1987 Legislative Session: 1st Session, 34th Parliament

HANSARD

The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.

The printed version remains the official version.

Official Report of

DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(Hansard)

THURSDAY, MAY 28, 1987

Afternoon Sitting

[ Page

1429 ]

CONTENTS

Routine Proceedings

Oral Questions

Cabinet minister's remarks. Mr. Gabelmann –– 1429

Freight rates for coal. Mr. Harcourt –– 1429

Voter registration. Mr. G. Hanson –– 1429

Vancouver log market review. Mr. Kempf –– 1430

Journalist's foreknowledge of Bill 28. Ms. Marzari 1430

Release of government information. Ms. Marzari –– 1430

Mr. Rose

Sooke school arbitration. Mr. Jones –– 1430

Vancouver log market review. Mr. Williams –– 1431

Industrial Relations Reform Act (Bill 19). Committee stage. (Hon. L. Hanson)

–– 1431

Mr. Gabelmann

Mr. Clark

Mr. Sihota

Hon. Mr. Brummet

Mrs. Boone

Mr. Jones

Mr. R. Fraser

Division

Mr. Miller

Mr. Rabbitt

Mr. Lovick

Division

Mr. Rose

Appendix –– 1452

The House met at 2:07 p.m.

[W Pelton in the chair.]

MR. ROSE : Mr. Speaker, in your gallery today are....

I'm

not quite sure of the number, and I was almost tempted to say 20 odd

NDP constituency assistants; but I won't say that. They're here for

their annual three-day get-together, briefing and learning session.

They're somewhat chastened, however, because of the severe thrashing

they received at the hands of the MLA softball team during the contest

last evening. Despite that, I wonder if the House would bring them a

nice warm welcome.

MR. CASHORE : Mr. Speaker, I'd

like to welcome to the gallery today a very dear friend of our family.

I could go on for a long time about her attributes, but the one I would

like to affirm at this time is her ability to get the most out of

children's choirs. I would like you to join me in welcoming Virginia

Bartolic of Surrey.

MR. MESSMER : Mr. Speaker, I'm

very pleased to introduce to the House today our youngest daughter

Cindy, who is here visiting us. She is the assistant golf pro at the

Kelowna Golf and Country Club — that small community to the north of

Penticton. She came in last night to watch the great game between the

press and the MLAs. Unfortunately we didn't have a no-show clause, so

consequently the game did not go on.

AN HON. MEMBER : But we won by default.

MR. MESSMER : Yes, we won by default. Would you please welcome Cindy to the House.

MR. MOWAT :

Mr. Speaker, in the House today we have a number of students from Eric

Hamber high school in the Little Mountain riding, with their teacher

Mr. Ballantyne. I'd ask the House to please make them welcome.

MR. CRANDALL :

In the members' gallery today are two senior management people from the

forest industry in the great southeastern part of British Columbia. I'd

like the House to welcome Mr. Brody Swan, chief forester from Radium

Forest Products, and Mr. John Murray from Crestbrook Forest Industries,

vice-president of the woodlands division.

Oral Questions

CABINET MINISTER'S REMARKS

MR. GABELMANN : Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Premier. This

morning in the House we had a second cabinet minister make racist comments.

The Minister of Labour and Consumer Services (Hon. L. Hanson) referred to people

being free, white and over 21. The minister is responsible for human rights

in this province. I want to ask the Premier whether or not he thinks the minister

can continue in his responsibility for human rights, given that kind of racist

comment.

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM :

Mr. Speaker, I understand the member apologized. But I should comment

here that I think all members on each side of the House perhaps need to

consider sayings and colloquialisms that have perhaps been used over

the years quite freely, not as a matter of expressing racism or any

such thing. They were a part — unfortunately or otherwise — of the

vocabulary. I guess we need to watch all those things. I'm sure that,

while the member apologized, there was nothing intended such as has

been suggested.

FREIGHT RATES FOR COAL

MR. HARCOURT :

Mr. Speaker, I'd like to ask the Premier about western coal. Next week

I will be meeting with the federal Minister of Transport, Mr. Crosbie,

to lobby for him to take action on freight rates for western coal,

which could create thousands of jobs if Ontario were to use more

western coal. I'd like to know, Mr. Premier, if you have scheduled a

meeting, when you're in Ottawa next week, with the Minister of

Transport, to push for the freight subsidies that are necessary to make

that coal be consumed in greater quantities in Ontario.

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM :

Mr. Speaker, I think we've done better than that. We've established a

committee involving Mr. Mazankowski, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr.

David Peterson, the Premier of Ontario, Mr. Don Getty, the Premier of

Alberta, and me to consider what we can collectively do to ensure that

the opportunities are provided for western coal to be sold throughout

the east but perhaps most specifically in Ontario, not only to the

public sector but also to the private sector. All of this is being

worked on right now. Mr. Mazankowski has people in Ottawa working on

some of the details, gathering information, as are the Premiers. A

meeting will be called shortly to bring all of the information together

and to see what we can do to develop a strategy that would allow us to

sell coal to Ontario.

I should say as well that at present

most certainly Ontario Hydro is committed until about 1992. They have

orders and commitments and legal contracts with suppliers in the U.S.

Obviously, in some respects, little can be done before that date, when

these contracts come to an end. But we are working on it. We have

certainly addressed this a number of times. I have had numerous

meetings in Ottawa with various ministers. But I think for the federal

government to charge the Deputy Prime Minister with heading such a

committee speaks for itself.

VOTER REGISTRATION

MR. G. HANSON :

Mr. Speaker, a question to the Provincial Secretary. The minister has

recently alleged that people who used

section 80 in the last provincial

election to vote in one riding, though previously registered in

another, represented abuse of the system. I have a letter here which

the chief electoral officer wrote prior to the last provincial election

in February 1986 clarifying this point, which states: "A voter honestly

not remembering if he is registered in another electoral district may

vote under the provisions of

section 80 and have his ballot counted."

Did the minister not bother to seek the ruling of Mr. Goldberg on this

matter before making his statements?

[ Page 1430 ]

DEPUTY SPEAKER : Just before we proceed, it seems to me, hon. member, that we are dealing with a matter here that is before the House.

HON. MR. VEICH : Mr. Speaker, you are quite correct. Bill 28 is before the House, and I don't want to offend the House in any way. However....

Interjection.

HON. MR. VEITCH :

Perhaps you have, hon. member, many times. However, yes, I have sought

Mr. Goldberg's counsel at all times in all things to do with election

legislation. Mr. Goldberg is a good adviser. And Mr. Goldberg, by the

way, is completely on side with the elements contained in that

legislation. It is before the House, and I think in discussing it now

we have offended it enough at this point.

VANCOUVER LOG MARKET REVIEW

MR. KEMPF :

Mr. Speaker, a question to the Premier. In view of the written tabled

response by the Minister of Forests and Lands (Hon. Mr. Parker) to my

May 12 question with respect to the possible $1 billion discrepancy

between logs priced in the Vancouver log market and those priced in

other jurisdictions, has the Premier decided to direct his minister to

carry on an in-depth review or investigation of the Vancouver log

market, as would have taken place if the quote in the document that I

tabled on Thursday last would have proceeded?

[2:15]

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM :

Yes, it's part of the ongoing review, and certainly this information is

being sought. I am sure that the questions asked and the response

provided will also be part of the documentation that will be a part of

the review.

MR. KEMPF : A supplementary question to

the Premier. From the written response, it would appear that such a

review is not taking place; an in-depth review of this situation is not

taking place. Irrespective of the minister's apparent lack of concern

about a possible $1 billion going into the pockets of multinational

forest companies, forest monopolies in this province, and not into the

coffers of the province of British Columbia, is the Premier not

concerned about that?

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM : I will

wait until I get all the information and the documentation as a result

of the review, and I will certainly express any concerns I have at that

time.

JOURNALIST'S FOREKNOWLEDGE OF BILL 28

MS. MARZARI :

Mr. Speaker, I have a question about process in this House. A column in

the Vancouver Sun on May 25 clearly indicated that the columnist had

been briefed on the contents of Bill 28 24 hours before the bill was

brought before this assembly. Can the minister confirm that this

information came out of his office?

HON. MR. VEITCH : Well, not knowing what information she is speaking

of, I can neither confirm nor deny it. I sometimes wonder myself how various

journalists come up with their information. Maybe they were talking with the

hon. member — I don't know.

MS. MARZARI :

I am new to this House. Members of my side and the press sometimes are

put under embargo. They are not allowed to talk about the contents of a

bill before it hits the House — that's respected. Did your office give

information about Bill 28 to various people before the bill came to the

House?

HON. MR. VEITCH : I have given no information

to any journalist regarding Bill 28 or any other piece of legislation

before it came to this House. However, if the hon. member would take a

little bit of time.... I also read that article, and it was most

interesting. If the hon. member had taken the time to phone the chief

electoral officer or check any of the statements of votes, she could

have ascertained the same information herself without any problem at

all.

RELEASE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

MS. MARZARI :

Mr. Speaker, I have another question for the Provincial Secretary on

process of information from this House. The minister has distributed a

pamphlet which outlines the changes in the Election Act proposed by

Bill 28, which, like Bill 19, is not yet law. The wording in the

brochure suggests the changes are a fait accompli. Is this routine

procedure for the government to engage in?

HON. MR. VEITCH :

Well, Mr. Speaker, for the edification of the hon. member — and I'm

glad that this is a kind of show-and-tell — yes, it's customary to put

out press releases and other forms of informational material so that

people can be apprised of what the government is doing, once

information is tabled in the House. You're quite correct; it is.

MR. ROSE :

I'm concerned about something, Mr. Speaker, that happened yesterday

with the Minister of Tourism (Hon. Mr. Reid), and then we have another

example of it today. I'd like to direct it to the Premier. I think that

prerelease of information before this House sees it really shows

disrespect for the House, and I'd like to know whether the Premier has

thought about bringing his cabinet into line on these matters, and

whether or not he intends to direct them not to indulge in this kind of

deliberate leakiness, designed to allow the public to know what's going

on in this Legislature even before its members know.

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM :

Mr. Speaker, in case the hon. member is not aware, I can assure the

hon. member that I have total confidence in the best cabinet this

Province has ever seen.

SOOKE SCHOOL ARBITRATION

MR. JONES :

Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Minister of Labour and Consumer

Services. In response to my question yesterday regarding the Sooke

arbitration, on the impact of an unfair appointment to that arbitration

process, the minister suggested that my question was hypothetical. I

would advise the minister that this arbitration process has begun, and

unfortunately without the participation of both sides.

[ Page

1431 ]

Does the Minister of Labour still believe that the appointment of Mr. Gallagher

as the sole arbitrator will still provide a fair and a reasonable arbitration

process in Sooke?

HON. L. HANSON :

Mr. Speaker, yes, I do, as a matter of fact. I believe that the boycott

of the situation by the teachers' association is not true and fair to

the system that is in place. I do believe that the result of that

arbitration will be fair.

MR. JONES : Supplementary,

Mr. Speaker. I don't see how the minister can construe that a fair

process will happen when a partisan appointment has been made, and both

sides are not party to that process.

The minister should be

aware that this is the third case in which teachers have boycotted this

arbitration process because of frustration with the unfairness of

appointments and frustration with the irrelevance and unfairness in

changes due to Bill 19 and 20. How can the minister expect anything but

boycotts and disruptions of the entire bargaining process in education

into the foreseeable future in light of this process with Bills 19 and

20?

