Manitoba Hansard — 5 May 1980 (Sitting 51B, 31st Legislature, 4th Session)

31-4-51b

Manitoba — Debates (Hansard)

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF MANITOBA Monday, 5 May, 1980 Time - 8:00 p.m. CONCURRENT COMMITTEES OF SUPPLY SUPPLY - CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS AND ENVIRONMENT MR. CHAIRMAN, Morris McGregor (Virden): I call the committee to order. Resolution 38, 5.(c)(1)- pass - the Member for Ste. Rose. MR. A.R. (Pete) ADAM: I would like to bring the matter up of the dam that was constructed in order to provide water for the town of Grandview. There has been some environmental problems there for quite some time that have been longstand ing. Studies were made in regard to this. HON. WARNER H.

JORGENSON (Morris): wonder if my honourable could tell me again where that dam has been constructed, and for what town. MR. ADAM: For the town of Grandview. MR. JORGENSON: Grandview. MR. ADAM: Reports on the impoundment of water from the Valley River, I believe, to provide water for the town of Grandview; nobody objects to the town of Grand view having an adequate water supply. There has been some problems associated with the dam, however, in regard to farmlands being flooded out. There have been some problems because of the dam.

Lands upstream are being flooded and the flooding really got started after the height of the dam was raised. They have been given a licence. The licence states that the elevation at the top of the works shall not exceed elevation 13 97.0 feet at any time. A spillway not less than 10 feet in width shall be cut through the midp oint of the wor ks. The overflow crest elevation of this spillway shall not exceed 13 95. That is, I guess, the 10-feet wide cut would be two feet lower than the top of the dam.

During the period from April 1 to September 1 of any year, in my opinion, and I am reading from a copy of a letter from Mr. Moffatt, the engineer ... MR. JORGENSON: The engineer? MR. ADAM: From the Water Resources, a regional engineer. MR. JORGENSON: I wonder if my honourable friend is raising a Water Resources problem and not an environmental problem. MR. ADAM: I am going to get to that. There are two problems: One, the environmental problem that we are flooding land. MR. JORGENSON: That is not an environmental problem. That will be a Water Resources problem. MR. ADAM: Okay.

The second problem is definitely environmental, because every year they raise the level of the dam. They are allowed to increase it from April to September. The Minister says, In my opinion, if the dam was 13 95.0 feet for the entire width of the structure, levels upstream would be lowered significantly. Now, the problem that this raises is that every year they keep adding dirt onto the dam, that extra two feet, and then one either . . . MR. JORGENSON: I wonder if my honourable friend could get to the environmental portion of it. MR.

ADAM: Well, this is the Environment; they keep putting dirt on it every year and every year it gets washed downstream into the water. MR. JORGENSON: It's still a Water Resources' problem. MR. ADAM: But it seems to me that the Environmental people should be interested in what's happening to the riverbed, that it's filling up the riverbed, and they keep putting dirt on every year .. MR. JORGENSON: That still, Mr. Chairman, is a Water Resources' problem. It is my understanding that this matter has been hand led by Water Resources. It's even gone as far as the Ombudsman. MR. ADAM: Yes, it has. MR.

JORGENSON: We haven't had anything to do with it in the past, other than providing advice to the Water Resources' people on Environmental matters. MR. ADAM: That's right and this is one of them. MR. JORGENSON: But I still don't see where you have raised an environmental question. I don't want to preclude you from raising a legitimate environmental issue, but I would like to know what that issue is. MR. ADAM: Yes, well, there is a paragraphing here that mentions the environmental problems. They refer to it as environmental problems, the Water Resources' people do. MR. JORGENSON: And they are? MR.

ADAM: Yes, they refer to the problem of the washing out of the dirt every year is going to cause serious environmental problems unless they find some other method of holding the water that they require, or make some different designs and that. They do say that this is going to be a serious environmental problem in the future. Mr. Chairman, if the Minister says it's not an environmental problem and the Water Resources says it is, then we have a dilemma. 3257

Monday, 5 May, 1980 MR. JORGENSON: Only to the extent that if an environmental matter is raised , then we are consulted, but the silting of that dam is still a Water Resources' problem and has been dealt with as such. MR. ADAM: Perhaps they haven't raised it yet with the' Environmental people, I don't know, but it's time that it was raised and that's why I'm raising it here, because I know that it is mentioned in the reports that there is a problem and there is going to be a serious problem of silting on the river if this is allowed to continue. MR. JORGENSON: I thank my honourable friend for raising this matter.

We'll look at it. MR. CHAIRMAN: 5.(cX 1) - the Member for Ste. Rose. MR. ADAM: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Minister is prepared to look into this . . . MR. JORGENSON: I've just said so. MR. ADAM: Yes, okay, thank you very much. MR. CHAIRMAN: The Member for St. George. MR. BILLIE URUSKI: Thank you, Mr.

Chairman. wanted to raise an issue in this connection - it's about two years old - that deals with a community in my constituency of Fisher Branch, where there happened to be a gasoline spill which contaminated the waters of the community; in fact, so much so that residents of a home within the community of Fisher Branch had to be evacuated for several weeks as a result of the gasoline flowing into the sump area and posing a danger to the family. Subsequent to the cleaning up of the spill - and I think that's been the problem - it never has been determined who or what was the actual cause.

They know what the element was, and that was namely gasoline, but from from which tank because there were a number of tanks within the community that were found to be rather not quite up to standard, I believe, but it was never mentioned to the residents of the commun ity whether the department determined the source of the pollution and whether the department was able to recoup any of the costs that it undertook in terms of the cleanup of the spill within the community and what actions subsequently were taken by the department.

I would assume that the department was actively involved in this, that a determination would have been made of the cause of the spill and which tank was involved in the spill. However, was the government able to collect some of its costs incurred in this area? What has really happened since that time? MR. JORGENSON: Mr. Chairman, I'm just attempting to get the name of that particular service station that we have found, and I might say that their court cases are pending now. We have laid charges. MR. URUSKI: You have laid charges? MR. JOGENSON: Yes, in an effort to collect the damages.

It is now before the courts so I can't comment any further on that. MR. URUSKI: I see, okay . . MR. CHAIRMAN: I would like to recognize each member in turn. When we're jumping in, I don't know how the recording machine can . The Member for St. George. MR. URUSKI: Likely it's the service station that was very close to the residents involved. I am making that assumption because that's where most of the activity was undertaken by the department. If that's the case and it is before the courts now, I will desist in ... MR. CHAIRMAN: 5.(c)( 1) - the Member for Churchill. MR. JAY COWAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

Before the break we were just briefly discussing the lead and ambient air survey that is going to be conducted this summer in regard to the pollution that has been found in some areas around lead smelters. I would ask the Minister if the only two sources that are being checked are Canadian Bronze and North West Smelting. Am I correct in that assumption? MR. JORGENSON: Three. MR. COWAN: Three, and Canada Metals would be included in that? MR. JORGENSON: Yes. MR. COWAN: The Minister, Mr.

Chairperson, indicates that Canada Metals would be included in that and I am aware of a report that was done by a student at the University of Manitoba last year in regard to testing lead and soil surveys. I would ask the Minister if he has been advised of the contents of that report? MR. JORGENSON: Yes, the department has been advised of the content of that report. MR. COWAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, the Minister will realize that some extremely high levels were found in the vicinity of Canada Metals in regard to lead in soil.

Has the Minister sought any opinion as to whether those levels represented a hazard to people either in the area or who had use of that area? MR. JORGENSON: Yes, two authorities have been contacted by the department, Dr. Stopps at the University of Toronto and Dr. Schmidt in British Columbia and they were questioned on it. MR. COWAN: Can I ask the Minister then as to what their observations were in regard any attendant health hazard as a result of this high level of lead in soil. MR. JORGENSON: On the basis of the levels that were indicated in the report they did not regard that 3258

Monday, 5 May, 1980 as a serious problem, except of course, on the immediate property, immed iate area of the lead smelters. MR. COWAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, we are going to have a disagreement on this and it's a technical disagreement and I'm not certain if it would serve the purposes of this committee best to get into the details of that, except I feel it is incumbent upon myself to put into the record the fact that there is some disagreement among the experts as to what levels should be considered safe and what levels should be considered unsafe. -(l nterjection)- l'm sorry for the interruption, Mr.

Chairperson, the fact is, there are some authorities who would consider levels that have been found in the vicinity of lead smelters to be unsafe and they have done so on the basis of studies, scientific and medical studies, as to theoretical as well as practical results of that sort of exposure and so I can only suggest the Minister make use of all the available experts in regard to different levels so that he may have as wide a perspective as possible, as to whether a specific level is indeed hazardous or not hazardous.

It is dangerous to make categorical statements that they either are hazardous or that they are not hazardous but I believe when we are dealing with lives - I don't mean to overdramatize the issue - but when we are dealing with the health of our citizenry and the health of our children we can never be too safe and I always have a tendency to accept the lowest level as being the one which I personally, personal observation and opinion, regard to be safe.

On the other hand, I know there are other just as qualified persons who accept a different opinion and I will argue long and hard for the reduction of levels to the greatest possible extent and I will argue just as equally long and hard for the analysis to be made on the basis of the lowest possible sate readings that are com monl y accepted among the expert community. That is not to say that there can be one that is extremely low in comparison to the others and may be due to a technical error in experimentation or an error in theory and, in that sense, one would find it difficult to accept that.

But there's usually broad ranges in this area that you can accept and I suggest that the Minister look towards the lower levels because, as the evidence becomes more and more available to us, we find that the detrimental impacts of lead cont amina tion on indi viduals becomes more and more apparent at lower and lower levels.

I recall during the debate on the MacGregor spill the Minister went through the whole process of descri bing how the standards were set tor vinyl chloride and that they were originally set at 500 parts per million some 40 years ago - excuse me that's wrong - that when they were first set they were set at 500 parts per million and then they had decreased down to where we have a one part per million TL V accepted by the Occupational Safety and Health administration in the States.

Well, the reason that that TL V kept dropping is that as they did further and further experimentation they found that the results or that the detrimental health impacts were being experienced at lowerand lower levels. And we have found that if one is to make an assumption - and that's always risky - but make an assumption based on past evidence, we have found that the lower levels seem to carry with them their own dangers and their own hazards, which may not be as visible right from the start but when we do start dealing with levels that high we do find that there are some inherent health hazards.

So I would hope that the Minister would do a number of things in this. No. one, I would hope that the Minister would ensure that local people in the area, who may be growing gardens, know full well of the hazards that they may face as a result of eating the vegetables grown in a garden near an area where lead pollution is significant. That's very important.

I believe the only way you can probably do that is by a door to door canvass and I don't believe that the expense or the time necessary to do so is too great when we come to talking about protecting people from health hazards that we know are present, or have great suspicion to believe may be present. So I would hope that is do ne and that the Minister uses every available method to communicate with persons who are growing gardens in the area.

I would also hope that the Minister would communicate with persons in the area who may have small children, who because of their habits may be eating soil, may be picking up soil on their fingers and ingesting it and are much more susceptible - or at least we are led to believe they are much more susceptible to the impacts of lead in their system - at lower levels than are adults.

