1987 Legislative Session: 1st Session, 34th Parliament

HANSARD

The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.

The printed version remains the official version.

Official Report of

DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(Hansard)

THURSDAY, MAY 28, 1987

Morning Sitting

[ Page

1417 ]

CONTENTS

Routine Proceedings

Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1987 (Bill 19). Committee stage.

(Hon. L. Hanson) –– 1417

Mr. Lovick

Mr. Gabelmann

Division

Mr. Clark

Mr. Miller

Mr. R. Fraser

Mrs. Boone

Mr. Williams

Mr. Serwa

Mr. Rose

Appendix –– 1428

The House met at 10:07 a.m.

[Mr. Pelton in the chair.]

Prayers.

MS. A. HAGEN: I'd like to ask the House to join me in

welcoming Doug Hardy, a friend from New Westminister who occasionally

comes to watch the deliberations in this House.

Orders of the Day

HON. MR. STRACHAN: Mr. Speaker, I call committee on Bill 19.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REFORM ACT, 1987

(continued)

The House in committee on Bill 19; Mrs. Gran in the chair.

section 5 as amended.

MR. LOVICK: Madam Chairman, yesterday when debate on this

particular bill adjourned, the atmosphere, to put it charitably, was

rather charged. On occasion, certainly, the moments were not entirely

happy, and I am willing to acknowledge that I perhaps contributed to

that atmosphere. I sincerely hope that today's will be somewhat more

civilized and more restrained.

However, I am concerned about activities undertaken on the part of

this government that impinge directly on this matter, activities which

I think exacerbate the situation and threaten to make it as

confrontational and contentious as it turned into yesterday. I'm

referring specifically to this kind of advocacy advertising we see in

the newspaper. This kind of advocacy advertising, while we're debating

in the House....

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, hon. member. Would you please take

your seat. Before you go any further in your remarks, I would like to

ask that you direct your remarks to the

section that is being debated.

MR. LOVICK: Well, Madam Chairman, I am trying to do precisely

that and suggesting that what has happened is that our debate about the

impact and the importance of

section 5, and all the emotions

surrounding that particular debate, are not helped one whit by this

kind of activity on behalf of the government. Surely that is directly

connected to the motion we're discussing.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Hon. member, your point is well taken. Would you continue with debate on the actual section.

MR. LOVICK: I shall.

I want to touch on only one other question about

section 5, and I don't

believe I'm going to be very long today on that, Madam Chairman. What would

constitute unreasonable behaviour on the part of an employer who was trying

to discourage the organization of a particular workplace? We're talking

now about the specific instance of employees banding together with a view to

getting their workplace certified, and to getting themselves certified as a

bargaining agent.

We have already put some pressure on precisely what that whole

section about free speech means; we have asked how it differs

significantly from the existing legislation that was there before, i.e.

section 3 of the old Code. The question, though, is whether in fact we

can come up with any scenario that wouldn't somehow qualify as being

permissible because of that free-speech claim. I was reflecting on this

and thinking that even though we have language like "coercion,

intimidation, threats, undue influence," as I tried to suggest the

other day, I think it doesn't require a great deal of imagination or

creativity on the part of a lawyer to demonstrate that it is

questionable whether any given act would fall into those three

categories: coercion, intimidation, threats. I want to just try that

out for a moment and see if I can't, in fact, build this case: namely,

that what an employer would do in terms of trying to discourage a union

— legitimately, perhaps, do under the guise of free speech.... I'm

sorry; I'm struggling to get this concept straight. Let me try that

again. Given this provision whereby free speech is allowed with only

those narrow constraints, I'm suggesting that almost anything goes.

In other words — let me give you an example or two — if an employer

were to say, "I believe that I am no longer going to be able to

function in a competitive environment if this place becomes organized,"

is there anything at all that we could use to say to that person that

that is not true, that that is intimidation, threat, coercion? Surely

it's the right of the individual to say that, because obviously

anything that is going to take away from the employer's side of the

total benefit in any kind of employment arrangement in a place of work

will be considered to be an interference with his or her right to make

dollars, to prosper, to function. That's the nature of an adversarial

system. Obviously every dollar that the trade union earns for its

members is a dollar taken away from the management.

The question, then — let's have no illusions about that — is: can't

an employer quite legitimately under this provision for free speech

make almost any claim that he or she wants about the threat of a union?

What constitutes unreasonable? What constitutes threat? What

constitutes coercion? To be perfectly honest about it, when I think

about this I cannot, in all honesty, come up with what I would call a

paradigm case of violation. I can't see how you could violate — okay? —

the legislation that is proposed to us.

[10:15]

If that's the case, if my conclusion is correct — and I would invite

the minister, please, to try to demonstrate where I am wrong — then

this is bad language, because it does not in any way, shape or form

satisfy the requirements that were set out and does not in any way,

shape or form satisfy the requirements that were set out, and does not

in any way fulfill the promise that the minister has suggested it would.

So I would invite the minister to respond to that question if he

can, and try to give us some specific illustrations of ways in which an

employer would be doing the wrong thing and would be violating this

provision as stipulated in

section 5.

HON. L. HANSON: I'm still having difficulty in understanding

whether we are here to debate the principles of this bill as it relates

section 5, or whether we are here to hear cases that may be

presented to the new Labour Relations

[ Page 1418 ]

Board, if you will, with all of the facts and all of the evidence that leads up to that.

The member opposite is asking me to comment on a specific case that

I don't know exists, that he doesn't know exists, and that nobody knows

exists at this point. The reason we do put adjudication-type committees

in place is to make decisions based on the law that they have to guide

them. We say very clearly in the amendment that nothing in the act

deprives a person of his freedom to express his views, provided he does

not use undue influence, intimidation, coercion and threats. That, to

me, is an indication that a good and properly constituted board will

make a decision considering all of the facts that are presented to them.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains the following

section. It says, "...freedom of thought, belief, opinion and

expression, including freedom of the press and other media of

communication..." and it goes on to include freedom of association.

Those are fundamental freedoms. They're so fundamental, as a matter of

fact, Madam Chairman, that the Charter limits the extent to which they

can be curtailed. The Canadian Charter of Rights — and I quote —

"guarantees the rights and freedoms set out, subject only to such

reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in

a free and democratic society. That's very important. If you try to

limit freedom of association or freedom of expression, you will not

succeed unless your limits are reasonable. We believe that the limits

on the ability of the employer to express his opinions are reasonable,

in that he cannot use undue influence, intimidation, coercion or

threats.

Section 2(

l) and (2) of the Labour Code is quite clear that freedom

of association means employers and employees are free to be members of

a trade union or an employers' organization. On the subject of freedom

our new

section 2(3) does two things: it declares that the act does not

deprive anyone of his freedom of expression; and it prescribes

reasonable limits to that freedom of expression. We believe it is a

reasonable limit on that freedom to say that a person must not use

intimidation, threats or coercion. We believe that it must be

demonstrated and justified, that it is fair and reasonable and that it

not imply intimidation, coercion or threats. We go even further and say

that freedom of expression is to be curbed if it amounts to undue

influence. At this point we have to stop. Any stronger curb on freedom

of expression would be against the spirit of the Canadian Charter of

Rights and Freedoms.