HON. L. HANSON : Mr. Speaker, it appears to me

that the question has now changed slightly, and there is a question now

whether the arbitrator is fair and reasonable. Or is it a question that

Bills 19 and 20 are unfair and unreasonable? Therefore, as a result of

that, the arbitrator is unfair and unreasonable. It appears to me that

that is a rather perverse reaction to an arbitrator whom we have

appointed and whom we feel will be a reasonable person and will provide

a reasonable and fair arbitration award.

VANCOUVER LOG MARKET REVIEW

MR. WILLIAMS :

A question to the Premier, following up the question from the former

Minister of Forests on these huge revenues that we have not yet

achieved from our forests in British Columbia and that legitimately

could be achieved. The review underway was to have reported last fall.

Clearly, much data was available to the department and all ministries

of government. Can the Premier advise us what date we will have that

review, so the Crown can get these revenues that are long overdue?

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM :

Mr. Speaker, we will certainly provide the information as soon as

possible. We will try to expedite the process as much as we can, but we

certainly must take great care in doing this, because we are all very

pleased, I am sure, with the fact that the forest industry generally

now is doing extremely well. Lots of people are employed throughout the

whole of the province. The employment rates are at an all-time high,

perhaps, and certainly we want to keep it that way.

Orders of the Day

HON. MR. STRACHAN : Mr. Speaker, I call committee on Bill 19.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REFORM ACT, 1987

(continued)

The House in committee on Bill 19; Mrs. Gran in the chair.

HON. L. HANSON : Madam Chairman, I would like to table an amendment to

section 8.

section 6 as amended.

MR. GABELMANN : As we finished this morning, I had asked the Minister of Labour a question. I wonder if he's prepared now to answer it.

HON. L. HANSON :

We don't believe that the apartheid system in South Africa and the

reference to it in the legal contract would be considered an employer,

so it would be perfectly legal and legitimate to include it in the

collective agreement.

MR. GABELMANN : Some of us didn't hear the entire answer because it has been quite noisy.

MADAM CHAIRMAN : Hon. members, could we have order in committee.

HON. L. HANSON :

The reference to the question this morning dealt with a clause in a

collective agreement that referred to apartheid in South Africa. We

don't think the

interpretation of an employer would extend to

apartheid, and therefore that clause would be perfectly allowable

within the collective agreement.

MR. GABELMANN : So

we're to understand then that if provincially regulated teamsters, for

example, have a clause in their contract saying they don't have to

handle South African products, they would not be required to handle

those products. The minister is saying yes to that.

MADAM CHAIRMAN : Could I please ask the members conducting meetings if they could conduct them in the hall.

MR. CLARK :

The minister has just made a very narrow

interpretation of the question

of employers, as I understand it. Just to follow up, if a collective

agreement were to contain a clause saying that all products — let's say

coveralls, to use that example again — must be produced in British

Columbia, would that be acceptable under this section?

HON. L. HANSON :

That really only expresses a prohibition; it's not a preference and

leaves the ability for the free marketplace to find its own level. I

think the reference that we made earlier in this act was to the effect

that the requirement for an employer to use only products produced

under a union label had connotations of unfairly forcing those people

who were employees of a non-union company to become unionized members.

I don't think, in suggesting in a contract that only B.C. products be

used, that there is any connotation of unfair pressure towards

unionization, or undue influence on the employees.

[2:30]

[ Page 1432 ]

MR. GABELMANN :

I want to pursue the question of the apartheid clause in conjunction

with the earlier discussion this morning about the clause in the UA

agreement — the plumbers' Local 170 agreement — which, just to quickly

refresh people's memories, is a clause that requires that products that

the plumbers are using in construction in British Columbia have to be

produced in a plant where a UA agreement is in place. That clearly is

illegal now under this section. An apartheid-related prohibition is not

illegal, according to the minister. If the clause in the agreement said

something to the effect that the employer agrees not to buy or use

products from countries in which fair and democratic elections are not

held to elect governments, etc., would that clause be legal?

HON. L. HANSON :

No, Madam Chairman, I don't think that would be illegal. There's no

reference to an employer or a specific employer, and there's no undue

influence on anyone to become part of an organized labour movement or

not. I think that that could be included.

MR. GABELMANN :

We now have the minister saying that restrictive clauses are legal. The

only restrictive clauses that are illegal are those that refer to a

unionized employer. Now he's saying you can have a restrictive clause

in respect of governmental policies in another country. In respect of

the South African situation, he said that clause would be legal. In

respect of a hypothetical situation — I was thinking of South Korea and

Taiwan — he said that clause would be legal. So it seems to me that the

clause that the plumbers would seek to have their employers agree to

would be a clause prohibiting the use of material imported from

countries without a democratic form of government, and that would be

legal. Or, for that matter, outside British Columbia; or a clause that

said we favour a made-in-B.C. policy such as the government of B.C. has

— a restrictive trade practice, I might say, but nevertheless a policy.

Those kinds of restrictive clauses are now okay under this section. The

only kind of restriction the government seems to want to make is a

restriction against union-made products. Would the minister not agree

with that assertion?

HON. L. HANSON : No, I can't,

Madam Chairman. The legislation deals with the relations between

employers, employees and unions. It does not deal with relations with

other countries, nor does it deal with relations with other religions

or whatever. It deals with the relativity of the employers, the

employees and their trade unions.

MR. CLARK : The

minister keeps referring to the fact that he's concerned about

prohibitions that union companies would have, to say they can't buy

non-union products. He keeps referring to that, but this act, once

again.... His

interpretation, or what he's intending to do, is not

fulfilled by this act. As the member for North Island mentioned, the

plumbers could conceivably say that products from outside the lower

mainland.... If the companies dealing with pipe-manufacturing in the

lower mainland were all union and they had a prohibition that specified

a geographic area, that would be legal. Does the minister agree with

that?

HON. L. HANSON : Again, we're getting onto issues that really have

nothing to do with the intent of the legislation. The question was asked, would

it be agreeable, because in a confined area they realize that there are only

organized-labour manufacturers.... Could they have a clause that says they

can only buy material from a specified area of the province? I suppose that

would be true, but it would be difficult to understand what the benefit of that

would be. There isn't any part of Canada or British Columbia that doesn't

have the opportunity to import, or bring in, or start new businesses. So I don't

understand the relativity of what you're saying.

What

we're trying to deal with in the clause is that the agreement between

an employer and a labour organization and its employees should not say

that the goods that they have can only be purchased from another

organized labour company, because it does restrict fair trade and also

puts undue pressure on the employees of that company to fairly, and in

their own right, make a decision whether they want to be organized or

not.

MR. GABELMANN : Madam Chair, we haven't yet

begun the debate on the major impact of this section, which is

secondary boycotts, an issue separate from the issue we've been

discussing this morning and now, relating to an attempt by people who

work in construction to protect jobs. That's what's being wiped out,

and we've been discussing that.

The curious situation that

we've got now is that by this section, in respect of this first issue,

the issue of attempting to protect jobs, which is being wiped out....

We've got a government bringing in legislation which we have to read

for itself. We can't read the legislation based on what the

government's intention was. We've enough court cases on that that

intention doesn't matter. What the minister might have said in the

House doesn't matter. What matters is the language of the law. And we

have a law now that says employers and their unions can negotiate

clauses which discriminate against political systems — if they want,

whole countries; perhaps other provinces — but not unionized employers.

That's the only prohibition that's in place. It's a prohibition against

making an agreement that goods or services will be supplied by a

unionized firm.

Let's take the Gainers dispute. Collective

agreements at the present time, in many cases, have provisions — which

will now become void — which say that union members do not have to

handle struck goods. The language is put in various ways. When Gainers

was on strike and being scabbed, the product was coming into British

Columbia. Union members in this province who felt that they did not

want to handle scab goods didn't have to. They will now be required to

handle those goods, given this section, unless they amend their

collective agreement — or unless they have a letter of understanding

which could be negotiated at any time during the term of the collective

agreement — to say: "We don't have to handle any products made by

meat-packing plants in Alberta." If the company and the employer agree

to that understanding, they would, if we follow the minister's logic

all the way through, be able to have that clause stand up. I wonder if

the minister wants to comment on that.

HON. L. HANSON :

I think a very basic fact has to be brought back to the House. We're

dealing with labour relations in British Columbia in this act. We're

not dealing with the trade practices of other countries. We're not

dealing with the trade practices of Canada or.... There's other

legislation that deals with that. We're simply dealing with industrial

relations as relating to British Columbia. If the carpentry shop, if

you will, says that in their agreement with their

[ Page 1433 ]

employer

they will not use oak trees grown in Arkansas, I would suppose that

that is legitimate. We're not dealing with that issue here; we're

dealing with labour relations as it relating to the employer, the

employee, the union and other British Columbia companies.

MR. GABELMANN : Will the new law allow a hot declaration to be applied to goods produced outside of British Columbia?

HON. L. HANSON :

I suggest that we're getting a little bit off the subject, but no, it

will not be allowed if it relates to a specific product or a specific

employer out of British Columbia. In other words, if it relates to the

fact that no goods used on the scene can be used that are imported from

Australia — there are no employer connotations there — that is

allowable, but if it says that no goods can be used on the scene

regardless of their origin unless they are union-made, that is

prohibited.

Excuse me, Madam Chairman. I just wanted to add

something else. I think that we have a perfectly acceptable clause in

our seventh master agreement with the British Columbia government. It

says in there that the union and the employer agree that preference

will be given to B.C. suppliers when clothing or wearing apparel are

purchased by the employer. I think that's perfectly acceptable as a

clause within an agreement between an employer and its organization.

MR. GABELMANN :

Earlier the minister was defending this

section on the basis that he

didn't want to restrict trade. That clause restricts trade, especially

the kind of free trade the government seems intent upon supporting in

respect of the Mulroney initiative. I wonder if the minister can't see

that contradiction.

HON. L. HANSON : No, I don't see

that prohibition, because if you look at the wording it says "agree

that preference," and that's no prohibition.

MR. GABELMANN :

The minister argues that this legislation is required to prevent

restrictive trade practices. He used different words but that is, in

effect, what he was talking about. The restrictive trade practice that

he wants to deal with is a practice where a unionized company has to

purchase goods or services from another unionized company. That's the

restrictive trade practice he wants to deal with. He defends it on the

basis of wanting to get rid of restrictive trade practices and cites,

as part of his defence, another restrictive trade practice. That's the

contradiction that I would like the minister to explain.

HON. L. HANSON :

Well, I guess we have a very different opinion of what that phrase

means. It quite simply means to me that if available and priced

competitively, let's say, preference will be made to buy in British

Columbia, and that they agreed to. It doesn't prohibit purchase from

anywhere else. What we're talking about in here is boycott, and boycott

means prohibition.

[2:45]

MR. SIHOTA :

The minister says that he doesn't see the contradiction in the section.

I hope he does, and I hope he admits that there is an apparent

contradiction. Now let me try to goat it from a different angle and

just sort of step back for a minute.

The minister says this

Section is designed to prevent agreements or contracts which have a

clause in them that restricts trade vis--vis trade union companies.

That is what I understand the intent of the minister to be in terms of

introducing this section. Before I go any further, let me just make

sure that I understand that; I'll sit down and see if the minister

agrees with me that my understanding of that intent is correct.

HON. L. HANSON :

It's not to restrict trade by union companies; it's to restrict the

ability of two people — two persons, I guess, in this legislation is

the correct terminology — from sitting down at a table and making an

agreement that puts undue pressure on a third manufacturer for his

employees to become part of organized labour.

They have

that choice freely, to make that decision whether they wish to become

organized or not. But the trade boycott that says it must be of a union

label puts undue pressure on those employees, the employees of another

employer, to become unionized or they suffer a restrictive trade

atmosphere.