That's for a number of reasons but the primary reason being that their nervous system is developing and any sort of attck on that plays a much more significant role than an attack on an already developed nervous system, and that stands to reason. So I would hope that they would make an effort to communicate with parents in the area. Now I know you held some meetings at the school. I attended one myself. I believe there have been others that have been held and I know that the department has been in communication with certain groups in the area that are concerned about this.

I can only hope that at those meetings they are getting the full and complete data that is available at the time; that they are having that data explained to them in as unbiased a manner as is possible; and that they are provided with access to all the differing opinions on the effects of lead, because at the meeting I was at there was some suggestion by some at that meeting, and not all of them who were representing the government, but there was some suggestions by some that, wel l, we have much more severe problems in other areas so don't worry about the problem that you have in this area, it's not that severe.

Well the tact is there are experts who are concerned about the levels that we're finding in that area both in blood samples and in soil and vegetation samples, Needleman being one from Harvard University, and his results are showing that the effects of lead on the central nervous system are being experienced at lower levels than we had ever imagined they would be experienced. So I believe that the department has a responsibility to provide to those individuals, who show an interest, that information.

At the same time, they can provide to them other studies that say, well, we've looked over Needleman's study and we believe that these are the imperfections in his study and we 3259

Monday, 5 May, 1980 believe that these are the imperfections in his theory, but they should have access to both. They should not have their opinion formed for them by the government. Also at the time, and I know it's a matter that the Minister is not directly responsible for, but I would hope that he would use his good office to talk to his coneagues in regard to it, and that is that some of the parents expressed difficulties in finding doctors and medical personnel who would deal with them on this issue.

I would hope that the Minister would make a long list available to those person, of people who the department considers to have some knowledge and some experience in lead. But that's an aside and I throw that out only as a suggestion, if I may. Again we talked about the smaller communities this afternoon and the fact that when researchers go into a community to do research or to do studies, the whole community is abuzz very soon with the information as to what's being done.

Well, there are small communities within our larger community ofWinnipeg, also, and I would suggest that a public meeting be held in much the same way before the studies are put in place this summer, so that the people can understand what those monitors are doing, where they're at. I know that I had employees who worked at the Weston Shops come to me and say, we think we have a lead monitor on top of our building and what does that mean; are we in danger? Well, the fact was that I believe there was a lead monitor there and it was part of an overall process in trying to determine the ambient air lead levels.

Well, it is impo rtant that those workers are also invited to these meetings so that they know and can understand, and they will provide, also, input back to the Minister as to some of their frustrations and concerns in regard to this and they will play, I would hope, a valuable role in the whole study. So again I just take that speech and present it to the Minister in a different context, that there should be public meetings before and after.

The last point I have to make is, I was somewhat concerned last year, and I did write to the Minister in this regard, that the testing that was done, the ambient air lead survey that was done, started at a period when the activity was low - and there was a period in there I'm not certain, I believe it was at the start, when the plant was not even operating - and then it ended on a period of high activity. Let me be more specific but I'm certain the Minister will recall the letter I wrote to him: That for the first week of testing the levels were at a certain point.

The second week of testing, because of the fact that the plant was shut down - it was shut down for clean-up operations; it had been closed, I belie ve by the government at that time, in order to be able to deal with some of the major lead contamination problems within the plant - we saw the levels decrease and then we saw them stay about the same in the third week. In the fourth week we saw them stay at the same level; and then in the fifth week we saw them start to go up again.

In the sixth week we saw them go up even higher, and on the last day of the testing, which was August 25, 19 79, we saw the highest reading of the whole series of testing as a reading from the Weston School area, I believe. So what we have in fact is problems with credibility again. Someone who sits down and reads this says, well, my goodness, it started and it went down a bit because the plant was shut down for awhile and then it started to go up and the testing was stopped.

Well, I know the Minister has explained to me that the time parameters were determined on the basis of availability of summer students who were performing that function. But the fact is that I believe it is an important enough test to be ongoing and that we should not stop it at a period when the levels are increasing. Now, in all fairness to the Minister, I know that he did not realize that the levels were increasing at the time they stopped the test, because there's a time lag between the last results becoming available and the testing itself.

But the fact is that there was a general upward slope also and it does take away from the credibility of the study when you have that sort of a mistake - and it was a mistake - that sort of a mistake occurring and people question the validity of the survey. I happen to belie ve very strongly in these surveys. I happen to believe that they are one way of us taking a snapshot of the environment in which we live and applying our knowledge to that in trying to imp rove that environment. So I don't want to see these sorts of mistakes.

I don't want to see the credibility of these surveys detracted from because of errors. I would only hope that the Minister would take into account that criticism when designing the new tests; so it can be over a longer period of time; so it can be more complete; and so that there might be some way of determining whether or not there are trends that are occurring so that the testing can be more readily accepted by those who have to accept it. I'd ask the Minister if he would wish to discuss any of that before passing on to the next area of concern. MR. JORGENSON: Mr.

Chairman, I want to correct perhaps one or two impressions that my honourable friend might have had in the statement that I made when I said that in our consultations with Dr. Stobbs and Dr. Schmidt that they said the levels weren't dangerous. I did not want to leave the impression that we felt that there was no problem and that we were going tobecome complacent in any way. If that were the case, then we would not have decided to continue on with the testing, as we have.

Not only are going to continue on testing, there's going to be a greater variety in the kind of testing we are conducting under differing circumstances, in order to try to obtain as complete data as possible so that we can learn more about this particular problem. If all the information were complete and we knew all there was to know about it, I don't think there would be that much difference of opinion amongst authorities.

It's because of the absence of definitive data and information that there is disagreement, but we hope that through testing, as my honourable friend has said, that we can gain more knowledge into the whole area of lead and perhaps finally learn what we feel is necessary for us to learn in order to deal with the problem effectively. We're going to continu e testing and my honourable friend's suggestion that we contact the people in the area is one that we had planned on acting upon.

We want to make sure that they are informed as to what is happening as we go along so that there can be no doubt about our concern about 3260

Monday, 5 May, 1980 the problem in those particular areas. We will continue to keep in touch with them; we will continue to carry on our testing program in order to learn as much as we possibly can. MR. COWAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. Testing has to lead somewhere, too, and that's the important point that has to be made now. There have been levels found in the city that, had they been found in Toronto a number of years ago, this top soil would have been removed because it would have been considered a sign ificant enough contaminant to cause health problems.

These levels were found, I believe, at least by the student from the University of Manitoba studies, and I'm not certain, because I don't have the exact figures before me, but I believe also simi lar levels were found in the vicinity of Weston School. We also know that there is lead pollution coming from gasoline containing lead in the emissions from automobiles and other vehicles and that it is a very significant environmental problem. So I would not suggest that we concentrate only on the schools but that we also try to determine an overall strategy to deal with an overall problem.

But at the same time, there is going to come a point in time where the Minister is going to have to make the determination that either we are going to live with those levels of lead in the soil or we're going to remove the soil because they constitute a hazard. And then the question becomes who pays for the removal of the soil. Is it the public who pay for the removal of the soil? Is it the individual who is having the soil removed who pays for the removal of the soil? Is it the company who pays for the removal of the soil?

Which brings me back to my super fund concept, which we talked about a number of days ago in regard to assessing companies for possible pollution that they may cause. So those are all -(I nterjection)- The Member for St. George says options. They're not really options because the Minister is going to have to face them and confront them. Those are all the things that he is going to have to confront and face as time goes on, in regard to this problem; what to do. The testing will show, undoubtedly, that there are high levels of lead in the soil. It already has, so I'm not telling the Minister anything new.

Then the Minister is going to have to determine at what levels he deems action should be taken. It has to be a Ministerial judgement in this case because we don't have any guidelines or objectives and we don't have any regulations. So unless the Minister is preparing those now, we're left up in the air and the decision must remain his. He mus t make that decision on the basis of the evidence presented to him. I just point that out, without wanting to pursue it too much further, but did want to put it on the record. I would like now, Mr.

Chairperson, to discuss the MacGregor vinyl chloride derailment in some length although I don't hope to overstay my welcome in this regard, but I do feel it is an important experience in recent months in that we should peruse it to some extent. I'm going to be rather harsh in my criticisms, not out of malice, Mr.

Chairperson, but because I believe the criticisms to be valid and I believe the criticisms to be constructive and !believe that they must be categorically stated, otherwise we are going to skate around the issue and dance around the issue and never come to any sort of positive conclusion as to what we should do in the future. So I just make that point that they will be harsh but it is not out of malice and it is not intended to embarrass, nor is it intended to confront. I'm giving you my personal opinion, which I hope you value, for whatever it's worth.

I think it's important to examine incidents such as this tha t capture the media's attention. It is important because it provides the society at large with an example. It provides the society at large, the people who are affected by the media, with a insight into area:s that they don't normally have an insight into. The more media attention there is, the more focussed the attention becomes on an issue, the deeper we get into an issue, and therefore the more insight that we would expect to gain from that.

If there was one failing alone - and I believe there were more than that - but if there was one failing alone in this issue, I would believe it to be the failure to inform fully, adequately, and properly. I believe that there was a failing on the part of the major actors in this incident to inform the workers as to the hazards they faced and also to inform the public as to the hazards that might be associated with exposure to vinyl chloride if such exposure were to take place.

Workers and the general public have the right to know - the Minister agrees with me on that issue, I'm certain, because we've discussed it. But they have a right to have all the information available to them so that they may make informed and responsible decisions as to what part they are going to play in an accident or an incident of this nature. We know that the MacGregor incident, although it is unusual in the fact that it did capture so much attention from the public, is not an isolated incident.

I don't have the exact figures before me but I could get them if necessary to show that there have been numerous derailments in that specific area over the past number of years. I believe it was 25 , but I may stand corrected on that, because I read the

article very briefly and didn't have time to commit it to memory; but the fact is that there have been a number of derailments in that area. We also know from the CNR President, Mr. Lawless, that it is expected that the vol ume of transportation of hazardous goods will increase in the near future in western Canada. On March 9, he told a meeting of the Western Transportation Advisory Council that the four western provinces are expected to account for about three-quarters of CNR's total volume growth during the next five years.

The interesting point that he made was that much of that growth would be potash and petrochemicals. He said that rail travel was remarkably suited to the transportation of those two commodities and so it is. So what we know is that we have had derailments in the past; we know that transportation of those commoditie s will increase in the future.

We also know, according to a study done by a Carleton University professor, and I'm not going to attempt to give you the gentleman's name because I don't think that I could do justice to the proper pronunciation of it, but he did state in a recent study that derailment rate in Canada today, calculated in terms of traffic volume, are approximately double what they were in 1960. He also stated that during 3261

Monday, 5 May, 1980 the 19 60 to 19 77 period railway maintenance staffing levels have been reduced by 60 percent. So there would appear to be some correlation between the reduction in staffing and the increase in accidents, although one could not make a categorical statement that the two went hand in hand. We know a lot of derailments are due to poor track condition, as well as other reasons, and therefore we can assume that a reduction in staff would result in more derailments if there were not other factors that were brought to bear that would tend to ensure that track conditions do not deteriorate.

