Fourth Session, 42nd Parliament

(2023) OFFICIAL REPORT

OF DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Thursday, April 6, 2023

Afternoon Sitting

Issue No. 302

ISSN 1499-2175

The HTML transcript is provided for informational purposes only.

The PDF transcript remains the official digital version.

CONTENTS

Orders of the Day

Committee of the Whole House

Bill 21 — Civil Forfeiture Amendment Act, 2023

(continued)

M. Morris

Hon. M. Farnworth

Report and Third Reading of Bills

Bill 21 — Civil Forfeiture Amendment Act,

Committee of Supply

Estimates: Ministry of Indigenous Relations and

Reconciliation (continued)

M. Lee

Hon. M. Rankin

Proceedings in the Douglas Fir Room

Committee of Supply

Estimates: Ministry of Indigenous Relations and

Reconciliation (continued)

M. Lee

Hon. M. Rankin

Proceedings in the Birch Room

Committee of Supply

Estimates: Ministry of Agriculture and Food

(continued)

J. Sturdy

Hon. P. Alexis

I. Paton

A. Olsen

J. Rustad

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2023

The House met at 1:03 p.m.

[Mr. Speaker in the chair.]

Orders of the Day

Hon. M. Farnworth: In this chamber, I call continued Committee of the Whole, Bill 21, Civil

Forfeiture Act.

In

Section A, the Douglas Fir Room, I call continued estimates on the

Ministry of Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation.

In

Section C, the Birch Room, I call Committee of Supply, estimates for

the Ministry of Agriculture and Food.

Committee of the Whole House

BILL 21 — CIVIL FORFEITURE

AMENDMENT

ACT, 2023

(continued)

The House in Committee of the Whole (Section

B) on Bill 21;

J. Tegart in the chair.

The committee met at 1:04 p.m.

The Chair: We’ll call the Committee of the Whole to order.

We’re dealing with Bill 21, Civil Forfeiture Amendment Act,

Clauses 5 and 6 approved.

On clause 7.

[1:05 p.m.]

M. Morris: Clause 7 requires that, on request of the director, a “registrar

of the court must seal the court file” relating to an application or

related materials until the application is heard. And it says the court

“must.” Just wondering if the minister can give an example of when these

kinds of orders might apply. What kinds of circumstances?

Hon. M. Farnworth: An application for banking rec­ords, for example, would be

an example the member is looking for.

M. Morris: So an application for what kinds of records? Banking records.

Technically, it’s sensitive information that the director might come in

contact with. Could it also include informant information coming from

the police? No, IT won’t include any of that. Okay, thank

you.

Clauses 7 to 9 inclusive approved.

On clause 10.

M. Morris: This clause 10 is quite significant, several pages. So we’ll

slowly plod our way through here, because I think this is the crux of a

lot of what we’re going to be talking about here with these unexplained

wealth orders. Pretty comprehensive, when I was reading through these

things here.

In the

definitions sections, we’ll go to 11.05(f), “a prescribed

individual….” We could go through…. We’ve got a parent, a sibling, a

child, a sibling of a parent and a child of a sibling and then a

prescribed individual or an individual in a prescribed class. I’m

wondering if the minister can give me an indication of what that might

look like.

Hon. M. Farnworth: Anybody we might have missed in the list above.

M. Morris: That won’t apply to too many, then, because it’s a pretty

comprehensive list. I guess I was looking at a lot of these

relationships with stepchildren and stepmothers. So is this what the

prescribed entity would probably cover? Okay.

In relation to “‘settlor’, in relation to a trust, means a person

who contributed any property to the trust estate, whether or not that

person is the creator of the trust,” this is a field that I think is….

There’s some work being done right now with respect to a lot of trusts

that really don’t meet the criteria that they were initially established

under.

Would this particular definition capture everybody that had

contributed to that trust in some financial way? Nodding the

heads.

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yes, it would.

M. Morris: Excellent. I think that’s a great new provision here.

Affiliated. There are a number of subsections under 11.06(1). I’m

reading 11.06(1)(a)(iv): “if the individual is connected to a

corporation or partnership, any person that is connected to the

corporation or partnership” is affiliated. And then (

v) is “a person who

is affiliated with a person who is referred to in subparagraph

(iv).”

[1:10 p.m.]

Is this designed to cover these corporations…? This pretty much

covers everybody in a corporation. Is that correct? It doesn’t leave

anything for the imagination if somebody is…. Okay.

Hon. M. Farnworth: You’re correct in your assessment.

M. Morris: This might go a little quicker than I thought, then. Under

11.06(1)(d)(vii), “a prescribed person or a person in a prescribed

class,” again, can the minister give an example?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It’s catching anybody we didn’t capture in the previous numbers

above this one.

M. Morris: I take it, from reading through this, that this is…. In your

earlier comments introducing the bill, talking about the U.K. and the

work that they’ve done in putting this together…. Is this reflective of

the work that the U.K. has done, in order to capture some of the holes

that they had in their legislation? I’ll just leave the question at that

right now.

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yeah. This essentially mimics what they have put in place as

well.

M. Morris: I’m curious. I didn’t do any research with respect to the case law

that was developed as a result of the U.K. attempts at putting this

legislation forward. Were there specific references in any of the

jurisprudence that flowed from those few cases that were tried that

questioned the affiliation and the connections of individuals involved

in these orders?

Hon. M. Farnworth: No.

M. Morris: I’ll go down now to sub 11.06(2). Again, I can probably predict

what the answer might be. “Subsection (1)(a), (b), (c), (

d) and (

e) does

not limit any other paragraph in that subsection.” So they could be all

of the above? Is that what that particular

section refers?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yes, it’s all or any.

M. Morris: We’ll go down to 11.07, “Meaning of ‘beneficial

owner.’”

“A person is a beneficial owner in respect of the whole or a

portion of an interest in property held by a trustee of a trust if any

of the following apply….” I’m sort of reading this out because I know

there are a couple of folks watching that are really interested in this

part of what this bill is about: “(

a) the person has, in respect of the

whole or a portion of the interest in property, a beneficial interest,

other than an interest that is contingent on the death of an individual

other than the person.”

Then “(

b) the person has the power to revoke the trust and receive

the whole or the portion of the interest” in the trust.

So if we have a trust that is set up for charitable purposes,

would everybody that’s involved in financing that initial trust be

considered a beneficial owner in a not-for-profit or in a

charitable-purpose trust?

Hon. M. Farnworth: By this definition, most likely yes.

[1:15 p.m.]

M. Morris: Probably.

You know, I’ve worked in law quite a bit over my years, and I’ve

never seen anything quite as comprehensive as this, so my hat is off to

the people who drafted this legislation as well.

When we get into 11.08, “Meaning of ‘connected,’” it says

11.08(b)…. I’ll read a little bit of it here first.

“A person is connected to a corporation if any of the following

apply: (

a) the person is a legal or beneficial owner or has control,

directly or indirectly, of (

i) shares of the corporation representing

10% or more of the value of the equity of that corporation, or (ii) 10%

or more of the voting rights in respect of the corporation; (

b) the

person has the right, directly or indirectly, to appoint or remove from

office the majority of the board of directors of the

corporation.”

What is intended with the word “indirectly” in this particular

section?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Just because you’re on a board of directors does not necessarily

mean you’re the one who’s doing the controlling. It could be done

through another person.

Let’s say, for example, an individual put their child on the

board, an adult child. It could be a spouse doing it through another

spouse, directing the individual on the board. So that’s how it

works.

M. Morris: A couple things. I was wondering whether this might capture…. When

we see the way organized crime operates anywhere, they take advantage of

all the different loopholes. You have somebody that may not show up on

the board, but he or she is behind the scenes. They provide their input

through intimidation, through blackmail…. These are other criminal

offenses that they might be involved in. Those persons would be captured

under this

section as well?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The answer is yes. If not, we’ve reserved the right to prescribe

them as well.

M. Morris: I love this.

When you look at the number under 11.08(1)(a)(i), it says: “shares

of the corporation representing 10% or more of the value of the equity

of that corporation, or (ii) 10% or more of the voting rights in respect

of the corporation.” So 10 percent seems to be an arbitrary number. Is

there some way that…? What was the reason for this number?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The 10 percent number is the one that’s also used in the corporate

transparency register.

M. Morris: Would this take into account if you have a number of people that

hold 9 percent that are affiliated with one individual that might be

controlling these?

So he might have ten or 15 people involved in equity shares of a

company, all holding less than 10 percent, but they would be

attributable or connected in some way to him. Would this preclude

anything from happening to the individual that was controlling those

shares?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The answer would be yes. If they’re working together, even though

they control less than 10 percent, yes. They would be linked.

M. Morris: They would be…? I’m sorry. I didn’t catch that.

Hon. M. Farnworth: They would be clearly linked. Affiliated.

[1:20 p.m.]

M. Morris: This is comprehensive. I’ll probably exclude a number of questions

that I’ve had on that.

I’ll go down to 11.09, under the “Application for unexplained

wealth order.” The unexplained wealth order: “The director may apply to

the court for an unexplained wealth order in relation to property

requiring a respondent or a responsible officer to provide a statement

that includes all of the following: (

a) particulars of the nature of the

interest or the portion of the interest in the property held by the

respondent, including the extent of the interest or the portion of the

interest in the property….”

Can the minister take me through the process that the director

would go through from the point of making an application? Where does the

information come to the director to the point where he’s putting all

this information together, and he is now going to be in the process of

making an application?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Most likely it would be that a pol­ice investigation is

underway. They determine, or they feel, that there is unexplained wealth

here. They would take that information to the director. The director has

the ability to amplify that through his, let’s say, additional

open-source information they have access to. They put that together, and

then they apply to…. They would go to the court and apply for an

unexplained wealth order. Then the court would make the decision on

that.

M. Morris: As the director goes through, and the particulars reveal that

there are others identified as interest holders in his or her

investigation, would separate orders be applied for, or would they be

added to the application that is going before the court at that

time?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It would be…. You could do…. If you started out with one and then

you became aware that there were others, you could get one for that

person and one for that person and one for that person.

M. Morris: That’s interesting. It’s a lot of work for the director for sure.

I guess I know from my own criminal investigative experience over the

years, you start diving into something, and you find out all this

connectivity to other agencies and other people and whatnot. What leads

to…. Instead of a one-charge information, you’ll have a ten-charge

information. But oftentimes it identifies other people where other

charges will be laid. This is similar to the system that the director

would use. I see nodding heads over there.

Again, I go back to 11.09 with my earlier comments just before we

broke at lunchtime. The information that’s provided in this is pretty

comprehensive. Again, I’m going to read some of it out here, because I

do think that some of the people out in TV land that aren’t aware of

this particular legislation need to pay attention.

It says that the director applies to the court for an unexplained

wealth order requiring the “particulars of the nature of the interest of

the portion.” I’ve read that one out already, so: “(

b) particulars of

the respondent’s acquisition and maintenance of the property or the

interest or the portion of the interest in the property, including how

any costs incurred in acquiring and maintaining the property or the

interest or the portion of the interest in the property have been

met.”

[1:25 p.m.]

This tells me that I’m going to go to the respondent, and I’m

going to say: “How’d you get this? Who’d you get if from? How much money

did you pay for it and your maintenance over the…?” If it’s real

property, if it’s a vehicle or serial numbered property, if you had to

replace an engine, all those kinds of things have to be included in

this.

“if any of the circumstances listed in

section 11.11 (3) (

b) to

(

e) apply, the information or particulars with respect to those

circumstances as specified by the court; (

d) without limiting paragraph

(c), in the case of property held by a trustee of a trust, the

information or particulars with respect to the trust as specified by the

court.”

This tells me that you can dive right into the origins of that

trust and how it has grown and how it has been used over an unlimited

period of time, as we’ll get into later on with removing the limitation

or extending the limitation. So I’m recording that correctly.

