there are a lot of concerns of a technical nature which
I'm going to leave now, but my major concern about this picketing
section is that while it meets some legitimate concerns about the
widespread use of secondary picketing, which on occasion has not been
well handled internally by the labour movement — I acknowledge that — I
think that unfortunately sometimes people bring on repressive
legislation, and to a certain extent we saw that in this case.
But be that as it may, this legislation goes beyond the concerns
that were expressed by many people as a result of the recent forest
industry picketing. What it does is to say to a small union that is
attempting to successfully conclude a labour dispute: "In order to
prevent your employer from continuing to circumvent the strike, as
employers often do in the small sector, you are going to have to first
of all go to the labour board to get authority for secondary picketing
in each and every instance where you want to apply that secondary
picketing." So in the classic case of a load of widgets coming out of a
struck plant, or an allied plant, which might well be legitimately
declared to be a target for secondary picketing by the labour board,
the truck will be long gone before the picket line is approved.
That may be the government's intention. This may be what you want to
help the employer on his side of the strike, but that's what happens.
The effect of it is that you can't exert maximum economic pressure,
which is what strikes and lockouts are all about. The more economic
pressure you can exert, the quicker the resolution is achieved. If the
union can't exert economic pressure on the employer in that case
because the employer can continue, one way or another, to produce the
goods, you have the inevitable result of lengthened labour disputes and
more frequent unresolved labour disputes. We have some labour disputes
that are 15 years old and haven't been resolved and never will be —
Dominion Motors and many more. The retail wholesale union, which is the
union I belonged to for some years, is the one that particularly will
be affected because they're actively involved in organizing and in
representing small employers. Without the ability to quickly put up a
picket line, the employers will have it all over them. I think that in
this
section that's the major problem. If you're attempting to deal
with pulp workers expanding their picket line to include forestry
operations or sawmills, that's one thing. But in effect you're saying
to small unions that you're taking away whatever economic power they
have, which they have largely — not exclusively — through their ability
to put up a picket line in a hurry and to move it around. That's now
gone without prior approval.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Well, Mr. Chairman, we made a similar
amendment, as the former Minister of Labour reminds me, to allied
picketing, and it's working quite well.
We've got a bit of a philosophical difference here, and I think it's
come up earlier as well. What the member says might be great industrial
relations theory to be taught at labour schools or other places, but
what we're saying is that you should have the right to exert that
economic pressure on anybody, hurt them as much as you want in order to
bring pressure on someone who is the primary target. It doesn't matter
whether those people have any interest in the affair. You should be
able to shut them down for three days — and they're probably small
employers too, if it is a small employer situation — without impunity.
I just don't agree with that. I don't think you should be able to use
other people as a club to bring someone else in line.
One of my advisers has a sort of a parable about a hockey game. As
long as the players confine their fights to the ice, perhaps it can be
tolerated in some way, but as soon as they go out and start bashing the
fans, then somebody else had better step in. Really, I guess in many
ways that's what we're saying. I don't believe that you should have an
unlimited club to use on innocent parties in a labour dispute. There
may be times when that economic pressure can legitimately be used, but
surely there's nothing wrong with having permission to use it first.
That's the position we take.
MR. GABELMANN: Let's continue the hockey game analogy, Mr.
Chairman. If Dave Langevin takes on Wayne Gretzky, under these rules
Dave Semenko has to get prior approval from the referee to intervene on
Gretzky's behalf. In the hockey game now, normally Semenko will go in
and beat up Langevin.
MR. MICHAEL: That would sure make for a cleaner game.
MR. GABELMANN: It sure wouldn't; that would be the problem.
Then we would get into the European style of hockey where they kick
each other and use the stick and do all kinds of dirty, illegal things.
Right?
The minister's analogy about the fans is not appropriate. What he's
saying to Dave Semenko is: "You get prior approval from the referee to
go in and beat up Dave Langevin.
[10:30]
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: They don't have fights in baseball.
[ Page 4800 ]
MR. GABELMANN: Well, you started the hockey analogy; I just
wanted to continue it. It's a serious matter. Levity is fine, and my
colleagues think I'm never humorous or light enough. It is a serious
matter, though, Mr. Chairman, and one that I know again tilts the
balance overwhelmingly against the unions in the collective bargaining
process and in their attempts to resolve disputes. We shouldn't be
surprised at the kind of response you saw yesterday in Vancouver, when
Code amendments include at least three or four really serious matters
upsetting the balance. I'm not arguing that the status quo is perfect,
but this requirement for prior approval....
I said yesterday that I don't like predicting, because sometimes you
predict and then it comes true, but I think I know enough about the
business to know that that prior approval will be violated, and it will
be violated by necessity. There is no point in going for approval to
stop a truck from delivering some goods that end up breaking your
strike if, by the time you get the approval, the truck has finished its
delivery. So what people will inevitably do is picket that place
without approval, and that's not what we want in a labour code. We want
there to be a code that applies fairly and is perceived to apply
fairly, and not an invitation to break the law. For the most part
people don't want to be lawbreakers, trade unionists don't want to be
lawbreakers, but the government is saying: "We are going to force you
to be lawbreakers." The alternative is that you can't prosecute your
strike with the same effect that the employer is able to prosecute the
lockout.
So while these sections deal with the political problem that is
perceived by the government, they go that extra step, which in my view
is totally wrong. Time will demonstrate the validity of our respective
positions. There is no doubt at all in my mind that time will
demonstrate that that particular aspect will have to be reversed.
MR. R. FRASER: Mr. Chairman, I disagree with the member for
North Island. I happen to have been involved as an innocent bystander
in a secondary-picketing circumstance that I thought was completely and
totally offensive to me and the other several hundred people who were
there as well, one involving a large union and a large corporation
fighting each other on somebody else's territory. As I said earlier, I
really think that labour disputes involving unions and management
should be restricted to those people who are directly involved, and not
involve anybody else. I would support this
section wholeheartedly,
because I feel that whether the unions and the companies are large or
small, they are probably of equal strength in almost every circumstance
and can quite adequately solve their problems without involving
innocent parties.