MR. SIHOTA : Fine, I'll accept that

explanation. But if the minister reads the section, and particularly

the use of the words "another employer" — in the copy that I have, in

any event, in that second-to-last sentence — then surely he must agree

that the usage of the words "another employer" is so broad that it

could incorporate not only the situation the minister speaks about but

also other employers in other jurisdictions, for example, Alberta or

South Africa.

Does the minister not see that the provision

of those two words in that

section allows for a broader

interpretation;

and keeping in mind that the

Interpretation Act, which is what we use

as a guide to interpret legislation, says that legislation ought to be

interpreted liberally, does he not see that the

section extends way

beyond what it is that the minister says that he's intending to do?

HON. L. HANSON :

First of all, I don't agree with the

interpretation the hon. member

made. Those words have to be read within the context of the whole

section, and I think that the gentleman who just put that question is

very learned in reading these sorts of things and can draw his own

conclusions for it. My answer to his question is no.

MR. SIHOTA :

Maybe I took one step too early, but I'll go back and cover that

territory as well with the minister. Let's read the

Section in its

entirety.

"An agreement between an employer and a trade

union, express or implied, by which the employer ceases or refrains, or

agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting

or otherwise dealing in the products of . . . any other employer or to

cease doing business with another person, is void."

you read the entire context of that, the example of a limitation on

trade with a South African employer, or ceasing to do business with

another person — and person, of course, includes employers — can easily

be construed.... Does the minister not agree that the example I've just

cited of South Africa falls within all four squares of that

section

read as a whole?

[ Page 1434 ]

HON. L. HANSON :

I'm sure I'm not pointing out anything to the member who has just

spoken, because he's obviously very experienced in legal work, but it's

my understanding that where an enactment restricts the right to

contract, the courts read it very narrowly. The wording that is there

has to be taken in the context of the whole section.

MR. SIHOTA :

If it's the minister's argument that the courts will construe these

provisions narrowly, which I think is a debatable point.... It's an

interesting point, but it's highly debatable. I don't want to sit here

and give a treatise on the law in that area, but I'll advise the

minister that the two areas of law I specialize in are personal injury

and commercial contracts, and I know darned well how courts are obliged

to deal with commercial contracts. Surely the minister must see that

that

interpretation is possible, putting aside that debate for the time

being; and would he not agree that it would be far more prudent to word

this

section such that it is narrow in its scope and deals with the one

situation that the minister envisioned for it? Would the minister not

agree that it would be far more prudent to go in that direction and

eliminate doubt, instead of leaving it open for doubt?

The

minister indicates "no" across the floor. Then let me ask the minister

this: is the intent of this

section solely to limit trade or contracts

between trade union employers?

HON. MR. BRUMMET :

Madam Chairman, I would like to just follow up and ask the minister

this: when the term "employer" is used in the British Columbia

Industrial Relations Act, is it more likely that "employer" would refer

in a more narrow sense; or, just because the term is used without being

specified, could it apply to every employer anywhere in the world?

HON. L. HANSON :

If you turn to the

interpretation

section of the Labour Code, you'll

see that employer is very specifically detailed out there. It would be

read as requiring that the agreement specify the type of employer. The

whole thing behind the legislation is again to ensure — and I've said

it so many times that I'm getting tired of it — that two people sitting

down at a table do not unduly restrict or pressure the employees of

another firm that is not organized into organizing. They have the right

to organize; it's clearly spelled out. They can make their own

decision. We don't believe outside pressure should be put on them to

form that organization.

MR. SIHOTA : In response to

the defence of the Minister of Education and the comment that flowed

from the Minister of Labour afterwards, the copy of the Labour Code

that I have here before me.... And I'm only looking at the Labour Code.

I don't see in Bill 19 where the definition of employer has been

changed, unless the minister wants to bring that to my attention. The

Labour Code says: "'employer' means a person who employs one or more

employees and includes an employers' organization." The reference to

the employers' organization doesn't matter, but the fact is that the

definition of employer under the Labour Code would not restrict it to

British Columbia employers.

I think that deals with the issue that the Minister of Education

raises. Now I go back and ask the minister whether the sole purpose and

intent of this

Section is purely to prevent provisions in contracts

which restrict an employer to dealing solely with unionized employers,

as defined under the Labour Code. Can the minister answer that question?

HON. L. HANSON : First of

all, we are dealing only with British Columbia. We have no jurisdiction

outside of British Columbia. There are all sorts of trade restrictions

that flow between various countries. We are not dealing with that. We

are dealing only with B.C. and its jurisdiction.

I would

like to point out to the members opposite that it would be just as

illegal to sit down at a table and bargain a clause in a collective

agreement that said that only goods made by non-union employers would

be used on the site.

MR. CLARK : Just following the

logic, then, does the minister agree that a hot edict that applies to

products that are from outside British Columbia, like Gainers, for

example, would be allowed under this legislation?

HON. L. HANSON :

Again, I point out that the Code deals only with labour relations in

British Columbia. If a clause like that is in a collective agreement

outside of British Columbia, we have no jurisdiction over it.

MR. SIHOTA :

Well then, let me provide the minister with an example which involves a

situation that would happen in British Columbia. I will pause while the

minister is consulting, so that he can hear the example.

The

example is simply this. An employer and an employee enter into an

agreement whereby the employer agrees to refrain from handling or

buying any goods that are made in South Africa. They negotiate that. It

is a British Columbia employer and a British Columbia employee trade

union. There is a provision in the contract which, like I said, says

that the employer agrees to refrain from handling or buying goods made

in South Africa.

The goods arrive in cargo in Vancouver.

The employer directs his employees to go and remove those goods from

the ship, for example, that they come in on. The employee organization

says: "Look, we have this provision in the agreement that says we don't

have to handle goods from South Africa." Remember, I am using the

language here.... So here we have a situation that is wholly within the

jurisdiction of British Columbia, with a British Columbia trade union

and a British Columbia employer.

The employer then waves

section 6 of this act and says: "That provision is void by virtue of

section 6 of this act." Is the minister saying that that type of

scenario is not captured by

section 6, notwithstanding the fact that

all of the action takes place in British Columbia?

HON. L. HANSON :

If I understood the question again, it's this: is it illegal to have in

a collective agreement a clause that says: "We won't deal with products

from South Africa"? And secondly, when those products come to Canada

and they are refused to be handled under that clause, would that be

legal?

MR. SIHOTA : That is essentially the question, but if the minister requires further clarification, I can supply a bit more.

HON. L. HANSON : Sure, please do.

MR. SIHOTA :

Let's run through the example again. The employer and the employee

negotiate a contract. Within the contract the following words are used:

"The employer agrees to refrain from handling or buying any goods or

products

[ Page 1435 ]

from

an employer in South Africa." We are dealing with a British Columbia

contract made between the employer and the employee, a freely

negotiated agreement.

[3:00]

The goods arrive from South Africa in port. The employer tells its

employees to go over and pick up those goods. The employees get over

there, realize the goods are from South Africa and come back to the

employer and say: "We won't touch those goods pursuant to the agreement

that we have executed with you." The employer then stands up and says:

"Well, that clause, although it is in the collective agreement, is void

by virtue of

section 6" — of this legislation before us now. Is the

minister saying that that kind of situation is not captured by

section

6, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement between the employer and

the employee is a wholly B.C. agreement, and that the action is taking

place within British Columbia?

HON. L. HANSON : Of

course, a number of these things are hypothetical cases, and certainly

will be dealt with in the jurisprudence that follows the enactment of

this. But in the case of a clause such as you're suggesting — a British

Columbia employer and a British Columbia employee agreeing not to

handle the goods of another country — that would be permissible. But to

agree in this clause that they would only handle unionized products

with unionized labels out of the country of South Africa would not be

legal.

MR. SIHOTA : Let me just seek clarification on

that. Let's take the same example, which I hope I don't have to go over

again.... On the assumption that the goods are union made in South

Africa — let's say they're mining goods or something like that — but

the rest of the story holds true, is the minister saying that in that

instance this

section would not capture that type of agreement?

HON. L. HANSON :

I'm afraid there were so many conversations going on that I didn't

catch the first part of your question. Are you asking if it would be

legal if there was a clause in the contract that said no goods from

South Africa could be handled? It's my opinion that it would be

permissible. But if it said that all goods purchased from South Africa

had to be union-made, I would suggest that that would be illegal.

MR. CLARK :

This is a strange

interpretation, and I see he's getting counselling.

He's saying, on the one hand, that "employer" should be narrowly

defined as unionized versus non-unionized employer, and that geographic

considerations don't really apply — that South Africa doesn't really

fall.... If you said unionized products in the generic sense, and

didn't mention any employers, why wouldn't that be allowed under this

clause? It simply talks about the products of another employer or

person. But if the broader thing is okay, why wouldn't the broad

statement of unionized...? It doesn't mention unionized companies in

here.

HON. L. HANSON : Well, again, Madam Chairman,

I'm not able or obliged to offer legal opinions, but the intent of the

clause is quite clear. As I've said many times, the intent of the

clause is simply that two people sitting down at a table shouldn't

unduly affect a third party who is not sitting at the table, nor his

employees. Nor should it affect their right to compete in the open

market. That's very clear here.

MRS. BOONE : Further

to what the minister has just said.... He keeps saying that it's to

prevent anyone putting any undue pressure on a group to organize or

unionize. I'd like to go from the other side — it's slightly different.

If a hot edict or a boycott is put on a product because there is scab

labour in there, and products are being put on the shelves — and

usually this takes place in a small unionized place — is not the

minister then taking the side of the employer by forcing other

unionized people to handle those goods, and thereby taking a biased

position on a strike where an employer is hiring scab labour and there

are products being produced and are going out. The other unionized

people in the past have been able to say: "I won’t handle this."

They've been able to put some pressure on a small employer. Now, Mr.

Minister, you are taking a biased position and saying that unionized

people can no longer put that kind of pressure on the employer. Is that

not correct? Are you not then taking the side of the employer in a

position such as this?

HON. L. HANSON : Absolutely

not, without any question. I'd like to point out to the members

opposite that there is no restriction on anyone or any labour

organization for putting out hot declarations or boycotts. But those

boycotts cannot be written into an agreement. Union members still have

the ability to refuse to do their shopping or whatever in the case of a

hot declaration, if you will. But it's not permissible under this act

to write it into the collective agreement being negotiated.

MR. JONES :

I'd like to raise an example that's not a hypothetical one, and perhaps

the minister can help me with this one. It's an example from my

experience. A number of school boards in this province, including the

one that I chaired, have agreements with groups other than their

employees. For example, in Burnaby we had an agreement with the

carpenters' union that suggested that our construction work would be

done by members of the carpenters' union. I'm wondering if

section 6 of

this legislation does not override those kinds of collective

agreements, or clauses in collective agreements. Does the legislation

section 6 override that? Does it make null and void future

agreements, and agreements already in place?

MR. R. FRASER :

Madam Chairman, I can't resist the invitation of the first member for

Vancouver East (Mr. Williams) to participate one more time in this

debate, because, like many of you, I think it's worthy of a great deal

of thought, effort and time. I have the bill right here, which I've

read carefully and will continue to read so that I will have a full and

comprehensive understanding.

What I find interesting about

the debate — and I tend to be supportive of the legislation generally —

is that the second member for Nanaimo (Mr. Lovick) came out the other

day with an argument that suggested that no one on this side of the

House understood the bill or was even capable of understanding; and

today, what we hear is a series of questions that would indicate that

the other side has simply no comprehension of what is going on. So

there is apparent conflict there that I think we should discuss. Which

is it? Do you understand, and would you like to help us with our

understanding? Or do you not understand, and you rely on the minister

to carry on at great length?