And: “any other information or particulars as specified by the

court.” The director puts his package together, sends it to the court,

and then the court is entitled to ask questions and ask for more

information. Is that what this particular subsection says?

Hon. M. Farnworth: No. If we meet the test, then the court makes an order to the

individual to supply the information that we are seeking.

M. Morris: In subsection (2), it says: “The director may apply for an

unexplained wealth order before, at the time of or subsequent to (

a) an

application for another order under this Part, or (

b) commencing

proceedings under

section 3 in relation to the property.”

I’m wondering. Does the time limit that is stated in 11.03, that

90-day time limit that was extended to 90 days, apply to this particular

section too?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The 90 days is primarily for banking records. That is when it’s

most likely to be used.

M. Morris: Sub (3) says: “An application for an unexplained wealth order (

a) applies only in relation to property or an interest in property located

in British Columbia, and (

b) may be made whether or not, (

i) at the time

of the application, more than one person holds an interest or a portion

of an interest in the property.”

I’m wondering. How would this apply, and how would we be able to

capture somebody from a foreign country investing into real property

that this

section pertains to? They may never have been in British

Columbia, but they have wired money or provided some kind of investment

into this. Would that be captured in the order?

Hon. M. Farnworth: If the individual has the property here but doesn’t live here, we

can still get the order to go after them. Of course, they don’t live

here, so it is not easy. That being said, in most cases, they use a

corporation, in which case, we would go after the

corporation.

M. Morris: What about property other than real property? So serial numbered

property — precious metals or other types of serial numbered property —

that was purchased and held in British Columbia for a period of time. It

was bought here, and they moved it out of the province. How would a

situation like that be dealt with?

Hon. M. Farnworth: We would not be able to deal with that. We can only deal with

stuff that’s actually within the province.

[1:30 p.m.]

M. Morris: Probably a hypothetical question at this particular time, but is

there any thought to…? Would there be opportunities for reciprocal

agreements with other provinces like Manitoba, which has similar

legislation?

Hon. M. Farnworth: I appreciate the question. We have agreements with other

provinces, so we would be able to transfer the information to them, and

then they would be able to go after the individual in the province where

that person is located.

M. Morris: For clarification, then, would that prov­ince be operating…?

What if that province doesn’t have a similar piece of legislation in

place? Is there something in the reciprocal agreements that they can

operate on B.C.’s information?

Hon. M. Farnworth: No, it would be on their own legislation. But most provinces have

forfeiture legislation in place.

M. Morris: So if I get this, most of the provinces have civil forfeiture

legislation in place. Would they have to have sections applicable to

unexplained wealth orders in place before something like that could

happen?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Now, it’s a little…. We can transfer some information to the other

province, or they are then able to get other information from the police

here in British Columbia in terms of pursuing things.

M. Morris: Yes, that was coming to my mind. I know that there are some

provisions further on into this bill that talk about what the director

can share and what they can’t share, as well, so I appreciate

that.

I’ll go on to 11.10. It says: “The director must serve a copy of

the notice of application for an unexplained wealth order and each

supporting affidavit on (

a) the respondent, and (

b) the responsible

officer, if any.”

Then sub (2) says: “The director is not required to serve the

documents referred to in subsection (1) on, or otherwise give notice of

the application to, any person other than a respondent or responsible

officer.”

Does this prohibit or restrict the director from serving a notice

on any other interested party, or, just for the simplicity of this

section, they just serve on the respondent?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It restricts anybody from ap­pearing in court to contest our

action unless they’ve been named.

[1:35 p.m.]

M. Morris: Subsection (5) says: “Unless the court orders otherwise, an

application for an unexplained wealth order must (

a) be scheduled for a

hearing of not more than 2 days in length….”

I’m wondering why the two days was chosen, why this arbitrary

number is embedded in the legislation.

Hon. M. Farnworth: I’ll put it this way. If you’ve done the investigation, you’re

seeking the unexplained wealth order, and you can’t explain it in two

days, then you’ve probably not done a very good job, and you’re probably

not going to get your order.

M. Morris: We’ve got some good investigators out there, for sure.

When we go back to the conversation we had before, where you have

multiple-count information, that’s what I was looking at. Some of these

could become very comprehensive and have a lot of information that needs

to be presented for the court. That’s what I was thinking, because I

have been in trials that lasted weeks, sometimes. Mind you, it’s having

the witnesses that are under cross-examination through the

process.

But is it just the courts that examine the information? There’s

nobody else that is intervening at this particular time.

Hon. M. Farnworth: That is correct.

M. Morris: This is subsection (6): “An application under subsection (4) to

shorten the period for filing and serving a response to the application

for an unexplained wealth order, or an application to adjourn the

hearing of the application, must be supported by an affidavit setting

out (

a) the factual basis for the application….” Who conducts the

necessary work to ensure that the respondent’s affidavit is

factual?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The respondent or the respondent’s lawyer.

M. Morris: So we’re relying on the respondent, who’s involved in unlawful

activity, to say that his information is factual. Is there a process

that the director goes through to corroborate that information and make

sure that it is factual?

Hon. M. Farnworth: These are just the facts for why they need an adjournment. They

have to say, “This is why we would need an adjournment,” and say that

these are the facts why something needs to adjourn.

M. Morris: Exactly. I’ve seen the facts presented in court before, for

adjournments, and it makes you wonder. I know the police officers

sitting and listening to these facts being presented oftentimes have to

shake their heads at these facts, because they know they are not

accurate. I’m just throwing this out there. We have a presumption that

all these bad guys are going to be presenting the facts in a truthful

manner. I’m a little skeptical, after all my years dealing with the

liars and the cheaters and thieves in the world, but we’ll see how this

rolls out.

“The court may shorten the period for filing and serving a

response to the application for an unexplained wealth order or adjourn

the hearing of the application only if (

a) the director consents to the

order, or (

b) the court is satisfied that (

i) the order is reasonable in

the circumstances….” This is reasonable, but is there any limit to the

number of adjournments that can take place in this process?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Once we’ve initiated an application, it should be heard within 180

days. I think that should limit the issue around

adjournments.

[1:40 p.m.]

M. Morris: That 180 days is for the entire process to take place, despite the

number of adjournments that might happen within that period, or does 180

days start after an adjournment has been granted?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It starts from right when the whole process starts, and it’s not a

case of if there’s an adjournment, then it resets — that’s not how it

works.

M. Morris: Subsection 8 says: “No person, other than a respondent or

responsible officer, may oppose the relief sought on the application for

an unexplained wealth order.”

Just looking at what-if situations that happen, can a respondent

change? If a respondent — I don’t know — is incapacitated somehow, can

another respondent step in or, the same thing, can an officer be

switched out during the process itself? What would the process be if

that was to be the case where somebody was incapacitated for a period

beyond the 180 days?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The director does have the ability to ask for an adjournment, and

if need be, we can easily bring another order against another

respondent.

M. Morris: I, perhaps, missed that. Just looking for the

section for the

director’s authority to ask for the adjournment and go beyond that 180

days.

Hon. M. Farnworth: It’s 180 days but also as soon as practicable. So if someone was

incapacitated that “as soon as practicable” would cover, I think, the

situation that the member is referring to.

M. Morris: Pretty comprehensive legislation. I’m im­pressed.

In 11.11, “Unexplained wealth order”: “In this section,

‘politically exposed foreign person’ has the same meaning” as under the

Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.” I’ve

got a copy of it here. It includes the Governor General,

Lieutenant-Governor or head of government, member of the Senate or House

of Commons. Pardon me.

“Politically exposed foreign person” is a “(

a) head of state or

head of government; (

b) member of the executive council of government or

member of a legislature; (

c) deputy minister or equivalent rank; (

d) ambassador, or attaché or counsellor of an ambassador; (

e) military

officer with a rank of general or above; (

f) president of a state-owned

company or a state-owned bank; (

g) head of a government agency; (

h) judge of a supreme court, constitutional court or other court of last

resort; (

i) leader or president of a political party represented in a

legislature; or (

j) holder of any prescribed office or

position.”

We can know what prescribed means.

I guess the question I have is that under this it says…. I’ll have

to read it out here, so we get the general gist of it. When I was

reading it, maybe I missed something. It says: “Unless it is clearly not

in the interests of justice, the court must make an unexplained wealth

order in relation to property if the court is satisfied that (

a) the

director has reasonable grounds to suspect that (

i) the respondent, or a

person affiliated with the respondent, directly or indirectly engaged in

unlawful activity, or (ii) the respondent is a politically exposed

foreign person or is affiliated with a politically exposed foreign

person.”

[1:45 p.m.]

I guess, when I read this, it says for (

a) you have to be

conducted or “engaged in unlawful activity,” and subsection (ii) says

that all you have to be “is a politically exposed foreign person.” I’m

just wondering. What am I missing here that that’s not clear?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The three sections all have to be read together. So you’d have to

meet the test in the third section, but they’re all read

together.

M. Morris: Okay, I appreciate that. Unlawful activity is any enactment, any

law in Canada. Am I correct on that?

I see nodding heads.

Okay.

Again, going back to the politically exposed foreign persons, I’m

thinking about the allegations that we see of foreign influences. I

think about where we see individuals that have been providing finances

for various operations, here within Canada, that might be linked to one

of these foreign persons.

It says: “(

b) the director has reason to believe that (

i) one or

more of the circumstances listed in subsection (3) apply,” which are

that the respondent “is a registered or unregistered owner of the

property or the whole or a portion of an interest in the property;” he

is “connected to a trustee of a trust that holds the whole or a portion

of an interest in the property;” the respondent “is connected to a

corporation….”

Again looking at the exposed foreign persons, I guess I go back to

subsection (2)(b): “the director has reason to believe that (

i) one or

more of the circumstances listed in subsection (3) apply,” but “(

c) one

or more of the following constitutes a serious question to be tried: (

i) whether the known sources of the respondent’s lawfully obtained income

would have been insufficient for the purpose of enabling the respondent

to acquire or maintain the property or the whole or the portion of the

interest in the property held by the respondent.”

Would this be in a situation where we see what’s taking place with

Russia and Ukraine and the oligarchs that have been obtaining wealthy

mansions and properties in British Columbia…? Is this

section trying to

capture that kind of activity?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It could, but the practical reality of the situation the member is

describing is already covered by the federal government’s special

measures in relation to that. They have legislation already in place for

that kind of thing. We can’t supersede that.

M. Morris: I guess I’m still trying to make the connection here with

politically exposed foreign people.

Hon. M. Farnworth: Just an additional explanation to that previous answer: as I said,

the feds have their special legislation in place. But let’s say an

individual was not on that list, in the Russia-Ukraine situation, then

yes, they could be captured by our legislation.

M. Morris: I’m missing something in here. Hopefully, the minister can set me

straight on it. I did go over this a few times, wondering where the

missing element was.

I go back to (2)(a)(i): “the respondent, or a person affiliated

with the respondent, directly or indirectly en­gaged in unlawful

activity….” That’s clear. He’s involved in or engaged in an unlawful

activity. Or (ii): “the re­spondent is a politically exposed

foreign person or is affiliated with a politically exposed foreign

person,” but it has no connection that I read through in here to

unlawful activity or something that we can connect to an unexplained

wealth order.

I may have overlooked it. It’s not unusual for me to do

that.

[1:50 p.m.]

Hon. M. Farnworth: If we have suspicion that they are a politically exposed

individual, the critical area is under

section (c), which is that they

must meet one of those three sections.

It’s either “(

i) whether the known sources of the re­spondent’s lawfully obtained

income would have been insufficient for the purpose of enabling the

respondent to acquire or maintain the property or the whole or the

portion of the interest in the property held by the respondent; (ii) the

property has been used to engage in unlawful activity; (iii) the

property or the whole or a portion of an interest in the property was

acquired or is maintained directly or indirectly as a result of unlawful

activity.” They would have to meet one of those three

conditions.