MS. BROWN: I just want to set the record straight when that
member talks about union and management being of equal strength. This
province has a history, going back many years, that there has not been
equal strength. I can think of Sandringham Hospital, where those 28
women were up against a large private hospital corporation for years.
Certainly they were almost beaten into the ground until legislation was
introduced in terms of ensuring their first contract. Windermere
hospital, the cancer clinic, all the hospital unions. When you talk
about inequality between union and management, the unions involved are
mostly women workers. They're usually in weak unions up against very
powerful employers, and usually they lose their strikes. Secondary
picketing is one thing that I know certainly has been used in the past
by a number of them, and one that they would be able to continue using.
If it were simply a matter of equals up against each other, we wouldn't
need the Code, quite frankly, but that's not the way it happens.
I've refrained from participating in this debate because I thought
that our critic was articulating our position very competently. But
when the first member for Vancouver South (Mr. R. Fraser), who is the
expert on the meaning of words, interjects this new concept of
management and union being two equals locked in mortal combat with each
other, I just have to say that that is not the fact at all. That has
not been the experience with women in the restaurant industry, in the
banks, in the department stores and in the hospital industry, which is
the reason why they're not organized today. The bank workers are still
not organized. The department stores — the same thing. Most women in
the restaurant unions, many of whom are immigrants, and running into
language difficulties and this kind of thing, can't fight the employer;
they're too weak. This is the reason they needed a strong Labour Code.
This is why we were upset about the certification
section — which I'm
not going to reflect on because it's gone — and the decertification
section. Certainly secondary picketing for those unions that did exist
was one tool they could use that was very vital to them. I think it's
unfortunate that the bill, when it is passed, is going to really weaken
an already weak group of workers who needed the protection that a good
Labour Code could have given them.
MRS. WALLACE: I've been listening very carefully to the
debate and the questions my colleague has been asking relative to what
does constitute secondary picketing. I thought I understood this
section, quite frankly, but as I listen to the minister's answers I'm
not sure. So I want to pose about three sets of examples, and get the
minister's response: either yes, that's secondary picketing and would
require all this, or no, it isn't. Let's assume there are two sawmills,
both making the same product, both owned by the same company and both
organized by the same trade union. A problem arises in one. Is it
secondary picketing if that same union pickets another operation owned
and operated by the same employer? Would that require going through
this process and getting permission? What's the answer on that?
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: The member is saying that they're
covered by the same collective agreement. There is only one collective
agreement, so they are one unit.
MRS. WALLACE: No, I said they were represented by the same trade union, not necessarily the same agreement.
MR. GABELMANN: I'll put that same question in a different
way, Mr. Chairman. Let's assume there's a restaurant chain with ten
restaurants. One of them is organized and certified. Collective
bargaining takes place, it breaks down, and they go on strike. A picket
line goes up around that restaurant that has been organized. That's
primary picketing — no question. That's legal — no problems. That
restaurant chain continues to derive 90 percent of its income from the
other nine restaurants, because they're still working. The employees
suffer 100 percent loss of income; the employer suffers 10 percent
loss. The union recognizes that the employer can go for a long time
with 90 percent of its revenue — or more, because some of its customers
will probably go to
[ Page
4801 ]
the next restaurant, and it will probably continue
with 95 percent of its income. So the union workers, who are suffering
100 percent penalty, decide they want to expand their picketing in
order to try to resolve the dispute by bringing the employer back to
the bargaining table, which the employer won't want to go to because
there is no economic pressure on him, so the union expands its picket
line by going to the other restaurants. That's secondary picketing,
under these
definitions, and can be refused. So too could a boycott
campaign. Anyone participating in or advocating a boycott of those
other nine restaurants — as I read the changes in their cumulative
effect — is also required to go and get approval before instituting
that economic boycott.
So the government is saying by these amendments that the workers in
that certified restaurant have no economic power. That's what's at the
heart of this section. The way to resolve that dispute at that first
certified restaurant is to put an equal amount of economic pressure on
the employer as exists on the employee. Unless the union has the right
to go and picket those other places, they won't have that power.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: That's right, and I think it should be.
Why should a group of employees, who have a collective agreement in
place, be able to put another group of employees, who have chosen not
to belong to a union, out of work? Why should they have that right,
unless the test of the act is met? The test of the Act is quite clear:
if it can be proved that the employer is carrying on the primary
functions of his business at another site, then that can be ruled by
the board — not by the government or by anybody else — to be a
secondary site and can be legally picketed.
There is a classic example. Many MLAs in this House receive all
kinds of correspondence from a company called Malkin and Pinton. Nine
unionized employees in their Prince George operation were on a legal
strike and put another 275 non-union employees in sites all over the
lower mainland effectively out of work by putting up picket lines
around those firms where there was no collective agreement in place.
The member thinks that's okay, and they should be allowed to do that. I
say it's time somebody started to protect the public interest in this
province, and I believe that that's what this
section does.
MR. GABELMANN: It does that, sure, but it also denies the right of the
employees on strike or the locked-out employees to successfully conclude their
negotiations, especially when it's the first contract. Under these rules,
a campaign for example, at the present time against Canadian Tire in Victoria
would not be legal. If I were to stand outside the Canadian Tire store in Victoria
handing out leaflets urging people not to shop at that store because of the
strike at Prince George, I wouldn't have that right under these....
The public still has the right to cross that picket line when the struck operation
is continuing to work. For the most part this affects that kind of situation
where there may well be a picket line put up around a non-union — as I cited
earlier — restaurant or Canadian Tire store. The public still has the right if
they so choose. Jack London had a nice description for people who do it, but
if they want to go across the picket line they can. The public right isn't
affected. The rights of those struck employees sure are. You say to people in
a first contract situation in those areas: "You may as well forget even
bothering to organize." You can never successfully conclude a first collective
agreement unless one is imposed under
section 70 of the Code, and when does
that ever happen? Should it happen is another question, but when does it ever
happen?
[10:45]
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: We're obviously not going to agree on
this
section and what it does. I accept that the member has some very
earnestly held opinions on it, and I don't share them.
