Sandra C. SMITH, Respondent, v. Tracy E. WIDENER, Stacy E. Currie, Ronald Widener, The Estate of James Donald Epting, CitiStreet, LLC, and Karen S. Erickson, Defendants, of whom Tracy E. Widener, Stacy E. Currie and The Estate of James Donald Epting are the Appellants, 397 S.C. 468

FEW, C.J. In this appeal we hold that when a plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages arising out of the same injury, the two types of damages are part of the same claim for purposes of determining whether a nonsettling defendant is entitled to a setoff to account for funds paid to the plaintiff by a settling defendant. We reverse the circuit court’s order to the contrary. I. Facts and Procedural History In March 1985, James Donald Epting designated his wife, Sandra Smith, to be the beneficiary on his South Carolina Deferred Compensation Program account. In December 1990, Epting and Smith divorced.

However, Epting did not remove Smith as his designated beneficiary. When Epting died in October 2006, the account held $75,410.38. Epting’s daughters, Tracy Widener and Stacy Currie, were named personal representatives of Epting’s estate. After discovering that Smith remained the designated beneficiary on the account, Widener and Currie asked Smith to sign a document to waive her beneficiary rights. Smith admitted to signing a document, but denied that the document she signed was a waiver of her beneficiary rights. For convenience, we refer to this document as the waiver form.

Smith also signed another form, this one seeking to enforce her beneficiary rights. We refer to this form as the beneficiary distribution form. The beneficiary distribution form listed LPL Financial Corporation, a brokerage firm where Smith already had an account, as the recipient of the funds she expected to receive from Epting’s account. Smith sent the beneficiary distribution form designating LPL to CitiStreet, LLC. CitiStreet was the employee benefits provider for the deferred compensation program, and controlled the funds from Epting’s account.

The beneficiary distribution form requested that CitiStreet transfer the $75,410.38 into Smith’s account at LPL. At approximately the same time Smith sent the beneficiary distribution form, Widener and Currie sent the waiver form to CitiStreet. CitiStreet processed Smith’s beneficiary distribution form first, and placed $75,410.38 in Smith’s account with LPL. Smith immediately withdrew $40,000.00. When CitiStreet received the waiver form from Widener and Currie, it issued a stop payment order while it reviewed the competing claims. CitiStreet eventually concluded the waiver form was valid.

CitiStreet then contacted LPL, which in turn contacted Smith requesting the $40,000.00 be returned. Smith claimed her signature on the waiver form was forged and refused to return the money. CitiStreet sent the remaining $35,410.38 to Widener and Currie as personal representatives of Epting’s estate. Smith filed a lawsuit against Widener, Currie, Epting’s estate, CitiStreet, and others. She asserted causes of action for civil conspiracy, conversion, slander, and fraud against Widener and Currie, and civil conspiracy, conversion, slander, and negligence against CitiStreet.

At the beginning of trial, Smith settled with CitiStreet for $35,410.38. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found in favor of Smith on her conversion cause of action against Widener and Currie in the same amount — $35,410.38. Widener and Currie made a motion asking that the damages awarded be set off by the amount of the settlement between CitiStreet and Smith. The trial court denied the motion. Widener and Currie appeal claiming the trial court erred in denying the setoff. II. Applicable Law “[T]here can be only one satisfaction for an injury or wrong.” Hawkins v.

Pathology Assocs. of Greenville, P.A., 330 S.C. 92, 113, 498 S.E.2d 395, 407 (Ct.App.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). A settlement by a joint tortfeasor “reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant.” S.C.Code Ann. § 15-38-50(1) (2005). Therefore, before entering judgment on a jury verdict, the court must reduce the amount of the verdict to account for any funds previously paid by a settling defendant, so long as the settlement funds were paid to compensate the same plaintiff on a claim for the same injury.

Hawkins, 330 S.C. at 113, 498 S.E.2d at 406-07. When the settlement is for the same injury, the nonsettling defendant’s right to a setoff arises by operation of law. Ellis v. Oliver, 335 S.C. 106, 112, 515 S.E.2d 268, 271-72 (Ct.App.1999). Under this circumstance, “[s]ection 15-38-50 grants the court no discretion ... in applying a set-off.” 335 S.C. at 113, 515 S.E.2d at 272; see also Vortex Sports & Entm’t, Inc. v. Ware, 378 S.C. 197, 210, 662 S.E.2d 444, 451 (Ct.App.2008). In this case, Smith’s claim against CitiStreet was for the same injury for which she sought damages from Widener and Currie.

The essence of all Smith’s claims was that the actions of the defendants denied her the right to the remaining $35,410.38 after she withdrew the initial $40,000.00. While Smith stated that claim in various causes of action, some of which overlapped between Widener and Currie and CitiStreet and some of which did not, the injury Smith alleged she suffered as a result of the tortious conduct of all defendants was the same. Therefore, the trial court was required to grant the request for a setoff.