M. Morris: I thank the minister for that clarification.

We would read it, then: “The respondent is a politically exposed

foreign person affiliated with a politically exposed foreign person”

whose property was being used to engage in unlawful activity, and that’s

all the director would have to present to the courts.

Okay, thank you for that.

Again, we get into…. We’ll go down to 11.12, which is “Contents of

unexplained wealth order,” still under clause 10. It says: “In addition

to addressing the matters referred to in

section 11.09 (1), as

applicable, an unexplained wealth order must do all of the following:

(

a) require a respondent or responsible officer to disclose to the

director copies of the following: (

i) any information or records in the

custody or control of the respondent or responsible officer that are

related to the statement referred to in

section 11.09….” What if those

records are held outside of British Columbia, outside of Canada or

outside of North America?

Hon. M. Farnworth: They’d have to produce them or provide a reasonable explanation to

the court as to why they can’t produce something.

M. Morris: So they must. If they don’t, then the courts would consider that

they refuse to provide that.

Are there any special provisions that the director has to obtain

that information? If the individual says that it’s located in Paris,

France, and it’s located here in some kind of an institution, is there

any way that the director or anybody can obtain that information? That

has to be fully on the shoulders of the respondent?

Hon. M. Farnworth: We can compel information from inside the province — from public

institutions or financial institutions, for example. We wouldn’t be able

to compel from Paris, France, for example. But that being said, then, if

the respondent was not providing information that had been requested, I

think the court would obviously draw a somewhat negative inference from

that.

[1:55 p.m.]

M. Morris: I guess this goes hand in hand with my thoughts on this anyways. I

look at the revisions to the Criminal Code with Bill C-75 and the

reverse onus issues that were taken away. I know when I read that bill

back in 2017 or 2018, I looked at it and said: “Oh my goodness, this is

going to cause 20 percent more workload for the police and the

prosecutions and whatnot.”

I’m thinking that the courts are taking a pretty hard look at

reverse onus situations. I’m wondering if any argument came up in the

U.K. with respect to any reverse onus situations. If we’re dealing with

$1 million properties or multi-million-dollar properties and somebody

has…. The title is sitting in a bank deposit account somewhere offshore

or out of the country, and it’s his responsibility to get it out,

how…?

I’m trying to predict what may happen down the road here and if

there are any kinds of ways other than asking the guy to produce it, and

he says, “Well, I can’t, because it’s over there, and there’s nobody

around to get it. I’ve got the only key” kind of thing.

Hon. M. Farnworth: I think the shortest and best an­swer I can give you is: you

do that at your own peril.

M. Morris: At the mercy of the court, I guess, at the end of the

day.

We do see, and I’ve seen it over the years too, where you have

these individuals that commit these crimes, and they take their proceeds

of crime or they take a lot of the evidence that you need and they end

up in the Cayman Islands or in some faraway spot. You never see them

again, and the file is left on the table for a long time. In a situation

like that, we’re at the mercy of the court. If the court says: “Well, he

needs to produce it, and if he doesn’t, then we’re going to forfeit

it….” Then that would be great.

What would happen if they make a ruling returning that property

because they feel it unreasonable? Has that scenario been looked at and

examined in light of developing this legislation?

Hon. M. Farnworth: I mean, at the end of the day, the evidence is presented to the

court. They will make a ruling on an unexplained wealth order. What

comes back, what’s presented — they look at that. They’ll make a

decision. It is independent. What you want to see is a strong enough

body of evidence that they say (1) yes to the unexplained wealth order,

and (2) if there is not a satisfactory explanation, then a forfeiture

order is given.

At the end of the day, that is up to the court. As you and I both

know, that’s their role. They are independent of you and I and of the

director and of the police.

M. Morris: No, I certainly am aware of that.

Is there an appeal process for a respondent on this? Can they JR

it? Is there another level of court they go to if they’re not happy with

the court’s decision?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yeah, they would have the right of appeal to the Court of

Appeal.

[2:00 p.m.]

M. Morris: I will go to

section 11.12(4). We’re talking about: “If a

respondent or responsible officer claims that any information or records

required under subsection (1) (

a) of this

section are privileged, Rule

7-1…of the Supreme Court Civil Rules applies in relation to the claim….”

The reference to rule 7-1 is to be read as a reference to the statement

referred to in 11.09(1).

“A respondent or responsible officer must allow the director to

inspect and copy, during normal business hours and at the location

specified in the statement referred to in

section 11.09 (1), the

originals of any records of which copies were disclosed to the

director.” So under rule 7-1, if the respondent or the officer is

claiming that the documents are privileged….

I guess I’m curious as to what would happen if the respondent

exercises…. Does he exercise rule 7-1 in privileged, or does he provide

the information first to the director, and it’s the courts who determine

whether or not it’s privileged under rule 7-1?

Hon. M. Farnworth: I thank the member for the question. A respondent who’s wanting to

claim privilege must specify the information, the records and the type

of privilege being claimed and must provide that information to the

director. Then the director can challenge the claim, in which case, the

court may determine whether or not the claim to privilege is

valid.

[S. Chandra Herbert in the chair.]

M. Morris: So the information that the respondent or officer claims is

privileged probably would be held by his law firm or his legal counsel.

Would it have to come to the director, to the court, or would it go

straight from the legal counsel to the court without the director seeing

it?

Hon. M. Farnworth: A list of the information would go to the director, but only the

court would actually see the information.

M. Morris: Those would be my questions for clause 10.

Clauses 10 to 12 inclusive approved.

On clause 13.

M. Morris: Under clause 13, referencing

section 14.01, I go down to (b)(a),

where the new amendment says: “(

a) holds a registered interest in the

whole or a portion of an interest in the subject property.”

The old

section says “owns a registered interest.” I’m wondering

what the reason for the change in

definitions from “own” to

“hold.”

Hon. M. Farnworth: Legal advice is that “holds” is a more consistent

definition.

M. Morris: The other

part in this was, under (b): “did not directly or

indirectly engage in the unlawful activity that is the basis of

forfeiture under this Act, but, in the case of subject property that is

a financed vehicle, does not include a specified interest holder.” So

this amendment appears to separate financed vehicles from the process

here. I’m just wondering what the rationale, the reasoning was for

that.

[2:05 p.m.]

Hon. M. Farnworth: There are two types. There are specified interest holders and

protected interest holders. There’s a different process for each one,

and the two don’t combine well.

Clause 13 approved.

On clause 14.

M. Morris: Reading through clause 14, it’s a new process for dealing with

vehicles that are financed. I’m just wondering if the minister can

explain the new process that these amendments provide for in dealing

with financed vehicles. I see the rationale for doing this now, but I’d

just like to know the process a little bit better here.

Hon. M. Farnworth: Previously, we couldn’t use the administrative process to seize

financed vehicles. This change allows us to do just that.

Clauses 14 and 15 approved.

On clause 16.

M. Morris:

Section 14.06 under clause 16 deals with how notice is to be given

to interest holders. It says: “Notice to a known interest holder must be

given (

a) by sending the notice by ordinary or registered mail to the

last known address of the person, (

b) by sending the notice by email to

the last known email address of the person, (

c) by sending the notice by

fax to the last known fax number of the person, or (

d) by delivering the

notice by a prescribed method.” I know that’s open to the imagination

once we get rolling here.

Under (2), it says:

“Notice given to a person in accordance with subsection (1) is

deemed to have been received by the person as follows: (

a) if the notice

is sent by ordinary or registered mail, on the seventh day after deposit

with Canada Post; (

b) if the notice is sent by email or fax before 4

p.m. on a day that is not a Saturday or holiday, on the day on which the

notice was sent; (

c) if the notice is sent by email or fax on a Saturday

or holiday or after 4 p.m. on any other day, on the next day that is not

a Saturday or holiday.”

I had to read that a few times.

I’m wondering. If the notice was sent before 4 p.m. or on a

Saturday or holiday — and I’m wondering about Sunday; is Sunday

considered a holiday? — is the time received calculated to the next day?

So if it’s Saturday, do we go straight to Monday, and anything after 4

p.m.?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It would be considered the next business day.

M. Morris: Is this consistent? I know we’ve got this modern world now

delivering documents and whatnot, so is this consistent with the other

legislation that we have throughout the province here?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yes, it is.

Clauses 16 and 17 approved.

On clause 18.

[2:10 p.m.]

M. Morris: This bill bounces around from a few different sections. This deals

with if no notice of dispute is received by the director.

Here, under 14.09, under the act itself, it says: “If, by the 7th

day after expiry of the dispute period, the director does not receive a

notice of dispute to forfeiture under this Part of a subject property,

the subject property is forfeited to the government for disposal by the

director.” What is the process used to discharge the registration of a

vehicle, for an example?

Hon. M. Farnworth: We use the real personal property registry.

M. Morris: It says: “in the case of subject property that is a financed

vehicle, discharge the registration of all specified security interests

and any other charges or interests in relation to the financed

vehicle.”

I’m just wondering the process that the director would take to

deregister, I suppose, the respondent or the officer or the company or

whoever had this vehicle that has been forfeited. What is the process

there? I know this is a significant change to try and help the director

out in clearing the backlog of vehicles that they may have under seizure

right now and in the future.

Is it just a simple thing of contacting the ICBC motor vehicle

registration branch and saying: “This no longer belongs to this guy; we

have it”?

Hon. M. Farnworth: No, we just go online, discharge it and delete it. In the personal

property registry online, we would just go online and delete

it.

M. Morris: If we’ve got a $400,000 Lamborghini that’s registered to a

respondent or an officer, you’d just delete that registration. How do

you…? Is it reregistered to the Crown, to the corporation, until such

time as it’s sold again?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yeah, we simply delete it. We don’t register it in our name. We go

on to ICBC, and ICBC gets to register it in the name of the Crown, the

province.

M. Morris: A pretty simple process.

Clauses 18 and 19 approved.

On clause 20.

M. Morris: “Notice of remaining proceeds,” 14.12:

“If the amount of the proceeds resulting from the disposition of a

financed vehicle forfeited under

section 14.09 exceeds the total of the

following amounts, the director must give written notice to each

specified interest holder: (

a) an amount equal to any costs incurred by

the director in relation to seizing, towing and storing the vehicle if

the costs are incurred after the earlier of the following, as the case

may be: (

i) the date of an order made under

section 11.02 (3) in

relation to the vehicle; (ii) the time of forfeiture under…14.09; (

b) an

amount equal to any costs incurred by the director to dispose of the

vehicle; (

c) an administrative fee…in the prescribed amount.”

[2:15 p.m.]

I guess first is: what would the disposal costs be that the

director would be facing? And an example of what the administration fees

might be on this as well.

Hon. M. Farnworth: There’ll be the registration fees with ICBC, for example, and an

auction fee, once the vehicle is auctioned.

M. Morris: I guess this might pertain to an earlier question. I asked the

difference between 11.02(3) and 14.09, but what circumstances would

result in a forfeiture under 14.09 earlier than an application under

section 11.02(3)?

Interjection.

M. Morris: No, I meant 3,

section 3.

The Chair: There’s been a request for repeating the question.

M. Morris: Oh, I’m sorry. I’m trying to read my scribble on here.

What circumstances would result in the forfeiture under

section

14.09 being earlier than an application under

section 3?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It’s unlikely that that would ever happen, but it is there at the

suggestion of legal counsel as something we should include, for the

possibility might happen, however unlikely that that is.

The Chair: Shall clause 20 pass?

Some Hon. Members: Aye.

The Chair: So ordered.

Shall clause 21 pass?

Some Hon. Members: Aye.

The Chair: So ordered.

Member on clause 22.

M. Morris: Actually, Chair, if we could go back. Clause 20 encompasses

several pages here before I get to 21, and I did have another question

with respect to clause 20.

The Chair: Okay. We’re happy to take questions on those. We did vote on

them and approve them.

Is there agreement of the committee to redo those votes when

we get to them?