On the matter of whether or not a person could counsel an economic
boycott, that's covered under
section 84 of the Code, dealing with
information. It is quite clear that anybody at any time, as long as
what they do is not constituted as picketing under the act, can hand
out pamphlets and can advise people. Picketing only restricts the site.
They can hand out pamphlets saying: "Don't eat Canadian tires," or
whatever, and that would be quite legitimate, in my opinion. They could
have someone standing there saying: "Everyone who works in here is a
scab." I would consider that to be legal under the Code.
MR. GABELMANN: I don't think there is any doubt that I could
hand out a pamphlet here to every member saying: "Don't shop at
Canadian Tire." There's no problem about that. But I'm not sure any
longer that I can stand outside the front door of the Canadian Tire
store in Victoria with a sign on my back saying: "Canadian Tire on
strike," and hand out literature urging people not to....
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Any place, any time.
MR. GABELMANN: We'll see how the picketing
section is
interpreted. I have some grave concerns about that. When is an
information line a picket line? This is a gray area. I think this
amended wording leads to a situation where that kind of thing will be
what has been perceived to be an information line or an economic
boycott.
Section 84 will no longer have the same impact as a result of
the changes to 85. We've made the case.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Don't forget that an employer can go to
the board at any time over any matter, I'm sure, and ask for the earth.
The board may decide that it's not a matter that they should hear, or
that the employer is mistreating the board. There's always that
opportunity. It's the board that will make the
interpretations, and
they'll have to interpret from the words they've got in the
legislation. I'm sure that they'll continue to look at past practice as
well as it relates to the new words. That can happen. Any employer can
go at any time to the board and say that they don't like what is
happening in terms of an informational picket line, and then the board
has the duty to make a judgment on whatever it is that is before it.
MS. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, I want to ask again for some
clarification about this. I use the example of the dispute that took
place at the Windermere private hospital when the nurses' aides were
trying to negotiate their first contract; as the minister knows, it
took them about four years to do it. The Windermere hospital is a part
of a series of 24 long-term care facilities right across the United
States and Canada which is owned and operated by Trizec, whose main
function is real estate. Trizec is a billion-dollar Ontario real estate
development company; it's the second largest in Canada. Running
[ Page 4802 ]
private hospitals and long-term care facilities is
not their primary job. For example, in British Columbia they own the
Lougheed Mall and the Brentwood Mall. Could those nurses' aides, under
this legislation as it is now, put a picket line around the Brentwood
Mall or the Lougheed Mall? Even though they were negotiating a first
contract at a private hospital, a long-term care facility, the primary
job of the owners of that hospital is not running long-term care
facilities; it is real estate. Would that still be considered primary
or secondary picketing, bearing in mind that the owners are running the
long-term care facility as a secondary job?
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, if you allowed that you
would have chaos — industrial chaos and economic chaos. There are lots
of people who own lots of different businesses. If the kind of thing
that the member is suggesting was allowed, you would have no way of
managing the system.
MS. BROWN: It says the "primary place of business." The
primary place of business is not the hospital. The hospital is just a
little something that they have on the side. Their primary office is
located in one of those malls.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, the employer is the person whose name appears on the collective agreement. That's who the dispute is with.
MS. BROWN: And that disputed employee is an employer of
Trizec Corp. and running a hospital is not their primary function. As
this act is written now, they presumably could put up a picket line
around Brentwood Mall or Lougheed Mall, which is where they have their
office.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, if the company had its
head office at Lougheed Mall — I've already answered the question of
the member for North Island (Mr. Gabelmann) — yes, that head office
could be picketed.
MS. BROWN: Okay.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: It has been the past practice of the
board that the mall cannot be picketed, but the head office of the
company can be picketed.
A prime example is the liquor stores. When BCGEU employees went on
strike and the liquor stores were closed down, picket lines were set up
around many malls in British Columbia effectively closing down the
entire mall — Safeway, shoe store, the whole thing. The board ruled
under current provisions of the Code that that was not allowed. Only
the area in which the dispute was held could be picketed, and so the
liquor store could be picketed. What you're saying, though, is that if
the head office is there, yes, the head office can be picketed.
MS. BROWN: Presumably, Mr. Chairman, because they own the
malls, they could apply to the Labour Relations Board for permission to
picket all of the malls. They own the malls; they built them, they're
theirs. They don't just own the head office.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, they can apply, if they want, but
I would be very surprised if the board allowed the picketing under the current
provisions or the new provisions of the Code. Take the steelworkers of Trail,
who have a contract dispute with Cominco. Should they be allowed to shut down
the CPR transcontinental railway? Should they be able to shut down the Canada
Place development because Marathon Realty has been involved in it? You just
can't allow that kind of chaos to exist in the community. You've got
to narrow it in some ways. I'm sure the board would say that that's
not allowed under any circumstances, whether under the new
section or the old
one.
MR. MICHAEL: Mr. Minister, I suppose the best way to describe
this question is to give a bit of background or perhaps develop a
scenario. Suppose the office workers' union was bargaining with the IWA
regional council, and one of their demands was the abolition of company
unions — they didn't like the idea that some local unions in B.C. had
stenographers who were members of the IWA — and the office workers
said: "Look, we want to abolish company unions. We insist that all
employees in local unions who are stenographers belong to the Office
and Technical Employees' Union." Suppose that developed into a strike
at the regional council level in Vancouver, which is owned and
controlled by the 16 local unions. Would this legislation permit those
girls and guys in Vancouver to go out to the 16 local unions, the ones
that require their stenographers to become members of the IWA, and
picket those local union offices without the permission of the board?
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Again, Mr. Chairman, I don't really
know. It would be up to the board to put the test. The test is in the
act. The test is simply whether or not the primary employer is having
work carried on at a secondary site which is essential for the
operation of his business. If that test could be proven, I would assume
that secondary picketing would be allowed; if the test couldn't be
proven, then it wouldn't.
Sections 16 to 19 inclusive approved.
Title approved.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, I move the committee rise and report the bill complete without amendment.