The study further concluded that between 19 72 and 19 78, there was an average of 8 major and 18 mi nor accidents involving dangerous commodities in Canada on a yearly basis. We know that this problem is not confined to the province of Manitoba; we could have assumed that.

We know that it is a problem that will probably increase so we must develop the proper mechanisms to deal with it now; we must develop them before we have to go through another spill such as the one that occurred in MacGregor; we also know that according to a press report railways are spilling approximately 1 percent of all the chemicals they are transporting. The problem in MacGregor is not an isola ted incident; it is just one that is of unusual significance to Manitobans.

I'd like to point out to the Minister a statement that was made in the Science Council of Canada's Policy and Poisons Report in regard to the sequence of events that follow environmental and workplace accidents. I'll read directly from the report if I can or I'll read a direct quotation from the report and would lik e to apply the rest of my comments to the statements that are made in this particular paragraph. The media publis hed an account of the problem with some magnification of the severity and the extent of it.

The first response of public officials in some instance is to deny that there is a problem; then they deny that there is a problem of any severity; and then they devote a great deal of energy to establishing that some department, or jurisdiction other than their own, was pr imarily or jointly responsible. In some instances there has been an effort by participants in the dispute to discredit the evidence and/or those that have produced it.

The spectacle of official confusion, with the initial denial followed by later general corroboration of the initial report, leads the public to believe that the matter is not being treated openly. This suspicion (usually justified) necessarily fosters the belief that the actual problem is probably much more extensive than was initially reported in the media (a belief that may or may not be justified). I believe if one takes that sequence of events and applie s it to what occurred in the MacGregor incidence one will find some very strong parallels; and I'd like to go through those very briefly.

I do so to point out that the reaction to the MacGregor incident by this government was not an unusual reaction, the reaction to the MacGregor derailment by CNR and by Dow Chemical and by the federal government was not an unusual reaction, that it is part of a pattern that has built up over a great number of years. I'm not certain when this report was written but it was written a number of years ago; so we know that this pattern has been in effect for quite some time.

They have based it on a historical perspective, I am certain, otherwise they could not have categorically stated that sequence of events would occur. The reason that I mention this is that I do not wish to cast any unnecessary blame on the government for its actions in regard to this bill. They were reacting in a commonly accepted manner. The fact is it is a wrong way to react. It creates credibility problems; it creates information problems; it creates problems all down the line.

I'm certain the Minister can confirm that statement much better than I can because he was the one who had to deal with many of those problems. But the fact is that this reaction sequence must be broken; that we must break out of that pattern; that we must deal with these derailments; that we must deal with these problems in a different way. I believe, to the credit of the government, that they are attempting to develop new mechanisms.

We had this discussion or a similar di scussion with the Minister responsibl e for Emergency Measures Organization and he has assured us that they are developing new mechanisms to deal with emergencies. The Minister has assured us that they are developing new mechanisms to deal with these sort of accidents, the reporting of spills.

The Minister has assured us the first thing next time he's going to have an information officer in place which, if used properly, will aid in the entire government action to inform the citizens properly but also to make certain that they have access to the government so that they can provide input as well as accept output. The pattern that I talked about, that the Science Council of Canada laid out, was prominent right from the start. According to a Winnipeg Free Press

article under the headline CN Tanker Leaks Dangerous Gas Near MacGregor there was a following introduction to the public of what was happening at the MacGregor spill and this I believe was in one of the first articles in regard to the spill, and I will quote from it, A dangerous chemical continued to leak from a derailed Canadian National Railways tanker car near MacGregor this morning but railway officials were down-playing the seriousness of the problem. The chemical from one of these cars is dissipating nicely into the atmosphere according to experts at the site, said Jack Skull, CN's public relations officer.

Now we see a headline which magnifies the severity of the problem CN Tanker Leaks Dangerous Gas Near McGregor; we also see a government official, or an official of the majoractor in this incident, the public relations officer for CN, saying that the seriousness of it is not what one would anticipate and that the chemical is dissipating nicely into the atmosphere; a statement that of course would come back to haunt him in future days. The fact is in that

article also there's a brief description of vinyl chloride but that was hardly alarmist in its content or its delivery. It said, and I quote, Vinyl chloride used in the production of polyvinyl chloride is a highly flammable gas which can have a narcotic effect. It can also irritate and burn exposed skin. Prolonged exposure may lead to liver damage. So the fact is that while the headline may have been somewhat sensationalist in its tone and its tenor, the

article itself did not appear to be. In spite of that, we have officials and major actors trying to down-play the seriousness of the problem. 3262

Monday, 5 May, 1980 At the same time and in the same article, we have a comment by a woman in the area, who said, and I quote from the article, She is angry CN officials didn't bother to tell area residents that the cancer causing chemical was leaking. This quote is from her: The fact that I have to get my information from CBC really puts me off, she said. What really puts me off was CN kept saying there is no leak.

And the Minister is wel l aware of that problem at the beginning of the MacGregor spill, that there was initial confusion as to the extent of the leak; as to whether there was a leak; as to whether one or two or three cars were leaking; as to whether it was vinyl chloride or chlorine. There was a fair amount of confusion and the public was being quite put off because they didn't seem to be able to get the proper information from the officials, they had to rely upon the media. This did two things.

Number one is it made the people rely upon the media for their information and, number two, it tended to destroy the credibility of those people who are supp osed to have credibility in dealing pub licly with these sort of matters.

This same woman continued, and I quote again, she said secrecy surrounding the derailment has made her uneasy and she wants CN officials to inform them of what 's goin g on and the intervention of an environmental official to look after the area residents concerns, quote, I think the expert (Dow Chemical experts were flown in this morning by CN) will be most concerned with looking after the CNR . She added, He's going to say exactly what he has to and nothing more.

Well again, we're following the scenario laid out by the Science Council of Canada and based upon historical perspective of how these problems tend to develop and how these incidents tend to develop. There is a great deal of confusion as to the actual Jact. There is some bitterness already on the second day as to the fact there seems to be a secretive nature about those who are most accessible to the public. The Mayor of the town of MacGregor is quoted as saying in that

article he was assured by a CN inspector that the tanks were not leaking, when told of a slight leak he said Well, you can pick or choose your story. And that's the unfortunate

part is that you could pick or choose your story. There were enough stories going around that one had to pick and choose. It was not a matter of choice; it was a matter of the fact that you had to pick and choose whichever story best suited your own perception of what was happening. They were looking, or at least the one woman who was qu oted in this

article was look ing to the provincial government for gu ida nce and for protection because she believed, as I believe, that the provincial government had a neutral role to play; that it could play a role that would be as unbiased as was possible; that they were concerned primarily with the protection of the environment, primarily with the citizens of Manitoba, and therefore they had no axe to grind, they had no vested interest other than our environment's protection and our safety and health. It is also important to note also at the beginning that there was confusion as to what was actually leaking.

I'll read a quote from a statement made by the Minister responsible for the Emergency Measures Organization in the House, I belie ve it was on Tuesday. He said, There was some concern at that time expressed by CNR that chlorine was involved and a possible leak of that su bstance might be expected.

Further checks by an officer of the Emergency Measures Organization, who immediately informed the RCMP, and upon further checking with the CNR as to the actual contents involved indicated that thesubstance was not chlorine but vinyl chloride product which, while inflammable and dangerous from that point of view, did not have the danger associated to the environment and/or citizens in the immediate area that chlorine gas has. Now, that is true but the fact is that by getting into a mind set about chlorine . . .

And this was due to no fault of the government; most likely any person would have fallen prey to that mind set because we have the Mississauga example and we tend to base our perceptions of what's happening today on our memories of what has happened in the recent past and that was a very strong memory in the fact that it was a very major incident and that it was very recent.

So we don't blame anyone for getting into the qua rry and mind set but we do have to acknowledge is that once they got into that and they viewed this as a problem with an inflammable gas, it tended to take away from the other health hazards that may be associated with vinyl chloride exposure. That went for government officials, the public; it went for myself because I fell into that same perception at that time.

I knew that vinyl chloride had carcinogenic properties, I talked about them in the Legislature to a certain extent, but I was assured by the government there were no problems and I believed those assurances because I was being a participant of the same process that they had been in regard to Mississauga.

Although in all fairness to myself, I do have to point out that while I did not feel free at that point to comment on the relative dangers between vinyl chloride and chlorine, I said that the substance that is actually involved, because it is indeed a very ser ious health hazard and a very serious environmental hazard, must be dealt with very carefully.

When the Minister returned to the Legislature that afternoon, after visiting the site, he talked a bit about vinyl chloride and I believe the Minister attempted also to down-play the hazards involved and I don't belie ve he did so intentionally, I believe he was acting on the advice given to him and I think there was a problem in that advice but I do believe that when he did say I was advised however that, given existing wind conditions, any potential hazard is mini mized through harmless di ssipation into the atmosphe re. he in fact was relating to the Legislature, in all good faith, the information that had been given to him, perhaps, and I don't know, but perhaps by Jack Skull, who we know was quoted as saying it was dissipating nicely into the atmosphere, or perhaps it was given to him by other people in the area, but the fact is that information was put on the record.

He talked about the greatest danger being a fire hazard in regard to the vinyl chloride spill and in the beginning that certainly was the greatest danger at that time was the fire hazard, and there will be no argument about that. But the fact is that, as the fire hazard reduced , other dangers became more prominent and those dangers were specifically to the workers, as we now know, but could very well have 3263

Monday, 5 May, 1980 been and may, in fact, have been, we won't know for some time, dangers that might be experienced by residents of the area. So we see in that first full day of public debate, we see a number of patterns being followed, that is a downplaying of the seriousness of the situation, some confusion; we see the media reports, not sensationalizing the incident, but we certainly see headlines that are pointing out the more dangerous aspects of the incidents.

We see the NOP opposition taking a role that we can expect them to take and that is perhaps not 10 0 percent correct but we certainly like it, and we all got trapped into roles that we felt were historical roles that we should play. MR. CHAIRMAN: I might draw the membe r's attention, he has approximately four minutes left. MR. COWAN: Mr. Chairman, on the basis of that, and I thank the Chair person for jelling my thoughts at this moment.

I would ask the Minister who was providing him with the advice that this material was indeed dissipating harmlessly into the atmosphere; that there appeared to be no danger either in the worksite or in the general area. MR. JORGENSON: That was not my statement. That was the statement of the representative of the CNR, I believe. MR. COWAN: I believe, and I have my files here with me so I can check, I believe the Minister did make the statement that some spillage has been noted and small pockets of gas have been located in the immediate vicinity.

And at the same time you said, I was advised, and that's exactly what I said was that you were acting on the advice of others. However, that given existing wind conditions, any potential hazard is mini mized through harmless dissipatation into the atmosphere, and that was a statement that you made in the House on March 11 th, I would believe upon your return from the site itself. MR. JORGENSON: As far as the town of MacGregor was concerned, that statement was a fact and it was the residents of the immediate area that, as my honourable friend will appreciate, was my immediate concern. MR.

COWAN: Would the Minister not agree that a statement like that, if read by workers in the area, might tend to lead them to believe that there was very little risk involved in the work activity that they were asked to undertake in regard to cleaning up the spill? MR. JORGENSON: My honourable friend has earlier raised the very point that seems to have been either ignored or glossed over, and that is the areas of jurisdiction.

