Third Session, 42nd Parliament

(2022) OFFICIAL REPORT

OF DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Tuesday, April 5, 2022

Afternoon Sitting

Issue No. 182

ISSN 1499-2175

The HTML transcript is provided for informational purposes only.

The PDF transcript remains the official digital version.

CONTENTS

Orders of the Day

Second Reading of Bills

Bill 12 — Property Law Amendment Act, 2022

(continued)

On the main motion (continued)

E. Ross

Hon. S. Robinson

Question of Privilege

A. Olsen

Hon. M. Farnworth

Committee of the Whole House

Bill 6 — Budget Measures Implementation Act,

Hon. S. Robinson

P. Milobar

S. Furstenau

Proceedings in the Douglas Fir Room

Committee of Supply

Estimates: Ministry of Advanced Education and Skills

Training (continued)

Hon. A. Kang

C. Oakes

M. Lee

M. de Jong

G. Kyllo

TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2022

The House met at 1:32 p.m.

[Mr. Speaker in the chair.]

Orders of the Day

Hon. M. Farnworth: In this chamber, I call continued second reading debate on Bill 12.

In

Section A, Douglas Fir Room, I call continued estimates debate for the

Ministry of Advanced Education and Skills Training.

[S. Chandra Herbert in the chair.]

Second Reading of Bills

BILL 12 — PROPERTY LAW

AMENDMENT ACT,

(continued)

On the main motion (continued) .

Deputy Speaker: Recognizing the member for Skeena.

E. Ross: Thank you, hon. Chair. Welcome back to the chair.

Previous to the break, for those thousands of people that are watching

at home — millions — I actually started my speaking points on Bill 12, the

Property Law Amendment Act. I was speaking, really, to the lack of transparency

coming from this government, mainly because there are no details in this

bill.

We’ve seen this before, where the government is actually leaving most of

the details up to regulation. We’ve seen it in Bill 14. We’ve seen it in Bill

22. Really, we owe British Columbians more than that, especially as MLAs. When

we come down here, we’re elected to understand the details of this so we can go

home and explain it to the people of British Columbia, including the people of

Skeena.

Therefore, I conclude my remarks, hon. Chair, and thank you for this

time to speak.

Deputy Speaker: Seeing no further speakers, I call the vote. I’m not sure if the

minister wanted to come back to speak to the bill or not.

I recognize the Minister of Social Development and Poverty

Reduction.

Hon. N. Simons: In the interest of ensuring we give the appropriate opportunity, perhaps

a short recess?

[1:35 p.m.]

Deputy Speaker: Again, seeing no further speakers, it’s now time for the proposed vote

on Bill 12, I believe it is, the Property Law Amendment Act.

Division is called.

[1:40 p.m. - 1:45 p.m.]

[Mr. Speaker in the chair.]

Mr. Speaker: Members, the question is the second reading of Bill 12.

Second reading of Bill 12 approved on the following

division:

YEAS — 52

Alexis

Anderson

Bailey

Bains

Beare

Begg

Brar

Chandra Herbert

Chant

Chen

Chow

Conroy

Coulter

Cullen

Dean

D’Eith

Donnelly

Dykeman

Eby

Elmore

Farnworth

Fleming

Glumac

Greene

Heyman

Kahlon

Kang

Leonard

Lore

Malcolmson

Mark

Mercier

Osborne

Paddon

Popham

Ralston

Rankin

Rice

Robinson

Routledge

Routley

Sandhu

Sharma

Simons

Sims

A. Singh

R. Singh

Starchuk

Walker

Whiteside

Yao

NAYS — 27

Ashton

Banman

Bernier

Cadieux

Clovechok

de Jong

Doerkson

Furstenau

Halford

Kirkpatrick

Kyllo

Lee

Letnick

Merrifield

Milobar

Morris

Oakes

Olsen

Paton

Ross

Rustad

Shypitka

Stewart

Stone

Sturdy

Tegart

Wat

Mr. Speaker: Member for Saanich North and the Islands.

A. Olsen: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I was waiting for the resounding round of

applause.

Mr. Speaker: Just a second. Member, have a seat.

Minister of Finance.

Hon. S. Robinson: I move that the bill be referred to a Committee of the Whole House to be

considered at the next sitting of the House after today.

Bill 12, Property Law Amendment Act, 2022, read a second time and referred

to a Committee of the Whole House for consideration at the next sitting of the

House after today.

Mr. Speaker: Now, Member for Saanich North and the Islands.

Question of Privilege

A. Olsen: I rise to speak to a question of privilege that I raised last Thursday with

respect to comments that were brought in this House in question period on

glyphosate by the Minister of Forests.

On Thursday, March 31, I asked the Minister of Forests about glyphosate

spraying in B.C. In response to my question, the minister said the following

regarding glyphosate.

“I’ve done a lot of research on this. We’ve also been…. There are questions

about glyphosate use in forestry, and the effects of glyphosate on human health

have been really extensively reviewed by international regulatory agencies,

including Health Canada, with the conclusion being that exposure to glyphosate

does not pose a carcinogenic or general toxic risk to humans. It remains an

important tool for establishing conifer or conifer-deciduous mixed stands and

ensuring future timber supplies.”

[1:50 p.m.]

I rose on this point of privilege immediately after question period. I

raise this question of privilege to highlight that the Minister of Forests’

comments regarding the safety of glyphosate are misleading. The minister led the

House to believe in her comments that the science on glyphosate is complete.

However, had the minister done the review, she would know that significant

concerns with the safety of glyphosate remain.

As the Minister of Forests opened her defence of the safety of glyphosate

by saying, “I’ve done a lot of research on this,” it then follows that the intent

of the comments made by the Minister of Forests was to intentionally mislead the

House. Following a cursory review of various studies reviewing the safety of

glyphosate, I would not feel comfortable in any way stating, as the Minister of

Forests continued: “…with the conclusion being that…glyphosate does not pose a

carcinogenic or general toxic risk to humans.”

Glyphosate is an herbicide used on many products, including agricultural

crops such as wheat and soybeans and lumber crops. It has been and continues to be

used on B.C. tree farms.

The Minister of Forests justified the use of glyphosate, saying that it is

“an important tool for establishing conifer or conifer deciduous-mixed stands and

ensuring future timber supplies. That said, the use of this herbicide in B.C.’s

forest sector has declined significantly in recent years, as foresters use a

variety of approaches to manage competing vegetation, including manual,

mechanical, burning, biological and herbicides. The glyphosate use in forestry has

to comply with B.C.’s Integrated Pest Management Act, and steps have to be taken

to minimize impacts on environment, including in fish-bearing streams.”

Glyphosate is the key chemical compound in Roundup, and the terms are often

used interchangeably, though Roundup is a brand name. The dangers of glyphosate on

human health have been widely debated.

The WHO’s International Agency for Research on Cancer found “strong

evidence that glyphosate is likely to be carcinogenic to humans.” The U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency determined glyphosate to be non-toxic to humans;

however, the EPA utilized non-peer-reviewed research commissioned by

Monsanto.

Nearly 100,000 plaintiffs in the United States have received settlements

from Bayer, the owner of Monsanto, to the tune of $10 billion.

The minister stated that international regulatory agencies and Health

Canada have ruled that glyphosate is not carcinogenic or toxic to humans. It is

irrefutable that there is at least some danger associated with glyphosate. It is

also irrefutable that powerful actors with a stake in continued glyphosate use

have influenced the body of research on the chemical.

On February 7, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that Health Canada

didn’t follow its own rules for regulating pesticides and herbicides. There are

concerns that evidence used to authorize the use of glyphosate was influenced by

Monsanto, the makers of Roundup. Monsanto was bought by Germany’s Bayer AG. Bayer

has faced multiple lawsuits in the United States from Americans claiming Roundup

gave them cancer. Bayer is appealing one of these cases through the U.S. Supreme

Court. Health Canada is reviewing the ruling.

In 2022, just this year, numerous countries have restricted or banned the

use of glyphosate in response to health concerns, including cancer litigation that

occurred in the U.S., or have implemented plans to transition away from

glyphosate. Eight out of ten provinces in Canada “have some form of restriction on

the use of non-essential cosmetic pesticides, including glyphosate.”

Glyphosate was authorized for use in the EU until December 2022 and is

currently under review to re-evaluate its safety.

Germany, the home country of Monsanto’s parent company, Bayer, has decided

to phase out glyphosate entirely. In 2019, the German cabinet approved legislation

to ban glyphosate by 2024.

Further determination will be made based on evidence submitted by the EFSA,

which is the European Food Safety Authority, and the ECHA, which is the European

Chemicals Agency. Targeted consultation by the ECHA on potential hazards of

glyphosate began on March 29 of this year, and will conclude just in a few weeks,

on April 14, 2022.

[1:55 p.m.]

In July 2020, Human Rights Watch discussed the lack of credibility of the

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s assessment of glyphosate. The EPA declared

glyphosate to be non-carcinogenic and non-toxic to humans. However, the EPA relied

on non-peer-reviewed research commissioned by Monsanto, which fundamentally

differed from studies taken by the International Agency for Research on Cancer. I

note that we’re wearing these pins because April is also Cancer Month.

In 2020, of that year, despite continuing to assert that Roundup is safe,

Bayer agreed to a $10 billion settlement for at least 95,000 claims against it. As

of March 7 of this year — just last month — it is estimated that there are still

30,000 lawsuits against U.S. Bayer’s Monsanto that have not been settled. There

are further concerns around migrant farmworkers being left out of Roundup cancer

compensation due to precarious citizenship status and fears of deportation, citing

the likelihood of far more cancer-related cases against glyphosate.

In 2019, an

article published in Environmental Sciences Europe

assessed the discrepancy between the EPA finding that glyphosate is safe and the

IARC finding that glyphosate is dangerous. The authors concluded that the

organizations reached such different conclusions because the EPA relied on

unpublished, commissioned studies, while IARC relied on peer-reviewed

studies.

A March 2017 discovery in a lawsuit against Monsanto releases evidence that

Monsanto recruited scientists to co-author reports defending the safety of

glyphosate. The evidence also demonstrates a friendship between Monsanto and a

senior regulator in the American Environmental Protection Agency.

March 20, 2015. The International Agency for Research on Cancer, the arm of

the World Health Organization, finds strong evidence that glyphosate is probably

carcinogenic to humans.

There are four criteria when raising a question of privilege.

One, that it be raised at the earliest opportunity. I believe that I meet

that criteria, as I stood immediately following question period to raise the

question of privilege.

Two, it must be a matter directly concerning the privileges of the House,

committee or member. It does, as it concerns misleading statements by a

minister.

It must be raised to correct a grave and serious breach. The goal of this

is to highlight that at the very least, the science on the use of glyphosate has

not been settled. The science is not settled on it. There are many, many concerns

raised around the world and even here in Canada.

And it must be raised in order to seek a genuine remedy that the House has

the power to provide and for which no other parliamentary process is reasonably

available. I believe that we meet that criteria as well.

If an allegation of misleading the House must meet these three criteria —

that the statement is, in fact, misleading; that the member must have known that

the statement was inaccurate at the time the statement was made; and that the

member must have intended to mislead the House…. I contend that the minister, in

opening the comments, stated that she had done a lot of research on this issue.

The member must have known the statement to be inaccurate.

If the member had, in fact, done a lot of research on the issue, then they

would have found a litany of studies, just like we did, to at the very least

demonstrate that the science on glyphosate is far less than complete or far less

than settled.

Therefore, point 3, the member must have intended to mislead the House. I

contend that in making the statements that the evidence lands in favour of

glyphosate, the minister was trying to defend the use of glyphosate by the

forestry — indeed, her Ministry of Forests.

Hon. M. Farnworth: I thank the member for his dissertation. I would make the point that in

reviewing that lengthy dissertation, you would find that it is, in fact, not a

matter of privilege but, rather, a dispute over the facts.