Smith argues, however, that the settlement with CitiStreet was for punitive damages only, and thus there was no right to a setoff. We disagree. Smith’s claim for punitive damages against CitiStreet was not a separate claim arising out of a separate injury as she argues. Punitive damages are a different type of damages from actual or nominal damages. However, when a plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages in the same claim, both types of damages arise out of the same injury.

Our courts have long recognized that punitive damages serve to compensate a plaintiff and vindicate his rights arising out of a wrong suffered or injury sustained. Our supreme court recently summarized this history in O’Neill v.

Smith, 388 S.C. 246, 252, 695 S.E.2d 531, 534 (2010), stating: Exemplary or punitive damages go to the plaintiff, not as a fine or penalty for a public wrong, but in vindication of a private right which has been willfully invaded; and indeed, it may be said that such damages in a measure compensate or satisfy for the willfulness with which the private right was invaded, but, in addition thereto, operating as a deterring punishment to the wrongdoer, and as a warning to others....

Punitive damages have now come, however, to be generally, though not universally, regarded, not only as punishment for wrong, but as vindication of private right. This is the basis upon which they are now placed in this state. 388 S.C. at 252, 695 S.E.2d at 534 (quoting Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 379, 529 S.E.2d 528, 533 (2000) (quoting Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 573, 106 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1958))). Therefore, a plaintiffs claim for actual and punitive damages arising from the same injury is the same claim for purposes of setoff under

section 15-38-50(1). In Ellis, this court held that when a prior settlement involves compensation for the same injury for which the jury awarded damages, the right to setoff arises as an operation of law. 335 S.C. at 112-13, 515 S.E.2d at 271-72. Likewise, when the prior settlement involves compensation for a different injury from the one tried to verdict, there is no setoff as a matter of law. See Hawkins, 330 S.C. at 114-15, 498 S.E.2d at 407 (holding that Georgia and South Carolina wrongful death actions involve different injuries and therefore are separate claims with no right of setoff).

On the other hand, when a settlement is argued to involve two claims, one of which involves the same injury as the claim tried to verdict and one of which does not, the circuit court must make the factual determination of how to allocate the settlement between the two claims. Here, the settlement is for the same injury as a matter of law. Therefore, the right to setoff arises as an operation of law, and the circuit court must award a setoff. The dissent argues there are facts in the record supporting the circuit court’s determination that the settlement with CitiStreet was for punitive damages only.

As we have discussed, however, our ruling is based on the point of law that actual and punitive damages are part of the same claim for one injury. Therefore, the facts discussed in the dissent are not pertinent to the analysis of whether Widener and Currie were entitled to a setoff. In any event, the facts in the record do not support the circuit court’s determination. First, Smith’s position that she negotiated a settlement with CitiStreet for punitive damages in the exact same amount as her actual damages claim is not credible.

Second, Smith’s position that she had a settlement agreement with CitiStreet which called for the parties to allocate the proceeds of the settlement completely to punitive damages is not supported by the record. In fact, at the hearing on the motion for a setoff, counsel for CitiStreet specifically denied an agreement as to how the funds would be allocated, insisting instead that the agreement called for Smith “to allocate it however you would like to.” III. Conclusion We hold that Widener and Currie were entitled to a setoff for the amount of Smith’s settlement with CitiStreet.

We reverse and remand the case to the circuit court to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion, and to conduct other proceedings as may be necessary to reach a final judgment. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PIEPER, J., concurs. LOCKEMY, J., dissenting in a separate opinion. . This is what the circuit court did in Rutland v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 390 S.C. 78, 700 S.E.2d 451 (Ct.App.2010), cert. granted, (Oct. 19, 2011).

This court affirmed the Rutland trial court’s determination that the settlement was not properly allocated between the different claims of wrongful death and survival because there was no evidence of conscious pain and suffering. 390 S.C. at 85-86, 700 S.E.2d at 455. In this respect, Rutland conflicts with Ellis. In Ellis, the court of appeals stated that wrongful death and survival are the same claim for the same injury. 335 S.C. at 112-13, 515 S.E.2d at 272. The conflict between Rutland and Ellis is resolved by reference to Bennett v.

Spartanburg Railway, Gas & Electric Co., 97 S.C. 27, 81 S.E. 189 (1914), in which the supreme court held that wrongful death and survival actions are different claims for different injuries. 97 S.C. at 29-30, 81 S.E. at 189-90. The court stated: "Necessarily, therefore, there must be separate verdicts and separate judgments, and hence there should be separate actions.” 97 S.C. at 31, 81 S.E. at 190. The conflict does not affect the rule for which we cite Ellis.