He did mention that the railway was the prime actor in this role and the hearings that are currently going on the CTC are attempting to det ermine if the CNR fulfilled the role in the protection of the workers. I did not regard that the workers on the site were the responsibility of the Minister of the Environment. They were di rectly under the control of the CN and being advised by Dow Chemical. I perceived my role as one that was intended to ensure that the safety of the people outside the immediate area, the immediate spill site, that their well-being was not endangered.

Under circumstances such as this there is a normal pattern of lines of responsibility. In this case it happened to be the CNR with Dow as an advisor; Environment Canada as a prime environmental advisor, with Environment Manitoba playing a supporting role. Under differePt circumstances the roles would be reversed, as my honourable friend perhaps will recall, during the flood in Morris it was a provincial responsibility. We took complete control and had the authority and the legislation to give us that control. Other environmental accidents will be different again.

I don't want my honourable friend to make the mistake of assuming that this is a pattern that will be religio usly followed in all succeed ing accidents because it won't. A highway accident will have a different sequence and a different chemical will have a different sequence. If the dangers are obvious, as it was in Mississauga when the material was burning, nobody needed to tell them that there was a problem there.

It's when you get into these grey areas, such as it did in MacGregor, where the people in the area were not sure just what the dangers were, or indeed if there was a danger, that I felt there was a lack of commun ication and a lack of information being provided to the people in the area.

As I indicated earlier that if I were to do it over again the one thing that I would do different, having regard to my responsibilities in the matter, would be to ensure that there was an information office set up so that the public would be informed and that we would ensure or attempt to seek the co-operation of the prime actors in the drama; that they would provide the information that was necessary and the information that was asked for. I don't think it was of great concern, for example, because they weren't directly affected and were not in any danger to the people of the city of Winnipeg.

The information office should have been located right in MacGregor where the danger was and where the people lived that would have a legitimate concern. So these are things that, as my honourable friend said, we have learned from this one experience. He has already pointed out to the reorganization of Emergency Measures, it's another step, that I might add had started before the MacGregor incident, that process was going ahead in any case. The third point of course is the transportation of dangerous goods.

Now as the honourable member is probably aware, a bill dealing with this particula rmatter was introduced into the House during the course of the last parliament and then di ed on the Order Paper when parliament was dissolved and that bill now has been reintroduced into the House, has received second reading, and the provinces have had a fairly substantial input into the drafting of that legislation.

So our experiences in this incident may now serve as an opportunity for us to have further input and to ensure that the bill meets some of what we consider to be the deficiencies that existed at the time of the MacGregor incident. So we learned from those experiences. But I just want to make the point that the next accident may be an entir ely di fferent set of circumstanc es and the same rules may not 3264

Monday, 5 May, 1980 necessarily apply, so we have to judge each situation as it arises and that is the pu rpose of the new structuring of Emergency Measures. It is to enable us to provide that kind of flexibility that in a very short time we can assess the situation and deal with it as effectively and as efficiently as possible. We're never going to be perfect and I doubt very much if we'll ever stop making mistakes, but if we can learn by those mistakes, as I think that we have in this particular incident, then we can progress from there and that's what we hope to do. MR.

COWAN: I thank the Minister for his comments and I believe it's important that we have this sort of free-flowing discussion in regard to this and this is one opportunity to pursue it without the usual constraints of the House, which sometimes get us locked in the postures that are not always most productive to the analysis of an incident such as this. But I will mention to the Minister that again he is pointing out that there is another jurisdiction that had responsibility for this.

In fairness to the Minister, the Minister didn't develop the other jurisdiction; the Minister had very little to do with developing the splits in responsibilities that come from jurisdictional disputes because of the history of this country and because of the way in which governments are set up. But the fact is that we're always a bit quick to say, well, that's the other person's problem.

Now we have to do that in some instances because in fact we have no responsibility or no avenue of recourse to solve that problem, in which case we don't want to accept any responsibility for because we can't do anything about it in the first place. But in this instance, in this instance I believe that we can't say there was another jurisdiction. Even CTC and Labour Canada don't know whose jurisdiction it is.

Maybe I can read to the Minister from a letter to Terry Sargeant, April 11 th, 1980, from the Honourable Gerald Regan in regard to the spill, and he said, We share your concern with respect to the hazards associated with exposure of vinyl chloride. Although the authority for occupational safety and health provided by

Part IV of the Canada Labour Code does extend to some railway emp loyees it does not extend to those empl oyees working at the site of the derailment. Authority for safety and health in this matter is provided by The Railway Act which is administered by the Canadian Transport Commission, CTC. Then they go on to say that instructions have taken place over a long period between officials of the CTC and Labour Canada conc erning the di fference in coverage of occupational safety and health by

Part IV of the Code; in general orders issued pursuant to The Railway Act. Labour Canada's view is that

Part IV should apply unless the CTC provides equivalent protection under The Railway Act. This has not been done and so we see the jurisdictional dispute, not only between federal governments and provincial governments and municipal governments, but we also see it between the different levels of government and it works to the detriment of solving these problems in a most efficient way. That's the point that I'm trying to make; that's the point that they make here, that we're too quick to say, That's the other person's problem, let them take care of it.

While that other person is saying, at the same time, Well, that's their problem, or You have this little segment of the problem and we have that little segment of the problem and we have this segment over here, and nothing ever becomes resolved. - (I nterjection)- Yes, we can't deal in that way. The Minister, if I heard him correctly saying it will never work, and he's absolutely correct. So let us not say that the problem was not the Minister's jurisdiction or it was not the federal government's jurisdiction; let us say that we have todevelop better means of co-ordination in the future.

That's another problem that we found from the MacGregor incident. We have to be able to pull these different groups together and to make them work as one unit instead of trying, as the Science Council says, devoting a great deal of energy to establis h that some department or jurisdiction other than their own was primarily jointly responsible. There was a problem; it was not the Minister's problem alone.

Goodness gracious, it was everybody's problem and they're still arguing about it and they'r e going to be talking about it tomorrow and for weeks to come and, unfortunately, they will most likely be talking about it after the next incident. But if we can work towards a successful resolution of that problem then I think we are well on our way to solving some of the problems. But I'm not even certain that given the jurisdictional disputes that we can absolve the government of their responsibility in this regard that easily.

I would like to read from a material safety data sheet put out by Dow Chemical, Midland, Michigan, dated October 5th, 19 78, product named vinyl chloride inhibited. And what that sheet says is that several actions should be or must be . . . MR. JORGENSON: I wonder if my honourable friend would read that, vinyl chloride, what was that other word? Inhibitor? MR. COWAN: Inhibited, yes. Certain actions should be taken in the event of a spill of vinyl chloride.

Section 4 , entitled Spill, leak and di sposal procedures, says, Action to take for spills: (Use appropriate safety equipment, remove all sources of ignition, supply ample ventilation and allow only properly protected personnel into the area. Do not allow vinyl chloride to enter the sewer system because of explosive hazard. Disposal method: Incinerate in equipment with the hydrochloric acid scrubber according to local state and federal regulations - remember this is from their Midland branch in the United States. Contact Dow Chemical Company for additional help.

It also says that the inhalation, under the category of inhalation, it states OSHA standard, time-weighted average, one part per million in 1977; maximum average over any 15-minute period, five parts per million. Effects of over-exposure, cancer-suspect agent. Finally, under the heading of 'Sp ecial Handling In forma tion' there's several criteria li sted for ventilation, respiratory protection, protective clothing and eye protection. Of particular significance in light of what happened at MacGregor is the following recommendation. Respiratory protec tion: NI OSH -app roved respiratory protection required.

In the absence of environmental control for emergencies, a self- 3265

Monday, 5 May, 1980 contained breathing apparatus or a ful l-face respirator as approved by NIOSH, which is the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, is recommended. I bring that information forward to make a couple of points.

One is that the accepted method of disposal is incineration, and that is a question debated frequently in the House and outside of the House, but I want to point out that Dow Chemical in their own safety data sheet says that the accepted method of disposal is incineration and also provide for the one part per million, time-weighted average, and also talk about respiratory protective equipment. So I think it is important to note that if that spill had occurred in the U.S. and Dow had been involved, those would have been the recommendations they would have had to make there.

I'd ask the Minister if, in this case, Dow made any recommendation that the vinyl chloride should be incinerated or if it was their recommendation that it should be allowed to evaporate? MR. JORGENSON: Mr. Chairman, I'm afraid I couldn't tell whose recommendation it was, I can only presume it was Dow's, made to the CNR, since Dow was the advisor on this matter to the CNR. MR.

COWAN: So here we have an enlargement of the jurisdictional problem into, you know, different things are done in different countries and of course that's accepted because different countries have different ways of dealing with problems and are also at different levels of development in regard to how they treat these incidents, and also have different motivations and different pressure groups which bring about different types of legislation. But the fact is it is another jurisdictional dispute we have to be aware of, although I don't bring it up as a major part of my thoughts this evening, just as an aside.

I'd ask the Minister if he, in future incidents, would rely . . . Perhaps I should approach it from a di fferent angle. I'd ask the Minister who the Department of the Environment relied upon for advice in regard to the clean-up operation of the spill and the reduction of any environmental hazards? MR. JORGENSON: Mr. Chairman, my prime advisors in this whole matter, as my honourable friend should suspect, were my own departmental officials. I'm sure my honourable friend knows that Dr.

Bowen is perhaps as good an authority on the subject as anybody in this country and that's one of the reasons why he is holding this position. I have some hesitation, depending upon the information from people I have no control over, people who come in from other parts of the country or other jurisdictions, or people that I do not have under my jurisdiction. I prefer to take advice, and I presume and in this case I know they have, consulted others before passing advice on to me but my prime advisors in this case, and I think properly so, were my own departmental officials. MR.

COWAN: Well perhaps I could ask the Minister, then, who they were relying upon for advice as to the best methods of disposal for the spill of vinyl chloride. MR. JORGENSON: There were a number of people contacted, their names I may not be able to recall but the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States was one of them; Dr. Gehring, Chief Toxicologist at the Dow Lab. in Midland, Michigan; Dr. Plaa was the third one.

We tried to get as wide a selection as we possibly could of people who, we felt, had credentials in this particular area and I felt the department was doing their utmost to ensure a wide variety of opioions were sought. Now since the accident we've had discussions with the University of Manitoba and, as a result of those discussions, they have offered to set up a team and we happily accepted that offer. In the event of another situation such as this, we will be in consultation with them as well.

So we intend to broaden our line of contacts so that we have as wide a selection of people as possible but, at the same time, I will still continue to rely up on my own departmental officials, knowing they have consulted the best authorities they can find. MR. COWAN: If I recollect correctly, Mr. Chairperson, the content the Minister talks about in regard to the University of Manitoba perhaps was brought about by a report in an

article from a Dr. . . . I'll have to find his name; he was Associate Professor of Biology ... There's also a Dr. Hymie Gesser, who also made public statements in regard to the fact they believed the department had not contacted local people in the area for their advice and they were somewhat concerned about that. If I can just find the proper area here, I can indicate to the Minister exactly what it was that had been said. Yes, it's in a March 19th

article in the Free Press, Dr. Hymie Gesser is quoted as stating I'll tell you that people at the University are up set because the government is paying out salaries and they should get benefits from our knowledge. He added, We're well prepared, if advantage is taken of the facilities that are available. Then he continued on The first thing they should have done was get some people from the University together, Dr. Hymie Gesser said yesterday. In five hours, I could have had a portable gas chromatograph at the accident site and started a technique for analyzing active quantities of gas. And then Dr.