The opposition seem to be reading some dire threats in this

legislation that would allow threatening remarks to be made freely to

someone who is trying to deal with the certification. I go again to the

point that nothing in this act that should stop a person — and that

includes the union organizer, the individual employee and the employer

— expressing his views, providing he doesn't use undue influence,

intimidation or coercion. I still have difficulty in understanding why

the opposition are opposed to giving that freedom of information that

must go between the various parties so that they can make up their

minds fairly and reasonably as to which way they want to go, whether it

be representation by a union or an association or individually.

MR. LOVICK: Madam Chairman, sadly we are parallel streams; we

are not converging. Clearly we're talking about different things, it

would seem to any observer

I don't want to belabour the point; obviously we're not serving

anybody's interest by my continuing to do so. Instead, let me just

offer this observation. I would suggest that it is incumbent upon

legislators of whatever persuasion to do that kind of hypothesizing,

that kind of anticipating what the legislation actually means. I would

argue further that to suggest that we will simply defer to a board, a

tribunal or somebody else to answer the difficult questions, or even

grapple with the difficult questions, amounts, frankly, to an

abrogation of responsibility. That's my concern, and I say so without

rancour. I say it, rather, with sadness, because it seems to me that

what we have been trying to get for the last two days is precisely some

specific answers to some very particular and specific kinds of

questions.

The question in this case, again for the record, is simply: what

constitutes coercion, intimidation or threat? I am suggesting to you,

Mr. Minister, through you, Madam Chairman, that you cannot come up with

something to which all of us can instantly say: "Yes, indeed. That

equals coercion, intimidation and threat." I'm suggesting further that

if you want to present that, Mr. Minister, I will happily take the

adversarial point of view and suggest that I can build a pretty darned

good case to suggest that that thing is not coercion, intimidation or

threat. If I'm correct in that analysis, if that argument is correct,

then the whole section, frankly, doesn't matter a great damn. That's

the problem, Mr. Minister.

MR. GABELMANN: As we closed yesterday afternoon, I indicated

that I was going to refer to a series of LRB and court decisions

reflecting on earlier language, and ask questions relating to the

language as it's now changed. But I've decided not to do that. I think

we've had sufficient debate on this clause. In fact, frankly, Madam

Chair, I think we've spent more than enough time on

section 5. I think

the problem yesterday was that it took a long time to clarify the

issues that were at stake. It took considerable time — most of

yesterday afternoon — to get the minister to be as forthright as we had

hoped he would have been earlier. We did get that clear from the

minister. There's clearly a division of opinion, which is quite

significant, between that side of the House and this about issues

involved with employer interference in organizing or in decertification

campaigns. There is a difference of opinion. We feel strongly about it,

and presumably some members, particularly the second member for

Richmond (Mr. Loenen), feel quite strongly the other way. We are just

going to have to leave it at that.

In conclusion I would like to read a very brief excerpt from a

decision of the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board which deals with

the issue. I will quote the excerpt. It is not long — it's not as long

as the thing I did a couple of days ago; it's just one paragraph — and

we will leave the debate at that. This is the Saskatchewan Labour

Relations Board's 1981 Super-Valu case.

"During an organizing campaign, the employees while at

work are a captive audience for whatever representation the employer

wishes to make to them with respect to the union, whether directly or

indirectly, while, on the other hand, the union representatives do not

have free access to the employees at the workplace. The employees are

economically dependent upon the employer for their livelihood, and,

naturally, they are generally highly sensitive to any communications

from the employer with respect to union organization, whether direct or

indirect. It must

[ Page

1419 ]

also be recognized that the employer may in very subtle ways

make its wishes known to the employees. Recognition of all these factors leads

the Board to very careful scrutiny of all employer actions, communications and

other conduct which might, in the eyes of the employees, constitute open or

tacit efforts to interfere in the decision of the employees. In such circumstances

the employer should remain strictly neutral, and where an employer takes any

actions which stray from strict neutrality, he runs the inevitable risk of impinging

upon the employees' right to choose or not to choose a union without interference

from the employer."

[10:30]

Section 5 as amended approved on the following division:

YEAS –– 29

Brummet

L. Hanson

Michael

Parker

Pelton

Loenen

Crandall

De Jong

Rabbitt

Dirks

Veitch

Strachan

Vander Zalm

Couvelier

Davis

R. Fraser

Weisgerber

Jansen

Hewitt

A. Fraser

Chalmers

Mowat

Ree

Bruce

Serwa

Vant

Huberts

Messmer

S.D. Smith

NAYS — 17

G. Hanson

Barnes

Marzari

Rose

Stupich

Boone

Gabelmann

Blencoe

Cashore

Smallwood

Lovick

Sihota

Miller

A. Hagen

Jones

Clark

Edwards

section 6.

HON. L. HANSON: I move the amendment to

section 6 standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]

On the amendment.

MR. GABELMANN: I want to ask the minister what the motivation

was for the changes that were made, which include eliminating the word

"services" and inserting the word "buying" as a major change. What

thinking went into that particular change?

HON. L. HANSON: The secondary boycott, as it relates to the

deletion of or using the services of, clarifies that the intent of the

section is to prohibit secondary boycotts and not to restrict the

capacity of the parties to negotiate contracting out language. The

primary impact of the change will be on the construction industry.

Secondary boycotts and contracting out is also dealt with in a

section

that we will come to later in the process.

The word "buying" has been added at the request of the draftsman

for relationship or symmetry with the word " selling," which is already

included. It's not intended to change the substance of the

section or to

incorporate any new meaning that might not be captured by the phrase "using

or otherwise dealing in the products of."

We also replace references to an agreement with reference to a

provision of an agreement being void. It clarifies that the intent of

the

section was not to void a collective agreement but only to void the

provision that was contrary to the legislation.

MR. GABELMANN: I understand the second change. I still am not

clear on the first change. Would the minister agree that the effect of

the new language in terms of what clauses are prohibited in a

collective agreement is the same under the amendment as it was under

the original proposal? Would the effect of the new language be the same

as the effect of the old language, or would the effect be different

with these changes?

HON. L. HANSON: The wording as it is in the old act, is it the same as the wording that's in this: is that your question? It isn't.

MR. GABELMANN: I'll try again. The wording in Bill 19 as

originally proposed means certain things. Does the amendment to that

original proposal mean now that it means different things?

HON. L. HANSON: Yes, it does. The

section that I referred to

further on deals with an exclusion as it relates to the contracting

industry. The wording "or using the services of " was seen to have an

effect on that exclusion of the contracting industry in a future

section that we will be dealing with. It relates to a clause later that

deals with affiliation and union work on a job site, and that sort of

thing; but we'll be dealing with that in a later section. So it does

change that in that sense.

MR. CLARK: I'm just struggling with how this materially

affects it. Can I put a proposition? If a union and a company put a

clause in a collective agreement that says you must buy something from

somewhere, that's no longer allowed; but if a union and a company enter

into an agreement that says that any contracting out of work performed

by union members must go to a union company, would that be allowed?

In other words, to make it more specific, a janitorial firm, for

example: if they contracted out the services.... Let me just put it

this way: if you eliminated the janitorial services from the master

agreement but said that any contracting out of janitorial services must

be to a union company, would that clause now be allowed, or would it be

struck down by this section?

HON. L. HANSON: Yes, it would be allowed under this section.

MR. GABELMANN: But not allowed under another one.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, we will be getting to the

other sections. That is an anticipatory question and we'll deal with it

as we come to that section.