[ Page 1436 ]

It seems to me that there are some things about the

section that I would have strengthened, but what you really want to do....

Interjections.

MR. R. FRASER :

You want to hear a little more. There's so much more. Oh, you want to

take a turn too. Okay. If I could carry on for just a little while,

Madam Chairman, it would....

Interjections.

MR. R. FRASER :

They're heckling me unfairly, Madam Chairman. I have rarely been

subjected to such intense pressure. Right through '83 and '84, nothing

was ever this bad. It's incredible what you have to endure in a job

like this, serving the public. This is one of those great occasions.

The

minister has got something going for him here. I think this bill is

going to be widely seen as fair, and this

section will be no different

than any of the others. It will give opportunity for everyone to

participate in the supplying of product, which is naturally in the

interests of all British Columbians, and it will....

Interjection.

MR. R. FRASER :

There should be some order here, Madam Chairman. Could you admonish

those members over there. This is incredible. You know, perhaps I

should go back to Hansard and

get out the record where my hon. friend from Coquitlam told the story

about how he was trying to quit smoking. That was a good one. We needed

that one at the time; perhaps we could use it now.

It is a different House, isn't it? It's just amazing.

Interjection.

MR. R. FRASER :

Well, I wish you would, actually. It makes more sense than what I've

heard today. You did hear the opposite members saying they're going to

mail my speech, and in fact I got a piece of mail from Elsie McMurphy

the other day that I thought was great. It was my hon. colleague the

Minister of Education's speech. I was glad she mailed that around. I

thought it was quite well done.

Anyway, back to this secondary boycott agreement prohibition.

MR. GABELMANN : Don't look at the bill, because it'll be dangerous.

MR. R. FRASER :

Could it be dangerous? I remember once when the member from Atlin was

asked to say something nice about the bill, he said: "The printing's

good and the holes are punched neat." That was a long time ago.

Interjection.

MR. R. FRASER : That was research. That was an interesting guy. He went both ways on that bill.

MR. JONES : Does it override collective agreements between carpenters and school boards?

MR. R. FRASER : Well, it would certainly depend on whether or not they wanted to make an agreement.

MR. WILLIAMS : You know you're going to get the east side of the riding when it's split.

MR. R. FRASER :

If I got the east side of the riding I now represent, I would win it.

In fact, I've been looking at some of the numbers and they look

interesting. I will speak on that at great length when I get a chance.

But

I can see that the minister, who has returned, wants to speak. I wonder

if I should let him, actually. He's had a lot of turns today. Hey, I

think this

section is good. I think there are lots of things that will

work out. I think it will be to the great advantage of everybody in the

province. Madam Chairman, with that I will wait until another moment.

MR. GABELMANN :

I now know why the voters in Vancouver South elect the member as the

first member. It's because they think they're voting for John Fraser.

wonder if the minister would care to respond to the question put by the

member for Burnaby North in respect of the agreement between the school

board and the carpenters.

HON. L. HANSON : Thank you

for that small recess. In any case, the only exclusion of an agreement

of that sort, as I understood it, was an agreement with the school

board that their work would be done by the carpenters. I would see no

reason why that wouldn't be allowed within the contract, because it's

actually effectively subcontracting, and what they have is an agreement

that work of the bargaining unit would be subcontracted to someone

specific.

[3:15]

MR. GABELMANN :

So if you're a school board employer, to subcontract out carpentry work

specifically to the carpenters' union is not prohibited by this clause

— if I understood what the minister was saying — but to insist that the

material used be subcontracted from a unionized employer or a specific

employer is illegal. I guess I'm having some difficulty understanding

the distinction that the minister makes between those two sets of

circumstances.

Well, Madam Chair, the minister doesn't

respond. I assume we now are to assume that there can be an agreement

between an employer and a trade union which is of a positive nature. I

think that must be the distinction. Because the language of the

section

says: "An express or implied provision of an agreement between an

employer and a trade union by which the employer ceases or refrains, or

agrees to cease or refrain from handling...." So you can't do the

negative, but you can do the positive, it appears. And I wonder if

that's the basis for the distinction, or is the basis for the

distinction that the carpentry work done by the carpenters in Burnaby

is not manufacturing but in fact a craft or a service? The minister

nods.

If the service is of a construction nature, it's legal; if it's of a manufactured nature, it's illegal. Is that the distinction?

HON. L. HANSON : I think, for the member opposite's clarification, Bill 19, under the title "Secondary boycott agreements prohibited," reads:

"An

agreement between an employer and a trade union, express or implied, by

which the employer ceases or refrains, or agrees to cease or refrain

from

[ Page 1437 ]

handling, using, selling," — and we've added buying, I believe, in that

section — "transporting or otherwise dealing in the

products of any other employer or to cease doing business with any other person,

is void."

We've

removed, by the amendment which is already passed, "using the services

of." By removing that wording of "using the services of," it would

appear to be quite legitimate in the circumstances the member mentioned

under this section.

MR. GABELMANN : Then that would

be my

interpretation as well. Earlier on in the discussion — this is

still this afternoon — the minister said, and this is a paraphrase,

that the only intent of this

section was to prevent — and these are my

words — top-down organizing; that he wanted to make sure that plants or

factories or whatever, fabricating factories in particular, didn't feel

compelled to organize because they wouldn't be able to sell their

product unless they were union; that that was, as the minister at one

point said, the only intent of this section.

I don't

think he meant that, because the major intent of this

section is really

to deal with secondary boycotts and strike situations, and that's what

this

section is primarily all about. I want to shift the focus of the

debate on this

section to that subject now. We're talking about the

Famous Players case; we're talking about the Nikolai case and others,

many others. I want to ask the minister if he doesn't agree that in

labour relations a quick settlement isn't one of the most important

objectives.

HON. L. HANSON : The member referred to a

suggestion that it was only.... I don't think that was in the wording,

but we can find that out. I think that what the member is referring to

is the second

section of it where, let's say, as an example — and I

think this was an actual example — Pacific Press refused to carry the

ads of Famous Players theatres. Pacific Press was not part of the

dispute and, effectively, that would be not allowed under the new

legislation. Does that answer your question?

MR. GABELMANN :

No, the question was whether the minister didn't think it was a sound

objective of labour relations that a quick settlement be effected in

labour disputes. That was my question.

HON. L. HANSON :

As a philosophy, I have no difficulty in subscribing to the philosophy

of quick settlement of disputes. On the other side, I'd like to read

just a small

section of a judgment of the Labour Relations Board: "By

recognizing that the union may employ the hot unfair declaration to

serve as a broad interest, the board has accepted that the hot

declaration is a weapon of general use not restricted to particular

labour disputes."

Although the union had sought to organize

a place, the boycott or hot declaration was used as a weapon to

influence the employees to become organized, and that's what we, as a

philosophy, disagree with.

MR. GABELMANN : I

understand the point that there is an intent by the government to

prevent what we call top-down organizing, rather than bottom-up, where

the members freely determine they want to and there is no economic

imperative from outside. I understand that argument. I don't

necessarily agree with it, from a much greater philosophical argument

which I'm not going to get into now.

The question I want to

focus on now is.... After organizing is finished, and there is a union,

and there is an employer, and they are bargaining, and they fail to

reach an agreement in bargaining.... So either there is a strike or a

lockout in place. The point I want to deal with follows from that. It

seems obvious to some of us that there needs to be a balance between

the employer and the employee, between the employer and the union. If

there is no balance, in economic terms, the dispute will drag on. That

is one alternative. The other alternative is that somebody will get

drawn into signing an agreement that they can't really live with.

The

union has too much power. The employer may feel compelled to sign an

agreement that he can't really live with and may, in fact, jeopardize

his business as a result of that. So it is important not to give the

union too much power compared to the power the employer has. That is

the argument, in terms of a balance.

Similarly, on the

other side, you need to make sure the employer does not have too much

power either. What happens in disputes in small industries in

particular — we are talking here of employers with under 500 employees,

and often a dozen, or two or three — is that when the strike or lockout

commences and replacement workers are hired, the employer continues to

make money. Business goes on and continues to make money. The worker is

on the picket line, not making any money at all. There is no economic

pressure whatsoever on the employer — none, unless there is an ability

to persuade people not to do business with that employer.

One

of the ways you can persuade people not to do business with the

employer is to advise them of the fact that this particular employer is

on strike, and is employing scabs, and may do so for years, as in the

case of Dominion Motors. The strike started in 1968; it is still not

resolved, and never will be.

In the Famous Players case,

the agreement between Pacific Press and its unions allowed the Pacific

Press unions not to run an ad in a situation where Famous Players was

on strike, as a way of discouraging economic return to the employer. If

workers have no ability to prosecute their strike, they will lose the

strike. The scabs will become the permanent employees.

During

the late sixties and early seventies, there were literally dozens of

situations comparable to the Famous Players case, where a small group

of employees.... I remember A.B. Dick. Retail Wholesale organized A.B.

Dick, which is the duplicating company, a small company in Vancouver;

the company hired replacement workers and continued to make a profit.

The union workers were on the picket line going hungry; several years

went by and the strike was lost. Those people's jobs were lost forever,

and there were dozens and dozens of cases of that kind.

the labour movement, seeing that there was no economic balance between

management and labour — no neutrality, in economic terms — began to

develop tactics to try to bring some balance to the situation, and

developed things like the hot declaration. The first step was usually a

boycott, and then a hot declaration. The boycott, in case the minister

doesn't know, was a suggestion to people that they not purchase those

goods, or deal with that supplier, or have any business with that

particular company, but it was not a requirement that other union

people not use the goods or the services. That's what the hot

declaration was designed to do.

[ Page 1438 ]

The

hot declaration in British Columbia has been applied very rarely. It

was applied in the Famous Players case; it's been applied in perhaps a

couple of dozen other situations in the last 15 or so years since it

was developed. I used to be a staff person at the B.C. Federation of

Labour, and I remember the weeks-long discussions that would go on

prior to the application of a hot edict. Often the request from the

union for a hot edict was turned down, because it was a weapon to be

used only in rare circumstances. It has only been used in rare

circumstances to try to effect some reasonable balance between the

employer and the employee. If you don't have that balance, the employer

has no reason to settle, to deal with the employees whose jobs are at

stake. So the strike is lost, and the place becomes deunionized through

that activity. The hot declaration is simply a carefully chosen weapon.

If it was used too often, it wouldn't work. The labour movement knows

that, so they apply it very rarely. It is simply a device to try to

achieve some economic balance, given the fact that no law in British

Columbia prevents hiring replacement workers.

That would be

the solution. If we had a law saying that when a strike or a lockout is

in place, people are on strike and are locked out and that's it, the

place shuts down.... If we had the kind of provision in our labour law

that says no replacement workers can be hired, we wouldn't need this

section of the bill. But we have never been able to persuade

governments of either political party to bring in that kind of law.

They did in Quebec — in a modified way, but it's there. But we haven't

been able to persuade governments in this province to do that.

[3:30]

The

reason for doing it is to achieve balance and fairness between the

parties. When you have a

section such as the one under discussion now,

you take away the only weapon available to small groups of employees,

which is to be able to say to other people in other, organized

situations: "Don't handle these hot goods, or don't use these hot

services, because if you do, you will be putting money in the

employer's pocket, which will enable him to continue not to bargain."

If he continues not to bargain year after year, the strike will be lost

and the people will disappear. It happens frequently.

Now

we're going to have a law in place that will absolutely guarantee that

the democratic rights of people to organize a union, to bargain and to

reach a collective agreement will never happen in small situations.