Leave granted.

The Chair: Okay, we will do that. Thank you. So we’re going to go back to

clause 20.

On clause 20 (continued) .

M. Morris: I appreciate the leniency of the House.

Just in respect to

section 14.13, the notice of interest in

remaining proceeds. Under sub (3): “A specified interest holder must

deliver the notice of interest to the director within 180 days after the

date on which the specified interest holder is deemed to have received

notice given under

section 14.12….” This is an inordinate period of

time. I’m just wondering what the rationale is behind the length of time

here.

Hon. M. Farnworth: This is the time that a bank or finance company has to be able to

reclaim their money.

M. Morris: Under 14.14, it talks about if the director receives a notice of

interest “as soon as practicable after receiving a notice of

interest…the director must pay to the specified interest holder out of

the civil forfeiture account in accordance with

section 27 an amount

equal to the amount owing to the specified interest holder in relation

to the applicable specified security interest in the financed vehicle at

the time of forfeiture,” and it goes on.

[2:20 p.m.]

Subsection (2) says: “For the purposes of subsection (1), the

amount owing to the specified interest holder in relation to the

financed vehicle does not include (

a) an amount owing in relation to a

prescribed charge or a prescribed fee arising under the terms of the

security agreement, or (

b) an amount equal to the portion of a

prescribed charge or a prescribed fee arising under the terms of the

security agreement that is greater than a prescribed amount.” I’m

wondering if the minister can clarify. What exactly does 2(

a) and (

b) mean?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It means that if the finance agreement contains additional

remedies, they can’t reclaim them from the director.

M. Morris: Then the last question I have with this clause is…. It says, under

(3): “If an amount is payable under subsection (1) to more than one

specified interest holder, the director must pay the amounts into court

rather than to the specified interest holders.” I take it from this

section, then, that the court is responsible for

disbursement.

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yes.

Clause 20 approved.

On clause 21.

M. Morris: This is dealing with cannabis. I was happy to see this

section

brought in, because it has proved…. There are circumstances out there

that are frustrating a lot of the various law enforcement

agencies.

I’ll read it. I know there are hundreds of people out there

watching and wondering what this new bill is all about.

“Instrument of unlawful activity” with respect to growing

cannabis: “In this section, ‘cannabis plant’, ‘dwelling house’, ‘grow’

and “medical cannabis” have the same meanings as the Cannabis Control

and Licensing Act.”

It says: “In proceedings under

Part 2 or 3 or

section 14.11, proof

that cannabis plants were found growing at property in any of the

following circumstances is proof, in the absence of evidence to the

contrary, that the property is an instrument of unlawful

activity.”

We’re targeting grow ops, basically, and real property that is

being used for grow ops or any other property.

“in the case of real property that is not a dwelling house, (

i) the

growing of cannabis plants at the property is not authorized under the

Cannabis Act…or (ii) the number of cannabis plants that are medical

cannabis growing at the property is greater than the number authorized

under the Cannabis Act of Canada; (

b) in the case of a dwelling house,

the number of cannabis plants growing at the dwelling house is greater

than the sum of the following: (

i) the total number of cannabis plants

that are medical cannabis that each adult who ordinarily resides at the

dwelling house is authorized under the Cannabis Act…to grow at the

dwelling house.”

So the total number.

Then, “(ii) the number of cannabis plants determined by the

following formula: 5 x A,” in that A is the “number of cannabis plants

referred to in

section 56 (c)” of the Cannabis Act, which is four. So

five times four is 20. This seems like an arbitrary number.

I’m wondering where that number came from, and what was the basis

for making that determination?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The number is in place because it is significantly more than what

the grower may be…. Let’s say you have a medicinal licence to have,

let’s say — I don’t know — 20 plants or 40 plants. Five times is a

significant increase, and that’s the target. It’s that significant

increase over what you’re licensed to be growing.

M. Morris: I was just wondering whether it had any reflection on the values

that we were looking at, a value of $75,000 and more. We looked at….

What are 20 plants worth? Is it worth $75,000 or more per

ounce?

No? It didn’t have anything to do with that. Okay.

[2:25 p.m.]

The other part…. I asked this question right at the beginning,

about the laws of general application as they apply to our First Nations

communities. I know the police can get search warrants, on reserve, on

First Nations communities to search for stolen property or drugs or

what­ever the case might be. So the laws of general enforcement

and all the tools that are attributable to those laws or supporting

those laws are in effect on reserve.

If we have an organized crime group that has established a

presence in a First Nations community and is using it to sell, produce,

grow cannabis in that community…. I’m wondering whether this

section

would apply. If we see that it’s being distributed from a trailer that’s

set up on reserve land, a movable commodity, is that seizable, as well,

if all the provisions of this act here are met?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The short answer is no. What you are talking about is on reserve

lands. Then these amendments would not be applicable on reserve

lands.

M. Morris: So the Civil Forfeiture Act is not a law of general application in

the province of British Columbia?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Civil forfeiture is not criminal law; it’s civil law. Our legal

advice is that it’s not applicable on reserve lands.

M. Morris: Civil law in the province of British Columbia…. Any civil statute

that we have is not enforceable on First Nations reserves and land.

Finance companies can’t go in and seize vehicles in First Nations

communities, for a lack of payment or whatever the case might be. I’m

curious about this.

Hon. M. Farnworth: It could probably be seized, but it’s unlikely that we could

forfeit it. That’s the advice that we’ve got.

M. Morris: If it’s seized, what would the remedy be? What would happen to the

property that is being seized as a result of these provisions,

then?

Hon. M. Farnworth: If the member is.… What we could do is…. If we could go on to

another section. We will get a definitive answer for the member, if that

assists him in the course of his questioning.

M. Morris: I appreciate that. It is an important issue. I know many of my

colleagues…. I’ve had questions from other law enforcement agencies

across the province on this issue as well. So I would appreciate an

answer on that.

I will go on to…. It’s still under clause 21, under “Presumption –

failure to comply with unexplained wealth order.”

Under 19.07, it says: “Subsection (2) applies if a

re­spondent or responsible officer, as applicable, on or before

the latest date on which the respondent or responsible officer was

required to comply with any requirement in an unexplained wealth order,

(

a) did not provide all of the information and records required to be

provided under the order, or (

b) otherwise failed to comply with a

requirement of the order.”

[2:30 p.m.]

It says: “In proceedings under

section 3 (1) in relation to the

whole or a portion of an interest in property it must be presumed,

unless the contrary is proved, that the interest or the portion of the

interest in the property held by a respondent, if any, is proceeds of

unlawful activity.”

I’m wondering if there are any circumstances where the director

would make a second or third attempt to obtain that information that has

been missing from the responder or officer.

Hon. M. Farnworth: The answer would be no. If you’re not answering, then you’re

deemed to be unlawful, and you’re going to get the consequences that

flow from that.

M. Morris: This process is in the hands of the courts, and the respondent and

the officers have been asked to provide the required information under

this bill. Is this a paper exercise for the courts — so that there’s

nobody in court, the judge is just in his chambers, and he’s reviewing

all the evidence provided by the respondent or the officer, in relation

to the information that the director has held? Or is this actually a

hearing, before the judge, with the director?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It is absolutely a court hearing.

M. Morris: Thank you for that. Would the respondent or the officer be in

court at the time this is being heard?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yes.

M. Morris: In essence, this would be a trial or a hearing. Would legal

counsel…? Would there be cross-examination by counsel for the respondent

or the officer, as well as the director or the prosecution?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It would be the director affidavit evidence. If the court ordered

it, there could be cross-examination.

M. Morris: So the court is operating on the basis of an affidavit provided by

the director and the written response by the respondent or an officer.

Then is it up to the discretion of the court to hold an in-person

hearing? I’m hearing both here. I’m not quite sure on the

process.

If there’s an affidavit, the court already has the affidavit. If

it’s an in-person hearing, it’s either to clarify the contents of the

affidavit, I assume, and clarify the information pro­vided by the

respondent and the officer to the court itself. Do both things

happen?

[2:35 p.m.]

Hon. M. Farnworth: It is an in-person hearing, with affidavit evidence that is

provided by the director.

M. Morris: This is in respect to the unexplained wealth orders. Is this the

same process that is used in a normal civil forfeiture that is going

before the courts for disposition for a forfeiture? Do both use the same

process as an in-person hearing?

Hon. M. Farnworth: This is just to get the unexplained wealth order. Anything to do

with forfeiture is, in essence, then, back to the judge with the

presentation of the information. In essence, that is kind of like a

trial at that point.

M. Morris: I think clarity is coming.

This is in the process of getting the unexplained wealth order. If

the court is in agreement with the evidence that has been presented, he

says that we do have an unexplained wealth order, and then forfeiture

takes place after that. Is it the court that provides the forfeiture

order at the conclusion of this particular hearing? Or is it a separate

process that the director has to initiate?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The director takes the information to the court, seeking the

unexplained wealth order. They present the information. The court says:

“Yes, we’re going to grant the unexplained wealth order.”

Then the respondent, let’s say, is not able to explain how they’re

living on $10,000 a year and have a multi-million-dollar house and

really fancy car. The court decides…. We’d take that back, put that

before the court, and then we would commence an action for forfeiture of

whatever material property is suspect.

M. Morris: I know this is a new tool that we’ve injected into civil

forfeitures — a good tool. We have the hearing to determine whether or

not the unexplained wealth order should exist, and the courts deem that

it shall exist.

There’s another procedure, then, you’re saying now. Once we have

the order of the court saying, “Yes, we have this unexplained wealth

order,” the director then goes and uses the provision of the Civil

Forfeiture Act to forfeit the property that has been included in the

wealth order?

Hon. M. Farnworth: That would be correct. So the unexplained wealth order — you’re

not able to explain it. We would then commence an action under the Civil

Forfeiture Act to get forfeiture.

[2:40 p.m.]

M. Morris: Without going back through some of the other sections that we’ve

already talked about…. I’m assuming that some of the earlier things,

like under

section 3 of the Civil Forfeiture Act…. Would the respondent

or the officer be required, then, to resubmit the information required

under that process for forfeiture, or would the director just use the

existing information that was presented to the court and review it?

Would there be another opportunity for the respondent to have any input

into the forfeiture part of this unexplained wealth order?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The answer would be yes.

M. Morris: Thank you. That does clarify it, in my mind and for everybody

watching, I’m sure.

I’ll go on now to, still under clause 21,

section 19.08(1): “The

director may, within one year of the latest date on which a respondent

is required to comply with a requirement in an unexplained wealth order,

amend the director’s pleadings in proceedings commenced under

Part 2 to

address any matters arising from the unexplained wealth order.” I’m

wondering if the minister can clarify the intent of

section

19.08.

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yeah, that’s because, during the course of the unexplained wealth

order, we may learn some things, so we’re able to amend our pleadings to

take that into account.

M. Morris: That makes sense. The person has probably acquired more wealth in

the interim while the process was going on, knowing the way some of

these criminals operate.

Going on to 19.09, “Adverse inference – unexplained wealth

order”:

“Subsection (2) applies in relation to a respondent against whom an

unexplained wealth order is made if either of the following apply: (

a) the respondent or responsible officer does not provide all of the

information and records required to be provided under the order, or

otherwise fails to comply with a requirement of the order; (

b) a court

finds that (

i) a fact included in a statement provided by the respondent

or responsible officer in accordance with the order is not true, or (ii)

a record provided by the respondent or responsible officer in accordance

with a requirement of the order is not authentic.”

Then sub (2) says:

“In proceedings under

Part 2 or 3 the court may draw an adverse

inference against a respondent to whom this subsection

applies.”

I’m wondering if the minister can elaborate a little bit on that

adverse inference.

Hon. M. Farnworth: An adverse inference may be because the court finds that the

person withheld information because it may make them look guilty, which

they probably were.

Clause 21 approved.

On clause 22.