Samoi loff said that testing should be done by universities because it would provide more pub licl y acceptable informa tion. His qu ote is Everything would have been open, everything would have been done by an im partial group, if the university had been invited to monitor the train derailment and spill. At that time, they talked about pulling together a prairie province team that would have equip ment available to it and would be then able to respond very quickly to these type of spills.

I would ask the Minister if that is the type of team they have in fact pulled together with the assistance of doctors from the university. MR. JORGENSON: I couldn't tell you the personnel that are involved -(I nterjection)- Yes, Dr. Gesser, I believe is one of them; Chow is another and I believe the other is Charlton. MR. COWAN: Wel l, I've heard of two of the individuals and they come very highly qualified. I'm certain the third one does also, it's just that I haven't 3266

Monday, 5 May, 1980 run across him in any of my work or any of my studies, but that doesn't mean he's not more than qualified for the job that confronts him. And I'm pl eased to hear that because it is a serious responsibility the Minister has and it's important he does use every available resource in dealing with these. I would just ask the Minister to confirm, then, that they did not at first contact the university or contact these individuals in the university. As a matter of fact, it must have been after March 18th because that's when the interviews for this

article were taken. MR. JORGENSON: The contact with the university with respect to this clean-up, to the MacGregor question, came after the incident but prior to that we had meetings with Dr. Campbell and some of his staff with a view to setting up a team at the university that could help us with a variety of problems. At that time accidental spills of chemicals were not even contemplated. We were discussing other matters relating to environmental concerns, waste management among them, and ways in which the university could be of assistance to us.

So this was just a logical extension of that initial meeting, dealing with a specific matter, such as my honourable friend has mentioned. MR. COWAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, but that original contact was before the MacGregor spill and the next contact didn't come until after there were public statements . . . MR. JORGENSON: I believe it was before Xmas some time. MR. COWAN: Now the Minister indicated that his department and his Deputy Minister had been in contact with a number of personalities, Dr.

Perry Gehring, Toxicologist and Director of Health and Environment Research with Dow Chemical, Midland, Michigan; Dr. Nuttall, Environmental Response Team with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Dr. Gaby Pla a, Professor of Pharmacology at the University of Montreal. I believe there's also a Dr. Gehring with Dow Chemical. I would ask the Minister when first contact was made with these individuals. Well let me specifically say when did they first contact the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States? MR. JORGENSON: It was the Friday afternoon. MR.

COWAN: Thank you, that would have been then Friday, March 14th? Is that around March 14th, Friday? 15th; that was after the visit of Dr. Stellman to the Minister. MR. JORGENSON: That was the same date. MR. COWAN: I would ask him when he contacted Dr. Gaby Plaa of the University ... MR. JORGENSON: They were all contacted that afternoon. MR. COWAN: The Minister says they were all contacted that afternoon and we know why they were contacted that afternoon.

We also know that the decision was made to allow the chemical to dissipate into the atmosphere and the decision was also made, according to the Minister, to spread the contaminated snow out, so that it would dissipate more rapidly, before that. When we ask the Minister who had suggested that was a proper proceedure, he indicated at that time that his department officials had informed him that in fact was a proper proceedure.

I'd ask the Minister who was advising the department at that point when they made that initial decision because that was announced by the Minister, I believe on March 12 th in the House, on the Wednesday, I believe, the Minister indicated ... MR. JORGENSON: That wasn't a departmental decision; that was a decision of the CNR. I was simp ly commun icating that informat ion, that statement that was made by CNR to the House. It wasn't a definitive plan of action; it was one of the options being considered at the time. MR. COWAN: If I can just take one moment, Mr.

Chairperson, the question in the House was, from myself, further to the question from the Member for Portage, who had asked if there was any danger to the residents of the area due to the recent CNR derailment in and around MacGregor and resulting chemical leakage that is reported, the Minister answered him. Then I said, further to the question, can the Minister indicate exactly how much leakage during the entire episode? In other other words, what quantities have escaped? At that time we didn't have a figure but the Minister said, I'll read the whole statement so that I'm not taking it out of context.

At that moment, that has not been determined, - this is the Minister spe akin g - and will not be determined until the car is set upright and can be accurately measured. My understanding is that once a car is set upright they can measure accurately the amount of seepage. It is not anticipated that it's a great deal. Further to that, Mr. Chairman, it is the intention of the railway officials to remove the snow which contains the contamination and spread it over a fairly substantial area so it can be dissipated into the atmosphere as soon as they are hit by the sun's rays.

Now the question that followed from that - and we have to get the whole sequence to understand the full context - I asked the Minister. I'm concerned , Mr. Chairman, as to the last statemtent. Has the Minister checked with other authorities in regard to environmental waste management and transport of hazardous chemicals as to the advisability of taking a known carcinogen and a known pollutant and spreading it out so that it may dissipate into the environment at large?

Has he checked with other officials and other experts on this area to ensure that there is no inherent danger in subjecting our environment to this sort of abuse? And the answer of the Minister was, In response to my honourable frien d's ques tion, Mr. Chairman, officials of the Environmental Branch have assured me that this is the proper procedure to be taken and they have done so with the concu rrence of our Environmental people.

So the Minister informed us at that time that the Environmental Branch - now that may been the federal or the provincial because he didn't clarify it - had made a statement that was the proper procedure to follow and also, when he 3267

Monday, 5 May, 1980 says the concurrence of our Environmental people, I would believe that he is talking about his own department, who was advising his department in regard to the appropriateness of the plan to spread the snow out into the general area? MR. JORGENSON: That advice was coming from my own officials and Environment Canada. MR. COWAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. What I'm asking is, who was advising the Environmental Department as to the advisability of that particular course of action? In other words ... MR.

JORGENSON: Well, if my honourable friend is asking who was advising the CNR as to what the course of action should be, I would suggest it would be Dow Chemical. MR. COWAN: I would imagine also that it would be Dow Chemical.

I'm certain that would come out in the inquiry, but the question I am asking, because the Minister says that this action was being taken with the concurrence of our Environmental people, had the Environmental people in the province contacted the Environmental people in the federal government or contacted Dow or contacted these other people that the Minister indicated that they had contacted later on? In other words, where did the province go for its advice? MR. JORGENSON: Mr.

Chairman, we were in constant consultation and discussion with the federal environmental agency, as well as the clearers on the site, Dow Chemical as well as the CNR. MR. COWAN: That's a point that I was trying to get at, Mr. Chairperson, and I would do it so that I could make a suggestion, if I might, and that is in future incidents that we go immediately to the local people, which the Minister has assured me we will, because there is going to be a response team that is set up by the University and I would hope that they would be called up in all these instances to deal with the problem.

But also that we make certain that the input we're getting comes from a varied enough source as to not be specifically that of persons who have vested interests in determining how that spill is presented to the public. I know why a chemical company would want to downplay a spill of their chemical; we know that they have to sell that chemical and if that chemical gets a bad public image that they will have trouble selling that chemical because the general public would say, we don't want that chemical around here; it's a harmful chemical.

I know why CNR has a vested interest and they would say that; we have to transport chemicals, we want to cont inue our business, we want to increase our business and therefore we don't want it to appear that we're spilling dangerous chemicals all over the area. So I would only hope that in the future the Minister does take advantage of the many sources of information that we have in the province that are very capable in their own fields, and I'm certain he will. MR. JORGENSON: Let me make this point very clear, Mr. Chairman.

I have no hesitation in seeking as wide an area as possible of information on any given subject, but I want to make it clear that in the final analysis - because I do have control over them, I can fire them if they are wrong, in other words - I depend on my own department to give me my final advice. I'm confident because I've worked with them enough to know that they will seek as wide an area of advice as possible, but I must rely on my own officials, otherwise I should not even have them. MR. COWAN: No argument from myself, Mr.

Chairperson, except that he must also assure that his officials are relying up on the best available information and the most information that they can possibly pull together in short notice on how to deal with these problems. I still to this day, and it's a matter of opinion, don't agree with the concept of diluting and dispersing known pollutants, known health hazards. There is two ways of dealing with them: capture and contain; dilute and disperse. My personal opinion is that you capture and contain whenever you can.

The Minister ind icated in his statements that was indeed a possibility because he said was we're going to gather up all this snow, so we have captured; but instead of containing, he said we are going to then dilute and disperse. Now that's capture and dilute and disperse. I would say that once you've captured you contain, and that should just be a general practice. The smokestack in Flin Flon is another example, do you capture the sulphur coming out and contain it, which has its own problems?

We were talking about what lnco is going to do with all that sulphuric acid that it's going to be manufacturing as a result of trying to save the environment from some excesspollution. That's a problem in itself, so I'm not saying this in a simplistic sense unaware of some of the other problems that are created, but in this instance, we know that it could be captured - the Minister indicated that it could be captured - I believe that it should be contained.

I would only ask the Minister if, as a general policy, it is the policy of the department to follow the course of action commonly termed capture and contain or is it a general policy, and I realize that there would be specific instances where this policy will not be followed entirely, to dilute and disperse? MR. JORGENSON: Mr. Chairman, we follow the practice of containment whereever that is practical and possible. It's not always possible and in some instances it may not even be practical, but that certainly will be a policy that will be followed first when it is practical and when it is possible. MR.

COWAN: We'd only argue that if they were going to pull the snow together in order to spread it out that it was possible to capture it. Now I don't know about the containment procedures, perhaps there are problems there that I'm not aware of, but I would assume that once you've captured it you can contain it fairly easily. I'm pleased to hear that in the future that course of action will be followed. MR. JORGENSON: Well, it's been followed in the past on many many spills that we have; we contain and remove if we possibly can. 3268

Monday, 5 May, 1980 MR. COWAN: No argument there. I would ask the Minister if Dow ever advised, to his knowledge, either his department or the CNR, the carrier, that the spil led vinyl chlo ride should be incin erated in equipment with a hydrochloric acid scrubber as per their instructions on their material data sheet? Was that advice ever presented to them? MR. JORGENSON: Incinerated on the site? MR. COWAN: No, no, it would have to be captured, contained, shipped and incinerated. MR. JORGENSON: I'm not sure if that was one of the options. It seemed like a very remote one.

I'm informed that it was not one of the options that were put forth. MR. COWAN: I only mention that because I believe it wou ld have had to, by regulation in another jurisdiction, been put forward as an alternative suggestion and one with a very heavy recommendation. MR. JORGENSON: If my honourable friend is reading from that initial paper that he presented here and that's the reason I asked him that question abo�t the inhibitor, then that would pose somewhat of a different situation. MR. COWAN: Perhaps the Minister can clarify why it would impose a different situation. MR.