Every employer, unless he's very enlightened, wants the union and likes

having a union, and then it's different, will now scab the strike —

replacement workers — and just refuse to bargain, or will go through

the motions, as has been done over the years, if the IRC demands that

there be some bargaining. The only weapon those workers have is the

ability to persuade colleagues to help them put some economic pressure

on the employer. The minister and the government have talked repeatedly

about this legislation being balanced and in favour of democratic

rights. Here is a

section that further destroys the balance, which we

don't even have now, between the employer and the employee.

The

employer has far more clout in situations such as Famous Players. This

legislation will take away any vestige of the employees' ability to

prosecute a strike.

MR. R. FRASER : You're off the subject.

MR. GABELMANN :

I'm not off the subject; I'm on 4.1 of the Labour Code, as amended,

which "prohibits secondary boycott agreements." In the Famous Players

situation, the Pacific Press unions' clause with Pacific Press — which,

incidentally, Pacific Press freely bargained with their unions; nobody

compelled Pacific Press to sign that clause; and then they had the gall

to go to court and try to get rid of it, and lost there too....

Nevertheless, that kind of agreement is now gone. Any agreement in

countless industries that enlists the support of other workers to help

provide balance between the employer and the employees is gone.

wonder if the minister can justify in a philosophical sense why he

would want to destroy attempts to get balance between the parties. That

balance would lead to shorter strikes, shorter lockouts and more

favourable industrial relations. This will lead to more disruption,

longer strikes, and the eventual collapse of the strike and of the jobs

— in effect, the elimination of the jobs of those people. And when

people begin to realize that that's happening, they won't, for fear of

this language, organize, which is supposedly their democratic right.

For fear of

section 4.1 of the new code, they will say: "We'd better

not organize, because if we do, we might get into a position where

we're locked out or go on strike, and then our jobs will be gone,

because we'll have no economic power whatsoever."

For the

government to say that this legislation is fair and balanced and

democratic is wrong on all counts, in this

section and in others, and

we'll get to them later. It's appalling that we would move in this kind

of direction when the trend in labour relations is in the other

direction, as we see in the Quebec example. I'd appreciate some

comments on the general point there.

HON. L. HANSON :

I guess the bigger question is what is balance or what is out of

balance in a particular situation — and I guess that depends on your

point of view. What I would like to point out to the member opposite is

that there is no law that says a boycott or hot edict can't be issued,

and, of course, people who support the dispute that is going on

certainly will withdraw their business. In the case of a theatre, if a

theatre is declared hot or whatever and picketed, I would suggest that

the amount of business that that theatre was able to do would drop off

to the point where it wasn't even viable to stay open, and to me that

is considerable economic pressure on an operation.

The

other thing that I'd like to point out to the hon. member is that

people can still be persuaded, through that system, not to deal with a

particular product or a particular organization, but with the new

legislation they can no longer be required to boycott it. I guess our

philosophy differs. We don't feel that that's fair.

MR. GABELMANN :

Let's talk about fairness for a moment. We have a multinational

company, such as Famous Players — I forget who owns them now; it could

be Coca-Cola or Gulf and Western, or somebody big; in any event, a

multinational company that has money coming in from sources all over

the world, probably, and certainly all over North America; they have a

collective agreement with employees in, let's say, British Columbia. I

don't think there's one agreement for the whole province, but let's

just say there is. Given what strikes and lockouts are all about —

exerting pressure on the other side so they'll come to the bargaining

table and reach an agreement — Famous Players, in this case,

[ Page 1439 ]

can

continue to use profits from all over the world to sustain the fact

that they're not making any profits in British Columbia, if the place

wasn't scabbed. So if it wasn't scabbed, if they didn't try to operate,

they still, even in that circumstance, have far more economic power

than the 200 or 300 people who are walking the picket line. Because

their revenues continue to come in, their balance sheet is hardly

affected.

The people who are walking the picket line have

no other income; they might get strike pay of $25 a week or so, or

another $5 per kid, or that kind of minimal assistance — not enough to

meet a mortgage. So even when it's not scabbed, there is an incredible

imbalance between the employer and the employee. If you had a balance,

the economic pain would be equal. But we go further with this case.

They continue to operate, and here in this province they continue to

make money. There is no economic pressure on them whatsoever. The

economic pressure on the union is immense, because the members are

making no money. After six months or so, what do they do?

Interjection.

MR. GABELMANN :

In that industry it's low wages to begin with — that's right. But let's

leave that aside; we're dealing with it in general terms.

There's

no balance whatsoever if the pain isn't equal. That's the point that's

being made. The ability to enforce the hot edict — and I agree with the

minister that you can still declare something hot; you just can't

enforce it — is a picket line. A picket line isn’t just somebody

walking up and down a sidewalk in front of a building. A picket line is

an effective tool, of whatever kind, that prevents the consumption of

the product or the service that's being provided behind the picket

line. The picket line can be an imaginary line; and when you impose a

"hot" declaration, that's what it is. It's still permissible, under the

amended legislation, for union members not to cross the picket line.

But if you think about the picket line as being more than just people

walking up and down in front of a theatre, but rather an effort to make

sure that people don't use the goods or services — which is really what

a picket line is — you're saying that part of that picket line can't be

crossed, the actual physical one; the people can cross it but they

can't be prosecuted for not crossing it, if they have a collective

agreement provision that allows them not to cross a picket line.... But

you're saying that the rest of the picket line, the invisible part of

the picket line, or the "hot" edict part of the picket line cannot be

honoured.

Interjection.

MR. GABELMANN :

The member for Vancouver South says: "No, he didn't." Yes, he did, and

so the language of the legislation says. If you have a clause in your

collective agreement which gives you the right not to cross a legal

picket line, you can do so under this legislation as it's amended, as I

read it. But if that picket line is in the form of a hot edict, you

can't refuse to cross it. That's what the new legislation says. That

takes all the power away from the small service sector and small

industries in particular. It's not a big deal when you come to the IWA

or to the pulp unions, the a government employees or whatever else;

that's not a tactic that's necessary for them. But it sure is for the

little guy. And for a government that talks about fairness, democracy,

balance and protecting the little guy, to bring in a law like this,

taking away all those rights, is really hypocritical, to put it mildly.

could go for a long time going through the Nikolai case, the decision

in the House of Lords on this question, which I think is classic law,

the Famous Players case, and a multitude of other stuff. I'm not going

to do it. I'd like to, but we've taken a considerable amount of time on

this section.

I just want to say in passing to the minister

and to the government House Leader that all the sections won't take

this much time, you can be sure. Some will take a bit more, but most

will not.

What I'm struggling to get from the minister is

some understanding that he violates some fundamental rights here: the

right to be able to go on strike. In the small industry and small

service sector, there will no longer be the right to strike and, in

effect, no longer the right to organize, because the implication of it

all at the end of the road is that you lose your job. I don't think the

minister understands that. I would hope that the reason we have this

legislation in place in this form is because he doesn't understand it

and that he would seriously consider taking some time, standing this

particular section, or using one mechanism or another — moving on to

estimates or something — so that we can deal with the issues here.

Because if the law stays as it is, that is the end of organizing in the

small sector of our economy, and it is the end of small unions in this

province. It's clear and simple.

[3:45]

Section 6 as amended approved on the following division:

YEAS — 30

Brummet

Savage

L. Hanson

Dueck

Michael

Pelton

Parker

Loenen

Crandall

De Jong

Rabbitt

Dirks

Witch

S. Hagen

Strachan

B.R. Smith

Couvelier

Davis

R. Fraser

Weisgerber

Jansen

Hewitt

Chalmers

Mowat

Ree

Serwa

Vant

S. D. Smith

Messmer

Huberts

NAYS — 19

Barnes

Marzari

Rose

Harcourt

Stupich

Skelly

Boone

D'Arcy

Gabelmann

Blencoe

Cashore

Smallwood

Lovick

Sihota

Miller

A. Hagen

Jones

Clark

Edwards

section 7.

HON. L. HANSON : Madam Chairman, I move the amendment standing on the order paper in my name. [See appendix.]

On the amendment.

[ Page 1440 ]

MR. GABELMANN : I'd like to ask the minister what his intent is in making the change suggested in (2)(

b) of the amendment.

HON. L. HANSON : Madam

Chairman, the intent — first of all, I'll read it: "activity by the

employee against the trade union contrary to this Act" — is that should

there be a trade union member who, against the union's wishes, takes

some action that is contrary to the act as it will be finally drafted,

it will allow the trade union to discipline its employee or its member,

even to the point of removing his union membership and causing his

termination or other disciplinary action by the employer.

MR. GABELMANN :

So what we basically have here is prohibitions on union discipline — in

effect, saying that the only areas where effective discipline can take

place relate to the paying of dues or the regular assessment of

initiation fees; and also if employees, contrary to the wishes of a

union, break the law of the province. Those are the only situations

where effective discipline . . .

[Mr. Weisgerber in the chair.]

Interjection.

MR. GABELMANN : Or the collective agreement, right.

. . . can take place. Is that right?

HON. L. HANSON :

Well, I think that's a hypothetical question. It certainly gives the

union the ability, when the member is acting contrary to this act, to

discipline them. I understand that the union has a number of internal

disciplines that are still available to it within the organization.

MR. GABELMANN : Would scabbing a lawful strike be considered activity by the employee contrary to this act against the trade union?

HON. L. HANSON : Are you suggesting that in the case of a lawful picket line and a member crossing it, is that illegal? Is that your question?

MR. GABELMANN : I thought the question was clear, but I'll try it again. If you scab a strike, can the union revoke your membership?

HON. L. HANSON : The answer to that is yes, the union can revoke the membership.

MR. GABELMANN : Does that mean in a closed shop that the job is lost, too?

HON. L. HANSON : No, it does not.

MR. GABELMANN :

Except for violations of the payment of periodic dues, assessments and

initiation fees, or activity against the union's interest that's legal,

there are no effective disciplines? The minister says he believes there

is. I'm not going to make a big to-do about this particular section.

What

we're really looking at is yet another interference in democratic

organizations in our society. It's really, for me, baffling that a

government that proclaims it wants to do this, that and the other to

get the government out of people's lives introduces legislation which

totally controls the way in which people in democratic organizations

govern their own lives.

I concede that there is a

legitimate debate about the question of losing your job as a result of

some action or activity against the interests of the union. 1 concede

there is a legitimate debate about that, and sometime perhaps we should

have it. But this goes far beyond that simple question.

it's the government's intent or their concern that there be proper,

fair, appropriate internal disciplinary procedures, why doesn't the law

say that? Why isn't this

section drafted in a way that requires due

process, fair application of discipline and proper procedures — all of

the questions that we would all agree should happen in a union, and do

happen in 99 percent of them? Why isn't the law drafted in a way that

calls for them to have a fair process, rather than determining the

rules in this way?

[4:00]

HON. L. HANSON :

I guess we're making an assumption that the unions within their

constitutions do have due process for disciplining their members. We've

been assured that it's a fair and democratic process.

MR. GABELMANN :

I don't think the minister understood me, Mr. Chairman. Let's just

start slowly through this. In the first place, virtually every union —

and there are exceptions, I concede — does have a fair disciplinary

process built into its constitution and bylaws and in fact its own

common law, as it were. There are exceptions, and if this legislation

is designed to deal with the exceptions, then it's going about it in

the wrong way. What the law could say, if this is a concern of the

government — and I concede that it is a concern — is that there must be

a process within the union that is fair and appropriate and has due

process and all of that. If you simply said that, and left the question

of what discipline could be about — the parameters of discipline — to

the union organization, you would achieve, I think, the goals you want,

unless there's a hidden agenda here that I don't quite understand.