[ Page 1420 ]

MR. GABELMANN: Dealing with the amendment, we're trying to

clarify the purposes of the amendment. It's clear that the change in

this

section allows something which is prohibited later on, so I'm not

sure we've really gained very much in terms of what we're talking about.

What's at issue here is secondary boycotts. The amendment appears to

say now that it's.... I think it still includes services — implied, if

not explicit — in the existing words. I wonder if the minister can

comment on that?

HON. L. HANSON: Are you suggesting that by the deletion of

the words "using the service of" it's still implied that you can't use

the services of...? Is that your

interpretation?

MR. GABELMANN: I'm having trouble understanding why you took

it out. There may be a good reason; there may be a specific case, a set

of circumstances that would have been covered if the word "services"

were included but now is not covered. I wonder if the minister can give

us an example of a situation which led to a decision to delete these

words.

HON. L. HANSON: Well, Madam Chairman, there's a conflict

between the provision in this

section as it was originally written and

those of another section. Without this amendment to this section, in a

section that we will come to discuss later the construction unions that

are exempt would not have been able to pursue grievance in an orderly

fashion for non-compliance with subcontractor clauses. But they would

have been able, in effect, to strike — to put down tools and interrupt

production for non-compliance with the nonaffiliation clause. So what

we're doing here — this removing "the services of" — will not have the

effect, as it would with the wording in there, of negating an exclusion

that comes up later in the sections.

[10:45]

MR. GABELMANN: That's what I understand it to be too. Let me

ask a further question. The position that the UA — the plumbers, Local

170 — have put to the minister in respect of clauses in their agreement

which require that their employers use material manufactured in UA

shops in North America.... That provision is clearly still illegal

under this change. Would the minister agree with that? He nods, and

that's sufficient; he does agree with that. So in terms of an ability

for construction unions to have what are in effect affiliation clauses

— which are allowed in a later section.... They are now precluded in

this particular section.

HON. L. HANSON: I think just exactly the reverse is true. The

allowance of non-affiliation clauses, without the removal of "using the

services of," would have been voided under this section.

MR. CLARK: Just to get it clear, then, the first change, in

"buying," is a technical amendment that no one requested but that was

caught by some staff, or something, and the second amendment is really

to deal specifically with construction unions and no one else. Is that

fair to say? The minister is nodding.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, that's what we refer to

specifically later in the bill, but substantially you're correct; it's

relating primarily to the construction industry.

Amendment approved

section 6 as amended.

MR. GABELMANN: What this

section as amended does is strip

freely-negotiated agreements out of collective agreements. It takes

away provisions that have been agreed to by the parties affected by the

agreement. In my view, that — and this is not the only

section that

does that — is a violation of a fundamental principle in our society.

If two parties enter into an agreement freely, without coercion, what

right does the government have to say to them: "You can't agree to do

those things"?

What they've agreed to do in this case is to try — particularly in

the construction industry, but elsewhere as well — to provide some job

security. One of the fundamental reasons for a union's existence is to

provide job security. Many would argue that it is the fundamental

reason for a union's existence. The job security that plumbers are

interested in, for example, relates to jobs in manufacturing — in a

particular instance — of goods that are used in construction here in

this province, particularly in pulp mills and other major elements of

our industry. What this

section will do in that case is say to plumbers

in the construction industry in British Columbia: "You will now no

longer be able to insist on working with goods produced in North

America by your fellow union members." They will now have to work with

imported goods from Korea, Taiwan or other Third World countries which

are produced by what in many cases is virtually slave labour,

destroying jobs around North America, but in particular jobs here in

British Columbia, because a great portion of the goods produced that

are used by the construction industry in fact come from British

Columbia.

What this clause will do will be to wipe out existing jobs here in

this province, and why the government would be interested in doing that

is beyond me. Why the government would be interested in saying to

manufacturers of piping or various components for the construction

industry: "We think it's better that we buy this stuff offshore than

buy it onshore. We think it's better that we provide employment in

Korea than provide employment here in British Columbia." Because that

is the effect of this section. Unions and their employers will no

longer be able to agree freely to buy material from a union shop or a

shop in which the same union is certified, or any other agreement that

they might reach freely. Why would the government be interested in

wreaking that kind of havoc on those jobs here in British Columbia that

heretofore have been produced as a result of agreements such as the one

the plumbers are so concerned about — and quite properly so, in my

view? I'd just like to ask the minister why he feels it's better to

bring in a

section that creates jobs in Korea, rather than leaving it

alone so we can preserve jobs here in British Columbia.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, it's obvious that there is a

difference of opinion as to what the results of this

section will be.

The suggestion I hear from the hon. member on the opposite side is that

this restrictive clause in Bill 19 will create all of the purchasing of

products from offshore markets. I could give that member a number of

instances where by that requirement, because the particular item was

not of union-made calibre in British Columbia, it was mandatory to

purchase it outside British Columbia, and in some cases outside Canada.

[ Page 1421 ]

We believe that the fundamental right, as it relates to free trade

and competition, is that two parties who sit down at a table and

negotiate an agreement that affects the viability and the jobs of a

third party who is not party to those discussions...is unfair. We feel

that the members of a shop producing goods should have the right, given

all of the information, which we concluded in

section 5, to make up

their own minds to become a certified union shop or not. We don't

believe that two parties who have no association with those two should

effectively use economic pressure — that in order to maintain their job

and the viability of their company, in order to compete in the free

market, they should be pressured unduly by two parties they have no

voice in to become union members. We feel that it's only fair that the

employees of that particular firm make up their own minds, given all of

the facts, how they want to be represented, whether it be by union or

by association or by individual. We believe that the operation of the

plant has some bearing on whether they have a job, and that if the

ability of that plant to compete in the open market requires them to

become members of a union before their owner's goods can be sold, that

is an unfair situation.

I guess there's a basic difference in philosophy. We don't think

that secondary boycotts should be used as a method to force people in

another organization to become unionized. We feel that they should be

able to make that decision without that coercive effect of secondary

boycotts. We have cases where goods, as I said earlier, because of the

union-made requirement....are actually sending business out of the

province of British Columbia because there are not goods of the type

that are required to be manufactured in British Columbia. It seems to

me to be a negative aspect if we are concerned about jobs in British

Columbia.

MR. MILLER: Surely this combines situation, or your fear of

it, is covered under federal legislation. If that is the case, and I

think it is, why would the minister want to change it? I think there

are lots of other arguments here that this clause strikes at what

people have freely negotiated. But surely that issue is covered by

combines legislation.

HON. L. HANSON: I appreciate the remarks of the member

opposite, but we are dealing in this bill with a fundamental philosophy

that we believe should be in the workplace in British Columbia. We are

quite simply, as I said earlier, ensuring that there is not any undue

influence on the employees of a firm who are dependent upon their

competitive position in the open market to become unionized or not.

We are simply saying that in the construction industry there is an

understandable requirement for those people to have an agreement that

the people working with them should be unionized, but we feel that it

is a restriction on free trade that there be a requirement that the

products used on the site are union made.

Going a little further, I think that I can give you a hypothetical case of

a large firm with a coffee room that has a pop machine in it. We think it is

unfair for the employer and the employees to insist that that pop machine be

serviced by unionized employees, because that then puts pressure on the repairman

of the pop machine to become a unionized member. We feel that he should have

that right to make that decision, given all of the facts as we put in the earlier

section 5, given all of the reasons and communication and information, without

undue pressure on him because of economic pressure extended by secondary boycotts.