[2:00 p.m.]

More importantly, hon. Speaker, I would also ask you to review the sections

dealing with questions of privilege and remind those who want to raise the issue

that the matter is to be submitted in a brief written response. What we have had

today is anything but brief, or I would say that it certainly wasn’t briefly

written.

The other point I would also ask is in the review of the presentation

itself and the use, in my view, of the words “deliberately misleading,” which I

think the Speaker may well find to be unparliamentary.

Hon. Speaker, I ask, in your review, that you review my comments and find

that it is, in fact, not a question of privilege.

Mr. Speaker: Member, you have further comments.

A. Olsen: Just that as part of raising a question of privilege, I have to

demonstrate….

Mr. Speaker: It’s okay. You don’t have to justify that, Member. I heard your comments.

That’s okay.

A. Olsen: No, I have a motion.

Mr. Speaker: Okay, sorry.

A. Olsen: I do have all the written evidence that I referred to in my comments, which

I will deliver to the Table. I have prepared, as per the requirements within the

question of privilege, a motion that should you find this to be a breach of

privilege, it be referred to the Select Standing Committee on Parliamentary

Reform.

Mr. Speaker: The Chair would like to thank both the member and the minister for making

their comments. I’ll take it under advisement.

Hon. M. Farnworth: I call, in this chamber, committee stage, Bill 6, Budget Measures

Implementation Act.

Committee of the Whole House

BILL 6 — BUDGET MEASURES

IMPLEMENTATION ACT,

The House in Committee of the Whole (Section

B) on Bill 6;

S. Chandra Herbert in the chair.

The committee met at 2:04 p.m.

On clause 1.

The Chair: I recognize the hon. Finance Minister.

Hon. S. Robinson: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. It’s good to have you here joining

us.

I have a number of staff members who are here, and there’s going to be a

number that come through as we plow through this significant bill. I have Doug

Foster here on my right. I have Fisnik Preniqi on my left and Chris

Ferguson-Martin, who is sitting behind me.

I look forward to taking questions from the hon. member.

[2:05 p.m.]

P. Milobar: Thank you to the minister for this 133-clause bill that thankfully is

not 133 clauses left to regulation. We’ll get right into it and try to get some

understanding of some of these clauses.

In clause 1, it appears to be amending

section 2.2 of the Balanced

Budget and Ministerial Accountability Act by adding extra years in. Can the

minister please explain the rationale for needing to make this

amendment?

Hon. S. Robinson: I did catch the zinger. I hope we don’t have too many of

those.

I think this is serious business, having this bill before the House.

Recognizing that we’re going to have an opportunity to go through it clause by

clause I think is part of doing good governance here.

I appreciate the member’s question in terms of explaining what this

clause is about. The member might recall last year, when we recognized that we

were going to see deficit budgets for the in-year term, given the fact that we

supported British Columbians through a significant pandemic — we supported

businesses; we supported communities — and that, in fact, we were going to be

continuing to provide services for British Columbians in a deficit

situation.

This clause extends what we brought forward last year by one more year.

You can see in the budget that we have declining deficits over the fiscal plan.

This just makes sure that we’re consistent with the legislation by suspending

this particular clause for one more year.

P. Milobar: This is amending the Balanced Budget and Ministerial Accountability Act.

Clause 2 in that act says: “The main estimates for a fiscal year must not

contain a forecast of a deficit for that fiscal year.” This is now

section

2.2.

Can the minister confirm, then, that

section 2.2 did not exist before

last year? It was added in as an amendment provision to enable deficit budgets

by the government.

Hon. S. Robinson: Yes, last year was the first time, and it was a result of the

pandemic.

P. Milobar: I’ll refer back a little bit, I guess, between the two questions I’ve

asked already — that is, why the need (

a) to amend and (

b) to extend the dates.

I understand and fully recognize that the budget book goes up to ’24-25 — that

this year’s estimates are based upon, that Bill 6 is based upon. However,

usually you need to amend or extend or clarify if there is a punitive provision

if a clause is not met.

Had this amendment not been brought in this year, what would be the

punitive measure? What would be the consequence to government for not

fulfilling what is actually clause 2 in the current act?

Hon. S. Robinson: We would be going against the intent of the legislation, and this is

about making sure that we’re consistent.

P. Milobar: Just to get clarification, in the existing act, without this amendment,

it appears the consequence for not following the act, for not following clause

2 of ensuring non-deficit budgets would be ministerial holdbacks. Is that not

correct?

Hon. S. Robinson: This has nothing to do with ministerial holdbacks.

[2:10 p.m.]

P. Milobar: Can the minister, then, point to, in the act, other than intent, why

there would be a need to specify dates? In other words, last year the amendment

was brought in, specifically to deal with the budget and the three-year fiscal

plan that was being presented, to circumvent clause 2 in the existing act. If

there’s no actual repercussion for not fulfilling clause 2, what is the point

of having an amendment? What is the point of amending the amendment a year

later to add yet another year of the ability to have a deficit budget if

there’s no actual consequence in the ministerial accountability act?

Hon. S. Robinson: The proposed amendment ensures that the new three-year fiscal plan

remains in line with the legislation. Although the deficit prohibition only

applies to the next fiscal year in the estimates ’22-23, the amendment provides

clarity that the deficit prohibition exemption will apply to all three years of

the fiscal plan.

P. Milobar: For certainty’s sake, if this amendment did not happen, what would be

the breach? What would be the problem? If there were no other changes in the

financial Balanced Budget and Ministerial Accountability Act, what would be the

problem if this is strictly a clause to show intent of the

government?

It seems a strange way to embed in legislation an amendment to strictly

speak to something that, to hear the minister say it, is at her discretion to

do or not do, because there’s no actual accountability measure in

an act that

actually has the word accountability in its title.

Hon. S. Robinson: Again, the amendment really is about making sure that we’re consistent

with the plan. We are saying to the public that there is an anticipated deficit

over the three years and making sure that we are consistent with the

legislation, making sure that the legislation reflects that and that we are

able to have this discussion so that those watching at home understand and are

clear that we are expecting to have deficit budgets over the next three years.

We are amending the legislation so that we are consistent and that the public

knows that we are expecting, over the fiscal plan, three years of

deficits.

P. Milobar: Well, this is the

section where we’re amending the Balanced Budget and

Ministerial Accountability Act. It’s not a long act. It’s only got ten clauses

in it, 11 if you count the commencement date from 2002. The first actual clause

in it is about the prohibition against deficit budgets. “The main estimates for

a fiscal year must not contain a forecast of a deficit for that fiscal

year.”

That’s the original bill. Last year 2.2 was added in, which is: “The

prohibition in

section 2 [prohibition against deficit budgets] does not apply

to the main estimates for the 2021-2022 to 2023-2024 fiscal years.” This year

we’re adding in ’24-25.

The reason it’s important is because, as I say, this is an

accountability act. This is an amendment to an accountability act. The fact

that it’s called accountability…. You can’t have accountability without a

consequence if you don’t deliver.

The whole purpose of the budget measures Balanced Budget and Ministerial

Accountability Act is to prevent deficit budgets. It was actually brought in

because of problematic budgeting when this government was last in

office.

[2:15 p.m.]

Therefore, the whole act that was created, and the accountability piece

to measure whether or not there was accountability, all relates to ministerial

salary holdbacks. That’s the only trigger of any type of accountability in the

act.

Again, I guess I’ll ask the minister. Given that, shortly, we’ll be

dealing with other sections that remove that accountability measure, what is

the purpose of having the charade of adding an extra year to an amendment when

future clause amendments are going to remove the need in perpetuity to have a

balanced budget?

Hon. S. Robinson: You know, what we’re doing right here in this very moment is really

about making the legislation transparent for the fact that we are anticipating

presenting deficit budgets for the next three years so British Columbians know

that’s, in fact, what they can expect. We are committed to reviewing this

annually. Hopefully, it won’t be the case, but we are certainly moving into

recovery mode as we continue to transition through this pandemic.

I want to remind the member opposite that there was a

section 2.1 that

was repealed, from the years 2008 to 2010. The B.C. Liberals actually brought

in the identical legislation after the global financial meltdown because they,

too, found that they needed to amend this legislation. That was repealed

shortly after because they were able to get back to balanced budgets, and we

expect to be able to do the same thing.

P. Milobar: Yes, the global economic meltdown certainly did hit governments, and

there was an understanding as to why deficit spending may need to happen, and

there was an understanding last year, when this came forward, why deficit

spending may need to happen.

Can the minister clarify, then, when 2.1 was inserted in and amended,

was there also an amendment to withhold ministerial holdbacks and remove those

provisions, as there is in this bill?

Hon. S. Robinson: This

section has nothing to do with holdbacks. This is just about

amending tabling of balanced budgets.

P. Milobar: Okay. Let’s try this another way. Is the minister, then, saying that

there is no intention of having deficit budgets after ’24-25 from this

government?

Hon. S. Robinson: Our intention is to continue to budget in a thoughtful and strategic

way, making sure that the services are there for British Columbians when they

need them but also being very careful around how we steward tax dollars,

recognizing that those are precious dollars.

[2:20 p.m.]

I can’t speak to what might happen after this fiscal plan. Right now we

have the next three years. This is what our anticipated spending looks like.

The next budget will have, certainly, more to say about how we see the recovery

transpire and how we see this pandemic continue to evolve.

Clause 1 approved.

On clause 2.

P. Milobar: Clause 2 deals with

section 3 in the act. It’s a very short section,

3(1): “The salary otherwise payable under

section 4 of the Members’

Remuneration and Pensions Act to each member of the Executive Council” — which

is cabinet, for those at home — “must be reduced by 20%.” Then section (2) is:

“A reduction in salary, under this section, of a member of the Executive

Council is to be restored, in full or in part, to the member as provided in,

and subject to, sections 4 and 5.” We’ll get to those sections

later.

I guess the question to the minister is…. In this, the amendment is

striking out the 20 percent and substituting 10 percent. Then we’ll get on to

striking out sections 4 and 5. This is actually the accountability piece, the

consequence piece, to running a deficit budget. It was that executive council —

the Premier, the cabinet — was to see a 20 percent holdback. The amendment

being suggested by the minister is 10 percent, from 20 percent.

That’s significant because the 20 percent is made up of two different

components of 10 percent. The one that’s being struck, the 10 percent that’s

being struck, is based on the overall budget being in deficit or not — the same

overall budget that just had the years added to ’24-25.

If the minister says that they’re committed to getting back to balance,

if the intention is truly to get back to balance, why was this clause not

amended to exempt up until ’24-25, to match up with the amendment in 2.2 and

actually have a stop date on it, instead of changing the payment structure for

cabinet in perpetuity?

Hon. S. Robinson: I listened to the member’s question very closely. What I find actually

quite interesting is that a deficit holdback measure, we believe, sends the

wrong message. It prioritizes austerity and cuts to important

programs.

I think back to cuts that were made in 2001-2002 to sexual assault

programs, for example, and to programs ending violence against women. I was

working the front lines; I remember those. It was based on this idea of

holdback. So members chose to collect their 10 percent because of the

collective holdback, which is what we’re proposing to end here, over providing

services to vulnerable women. From my perspective, I think that’s a wrong

motivation.

We are keeping a 10 percent holdback from ministers, because they’re

expected to live within their budgets. They have a responsibility and

accountability, to cabinet and to all of their colleagues, to make sure that

they are living within their means. It’s allocated in their budget letter.

There continues to be an expectation, on all ministers, to make their decisions

wisely, to do their work and to achieve their goals within their

means.

[2:25 p.m.]

We also have a thing called an election; it happens every four years.

That is the ultimate accountability.

If British Columbians are satisfied with the government delivering the

services, making the wise decisions, thinking thoughtfully about where to

invest and how to support people, how to make sure that the services are there

for them when they need them — whether it’s sexual assault services or services

to end violence against women, health care services, child care services, all

those things that we rely on — then it really is up to the electorate to make

the decision about whether or not the government has been doing a good job in

stewarding tax dollars and investing in the things that matter to British

Columbians.