HON. L. HANSON :

First of all, I assure the member there's no hidden agenda. We are

really only debating the amendment to the section, I believe. We are

putting in place the wording that the activity by an employee against

the trade union, contrary to this act, is an exemption where the

employee can be disciplined or lose his job as a result of it. We do

accept the fact that there are fair and reasonable disciplinary methods

within the union, and are not dealing with that.

MR. CLARK :

Those who have studied unions in British Columbia have indicated

clearly that they are among the most democratic in North America. I

can't believe that unionized employers would be happy with this kind of

clause, because unions perform a number of functions in society. One of

them is the orderly — not necessarily harmonious — resolution of

disputes before they fester. If you reduce the ability of the majority

to determine discipline of a few people over a wide range of issues,

then what you're saying to them, in a sense, is that the majority does

not have recourse to a kind of process that ensures the correct result

in terms of majority rule.

What you are inviting, I think,

is workers to take matters into their own hands. And workers will,

because if an individual scabs on a lawful strike and you take away

from the

[ Page 1441 ]

union

majority the decision to revoke the membership and therefore require

that individual to be discharged, then what is the remedy? What is the

remedy for the majority in that case? If there is no remedy and nothing

happens, you invite the other members of the minority potentially to

disobey the collective wishes of the majority. It seems to me that you

invite a kind of chaotic situation which invites industrial unrest and

disruption within units. I can think of many in my experience: large

pulp mills and others where a small minority of people disagree with

the majority view. When you limit the power of the unions, the

collective wishes of the majority to deal in a democratic way with

those kinds of individuals, I think you invite serious problems.

wonder if the minister has even thought about why that is, and whether

employers in fact have made these kinds of representations with respect

to the implications of weakening the ability of the majority to

discipline the minority.

HON. L. HANSON : I think the

question that was ultimately reached was whether I considered that, and

certainly I have in the drafting of the legislation.

would point out to the member — although I guess it's slightly off the

proposed amendment that we're debating — that the union does, through

its internal mechanism, have the ability to discipline its members. It

has recourse to all of the other remedies that anyone else has to

discipline its members. The only place we differ is that we don't

believe that internal disagreement within the union should in effect

cause the individual to lose his method of making a living.

MR. MILLER :

The amendment is really simply a rewording — or perhaps a better

wording — of the original proposal. The minister nods his head, so we

may simply be debating the section.

Section 5.1(2)(a):

failure by the employee to pay the periodic dues, assessments and

initiation fees required as a condition of acquiring or retaining

membership. I want to talk about that in relation to your explanation

that union bylaws, their constitutions, their methods of disciplining

their own members, remain intact; that this clause doesn't really

conflict with that. The first question is that

section (

a) does not

mention the word "fines." Most unions have, in their constitution

bylaws, a mechanism for a variety of fines in relation to the

seriousness of the offence or the breach of the bylaws committed. But

that is not included. Dues, of course, are obvious. Assessments

generally are levied in support of or for a particular purpose, either

to raise money for a defence fund or to send money to another union

that may be on strike. Initiation fees again are pretty straightforward.

The

whole question of fines that are levied as a result of an internal

hearing or a procedure that decides that a member has violated the

constitution to the extent that a fine is warranted is not covered. I

wonder if you could comment on that.

HON. L. HANSON :

As it reads and as the member has read it, I think he is quite right

that the failure by the employee to pay periodic dues and so on is a

reason that the employee could be terminated; but the application of a

fine, as it reads here, is not a reason that he should be denied

employment. There is no question that the union may deny membership,

but the question is: should it have the right to deny employment?

There

are some circumstances, I suppose, where, as prescribed in the act in

other areas, or except as prescribed in circumstances as allowed in the

act.... But if your question is — and I think it is — if there is a

fine for some contravention of the internal union workings, that fine

could not result in the employee losing his employment.

MR. MILLER :

I'm somewhat surprised, because I honestly didn't expect that response.

I thought the minister would agree that's a situation that should have

been covered. So what we have, then, is a clause that virtually allows

the bylaws or the constitution of an organization — in this case, a

trade union — freely adopted and voted on by that organization, to be

violated by any member of that organization, and no penalty can be

imposed. So we have, in a sense, a state of anarchy or a potential

state of anarchy that could exist in that organization.

really am concerned that this is something that does not apply to other

organizations. For example, I presume if you are a member of the bar

association and you violate a tenet.... I don't know whether they call

them bylaws or what they call them, but there was one I think in

relation to advertising. You weren't allowed to advertise. It is my

understanding that if you violated that bylaw of the bar association,

you could be fined, and that, I believe, is still the case. Yet you're

saying that a trade union can't have that same right. Am I correct in

this assumption?

HON. L. HANSON : No, I don't think

you're quite correct. As a matter of fact, I know you're not quite

correct. There is absolutely no reason why a trade union can't fine its

member. I am sure it has in its bylaws and constitution circumstances

where it can fine its members. All we're saying is that a decision to

fine its member and its member refusing to pay those fees is not in

itself a reason that the employer is obligated to relieve the employee

of his employment.

MR. MILLER : Will the minister

then explain or suggest how the trade union could possibly enforce its

bylaws with respect to any fine that they may wish to levy against a

member for a clear violation of the constitution? How can it be

enforced? What other mechanism exists?

HON. L. HANSON :

It can be enforced, the same as anyone else can enforce that sort of

thing, by civil action, garnisheeing, whatever. There is a method of

collecting the fine, and I think that unions, being the democratic

organizations that they are, have in their constitutions all sorts of

protections that they are able to discipline their members with, freely

agreed to among all the membership.

MR. RABBITT : Mr. Chairman....

Interjection.

MR. RABBITT :

I'll relinquish the floor in a few minutes, hon. member. To the

minister, I just received a phone call approximately an hour ago from a

former constituent, and he has related a problem that I would like to

get some direction on from you today. He is presently employed in the

lower mainland. He was informed verbally by his union that there will

be a picket line outside his place of employment next week, and that if

he crosses that picket line — an illegal picket line — he will be

suspended or fined. He will possibly have his union card revoked, and

the operation is a closed

[ Page 1442 ]

shop. This appears to be abuse and not use of a union's authority. What they are discussing....

MR. CHAIRMAN : Excuse me, Mr. Member. Is this relevant to the amendment?

MR. RABBITT : Yes, it is very relevant. The item I'm talking about is the specific thing we are talking about in this section.

The

question that was related to me and I am relating to the minister is

this: how will this legislation, specifically this

section of the bill,

protect him? I realize that there is a

section further on in the act —

I believe it's

section 70, which is also a transition

section of the

act.... Will this specific legislation cover an individual who wishes

to obey the law, rather than break the law?

[4:15]

HON. L. HANSON :

That is really the main part of

section 5, I guess, as opposed to

section 7. But it is in the act that in that circumstance the

individual would be protected.

MR. RABBITT : Supplementary to the minister. Will it be retroactive? Do I have that assurance?

MR. GABELMANN :

On this question I would just like to ask the minister and the member

for Yale-Lillooet.... He should read

section 5 of the existing Labour

Code, which has been in place for a long time: "...'unlawful industrial

action' means industrial action that is prohibited by or under this

Act. No trade union shall expel, suspend or impose a penalty...." So

when members of the House are asked questions by their constituents or

former constituents about how the law might affect them, it might be

useful, first of all, for those members to read the law.

MR. RABBITT :

Mr. Chairman, I was directing the question to Bill 19 and the amendment

that is before us. I was not asking the question about the existing

Labour Code.

HON. L. HANSON : The member opposite is

quite right. The new Industrial Relations Act, when it is proclaimed,

will protect that. But I would refer the member to

section 5 of the old

Code, which in fact does protect that and which is being carried

forward in substance to the new act.

MR. MILLER : I

hope the member for Yale-Lillooet would advise that person that

protection is there already. We don't really need a change in the

present act. I would hope he wouldn't fan the flames of anything now

that he has received that information.

Getting back to the

train of questioning I was conducting earlier in relation to the

union's ability to enforce its bylaws with respect to fines they might

levy, my own union's constitution has a line in there that effectively

says that assessments and fines are payable before dues. If the

minister understands what I am saying, it is that any money the

individual may put forward.... Let's say, for example, that the person

is fined $50 and the dues are $50, and he hands over the $50. That $50

goes for the assessment, and therefore the dues remain unpaid. Would

the minister confirm or not confirm that that type of arrangement is

quite legal, and would not be a contravention under this proposed

section of the act?

HON. L. HANSON : Mr. Chairman,

we're getting into a lot of hypothetical cases, and I guess that clause

in the union's agreement would be.... If the employee agreed to the

fine, there'd certainly be no difficulty, because he would authorize

the employer — if he wished to do it that way, and not pay it — to

deduct so much of his money and pay it to the union, as a result of

that fine. But I guess it would be wrong to assume that if the union,

which had taken these periodic payments each month for 100 years as

their monthly dues, all of a sudden said that because of a fine, this

normal monthly payment that would come forward is not dues this month,

it's a fine.... I would think that the adjudication division would find

it difficult to accept that as his not having paid his dues, but it

would be subject to the jurisprudence that would eventually be evolved

through the board.

MR. MILLER : Mr. Chairman, going

back just a touch, when people.... I'm really talking about industrial

applications here, where membership in the union is a requirement of

employment. In other words, after the 30-day probationary period

required by most employers, that individual is required, as a condition

of employment, to join the union, and in so doing.... It takes a

variety of forms, but the person signs an undertaking to abide by the

constitutional bylaws. They often appear before the general assembly of

the union — the monthly meeting — and come up to the front. There's a

little ceremony, in terms of a swearing-in, and they agree to accept

the conditions laid out in the constitution and bylaws — again, bylaws

that have been arrived at quite democratically, because in my own case,

they can't be changed, except with a two-thirds majority vote.

the bylaws are generally a fairly carefully watched item in terms of

the internal workings of a union. Nonetheless, the person agrees that

they will abide by those bylaws. Now in there, it clearly spells out

that that's the case — that assessments and fines are payable before

dues — so they are agreeing to that at the time.

So with

that understanding, why would that kind of provision be a

contravention, and why wouldn't the minister agree to it? Because it

seems to me that when we talk about the ability to enforce, that would

provide a very stable way for trade unions to enforce those kinds of

bylaws. After all, in society generally we have a variety of

methods.... Even under this act there are a variety of penalties

imposed if an individual or a person — let's use the word "person" —

contravenes a

section of the act, and that applies right throughout

whatever we do. I mean, if we park in the wrong spot, we could be towed

away, we have to pay the towing fee, and we could get a parking ticket.

So I wonder why the same consideration cannot be afforded to the trade

union in their pursuit of enforcing their bylaws, which — and maybe I'm

repeating this too much — have been freely arrived at through a very,

very democratic process.

HON. L. HANSON : Mr.

Chairman, again we're dealing with a hypothetical case. I'm sure that

that case will come up someday, if the member is suggesting that that

is a circumstance, and I guess the board — we'll call it the board for

the time being — would eventually make a decision that dues that had

been collected over a period of time and were obviously for that

purpose all of a sudden become part of a fine, and the dues are still

payable. They would determine if that was a fair and reasonable

circumstance, and that in fact the dues had not been paid.

[ Page 1443 ]

But

I want to emphasize that we're not interested in how the fines are

collected. What we're interested in ensuring is that people do not lose

their jobs because of non-payment of a fine, which is not a uniform

assessment. The jurisprudence that evolves around the circumstance that

you're talking about may decide that if that clause is in the bylaws of

the union, in fact the dues were not paid. Not being a person offering

legal advice, my opinion is that that would not construe a non-payment

of dues. If the dues had been collected in a certain manner, over a

period of time, and a precedent established, all of a sudden they're

applied to a fine, and the dues haven't been paid. I would find that a

little hard to accept. But it would be decided eventually. I think the

circumstances of the case would have to be considered.