M. Morris: This is a fairly lengthy clause as well. It goes on for several

pages in this particular bill. But I’m wondering if perhaps the minister

can provide an overview of the genesis of clause 22 rather than going

through each section. I will have a few questions to ask on some of

them, but if he can just give the genesis to what this particular

section does with respect to suspension and extinguishment of interests

and property and finance vehicles.

Hon. M. Farnworth: This will probably assist the member. What

section 22 does is it

provides an interest in property that takes precedence over other public

bodies. For instance, if the director commences a forfeiture proceeding,

and then later, another ministry raises a debt that can be backdated, it

would impact the property available for forfeiture. This

section gives

forfeiture the priority.

[2:45 p.m.]

The

section also supports the director’s ability to use the less

costly administrative forfeiture process for vehicles that a person

involved in unlawful activity has financed. Previously, the director had

to utilize the more costly civil forfeiture finance vehicles, and as we

know, as we’ve dealt with that, the administrative forfeiture process

was in

section 20. It makes it clear in terms of the precedence in terms

of the forfeiture in the interest of the property.

M. Morris: Under clause 22,

section 20.04, “specified period”:

“beginning on the date that the director takes an action referred to

in subsection (2) (

a) or (b), as applicable, and (

b) ending on the

following date, as applicable: (

i) if the director withdraws from

proceeding under the Act under

section 14.08…or discontinues proceedings

commenced under

section 3, the date of the withdrawal or discontinuance;

(ii) the date on which a court makes or refuses to make a forfeiture

order; (iii) the date of forfeiture under

Part 3.1.”

Again, to clarify, the proceedings commence…. Under 3.1, it’s not

forfeiture; it’s just the beginning of the process under

section 3.1. So

proceedings under 3.1 — they don’t imply forfeiture. It’s just the

beginning of the process. The actual forfeiture doesn’t take place until

after the hearing is heard. I was just a little concerned with the

dates.

Interjection.

The Chair: All right, there’s been a suggestion for a short recess. We

will recess for approximately five minutes.

I appreciate the approval, Member. This committee is in short

recess.

The committee recessed from 2:48 p.m. to 2:54 p.m.

[S. Chandra Herbert in the chair.]

The Chair: All right, Members, let’s draw this committee back into

order.

Of course, we’re here with Bill 21, the Civil Forfeiture

Amendment Act, 2023, with our Minister of Public Safety. We are on

clause 22.

M. Morris: I appreciate the patience of the minister and his staff there as I

go through all these timelines in the different sections

here.

Under sub (2) of 20.04, it says: “Section 20.05 applies if the

director does either of the following in relation to a financed vehicle

or the whole or a portion of an interest in a financed vehicle: (

a) registers notice of forfeiture in the personal property registry under

section 14.04 (1) (a); (

b) commences proceedings under

section

3.”

[2:55 p.m.]

I guess that was what confused me.

Section 3 seems to be the

initial…. It starts the process. Then, “registers notice of forfeiture

in the personal property registry….” is the completion of the forfeiture

process, if I understand correctly here. So if those two are met, then

section 20.05 applies. Is that what that says?

Hon. M. Farnworth: This

section applies to the commencement of forfeiture for either

section.

M. Morris: Okay, thank you for that.

Under

section 20.05: “All rights or remedies of the owner of a

financed vehicle under a security agreement or

section 62 of the

Personal Property Security Act are suspended during the specified

period.

(2) During the specified period, the following legal proceedings

in relation to a financed vehicle may be commenced but no further steps

may be taken, and no orders may be made, in the proceedings other than

discontinuing the proceedings.”

Under (a), it’s “a legal proceeding for possession of the

vehicle;” and (b), it’s “a legal proceeding that may result in an order

directly or indirectly reducing the amount of money that would otherwise

result from the disposition of the vehicle or the whole or a portion of

an interest in the vehicle….”

I guess just a little clarification. What does that mean? What

happens, generally, that has brought this to bear within the

statute?

[J. Tegart in the chair.]

Hon. M. Farnworth: What it means is that they can’t sue us to get their vehicle back

while we are in the process of getting a forfeiture on that

vehicle.

M. Morris: This is only with respect to the respondent, so nobody else can

have any legal proceedings at this particular time.

Hon. M. Farnworth: That’s correct.

I’d also just make the observation in response to your question

that we had on the cannabis issue. When we finish with this section, we

can provide you an answer that you were looking for.

M. Morris: Still under clause 22, under 20.06, “Interests extinguished and

proceedings limited after forfeiture,” it goes on to say: “…all rights

or remedies of the owner of the financed vehicle under a security

agreement or

section 62 of the Personal Property Security Act are

extinguished (

a) on and after the date the forfeiture order is made

under

section 5, or (

b) at the time of the forfeiture under

section

14.09.”

[3:00 p.m.]

From experience to date, how often do we get to this point with

the vehicles that have been seized under this particular legislation in

a year? Is this a common occurrence? Is this new? Is this something that

is new to the process?

Hon. M. Farnworth: What the member is talking about is actually quite common, but

what this

section does is it streamlines the process, because the

current process is actually quite costly. So this will make it much more

streamlined, less costly and more efficient.

M. Morris: In sub (3), it talks about…. I will read the whole

thing:

“…if a financed vehicle or the whole or a portion of an interest in

a financed vehicle is forfeited to the government under this Act, the

following legal proceedings may not be brought or maintained on or after

the date the forfeiture order is made under

section 5 or the time of the

forfeiture under

section 14.09, as applicable: (

a) a legal proceeding

for possession of the vehicle; (

b) a legal proceeding in relation to the

forfeiture of the vehicle, the disposition of the vehicle by the

director or any proceeds from the disposition of the vehicle, including

a legal proceeding for damages that is commenced or maintained by an

uninvolved interest holder.”

It goes on down to subsection (4)(

d) and (e). It says, “a legal

proceeding for damages brought by a party to a security agreement

against another party to the agreement,” so subsection (3) does not

prohibit this from happening. It also doesn’t prohibit “in a case where

a party to a security agreement retains possession of a financed vehicle

under a forfeiture order made in respect of the vehicle or the whole or

a portion of an interest in the vehicle, a legal proceeding seeking

possession of the vehicle brought by another party to the

agreement.”

It says that those two scenarios can proceed in this. I guess I’m

curious as to why these can proceed and the others can’t.

Hon. M. Farnworth: Once they forfeit your vehicle, the creditor can still sue

you.

M. Morris: So this action would be against the respondent or the officer, and

not the province?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yup, it’s correct. If you still owed $10,000 on the vehicle, they

can sue you for the $10,000 on the vehicle.

If the member could just rephrase that question, just ask that

question again, that would help — the one that he was looking for the

answer for.

M. Morris: With respect to the cannabis? Yeah.

I’m just wondering. This particular legislation is of general

application. Are vehicles that are used for illegal purposes or a

building that has been used for unlawful purposes that is portable — a

trailer or something like that — on reserve land…. If it’s found to be

in contravention of this one dealing with cannabis or any other matter

that could be involved with this legislation, including an unexplained

wealth order — whether those items can be seized on First Nations

property and removed and forfeited.

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yes, police can seize. If the property is then not on the reserve,

then they could seek forfeiture.

[3:05 p.m.]

M. Morris: Just a follow-up to the minister’s answer. This was an unresolved

question from before.

If it’s movable property, like a trailer that has been used for

selling cannabis, it might have illegally obtained cannabis. They might

be growing 25 plants within that trailer. It would be subject to seizure

under those provisions of that particular section. Bring a tow truck in,

hook it up and pull it away. It’s seized, and the proceedings would

follow the proceedings outlined under this legislation?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It’s the police that can seize the property. We can’t seize the

property. Civil forfeiture can’t seize the property, but the police can

seize the property.

M. Morris: Just one more follow-up. So the police are conducting their

investigation. They find that this property has been used for selling

drugs or whatever the reason might be. It’s mobile property. They can

seize it and then send the information to the director, and forfeiture

action would result from that. Is that what I hear?

Hon. M. Farnworth: That’s correct.

Clause 23 approved.

On clause 24.

M. Morris: Clause 24, “Requirement to not disclose the request.” Again, it’s

excellent information in here. The re­quirement to not disclose

the request says: “In this section, ‘relevant organization’ means a

specified organization as defined in

section 22….” I believe that

information under

section 22 says, “If the director requests that a

relevant organization,” which includes “a person, an unincorporated

association, a trade union, a trust or a not for profit organization.”

Quite a broad definition under that this particular

definition.

In this section:

“If the director requests that a relevant organization disclose an

individual’s personal information to the director, the relevant

organization must not, during the six-month period after the

organization receives the request, disclose to any person, other than a

person in respect of which solicitor-client privilege exists, either of

the following: (

a) that the director has requested the relevant

organization to disclose the individual’s personal information; (

b) that

the relevant organization has disclosed the individual’s personal

information to the director.”

My question would be: what if the organization doesn’t

comply?

Hon. M. Farnworth: There is no penalty for non-compliance.

Also, when I sit down, I just want to make sure that…. Did we pass

section 21?

The Chair: Yes, 21 did pass.

M. Morris: So there’s no penalty

section in this if they don’t comply, which

is…. The information that these organizations have can sometimes be

critical for the file.

Somewhere in here it talks about a six-month period that they

can’t disclose this information or disclose the fact that they were

talking to the director. Is there an ability to extend the six-month

period?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Instead of using this section, we could, for example, use a court

order, in which case yes, we could.

[3:10 p.m.]

M. Morris: Interesting. Okay, thank you for that.

Then the information being requested by the director of these

organizations can be subpoenaed. Is that how that works?

Hon. M. Farnworth: There are other provisions in the act that would allow us the

ability to obtain the information that was being sought.

Clause 24 approved.

On clause 25.

M. Morris: “Information sharing” is the next one, 22.002. It says:

“

(2) Despite any other enactment or law other than a prescribed

enactment, the director must not use or disclose specified information

except as authorized by this section.

“

(3) The director may use or disclose specified information as

follows: (

a) for the purposes of administering this Act, including any

proceedings…(

b) for the purposes of a prosecution for perjury or for

proceedings for contempt; (

c) in accordance with an order of the court

made on application by the director in proceedings under this

Act.”

I’m curious. I’ll go back to sub (2) on this: “Despite any other

enactment or law other than a prescribed enactment….” I wonder if the

minister can tell me what a prescribed enactment might be. There are a

lot of safeguards being put into the director being availed of this

information. I really appreciate that, but I’m just curious as to what

this “prescribed enactment” might be.

Hon. M. Farnworth: Part of the answer could be that I’m not allowed to tell you, but

the reality is that if there are future changes…. I think that probably

the best way would be….

Yesterday in the second reading, when I talked about the

difference between the U.K. model and the Irish model, the Irish model

uses a tax system, and the U.K. model uses, in essence, the reverse

onus: “Explain how you got this.” If we were to do that — and I

indicated yesterday that I could well see that — then we have to be able

to talk to each other. The two approaches have to be able to talk to

each other. This would allow for that.

M. Morris: I appreciate that. I look at the exercise in drafting this

particular bill, and any other bill, for that matter, and the

conversation that must take place between the people that are drafting

this. They must come up with some solutions or some scenarios that cause

them to put this particular provision in place there. That’s why I was

asking the question — if there’s something out there that triggered

their interest in this.

I know how personal information is protected, safeguarded to a

significant degree in this province and across the country, for that

matter. Having this particular provision in there, which gives the

director the ability to go to these organizations and get that

information, I think, is pretty significant. It’s a lot of authority

there. I’ll look forward to see whatever that prescribed bit will be

coming from that.

Still on clause 25, it talks about “…the director must not be

required, in connection with any legal proceedings, to give or produce

evidence relating to any information or records obtained by or on behalf

of the director under this Act,” but it doesn’t apply “in respect of

legal proceedings referred to in subsection (3) (

a) or (b),” which we’ve

already talked about.

