Filed 4/20/26 P. v. Lawson CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RODNEY JOSEPH LAWSON, Defendant and Appellant. B337163 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.

NA051873) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed. Micah Reyner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

2 Defendant Rodney Lawson appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition under Penal Code

section 1170, subdivision (d) (section 1170(d)),1 which authorizes juvenile offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) to petition for the recall of their sentences and resentencing. Lawson argues his sentence of 50 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP and that denying him resentencing relief under

section 1170(

d) violates his right to equal protection. We affirm. BACKGROUND In 2003, a jury convicted Lawson of second degree murder, a crime he committed at age 16. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The jury also found true that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)) and committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Lawson was sentenced to a term of 50 years to life. In 2023, Lawson filed a petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to

section 1170(

d) and People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard). The trial court denied the petition. The court found Lawson was not sentenced to LWOP or its functional equivalent and Heard did not apply. Lawson appealed. In October 2025, we vacated submission of the matter and invited the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058 (Thompson), review granted September 24, 2025, S292540, and People v. 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3 Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117 (Isayev), review granted November 12, 2025, S292860, which were decided after the parties completed briefing. After receiving supplemental briefs,2 we resubmitted the matter. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review Lawson’s claims raise pure questions of law which we review de novo. (People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485, 518.) B. Equal Protection Challenges to

Section 1170(d)

(1) Section 1170(d)(1)(

A) allows “a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to” LWOP and who “has been incarcerated for at least 15 years” to petition the sentencing court for recall and resentencing. The statute’s plain language limits relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. (People v. Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583.) Heard held that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection enables juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms to petition for

section 1170(

d) relief. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 633–634.) According to 2 Respondent complied with the requirements for additional briefing set forth in our request in neither format nor substance. It did not substantively address Thompson and Isayev or provide reasoning in their aftermath for its concession that a juvenile offender’s sentence of 50 years to life is the equivalent of LWOP. We independently address the merits of Lawson’s arguments. (See People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 847 [“We are not required to accept the Attorney General’s concession”].)

4 Heard, a court must assess whether the defendant’s original sentence at the time it was imposed was functionally equivalent to LWOP. (Id. at p. 629.) It must not consider whether the defendant is currently eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under

section 3051. (Ibid.; People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 454 (Sorto) [concluding Heard was correctly decided]; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1056 (Bagsby) [reaffirming Heard].) Many courts of appeal have recently disagreed with Heard. They are now split on whether a juvenile offender sentenced to 50 years to life is serving the functional equivalent of LWOP for purposes of

section 1170(d). Further, the courts that have found 1170(

d) inapplicable have done so for varying reasons. (See, e.g., People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828 [concluding 50 years to life was not the functional equivalent of LWOP for purposes of eligibility under

section 1170(d)]; Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062 [finding defendant failed to show LWOP limitation on

section 1170(

d) eligibility was irrational as applied to juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life]; Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142 [holding that because defendant was eligible for youth offender parole hearing, his sentence of 50 years to life was not functional equivalent of LWOP].)3 We assess Lawson’s argument, taking into account this growing body of caselaw. 3 Our Supreme Court is set to address whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is entitled to recall and resentencing under

section 1170(d)(1) on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP in People v. Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th 499.

5 C. Lawson is Not Serving the Functional Equivalent of LWOP Lawson argues that pursuant to People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras), he is serving the functional equivalent of LWOP and that under Heard, denying him

section 1170(

d) relief violated his right to equal protection of the law. In Contreras, our Supreme Court addressed whether sentences of 50 and 58 years to life imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders violated the Eighth Amendment as outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v.

Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 (Graham). (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 356, 360.) Contreras concluded the defendants’ sentences violated the Eight Amendment and were functionally equivalent to LWOP as they did not give the defendants “‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’” (Id. at pp. 367–369, 379.) Unlike Lawson, however, the defendants in Contreras were not only nonhomicide offenders, but also ineligible for youth offender parole hearings under

section 3051. (Id. at p. 381.)

Section 3051 “requires the Board [of Parole Hearings] to conduct a ‘youth offender parole hearing’ during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of a juvenile offender’s incarceration,” depending on the offender’s “‘“[c]ontrolling offense.”’” (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 277 (Franklin).) “A juvenile offender whose controlling offense carries a term of 25 years to life or greater is ‘eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing . . . .’” (Ibid.) In Franklin, a juvenile homicide offender, who was 16 years old when he committed the offense, argued his sentence of

6 50 years to life violated the Eighth Amendment because it was the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 268.) Franklin concluded the defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence was rendered moot by

section 3051, which was then recently enacted. (Id. at p. 268, 279–280.) The statute “changed the manner in which the juvenile offender’s original sentence operates by capping the number of years that he or she may be imprisoned before becoming eligible for release on parole.” (Id. at p. 278.) The change was effected by operation of law with no additional resentencing procedure required. (Id. at pp. 278–279.) Consequently, the defendant’s sentence was “not the functional equivalent of LWOP” as the defendant was “now serving a life sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity for release during his 25th year of incarceration.” (Id. at pp. 279–280.) Lawson acknowledges he will receive a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration, which would be in 2028 when he is approximately 42 years old.