MR. MILLER :

I guess our purpose in these clause-by-clause debates is to determine

the meaning of particular clauses: why they've been brought in; what

their intended purpose is, and how they will apply. I think it's

entirely reasonable for us to ask the kinds of questions I've been

pursuing, which I don't think are particularly complex, and to get a

reasonable answer about what the intent is. You say there is no legal

opinion on whether the situation I described....

Interjection.

MR. MILLER :

Oh, you said you didn't offer one. Well, perhaps there is one. Maybe

you'd like to offer it; I'll gladly sit down if you want to. Is the

minister agreeing to stand up or not? Well, I'll have to continue this.

First

of all, I'll use your phrase, "I'm not a lawyer." So I'm not certain as

to the enforceability or the applicability or what happens when a union

tries to use the courts to enforce their bylaws. Maybe the minister is

more familiar, and he might want to enlighten me about that. My feeling

is that it's probably a fairly difficult process. Yet quite often,

fines are levied or penalties are imposed, not because of some desire

to penalize someone who's different, who doesn't agree with the

majority.

I think you have to recognize that unions are

pretty responsible groups when it comes to that. After all,

organizations that have spent really most of their time defending

people find it very difficult to have a shift of focus and put

themselves in the role of penalizing people. There's always a pretty

hot and heavy debate before this kind of thing takes place. There are

also appeal mechanisms, at least in my union, that give a wide avenue

of appeal to penalties that may have been imposed. Quite often the

penalty may have been imposed as a result of an activity that took

place that in fact endangered someone's life. That's clearly spelled

out in the constitution; I refer to mine, because I know it better.

There's a

section in there that says we're responsible for each other,

and if we violate that in any way, particularly on the job, through

reckless behaviour, the union through their bylaws has the ability to

correct that behaviour.

Yet if we get into a situation

where that becomes an unenforceable situation, it seems to me you've

taken away maybe not all of the safety opportunities that exist on the

job, but certainly one of them. I can recall instances — in fact, I

remember arguing strongly against my own union at one point because an

employee had conducted a terribly unsafe act that could have resulted

in many deaths, and fortunately didn't. As a result of that, the union

felt quite strongly and advised the employer that that person should be

suspended, and the employer acquiesced. It wasn't anything that was

written down anywhere; it was just a deep concern — and it corrected

the situation. We didn't have a repeat with that person. It wasn't a

long suspension, but it was enough to teach a lesson. That kind of

activity, I think, would be denied now under this section. I think

that's an important loss; that policing mechanism is simply being taken

away.

[4:30]

Yet I get the feeling that this clause has been inserted somehow

because of other arguments that have been used: the one that the member

for Yale-Lillooet (Mr. Rabbitt) was attempting to put — that is, that

the union says, "If you don't do what you're told, we're going to get

you." Quite often, there's a real reason why these situations exist.

I'd hate to see a watering down or a taking away of the right of a

group of people to exercise self-discipline, and that's really what it

is. That really wasn't a question, it was more of a statement, but it

expressed my concern about what I see as a loss as a result of the

inclusion of this clause.

HON. L. HANSON : There is

nothing that I know of in the old act or the new act that precludes a

person whom the union recognizes as being a danger in the workplace and

the employer recognizes as being a danger in the workplace from

releasing that employee. There is nothing that requires that. What

we're saying in the act is: "No trade union and no person acting on

behalf of a trade union shall require an employer to terminate the

employment of an employee or otherwise discriminate ... in regard to

employment or condition of employment..." because of the following.

circumstances like you're talking about, which are to the benefit of

everyone in the workplace, the employer included, I see no difficulty

in that happening or any exclusion in the act.

MR. CLARK :

The second member for Kamloops (Mr. S.D. Smith) and I were discussing

this question, and I'm sorry he had to catch a plane to Kamloops;

otherwise he could have asked this.

If a union and a

company enter into a collective agreement that states that it is a

requirement under that collective agreement to be a member of the union

if you work in the bargaining unit, and if a trade union, through its

bylaws, decides to expel that member from the trade union, then is the

employer required to discharge that individual?

So the

second member for Kamloops and I are wrong. The revoking of a

membership, even if it's in the collective agreement.... The clause

that's in almost every collective agreement that I've ever seen says

that it is a requirement to be a member of the trade union to work for

that company. It's not a closed shop; it's a union shop clause which

simply says you have to be a member of the union. If that person is no

longer a member because he has been expelled by due process, then that

section of the collective agreement is void essentially. Is that

correct?

HON. L. HANSON : Essentially I believe the

member has an understanding all right, but subsection (1) does not

apply. First of all, 5.1(1) reads:

"No trade union and no person acting on behalf of a trade union shall require an employer to terminate

[ Page 1444 ]

the employment of an employee, or otherwise to discriminate against

an employee in regard to employment or a condition of employment, because the

employee has been expelled or suspended from membership in the trade union,

or because membership in the trade union has been denied or withheld from that

employee.

"(2)

Subsection (1) does not apply where the expulsion or suspension from

membership, or the denial or withholding of membership, was occasioned

by (

a) failure ... to pay ... dues, assessments ... or (

b) activity by

the employee ... contrary to this Act."

MR. GABELMANN :

The answer we get from the minister is that he reads the section. We've

been reading the

section for how long — since Monday afternoon? We're

not going to take a long time with this particular

section — in fact I

think we're close to finishing it — but I think the point needs to be

made that when government members deny that we're moving towards

right-to-work in British Columbia, they should read this

section each

time they feel like saying that, because this is a step toward

right-to-work laws.

If there is any mystification about

that, it's clear that except for those grounds so listed in sub (2), a

union shop will no longer be a union shop if a group of employees

decides to deliberately flout union rules in the constitution of the

union, and are therefore expelled from the union. They keep their jobs

without belonging to the union in a union shop. That's not the full

concept of right-to-work, but that is more than just opening the door.

The door is fairly wide open, and that can be manipulated. Employers

can hire.... In a union shop, the employer has control over hiring, as

long as there's no recall list on the seniority list and all of that.

The employer can hire persons who may be anti-union; when they're hired

they will be required, after their probationary period — normally 30

days — to join the union. They can then undertake some action or

activity for which the union by majority decision feels compelled to

discipline these people.

AN HON. MEMBER : They have to pay dues.

MR. GABELMANN :

They have to pay dues, yes; no question of that. They have to pay

assessments as well. They might take some other activity. I'm just

setting up a situation which is hypothetical right now but won't be

hypothetical for long. These employees — and there could eventually be

a large group of them — will continue to work in a shop that has been

determined to be a union shop (

a) by the majority of the membership or

bargaining unit and (

b) by a freely negotiated agreement with the

employer, and in fact it isn't a union shop anymore. There are a group

of employees whose jobs are protected, who are actively campaigning or

working against the interests of the union, and they're working side by

side. Can you imagine what tension is going to exist between those

groups of employees — the union members and the non-union members

working in a union shop? Can you imagine the kind of industrial chaos

that could eventually follow from such tension and such anger?

I'm

going to say something that I want to be very careful about, because

it's treading difficult ground, always being careful not to predict

things that are bad, to predict violence, to predict events; because

sometimes the mere fact of the prediction adds to its coming true. I'm

very careful about that. But I will predict that in a few years —

because it will take a few years — if this provision remains in place,

there will be in workplaces such animosity and such confrontation

between workers that it will impair the ability of that union and that

employer to have a meaningful and productive relationship. I make that

prediction with confidence. I'm not spelling out the kinds of things

that could happen, and inevitably will happen, in terms of the way

people treat each other in those situations. By this particular

provision, the minister is opening up, not this year and probably not

next year, but in the years to come, if the government is given a

second term, and we aren't elected to be able to repeal this.... Given

a few years, there will be pools of anti-union employees working in

union shops, and the damage to industrial relations and the damage to

that employer's productivity will be untold. I don't believe the

government can comprehend just how bitterly people will feel towards

each other in those workplaces.

I suspect that the

government is determined to plow through with this stuff; but just keep

an eye on this over the next little while, and I predict you'll be

forced to come in with amendments. This move toward right-to-work will

not be tolerated in this province.

MRS. BOONE : I think my colleague from North Island has made some very valid points there, ones that I hope the minister listens to.

have some very direct questions to the minister. If in a case where a

union employee is suspended or denied membership.... He's not listening.

the trade union has terminated, the membership of an employee in the

trade union, and that member is still allowed to work with the

employer, do you see that employee still paying dues to the union?

Would they still pay dues to a union, even after they'd been suspended

and expelled from that union?

HON. L. HANSON : I

guess the simple answer is no, because it's difficult to understand how

someone who is expelled from union membership could be expected to pay

union dues.

MRS. BOONE : If the unionized employee

has been terminated and has quit paying his union dues, would the

employer be forced to terminate employment? In this act you state that

failure to pay dues would be a reason for dismissal.

HON. L. HANSON : I think the member is forgetting that, first of all, he's no longer a union member because he has been expelled.

MR. LDVICK : Except what about paying members as a condition of employment? What about a closed shop?

MR. CHAIRMAN : Would you care to stand, hon. member?

MRS. BOONE :

I don't understand where the minister is coming from on this. The union

has terminated the unionized person's membership — has taken away that

membership — and that employee still maintains employment. He no longer

pays dues. The act specifically says that you can — or must — fire

somebody who fails to pay periodic dues. Surely the act is quite clear

on that: that if that person stops paying dues, then that person must

be fired by the employer. The minister

[ Page 1445 ]

shakes

his head "no." The non-union person is now working in the place. He's

not paying dues. Who negotiates for this person? Is this person then

working in a shop? Does he have the same conditions? Does he have the

same employment? What conditions is that person working under when he

is now one person in a unionized place that has conditions of

employment worked through for him by his union?

HON. L. HANSON : First of all, Madam Member, there are other jurisdictions that have this and we haven't any examples of such drastic action.

any case, the person has been expelled from union membership. He hasn't

quit union membership; he hasn't resigned from union membership; he has

been expelled from union membership. If the union should say: "We lift

your expulsion and you come back into the union," and he refuses and

doesn't pay dues, he would be expelled and terminated.

[4:45]

MRS. BOONE :

This is incredible. I'm getting that the minister is able to twist

things any which way he wants to in this. Just in reading the first

three sections — the sections that we've gone through today — in two

areas you have negated or made void sections of contracts that people

have negotiated. In the previous

section you voided — and it's stated

right in the act — a negotiated part of a contract. Now you are doing

it. Although you don't actually state it, you are making void a

negotiated part of a contract. For the government to even pretend that

this is not anti-union legislation, that the intent — and the sole

intent — of every

section of this legislation, including this

section

here, is to non-unionize the sector out there, to make every area

non-union, to give everybody the opportunity to get out of the union,

they are just covering their eyes and putting their heads in the sand.

This is absolute garbage.

MR. LOVICK : I was

listening very carefully to that interchange of a few minutes ago, and

in order to be entirely sure that I have my facts correct, let me just

run through this argument as we heard it.

We have created a

scenario that the minister has gone along with which says that an

individual is expelled by the membership. As a result of that

expulsion, the member no longer pays dues to the union. However, the

contract governing the workplace demands a union shop, whereby

membership in the union is a condition of employment. First, is the

minister telling us that that is not the case, and that in fact if

somebody is expelled from the union, that individual still must pay

dues or some such thing? How can that work? Let's start with that

question.