MR. R. FRASER: This

section is such a great opportunity for

the company itself. Certainly from my perspective, Mr. Minister, I

would have left more things in it, because what you want to do is to

make the unit that the employees are working in the most viable or

survivable. Protecting your own job is number one; looking after

someone else's job obviously must be number two.

There are circumstances where you might want to pick one unionized

company over the other, not non-union or union necessarily. So you want

to have that freedom of choice. You want to make sure as an employee,

as an employer or as a member of a trade union that that economic unit

survives. You make that survive by giving the widest possible freedom.

The fact that "services" was taken out.... We hear from the minister

that that was done for other reasons. But I think it would have been

useful to have had it in. The product is fine; the product will work.

It will be better. It will make everybody more competitive, more

energetic. It is a survival opportunity really for everybody to work on.

We are not trying to protect the job in any other place but the

company where that one individual works. That is what this does. So it

makes unions compete with unions, companies compete with companies. It

is a very energetic amendment. It is a very energetic section. It is

useful; it has value. So it means you cannot restrict non-union; you

cannot restrict union; you cannot restrict union versus union,

non-union versus non-union. This is exactly what this economy needs.

MR. MILLER: I assume that that wasn't a question that the previous speaker had.

We spent quite a bit of time debating the previous

section dealing

with freedom. Mr. Minister, does this clause not interfere with

people's freedom to freely enter into negotiations?

[11:00]

HON. L. HANSON: No, it doesn't, absolutely not. I think that

the member opposite is suggesting that we are interfering with the

freedom of the two individuals sitting at the table.

Carry that a little further. With secondary boycotts, an agreement

that is made there is certainly much more seriously impeding on the

freedom of the third individual who doesn't even have a voice at the

table.

MR. MILLER: The minister is now casting himself in the role

of arbiter, of deciding which freedom to allow and which one not to

allow, so in essence there is no complete freedom.

For example, is there any provision or prohibition between companies

deciding? Quite apart from the wishes of a trade union to decide to

purchase or not purchase or decide that they will only purchase from

one particular company, is there any prohibition anywhere that prevents

that kind of decision being made? Is that a similar type of abuse? Does

the minister not see that in the same light?

HON. L. HANSON: Something that's being forgotten in this discussion or debate is the fact that there's nothing in here

[ Page 1422 ]

that says that the employer, or whoever's doing the

purchasing, can't continue to purchase union goods. It simply says that

two parties sitting at a table can't agree to put undue pressure on the

employees of a third party by that agreement. There is nothing in here

that says that the purchaser who is purchasing goods doesn't have the

freedom to purchase the goods wherever he wants. That's certainly his

privilege. They can be union-made or not union-made. They can be

imported. They can be anywhere. That's the basic philosophy that we're

trying to state: two people sitting down at a table should not be able

to reach an agreement that affects a third person who isn't in the

discussion. But that is not to say that they can't purchase those goods

that they had been purchasing for years. It's a free decision that they

make. They just cannot limit it by agreement.

MR. MILLER: Following from that answer, then a company could

not go to the labour board and say that because they couldn't sell

their product to another company, there was an implied provision

limiting the purchase of union-made goods. How are you going to sort

that one out? For example, say an arrangement exists now in a factory

that has a provision in its collective agreement with the workers that

they will only buy union-made goods, and this act goes through and that

clause is struck down, and yet that factory continues to follow exactly

the same thing that they've been doing all along as a result of that

original agreement. There is no breach of this section; because they

continue in the same manner, that doesn't imply that there is an

agreement. Is that what you're saying?

HON. L. HANSON: As I said — I guess I didn't make it clear

enough — that's freedom of choice. Certainly they're free, white and 21

to do all of those things, as is everyone else in the world, wherever

they are.

AN HON. MEMBER: Free, white and 21?

HON. L. HANSON: Well, that's an expression that wasn't meant to be a racial one. I withdraw it.

I'm simply saying that they're free in the free world to purchase from whomever they want, at whatever time.

I might ask the member on the other side: in the case of B.C.

Ferries, do you think it's right that we have a coverall manufacturer

in British Columbia that we couldn't buy our coveralls from because

they weren't a unionized firm? We had to purchase them from out of

British Columbia. It was a requirement.

MR. MILLER: I'd be happy to answer that.

MR. GABELMANN: First, Madam Chair, I think we need a more formal apology from the minister for that comment.

HON. L. HANSON: I'm sorry, and I do certainly make that. My apologies.

MR. GABELMANN: I'm just a little bit stunned by the fact that

anybody in 1987 would still make those kinds of racial comments that

were so prevalent in this society prior to a recognition that white

people weren't the master race. I appreciate the....

Interjections.

MR. GABELMANN: Just relax. I appreciate that the minister has

apologized. I must say it's just a stunning kind of comment that shakes

one up a little bit. The issue's dead; fair enough. I'll just try to

relax.

Dealing with the overalls, the people who have to wear those

overalls on the ferries are the people who should be making the

decision, I would not, as an employee of the B.C. Ferries, want to wear

a non-union suit, coverall or whatever. It would violate my rights as

an individual, my freedom to say that I will not wear clothing

manufactured by a non-union company. That should be a freedom available

to individuals.

Just continuing on this freedom issue, on the previous

section the

minister talked about the freedom of the employer to talk to the

employees about things. This

section takes away the freedom of the

employees to talk to the employer about where goods that they use

should be manufactured. In

section 5 we deny employees a right by

giving a freedom to their employer, a freedom to interfere; and in

section 6 we take away a freedom from employees to discuss with

employers. Is that fair? Is that balanced?

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, I think the member opposite

is taking the wrong approach to it. I think we've increased the

freedom. I think that the freedom of the individual or the freedom of

the businessman to compete in the free market is what we're talking

about here. We're not talking about taking away the freedoms of

individuals. As I said earlier, the employer is quite free to purchase

wherever he sees as being the reasonable place to purchase.

Let's say as an example that there are coverall manufacturers, if

you will, in British Columbia of both kinds. They're all British

Columbians; they're all democratic, free people. Why shouldn't they all

have the same right to compete in the open market, without an employer

and an employee group sitting down and making a decision that's

discriminatory against one of those two firms? The employer makes a

decision based on price, quality and all of the other things that are

involved in purchasing his goods. We just want to ensure that there

isn't an agreement written that makes that ability to compete in that

open market restricted.

MR. GABELMANN: Leaving the principle issue aside for the

moment, you do more than that. The legislation does more than that

because it contains the word implied. As I read this amendment, you

cannot even have a discussion with your employer about which of those

suppliers should be chosen; because if you do, if you say in

conversation with your employer, "we want you to buy the union

coveralls" — in this case or whatever — that's an implied agreement. So

it's no longer legal, right?

HON. L. HANSON: No, it's not right. I think that it's right

to say that there isn't an implied agreement that puts undue pressure

on another organization to become unionized. There's certainly nothing

that prohibits the discussion of quality, the discussion of delivery,

and all of the other things that are related to a preferred product to

purchase. But it certainly should not be restricted by the simple fact

that if it's made in a union shop, the goods must be purchased from a

union shop. There's certainly no reason why anyone, employer or

employees, can't discuss the conditions, qualities,

[ Page 1423 ]

delivery of any product and decide to purchase a product, but not solely on the fact that it's made in a unionized shop or not.