[11:00]
Motion approved on the following division:
YEAS — 24
McCarthy
Nielsen
Gardom
Curtis
McGeer
Davis
Kempf
Mowat
Campbell
R. Fraser
Johnston
Pelton
Michael
Ritchie
Richmond
Heinrich
McClelland
Schroeder
Brummet
Waterland
Ree
Segarty
Reid
Reynolds
[ Page
4803 ]
NAYS — 15
Macdonald
Howard
Cocke
Dailly
Sanford
Gabelmann
Blencoe
Rose
Passarell
Mitchell
Wallace
Lockstead
Hanson
Brown
D'Arcy
An hon. member requested that leave be asked to record the division in the Journals of the House.
The House resumed; Mr. Speaker in the chair.
Division in committee order to be recorded in the Journals of the House.
Bill 28, Labour Code Amendment Act, 1984, reported complete without
amendment, read a third time and passed on the following division:
YEAS — 24
McCarthy
Nielsen
Gardom
Curtis
McGeer
Davis
Kempf
Mowat
Strachan
R. Fraser
Johnston
Pelton
Michael
Ritchie
Richmond
Heinrich
McClelland
Schroeder
Brummet
Waterland
Ree
Segarty
Reid
Reynolds
NAYS — 16
Macdonald
Barrett
Howard
Cocke
Dailly
Sanford
Gabelmann
Blencoe
Rose
Passarell
Mitchell
Wallace
Lockstead
Hanson
Brown
D'Arcy
Division ordered to be recorded in the Journals of the House,
HON. MR. GARDOM: Committee on Bill 27, Mr. Speaker.
EDUCATION STATUTES (FISCAL YEAR)
AMENDMENT ACT, 1984
The House in committee on Bill 27; Mr. Pelton in the chair.
section 1.
MR. ROSE: I think this bill amounts more or less to a
housekeeping arrangement or rearrangement. I have some reservations
about it, but I indicated earlier in second reading that I didn't have
any deep or profound ones. But I would like the opportunity to make
some general remarks about the bill. I'd like some advice on the proper
stage at which to do that.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Would you continue, please.
MR. ROSE: I would just like to say a few things about the
bill. First of all, I agree with the minister that it's a long overdue
reform and that it's been welcomed, especially by the school boards. It
will allow them to strike a budget now for the entire school year,
because it makes the fiscal year consonant with the school year. I
think that's a welcome change.
Some of the amendments that are coming up, though, I think, instead
of simplifying things for some people, especially the school teachers
in their bargaining, will tend to make it a little bit more difficult
for them. I would like to give some examples of that. Of course, I and
my party don't believe in the compulsory arbitration principle. We
never have. We've accepted it. It's been in there for at least 20
years. We know that, but we don't like it very much. We feel that there
should be full collective bargaining for teachers — with a legitimate
timetable, though, for compulsory arbitration, should there be a
breakdown. What we've got here now is a legislated timetable for
reaching a settlement. So the problem is that there is often little
incentive — for either the teachers, in some cases, or the boards — to
settle by collective bargaining.
Interjection.
MR. ROSE: I was invited to proceed under this sort of
umbrella — we'll call it the title. It doesn't particularly matter to
me. But I want to make these remarks. When we come to the places where
we're amending — I understand the minister is going to introduce some
amendments — I can be more particular and less general at that stage.
But I would like to say some general things here.
I think we should probably look into greater opportunities to
establish these salary arrangements by collective bargaining. With the
budget now being imposed by the central authority, I don't know what
bargaining can take place, anyway. Certainly not very much in the way
of salary bargaining, unless you're bargaining your way down instead of
bargaining your way up.
So that's one point I would like to make. The other thing is that
there's still no protection for school boards against an arbitrary cut
or an arbitrary decision inflicted upon the boards or the school
districts by a minister, such as when this minister's predecessor
marched in with the interim financing act in the middle of the year. We
know we're on a three-year plan now — steadily down for three years,
but we're aware of that.
The other thing is that — we can get to this in greater detail a
little later on — the salary settlements.... The amendments now
contemplated tend to lock the budget some six weeks perhaps in advance
of when the arbitration process ends. At the moment, settlements are
handed down January 1 and budgets are finalized February 15. In this
case, it's going to be the reverse. In other words, you finalize your
budget and then arrange your salary settlements some six weeks later.
That doesn't make much sense to me or to us. What happens is that you
put the cart before the horse. Once you've settled your budget, how
then can you arrange for anything sort of elastic in your salary
settlements? If you do get a salary settlement that perhaps is less
than those anticipated in the budget, what do you do with the surplus?
Are you going to be criticized for being poor budgeters because you've
got a huge surplus? It doesn't matter when you start to bargain. It's
when you stop bargaining that counts; because once that budget is
frozen there's very little room for bargaining.
[ Page 4804 ]
Those are my general remarks. When we get to the various sections perhaps I'll have a bit more to say.
[11:15]
Sections 1 to 14 inclusive approved.
section 15.
MR. CHAIRMAN: On
section 15 there's an amendment.
HON. MR. HEINRICH: Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]
Amendment approved.
Section 15 as amended approved.
section 16.
HON. MR. HEINRICH: Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]
On the amendment.
MR. ROSE: On a point of order, I think we're going through
this pretty rapidly; a person has to be pretty fast on his feet in
order to follow all this. It might be suggested that maybe I should
have read it more carefully earlier, but when the minister brings in an
amendment, the House would welcome an opportunity to hear him explain
the nature of and reason for his amendment. I don't think he needs to
lapse into a soliloquy or to filibuster his own bill, but I would like
the minister to assure the House that he actually knows what's in these
amendments, and to explain them to us.
HON. MR. HEINRICH: All of the amendments that we are involved
with now are to do with a few dates. What happened is that after we
introduced the bill, the school trustees and teachers expressed a
concern with respect to notice to arbitrate, to when they went into
conciliation and into arbitration, and to when the final arbitration
report must be submitted. What we have done, at the request of the
contacts through the BCTF who made this request, and through the BCSTA
who also made it, is to advance the dates. The real reason coming from
them was that they would like, if at all possible, to conclude
arbitration while the teachers are still teaching; in other words,
before the school year concludes. That's the reason why the date, for
example, of.... They must go to arbitration on May 1 if they cannot
secure an agreement. The arbitration award must be made on May 31 and
reported June 7.