P. Milobar: The minister talked about everything but answering the question. I’ll

try it again.

The minister seems to be trying to have it both ways. On the one hand,

saying that clause 2 in the existing act is about sending a message to the

public about trying to be fiscally responsible and have balanced budgets. On

the other hand, we just dealt with an amendment to 2.2, which was brought in by

this government to enable themselves to have deficit budgets — and, in fact,

has added another year to that.

At the same time that they’re adding another year, the minister was

trying to make it sound like their full intention is, the following year or

years soon after, to be out of deficit. She just answered about making sure

that programs are funded without worrying about deficit. So the minister is

trying to have it both ways on this.

The question was: why the provision, if we already have a provision

acknowledging a deficit with an end date year in it, literally right at the

clause before this clause in the act? Why was there not simply that

acknowledgment on the holdback provisions — that the holdback provision is

suspended until ’24-25 to align with the changes in 2.2, acknowledging the

deficit spending? Why was that holdback provision not suspended with an end

date? Why is that holdback provision completely removed, ensuring that cabinet

will see a 10 percent raise?

The minister will say it’s not a raise. In any job I know, if you change

the rules by legislation to ensure that you have more money in your bank

account every payday, that’s a raise, plain and simple.

Why has the date not been put in to make it clear that the ministerial

responsibilities would match up with the overall changes that were made in the

section preceding this, in

section 2.2?

Hon. S. Robinson: Well, the member will know full well that it is not a raise — he

anticipated my comments — because it’s a holdback.

[J. Tegart in the chair.]

Again, I think it sends the wrong message, because what it says to

cabinets is: you should choose to get your full salary over making sure that

people have the services that they need. Which, to me, is a selfish way of

doing governance. I think that it shouldn’t be part of the thinking about doing

good governance. I think British Columbians expect, their cabinet expects,

their MLAs to be making wise decisions based on their needs, on them, and what

they need when they need it. Not: “Gee, we shouldn’t make this decision,

because then I don’t get my holdback.”

I didn’t sign up to do this work for that reason. I signed up to do this

work because British Columbians, I think, need a government that puts their

needs first. The risk of this holdback legislation in this way suggests that

members of cabinet can put their needs first, which is — and I know that the

member will agree — not appropriate, and it should never be the case. I’m sure

that all members of the House would agree with that, but it does create that

risk.

When I think back to the choices that previous governments have made

around cuts to vital programs — cuts to support vulnerable women, cuts to

health care services, cuts to child care services, cuts to schools, cuts to

education — so that members of the executive council can get their full pay, I

think that’s a terrible motivation.

[2:30 p.m.]

What we’re doing is saying members of executive council should be making

the right decisions because they’re the right decisions to be made at the time.

That’s what this is about.

Madam Chair, welcome to the chair. It’s nice to see you here.

P. Milobar: Well, this has been in place for 20 years. The interesting part with the

minister’s last answer or speech or a combination of both is there didn’t seem

to be that passion of principle when they were budgeting based on an extra $2.7

billion surplus left by the previous government.

There didn’t seem to be that passion of principle in the budget after,

the budget after, the budget after or the budget after. In fact, this new-found

passionate principle from the minister is on the sixth budget introduced by

this government. This is the sixth budget we’ve dealt with. This is the first

time this has come up.

Remarkably, it comes up in the act of governing when difficult decisions

that have to be made by any government of any political stripe need to start

being made. What a convenient time to find that passion for this principle,

because this wasn’t waived in any other previous times under this

government.

We’ve had other amendments come through. Just last year we had to have

the budget introduced after the fiscal year started because the minister

couldn’t get it delivered, even with the legislated one-month extension that

was brought in by her predecessor.

Just last year an amendment was brought in about deficit spending.

Didn’t touch the holdbacks then. Didn’t seem to have the same concerns about

ministerial decision-making based on their paycheque.

Frankly, I think that’s a fairly…. I don’t know what the right word is.

I was going to say “offensive.” I’m not sure “offensive” is right, but we’ll go

with “offensive.” It’s a pretty offensive way to characterize cabinet ministers

from all political walks of life over the last 20 years and their

decision-making.

It makes it sound like the minister says they would have actually done

more spending over the previous five budgets if only it wasn’t for those nasty

holdbacks. They would have been in deficit spending sooner if not for those

deficit holdbacks.

Why hold back? Maybe that’s why we don’t have $10-a-day child care six

years in. According to this minister, other ministers wouldn’t want to spend

that extra dollar to provide that program because they wouldn’t get their pay.

So we’re going to remove that out.

Again, the question. The minister keeps flipping it back to

decision-making. The question is: why the removal of this clause in perpetuity,

as opposed to having it align with the changes in 2.2 that have specified years

that the budgets will likely be in deficit?

Hon. S. Robinson: Again, the deficit holdback measure, we believe, just sends, frankly,

the wrong message. The member talked about how it’s been around for 20 years.

Well, people have been hurt for 20 years because previous governments insisted

that they collect their holdback. That was their priority, and they made budget

decisions based on that.

I think British Columbians expect their elected members and their

executive council to make decisions because they’re the right decisions at the

time, not because they are motivated to collect a holdback.

Again, I just checked with staff here to ask: “Any other jurisdiction

have this?” The answer is no. It doesn’t exist anywhere else. It’s only

here.

[2:35 p.m.]

Now, in terms of what we’ve experienced in this pandemic, none of this

was planned. None of this was anticipated. We’ve had some significant

challenges around what that means for health care, what that means for safety,

what that means for how we live our lives.

How long is it going to be with us for? I don’t think that any of us

expected to be here two years in, still masked up. These are, I think,

difficult times for many. But I also think that it gives us an opportunity to

determine or assess what makes sense. Frankly, this deficit holdback measure,

again, sends the wrong message.

The member and I are not going to agree on this. I think he thinks it’s

a good measure, because clearly, he thinks it should be in there. He thinks

that that’s what’s going to keep government decision-makers making the right

decision.

We’ve been making, I think, the right decisions since 2017 — certainly,

March 2020 — when we had to make the difficult decisions, really difficult

decisions, about what to do to protect people, knowing full well that we had to

spend money that we didn’t have. It was going to create deficit. The holdbacks

weren’t part of our conversation. It was about doing the right

thing.

I believe that whenever anyone puts their name forward to be part of

government, to be part of this place, they’re going to make decisions because

they’re the right decisions to make, not because there’s a holdback incentive

to make the right decisions. So fundamentally, we just think it just sends the

wrong message, and that’s why we’re removing it from this

legislation.

S. Furstenau: Just following this discussion, back and forth, and trying to understand

a little bit from the minister’s perspective, the argument being made is that

the holdback is sending the wrong message. It’s not included in

decision-making. The minister just indicated that there’s no other province,

apparently, that has this kind of legislation.

My question is, then: why keep the legislation at all? Why have it go

from 20 percent to 10 percent? Based on the argument that the minister has

made, it shouldn’t exist at all.

Hon. S. Robinson: There is one useful mechanism in there. One useful mechanism. That is

when ministers get their budget letter. They get a budget letter that says:

“Here’s your bucket. Here’s what your allocation is for the year to do the

spending, to deliver the services. The expectation is that you’re going to do

your work within that allocation.”

If they don’t, it’s about them being accountable to their colleagues and

each other, because it means that money has to come from somewhere else if they

overspend. So there is a mechanism for the ministers to make sure that they are

being accountable to each other and to their colleagues, and it’s within that

context that it makes sense.

S. Furstenau: Following along that argument, the mechanism of….

Is the minister suggesting that without the legislation, the holdback

legislation, there wouldn’t be the mechanism of a minister being provided with

their budget bucket?

Hon. S. Robinson: No, they’ll get their budget letter that has their allocation, but the

expectation is that they live within their allocation, so that by the time we

get through the year, they haven’t gone beyond their allocation, because if

they do, then we have to find the money from somewhere else, and that would

create challenges within government.

This is about holding each other accountable and making sure that they

know that there is a penalty within government for not following through and

living within the allocation that they’ve been given.

S. Furstenau: I guess I just am somewhat confused by the argument here. On the one

hand, in responding to the critic for the official opposition, the argument is

that the holdback part of the legislation really isn’t responsible, because it

moves the ministers’ minds off of the work at hand and serving the public, but

then on the other hand, I’m hearing a justification for it because it keeps the

ministers responsible and accountable to each other.

[2:40 p.m.]

Honestly, I’m just trying to figure out what the argument is for

reducing the holdback, based on what we’ve heard from the minister, as opposed

to removing it. I don’t think the mechanism for getting a clear indication of

what a minister’s budget is would be removed if this holdback were

removed.

I’m a little bit stymied by whether the minister sees this as net

positive to have this budget holdback piece for the ministers, or net negative.

How are we navigating these two sides of this argument?

Hon. S. Robinson: I want to make sure that the member understands. We may be talking about

two different parts of holdback. There’s the individual holdback, the

ministerial holdback, that is really about ministers having full control over….

They know what their mandate letter is, they’re given their budget allotment,

and they make decisions within that framework about how to spend those

resources. They have full control over that.

When I think about the overall holdback for the overall budget, which is

different than the ministerial holdback, which is an individual holdback…. This

10 percent is really, when you think about deficit spending, beyond

government’s control.

The global meltdown, the crisis that happened in 2008, wasn’t the fault

of any one government. I mean, there were multiple challenges with it that

other governments, I think, had influence in, but it impacted British Columbia

not because government made decisions but because we are a small jurisdiction

in a global economy. The pandemic, fires, floods are the sorts of things that

no government has complete control of. Things happen, and then we have to

respond. It’s how we respond, I think, that is really critical to taking care

of people, taking care of the citizens who count on us to make the right

decisions.

It’s in that context that we are seeing this differently. When a

minister is given their mandate letter, when a minister has made their various

requests of Treasury Board, when a minister takes a look at their strategic

plan, when they do their estimates, there’s a framework for those dollars. They

have complete control over the decisions that happen within their ministry, and

the expectation is that they’re going to follow through on their plans. If they

overspend, that’s about a choice that they’ve made and not because some

external event happened.

If there is an external event, I expect that they would come to Treasury

Board. They would come to government, and other plans would be made. That would

be certainly well within their opportunity to do that. But the expectation is

that they are making decisions based on all the things that they can control,

and they need to be making those decisions wisely.

P. Milobar: A lot to unpack there over that exchange.

The minister’s answers to the Leader of the Third Party were describing

and justifying the holdback that is actually being removed. She said it keeps

cabinet responsible for each other, because if one minister starts to

deficit-spend, other ministers would have to make up, out of their unspent

funds, to keep that minister whole.

[2:45 p.m.]

That’s the concept around the holdback that’s being removed right now.

It’s that as a collective — as a collective — you don’t go into deficit

spending. It recognizes that you might have to move some dollars around as an

overall cabinet, but you don’t go into deficit spending as priorities might

shift throughout a year. You make amendments.

Again, I come back to it. The minister touched on it in her last answer.

When world events happen, you may slip into deficit spending. It has happened

in ’08. The bill was amended; the act was amended. It’s happening with COVID.

The act has been amended. This is the first time in the 20 years where we’re

seeing a permanent change that directly increases cabinet pay, with no end date

— to get back to the accountability piece.

Now, this is called the Balanced Budget and Ministerial Accountability

Act. The first few clauses here are actually dealing with the balanced-budget

part. This holdback deals with the balanced budget; the holdback removal deals

with the balanced budget. The ministerial holdback, the

ministerial-accountability part of the act, is in a few sections down, where

the individual minister is responsible for their individual ministerial

spending.

On the balanced-budget side, it ties into the very first question asked

by the Leader of the Third Party. What is the purpose of keeping the charade of

clause 2 of the existing act that says: “The main estimates for a fiscal year

must not contain a forecast of a deficit for that fiscal year”?