MR. CLARK: Madam Chairman, I know the minister has apologized

for his statement, but I can't help reflecting that it is kind of

shocking coming from the minister responsible for human rights

legislation in this province.

I must say that the minister has talked a number of times about

fundamental philosophical differences, and there are on this question

some very serious ones regarding how we view individuals freely allowed

to negotiate their working conditions and the things that they do with

respect to their work. We believe or I believe that workers do have a

role not just in working but in participating in other decisions that

affect their lives, and this is one of them. The minister is saying,

when it comes to the free and competitive marketplace, that it's free

for employers but not free for workers to decide how they would best

like to see some provisions that deal with purchases of goods and

services by the company they work for.

It really is a very interventionist

section of the act. I can't help

reflecting that there are clauses like the plumbers' clause, which has

been in existence for 60 years in this province. There are clauses

relating to the operating engineers which will be voided by this

section and have been in existence for 22 years in this province; but

the plumbers' clause is the oldest one. I don't know if the minister

knows, but every year that's up for negotiation. Almost every year for

60 years the employer has tried to get that out of the collective

agreement and every year it stays in. It stays in because the union

gives something up in their negotiations to retain that.

What this clause does is retroactively intervene on the side of the

employer and takes something away from workers that they have fought

for for 60 years and have won consistently for 60 years, and have done

by trading off some other gain they could have made.

So it is very interventionist and really strikes at the way in which

we've conducted collective bargaining in this province, and in North

America for that matter, and intervenes directly to deal with something

which has been an irritant for the employers. This clause will have

significant economic impact. I don't want to overstate that, but it

will have an economic impact in this province.

One of the last pulp mills we built — I think the last one — was the

Skookumchuck pulp mill a few years ago, and there was an attempt by the

employer or the builder to use non-union pipe. Seventy percent of the

contract cost.... There was a lot of pipe; it was the single biggest

contract in a pulp mill. Seventy percent of the pipe was going to go to

a Japanese company but for this

section of the collective agreement

that was invoked by the union and fought over.

[11:15]

It went to the Labour Relations Board and was upheld; it went to the

highest court in British Columbia — the appeal court of British

Columbia — and was upheld. It's not a question of combines, legislation

or otherwise. It has been upheld by courts in this province

consistently for 60 years, and the latest fight over it was with

respect to the construction of a pulp mill, Skookumchuck, which had

great economic stimulus in the province in terms of the work it added.

Now we are faced in British Columbia with probably the largest pulp

mill expansion in years — close to a billion dollars in investment is

scheduled in the next year in pulp mill expansion — and I can't help

thinking that this clause and this bill may, in fact, have something to

do with the fact that we're on the verge of this kind of expansion in

the pulp sector. The timing is really significant, because if this

passes prior to tenders being let on all of those piping contracts, I

think it's quite clear — in fact, it's inevitable — that the vast

majority of that work will go to Japanese, Korean or other fabricators

of pipe and not to British Columbia contractors.

That will be the impact of this legislation, and it is particularly

significant in this sector now, because of the kind of expansion that's

scheduled in the pulp sector. I wonder if the minister could tell the

House whether he or his ministry has done any economic analysis of the

impact of this

section of the legislation.

HON. L. HANSON: Again, Madam Chairman, we haven't done any

in-depth analysis, but certainly we've had discussions with various

industries on the impact of the legislation. There may be some drift of

work outside of the province in the short term. That's a possibility,

but we believe that in the long run, when given the opportunity to

compete freely in the marketplace, it will generate some new

manufacturing that will fill that capacity.

The reality is that there are workers in both classes in the

province of British Columbia. By class, I mean that some are in

organized labour organizations, others are in simple bargaining

associations, and others are totally unionized. But we want everyone to

have a fair and reasonable right to compete in that market. We don't

feel that the fact that they are one or the other or the third in their

relationship with their employer means that they should suffer a

hardship as far as the ability to find work — simply because there is a

restriction on the ability of their employer to merchandise his goods.

I reiterate that we're not taking any freedom away from the

purchaser of goods. He certainly has the right to purchase any goods

that he wants, be they union-made or non-union made, but he can't write

into an agreement by contract that he will purchase only certain kinds

of goods, as they relate to organized labour or non-organized labour,

union-made or non-union-made. That's not to say that he won't continue

to purchase union-made goods forever and a day, but it will be done on

a voluntary, free-decision basis.

MR. CLARK: Well, I think it's a shocking admission the

minister made that there is a good chance we will lose work in the

short run in a province with the highest unemployment rate in western

Canada and one of the highest in Canada. The Minister of Labour and

Consumer Services is saying that this

section may well prohibit....

When will we next have a billion dollars in pulp mill expansion in this

province and the kind of work for pipefitters that we're going to see?

I think it strikes at another question, because he keeps referring

to the open market and how we have to compete in the long run. If you

expect, Mr. Minister, that we're going to compete with Taiwan and Korea

for pipe fabrication, then you're saying that we have to work for those

wages. The minister is nodding his head. If that is the future that

this government is talking about to the people of British Columbia,

then it is not a future that we relish on this side of the House, if

the minister or the government does. And it's not a future that the

government is putting forward very clearly — although some would argue

— to the people of British Columbia. Because that's the inevitability

of what you're saying. Consistently you're saying that we have to

compete with those countries, and you're saying that we can't compete

[ Page 1424 ]

now, and you're implicitly saying we can't compete

now because of the union and because of high wages. So you're assuming

that by this clause, if we lose work now because they're all union,

we'll gain it later because they'll all be nonunion and working for

less money. But how much less, and where does it end?

It is clearly ill-conceived, in my view, and the minister's comments

indicate clearly that they are aware of the dangers and the potential

consequences to the economy. I think that's a shocking admission.

MRS. BOONE: I'll know better than to let my colleague go before me again, because he's stolen most of what I wanted to say.

I wanted to reiterate the business of the contract — the fact that

contracts are negotiated, and that in a contract negotiation there is

give and take on both parts. Parts that have this

section that gives

the union the provision that they must use unionized products....

That's given at the cost of giving up something else. When you

deliberately go in and by legislation void something that people have

agreed upon, you're intervening in the worst way.

You have said you want to get the government off the backs of the

private sector, but you have no fear about putting that government on

the backs of the employees of this province. Government intervention,

it appears, is no longer acceptable in the private sector, but most

definitely acceptable in the employee sector. I'm really concerned

about this, because, as I stated, people have given up things in order

to have this in the contract.

One of the things that I find really interesting.... I find it funny

that you mention the B.C. Ferries, and is it right that they have to

use unionized contracts. You're stating that it shouldn't be right that

we are limiting the purchaser's ability to go anywhere to purchase

anything. Yet this government has deliberately said that B. C. Ferries

must use in the kitchen only products purchased in B.C. That is what

the minister has said.

Interjection.

HON. MR. STRACHAN: No, you're wrong.

MRS. BOONE: Am I wrong on that? I thought that's what the Minister of Transportation and Highways (Hon. Mr. Michael) indicated.

AN HON. MEMBER: Buy B.C.

MRS. BOONE: Buy B.C. Yes, that's what he's saying. On B.C.

Ferries it's "Buy B.C." He stood in this House and said, "Buy B.C.,"

yet we are not allowing the employees to say: "We want to use coveralls

made by unionized companies." So it appears that there is very much a

two-faced idea here. You can do one thing on the one hand, but the

unions — the employees — are not going to have any rights to insist on

anything whatsoever.