One of the comments made by the member for Coquitlam-Moody is that
the negotiations are collapsed from six to four weeks. It must be
remembered that as the act is presently written negotiations for
arbitration go from November 15 to December 31, but in there we have a
two-week period for the Christmas holiday. So they said, "All right, if
that be the case we would like it collapsed at the other end," and
that's exactly what we're doing — from May 1 to May 31. That resolves
that problem. I understand, through their communications with me as
well as with the ministry, that they are most satisfied with the
proposed amendment.
Yes, it is true with respect to budgets having to be filed on March
15 with the Ministry of Education, but the validating bylaw passed by
the school board is on May 1. All local teachers' associations and
school districts have the opportunity to negotiate their agreement
prior to either serving notice of arbitration or going to conciliation
or arbitration. The date of May 1 is very important, because at that
time the board must validate its budget, which is to be approved by the
ministry after being submitted on March 15. In every school budget in
all 75 districts there is always some give and take on the budget which
is submitted on the 15th. Hence that period of time from March 15 until
it goes back to the board. That is the basic reason why there was a
change.
MR. ROSE: I'd like the minister to clarify that and amplify
it. Is he saying to us that the budgets are really not finalized on the
date suggested, March 15, but could be subject to amendment after that,
should negotiations continue for either the support staff or the
teaching staff?
HON. MR. HEINRICH: Right now it is not any different. The
budgets must be submitted on February 15; they are not validated by
bylaw in the school district until some time — I can't call the exact
date, but it's some weeks later — before the school board passes the
bylaw adopting the budget. This is exactly the same, only the dates are
somewhat changed. The reason for the dates being changed is to
accommodate dovetailing the fiscal year with the school year.
MR. ROSE: I don't have any problem with that, Mr. Chairman.
That's fine; I don't object to that at all. What I'm objecting to is
what I tried to outline earlier, and that is that at present
settlements are handed down on January 1, and budgets are finalized on
February 15. Right? That's what we have now. You brought in an
amendment — actually two; you've amended your amendment — but right now
we have a situation in which the budgets have to be finalized March 15,
and yet the salary settlements are not finalized until May 31, or,
under some conditions, even June 7. The objection that has been
expressed by some people, including legislative representatives of the
school teachers — the BCTF — is that you've taken away the incentive of
the employer to make a settlement, because he can finalize his budget
and then some six weeks later, when the salary negotiations are
legislatively required to come to an end, they can say: "Well, we're
sorry, we don't have any money." So we'll work on Mr. Peck's
ability-to-pay principle, and he has ruled in favour of the public
employer on the-ability-to-pay argument, which a lot of people disagree
with. But that is the major concern. If the minister can assure the
House that the March 15 budget deadline is sufficiently elastic — and
he can talk about validating as much as he likes — to permit an
adjusted budget as a result of a salary settlement, then the objections
would be met.
HON. MR. HEINRICH: Mr. Chairman, first of all, the local
teachers' association and school board have an opportunity to
voluntarily enter into an agreement, if they so wish, at any time
during the year, and certainly before March 15. I think there is some
realism with respect to bargaining, because prior to this the salaries
would be negotiated, and whatever they were, they would be picked up by
the school district. Mind you, it would have to go through the CSP
commissioner. It seems to me there is an incentive for both
[ Page 4805 ]
parties to resolve their differences, because under
compulsory arbitration the employer has no idea of what's coming down
the pike and neither does the employee. So as far as incentive is
concerned, I think it cuts both ways, and it's in their interest to try
to at least bargain within the scope of the funding which is pretty
well available to the school district.
One of these years school districts will have access to the
residential property base as a line of revenue; but under the sunset
provision that doesn't occur until after 1986. It depends on the board.
Recognizing that the board has some degree of autonomy — although a bit
eroded under the present financial arrangement — boards will obviously,
like all employers, make provision for any increase, if they have the
ability to pay that increase. That's not unheard of, and I think the
same thing applies here. If, in fact, a budget or an arbitrated award
comes down — let's say, on June 7; they've gone right to the end — and
that arbitrated award makes a demand upon the budget which exceeds the
budget validated on May 1, I think both the employer and the employees,
the school board and the teachers, then know that there are going to be
certain cuts required. There's nothing wrong with them being aware of
what the impact of a settlement will be if it is in excess of what the
board has available to it to meet its obligations for the fiscal year.
As for elasticity after March 15, with every district there are
problems which will come up. The object of this game, and the reason
for March 15 — for that next six weeks — is to make sure that
everything is covered. Some things may not be covered, but that
relationship is the same between any employer and employees. I think
there are other factors that come into play.
MR. ROSE: I think I heard the minister say that the budgets
would be determined by March 15 and would be validated May 1, yet the
arbitration settlements need not be concluded until May 31, one month
later, or, under some conditions, by the chairman of the arbitration
commission by June 7. So here we have four weeks after a validated
budget in which bargaining or arbitration presumably can take place. It
is our contention that this shifts the balance in favour of the
employer. The employer can simply say: "I'm sorry, we finalized our
budget on March 15. We validated it on May 1" — according to the
minister. What are we doing piddling around until May 31? The game is
over. As for the business of it being permissive, certainly we could
start to bargain earlier. But I think that anyone who has had anything
to do with negotiations knows that they tend to drag on and on. In some
industries work goes on for years without a settlement. I think that
the pulp industry was an example, That is the big objection that we
have to these dates: not that you shift the fiscal framework but that
you shift the balance in favour of the employer by finalizing a budget,
then the employer turns around and says "I'm sorry, guys, we haven't
got any money, and we don't have the ability to pay." So what on earth
is that extra month doing in there anyway? What is it for?