That has now been amended by

section 2.2, two years in a row, by this

government. With the further erosion of the last piece around balanced budget —

which is the consequence piece in the act, the removal of the 10 percent

holdback — why was there not an end date to match up with 2.2 around the

holdback?

Hon. S. Robinson: Again, I want to reiterate that this is not an increase in pay. This is

just about sustaining the pay, and it’s about eliminating a

holdback.

The individual holdback that we just talked about…. We just canvassed it

with the Leader of the Third Party, along with the mandate letters — we believe

fundamentally are sufficient for keeping government on track, making sure that

people are making the best choice possible in the circumstances.

Again, we’ve certainly seen — I’ve experienced, and I know that others

have experienced — what happens when previous governments, in order to get

their holdback, have made cuts. That’s, I think, the wrong motivation for

making decisions.

Taking action here to make sure that we have accountability through

individual holdbacks, as well as mandate letters…. Of course, every four years

there’s an election. That’s sufficient for accountability.

P. Milobar: Well, it’s very clear the minister feels that she’s entitled to her

entitlements, but the reality is that they’ve been government for a quarter of

the 20 years we’re talking about. This is the sixth budget. This is the first

time this has come up.

The minister references “because it leads to poor decisions.” Could the

minister point out some poor decisions that have been made by her government

over the previous five budgets? Is that why we don’t have $10-a-day child care?

Is that why we don’t have a $400 renters rebate that has been in her mandate

letter for the last two budgets?

[2:50 p.m.]

What poor decisions were made by this government, over the last five

years, that would have precipitated the need to give cabinet a 10 percent raise

so they will do their job appropriately?

Hon. S. Robinson: We haven’t made any cuts. In fact, we’ve been growing programs in a

really big way.

The cuts I’m referring to are the cuts to sexual assault services. The

cuts I’m talking about are cuts to women fleeing violence — the fact that there

hasn’t been any funding when the other side was in government. In fact, there

were cuts. Not just not funding, but there were cuts made to existing programs

so that they could meet their balanced budget legislation and not suffer a

holdback. To me, that’s horrifying. That vulnerable people, that choices were

made….

Governments all make choices. By doing this, we are making sure that

that kind of thinking doesn’t happen again, that choices will be made based on

the interests of the people that we serve, that individual ministers will be

held accountable because they will be given their allotments and an expectation

over which they have control to make sure that they’re being accountable to

themselves and to their cabinet. They’re being accountable to the mandate

letter, accountable to the Premier and accountable to British Columbians. Then,

of course, we have elections every four years, which is the ultimate

accountability.

P. Milobar: Again, the question to the minister, to get a better understanding of

what the thought process is to lead us to this amendment that sees a 10 percent

raise for cabinet, was based on her answer around poor decisions that get made

if this stays in. The question was around poor decisions.

Governments do have choices. Governments do have to make those. I notice

that under the previous Finance Minister, there wasn’t deficit spending. There

must have been choices that weren’t followed through on to ensure that there

wasn’t deficit spending. There must have had to be financial decisions made

around things like $10-a-day child care not being implemented until the federal

money came in with a dump truck at twice the cost, at $20 a day, and it may or

may not actually move forward.

There had to have been decisions made about it, twice promised in

elections. The minister references elections every four years. Twice, the $400

renters’ rebate was promised. There must have been a financial decision made by

government to not follow through and make that choice to not provide people

with what a campaign promise was. In fact, it’s in this minister’s mandate

letter — the $400 renters rebate. This is her second budget. So her choice has

been not to fund that program that’s in her mandate letter even though she’s

giving herself the ability to deficit spend.

The minister is saying that, in the past, poor decisions were made

strictly so ministers could get their bonus based on a balanced budget. This is

the first year that would change. They have had five budgets up to this point.

What poor decisions were made? What poor choices by this government were made?

What programs were left unfunded so that this minister and her colleagues, over

the last five years, could ensure that they got their full pay that they’re

entitled to?

Hon. S. Robinson: I believe I’ve answered these questions. We continue to believe that

deficit holdback measures do send the wrong message. It prioritizes austerity

and can influence choices to make cuts to important programs, even in an

emergency.

We think, and I believe — and I believe that all members believe — that

people put their name forward to run for office to make decisions based on what

British Columbians need. A holdback, particularly in a place where you have no

control over world events…. Who could have anticipated that Russia would go

into Ukraine and have impacts now on other movement of goods, energy prices,

etc.? It impacts British Columbians.

[2:55 p.m.]

I believe that all governments should and ought to make decisions that

are in the best interest of the people they serve, not because there’s a

holdback or not a holdback. So we fundamentally believe that a holdback measure

does send the wrong message, and that’s why we’re eliminating it

here.

P. Milobar: Can the minister not see how the public…? Certainly the feedback I’ve

been getting from the public — and that’s who we all ultimately serve — in a

time of record inflation, for our current generation…. I was too young to

remember, of any significance, the ’80s, when things spiked really

bad.

The public, who are finding their grocery bill ever increasing, who are

finding trying to fill up their gas tank that much more problematic, who are

seeing their rents…. In the minister’s own riding, rents are up $4,500 a year

for someone looking for a rental accommodation. Record housing prices. Interest

rates starting to move up. All of those issues facing people, with the stress

of COVID.

Can the minister not see why there might be questions as to why this is

the right time, this is the year that cabinet and this minister felt it was

appropriate to amend the legislation to ensure that their pay packet has an

extra 10 percent in it, regardless of what is happening to rest of the economy

and the rest of their budgeting and the rest of their programs that they’re

rolling out?

Hon. S. Robinson: I do talk to people in my community. There are certainly challenges, and

there had been challenges when we formed government. That’s why we continue to

invest in British Columbians, and we’re going to keep continuing to invest in

British Columbians.

This piece of legislation is about a holdback measure that the former

government put in place in 2001. It gave tax breaks to the wealthiest and then

made significant cuts to services, and they could collect a holdback. From my

perspective, I think that’s the wrong thing to do.

The member talked about why we didn’t look at this sooner. Well, we’ve

been pretty busy with the pandemic, and we continue to be busy with the

pandemic. Recognizing that governments make choices and our choice is to

correct something that, I think, fundamentally is flawed, we are fixing a piece

of legislation that we think fundamentally is flawed.

We want to make sure…. We’ve made unprecedented investments over the

last years to support people. We’re going to keep making investments. The

member was, I think, mocking — I think is the right word — the fact that we are

working together with the federal government to deliver child care faster than

we were able to do just as a provincial government. We were well on our way,

but them joining with us is good for British Columbians.

At the end of the day, we’re hearing from parents who are saying: “My

goodness. I’m saving $800 a month.” I just received a note from somebody who

was saying: “This is huge for me.” That’s a good thing. That is good for

British Columbians.

The reason that the federal government was able to partner with us so

quickly is because we were ready. We had the infrastructure in place. We’ve

been building this out for five years. We said it was a ten-year plan. I know

that the member is going to try to mock us again for not having achieved a

ten-year goal in five years, but we’re well on our way, and $20-a-day is way

better than when it was $50 a day.

Mocking progress, I think, is really unfortunate. I don’t think that

people send us here to mock good work for British Columbians. That’s really

unfortunate.

The same thing on the housing front. We’ve been investing significantly

in housing. I know that there continues to be challenges on the housing file.

We’re continuing to work every day to make sure that we’re delivering even

more.

The pandemic certainly changed the dynamics, in a way that I don’t think

any of us anticipated. We didn’t predict the pandemic, and predicting how

people’s real estate choices are impacted by the pandemic was certainly not

anticipated.

[3:00 p.m.]

The fact that we’re investing $7 billion in housing over ten years, with

32,000 units of subsidized housing well on their way…. Every week there are

more opening. Even in Kamloops, there are some really good projects that have

been happening there as well.

We are seeing housing starts. We are at record levels — like, record

levels. I believe it’s 47,000 units last year, which is unheard of in our

history. So things are firing on all cylinders. I only wish that we had gotten

into government sooner so that we could have gotten started on this important

work sooner.

P. Milobar: Well, $10 a day is…. There are only about 2½ percent of the spaces that

are needed by parents to date. So I think that the parents looking for child

care, six years in, would hope that there was more than a 2½ percent progress

rate, at this pace.

We could unpack a whole lot there, but let’s try to stay focused in on

the actual topic at hand, which is the ministerial holdback. The minister seems

to be trying to veer away from it, and I can understand why, because it was

confusing to me why we would have never seen this with former Finance Minister

Carole James’s budgets, bringing it forward.

You know, the minister is right. We did, during the financial crisis,

put a hold on the balanced budget. To my understanding, cabinet still saw a pay

cut during the financial crisis, during those times. They held to that

provision, unlike this.

Can the minister confirm to me what the commencement date of this change

to the holdback is? It appears to be actually backdated to 2021, April 1, not

2022, April 1. Can the minister confirm that this would actually include last

year as well?

Hon. S. Robinson: For ’21-22.

P. Milobar: Sorry. Just to be absolutely certain for the viewers at home…. When we

talk fiscal years, it can sometimes get confusing, especially when you tag in

’22 to the answer. My understanding is…. When I look at page 47, clause 134,

the commencement chart, it says that sections 2 to 7 commence April 1, 2021. So

when this passes, cabinet will receive the 10 percent from last year that has

been held back and automatically qualify for their 10 percent on this year. Is

that correct?

Hon. S. Robinson: It’s for the years ’21-22 and for the next three years going

forward.

P. Milobar: I’m going to try this, then. Are we dealing with Budget ’21-22 today, or

are we dealing with Budget ’22-23 today?

Hon. S. Robinson: We are dealing with legislation. We are not dealing with the

budget.

P. Milobar: I really don’t know why the minister won’t just provide a

straightforward answer. She must be so proud of this. You would think that she

would want to.

Is this amendment dealing with provisions for Budget 2022-2023, or is it

dealing with provisions for Budget 2021-2022?

[3:05 p.m.]

Hon. S. Robinson: This is legislation, and this legislation commences for the budget year

’21-22 on a go-forward basis.

P. Milobar: Again, just to get absolute certainty, because I know that this is what

the minister is saying, and I don’t know why she won’t say it in a way that’s

easily understood for the viewers at home…. This means that the 10 percent

increase to pay for deficit spending of the budget for ministers will take

effect, will be retroactive to April 1, 2021, despite the fact that we’re

sitting here on — what is it? — April 5, April 6, 2022.

There is a year of retroactive pay due to the ministers with this

amendment. Is that correct?

Hon. S. Robinson: Well, the existing holdback provisions did result in penalizing

ministers in the ’19-20 year as well as the ’20-21 fiscal year for deficits

that occurred in those years.

There was a lot of, I’ll say, activity to support British Columbians

through the pandemic. There have been, historically, holdbacks as a result of

this. What I think is not very good legislation, but we followed it.

This change is for the ’21-22 fiscal years. It’s always a look back, for

the fiscal year ending March 31, 2022, which just passed. It’s always based on

public accounts, which don’t get completed until August of this year. So it’s

always a look back. That’s why this legislation is here before us in April,

because the determination of the balanced-budget legislation will be looking

back on the year and letting us know what the impacts were.

P. Milobar: Wow. I’ve heard of creative bookkeeping before. This is a creative

answer. The bottom line is…. The minister referenced it — that there was the

’20-21 holdback, which this amendment will now reinstate.

Public perception…. And the minister knows full well that public

perception…. When a bill gets introduced in April of 2022 and every other

provision that I can see in this bill takes effect, commencement of 2022 or

later, except for a couple that go way back to ’13 and 2018…. We’ll get to

those later and figure out what impacts those have. Those provisions don’t

personally impact the pay for ministers, yet this one does.

All of the conversation from the day the budget was introduced till now

has revolved around the conversation and the assumption that this is a

looking-forward provision, not that it was going to be a retroactive pay raise

for cabinet.