[3:15 p.m.]

And: “To the extent of any inconsistency or conflict with sections

32 [use of personal information] and 33 [disclosure of personal

information] of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy

Act, this

section applies despite that Act.”

I guess I’m just reading that to emphasize, to the people that are

watching this with bated breath, the safeguards that are around this

particular provision and giving the director that particular

authority.

Clauses 25 to 27 inclusive approved.

On clause 28.

M. Morris: Clause 28, respecting

section 23(2) is repealed, and this

part is

substituted: “After commencing proceedings under

section 3 that relate

to personal property that is serial numbered goods or the whole or a

portion of an interest in personal property that is serial numbered

goods, the director may register, in the prescribed manner, in the

personal property registry notice that the proceedings commenced may

affect the personal property or the whole or the portion of the interest

in the personal property referred to in the notice.”

This appears to be a discretionary provision for the director. Is

this true, and why would it be discretionary?

Hon. M. Farnworth: The personal property registry does not permit a person with a

registered interest to file a form. This operational limitation has led

to an inefficient workaround where the director types in all of the

contents of the prescribed form into description boxes in the personal

property registry. Amending this

section to no longer require

registration by filing a prescribed form will improve efficiency.

Requirements for registration to the personal property registry will

continue to be established by regulation.

Clauses 28 and 29 approved.

On clause 30.

M. Morris: I’ve got to keep flipping pages, because some of these clauses are

multiple pages.

This says: “Division 4 – Director Entitled to Possession of

Property.” “This Division applies to property if (

a) the director has

reason to suspect that (

i) the whole or a portion of an interest in

property, other than real property, is proceeds of unlawful activity, or

(ii) property, other than real property, is an instrument of unlawful

activity, and (

b) the property referred to…is in British Columbia and in

the possession of a public body.”

Is this the

section where the director takes possession of, or

takes precedence over, all property that has been seized by a public

body for other reasons but that happens to come to the attention of the

director through civil forfeitures, and the director is now taking

possession of goods or property that has already been seized by a public

body?

Hon. M. Farnworth: In this case, what the member is referring to is…. The director

will depend on the referrals from the police and other law enforcement

agencies. Police often seize property during an investigation, either

for criminal forfeiture or further investigation. At any time during or

after the investigation, the police may refer the property to the

director. Conversely, at any time during or after the investigation, the

person from whom it was seized may apply for its return.

Property owners often rush to have property returned, specifically

to avoid forfeiture proceedings. The cost of pursuing property in a rush

scenario is a significant burden on the director and the courts, as

legal costs and court time are increased under time constraints. That’s

what this is all about.

[3:20 p.m.]

M. Morris: That makes sense. So the “Notice of interest” that follows this,

the director publishes a “notice of interest in relation to subject

property on a publicly accessible website maintained by or on behalf of

the government.”

If he publishes the notice of interest in relation to subject

property, he must: “(

a) subject to subsection (4), within 40 days after

notice is published, give written notice to each of the following: (

i) the person from whom the property was seized; (ii) a person who is a

registered owner of the property or the whole…” and a prescribed

individual. And then “(

b) within 120 days after notice is published, (

i) commence proceedings under

section 3 in relation to the property, (ii)

initiate forfeiture in relation to the property under

Part 3.1, or (iii)

withdraw the notice of interest.”

I’m looking at the 120 days after notice is published. So we’ve

got 40 days where he publishes the notice. Then 40 days later, he has to

give written notice to the person, and then within 120 days after the

notice is published, commence proceedings under

section 3. It’s quite a

lengthy time.

So we seize all these cars, which is a lengthy process, and six

months later, then you can commence proceedings under

section 3. Is

there a reason for that? I know we talked about that 120-day period

pertaining to registered finance obligations and whatnot. I’m just

wondering what the purpose of this timeline is, for these purposes

here.

Hon. M. Farnworth: The time frame that the member has outlined is to be able to

consider the evidence that has been obtained. Then, obviously, we can’t

have an unlimited time that we’re able to retain possession or to retain

the property — in this case, the vehicle, for example. This allows the

time for all the things that need to take place and to be able to

consider the evidence that has been collected.

M. Morris: So the police have the goods, the vehicle, in a compound, and

they’ve been conducting their investigation. The director would publish

this as soon as the police provide the director with their package of

information? Then further investigation, over this 160-day period, is

necessary in order to complete the application under

section 3, or the

application?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It would start from when the director gets the evidence from the

police, but that timeline is a maximum. That, that you’ve outlined, is

not necessarily what it would be. It’s going to be dependent, obviously,

on the evidence — ready to go and take it the next steps.

M. Morris: On

section 23.05, “Director deemed to be entitled to

possession”:

“On publication of notice of interest in relation to subject

property, the director is deemed to be lawfully entitled to possession

of the property.”

It says:

“The director’s lawful entitlement to possession of subject property

under subsection (1) ends in the following circumstances: (

a) the

director withdraws the notice of interest in relation to the property;

(

b) the director fails to comply with

section 23.04 (2) (

a) or (b)”

within the time limits that we’ve talked about; or “(

c) if a court, by

order, (

i) establishes a right of possession in the property with a

person other than the director or the public body, or (ii) authorizes a

person other than the director or the public body to have or to take

possession of the property.”

[3:25 p.m.]

Does this provide authority, for the director, for all property

under a

section 3 application, or property not yet seized under this act

but seized and in possession of the RCMP, or some other act?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Any property in the possession of a public body, including the

RCMP.

M. Morris: Thank you for that. “Notice of dispute,” under 23.06: “A person

who claims an interest in subject property may dispute a notice of

interest by delivering a notice of dispute to the director in accordance

with this section.” So just any person.

Does the director’s authority override any of the provisions or

the reasons why the property was originally seized by the RCMP, or is

this notice of dispute solely focused on whatever action the director

takes?

Hon. M. Farnworth: If the member could clarify. Was he asking if the director could

overrule? Is that what he was asking?

M. Morris: When I first read this section, it appeared to me that…. Another

government agency — the RCMP or an independent police department or

another public body — seized a vehicle as a result of their

investigation, and the director is now taking that vehicle. The police

force has turned that vehicle over to him. Is the notice of dispute only

focused on the director’s forfeiture action under

section 3, or does the

notice of the dispute also include the reasons why the police may have

seized it in the first place?

Hon. M. Farnworth: It would only be the directors.

Clauses 30 to 32 inclusive approved.

On clause 33.

M. Morris: I find this is an interesting

section as well. Under clause 33,

“Section 35 (1) is repealed and the following substituted:

(1) There is

no limitation period for the director (

a) commencing proceedings under

section 3, or (

b) initiating forfeiture in relation to property under

part 3.1.” There’s no limitation period.

When I read this I get quite excited, knowing what kind of files

are out there across the province and have been lingering out there

across the province. So does this pro­vide the director the

ability now to go back in time to any property that has been seized by

any police department, for as far back as if they still have that

property, and take action under this particular bill?

Hon. M. Farnworth: Yes, it does.

M. Morris: Just a comment on that. Probably that’s one of the most

significant sections in this particular bill. I’m sure there are police

agencies out there that are clapping their hands with delight, and I

hope there are a few people out there that are going to get a

comeuppance here as a result of this. This is very

interesting.

[3:30 p.m.]

The remainder of the bill deals with transition provisions that

I’ve looked through. There’s nothing within those provisions that I can

see, so I don’t have any other questions pertaining to the remainder of

this particular bill.

Clauses 33 to 44 inclusive approved.

Title approved.

Hon. M. Farnworth: I move that the committee rise and report the bill complete

without amendment.

Motion approved.

The committee rose at 3:31 p.m.

The House resumed; Mr. Speaker in the chair.

[3:35 p.m.]

Report and

Third Reading of Bills

BILL 21 — CIVIL FORFEITURE

AMENDMENT ACT,

Bill 21, Civil Forfeiture Amendment Act, 2023, reported complete

without amendment, read a third time and passed.

Mr. Speaker: The House will be in recess for five minutes.

The House recessed from 3:37 p.m. to 3:41 p.m.

[Mr. Speaker in the chair.]

Committee of Supply (Section A), having reported progress, was

granted leave to sit again.

Hon. L. Beare: I call the estimates of Ministry of Indigenous Relations and

Reconciliation.

Committee of Supply

ESTIMATES: MINISTRY OF INDIGENOUS

RELATIONS AND RECONCILIATION

(continued)

The House in Committee of Supply (Section B); J. Tegart in the

chair.

The committee met at 3:41 p.m.

The Chair: The committee will recess for a few minutes as we wait for the

minister and the staff.

The committee recessed from 3:42 p.m. to 3:49 p.m.

[J. Tegart in the chair.]

The Chair: We are in estimates for the Ministry of Indigenous Relations

and Reconciliation.

On Vote 34: ministry operations, $57,912,000

(continued) .

[3:50 p.m.]

M. Lee: I wanted to just bring us back to the point the minister was

making just before the break and the move to this main chamber. The

minister talked about regional solutions between Blueberry River First

Nation and the other Treaty 8 Nations. I just invite the minister to

comment on that some more in terms of as we manage through cumulative

impacts, which is something, certainly, the minister referred to in

making that statement.

I also invite the minister to comment on some of the other

provisions within the Blueberry River First Nations agreement which, I

know from the briefing, suggested that there are opportunities for

review and some flexibility, let’s say, in terms of the constraints as

to the measures that are being set out in the agreement around

disturbance and other economic activity under the terms of the

agreement.

When the minister refers to regional, is the minister suggesting

that that also creates opportunities for spreading the effort as to how

we deal with the cumulative impacts from economic activity on Treaty 8

lands for all nations, keeping in mind that there are also time

junctures in the agreement itself that provide for review and some

opportunities for further changes, let’s say, in terms of how the

constraints around disturbance and economic activity are set out in the

agreement?

The Chair: Minister.

Hon. M. Rankin: Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and welcome to the Chair. I’m

pleased to be in this chamber dealing with the estimates of the

ministry.

The question that has been raised by the hon. member involves

regional solutions. He asked me to comment on why those are important. I

said before the break that they are central to the cumulative effects

management and mitigation that is needed if we’re going to make progress

on the land base.

He asks why. I think the answer is very simple. There is one land

base. There are several herds, if you will, of different caribou and one

set of species, if we’re thinking wildlife or deer or whatever. They

migrate in the entire region.

Of course, there’s the other reason I raised previously, which is

that Treaty 8 is broken into a number of First Nations. But it’s one

treaty and one treaty people. Finding common solutions amongst them is

likely to be the most effective way to proceed.

As to the specific question, the Blueberry River First Nation

agreement provides for various reviews along the way — year one, year

two, year three — inviting us to examine how we are doing at each stage.

Do we need to make course corrections? Are there things we could be

doing differently and better? That’s the logic and wisdom of that

agreement. We’re pleased that that has been taken into

account.

M. Lee: Well, let me just say — I meant to say this earlier, but the

minister just commented on it — in terms of welcoming all the members’

visitors in the gallery, it’s more visitors, I think, than we usually

see on a Thursday afternoon before a long weekend.

The minister just commented on the state of these estimates. I’ll

just say in front of our visitors that I will commend the team now

that’s been around the minister for two days of supplementals, two days

of budgetary estimates and only one bio break. I’ve taken note of that,

let the record show. Thank you for that. That’s also suggesting that

there will be no further bio breaks between now and when the House rises

at 5:20. That’s just to be clear. I’ve got an hour and 25 minutes, so

we’ll make the most of it.

[3:55 p.m.]

I will just say to the minister…. Of course, we had an earlier

discussion about the importance of all of the lands for Treaty 8, for

all the nations. It demonstrates, though, certainly, the comprehensive

nature of the Blueberry River First Nation Agreement, first, and then

the consensus document for the other nations. So with these parallel

streams, for the reasons that we talked about earlier, there is some

additional benefit — recognizing that there are overlapping claims,

recognizing that there is a desire, under the consensus agreement for

the other Treaty 8 Nations, to work together.