JORGENSON: Prior to the process that has been by Dow Chemical for a few years now, there was an inhibitor placed in vinyl chloride to prevent it from polymerizi ng and the new process of manufacture now does not require the inhibitor. The inhibitor in those cases was a phenyl. MR. COWAN: Well, I'm not an expert in the area but I don't see the significance as to why that would cause a major contradiction when it does go on to name ingr edients, the ingredients that they are specifically dealing with in this instance are vinyl chlori de.

In this instance, they talk about vinyl choride vapours; they talk about vinyl chloride itself; they talk primarily about vinyl chloride and they give the same fiscal data as for vinyl chloride that we have been given in the past. So I would ask the Minister, according to his expert advice, if that would make a major difference in how to handle the spill of vinyl chloride. MR. JORGENSON: I don't think it would have made any difference in this particular instance since a spill was of a nature that was somewhat difficult to contain. MR.

COWAN: I've been in some conversation with people who have been in conversation with the department in regard to soil samples and they have ind icated that soil samples are being taken by Environment Canada, and that the results should be gotten from them. Is the Minister aware of the levels of vinyl chloride that are being found in soil samples coming from the area around the vinyl chloride derailment? MR. JORGENSON: I haven't seen them myself. MR. COWAN: Perhaps the department then is. Is the department aware of those samples? MR. JORGENSON: I might add that we're doing our own sampling right now. MR.

COWAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. Does the Minister have the results of that sampling yet, any results at all? MR. JORGENSON: No, no, we don't. MR. COWAN: Then does the Minister have - I'd ask him if his department has the results of the Environmental Canada sampling? MR. JORGENSON: Apparently not. MR. COWAN: The member is indicating that they are Environment Canada's property and that is a fact. I'm just asking if Environment Canada has shared with the department the test results? MR. JORGENSON: Well, I haven't seen the results. It appears as though the department haven't seen them either. MR.

COWAN: They have not. If I can, I'd like to tap some of the experience of the Deputy Minister in this regard and run a theory by him, through the Minister and through yourself, for comments from him. I have to preface my remarks by saying that I am not an expert in this area. I have discussed this with people who do consider themselves to be experts in this area, but I have not come up with a firm concensus, although there seems to be a general concensus as to the potentiality of the theory which I'm going to describe.

We know from data given to us by Dow Chemical that the levels of vinyl chloride in the air did not exceed 200 parts per million at the site of the spill on the day after the spill, in other words, when we would expect fairly high levels if the material was in fact evaporating. That's a matter of record, I believe, both public record and the record of the Legislature. We also know that we found fairly low levels throughout the area outside of the spill area and that we found levels approaching 5 and 20 parts per million right around the general area where the spill had occurred.

We also know that towards the second week, when testing was done, that if the testing was done and still there, that there was a very low reading and that if the snow was disturbed that the reading would go up as a result of the disturbance of the snow. We know also that vinyl chloride has been used as a refrigerant or has refrigerant qua li ties and properties about it.

Let us assume that the spill occurred on that evening and that the liquid ran out and formed - because it was very cold that evening, I'm not certain of the exact temperature but it was below the boiling point of vinyl chloride, which means that some of it would evaporate but that it wouldn't evaporate at a quick pace or a quick pace in relationship to a hotter climate - formed pockets underneath the snow, perhaps one large pocket, perhaps smaller pockets, but formed those pockets. As it evaporated it of course cooled off the 3269

Monday, 5 May, 1980 remaining pool, as we do on a hot summer day when we go sw imming in the water and the breeze evaporates us afterwards and we get cooled by that action. Well, the same action may have occurred in regard to the vinyl chloride. So that would inhibit further evaporation. The fact is that it would inhibit it to such an extent if it was insulated by the snow and it was a refrigerant factor, except that it may have had time to seep into the soil in large quantities.

We would be led to believe that because if - and this is where the Deputy Minister may be able to correct me - if there was a large scale evaporation taking place, we would anticipate high readings of vinyl chloride in the air because what we would be measuring in fact was the evaporation process.

So I would ask the Minister if that theory could be - and I know we're talking about a theory and so I don't expect him to make a categorical statement - but if that theory could in fact have transpired and that there may be large quantities of vinyl chloride in the soil as a result of the very unique circu mstances that were experienced because of the climate and the weather conditions at the time of the vinyl chloride spill outside of MacGregor. MR. JORGENSON: Mr. Chairman, the honourable member has raised the very reason why we're testing. We're currently conducting our own testing right at the spill site.

We're drilling and attempting to determine the extent to which the vinyl chloride penetrated through the soil. The purpose of that is to determine whether or not any trace of that vinyl chloride penetrated into the underground aquifers and that drilling and testing is going on right now and we do not have the results of all that testing.

MR COWAN: So in fact there may be some conjecture and the Minister is concerned at this point that the vinyl chloride never did dis sipate nicely into the atmosphere but in fact that, because of the properties of the vinyl chloride and because of the climate in which we live, that it did make its way into the soil. MR. JORGENSON: I would not want to comment on that definitively because that's what we want to find out. It won't be until we have done the testing that we will know.

But we are carrying on this drilling program in conjunction with the CNR, in an effort to determine, because it may be important for us to know whether or not the vinyl chloride did penetrate into the soil and reach the underground aquifers. We will know as soon as our drilling and testing program is completed. MR. COWAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. When would that be? Is there any proposed timetable as to the testing to be accomplished? MR. JORGENSON: My impression is that the drilling will be completed soon. The testing is being done both by ourselves and by Dow Chemical.

They are taking cores from the drilling that we're doing as well. Dow are taking the same samples and testing them, as well, in order to ... They're doing that for the CNR. MR. COWAN: So in actuality the province is doing its own testing and Dow is doing its own testing. MR. JORGENSON: Yes. MR. COWAN: I'd just ask the Minister for my own curiousity, does that theory in fact have any basis for consideration as to the refrigerant qualities in the fact that we were not seeing high levels of vinyl chloride in the are in the surrounding area outside of the actual derailment site? MR.

JORGENSON: Well, it's because we don't know that we're doing it. What we're endeavouring to do is to find out. I'll be able to inform my honourable friend a little better sometime later, when the testing is completed. MR. CHAIRMAN: 5.(c) - the Member for Churchill. MR. COWAN: Thank you. I just wanted a second opinion on my theory. So perhaps we can discuss it at another time, but I thought it was worth putting on the record because I had discussed it with numerous people and they have indicated that it might, in fact, be a problem.

As a matter of fact, I talked to one of the Environmental Canada people and their comments were that they had done some testing of the soil and they found some very high levels and they'd found some not so high levels and they were concerned that their testing methods might have been contaminating the samples; and they were concerned that they weren't doing the tes ting methods properly; and they were concerned that it was new ground and what we finally came to the consideration was that we are treading on new ground here, we're breaking path.

Because to the best of my knowledge, there has not been a vinyl chloride spill of this nature un der simi lar circu mstances up on which we have available information to make conclusions and to base our actions, so that we are breaking new ground in that respect. Perhaps our experience will not only help us develop better response mechanisms but will help other persons who may undergo similar experiences. MR. JORGENSON: That's the reason Dow are doing the testing, as well, on the same samples. MR. CHAIRMAN: 5.(c) - the Member for Churchill. MR. COWAN: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

I'd ask the Minister if they are finding any levels in the air, in the ambient air, directly at the derailment site now. MR. JORGENSON: No, the information was already provided to the Leader of the Opposition, I believe. No, there are no levels detectable there at the present time. MR. COWAN: According to the map that was given to the Honourable Leader of the Opposition, I would assume that the testing was done outside of the actual site itself. Is there anyone testing the actual site, itself, now? MR. JORGENSON: Not the air. We're now doing soil samples in there. 3270

Monday, 5 May, 1980 MR. COWAN: Is that because we went through a period of time where there were no concentrations discovered in the air or did they just stop testing? MR. JORGENSON: Well, I presume it is because the results of the testing indicated that there was no vinyl chloride detectable and after a period of time they decided that there was no point in continuing the testing. MR. COWAN: I'm going to try to tie this up.

I could go on at some great length, and I'm not so certain that it wouldn't be appropriate to do so, but I think we're into an area now at a level which the Minister and his aides and myself are finding interesting. I don't want to bore the rest of the committee except to say that I do believe that the situation was badly handled .

I believe that this government handled it badly; I believe that the federal government handled it badly; I believe that the CNR handled it badly and I believe that Dow Chemical handled it badly in the sense that we were not receiving full and complete information from unbiased source in an unbiased way. The Minister himself at one time indicated that 5,000 parts per million was an acceptable TLV and we know it was not. The fact is when we pressured him as to who had given him that statement, he said that his department had given him that figure.

Well, the Minister is shaking his head no, but it's all a matter of record and it's easy enough to find. On Friday, March 14, we asked him where he had arrived at a figure of 5,000 parts per million and he said that, That is a danger level of prolonged confined exposure. All I can say is that the level of 5 parts per million is far below any danger level expressed either in his terms or in terms of other people who had expressed opinions on the subject. So the Minister was using that figure of 5,000 parts per million and I know it was a mistake, and it was an honest mistake.

I don't believe it was a mistake that was intended to mislead or deceive, it was an honest mistake. MR. JORGENSON: I suppose it indicates that the honourable member is not the only one that is not an expert on this subject. MR. COWAN: The Minister is absolutely right and I have to substantiate what he said because I'm not certain it got on the record. And he says, it only indicates that I, myself, am not an expert on this matter and I've said that as many times as I believe to be necessary to get people to believe it.

And I, in fact, was using wrong figures in the beginning, although the difference was not in the level of figures but I had attributed my figures to OSHA and in fact they were ACIGH figures, which was a mistake. We have all made mistakes in this area because we weren't experts, because there's no real experience in Manitoba to draw upon in regard to vinyl chloride. It's just not a substance that we're familiar with because it's not used in production here to any significant extent. MR. JORGENSON: It only passes through. MR. COWAN: The Minister says it's only passing through.

But the fact is that those sort of mistakes do . . . -(Int erjection)- I'm sorry? MR. CHAIRMAN: The Member for Churchill has the floor, to my knowledge, unless the Minister ... MR. COWAN: Okay. I would just ask, in that instance then, ask the Minister why it is that - and he may not be able to answer this, perhaps it's better dir ected to the Minis ter for Emer gency Measures Organization - but I'd ask him why it was that CANUTREC was never called in to provide the department with information in regard to this?

It's a federal ·facility that is developed especially to deal with these sorts of incidents and accidents and I would have imagined that, had it been called in, we could have avoided some of the mistakes such as we have seen on everyone's part. MR. JORGENSON: I'm not sure whether we've contacted CANUTREC, but we did contact Chemtrec very early in the process and they advised us to speak to a Dow Chemical expert, so we were back where we started. I am advised by Mr. McLeod that CANUTREC was called by us and they referred us to Dow. MR. COWAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

We have on the record statements that CANUTREC was not contacted , and that was by the Emergency Measures Organiza tion. So perhaps it was not contacted by the Emergency Measures Organization but was cont acted by the Department of Environment, which shows that we probably should have a more closer communication and co-operation, which I'm certain we will have, having learned from this experience. I do not want to belabour the point except that I'd ask the Minister a question in regard to his press conference of Sun day.