The minister can correct me if I’m wrong, but I’m pretty sure, in fact,

that government has actually even acknowledged that their holdback still took

effect as

an act of solidarity with the public during COVID. We’re now hearing

that that ’20-21 fiscal year holdback is not actually going to happen, because

this will take commencement on April 1, 2021.

[3:10 p.m.]

For the budget year that just ended on Thursday, this will provide

cabinet with their holdback funds because of the commencement date of April 1,

Hon. S. Robinson: The member keeps referring to the year ’20-21. That’s done. That fiscal

year is long gone. What we are talking about is ’21-22.

The way it works — maybe the member isn’t aware; I know that some of the

members have been ministers — is that the holdback happens throughout the year.

The 20 percent is held back until the public accounts review of the province’s

books after March 31.

It is a look back, for sure, and the public accounts don’t come out

until the summer. In summer of 2022, we’re all going to see the public

accounts. British Columbians will have a chance to look to see how government

did. That’s when they look at the closed books for March 31, ’22, so it’s a

’21-22 year.

It will be determined in August-ish. August usually is when we see those

books that look back on how government did. What this legislation is doing:

it’s eliminating that holdback portion so that in August, when they review,

there will be the 10 percent individual ministerial look to see: did ministers

live within their means? If they didn’t, then there is the holdback. For the

collective, the holdback will not exist. It’ll just be for the individual

ministerial holdback.

P. Milobar: Oh, I fully understand the dates and fiscal dates. So the minister can

try to spin that way all she would like. I’m not asking about the day the

minister will get her $10,000 cheque in her bank account.

What I’m asking is…. The commencement date very clearly says April 1,

2021, which means that for the last fiscal year that just ended on Friday

morning — not that long ago, contrary to what the minister says, way in our

rearview mirror — the concept of this being removed was introduced in the

budget document for 2022-2023. The public perception — and there has been zero

correction from the minister, to this point, of any public statements made —

was that that was a go-forward change, a go-forward amendment to the

legislation.

The minister can try to spin all she wants, but the minister knows full

well when something is put in a budget document for future years, the first

question that people don’t ask is: “Oh, does this involve something that

happened three years ago, or is that for the current fiscal, moving

forward?”

[3:15 p.m.]

The public expectation was that this holdback that results in more pay

for ministers, regardless of performance, would be for starting the year

2022-2023, because that’s where it first shows up in the budget document. This

piece of legislation wasn’t tabled ahead of the budget document. The first

reference we got to this was in a budget document that is a forward-looking

three-year document, not a backward-looking document.

The minister can try to slough this off and make it sound like: “Well,

we won’t get our payment until August.” The reality is that this has been

structured…. We are dealing with a piece of legislation, in April of the fiscal

year 2022-2023, that will confer a benefit on cabinet and the Premier for the

fiscal year 2021-2022. That’s the year that this change will actually commence

— last year’s fiscal. Is that accurate?

Hon. S. Robinson: Again, when we bring forward laws in this place, they begin, typically,

when the law is passed and gets royal assent. That’s when the law passes. It

passes — ideally, this session — on a go-forward basis.

The go-forward happens when the public accounts get reviewed. It isn’t

reviewed yet. Passing the law now means go forward on a go-forward basis. So

it’s in that context that we don’t know yet — the books are closed — if it’s a

deficit budget, technically. I believe it is, but there are lots of moving

parts, revenues, that certainly came in, in making sure that we have all the

pieces put together.

I know that, for the members opposite, they fully understand that it

takes a significant amount of time, for the people that are on either side of

me, to close off the books, to make sure all the bills are paid, to make sure

that the revenues are recorded appropriately. Then it gets scrutinized by the

Auditor. The Auditor will follow, and we will be following, the laws as they

proceed forward.

I know that the member is chuckling. He might think this is funny, but

this is, from my perspective, serious business, around making sure that we have

laws that reflect the values of British Columbians.

That’s what this is. It’s about the value of a government that delivers

important programs because that’s what people need, not because there’s a

holdback that is going to force cuts, which I think was perhaps a motivation of

other governments. It certainly hasn’t been a motivation of ours, but I do

think that it runs a risk of being a motivation. I think that’s just not good

legislation. So we are proposing the change here.

I appreciate the questions that the member is going to continue to ask

me about it, but this is really about changing the law, making it happen on the

commencement date when it becomes law. Then any activity that happens after

that date is reflected in the law. It’s within that context that that would

happen.

P. Milobar: One more time. The whole premise of this, the minister said, was to

ensure good decision-making by government, that the minister is not making a

decision at the expense of the public. The first we see this concept is in the

budget document for 2022-2023.

[3:20 p.m.]

It would be understandable if the minister and the rest of cabinet, in

cabinet meetings that are confidential, in discussing the upcoming budget for

2022-2023, said: “You know what? This holdback is problematic for us, because

we’re going to be deficit-spending. We want our full pay. So in our programs in

2022 moving forward, we can’t keep having this.”

That would actually align with what the minister’s earlier statements

were, about this newfound priority of decision-making, to align with the budget

document that first came out — that is for 2022-2023 up to ’24-25 — which is

why we amended 2.2. But the decisions in fiscal year ’21-22, when this is going

to take commencement on, happened more than a year ago.

Now, technically, we didn’t even see the budget until a month from now,

last year, because it was two months late. But the budget creation, the

concerns about deficit spending, the discussions of cabinet, would have all

happened last year at the same time. Yet despite the fact that this act was

amended last year to account for deficit budgets, the holdback concept wasn’t

raised. It wasn’t brought up. It wasn’t amended. It was this year, and it was

talked about in the context of a budget and was talked about in the timeline of

that budget.

I think the public deserves a straight answer from the minister — not

about the date that the public accounts will verify 2021-2022, not about the

dates that they’ll get their extra cheque, their retroactive holdback pay that

they are now ensuring will happen. I don’t think the public’s really concerned

if it’s August 5 or August 14 that the minister gets her extra $10,000 that

this will provide. That’s not really the issue.

For a government that’s routinely called the most secretive in Canada,

to not even get a straight answer from the minister that this is retroactive,

that the commencement date ensures ministerial holdbacks for the fiscal year

’21-22 will retroactively be removed, resulting in a guaranteed 10 percent

extra pay, regardless of performance for ’21-22…. The fact we can’t even get

that as a simple answer out of the minister is shocking.

If she is so proud of this removal because it liberates cabinet to make

better decisions, and it’s not about their pay, I look forward to the minister

acknowledging this and maybe acknowledging that, in fact, we could amend this

and have it take effect April 1, 2022 — like people would have been expecting

in the first place, after only first hearing about it in budget document

2022-2023.

Again, why the retroactive pay aspect to this amendment? Why was it not

just brought in forward as an amendment last year, or why was it just not acted

upon and actually kept at the 2022, April 1, commencement date?

[3:25 p.m.]

Hon. S. Robinson: First of all, I want to thank the member for acknowledging what he

referred to as ministers receiving their full pay. I think that that’s really

critical here.

I know that from a partisan perspective, the spin on it has been a

raise, and it’s not the case. It’s a full pay. You can go online and see what

the pay is for ministers. It really is a holdback. It’s a punishment for not

achieving certain goals, which…. It’s about penalizing, when, in fact,

ministers have no control over the pandemic, have no control over a global

meltdown crisis. I do think it was unfair for members on the opposite side,

when they were in government, to have been penalized when they had no control

over a global meltdown.

In that respect, I want to thank the member for finally acknowledging

that this is about receiving full pay. The amendment does remove the existing

collective holdback provisions, so that ministers aren’t penalized for making

the right decisions. Again, I tabled the budget February 22, which was still in

the middle of the calendar year that we were operating in. We were continuing

to make decisions throughout that time within that fiscal year, which did end

on Friday. It’s really, I think, important.

Again, I want to acknowledge and thank the member for finally

acknowledging that this is about penalizing ministers, who do a really

difficult job — make difficult decisions — in the context of a global

situation, recognizing that the question is, should they be penalized as well

as, perhaps, motivated to not make the right decision. So it’s within both of

those contexts that we are bringing this forward.

P. Milobar: Well, it is a raise. Yes, it’s a raise that gets you to what the pay

chart says is 50 percent of an MLA’s salary for being a minister. I guess the

question, then, to the minister is…. Last year the cabinet created a budget

with the understanding that the holdback provisions that we are now amending

were in place. They did that with the understanding that they were in place for

the budget year ’21-22.

Now here we are, and we have the bill in front of us that is actually

saying it doesn’t matter what you thought you were going to get paid for

’21-22. We didn’t actually amend the legislation last year when we were making

other amendments to it. We’re going to make sure, in April of 2022, that you

get back pay.

I guess the question is, if this is such a critical amendment to

ministerial decision-making in times of deficit, why was this not an amendment

for last year’s fiscal, very clearly spelled out as an amendment for last

year’s fiscal? Again, the first we heard about this was the budget presentation

and was, in fact, in the budget document for fiscal 2022-2023, with no mention

of fiscal 2021-2022.

Hon. S. Robinson: Well, I believe I answered the question already, in terms of…. You know,

we tabled the budget on February 22, 2022. We were still in the context of the

previous fiscal. I was listening to the member complain earlier about the fact

that we delivered the budget last year later than normal. It sounds like now,

he’s asking questions about a previous budget.

I’m not quite sure I understand his desire to go back and talk about a

budget that we debated last year. Right now, what we’re debating is legislation

that we’re bringing forward, and the actions that need to happen in this coming

year do reflect on last year’s budget. We recognize that there’s still process

that happens with the ’21-22 budget.

[3:30 p.m.]

Removing this holdback will have impacts on the last year, because we

presented it in that fiscal year.

P. Milobar: Well, the reality is this was presented February 22. This bill was

presented to this House on February 22, along with the budget. We didn’t have

second reading until March 10. Again, nothing in this bill and nothing in the

budget document — which were both presented on the same day, both of which

almost exclusively deal with Budget 2022-2023 — had any clear reference that

this was retroactive to the previous fiscal year. Budget documents don’t get

presented that way in this House — never do.

[S. Chandra Herbert in the chair.]

March 10. We have second reading. The minister says: “Well, we first

tried dealing with this — we first presented it — in the last fiscal. It must

have been clear.” Yet we don’t get to committee stage on it until April. March

10 is second reading. We don’t get to committee stage, conveniently, until

after we’re into the new fiscal, and the minister tries to wrap herself in,

“Well, we didn’t take our time to discuss it,” when we don’t control the

schedule of when bills come forward.

They wonder why more and more people are saying that this government

displays arrogance. Something as simple as the minister standing up and being

forthright and using language that she knows the public will easily understand

in terms of how they would get paid, how they would view this if this was

happening in their workplace, that the conditions of their employment have

changed as such that they’re guaranteed 10 percent more pay…. They would go

home and tell their significant other that they just got a raise: “Conditions

of my employment changed. I’m guaranteed 10 percent more. Oh, and you know

what? It counts for last year too.”

The minister knows, based on the commencement date in this bill, for

this holdback change, that’s exactly what’s happening. She refuses to give the

five-million-plus people in British Columbia that are struggling with

day-to-day costs right now a straight answer that herself and her cabinet,

based on this provision, will have no holdbacks for last year.

Could the minister answer this then. Based on this provision in this

bill, before this provision, as public accounts wraps up the 2021-2022 fiscal,

cabinet would have had 10 percent of their salary held back. They were in

deficit. We’re assuming that we’re in deficit, based on updates, fiscal

updates. That 10 percent wouldn’t have been paid out. Based on this provision,

the minister is saying that the ministerial bump in pay of 50 percent of what

an MLA is paid, and the Premier’s bump, which is I believe is 90 percent of

what an MLA gets paid…. That would be paid in full instead of what it would

have been, which would have been 40 percent without this provision — for last

year’s fiscal.