Does the minister have any idea as to how the employers are going to

give back to the employees something that they have given up in order

to have these areas in their contracts? Do you have any idea how you're

going to do that? You're most able and you seem most willing to go in

there and void sections of contracts that are negotiated in a free and

equal climate. What are you going to do to give these employees back

something that they've given away?

MR. WILLIAMS: I'd like to pursue the argument that the second

member for Vancouver East (Mr. Clark) made. It's very significant. It's

desperately necessary, given the economy of British Columbia, that we

think about the whole business of putting people to work. It happens

that there are these kinds of clauses that trigger those opportunities

for employment in British Columbia.

The bulk of the people on the other side probably don't know what's

happening in the pulp industry at the moment, but it's fat city.

They've never had it so good in the pulp industry in this province in

terms of profits and returns. That's because of the market — great

demand for pulp. The profits are so significant because we undercharge

for the resource, but that's another story, and we've dealt with it

before. There is a tremendous amount of money in return there that

could, in one way or another — if not through the Crown hands, through

private sector hands — be recirculated in British Columbia. If you're

on top of things, that's what you should be pursuing, in terms of your

broader role in cabinet.

The fact that there may be these private sector agreements with

unions that help us in that regard is good news — very good news

indeed. We in British Columbia should get the benefit of all this. We

produce pipe in this province. We produce it by and large through union

firms at decent wages. Now I think that's reasonable, and it should be

a decent public policy goal that there should be decent wages in every

industry in British Columbia.

What you're opening up in this whole exercise, in terms of

pressures, is the downward spiral in wages, which may serve the narrow

interests of a few foreign owners. What kind of public policy is that?

What kind of British Columbia policy is that? What we really need is a

made-in-British Columbia public policy throughout the piece, and we

would have, I suggest, very close to full employment in British

Columbia, not the desperate levels of unemployment we have right now,

particularly in some of the regions where these pulp mills are. It's

absolutely incredible that that isn't going through your minds, or at

least through your bureaucrats' minds, in terms of this business of

putting British Columbians back to work. You should really reconsider

these matters.

It seems to me that there's so much belied by everything you're

saying today — and that's been covered by others. It indicates a

mindset that is so narrow, it's really hard to fathom. Take this whole

business of workers being able to choose what they wear. You choose

what you wear every day of the week. Workers in jobs that you and I

might not like collectively having some kind of say about what they

wear, at least in terms of how it was made, is hardly asking for the

moon, in terms of the rights of those people as workers. It just

indicates a bias that is there again and again in every

section of this

legislation. The surrogate representatives in the Legislature of the

boss are delivering what he wants in terms of public policy and

legislation.

All of it pushes us into a downward spiral in terms of the economy

of the province and in terms of working conditions and wage levels.

It's absolutely extraordinary. If you could just pull yourselves back

and see what you're really doing to this province by this piece of

legislation and others, you might finally come to your senses.

[ Page

1425 ]

HON. L. HANSON: I'd like to ask a question of the member

opposite who says that we have lost our senses. If there were a

purchase-B.C. policy, would that mean a purchase-B.C. policy only using

union goods? You can continue...

Interjections.

HON. L. HANSON: Just give me a second.

...to make the conclusion that all work is going to go outside B.C.,

but that is totally hypothetical. I think that if you really got honest

about the situation, you would find more jobs in British Columbia as a

result of this legislation.

MR. WILLIAMS: We face hundreds of millions of dollars in new

capital investment in the pulp sector here and now, and you talk about

some pie-in-the-sky right-wing theory. You're the captive of

narrow-minded ideology, and that's typical of the government on the

other side. We're talking about hundreds of millions here and now that

could create jobs in British Columbia here and now — spinoffs from our

basic industry here and now. It's not unreasonable that we could have a

fair-wage policy as well, as the city of Vancouver had over the last

few years. That's not asking too much. That's not asking for too much

creativity, even from you and your handmaidens there. I apologize for

the potentially sexist remark. There is no creativity on the other

side. It continues to turn the screw in terms of wage levels in British

Columbia.

It's incredible that we in British Columbia should be worse off in

the eighties than we were in the seventies. That isn't the case in

Ontario; that isn't the case in Manitoba.

Interjection.

MR. WILLIAMS: There is linkage in terms of public policy, and

this bill before us right now is one of the big links, pushing wages

and working conditions down and limiting opportunities for fuller

employment in British Columbia. You only need some....

[11:30]

MR. HEWITT: Answer the question.

MR. WILLIAMS: I have — if you would but listen. Why don't you

get up, Mr. Member from Penticton, and talk about the jobs necessary in

your region, which could be improved with a change in public policy? We

were there last week, and you guys were asleep at the switch, even in

your own riding, as you are here in the Legislature. So I don't need to

hear anything from the cheap seats down there, the reduced-value seats,

the migrs from cabinet.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Hon. member, please take your seat. Would all

members please take their seats for a minute. I'd just like to suggest

that all remarks be addressed through the Chair, so that we can keep

this debate sane and sensible.

MR. SERWA: I would just like to discuss briefly the coverall

issue that the member for North Island (Mr. Gabelmann) brought up in

reference to this particular section.

I would like to make the point that the member for North Island indicated that

the employee should be able to choose whether he wears union-made garments on

the job. I would like to emphasize that that same employee has the choice individually

of taking advantage of the marketplace for his own economic viability.

Food, clothing and shelter, individual independent choices are made

with the intentions of utilizing the marketplace to the benefit of that

particular union employee. He will purchase grapes that are grown in

southern California; he will purchase fruit and vegetables produced by

Mexicans at substantially lower wages than we have in our own area. He

will take full advantage of that marketplace.

What hypocrisy on the part of the opposition members to deny the

employer that similar opportunity of taking full advantage of the

marketplace. That hypocrisy and economic viability of a corporation or

a company that is unionized would then deny the employee the

opportunity for a job. The members opposite are well aware that we live

in a much smaller world today with international competition and trade.

We produce resource materials, unionized, contributing greatly to

the economy of British Columbia and Canada. In exchange, we purchase

goods made by these foreign companies — perhaps Korean, who have just

accepted a large shipment of coal. I firmly believe that if we deny the

hypocrisy of the situation, we cannot do anything other than recognize

that employee viability is so necessary in the case of maintaining

union and non-union jobs.

MR. MILLER: We have really entered a very interesting debate,

and really at the crux of this section. I would like to deal with the

important topic relating to this section, the downward spiral that

could result if this thing has full implementation. We have got to go

back and look at it, because the bill is the sum of its parts. So we

now have a

section that we have just passed that says the employer can

talk to their employees about advising them whether or not they should

be union or not.

Of course, if we tie that in with this discussion, we can see an

employer advising employees in a coverall factory: "Look, I don't think

it is a good idea. I think we can get that government contract if we

don't go union." So there is the insidiousness, if you like, of this

bill. We will deal with that as we go along. It will pile up and pile

up.

Let's deal with the downward spiral of wages that could happen as a

result of this clause. The previous speaker talked about buying

vegetables from Mexico. You know, there is a big debate in California

right now where California agricultural workers, who are probably

making about $4 or $5 an hour, are faced with some serious competition

from Mexican produce, where they make about $4 or $5 a day.