HON. L. HANSON : If in a closed shop or a

union shop the union expels the member from unionship — remember he has

been there, and he has joined the union, and he is paying dues and

everything — that is not in itself, subject to these other reasons, a

thing that would trigger the requirement for the employer to dismiss

him. The union has all of the remedies within its own contract to

discipline the member. And if he was expelled from membership and that

expelling action was raised and they said, "Come on back into the

union," and he refused, there is no question that then he would be

subject to paying dues and would be fired out of the union.

MR. LOVICK : The question, though, is: is this in effect the end of a union shop?

Interjection.

MR. LOVICK :

No, wait a minute. Let me try it again. The minister says no, but I am

suggesting by definition that it is the end of a union shop. Look, a

union shop by definition is one that says: "Membership in ... is a

condition of employment." We have just listened to the minister sketch

out a scenario in which he tells us that an individual can be a

nonmember of the union, having been expelled, and apparently, subject

to the discretion of the employer, may not have to pay dues. I suggest

to you that if you are not paying dues in a union shop, then it is no

longer a union shop. Not true?

HON. L. HANSON : No,

that isn't true. What we are saying — and I guess I will have to say it

again — is that it is a union shop. Everybody is in the union, and

there is a requirement to be in the union. For some reason, there is a

member of that union expelled. If the reasons are not contrary to the

ones here, that is not in itself a reason that the employer must

dismiss that employee.

Interjection.

HON. L. HANSON : But the member is willing to be a union member. He wasn't by his own volition expelled.

MR. LOVICK :

Obviously the ghost of Orwell walks. With all due respect, Mr.

Minister, that's newspeak. That is really newspeak. What you have just

told us in effect is, well, it is a union shop, but the normal means of

defining a union shop don't obtain in this case. But it is still a

union shop. I would suggest to the minister that he review the record

of that brief interchange of opinion from the last five minutes, and he

will see that that is indeed the case.

That's what leads me

to my point. I wanted first to ask those few questions to determine

whether my ears indeed were still functioning. I am afraid that what we

are dealing with here is probably the most insidious and frightening

thing of all. Certainly it is going to be perceived to be so in the

minds of the trade union movement. For years we have had discussions

about something called right-to-work. We have heard about that for

years. Always at Social Credit conventions, as long as I have been

reading newspapers, the tide has apparently been turned back. Reason

prevailed, sanity was triumphant, and there was going to be no

right-to-work. I for one have always felt: good for you guys. In some

small wise, at least, you are coming to your senses; you are doing

something intelligent. I've always been pleased by that.

However,

what we have sketched out here before us is very clearly a prescription

for precisely that kind of thing to happen. It is quite possible, given

this particular

section of the Code,

section 5, the restrictions of

discriminatory practices, to have a group of people working within a

union shop no longer paying dues — still getting the benefits of

membership, by the way — who can spend all of their time telling the

rest of the workers in the shop: "You guys really ought to get out of

this union." Of course, in time what can happen is that that group of

individuals can become the majority of workers, and what we know will

then happen is that some kind of decertification vote will occur. The

whole concept of

[ Page 1446 ]

union

and non-union working together, where union membership in fact becomes

entirely voluntary, is again anybody's classic definition of

right-to-work.

Do you not see what I am getting at, Mr.

Minister? I'm getting at why it is the case that the trade union

movement is going to rise up in righteous indignation and say: "Look,

this is precisely what we are getting here. This is precisely what we

suspected this government was up to all along."

I dearly

wish I could be proven wrong in those assertions, Mr. Chairman. I

dearly wish that were the case. However, having some capacity to read

conclusions are absolutely correct, and I would challenge the minister

to demonstrate to us where we're wrong.

Amendment approved on the following division:

YEAS — 26

Veitch

S. Hagen

Strachan

B.R. Smith

Couvelier

R. Fraser

Hewitt

Gran

Chalmers

Mowat

Brummet

Savage

L. Hanson

Dueck

Michael

Pelton

Loenen

Crandall

De Jong

Rabbitt

Dirks

Ree

Serwa

Vant

Huberts

Messmer

NAYS — 15

Barnes

Marzari

Rose

Stupich

Boone

D'Arcy

Gabelmann

Clark

Jones

A. Hagen

Miller

Sihota

Williams

Lovick

Cashore

Section 7 as amended approved.

section 8.

HON. L. HANSON : Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment to

section 8 tabled earlier today in my name.

MR. GABELMANN :

First of all, Mr. Chairman, can I get the procedure clarified? At this

point we're debating an amendment to an amendment. Or are we debating

an amendment to the original...? Are we going to debate these as two

separate amendments, or are we debating an amendment to an amendment?

[5:00]

HON. MR. STRACHAN :

In response to the member's question, Mr. Chairman, there is only one

amendment to

section 8. There are no amendments on the order paper,

only an amendment tabled by the minister earlier today. So the

amendment we would deal with right now, and the only amendment, is the

one tabled earlier today.

MR. GABELMANN : That's right, Mr. Chairman. It's my mistake, and I apologize.

On the amendment.

MR. GABELMANN : This is an

amendment that was introduced at 2:30 today. It came out of last

night's cabinet meeting and relates to some apparent activity that

might take place next Monday. Am I correct so far, Mr. Minister?

HON. L. HANSON :

The

section we're dealing with is

section 8, and it's entitled "Duty of

fair representation." The

section requires a union or council of

unions, or an employers' organization, not to act in a manner that is

arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. The amendment proposed is to

add subsections (3) and (4), which require that a union or employers'

organization must carry out its responsibility in a fair and lawful

manner. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that parties, either

trade unions or employer organizations, who are given powers and

authorities over individuals, must discharge those responsibilities in

both a fair and lawful manner.

[Mrs. Gran in the chair.]

union or an employers' organization cannot discharge its duty of

representation if it advocates or counsels, or leads its members into,

an unlawful activity. We have witnessed trade unions placing extreme

pressure on their members to participate in unlawful activity. Those

members deserve protection or representation that is both fair and

lawful. To quote the gentleman often quoted, Mr. Weiler, he stated in

his book Reconcilable Differences :

"While the trade union may represent the employees as a result of their

majority vote, it is not in a position to govern them." The amendments

section 8 are clearly stated: the obligations to represent are

obligations to represent within the law.

MR. GABELMANN :

Before we deal with the main point of this amendment, which I think is

in (4), I want to ask the minister why trade unions are compelled to

act fairly, why councils of trade unions are compelled to act fairly

and why employers' organizations are compelled to act fairly, but

employers aren't.

HON. L. HANSON : Madam Chairman, employers are required to act fairly; there are other sections of the Code dealing with that.

MR. GABELMANN :

Here we're dealing with

section 7 of the Code, which is entitled "Duty

of fair representation". Parts of it have been there since 1973-74 —

proposed amendments, about which we will talk in a few minutes. This

section wasn't going to give us a long debate; there were some points

we wanted to make in terms of that, and it wasn't a long debate. But

what we've entered into here now is something far more significant.

We've not had much time to consider the implications of this section,

given the fact that we're debating other sections and attempting to

understand this one at the same time. Clearly, if this is the "duty of

fair representation"

section of the Code, then duty of fair

representation should apply equitably and evenly. It applies to unions,

to councils of trade unions and to accredited employers' organizations,

presumably — although those aren't the words used to describe

employers' organizations — but not to employers. Why not?

HON. L. HANSON : I think I should point out to the hon. member opposite that an employer does not have a duty of

[ Page 1447 ]

representation

other than of himself. We're dealing with those organizations that have

a representation responsibility to a constituency. Therefore, the

wording is "union," "council of unions" or "employers' organization,"

which are all representative bodies.

MR. GABELMANN :

I understand that, but I want to suggest, before we get into the debate

we have to have on (4).... In effect, what (4) says, without reading

it, is that any person can go to the Industrial Relations Council, if

that person feels that somebody in a trade union, council of unions or

employers' organization is going to break the law, and get a judgment

from the council ahead of time, before the law is broken. But if

somebody perceives that an employer is going to break the law, they

can't go.

HON. L. HANSON : I believe that an employer is also in the definition of "person."

MR. GABELMANN :

Madam Chairman, in question period today I suggested a reason why the

minister should be divested of one part of his portfolio; this is

another reason for divesting him of this portfolio. He doesn't know

what he's talking about.

A "person" can be an employer,

under definition. But it's the person who goes to the IRC to lodge a

complaint. That can be an employer — no question. But you can't lodge a

complaint about an employer who may be about to break the law. That's

the question I'm asking. A person — an individual, a trade union, an

employer, anybody — can go to the Industrial Relations Council and say:

"I perceive that next week a law is going to be broken by a trade

union, a council of unions or an employers' organization. I perceive

that one of those three groups is going to go and break a law next

week, and I ask you to tell them they can't break a law." But if a

person perceives that an employer — singular — is going to break a law

next week, he can't go and get a judgment.

It is so

symbolic of this whole insidious legislation. From beginning to end, it

takes the employer's side in every single respect, and does whatever it

can to put the employees down, in a position where they have no

strength, no rights, no nothing. The words aren't particularly

important here, except that they are so symbolic of this government's

attitude towards workers and their organizations; and so determined to

do everything they can in favour of the employer that they even write a

section like this. Where an apprehended lawbreaking might take place,

it's only if it's a trade union or an employers' organization or a

council of trade unions. But if somebody perceives that an employer is

going to break the law — go to it!

I'm not suggesting that

this

section would be remedied by adding the word "employer." The whole

section cannot be remedied, because it's a bad section. But we'll get

to that debate in a minute; I want to pursue this point first. How is

it that no one can go to the IRC for a declaration to prevent an

employer from breaking the law next week?

HON. L. HANSON :

I have to point out to the member opposite that the title of this

section is "fair representation." Representation means bodies that are

representing a constituency. We're ensuring in this act that those

bodies that represent a constituency act in a lawful manner.

MR. GABELMANN :

Just because the

section is entitled "Duty of fair representation"

doesn't mean the contents of the

section have anything to do with that

issue.

What we have here is an amendment that was scribbled

together, coming out of the cabinet chamber last night, at an emergency

cabinet meeting; no consideration; certainly no consultation; no real

thought. I can see them saying: "Let's find a

section of the Code where

we can add a

section that will make activities illegal such as next

Monday's activity, if it comes off."

AN HON. MEMBER : Before the fact.

MR. GABELMANN : Before the fact.

Given

other sections of this legislation, one person can go to the IRC, get a

declaration that the activity is illegal, and have it filed in the

Supreme Court; and everybody who might take such action as is being

proposed is in violation of a Supreme Court order — in contempt of

court. That's what you've done here.

[5:15]

Once the remedies of taking all the assets and the financial

wherewithal of unions is complete, and you've got all of their assets,

through this process, the next step is jail. Madam Chair, there are not

enough jails in this country to keep all of the people who will be in

violation of this kind of legislation incarcerated. It will do great

wonders for our economy and our construction workers, because we will

be building jails to hold thousands and thousands of people, if this

kind of law is allowed to go through. You invite lawlessness in a

society that is built on a foundation of respect for law. You invite

lawlessness by this kind of activity.

It is never good

law when it is written in the heat of the moment, after a long day at

work, at a night meeting, hastily scribbled together and introduced the

following day. Some of us have a rule about reacting to certain

situations by saying we'll sleep on it before reacting. In this case,

the government comes in with a law that invites disrespect for law and

will not solve the problem. What will happen is what the minister

predicted in his letter to the Premier dated February 28 of this year —

the Australian example. In that letter — and I paraphrase because I

didn't memorize it — he suggested to the Premier that making strikes

illegal, as they did in Australia, doesn't prevent strikes, it just

makes them illegal. If the minister or the government think they will

be stopped by making an opportunity for such demonstration