[3:35 p.m.]

Hon. S. Robinson: First of all, the member was, I think, complaining — I think that that

would be an accurate characterization — about not getting to committee stage

until now. But I want to remind the member that we were expecting and hoping to

get to this committee stage on March 31, but apparently, there were other bills

that they chose to spend more time on debating.

It was scheduled to go to committee on Thursday, actually, and

it….

Interjection.

Hon. S. Robinson: Well, no, this was on the list, but apparently that took a lot longer,

and there were hoist motions and other such things that delayed us from getting

here.

Just in terms of the member’s question, I do want to point out that

after this bill is done, the 10 percent holdback will be returned, and the 10

percent will still be held back, based on how things play out with the public

accounts that we won’t see until August.

P. Milobar: Could the minister, then, clarify…? I think what I heard is that the 10

percent holdback existing that’s being removed no longer would rely on public

accounts in August. Strictly, just the ministerial individual budget will be

held back for public accounts. So that means that once this is passed through

this chamber, cabinet will see an extra $5,500 for last year’s fiscal,

regardless of what the financial performance and public accounts say for their

overall performance of the province, and then that will continue on in

2022-2023.

Hon. S. Robinson: That’s correct — on the 10 percent — but I don’t know exactly when

accounting would be able to make that happen. But that’s how we expect it would

play out.

P. Milobar: Again, I don’t think the public really cares what date you get the money

in the bank account. All they want to know is that you’re actually getting a

retroactive pay raise, and that sounds exactly what the minister just

confirmed. I guess that’ll probably end my questions on

section 2.

The Chair: Shall clause 2 pass?

Division has been called on clause 2.

[3:40 p.m. - 3:45 p.m.]

Clause 2 approved on the following division:

YEAS — 50

Alexis

Anderson

Bailey

Bains

Beare

Begg

Brar

Chant

Chen

Chow

Conroy

Coulter

Cullen

Dean

D’Eith

Donnelly

Dykeman

Eby

Elmore

Farnworth

Fleming

Glumac

Greene

Heyman

Kahlon

Kang

Leonard

Lore

Malcolmson

Mark

Mercier

Osborne

Paddon

Popham

Ralston

Rankin

Rice

Robinson

Routledge

Routley

Sandhu

Sharma

Simons

Sims

R. Singh

Starchuk

Walker

Whiteside

Yao

NAYS — 26

Ashton

Banman

Bernier

Cadieux

Clovechok

Davies

de Jong

Doerkson

Halford

Kirkpatrick

Kyllo

Lee

Letnick

Merrifield

Milobar

Morris

Oakes

Paton

Ross

Rustad

Shypitka

Stewart

Stone

Sturdy

Tegart

Wat

On clause 3.

[3:50 p.m.]

P. Milobar: I must say, first off, that was an interesting vote. That’s the first

time I’ve seen cabinet not cheer for something that they voted for. Given that

it’s a pay raise, I guess that’s why. It was interesting hearing from some

cabinet ministers that they feel justified now on the banter that they get paid

the same as the opposition leader. I guess, maybe, that’s the true motivation

versus decision-making.

Anyways, on clause 3. This is repealing

section 4 of the act.

Section 4

of the act is about payment of half the holdback for achieving collective

responsibilities, and it’s repealing it in its entirety. I’m assuming that

that’s because this is the collective responsibilities piece, not the overall

individual ministerial holdback piece.

Hon. S. Robinson: With the elimination of the 10 percent holdback for executive council

collective responsibilities, there is no need for

section 4.

Clause 3 approved.

On clause 4.

P. Milobar: Clause 4 deals with

section 5 of the bill. This is about repealing,

amending, half of the reduction — 20 percent reduction — under

section 3 and

substituting it with the salary reduction under

section 3.

So this is about maintaining that 10 percent holdback for ministerial

individual performance of their own ministerial budget?

Hon. S. Robinson: Yes. That is correct. This is a consequential amendment. It holds the 10

percent individual responsibility.

[3:55 p.m.]

P. Milobar: Earlier the minister had alluded to: “This is an important

accountability piece.” This holdback is an important accountability piece

because it will put pressure on that minister and other ministers to stay

within their own ministerial budget, because otherwise, other ministers are

going to have to make up the difference so that everyone can still get their

pay and not have a holdback.

Would it not just be one individual minister, if they overspent in their

ministerial budget, that would be subject to the 10 percent holdback provision,

not cabinet as a whole?

Hon. S. Robinson: It doesn’t relate to all of cabinet. It relates to that individual

minister.

P. Milobar: I guess I’m trying to understand how that makes it a better

accountability tool for cabinet as a whole than the provision that has just

been stripped away — for a retroactive pay raise, I might add.

If ministers aren’t achieving their target, surely the Minister of

Finance, who’s ultimately responsible for those targets, would be able to

either enforce the holdback or, even more punitive, ensure the minister no

longer receives the 50 percent pay increase by making sure that they are no

longer a minister if they cannot be fiscally responsible with their own

ministerial budget.

I guess the question is: what is the point of this, other than a charade

of making it look like there’s accountability, if every other accountability

provision has been stripped away at this point?

Hon. S. Robinson: Well, first of all, I don’t determine who’s in cabinet. That’s the

purview of the Premier.

The member, if he thinks it’s a charade, and it was his government that

brought it in, might want to talk to their new leader about that. He was around

when that was the case, if I recollect.

We’re keeping this piece because, as I said earlier, when individual

ministers are given their budget letters, there is an expectation that they’re

going to manage their own individual pressures and priorities over the year

within that fiscal framework that they’ve been given in their budget letter.

They have a responsibility, collectively, because it is one budget, but

everyone gets a piece of it. They have a responsibility to manage appropriately

and make the decisions — and they’re hard decisions — within their budget

letter requirements.

There is a holdback that…. Again I’ll explain to the member that we

don’t actually see, at the end of the day, where things are with everyone’s

budgets until after public accounts, which doesn’t happen until August. So it’s

important that we have that process so we can see where each ministry lands. It

helps keep the ministers focused on making sure that they are being very wise

and thoughtful about the decisions that they make on a day-to-day

basis.

P. Milobar: Well, that’s interesting. Previously we heard that holdback provisions

lead to poor decision-making for cabinet members because they have the threat

of not earning as much money if they don’t deliver on what their mandate is in

terms of spending and stay within the parameters that are laid out for

them.

Is the minister now saying that on an individual ministerial level, they

make good decisions with a holdback, not poor decisions like they would if it

was a collective holdback?

Hon. S. Robinson: As I said earlier, this is about when ministers put together their plan

for the year. It’s based on certain parameters that we all agree to. It gets

detailed in their budget letter, so we understand what they’re going to be

spending their dollars on. It’s a collective decision-making.

The expectation is that they’re going to be sticking with that plan,

unless, of course, something changes and they come back to Treasury Board. They

come back, and they get some recognition that things change, and they do

change. So we work together to do that.

It’s also really important to make sure that people are paying attention

to their budgets, that they recognize that the decisions that they made have

implications. This is the piece that helps them make those

decisions.

[4:00 p.m.]

What I was speaking to earlier was around the wholesale idea of whether

or not you should be making cuts to services in order to collect your

collective holdback. That’s a government decision, and that is very

concerning.

In this case, what we’re doing is making sure that people are watching

the decisions that they make closely over the year, to make sure that they can

continue to deliver what they say they’re going to deliver when they put

together their budget framework and that they are living within the

expectations that are in their budget letter.

P. Milobar: If that leads to good, thoughtful, hard decision-making by an individual

minister, surely if every single minister of cabinet is operating under that

premise, then all of their decisions are in that lens. That means that when

they get together as a collective, the collective decision-making must be good,

but we heard the minister say it results in poor decision-making, with the

previous clawback.

The question, though, the original premise of the question, was around….

I don’t think the bill, as we operated with the bill when we were in

government, was a charade of a bill,

an act. I think that with these changes,

the minister has made it a charade of

an act — of being able to point to

something to try to show the public that maybe, kind of, ministers are being

held accountable.

Why not just remove everything? Why not just get rid of the act? We have

provisions now, year after year — amendments — to remove the need for

non-deficit budgets. You’ve removed, with the last standing vote, the provision

for collective holdbacks. The last remaining piece of a holdback — of any type

of accountability measure, of any type of consequence for not doing your job —

is this piece.

The minister can correct me if I’m wrong, but it sounds like the

minister has been saying, several times now, that if one minister thinks that

they’re going to be overspending, there’s the ability either for Treasury Board

to just go into deficit to top up that minister or for a different minister,

who might be underspending on their budget, to do their fellow cabinet minister

a solid and do an internal transfer, with the approval of cabinet and Treasury

Board, from one ministry over to the other, to make sure that everyone can get

their 10 percent raises that year. The minister won’t call it a raise. The

public will probably think of it as a raise, in that case.

Can the minister confirm that there is nothing in this to prevent

ministers from helping out a fellow minister to collect their holdback by doing

internal transfers between ministries to make sure that all of them wind up

hitting their number, regardless of what was going on?

Hon. S. Robinson: The fundamental thing here is about expectations of a minister managing

to their budget, and the expectation is that they will manage to their budget.

They ought to, and my colleagues, I believe, can and will do that.

[4:05 p.m.]

It’s very different when you’re faced with a pandemic or any other

global crisis. You have falling revenues, or you’re anticipating falling

revenues. You need to have massive investments, massive amounts of COVID

relief, in order to keep people as whole as possible. Then penalizing a cabinet

for making the right decision, I think, is a problem. They shouldn’t be

penalized for making the right decision in that context. So it is very, very

different in terms of understanding and expectations about

decision-making.

The member may not know that cabinet ministers can’t sort of do one-offs

because they help a friend out. That’s not how it works. There is a process,

and they need to be able to make the case for where in their budget things

haven’t been working. They have to come to Treasury Board.

There is a process. It’s not one supporting one another. There is an

accountability mechanism internally, in order to understand why there is a

change or why there is a change in demand for more budget resource. So there is

an internal process for making that happen, if that’s what’s needed. It isn’t

always accommodated. I can put that forward as a Finance Minister.

P. Milobar: To be clear, there is nothing in the amendments — there is nothing in

the existing act — that prevents ministers from coming to an agreement to

transferring within themselves to make sure that each minister can officially

not be in a deficit position within their ministry, and be able to collect

their 10 percent holdback — the only holdback that is remaining in this whole

bill?

Hon. S. Robinson: The votes are the votes. They can’t do that.

P. Milobar: I’m confused, then. Could the minister clarify? Earlier, several times,

she’s alluded to…. It makes for ministers to work together, and if one’s

starting to feel pressure within their ministry, within their mandate that they

were supposed to spend, others can help. It leads to….

Those were some of the answers she was giving the Leader of the Third

Party. So I’m just confused. Which is it? We’ve heard two totally different

versions of how ministers are to operate with their budgets.

Hon. S. Robinson: What the member might not be aware of is that when there is a change, if

there is a need of a resource — for example, in Health, there is an anticipated

challenge — then the minister has to come before Treasury Board to see if they

can access contingencies in order to make something happen that was a priority.

So there is a whole process that needs to happen in order to deliver additional

resources, so that the minister can deliver more service.

However, if that’s the case, and a decision is made to support that

ministry with those resources, it might mean that another minister that was

hoping that they could access contingencies can’t, because there is just no

more contingency. That’s the challenge that any Finance Minister has when

someone overspends in some way. It means that we might not be able to deliver

on some other service, or deliver on some other crisis or challenge that may

materialize in any given year.

That is why we have contingencies, in case some things do come up in any

given year, so that you have the ability to respond to British Columbians. This

is always the tension. It’s, I think, every Finance Minister’s challenge that

they have through all the years, and right across the nation as

well.