The solution that seems to be coming from that side of the House is:

buy the cheapest goods. On top of that, lower our wage levels to the

level of our cheapest competitor so that the wages in British Columbia

should be the same as the wages in Taiwan and a number of our

competitors. It is surprising that we have remained competitive in so

many things while paying such good wages in the unionized sector. I

don't know why the government feels that they want to unravel that.

It's good for this province. It is good that people earn a fair wage.

MR. WILLIAMS: If forces management to be efficient. Has that ever gone through your head?

MR. MILLER: So could the minister respond? Surely that must

be a serious concern. We are talking about the economy of British

Columbia, not just a simple clause that talks about freedom.

[ Page 1426 ]

HON. L. HANSON: I think the opposition is suggesting that the

reason behind this clause is to drive wages down. Then I think I heard

another member over there on the other side say that it forces

management to be efficient, or it forces operations to be efficient —

unionization. Well, I say to him that there's also another factor, and

that's that outside competition that you're worried about coming in

from out of the province or out of the country with "slave labour," as

you put it, that also forces people in Canada to become competitive.

Interjection.

HON. L. HANSON: It simply isn't the union wages that require

it. But I also suggest to the members that unionization is alive and

well in British Columbia, and it will continue to be alive and well in

British Columbia. Those employers who are unrealistic and in fact do

pay slave wages are certainly ripe fields for organized labour to

organize and bring in a standard of living and a level of wages that

they feel are reasonable.

MR. LOVICK: Ironically, Madam Chairman, my last utterance in

this House was a kind of farewell to rancour, but it's awfully

difficult to pursue that theme after I listen to some of those

platitudinous vacuities coming from across the floor. Look, let's be

candid about this. If we're going to talk about the free market,

marvelous mechanism though it is, let's recognize that it also carries

within its wake some capacity to commit horror stories. Madam Justice

Rosalie Abella of the Canadian Supreme Court made the point very well

some time ago when she said: "We have had too many people sacrificed on

the altar called the marketplace in this country's history, thank you

very much."

The predicament is that if we leave the marketplace to decide, we

cannot, frankly, compete with people who are not protected by health

and safety standards, who do not work within safe environments, and who

do not have any other assets at their disposal and therefore have to

pay low wages. We simply can't compete. And to try to suggest that we

in B.C. can freely and completely compete with our counterparts in

Malaysia or Singapore or the Philippines or something is patent

nonsense. I'm horrified to think that a Minister of Labour, who ought

to know better, can possibly suggest that.

What we're talking about when we talk about this business of

secondary boycotting — this particular

section of the bill — is what we

on this side of the House have contended is clearly an interference

with the right of the union to do its collective bargaining, the right

of the union indeed to function. We're suggesting that this clause, in

effect, comes down on the side of management. I think we can argue that

fairly readily, if you stop and pause even for a moment to reflect on

the nature of what trade unions are: a collectivity that is based on a

concept called solidarity that says nobody can, frankly, be allowed to

deviate from what we, the collectivity, bargains for. That's how we get

good wages. If we allow some people to deviate, obviously our wages go

down; that's elementary economics. We surely don't have to spend any

time on that.

The point, though, is that workers, having combined together, have

indeed accomplished great things. They have accomplished things like

safety in the workplace. They've accomplished decent wage rates.

They've forced governments to take steps to improve society. They've

improved, if you like, on the marketplace, on the kind of state of

nature. They've done that.

What the bill does now is suggest to unions that they can no longer

engage in those kinds of secondary-boycott activities, and in doing so,

I'm suggesting, makes it perfectly possible, indeed inevitable, that

we're going to encourage competition from a non-unionized sector with

whom we cannot compete. Thus the downward pressure on wages; thus the

downward pressure on working conditions and so forth. There's nothing

mysterious, nothing esoteric in that; that's just a simple calculus,

and certainly anybody who pauses to reflect can see that.

What we're suggesting is that the concept of secondary boycott,

freely negotiated by two parties, is a marvelous opportunity to do

things that governments can't perhaps otherwise do. Because recognize

that when an employer and a set of employees or a group of employees

agree to a clause such as those that are specifically prohibited in

this particular clause before us, what they are saying is a marvelous

manifestation of something that is traditionally called Christian

charity. In other words, we will treat our brothers and sisters

elsewhere as we do ourselves. What we desire for ourselves, we desire

for others.

That's what the purpose of a secondary boycott is: it effectively

says that we — management and employees — have agreed to patronize

those other firms that abide by the same labour standards and have the

same commitment to fairness in the workplace as we have. It's an

opportunity, then, for government surely to recognize that here is, in

fact, a window on opportunity, if you like, to do something about an

otherwise rather frightening and indeed anarchic sort of marketplace.

The other point in this.... And again, ere you think that I'm

jumping to some conclusion that isn't borne out and substantiated by

the bill before us, let me draw your attention to the first

section of

this, the enabling language, if you like. Because the crux of that

statement is just this: an agreement is void. Think about that: an

agreement is void.

MR. WILLIAMS: Sanctity of contract.

MR. LOVICK: Yes, whatever happened to sanctity of contract?

What we're saying, in effect, is that if we don't like the kind of

agreement you have, then we'll void it; we'll say it's not allowed. I'm

willing to acknowledge that there are occasions when governments ought

to say some contracts are perhaps not allowable — contracts that

interfere with basic human rights; contracts that condone violence by

one set of individuals against another and suchlike. But those are

highly principled declarations in which government takes that extreme

step of interfering with contracts freely negotiated between two

parties. In this case what we have, rather, is the government asking

for the power via

section 4 to scrap and otherwise put an end to

agreements freely negotiated, whose only object is to make life better

for workers. To suggest that that is somehow interfering with the

marketplace and that is, ipso facto, bad is, I think, a scandalous kind

of logic and scandalous reasoning.

The issue, as I've said before, is that the marketplace, thank you

very much, cannot adjudicate quality of life. It can do all kinds of

good things, Mr. Minister, but it can't adjudicate quality of life.

Freely negotiated agreements between workers and their employers can do

something. They can do something to improve indirectly the

standard of living in

[ Page

1427 ]

Korea, because in fact if every employer and

employee interaction, every context of that kind, were to have

agreements that say, "We will not buy non-union goods and we will not

buy goods that come from workers who are earning substandard, indecent

wages," then think what kind of improvement we will have made thereby.

I'm suggesting that this clause is a retrograde step. It doesn't,

frankly, make much economic sense; indeed if anything, as my colleagues

have already alluded to, it would seem to make quite the converse of

that; it's bad economics.

[11:45]

Let me just leave you with one other observation if I might, Madam

Chairman, directed to the minister. I'm asking in effect that this

clause just be withdrawn. The whole business of secondary boycotting as

spelled out here is simply wrong. I think it's wrong-headed. It's wrong

pertinently, as my remarks have already made clear, I'm sure, on moral

grounds. Please — I say this in anticipation of what I might hear from

the other side — don't suggest to me that that's some kind of

bleeding-heart, soft and fuzzy, warm feeling morality, because I want

to remind members opposite that all economic questions are political

questions and all political questions are moral questions. Please,

let's be guided by that rather than some slavish acceptance of the

primacy of the marketplace.