I'm not certain of the date but I believe there was only one press conference on a Sunday during the incident and that was a press conference du ring which his Deputy Minister indicated that, to the best of his knowledge, workers at the site were wearing respirators. And I know during a press conference there is not always time enough to examine in detail either the questions or the answers that are given because they're coming at you from all directions, but I would just ask the Minister if that was in respect to workers working right in the derailment area itself or workers generally at the site? MR.

JORGENSON: To the best of my knowledge that would be referring to the people that were working right on the site. MR. COWAN: That would have been Dow Chemical workers then, for the most part, officials; not CNR workers? MR. JORGENSON: Yes. MR. CHAIRMAN: 5.(c)(1)- pass - the Member for Churchill. MR. COWAN: In closing, Mr. Chairperson, I believe it was on the first day when the Minister responsible 3271

Monday, 5 May, 1980 for Emergency Measures Organization, and I'm not certain whether it was him or the Minister - I think it might have been the Minister for the Environment as a matter of fact - I could look through my files and find out but it's not really necessary, said that fortunately this was not an incident of extreme sign ificance and that we could learn from the lessons, perhaps we could use it best to learn lessons from. And although I may disagree with him as to the significance of the incident and I don't want to paraphrase him unfairly but I do believe that is the intent of what he said.

I, at that same time, said that, yes, perhaps that is the best course of action to learn from this experience and it turned out to be more than either of us had thought. I think we have learned, as individuals; I know I've learned and I know the Minister has learned and the department has learned. I think we've learned how to be more effective in our roles because I was a bit less than vigilant for a period of time there in regard to perhaps the questioning that I should have been pursuing in the House.

I was caught up in the chlorin e mine set as was everybody else, the Mississaugua experience, and was not delving as deeply into the subject as I should have. I won't make that mistake again and I'm certain the Minister won't make the mistake of . . . MR. JORGENSON: You think you won't. MR. COWAN: . . . of being caught unawares like that. One can't knock themselves too hard on this.

I think I was bringing out some of the carcinogenic properties right from the start and trying to get the discussion to that level but I was not as vigilant as I would have wished I had been until being jogged by someone into greater action and participation. But the fact is that we have a lot to learn from this.

We have learned a lot but there is a lot yet to learn and it is my hope, and my sincere hope, that we use this experience, not so much to cast blame although that's part of the political process and I will defend my right to do so and I know the Minister in similar circumstances would defend his right to do so.

That is part of it and that is an essential part of the process - I don't mean to belittle it, but we also must learn how to build a better society and build a better world, safer, healthier; that we are confronted as legislators, opposition and government alike, with some very serious problems, problems not of our own making and problems many times not even comprehensible to us, problems which we have trouble dealing with, problems which are exotic to our own experiences, problems which are going to cause us a great deal of consternation and concern, but we must deal with them.

The Minister has a different approach than I would on this. I believe that approach is reflected in the two di fferent politic al phil osophies from which we origi nate, that his politic al phi losophy has one approach that has been standard and historical and ours has a different approach. And we will argue that, I am certain we will argue that more in the future. We have discussed it over the last couple of days.

But we must never lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with a concern, with a subject that is very important to the people we represent, whether we represent a northern constituenc y or a southern constituency. The Attorney-General is here and I have to at this point just say that I was somewhat bothered, and I hate making that admission because he may in the future try the same tactics, but I was somewhat bothered when we called for the emergency debate and he said, that's just a political gambit on the part of the Member for Churchill to get votes.

I assure the Minister that it was not; I assure the Minister that my concerns in this and the concerns of my colleagues and I know the concerns of his government, are in fact in the best interests of the society at large. I assure the Minister that when we do bring these matters forward that we do so because we want to develop a better system; because we want to place on the floor some of the problems which we face so that we can have the interchange, so that we can have a discussion, so that we can develop better mechanisms to deal with these sorts of problems that do confront us.

So as an aside I mention that, but I don't want to use it to create a confrontation because I think one of the major achievements of this estimates proceedings is that we have been able to avoid a confrontation over this issue; because I believe it is an issue that is not best suited by confrontation tactics and I am certain the Minister believes that, and I know we have both gone out of our way in order to avoid that confrontation; that we have not risen to the bait when sometimes it was difficult for us not to because we understand the importance of the subject and we understand the importance of co-operation and mutual discussion so that we can benefit from each others knowledge and from each others thoughts.

I would hope that we will continue in that way to discuss these, to have this open discussion on these problems. I know, and I don't believe that it's wrong, that we will from time to time get trapped in the more political aspects of it, that's part of our nature as political beings.

But I assure the Minister that even when we do that, and even when we are wagging our fingers back and forth, and even when we are using terms such as inept and bungling, we may believe them, we are doing so because we believe the problems to be serious enough that we give it our full effort and use all those methods that are available to us to encourage the Minister to act, to gi ve the Minis ter the benefit of what li ttle knowledge we do have but also to give the Minister the benefit of the great concern that I know we all share.

So there will be times in the future when it will look like this co-operation may be breaking down, that this interchange and discourse may be breaking down, but the fact is we are doing so in what we believe to be the best interests of all our constituents in our province because our province is part of a very small world that is becoming more and more deluged by these sorts of problems and we must act together and we must act immediately so that we can forestall some of the major impacts that could result if we were to allow conditions to go on continuing to exist that need not exist and that certainly should not exist.

So I look forward to criticizing; I look forward to sugges ting; I look forward to these sorts of conversations and interchanges. I hope that when it's all over and when the dust is cleared and the 3272

Monday, 5 May, 1980 samples are all in and the story has been told over and over again, that we have made it a little bit better world to live in, and as long as I am certain that we are working towards those goals, I am certain that our efforts are not in vain and that what we do is probably the high est calling for any individual in my opinion and that is we seek to save the future. And I only hope that we continue and that we are successful in that regard. MR. COWAN: 5.(c)( 1)- pass; 5.(c) (2)- pass; 5.(d)( 1)-p ass; 5.(d)(2)- pass.

Resolved that there be granted to Her Majesty a sum not exce eding 4,875 ,400 for Consu mer, Corporate Affairs and Environment - pass. We shall return to Resolution 34, 1.(

a) Minister's Compensation. The Member for Logan. MR. WILLIAM JENKINS: Mr. Chairman, I want to say that this has been, for me, a fairly enjoyable experience. I want to thank the Minister for being as frank and having the conversations that we've had with him on the various topics.

I must say that when we go from Consumer and Corporate Affairs into the Environment we are really crossing quite a wide spectrum. -(Inte rjection)- I'm not going to repeat what the Honourable Minister of Hig hways just said to me but I do want to say to the Minister that I've enjoyed his frankness and I want to reiterate what the Member for Churchill has said, that while we may not always be in agreement, and I guess that's part of the political process, but I think we all do feel that the estimates procedure is one of the means by which we can exam ine the estimates and the philosophy of the Minister, and I'm not talking in a political nature as much as his philosophy, with the result I think I have learned a few things about the environment that I didn't know before.

As I said when we started these estimates I certainly didn't consider myself to be an expert in any of these fields but I do want to thank the Minister for the patience that he's shown with us and when we next meet again to discuss his estimates, well, we'll hope that we will carry on in the same fashion. There is one item, it slipped my mind when we were dealing with the Queen's Printer, and it has to do with the contracts because the Minister said that the Queen's Printer, Management and Brokerage was the brokerage firm for all departments and I'd just like to find out the government's contract re policies.

Will Manitoba firms be given preference if they were not necessarily the lowest? I mean, has the department a policy or has the brokerage firm a policy in that, or say if an out-of-town printing firm could do printing cheaper than a contract of a Manitoba firm, would a Manitoba firm, if they were in a percentage range, be given a preference over out of-province firm? MR. JORGENSON: I know that other provinces take a pretty firm view on that subject. Very little outside printing goes to anybody outside their provinces. We don't take such firm positions but we do if the descrepancy is a narrow one. MR.

JENKINS: Say within about five percent? MR. JORGENSON: I think it would depend on the size of the job. I have not set any firm figure but if the discrepancy in the bidding is low we feel that preference should be given to a firm in Manitoba who emplo ys Manitobans. So that's certainly not breaking new ground in that area because other provinces take very firm positions on it, positions that I think are wrong, but they are doing it so we feel justified in at least giving some preference to Manitobans in that context. MR. JENKINS: Fine, thank you. MR. CHAIRMAN: The Member for Wolseley. MR. ROBERT G. WILSON: Mr.

Chairman, unfortunately had to go to another committee and there's a couple of items that I wanted to discuss. One is the general concensus of the right of the public to know. I know when I attended the Parliamentary Commonwealth Conference with other provincial representatives, the Al berta contingent and myself had a chance to discuss the approach of consumerism and the protection of the consumer. It was felt that we would be better to have laws which would protect the consumer and allow the free flow of busine ss rather than have the jackboot of government or government control over the different industries.

It is for this reason that I seek with amazement a couple of questions and observations. I had a talk with the Attorney-General during his estimates and I've attempted a number of times to get the legal profession to publish a

schedule of fees. While it would be just a general guideline to the public, it would be something on which the consumer would be able to ascertain whether he is being given a fair shake. I notice that it's only when somebody has the wherewithal and the imagination to be able to take a matter to the courts that a judge like Judge Allan Philp reduced one legal bill by 12 ,000.00. I'm wondering why, to the Mi nister, why is the Minister of Consumer and Corpor ate Affairs and the Environment not have any say in the particular

section dealing with the particular Law Society and requesting that they give some guidelines and some direction to the general public pertaining to the establishment of a

schedule of fees? They do have a

schedule of fees printed, which I have read. It is very vague. It is not precise and it deals with only one or two areas. I believe in the collection of bad debts they are allowed to charge something like 25 percent, also in the area of some mortgages dealings they have general guidelines but it is not printed in a booklet form. There doesn't seem to be any way the general public can be given an opportunity to examine.

Even curtailing, I notice that one or two lawyers are beginning to advertise which I welcome and they're advertising 75.00 an hour, well, I think that at least gives the public a general view that this particular firm is 75.00 an hour. I also look with amazement that at one time there used to be a tariff of 25.00 an hour - I believe that's the legal aid

schedule - but as soon as a chap gets annointed a Q.C. he then is able to charge 100.00 an hour and I wonder what great power of the marketplace determines that anyone that is annointed with a Q.C. can all of a sudden charge four times what his colleagues can 3273

Monday, 5 May, 1980 charge? So what I'm saying, I think the consumerism at some point in time, and I appreciate Manitoba never seems to lead the way, but I at some point in time, if other provincial people do read Hansard, maybe Ontario or some other place will take the lead and have a

schedule of fees printed. The other area, now that we're into the law aspect, is unde r the Minister's portfolio, unde r The Consumer Protection Act under 102( 1) the Minister has a very very encouraging and interesting chapter. It says: If the amount has been paid by the debt or recover from the creditor an amount equal to three times the amount of the charge as a debt due to the debtor, I find that this

section is most encouraging except I personally, myself, have taken thre43 or four people to court and each time had it thrown out by a judge. I'm wondering if the Minister, at any time in the future, could give me a sample where this particular

section has ever been successful in the courts; or was it put in with so many loopholes that it becomes a

section where lawyers can make a good deal of money because in most cases the person going to court has to pay almost that equal amount in legal fees? I wanted to just draw that to his attention. I would more than welcome if he could give me an example where somebody has been successful under this section. One particular judge said it doesn't apply to contracts; another judge says it does not apply unless a statement of claim has been issued. I throw those out, whether they're accurate or not, these are my recollections as that particular

section dealing with The Consumers Act. Not wanting to hold up the estimates I did want to again, now that I've finished with the lawyers, want to talk about the insurance companies. At one time under the former government, the Consumer and Corporate Affairs Department had to administer a good deal of bonding requirements for the small businessman and the used car dealers and so on and so forth, within the provincial boundaries.