P. Milobar: We operate in a pretty dog eat dog world of politics, even within own

parties, where you have back benchers that are eyeing up ministerial seats and

would love to be a minister, and think that ministers’ roundabout answers and

things of that nature maybe aren’t cutting it and wish that they had that job

and could do a better job. You have ministers that wish they were ministers of

other portfolios.

It’s human nature. It happens in every workplace. You have people that

want to get up into the management ranks or not, or get a promotion and maybe

think that their co-worker didn’t deserve that promotion. That’s not that

uncommon.

[4:10 p.m.]

In fact, I mean, even the former Finance Minister…. You know, the

minister talks about the holdbacks as if it leads to bad decision-making,

especially because of the pandemic. Well, this is what Carole James said on

July 28 of 2020: “We felt the priority needed to be on putting together

recovery for people in this province, and that’s where we put our focus.” Why

they didn’t change the holdbacks.

We spent the better part of a little over two hours here talking about

holdbacks today on the back end of COVID, which we all hope we’re on. Not on

the front end. July 2020 was right in the thick of things. So priorities can

change. Perspectives can change from minister to minister.

I guess the question is: is the minister suggesting that the remaining

10 percent holdback…? Apparently the first 10 percent, which we just saw get

repealed retroactively, was for bad decision-making. This is for good

accountability decision-making, this 10 percent.

Would it be fair, though, to say that if you’re perpetually an

underperforming minister, the threat of being replaced, the threat of being

demoted, the threat of being moved out of cabinet, which comes with a 50

percent pay bump over what an MLA makes, should rightly be all the motivation

you actually need if you’ve already gutted out all of the other accountability

measures as they relate to the financial part of your job as a minister? The

need to be not in deficit is gone until at least 2025. The holdback to work as

a collective group is gone permanently.

There are still more than enough ways to ensure that a minister…. Surely

we can entrust a minister of the Crown, with all those other back pressures of

job performance, to do their job. What is the purpose? We have

an act that is

11 clauses, and we’re amending one, two, three, four, five, six, seven — at

least seven — eight, nine, ten…. We’re amending everything in it.

At what point will the minister just not admit that this government

doesn’t want to adhere to a balanced budget and ministerial accountability?

Everything we’re dealing with here is to gut that legislation. Yet now we’re

coming up, and the minister is clinging to justification for why a holdback is

the holy grail of ministerial accountability after two hours of saying the

exact opposite.

I’ll go back. I’ve asked this question similar ways. Why the charade?

Why not just tell people: “We have no plan on being out of deficit. We’re not

going to have any holdbacks on our ministers. We’re making sure that happens”?

We can go back in Hansard and find several different times the

minister has alluded to the fact that will happen for her ministerial

colleagues. You can go now to Treasury Board and ask for any sum of money — ask

to make that minister whole so they can get their holdback — because you’re

allowed to be in deficit.

This bill was all interconnected. It’s not anymore. Why was the bill

just not repealed? Why is the minister clinging to this last 10 percent

holdback as some grand accountability measure for her cabinet?

Hon. S. Robinson: I think it’s really important to make a distinction between meeting a

budget and setting a budget. With this change, ministers can collectively

decide whether it’s appropriate to run a deficit in order to invest in British

Columbians and meet their needs and provide the services that they need. Once

the budget is set — once it is set, and it’s voted on in this House — ministers

are still responsible for staying within their voted budget, and that’s a fair

expectation.

[4:15 p.m.]

Now, the member is smiling and looking a little churlish over there. I’m

not quite sure what part of that he doesn’t understand. I think the public

understands the difference between making a collective decision to say we need

to go into deficit because we have major flooding, have significant challenges

around a pandemic…. There is a significant crisis that needs significant

resources, and we, collectively, are going to make a decision that we are going

to engage in deficit spending in order to help people get through this

difficult time. And this is how we’re going to do that.

The expectation for the minister is: “You, Minister A, are going to be

delivering these services. This is what it’s going to cost, so here’s your

budget.” The expectation is that they’re going to be making those decisions

within that context in order to deliver that service. That’s, I believe, a way

to hold everyone responsible for what the decision is and what their

commitments are to the people of British Columbia.

P. Milobar: Well, I chuckled because the minister seems to forget about the billions

of dollars of unallocated contingency funds in her budget.

Could the minister clarify, then, that if a minister was overspending in

their budget and needed to go to Treasury Board, as long as it was within the

envelope of that passed budget, the approved budget that comes through this

chamber, and as long as it has allocated contingency funds — cabinet, Treasury

Board, the minister, likely just the minister…? We’ll get to that in clause 11

of this bill. Treasury Board could approve the extra dollars and still be

within this funding envelope that just got approved, the overall funding

envelope, because there are billions of dollars of unallocated dollars in the

budget.

Is that a funding avenue available to ministers to convince the Finance

Minister, the Premier, the Treasury Board, the cabinet to release some of those

contingency funds, unallocated contingency funds, to ensure that whatever

minister it is that’s making the pitch would then be no longer in deficit for

their ministry for that fiscal year and would be eligible for their 10 percent

holdback?

Hon. S. Robinson: Again, the member may not appreciate the role of Treasury Board in

making sure that any decisions that they make have to fit within certain

parameters. Any minister who has come up against a crisis or an unusual

circumstance — that is why we have contingencies, that all governments have

contingencies.

It’s related to, certainly…. I’ll speak to the pandemic and recovery

contingencies, which is the larger contingency that we have. It has to be

pandemic recovery–related.

Again, I know that the members of this House can appreciate things

continue to change and evolve. Certainly, if I can speak to last fall with the

changing nature and how to stand up extra clinics if we needed to do

vaccination, it’s having that pandemic and recovery contingency available so

that when the Health Minister said, “We need to stand up vaccine clinics, and

this is how much it’s going to cost,” or “We need to have additional people in

long-term care, making sure that everyone is safe,” we need to have some budget

access.

We created that contingency to make sure that we had the ability to be

flexible and adaptable based on what was happening in the moment. So it’s

within that context that we have the pandemic and recovery

contingencies.

[4:20 p.m.]

It’s the same thing for businesses. As they were required to be closed

because of public health — making sure that we could help businesses through

the relatively short period of time. I’m grateful it was a relatively short

period of time that they could get a grant to help them to pay some of their

bills.

It’s within that context that we had ministers making a case for how

they would use the money, in what ways they would use the money and how they

would be accountable for the money so that they could deliver the services that

British Columbians count on.

P. Milobar: Well, I guess it’s fitting that the minister went to the pandemic fund.

Just like that answer, I’m hard pressed to find anything that the government

doesn’t point to the pandemic, over the last two years, as a reason for

something. So I think a minister would probably be able to figure out some

reasonable way to find some reason to need that so that they could actually get

their 10 percent holdback and ensure that they get their pay bump for that

fiscal year.

The question, though, was really about the ability to tap into those

excess funds, because the minister, in a previous answer, made it sound like

once the budget is set and voted on, that’s the envelope of money, and no,

ministers still need to manage within their own money, and it’s not as simple

as saying that there are some excess funds to tap into through Treasury Board

and that.

I guess the question to the minister, then, is would the minister have

to go to all of Treasury Board and have all of…? Is Treasury Board designed to

be that firewall, to be that sounding board to make sure that a large portion

of cabinet and some other members within government are putting a look and a

broad set of eyes on that decision about whether or not a minister should get a

little bit of change in their budgetary area and their mandate so that they can

actually ensure that they are still meeting the test of collecting their 10

percent holdback?

Does that have to be done by all of Treasury Board? Is that what makes

it a stronger firewall — having those types of decisions funnel through that

larger body and making sure that there are multiple eyes and multiple opinions

discussing it?

Hon. S. Robinson: Treasury Board is the body that takes a look at any requirements for

resources. Even if a member of cabinet wanted to use existing dollars and move

it to some other program, it still needs to come before Treasury Board, because

Treasury Board has a corporate look at what’s happening. Our practice is that

not only does it go to Treasury Board to be ratified, but we’ll also take it to

cabinet.

P. Milobar: It sound like the minister is saying that the firewall — the

good-governance, good-decision firewall — from a minister potentially

overspending, from a minister needing top-up money to get their holdback is

Treasury Board, which consists of a large portion of cabinet and other voices

from within government MLA ranks, and then cabinet itself.

The Treasury Board piece is the strength of that collective skill set of

diverse opinions, ideas and ministerial responsibilities looking at the request

and putting it in the context of other things going on within the overall

budget. That process with Treasury Board is meant to be the firewall to ensure

that the integrity of this 10 percent holdback is met with good decision-making

by ministers.

[4:25 p.m.]

Hon. S. Robinson: I believe I answered that, and it’s correct.

Clauses 4 to 6 inclusive approved.

On clause 7.

P. Milobar: I thought, since this is the last clause being amended in the Balanced

Budget and Ministerial Accountability Act, I should probably stand up and

correct the record for my own comment just a few minutes earlier. I referenced

that every

section of the act was being amended, which seemed a little

ridiculous to still even keep the act in place, when in fact, I notice that

this is amending

section 8 in the Balanced Budget and Ministerial

Accountability Act, and there are actually nine clauses in the Balanced Budget

and Ministerial Accountability Act.

I just wanted to correct the record — that, in fact, we were only

amending eight of nine clauses in the act, not all nine.

Clauses 7 to 10 inclusive approved.

On clause 11.

P. Milobar: This is the clause that deals with changing the Financial Administration

Act and amending it, essentially, to delegate Treasury Board to enable the

Finance Minister or the chair or vice-chair — I believe the Environment

Minister is currently the vice-chair — to essentially be able to make decisions

that Treasury Board would normally make, make them in isolation of Treasury

Board, and proceed things forward.

Can the minister explain why the need to bring this forward and

essentially give her the ability and the power to unilaterally make decisions

around things like transferring dollars to make sure a minister stays whole so

they can get their holdback, when she just literally, three minutes ago, said

that the designed firewall for good governance is all of Treasury Board

reviewing and discussing and engaging and looking and making those collective

decisions?

Hon. S. Robinson: The amendment will help streamline some of the work of Treasury Board,

especially for minor but urgent items. It’s not easy to get everyone together

in an urgent fashion. So what I think is really important for the member to

understand is that it’s the Treasury Board itself that will determine what can

be delegated. So the Treasury Board will understand, in terms of what kinds of

items can be delegated.

[4:30 p.m.]

As well, the Treasury Board will prescribe how decisions that are

delegated get reported back to Treasury Board. At the end of the day, Treasury

Board has full confidence and gets to…. They’re the final arbiter of how those

decisions get made, and everything gets reported back to them.

P. Milobar: The minister, I believe, even in second reading comments, had referred

to minor things. Is there anything in this change, this clause, that caps

either the fiscal or the amount of years of a commitment or any of the

decision-making that the minister may be able to do? Is there anything that

actually defines what the minister keeps referring to as minor

decisions?

Hon. S. Robinson: There’s nothing in the legislation that has a cap. It is up to Treasury

Board to make the determination about what can be delegated.

P. Milobar: Treasury Board will be the sole decider of what powers the chair or the

vice-chair may have. They could have full powers, or this could just be nothing

more than enabling legislation. Is there anything in here to prevent Treasury

Board from granting full powers to the chair or the vice-chair, other than

where it’s about the regulation in (6)?

Hon. S. Robinson: This is really about making the business of Treasury Board work more

efficiently. Treasury Board is not abandoning their responsibilities and

doesn’t have an interest in doing that. This is about Treasury Board

determining which items can be delegated for a decision, with the chair and/or

the vice-chair, so that decisions can be made quickly.

They will also be determining how those decisions get reported back to

Treasury Board so that Treasury Board has all the information, from a corporate

perspective, of any decisions that the chair or vice-chair has made, given the

delegated authority.

P. Milobar: Is there anything in this that would compel Treasury Board to release

publicly what those new provisions and powers would be for the chair and the

vice-chair to be able to action?