MR. ROSE: Madam Chair, I get terribly upset when I hear what

I regard as a very narrow ideological view of the sanctity of the

marketplace. It's patent nonsense, and it comes from somebody who's not

been educated but indoctrinated. That's what bothers me. If you say it

often enough, it will become the truth. It's almost like chanting;

somehow it's self-hypnotic. It reminds me a lot of an estimable

gentleman by the name of Herbert Hoover: if we say it often enough....

I'd like to talk a little bit about what the member for Okanagan had

to say. He said something about a worker buying his grapes from here,

there and everywhere, and therefore the market economy is going to be

the final arbiter. That may be the case in some cases, but I don't

think it should be. Let's extend the logic of that just a little bit.

First of all, I think we might assume that the prosperity that we've

enjoyed over the last 200 years has been based on exploiting people in

the Third World. The reason we've done well is not that we've got a

tremendous amount of intelligence or even technical expertise. That is

part of it, and that's perhaps allowed us to develop educational

systems, factories and all the rest of it. If you really take that to

its logical conclusion, we've done well, Britain's done well and North

America's done well because of the exploitation of the people of the

Third World.

If you take that thing again to its logical conclusion, you come to

this point: the only way we can compete is if we can get our costs and

wages down to the level of the Third World. We're not interested,

apparently, in bringing the Third World up; in order to compete, we

want to bring us down. To me that makes no sense at all.

We always hear: "Get the government off the backs of the people."

Let's take the city of Kelowna. Let's take all the schoolteachers'

wages out of Kelowna. Let's take all the postal workers' and social

workers' wages out of Kelowna. Let's take all the publicly administered

funds: welfare, old age pensions, family allowances and all that

socialist stuff.

Where is your individual initiative then, Mr. Member? It's not there. That's just patent nonsense.

We cannot compete in wages with the Third World. It's impossible for

us to do that and maintain the standard of living that we have. When I

was a kid, which was a long time ago, we did not have decent union

wages. We did not have very many people employed; in fact, we had a lot

of unemployment even though the going wage in those days was two bits

an hour. That is not going to bring us full employment — the fact that

we lower the wages, or destroy some kind of union contract.

The reason we have prosperity, and the reason we have an internal

market in Kelowna, Vernon or any other place is that we have decent

wages in this country. You can't sell cars to somebody who's broke. You

can't sell Cadillacs to people on welfare. It's impossible. It doesn't

work that way. We have created an internal market that we have in our

society now. My mom and dad did not have a car. We did not have a

fridge, a television, or cameras. We didn't have all those things that

are purchasable because we have an internal market and a decent

standard of living.

Do you want us to have the buying power of people in Korea? You say

Japan has done well. What have they got in Japan? They've got paid

vacations, lifetime job security, low interest loans on houses and

health schemes in their institutions. We don't need to emulate a Third

World country in order for us to be successful. What we have to do is

encourage our people to be as productive as they can and our managers

to be as efficient as they can, and then see that we share the pie

better so more people can afford the things that we — the lucky ones,

the MLAs — can afford. But I think it's just absolute nonsense and

stupidity to think that by breaking up union organizations or

associations or anything else that people bargain collectively through

to improve their welfare, their safety or anything else, somehow we're

going to restrain ourselves into prosperity. That is patent nonsense.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, it's certainly an interesting

debate. I think that we've all of a sudden come from the fact that

we're trying to, in the legislation, ensure that all our British

Columbia companies have the ability to compete.... I'd like to remind

the members on the opposite side that not quite 40 percent of the

workforce in British Columbia, I believe, are organized, and simple

arithmetic says that about 60 percent are not, and I guess those 60 who

are working for employers who buy in the open marketplace are all, from

the discussion that I heard, purchasing goods from Korea. I don't think

that that's the case. I don't know what relativity it has in its

entirety. One member on the opposite side seems to be very concerned

about the pipe industry, and apparently in the pipe industry some of

our foreign competitors are very competitive. They're also very

competitive in the automobile industry and a number of other things.

It's interesting to note that it is better to have a boycott clause

in there that in effect could put a British Columbia manufacturing

corporation out of business than it is to have that firm non-unionized.

That just doesn't make sense. All we're trying to say — and I think the

members on the other side do realize that, but won't acknowledge it —

is that two people sitting down at a table making an agreement

shouldn't affect another person in our British Columbia society as to

their ability to make a living. There is absolutely no reason, as I

said earlier, that they aren't free to purchase their goods

[ Page 1428 ]

wherever they feel that they wish to purchase them.

If there is a quality or some other consideration on the purchase of

goods, well and good. That's the reason they should buy from somewhere,

not the fact that it is made in a shop that is organized or not

organized.

MR. GABELMANN: Did the minister just say that two parties

sitting down to reach a collective agreement cannot do anything that

might impact upon some third parties who are not party to the

negotiations?

Interjection.

MR. GABELMANN: The minister whispers over: "As it relates to

the purchase of goods" — if I heard him correctly. That's not what he

said — nor is it what it does, either.

What the minister said was that parties cannot sit down and make

agreements that might have some impact on somebody else. Every

collective agreement, every agreement between two parties, is going to

have some impact on somebody else, inevitably.

MR. WILLIAMS: That's too complex an item.

MR. GABELMANN: I wonder if the minister wouldn't concede that.

HON. L. HANSON: I had assumed, and I guess I had assumed

wrongly, that the discussion was on secondary boycotts and on the issue

of whether the individuals could sit down at a table and bargain the

purchase of particular goods as it relates to whether the manufacturer

of those goods is unionized or non-unionized. I guess I should have

preambled it with that because somewhere we've gone off on another

tangent.

But what I was saying — if there is any misunderstanding in it — is that with

this clause the negotiations that go on at a table between two parties cannot

unduly affect the decision of where goods are purchased as it relates to whether

they are purchased from a unionized or non-unionized firm.

MR. GABELMANN: I don't see the word "unduly" in there, but

I'm going to leave that alone for a moment. The minister suggests — if

I can paraphrase him, and hopefully accurately — that two parties

cannot make an agreement to limit the purchasing of goods from a

unionized firm, and that's what this

section is all about.

Let me read a clause from a collective agreement and ask the minister if this clause would be a legal clause.

"The employer agrees not to buy or use products from

South Africa. The employer further agrees that an employee cannot be

disciplined or otherwise penalized for exercising his/her right to

refuse to handle products made in or distributed from South Africa. It

is agreed between the parties that the operation of this provision will

be in effect so long as South Africa has a government that is not

elected on the principle of one person, one vote and practises

apartheid."

Is that clause legal?

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Shall

section 6 as amended pass?

The House resumed; Mr. Pelton in the chair.

The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Hon. Mr. Strachan moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 11:59 a.m.

Appendix

AMENDMENTS TO BILLS

19 The Hon. L. Hanson to move, in committee of the Whole on Bill (No. 19) intituled

Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1987 to amend as follows:

SECTION 6 , in the proposed

section 4.1

(

a) by deleting subsection (1) and substituting the following:

(1) An express or implied provision of an agreement between an employer and

a trade union by which the employer ceases or refrains, or agrees to cease

or refrain from handling, using, buying, selling, transporting or otherwise

dealing in the products of another employer or to cease doing business with

another person is void.

(

b) in subsection (2) by deleting "enter into an agreement" and

substituting "include in any agreement a provision", and

(

c) by deleting subsection (3) and substituting the following:

(3) A provision of an agreement is not void by reason only that it recognizes

the right to refuse to cross a picket line.

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