The whole idea of government requiring a bond was so that the insurance companies would go out and investigate the individual, make sure the person had financial stability, honesty and integrity, and met certain standards and was a person of good st anding within the commu nity. But now the insurance companies have all either fled or opted out of the bonding

section and the government has imposed a 5,000 bond, which means that upon payment of a 5,000 bond anyone can get into the particular industry. I, myself personally, was favoured with a bond by a large insurance agency called Reed Stenhouse since 19 58 and due to the media coverage of myself, I guess, my bond was yanked and I now am required to put up the 5,000 cash.

I have no quarrel with this, this is the insurance industry's choice except that I find that I'm probably in a better position today than I was in 1958 to be able to cover the 5,000 with the assets that the corporation has, as compared to the assets it had in 1958. So I would wish the Minister would consult with the insurance companies and ask if this is going to be a practice, and maybe the government is going to have to hire a staff person so that we can do the role that the insurance companies were doing, i.e. investigate the people that we are giving coverage to.

To turn around and increase the cash requirement for a person starting out in business would be very harsh and probably is not really the whole idea behind the bonding of individuals. In the area that I know about under the financial and credit community, I find it amazing that the government only bonds the corporations and they do not bond the individual. So what you have is an almost unfair situation where a person and the human failings of the individual gets caught up in one of these sometimes clear and sometimes very vague sections of The Consumers Protection Act and also

interpretations of lawyers versus civil servants and charges are laid against the corporation. And as each charge is laid the fine doubles and triples and quadruples and in the meantime the aggrieving individual starts up his own compoany, or moves to a competitor and might indeed be the very person that is the cause of all these particular infractions under three or four different companies that he may work for within the industry.

So I would like to see a bonding requirement for the individuals and that the infractions committed under the different statutes which this Minister is responsible for; be the sole responsibility of the individual who commits the infractions with some sort of record made of the corporation to which this person is working for. I think it makes sense because, after all, it is the human being that is in the forefront and is dealing with the individuals.

I can think of, say in the business of collection agencies, possibly 25 to 35 collection agencies, somewhere thereabouts, in the province, each training individuals, some like Financial and Allied and they have staffs of 20 or 30 individuals; and as each one of these personalities runs afoul of the Act, if they were bonded and licensed in such a way that if they continued they would then run into a situation where the government could indeed protect the person who, through hard times or what other, under circumstances sometimes premeditated, has a large debt to the community and should not have to put up with the harrassment of an individual who may have some sort of mental shortcoming and would be better off out of the industry.

I'm sorry to put this altogether but the Minister is closing and if I at least put them on the record, then at some point in time one of his staff people may be able to comment. And just to close, I realize this is probably a federal responsibility, but I'm now after the food people, the warehousing people. I found with amazement and I have a lid here - I talked about our little canine friends - I think possibly one of the major scandals that is on in the city of Winn ipeg right now is the spiralling costs and increase of pet foods.

I guess pets are probably a luxury of good times but it still doesn't call for people such as - this one here is from Safeway - having a product called Puss 'n Boots Tender Moist Cat Food on their shelf at 85 cents on a Saturday, and on the Monday morning it's 95 cents and then they put it on sale the following week at 93 cents. I would suggest at the size of their warehouse that they must have had a great deal of stock because very conveniently Loblaw and Dominion Stores and all the other big five or six very conveniently, simu ltaneously, put the food prices up almo st identical.

You cannot convince me that a product that was selling 4 for 1.00 and is now 41 cents a tin 3274

Monday, 5 May, 1980 was not stockpiled somewhere in a warehouse and that some means has to be devised through the provincial and federal governments, either through serial numb ers or through some form of computerized identification so that these huge profits from old stock are, at some point in time, checked or possibly questions raised so that the consumer, the purchasing public - and in many cases it is the elderly who have these pets, it is large families, ones with many children, that have a pet; there are a few areas of the city where they call them doggie areas where there's probably a greater number of pets per home than other sections of the city but I would suggest that if a study was done that it is not just the wealthy that have pets, both cats and dogs; I would suggest that it is the elderly, the lonely and those with large families.

I think it is absolutely most questionable that this type of increase, right across the board, is there and it is not, believe it or not - well the most expensive brand is Dr. Ballard's - it is these other unhe ard of brands who tested the market with the 5 for a 1.00 and the 4 for a 1.00 and now they're 41 and 47 cents a tin. I just think 10 cents over a weekend is far too great a price and I would hope that by putting that on the record, some federal government person dealing with price fixing and combines would look at this particular area.

What I am suggesting is that there is some combine, there is some area of price fixing that causes these prices to be almost identical in major shopping centres throughout the city of Winnipeg. MR. CHAIRMAN: The Member for Fort Rouge. MRS. JUNE WESTBURY: Thank you , Mr. Chairperson. Unfortunately, I had to miss part of the estimates because I was in the other room and, if I repeat things that have been brought up before, please let me know and I'll read the answers as they appear in Hansard.

First of all, I had some questions and comments on the Queen's Printer part of the estimates and I know there have been one or two questions. I don't know that these particular - is there something wrong with that? MR. CHAIRMAN: I might just need some guidance here, but I believe my understanding, when we get back to the Minister's Compensation, it's an overall comment. I don't think we go back into the questioning any one item in the estimates that have already been passed. It's just a general comment and an overall, as I understand it, and I could be wrong; I need some guidance. MRS. WESTBURY: All right.

I'll commend him for the excellent job he's doing and then go on to ifs, buts and maybe's, but, after the first semi-colon, but, Mr. Chairperson, you may very well be right. What I have been listening to is people who talk on the general subject of the Minister's Salary but they refer back to their concerns in certain areas. This is what I'm going to do.

I understand that there's a great deal of di scontent, frustration in the Queen 's Printer's Branch because of certain changes in salary for the position, for instance, of a gazette clerk, which was formerly paying 26,000 a year and the Civil Service Commission is reducing the salary to 16 ,000.00. Staffing vacancies have led to written complaints from provincial judges and the incapacity to bill departments for use of the service will, no doubt, eventually be identified by the Provincial Auditor. I wonder if the Minister wants to comment on that.

The salary for a gazette clerk, I'm told in Saskatchewan, yields a salary of 36,000.00. All seven managers, I'm told in the Queen's Printer section, have filed complaints with the Manitoba Government Empl oyees' Association on their reclassification reviews and this has been referred to me because they just don't feel that they are getting very much considera tion from the department or from the government. I'm told there is no mechanism or procedure to di strib ute or print the statutes in French. The Queen's Printer was told not to worry about it and who is going to do this printing, if not the Queen's Printer?

Have other plans been made or how has the Minister instr ucted his staff to deal with the distribution of Manitoba's statutes in French? There were complaints - I believe this question was asked by the Honourable Minister for Logan - a question asked about the tendering system and whether there has been an official or unofficial direction given to not to use Manitoba over Canadian firms. I understand that the Minister's reply to that was, only if the extra cost is minimal, and I take it that there is a percentage over which you do give preference to Manitoba firms.

There was a question raised about the concern on the part of employees that the method used in the estimates of costing new equipment over one year instead of seven years is intended or is likely to inflate costs to departments, and their concern that it may lead to a possible contracting out of the work, instead of it being handled through the department. So if the Minister can give us any information on that, I'd appreciate it. I asked a number of questions on rents in question period, and I' ve also asked some unde r the estimates in this Min ister's estimates.

I must say that I am extremely concerned, and my constituents and many leaders in the commun ity are extremely concerned over the apparent lack of concern by this government for the increases in rents that are expected after the controls are taken off in June. I have many many questions from the community on that. We just have received ineffectual answers on any questions that have been posed to the government on the whole matter of rent controls, and what's going to become of those people on fixed incomes after the 31 st of June.

The Minister indicated they could move around from an apartment block to apartment block, taking advantage of vacancies. Well, you know, we might as well put an elderly person into a personal care home and then they won't have to worry about it. The taxpayer and the province will have to worry about it, because these people just can't chase around empty apartments looking for breaks on rents and that's a totally unrealistic and unacceptable attitude, as far as the community is concerned, Mr. Chairperson.

I hope that sometime, in the next month or so, that the government will come forward with some positive program to protect the consumer in this area; to protect the elderly on fixed income; to protect the 3275

Monday, 5 May, 1980 people who are not quite elderly, between 50 and 65 who are having serious difficulties, many of them, in finding jobs, in holding their jobs and sometimes those people are worse off than the elderly people, and of course the working poor, the single parent families and these various groups that do need the protection and the concern of government and are not getting it, I'm afraid, Mr. Chairperson. I want to make a few remarks on the MacGregor railway spill.

I believe that the attitude of the Minister during that crisis - and I imagine he will question that word - I believe his manner and attitude were deplorable. The concentration on the experts at Dow Chemical as the source for his assurance that there was little or no danger to the residents of the community of MacGregor was ludi crous, in my opinion. I just do not understand how you can accept the word of the perpetrators of the condition and take them as your experts.

This Minister, who is in charge of the Environment, why he didn't even call the Minister of Transport as soon as the accident occurred, in order to have the benefit of the assurances and the expertise in his department who were available to the Minister, why he waited until the Saturday following the Monday on which the accident occurred to call the Manitoba Minister to obtain his intercession in this matter which built up into a very frightening incident in Manitoba.

That was because the politicians and the public did not accept the assurances of the Minister because he didn't really seem to be totally in control of the situation and he didn't seem to be totally frank with the House or with the public on what was really going on out there and what the dangers were. -(l nterjection) Wel l, Mr. Axworthy wasn't involved with the MacGregor spill, and that's what I'm talking about. The intervention, Mr.

Chairperson, leads me to say that I find it strange and amusing that everytime anyone raises a voice in this House or in the committees, if the NOP raise a voice in criticism they are told it was worse when you were in power, if I raise a voice I'm told what's Lloyd Axworthy doing on some totally different subject. Frankly, I'm not here as an apologist for Lloyd Axworthy or for the federal government, I am here representing the Liberals who vote in Manitoba for a provincial representative.

To get back to the subject that I was on, I have to say that I was di sappointed altogether in the complacency of the Minister in this whole spill that whole week following the accident because I found that, in itself, frightening. I was accused of rabble rousing, of scaring people by asking questions such as, is there any

Document details

Collection	Manitoba — Debates (Hansard)
Citation	31-4-51b
Type	hansard
Volume / chapter	31st 4th hansardpdf 51b.pdf
Language	en
Format	pdf
Source	PROVINCIAL
Identifier	f41a19a6cde2e801f97a46d0253161320d748dde

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