Hon. S. Robinson: The short answer is no. The board will be the ones to decide which items

can be considered by the chair or the vice-chair and will decide the reporting

structure that will go back to the Treasury Board, as the ultimate arbiters of

the decision-making.

P. Milobar: Well, it sounds like a wonderful place, where everyone has an equal

voice at the table and everyone comes to the same conclusion and moves forward,

and there’ll be hearty, robust discussion about the powers that the Finance

Minister should or shouldn’t have.

Political realities in Canada being what they are, Premiers’ offices and

Prime Ministers’ offices wield a heck of a lot of power and influence in

government. They control, as the minister said earlier, who’s in cabinet and

who’s not, who’s on Treasury Board and who’s not, who has profile or not. They

control a whole heck of a lot. They could also pretty much make it clear,

through the Premier’s office, what powers the minister will or will not have

delegated to them by Treasury Board, especially given that this is a piece of

legislation.

[4:35 p.m.]

This isn’t just a one-off. This doesn’t expire when this minister is no

longer the minister. This is how Treasury Board would be designed to operate

moving forward.

It’s probably a bit of a broken-record question, given the lack of

detail in so many different bills, but why not have the definition of what the

new powers on something as critical as the fiscal responsibility…? And as we

heard from the minister, the importance of having that group decision-making to

firewall the decisions, to make sure that the financial interests are being

examined properly, that projects are being approved properly on their merit,

not just on a political whim…. Why was there no certainty and

clarity?

There’s quite a bit of certainty and clarity when I read through the

Financial Administration Act on how Treasury Board is supposed to operate, how

they’re supposed to interact with the comptroller general. A lot of certainty,

a lot of clarity. Nothing here.

Why do we not have a better sense of what powers and authorities would

be delegated to the minister? The minister has said, repeatedly, minor. She

must have some idea of the power she would like to have extra. Why is there no

certainty and clarity on something as fundamentally important to the overall

spending and operation and decision-making of government as Treasury Board on

an amendment like this?

Hon. S. Robinson: I just want to read into the record the powers and functions and duties

of the Treasury Board, which is

section 4(1):

“The Treasury Board must act as a committee of the Executive Council in

matters relating to the following: (

a) accounting policies and practices; (

b) government management practices and systems; (

c) government financial

management and control, including expenditures and assets; (

d) evaluation of

government programs as to economy, efficiency and effectiveness; (

e) government

personnel management; (

f) other matters referred to it by the Executive

Council.”

That’s already in there.

What we’re saying is that, at times, there are situations that require

expediency or you’re not able to get your members of the Treasury Board

together in a timely manner in order to move a project forward to the next

stage or respond to an opportunity that might be presenting itself that has a

deadline. The Treasury Board members can create a framework that says: “Under

these circumstances, we can give authority to the chair and vice-chair, and we

expect them to come back within this time frame, within this context, in order

to report back the decision that was made and how it was made and in what

context.”

Ultimately, all of this comes back to Treasury Board.

P. Milobar: Well, they may make it that way. But, the point being, they may not. The

legislation allows them to not have to do it that way. That’s how this minister

would like to see it happen.

That’s why I’m asking this minister, based on this being her amendment

on powers that she is seeking from Treasury Board, why there was not more

certainty to limit those powers and circumstance.

The minister obviously has clearly thought through circumstances or has

experienced it. The previous minister didn’t seem to have a problem with it,

but the previous minister didn’t have a problem with the holdbacks

either.

The confidence starts to be undermined, both with the answers around

holdbacks, with a budget that gets delayed a month, with provisions that won’t

be known, that Treasury Board will or won’t confer to the minister. This is a

fundamentally significant change to how financial decision-making by any

government of any political stripe will be moving forward — massively

different.

To hear, because it might be in times of emergency, that cabinet members

who just retroactively voted a pay raise find it difficult to get to a meeting

in a timely fashion, to approve something that would help British Columbians in

a time of crisis, is shocking.

[4:40 p.m.]

It’s shocking. If that was the power that was being asked for, it should

just be spelled out that the minister is asking for the power to be conferred

during a state of emergency or a natural disaster — to bypass Treasury Board.

But that’s not what’s being asked for here. It’s open-ended.

The minister read

section 4 of the act that this is amending, and

section 4 of the act has three pieces to it right now. This adds a (4), (5),

(6), (7) to it.

“The chair or vice chair to whom a power, duty or function is delegated

may not delegate that power, duty or function to another person.” That makes a

lot of sense. That’s clear. That’s (5).

“(6) Subsection (4) does not authorize the chair or vice chair to

exercise an authority conferred on the Treasury Board to enact a regulation as

defined in the Regulations Act .” That’s pretty clear. That restricts

the powers.

“

(7) Section 12 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of

Privacy Act applies in relation to a power, duty or function delegated

to the chair or vice chair as if the power, duty or function were exercised or

performed by the Treasury Board.” That deals with everyone’s favourite thing,

with privacy and information.

But (4) is the problem. The amendment: “The Treasury Board may delegate

to the chair or vice chair of the Treasury Board any of the powers, duties or

functions of the Treasury Board under any enactment.” So it’s not minor. It’s

pretty serious. We wouldn’t have the membership on Treasury Board that we do if

it weren’t meant to be, as the minister acknowledged in her previous

section

when I asked, that it could be that firewall of decision-making.

The other piece of the act that interrelates quite heavily, actually,

with Treasury Board is the comptroller general’s office. Given the power that

this change actually can create in

section 4(4) and the financial oversight

problems it could create, was the comptroller’s office consulted on this change

of legislation?

Hon. S. Robinson: This has nothing to do with the comptroller general’s office. Again, I

want to point out to the member that the Treasury Board may delegate, but the

Treasury Board could choose to not delegate anything. They could choose to not

delegate anything. So I think that this is about respecting members of Treasury

Board, respecting their time, respecting their commitment,

acknowledging….

There are times when there are questions that the Treasury Board tables.

“You know what? This is the kind of decision that we didn’t need to come

together for, that we would have delegated to the chair or the vice-chair —

using their time to look at more significant decisions, where there needs to be

some more robust discussion.”

An example I think about is a project that has already received Treasury

Board blessing to move to the next phase. Does that really need to go to all of

Treasury Board for more discussion? Or we’ve already heard from Treasury Board,

they support the project moving forward, and it just needs to move to the next

phase. There is an obligation to take it back to Treasury Board.

Building in the framework and the opportunity for Treasury Board to say:

“Under these circumstances, the chair and vice-chair can make these decisions,

and this is how they’re going to report back to Treasury Board….” It’s

important that Treasury Board understand what decisions have been made. Again,

this is really up to Treasury Board to make the determination of what they feel

comfortable with.

[4:45 p.m.]

P. Milobar: Well, the comptroller general is linked in with Treasury Board, in fact,

under “Duties of the comptroller general,” 9(

e) in the act: “evaluate financial

management throughout the government and recommend to the Treasury Board

improvements considered necessary.”

I am asking: is this an improvement that the comptroller general thought

was necessary?

Hon. S. Robinson: Again, this has nothing to do with the comptroller general. The

comptroller general has their own powers. This is about how Treasury Board

makes decisions about what comes before the full board and what can be

delegated to the chair and the vice-chair.

Treasury Board, having the responsibility, can make that determination.

That’s what this is proposing — that they can make the determination to not

only identify the criteria for what decisions can be delegated to the chair and

the vice-chair. They also will determine, and can determine, how that gets

reported back.

As the member alluded to the comptroller general, all of these decisions

will go forward to the comptroller general as a package. In terms of how

Treasury Board makes its decisions, that is unique to just the Treasury

Board.

P. Milobar: Again, this is a…. I know the minister wants to slough this off as it’s

just going to be minor if it’s even enacted or acted upon. It’ll be enacted,

obviously, but whether or not it is acted upon is left up to question. I’ll

remind the minister that the Milburn report on Site C actually pointed out lax

Treasury Board oversight on a project that is now $16 billion. That was with

full Treasury Board oversight.

Under this change, is there anything preventing Treasury Board, with

this amendment, from saying: “Minister, vice-chair, you guys can solely…. We

confer to you the ability to deal with Site C independently of Treasury Board.

Just report back”?

Hon. S. Robinson: Again, I want to remind the member that Treasury Board is a subcommittee

of cabinet, and what we’re proposing here, again, is to make sure that the

Treasury Board has the ability to make sure that it runs efficiently. When

there are a lot of decisions to be made and lots of activity happening, then it

can get challenging to work through and have the robust discussions, when you

have a very full docket.

The Treasury Board having the ability to make some determination and put

some parameter around those items that can be delegated to the chair and the

vice-chair is good, I’ll say, organizational efficiency, making sure that we

can continue to move forward on what one might consider minor items. Ones

where, for example….

I’ll come back to a project that has received the blessing of Treasury

Board, and it’s moving forward. It’s now going through the next phase. It needs

to come back to Treasury Board, or they need to do a report back to Treasury

Board. To bring the full board back to hear those reports, Treasury Board could

say: “On the report backs, we’ll leave that to the chair or the

vice-chair.”

Again, the mechanism that it still has to come back to Treasury Board

and be reported out in some way provides the Treasury Board with the efficiency

it needs and has the accountability still there, because it’s got to come back

to Treasury Board in some framework.

[4:50 p.m.]

As well, our practice is to also take that to cabinet so that there are

many opportunities for many eyes, many ears and many opinions.

P. Milobar: However, the decision would’ve been made, the project would be

proceeding, and authorizations would be given by the time it’s reported back to

Treasury Board, with this amendment, because it’s conferring the power and the

functions.

“The Treasury Board may delegate to the chair or vice chair of the

Treasury Board any of the powers, duties or functions….” It sounds an awful lot

like approvals, and the minister keeps downplaying: “It could be minor. It

might not even be actioned. It’s just an extra tool for us.”

The question to the minister. Who asked for this tool? It hasn’t

appeared before. Was it Treasury Board that asked for this tool? Was it the

minister that asked for this tool? Was it the Premier’s office that asked for

this tool? Who exactly was clamouring and wanting this amendment put in that

opens the door and gives the ability for the Finance Minister to be the sole

decider of things happening at Treasury Board?

Hon. S. Robinson: I provided examples to the member about how active the Treasury Board

is, whether it’s new programs, a change in programs, reports back. There’s lots

of demand — I think that’s the word — on Treasury Board time.

Being able to delegate…. Again, it’s Treasury Board that gets to do the

delegation. It’s the full board that gets to have the discussion about what

would be appropriate to delegate, what would be appropriate to not delegate,

what the expectations are of the board that would need to come to the full

board and what parameters would be used to make the determination about what

doesn’t need to go to the full board.

That is a discussion of the full Treasury Board, as well as how that

will get fed back in and what the timeliness would be, around getting those

decisions back to Treasury Board and how that would play out. That’s work that

the Treasury Board would need to do. This amendment gives the Treasury Board

the ability to do that work so that it can be a more efficient body.

P. Milobar: Of the last few questions, neither has been actually answered. The first

one that wasn’t answered was whether or not this gives the Treasury Board the

ability to say that a project like Site C is now under the purview of the chair

and the vice-chair. Just report back. That was the first question: was it

avoided?

The second question, the most recent question, was: who asked for this?

There have been answers from the minister that makes it sound like this might

not even be actioned by Treasury Board. One would assume they must have

discussed something like this ahead of time, that there are some thoughts as to

how it could be utilized as a tool.

We’re not going to know. We’re not going to have a release. We’re not

going to find out what the new powers will be, despite the fact that existing

powers are very clearly spelled out in a public legislative document. As to

changes moving forward to how much power the Finance Minister does or doesn’t

have as the chair of Treasury Board, those will be kept secret.

The best we can get for an answer from the minister today is: “Well, it

might not actually get used, and it will probably only be used for minor

things. There’s really not too much to worry about because Treasury Board will

decide that anyway.” It has already been taken to task for lax oversight on a

very large capital project. “Well, we didn’t really even bother talking to the

comptr