[11:30]
HON. MR. HEINRICH: With all due respect, I'd like to point
out that the incentive on behalf of the employer to enter into an
acceptable contract with the teachers is always there. I'll tell you
what happens. The school board has an operation to run. It's got
students to serve. It must provide for what it thinks is going to be an
acceptable arrangement. If it doesn't it goes right into the lap of the
arbitrator, because if the award comes down and then is approved by the
compensation stabilization office, the school district is perhaps going
to have some difficulty in serving the students, because they are not
going to have enough money for everything they want. It's in the
interests of the school district as an employer to attempt to work out
some arrangement. That is not unheard of. Not only that, but I don't
think it tips the balance at all. It seems to me it makes it equal,
because what is happening in here is that the employee knows the
limitations of the board — for whatever reason those limitations are. I
might also add in conclusion that this amendment was agreed to and the
information passed on to me by the BCTF as well as the BCSTA when I
talked to them.
MR. ROSE: The minister knows about these things in an
abstract way because of his experience as a former Minister of Labour
and also a lawyer. But I lived through these things. I lived in the
sunny Okanagan where they felt it was worth at least $1,000 a year less
— off your salary — for the sunshine. In the years that I worked in
Oliver and later in Kelowna — I'm not sure about Oliver — it seemed to
me that we went to arbitration nearly every year. I don't see how, if
it was such a great advantage for the boards to settle early, somehow
the Kelowna board missed this opportunity and didn't understand what
the minister is telling us. I lived through very bitter times in which
there was a strong disagreement on salary matters between the board and
the teachers. Because we were in the Okanagan, anywhere up to $1,000 a
year less.... They were paid less in those days; I suppose the maximum
then would have been $5,000 or $6,000. That's the way they operated. It
cost us money because we had to hire lawyers, it cost them money, but
it went to arbitration every year. I don't see how that's different. I
don't see how, if the boards didn't want to pay that money then, this
has changed anything, and now it's going to be to their advantage to
settle earlier. They even went so far in those days.... One of their
little stunts was to publish the name of every teacher and their
salaries in the newspaper as part of their bargaining ploy. They lost
about 50 percent of their teachers that year, including me, but it
seemed that they felt it was worth it. I cite this as a horror story
but also as an example of where it was no advantage, apparently, for
boards to settle soon.
MS. SANFORD: I have a quick question for the minister related
to the period for conciliation, which I understand was four weeks under
the old bill and is still four weeks. Is that correct? Okay. I wonder
why the minister has decided to retain that four-week period. Is there
evidence that the conciliation procedures are effective during that
four-week period? After the first two weeks, are there any more
conciliations? If so, why is it necessary to retain the four weeks
rather than shortening that period of time? What are the advantages of
keeping it at four?
HON. MR. HEINRICH: Mr. Chairman, the member raises a valid
point. Practice in the past would indicate that the appointment of
conciliators is really an exercise, and nothing more than that. It's
unfortunate, because it seems to me that as a result of these changes
it may have a new thrust. The inherent value within the appointment of
a conciliator may now bear some fruit. That's all I'm getting at. It's
something that there was never any strong representation made to me
about. If it's not broken, they seem to feel in the field, don't fix
it. That was the general feeling I had. I
[ Page 4806 ]
concede to the member's point that conciliation in
the past is an exercise which has not been that great. It may, however,
have some value now. One of the views expressed by the BCTF, as relayed
to me, was that they try to close their negotiations and come to a
settlement before the school year ends, and that maybe they would take
full advantage now of the conciliation opportunity.
Amendment approved.
Section 16 as amended approved.
section 17.
HON. MR. HEINRICH: Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment standing under my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]
On the amendment.
MR. ROSE: I take it that the minister, after we agreed that
he would explain the amendments, feels that he did that, in answer to
my colleague's question.
HON. MR. HEINRICH: If there's some concern on this.... If you
look under
section 17, it was the appointing of a conciliator. So it
was covered, and I didn't think there was....
MR. ROSE: That's what I said. I assumed that that was the case.
Amendment approved.
Section 17 as amended approved.
section 18.
HON. MR. HEINRICH: I move the amendment standing under my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]
Amendment approved.
Section 18 as amended approved.
section 19.
HON. MR. HEINRICH: I move the amendment standing under my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]
Amendment approved.
Section 19 as amended approved.
Sections 20 to 31 inclusive approved.
Title approved.
HON. MR. HEINRICH: Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee rise and report the bill complete with amendments.
Motion approved.
The House resumed; Mr. Strachan in the chair.
MR. PELTON: Mr. Speaker, the committee on Bill 27 rises and reports the bill complete with amendments.
DEPUTY SPEAKER: When shall the bill be read a third time?
HON. MR. HEINRICH: I beg to move that the bill, with leave, be now read a third time.
DEPUTY SPEAKER: The question would be: when shall the bill be reported as amended?
HON. MR. HEINRICH: With leave, now.
MR. HOWARD: No, Mr. Speaker. With respect, I don't think you
need leave to make the report. The only requirement for leave would be
to give the bill third reading now, and I think that such a complex set
of amendments would take some time to look at in conjunction with the
bill as it originally stood. Perhaps leave should not be given in that
circumstance.
DEPUTY SPEAKER: Leave would be required because the House
cannot normally consider the bill until it is reprinted, and there are
amendments. So the question is: when shall the bill be considered as
reported?
HON. MR. HEINRICH: With leave, now.
DEPUTY SPEAKER: Shall leave be granted?
MR. HOWARD: This is for reporting it, but not for third reading?
AN HON. MEMBER: Yes.
MR. HOWARD: No problem.
DEPUTY SPEAKER: When shall the bill be read a third time?
HON. MR. HEINRICH: The next sitting....
MS. SANFORD: After today!
HON. MR. HEINRICH: The next sitting, Mr. Speaker.
Leave granted.
HON. MR. GARDOM: Committee on Bill 25, Mr. Speaker.
HYDRO AND POWER AUTHORITY
(LAND TRANSFER) ACT, 1984
The House in committee on Bill 25; Mr. Pelton in the chair.
section 1.
[ Page 4807 ]
MRS. WALLACE: Mr. Chairman, does the acting Minister of
Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, who is responsible for B.C.