In view of the minister’s response, there are opportunities to

alleviate the burden, let’s say, on one particular area under claim for

one particular Treaty 8 Nation. If this…. I wanted to hear the minister

again walk us through what the minister may anticipate could happen

here, recognizing that we still have to walk a year with the other

Treaty 8 Nations in terms of the consensus document.

Is there a growing possibility, let’s say, that there’s a

recognition that we can look at…? We talk about impacts on wildlife

management and that that can be looked at in a broader way on a regional

basis. That presumably could take some pressure off the land base for

one particular nation when we see it more broadly.

Hon. M. Rankin: The member invites us to anticipate what might happen in the

future. I can say what already is in place. In each of the Blueberry

River First Nation Agreement and the other Treaty 8 agreements, there’s

a commitment found to a single regional wildlife table, which I think is

a very specific example of what we’re talking about — species that

wander around the territory without any reference to what the boundaries

are between one Treaty 8 First Nation and another. So, therefore, the

nations have recognized that. We have worked at a regional level on

wildlife, which is a very, very significant example.

I can also say that on restoration and healing the land, we expect

there to be two restoration funds to coordinate between each other, so

the restoration activities aren’t duplicated. Each nation and

restoration fund should have information about what is planned and

current projects that are underway to restore the land. That’s another

example of a recognition of the need to avoid duplication in the context

of restoration.

But my expectation is that these processes will continue to work

in parallel and, where necessary and when it’s in everyone’s interests,

to find common ground.

[4:00 p.m.]

M. Lee: To come on to

section 16.1, “Honouring Treaty 8,” which refers to

the acknowledgment by the province that “Treaty 8 was a sacred

understanding between the Indigenous people in northeast British

Columbia, the province and the citizens it represents,” that honouring

of Treaty 8, as the minister and I have discussed, including in this

committee stage on estimates, includes sustained provincial Blueberry

River First Nation public communications, education and community

services.

I know that there are other provisions in the consensus document,

including with the Doig First Nation as well, and other Treaty 8

Nations, around public education, in how government, in terms of

understanding amongst the public, is to be worked through with the

nations.

I will just ask the minister. I do understand, certainly, that

there was something planned. At the Fort St. John Chamber of Commerce,

it was there publicly announced. There had been some indication that the

Minister of Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation and the Minister of

Forests would be attending this public forum, in order to help inform

and educate local community members, presumably non-Indigenous members —

it’s open, obviously, to all public members — about the nature of the

Blueberry arrangements and the Treaty 8 arrangements.

[S. Chandra Herbert in the chair.]

I understand there have been some concerns expressed by local

nations, including the Doig Nation, about how that came about. Perhaps

there were concerns — I think I’ve seen a letter that expressed concerns

— that it wasn’t complying with the consensus document. Can I ask how

that process unfolded and what corrections are being made by the

minister and his office in terms of how future consultation or public

information sessions should be conducted with the nations?

[4:05 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: I wanted to address the question of communications, public

education and the like — and our efforts to ensure that communities are

kept informed. I can say to the member that we have, I think, a very

strong track record, in the northeast, of

information-sharing.

We’ve had a regional…. What’s called the Northeast Roundtable that

has been around for several years. It consists of local government,

regional government, snowmobile operators, hunters, stakeholders from

across the spectrum, and we bring them updates regularly about regional

initiatives by government, including, of course, these important

negotiations. Our provincial staff, in addition, frequently meets with

local mayors, regional directors and industry leaders, with updates on

the negotiations, to the extent possible.

There was a specific question raised with respect to a meeting of

the Fort St. John Chamber of Commerce. The Doig River Chief, Trevor

Makadahay — with whom I spoke yesterday actually, and I’m grateful to

him — brought to our attention in a letter that the planning for the

date of that event had not been something with which he had been

involved. We thank him for that, and we’re committed to work together to

ensure that that goes forward in collaboration with him and other Treaty

8 Nations in the ordinary way.

I hope that’s sufficient for the member.

M. Lee: I appreciate the minister’s update on that.

Certainly, I’ve had the opportunity, with the member for Peace

River North, to visit with the council at Doig River. Obviously, they’re

one example of a Treaty 8 Nation that ought to be involved in the

ongoing communication and public awareness of these complex

arrangements.

There is work, as the minister referred to, in terms of the

stakeholder tables, but just before I go to that element of his

response, just on the first part, in terms of creating more public

awareness and understanding…. We know, of course, that with the pace of

change, complex legal agreements — as the minister and I have discussed

here in estimates — in the Blueberry River First Nations case are due to

the nature of a very important court decision relating, in part, to

cumulative impacts on the territory of the Blueberry River First

Nation.

In terms of understanding the changes and the requirements that

are set out in a fairly complex agreement, it does take, of course, that

level of dialogue which includes First Nations themselves. I appreciate

that there are provisions in the agreement that relate to that. I would

hope that, as government goes forward, it will continue to put resources

into this area.

[4:10 p.m.]

Of course, even with redacted agreements — which are soon to be

unredacted, in the sense of the full disclosure of the set of agreements

without redactions, as the minister confirmed earlier — there is still

an understanding as to the obligations set out both by the First Nations

themselves and by government — the restrictions around some of the

disturbance on the lands and what that means for future economic

activity and how nations are working together to look at regional

solutions, as the minister referred to. Apart from examples of the

wildlife table, it’s not necessarily immediately evident to a member of

the public that that is some of the approach that’s being utilized

here.

I do think this is an important area to continue to put resource

to, and I’ve continued to have that discussion with the minister about

it. I think this chamber event is a small example. This is, of course,

what the minister and his team do on a day-to-day basis — manage

relationships. I appreciate that’s what the minister has done here to

address that concern.

When we’re talking about public awareness efforts and resources

towards even helping the public to understand the Blueberry and Treaty 8

Nations, both the consensus document for the other Treaty 8 Nations and

the formal agreement with Blueberry River First Nation, can I ask: what

level of resource and plan does the ministry have going forward in this

area?

Hon. M. Rankin: I think the member puts his finger on a very important aspect of

the work we’re doing — namely, public awareness and understanding. That

is centrally important.

I think it’s, perhaps, not totally unusual, but I’m pleased to see

it in the agreement itself. There is a recognition. There are provisions

that talk about what we call honouring the treaty — meaning, people need

to be aware that we have this ancient treaty that we’re implementing.

The courts have told us we must, and of course, we’re committed to doing

that. It’s not every agreement that has such a provision that

contemplates public engagement to that degree. We’re very pleased to do

that. We see this as a centrally important feature.

As I said to the member in earlier questions, it’s the Ministry of

Water, Land and Resource Stewardship that is primarily engaged in this

work. We have been assisting, of course. But they are very much

responsible.

There are provisions…. We’ve talked about wildlife, land use, land

management, restoration. That will take substantive engagement. We want

to ensure that goes forward with the community involvement, and that’s

why we have been very, very pleased to have this Northeast Roundtable

for so many years. That has been such an effective forum for

dialogue.

[4:15 p.m.]

I’m also pleased to say, and I hope the member is aware of this,

that the former mayor of the Dawson Creek, Dale Bumstead, has been

retained by some of the Treaty 8 Nations to help with this work. He’s a

very honoured member of the community.

He’s working with the First Nations, but of course, he was a

highly successful local politician in the community, and his commitment

to this work is really appreciated by government and, I think, will make

a real difference on the ground in the northeast.

M. Lee: Well, I will, in view of the minister’s response, just have

further dialogue if the member for Cariboo-Chilcotin enables me to do

that, to join him in his estimates process with the Minister of Water,

Land, and Resource Stewardship around the stakeholder side of things.

We’ll leave that there for the time being that way. But thank you for

that.

I will turn to a discussion here relating to land and dealing with

considerations around transfer. There is currently an effort under Crown

land and reconciliation, a joint effort with this minister’s ministry as

well as a second ministry — whose name is set out as, of course, the

Ministry of Water, Land, and Resource Stewardship — relating to working

through a potential involvement of transfer of what I understand to be

70,000 hectares of provincial Crown land.

There are constraints and challenges in terms of working through

land requirements to resolve issues relating to overlapping titles. I’d

ask the minister if he could provide us with an update as to that

initiative.

Hon. M. Rankin: Perhaps a bit of clarification for the question from the member.

To which provision is he referring? Is he referring to treaty land

entitlement? Is he referring to this agreement, or is he referring to

other things? There are many things in the northeast going on. I just

want clarification as to which he’s referring to.

M. Lee: I’m not referring to this agreement or the Pacific Northeast; I’m

making a general comment. My understanding in terms of dealing with some

of this initiative first…. This is the Crown land reconciliation

initiative, as I understand it. I understand that that is a program

between the two ministries.

Perhaps if there’s not a clear understanding about what I’m

referring to, I can just ask the minister to generally comment on the

current considerations around third-party interests, land transfers,

compensation for land as we look at dealing with various assertions of

land title claims from nations.

I understand there was a figure of 70,000 hectares that might be

involved here. But if that doesn’t ring a bell, the minister can just

respond by giving a general understanding as to what’s being considered,

and then I will ask a second question as a follow-up.

[4:20 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: Thank you for the clarification. I think it’s important that I say

at the outset, when we now engage on the broader conversation about

land, that the province has consistently and firmly been of the view

that fee simple lands, privately held lands, will never be on the table

except if there is a willing-buyer-willing-seller situation. I think

that’s something that I need to say at the very outset.

Nevertheless, the province is committed to returning land in

recognition of the inherent rights to self-determination and

self-government, and we’re trying to find different negotiating paths to

do that. We understand that the existing legislation, the Crown land

legislation, if you will, is primarily involved in managing rather than

transferring land.

Our systems — Water, Land and Resource Stewardship and the

Ministry of Forests, which is responsible for Crown land programs — are

simply not designed to deal with the transfer of land. They’re more

designed, of course, for the management of land, which is what you would

expect.

We are committed to trying to find better processes to return land

where applicable. There’s a lot of work underway to deal with this.

We’ve made strides since 2017 to get Crown land back to First Nations,

having more than tripled our commitments in that regard.

I perhaps can wait for further questions from the member. He

alluded to third-party interests, and, of course, those are very much at

the fore, and how we address those is one of the challenges that, of

course, such an exercise would entail.

M. Lee: In reference to third-party interests…. The minister recognizes I

said those words, but, also, he did say that, generally speaking, the

principle is it must be a willing buyer, willing seller. If that’s the

case, then that obviously makes some constraints on the ability of the

government to deal with some transfers of Crown land.

In circumstances where there is a willing buyer and willing

seller, how is the compensation arrangement and assessment dealt with

and considered by government?

[4:25 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: I’m pleased to recognize the member for Cariboo-Chilcotin in the

House, because the illustrations I’m about to provide relate to his

communities.

I indicated that we work on acquisition of private land if, and

only if, a willing-buyer, willing-seller scenario occurs. I’m going to

give two examples of where that’s been done. I start by saying, in each

case, we seek an independent third-party market evaluation of the land

before any compensation, any money, is exchanged.

The examples I provide are…. In 2020, the Xatśūll First Nation in

the Cariboo was seeking a ranch that was critically important, they

thought, to their future. And we, using the incremental treaty process,

bought that land and, in effect, are holding it for that eventual day

when the treaty would be finalized.

More recently, a few months ago, a very generous Ross Beaty — some

of you in the House will know of that philanthropist and very much

involved in conservation — actually acquired land from a company called

the B.C. Cattle Company ranch.

The member for Cariboo-Chilcotin and I were at a meeting, both

virtually and in real time, at which he generously returned that because

he became aware that the Canoe/Dog Creek First Nation was anxious to

have that treaty land. It was the only way to get to a water body. It

was part of their culture to try to get back access to the water. And

through an enormous act of generosity — $16 million of generosity — that

land was returned and made available to the First Nation. We had the

benefit of attending a very uplifting ceremony where that

occurred.

But those are two examples I can give the member of both how we

proceed and where we proceeded on this willing-buyer, willing-seller

basis.

M. Lee: Thank you for recognizing the member for Cariboo-Chilcotin.

Certainly, I’ve had much discussion with the member, including from

other third-party holders of land in our province, recognizing the

importance of how government works through some of these processes.

Hopefully, that member will acknowledge that, with that discussion in

hand, there’ll be further discussion with the minister responsible for

Water, Land and Resource Stewardship by invitation in terms of some of

the other stakeholder arrangements around land management and

planning.

I will just turn to another topic here, which is the MOU between

Canada, British Columbia and the Wet’suwet’en, February 29, 2020. I

understand that we will have a discussion in this House on Bill 18 on

the recognition of the Haida Nation and that there may be some follow-on

discussion at committee stage at least where we could have a similar

discussion. But I thought I would at least, with the time we have here,

have some discussion with the minister.

I would hope the minister will appreciate — as we get into

committee side on Haida Nation recognition, in that Bill 18 — that we’ll

have a further opportunity to discuss some of these

considerations.

With the Wet’suwet’en…. The desire that’s set out in the MOU was

to have the governance…. Well, in sub 4(b), for example: “Clarity on the

Wet’suwet’en governance structures, systems and laws, that will be

ratified by the Wet’suwet’en and will be used to implement their title

to the extent required to understand the interface between the Crown and

Wet’suwet’en jurisdiction.”

[4:30 p.m.]

What is the status at this time in terms of obtaining that level

of clarity and bringing together what has been both hereditary and

elected leaders within the Wet’suwet’en Indigenous community?

Hon. M. Rankin: Thank you to the member for raising a difficult and complicated

issue — the issue involving the tripartite memorandum of understanding

between the Hereditary Chiefs of the Wet’suwet’en, the federal

government and the government of British Columbia. The member has asked

about the status of that, and I can say to the member the MOU

discussions have occurred, but only intermittently, since June of 2021.

They’ve been impacted by COVID, of course, and federal elections and

lack of engagement by the Chiefs at the negotiating table.

The key part of the work that’s going on is internal work within

the Wet’suwet’en Nation family, and those internal negotiations are

proceeding, we’re advised. We are hopeful that we can resume

negotiations amongst the three parties in the near term.

M. Lee: I understand that there was a level of funding provided to support

the work of the Wet’suwet’en under the MOU. Can the minister confirm the

amount of that funding and what it has been put towards in terms of

governance capacity building, for example?

Hon. M. Rankin: I thank the member for the question. I have said in this House

previously that in 2021, the province provided $7.22 million to the

Wet’suwet’en to support their work, under the tripartite MOU, to do work

in expanding governance capacity, to engage in the unity-building

exercises that I referred to earlier and, of course, to participate in

negotiations to reconcile rights and title. Those are complicated

negotiations that we hope to resume shortly, as I said

previously.

The funds also support capacity for further work on Wet’suwet’en

priorities. They’re very much involved in ecosystem monitoring, where

we’ve had great work done together; landscape-level planning; and also

enabling renovations to the Lake Kathlyn school property near Smithers,

which the community bought with a grant we provided, of $1.23 million,

in 2020. Meetings are continuing to occur. My deputy minister advises

that he, in fact, will be going to Lake Kathlyn school later this month

to address issues with the Wet’suwet’en.

[4:35 p.m.]

The MOU is a government-to-government-to-government understanding

that outlines the work that all the parties must do to advance

reconciliation. One of the priority topics, clearly, is the development

of Wet’suwet’en reunification, because we can only progress so far under

the MOU. Unless we have the support of community leaders, that

productive dialogue that could lead to lasting solutions cannot take

place. We’re looking forward to hearing from the Wet’suwet’en on the

status of their unity-building work under the MOU and how the funding

has been allocated for those important purposes.

M. Lee: I appreciate the

summary from the minister. As we look at the MOU

terms themselves, in clause 1, under “Immediate,” it states that Canada

and B.C. recognize that the Wet’suwet’en rights and title are held by

the Wet’suwet’en houses under their system of governance.

Would the minister agree, when we look at this provision, that

aboriginal rights and title is considered to be a communal

right?

Hon. M. Rankin: I would agree with the member to the extent that the rights at

issue — aboriginal rights, rights that are confirmed in

section 35 of

the Constitution Act, 1982 — are collective rights — not individual

rights, collective rights. We’ve been working hard to engage community

leaders to do the unfinished business of reconciling Wet’suwet’en law

and provincial law and implementing the Delgamuukw-Gisday’wa case, which

is over a generation ago, I’m sad to say. It’s been 25 years since Chief

Justice Lamer famously told us to get on with it and work together to

negotiate a resolution.

Our government has taken on that hard work, and we are proud of

that hard work. It is difficult, as I said, and we are committed to it.

We are resolute in our determination to undertake rights and title

negotiation at the table rather than in the courtroom, as the court

admonished us to do. Indigenous self-determination is a key tenet of the

UN declaration on the rights of Indigenous people. It is a key objective

of the Declaration Act that everyone in this House stood and unanimously

supported that day in late November 2019.

Doing this hard work will resolve issues on the land, conflicts of

which we’re all aware, healing the community and benefiting everyone,

Indigenous and non-Indigenous who live in that region.

M. Lee: I certainly appreciate the importance of the work and the

long-standing nature of the need for the work. I am asking these

questions, of course, to gain further clarity in this House as to the

government’s approach to this recognition.

Before coming back to the use of the words “collective rights,” I

know, in talking to other First Nation leaders, that the nature of this

MOU and the recognition of rights and title in a fairly direct way is

significant. Let me just go there for a moment, then, to ask this

question. Are there other examples, by this government, for recognizing

rights and title in such a straightforward manner in the context of an

MOU with other nations in this province?

[4:40 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: I really appreciate the member’s question. There are so many

examples, but I’d like to give two that I think are really critical, one

very current and one ten years ago.

Ten years ago, in June 2014, the Tŝilhqot’in Nation, led by the

Xeni Gwet’in and then and now Chief Roger William, went to the Supreme

Court of Canada and had the court declare that they have Aboriginal

title to what’s called the declared title area in the Cariboo-Chilcotin

region. There are other Aboriginal rights beyond that, as the member

knows, that were also confirmed by the court that day.

Over the last decade — literally, decade — the government of

Canada and the government of British Columbia have tried to pour meaning

into the court’s bald declaration of Aboriginal title. What does it

mean? What does it mean to the forest industry? What does it mean to

haying? What does it mean to so many other areas?

That process has involved subsequent negotiations predicated on

the collective right of the Tŝilhqot’in, the title that the court

declared, now ten years ago, in June of 2014. We’re looking forward to

attending a celebration of the court case in June, in the Nemaiah

Valley.

So much work has gone on in that period, and the lesson we have

learned, the lesson we’re trying to apply in Wet’suwet’en is simply

this. We can have a court tell us, or we can negotiate on the ground

what it means, how to best implement that title for people of British

Columbia.

That takes me to the second example, which is involving the Haida

Nation. Just in the last few days, Bill 18, the Haida Nation Recognition

Act, was introduced into this House for first reading and will be coming

up for debate shortly. The Haida Nation has had a constitution for

decades. They have had a Council of the Haida Nation, which has been

their governing body representing the nation for years.

We think, based on that proud history of effective governance,

that we are prepared to move forward, ideally to settle a lawsuit, and

recognize such a thing as Aboriginal title, Haida title, in Haida

Gwaii.

We do so because we know the experience that occurred in the

Tŝilhqot’in context with Roger William’s successful litigation that I’ve

just referenced. We believe and have sought to do the same with the

Wet’suwet’en. We will try to do that elsewhere. We believe the court

told us, in no uncertain terms, in Delgamuukw, to do this work. We are

doing that work, and we are committed, proudly and resolutely, to

achieve the results through negotiation rather than

litigation.

M. Lee: I appreciate the minister’s response.

The minister should know that the purpose of my question is

contextual. It’s to confirm my understanding and the reaction I have

from other discussions with other First Nation leaders in this

province.

[4:45 p.m.]

I would think the first example the minister provided…. I do

recognize, of course, that in the nature of nations having to go to

court to validate their own title and rights…. The decision ten years

ago that the minister referred to — I’ve had the opportunity to discuss

that with Chief Roger William as well. I appreciate the significance of

the decision.

My question was around government recognizing rights and title in

a quick, short, succinct manner, as it does in paragraph 1 of this

MOU.

I think, for the second example the minister provided, we will

have more discussion on Bill 18. Hopefully, Mr. Chair, if you’re in the

chair or your colleagues are in the chair, there will be some

recognition of latitude. I’ve already noted that I’m trying to have the

discussion here in estimates, but we’ll have it, as well, on Bill 18, to

a certain degree.

The minister has provided an example there which I don’t believe

is the same as what I’m asking. Let me just say this. It is significant.

I have the feedback from nations that say: “Well, we would like to have

the same recognition of rights and title in a simple

one-liner.”

Keeping that in mind, and recognizing that the minister will refer

to Delgamuukw and the court decision and other considerations — which

were dynamic, to say the least — around the time this MOU was entered

into…. “Dynamic” is not the best word for that, admittedly.

Let me just ask the minister. Recognizing, as well, that this is

Canada recognizing the rights and title, what level of work would have

gone into that to come to this assessment? I ask that question because….

Will other nations be able to have a similar, simple statement as well,

to recognize their rights and title? I’m just trying to get a sense as

to how the process worked to get to this statement to confirm rights and

title for the Wet’suwet’en peoples here in this document.

[4:50 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: Thank you to the member. He asked for examples of other places in

which we have made recognition of First Nations rights in such a

fashion. I thought I would give him another recent example, not an

example that maybe is on the front page of papers but which is

critically important to the nation affected. It’s the Gitanyow

governance accord of 2021.

I’d like to read, if I may, what we said in

article 1.2 of that

agreement. The member can find it online. It’s a public document. Bear

with me as I try to translate some of the words that are in there.

“Canada and British Columbia recognize that Gitanyow Aboriginal rights

and title are held by each wilp ” — that is, house — “in that

wilp ’s lax’yip ,” territory, “and that each

wilp , through its Simogyet,” the Chief, “has authorities

and responsibilities for that lax’yip ,” territory, “in

accordance with Gitanyow Ayookxw,” or laws.

A simple statement. The kind of statement the member asked whether

it exists in other places. There’s a recent example that one can find on

the ministry website. So we have made additional statements of that

kind.

We can find similar statements in the Lake Babine Foundation

Agreement. There are others across the way where we do this by

negotiation. It’s centrally important to First Nations. It doesn’t

perhaps draw the same kind of attention as in other places, but this is

the kind of hard work that’s going on.

Now, of course, that governance accord doesn’t end with that

simple one-sentence statement that I read. There are elaborate

arrangements that are contemplated, government to government to

government. But that’s the kind of work that we are proud to be

undertaking in every corner of this province.

M. Lee: Well, thank you. I appreciate those examples. Certainly, I will

share them with others as we go, because I think that’s important — to

understand that the government continues to progress relationship in

this good way. That’s my personal comment.

In terms of

section 1, then, on the collective versus communal

right discussion, just so I understand the minister’s distinction…. When

the minister says it’s a collective right, does that suggest, then, that

the hereditary leadership has authority or some level of…? I appreciate

that this gets into the governance issue, but I just want to ask the

minister in this way so he can articulate the challenge here.

[4:55 p.m.]

When we talk about recognizing this as a collective right, what

does that mean vis-à-vis the Hereditary Chiefs of the Wet’suwet’en

versus some question as to whether they’re representing the collective

community of the Wet’suwet’en peoples?

Hon. M. Rankin: The member asks about collective rights again, and I’d like to