Hydro, know whether or not this land has yet been rezoned from
industrial to residential?
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: As far as I know it has not, yet. I'll certainly check that to make sure, but I referred back to the notes in Hansard from the minister, and I have no other indication from any of the other notes.
MRS. WALLACE: Well, my understanding was that it had, at the time I asked the question, and he said no, it hadn't.
Sections 1 to 4 inclusive approved.
Schedule approved.
Title approved.
HON. MR. McCLELLAND: Mr. Chairman, I move the bill be reported complete without amendment.
Motion approved.
The House resumed; Mr. Speaker in the chair
Bill 25, Hydro and Power Authority (Land Transfer) Act, 1984, reported complete without amendment, read a third time and passed.
HON. MR. GARDOM: Committee on Bill 26, Mr. Speaker.
HOSPITALS AMALGAMATION ACT
The House in committee on Bill 26; Mr. Pelton in the chair.
Sections 1 to 12 inclusive approved.
Title approved.
HON. MR. NIELSEN: Mr. Chairman, I move the committee rise and report the bill complete without amendment.
Motion approved.
[11:45]
The House resumed; Mr. Speaker in the chair.
Bill 26, Hospitals Amalgamation Act, reported complete without amendment, read a third time and passed.
HON. MR. GARDOM: Committee on Bill 29, Mr. Speaker.
HEALTH STATUTES AMENDMENT ACT, 1984
The House in committee on Bill 29; Mr. Pelton in the chair.
section 1.
MR. COCKE: I note that doctors of chiropractic are now being
allowed to use a series of "doctor": doctor of chiropractic or
chiropractic doctor or.... However, it excludes the right for them to
use just straight "doctor." Incidentally, I'm not opposed to their not
being allowed to use the direct title "doctor" without the
modification. I'm wondering, what is the genesis of this particular
amendment to the Chiropractors Act?
HON. MR. NIELSEN: It is the opinion of the government and
myself that those people who have qualified academically in the health
sciences field, where the degree is that of doctor of their specialty,
should be in the position of using that title in conjunction with their
specialty. At the present time it is specifically prohibited by the
Medical Practitioners Act, and in my opinion there were a couple of
pretty silly court cases over this where a couple of chiropractors in
the province were charged for using the title "doctor": Doctor
So-and-so, Chiropractor. They were successful in their actions simply
because the other legislation prohibited it. We have been requested by
the chiropractors' association and by other professional associations
to permit them to use the same title as is common across Canada and in
most of the United States. I think it is quite proper that a person who
qualifies for the degree should be able to make use of the title
"Doctor" with reference to their specialty. I think it's been long in
coming, and I think it's quite proper that it's before us now.
Section 1 approved.
section 2.
MRS. DAILLY:
Section 2 is the Health Emergency Act section,
and it seems pretty clear that it's going to delete the requirement
that the Emergency Health Services Commission annual report be reported
to this Legislature. I just wanted to express a concern to the minister
and ask why he's doing this. We have a concern that once you start
removing the reporting of a commission or body to this Legislature,
it's removing some of the independence of that particular body.
Autonomous power is now given to the Minister of Health for the
reporting. Why we perhaps sound a little paranoiac about this is
because we recall that the same procedure took place with the Alcohol
and Drug Commission. One of the first steps was to remove its reporting
to the Legislature, and following that came the demise of the Alcohol
and Drug Commission. I am wondering why this was done.
HON. MR. NIELSEN: The specific reason is that the Emergency
Health Services Commission's report is included within the Ministry of
Health report now, and we intend to continue including it within the
report rather than have an independent report submitted to the House.
It is included within the annual report of the Ministry of Health as
part of the Ministry of Health report. This amendment would no longer
make it necessary for a separate report to be tabled in the House. It
will be included in the ministry's report.
Sections 2 to 4 inclusive approved.
section 5.
[ Page 4808 ]
MRS. DAILLY: We welcome this change. In fact I know that
members on this side of the House spoke at the time that the last
change was made that we did not feel it was complete enough. Of course,
now we have it improved so that either spouse can apply to change their
surname as long as the applicant spouse gives consent. This is
something which I know was given considerable attention by members on
this side of the House. Previously, married women could only change
their surname to their maiden name with the spouse's consent; this
allows either spouse to have individual choice in their surname. It
still remains, however, that one must first obtain the permission of
the spouse. I suppose the next thing we want to discuss with the
minister is, why does either spouse have to have permission? Also, if a
married man registers a change of surname, automatically the change is
also made for his wife unless she has elected for a change of surname
herself; yet a wife's change of surname doesn't automatically change
the husband's surname. This is a paternalistic attitude, and it should
be deleted so that changes in the surname apply only to the individual
applying for the name.
I know there are others who want to comment on this, particularly
the member for Burnaby-Edmonds (Ms. Brown), who spoke on this whole
matter at some length when it came up before. But before she takes her
place, I have one other question for the minister.
This is about a child. I notice there is no change at all in the
rights to change a child's name. There could, I suppose, be a case
where a parent wished to have an unlimited right in giving a child a
name. Perhaps a mother might want to give the grandfather's or
grandmother's surname. Perhaps the minister has had representations on
this; I don't know. Frankly, I just recently had it presented it to me,
so I must admit that I haven't given it a great deal of thought. I
wonder if the minister sees any advantage to giving this opportunity to
a child as well. Maybe we could have a discussion on that.
HON. MR. NIELSEN: Mr. Chairman, I'd be very pleased to
receive any submissions from any member or interested parties with
respect to future modification of the Change of Name Act, and have the
opportunity of discussing it to see whether it is a practical
suggestion.
I would think, Mr. Chairman, the director of vital statistics and
the persons responsible for this probably received every conceivable
form of request with respect to names, modification of names, and so
on. I think the director of vital statistics and the government have
some responsibility to try to establish an orderly method of
identifying people by name and keeping such records as may be
necessary. We really have had virtually every request one could think
of with respect to modifying names.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the amendments which have been put
forward today are a significant advancement in what has been considered
to be an inequitable situation with respect to the names. The amendment
may not resolve all of the problems or all of the considerations, but I
believe it's an important advancement, at least from what was
previously there. I'm quite prepared to look at any future
modifications which may be needed to resolve some of the identifiable
inequities which in the minds of some could still be there. I think by
today's amendment we have indicated that we are quite prepared to
listen to and accept responsible arguments which have been put forward.
So we can always continue to modify, once the case is made.
MS. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, I too want to say how pleased I am
at this decision to open this piece of legislation and modify it once
again. The struggle to get the Change of Name Act brought into the
twenty-first century actually started in 1972, so you can see how
slowly the wheels of justice do grind. We're getting there, but we're
still — as my colleague for Burnaby North (Mrs. Dailly) pointed out —
not quite there yet.
For example, on April 30 I received a letter from a woman who wanted
to use her surname as well as her husband's surname, and I'm wondering
if the minister could tell me whether under this
section that is now
possible. She didn't want to hyphenate it; she just wanted to have two
surnames. I want to know whether that is possible now.
I realize that I'm going on to
section 6 when I mention that I too
am surprised about the decision not to permit a woman to change her
surname without first getting the permission of her husband. I want to
say that this is incredibly difficult. I have mail going back to 1979
from women who have been separated for a long period of time but are
not divorced and would like to use another name. They find that they
have to either get permission or.... I notice
section 5, which said it
had to be put in the Gazette ,
has gone, and I'm really pleased about that. That's no longer
necessary. But maybe the minister could explain why it's still
necessary to get the permission of a husband you're no longer living
with — or have lived with for a while — to change your name.
The other thing was the question my colleague raised about naming the children, which I think we can make some submissions to.
Does it still cost $80 if you want to file a change of name? I don't know whether that's still in effect or not.
HON. MR. GARDOM: It's the cost of advertising; it has to be put into the Gazette.
MS; BROWN: Okay. But now that you no longer have to use the Gazette ,
I'm wondering whether it's still going to cost $80 to have it done. Can
the name a woman places on a marriage certificate at the time of her
marriage still be any name she chooses to use? Has that been affected
in any way by this act? If the minister would answer those two
questions, I will close by once again saying that I really appreciate
that this 12-year battle seems to be finally drawing to a close.
HON. MR. NIELSEN: I don't know whether the $80 still applies; I would have to check that out.
My understanding is that a woman upon getting married can use
whatever legal name she may have and retain that. That doesn't modify
that, provided it's her legal name.
The other question the member asked.... Again, I would have to speak
to our director of vital statistics with respect to the need for
permission, to see if there is some legal reason for that. I don't
think it is meant to be paternalistic, but I will get an explanation
for it.
I would say to the members that I am quite interested in the area of
vital statistics, particularly with reference to names and so on, and I
would be most pleased to have any submissions come forward, to speak
with the director to get his opinion, and to do a reasonable search
across the country to see who else has been making modifications,
because we do believe there should be some consistency. We are quite
prepared to at least advance to the twentieth century, if not the
twenty-first.
[ Page 4809 ]
[12:00]
MS. BROWN: Just very quickly, to the minister: I would like
to recommend both Manitoba and Ontario, which have recently dealt with
their acts, and Ontario, specifically, as affecting the naming of
children and single parents' right to name their children.
The House resumed; Mr. Speaker in the chair.
The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.
Hon. Mr. Gardom moved adjournment of the House.
Motion approved.
The House adjourned at 12:01 p.m.
Appendix
AMENDMENTS TO BILLS
27 The Hon. J. H. Heinrich to move, in Committee of the Whole on Bill (No. 27) intituled Education Statutes (Fiscal Year) Amendment Act, 1984 to amend as follows:
SECTION 15, by deleting the proposed
section 15 and substituting the following:
"15.
Section 133 is amended
" (
a) in subsection (1) by striking out 'August 15' and substituting 'February 1', and
" (
b) in subsection (3) by striking out 'September 25' and substituting 'March 5'. "
SECTION 16, by deleting the proposed paragraphs (b), (c), (
d) and (
e) of
section 16 and substituting the following:
"(
b) by adding the following subsection:
"
(1.1) Where an agreement between a board and an association is due
to expire
(
a) during the transitional period of January 1, 1985 to June
30, 1985, or
(
b) in any fiscal year commencing with the fiscal year 1985/86,
the board or an association may
(
c) in respect of the agreement that expires during the transitional
period, on or before March 1, 1985, or
(
d) in respect of an agreement that expires in the 1985/86 fiscal
year or any subsequent fiscal year, on or before March I of the fiscal year
that the agreement expires,
serve the other with a written notice of its desire
to negotiate or continue an agreement respecting salaries and bonuses or salary
and bonus schedules for the next fiscal year or for the next fiscal year and
one or more subsequent fiscal years.,
"(
c) in subsection (2) by striking out 'September 30' and substituting 'March 10',
"(
d) in subsection (3) by striking out 'subsection
(1),' and substituting 'subsection (1) or (1. I), and
"(
e) in subsection (4) by striking out 'October 14' and substituting 'March 30'."
SECTION 17, by deleting the proposed
section 17 and substituting the following:
"17.
Section 135 (1) is amended by striking out 'October 15' and substituting 'March 31'. "
SECTION 18 , by deleting the proposed
section 18 and substituting the following:
"18.
Section 136 is amended
"(
a) in subsection (1) by striking out 'November 15, ' and substituting 'May 1,',
"(
b) in subsection (3) (
a) by striking out 'November 22,' and substituting 'May 8, ', and
"(
c) in subsection (3) (
b) by striking out 'December
7, ' and substituting 'May 15, '."
[ Page
4810 ]
SECTION 19, by deleting the proposed
section 19 and substituting the following:
"19.
Section 137 is amended
"(
a) in subsection (1) by striking out 'January 1, ' and substituting 'May 31, ', and
"(
b) in subsection (2) by striking out 'before January
1, the chairman alone shall make an award on or before January 5 of the following
year,' and substituting 'before May 31, the chairman shall make an
award on or before June 7 of that year,'."
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