Lawson is therefore serving a sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity for release. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279– 280.) As our colleagues in Division Six have observed, because the defendant will have a parole hearing, “it is plain to see that he is not presently serving the functional equivalent of LWOP.” (People v. Lara (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 484, 488, review granted December 30, 2025, S294095.) Citing Heard, Lawson argues

section 3051 does not moot his constitutional claim. He argues that although we must interpret

section 1170(d)(1) functionally and expansively in its use of the term “LWOP,” we must interpret it technically and narrowly when assessing when the defendant “‘was sentenced.’”

7 More specifically, he argues that the statute is concerned only with the original sentence at the time it was imposed. We disagree. Our colleagues in the Third District observed that

section 1170(d)(1)’s focus “is the sentence being served at the time the petition for recall and resentencing is filed, not whatever sentence may have been imposed at the original sentencing hearing.” (Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142.) “The Legislature enacted

section [1170(d)] to provide (certain) juvenile offenders serving LWOP terms an avenue ‘to seek recall of their sentences and resentencing to a term that includes an opportunity for parole.’” (Ibid.) It would be inconsistent with that legislative intent “[t]o conclude . . . that the Legislature created a procedure for recalling and resentencing juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP even if that sentence was modified or vacated on direct appeal or via postconviction collateral attack.” (Ibid.) We conclude the trial court did not err when it held that Lawson was not serving the functional equivalent of LWOP. D.

Lawson Does Not Show the Legislature Lacked a Rational Basis Lawson’s equal protection argument also fails for another reason. He does not show the Legislature lacked any rational basis for treating juvenile offenders serving explicit LWOP terms differently from juvenile offenders serving a term of 50 years to life. Traditionally, California courts engaged in a two-part inquiry to determine if there has been an equal protection violation. (Cole v. Superior Court (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1280,

8 1289.) The threshold question was whether a classification affected two or more groups “‘similarly situated in all material respects’” in an unequal manner. (Ibid.) In Hardin, our Supreme Court held that courts no longer needed to ask this threshold question when the challenged classification appears on the face of the law. (People v.

Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 849–850 (Hardin).) The pertinent inquiry in such a case is “whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.” (Id. at pp. 850–851.) Lawson makes no argument that this case involves a suspect class or interferes with a fundamental constitutional right, and thus rational basis review applies. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 847–848.) This standard “‘sets a high bar’ for litigants challenging legislative enactments . . . ‘Coupled with a rebuttable presumption that legislation is constitutional, [rational basis review] helps ensure that democratically enacted laws are not invalidated merely based on a court’s cursory conclusion that a statute’s tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair.’” (Id. at p. 852.) “Under this deferential standard, we presume that a given statutory classification is valid ‘until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable.’” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852; Johnson v.

Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 [“To mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must ‘“negative every conceivable basis”’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity”].) “‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its “‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’”’” (Hardin, at p. 852.) “‘[T]he logic behind a potential justification need [not] be persuasive or sensible—rather than simply rational.’” (Ibid.)

9 Here, the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 9 (2011– 2012 Reg. Sess.), which led to the enactment of

section 1170, demonstrates that “while Graham violations and cruel or disproportionate sentences imposed on juveniles were the Legislature’s general considerations in enacting

section 1170(d), it was expressly concerned about juveniles being sentenced to die in prison.” (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075.) Reports “noted the limited scope of underlying offenses” affected by the bill, “stating that ‘[o]nly a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances, as specified, may be sentenced to a term of LWOP.’” (Id. at p. 1077.) “[T]he bill was described as a ‘“modest and narrowly focused piece of legislation”’ which “would only apply to 293 inmates in California.” (Id. at pp. 1076–1077.) At the time of enactment, the Legislature could reasonably determine that “providing the relatively small number of juvenile offenders otherwise certain to die in prison an opportunity to obtain a lesser sentence was the most pressing priority.” (Id. at p. 1077.) Lawson does not show that the Legislature’s concern regarding excessive punishments guaranteeing death in prison applies equally to sentences of 50 years to life.

He cites statistics concerning average life expectancy for inmates in arguing his term “is outside many . . . offenders’ natural life expectancies.” This data, however, was not presented to or deemed admissible by the trial court. “To strike down

an act of the Legislature as irrational based on a set of untested empirical findings would be antithetical to multiple settled principles of judicial review.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 862.) Moreover, Lawson does not show that “the line distinguishing [LWOP] from 50 years to life is irrational, even

10 when considered in an actuarial sense.” (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078.) “[I]t remains the case that, before

section 3051 reformed many sentences, as between juvenile offenders sentenced to 50 years to life and those sentenced to [LWOP], only the latter category had a 100 percent chance of dying in prison.”4 (Ibid.) This was a distinction the Legislature could rationally take into account. “‘Far from having to “solve all related ills at once” [citation], the Legislature has “broad discretion” to proceed in an incremental and uneven manner without necessarily engaging in arbitrary and unlawful discrimination.’” (People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 125.) Lawson further argues it would be irrational to extend

section 1170(

d) relief to “more culpable” defendants (those sentenced to LWOP) while excluding less culpable offenders (those serving the functional equivalent of LWOP who did not sustain a special circumstance finding).

However, “courts have found rational legislative schemes with similar effects.” (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079, citing In re Spencer S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1315.) Indeed, the Legislature “may rationally provide a rehabilitative benefit to a group of offenders who committed more serious crimes, while excluding those convicted of lesser crimes, when the less culpable group may have other avenues for relief.” (Thompson, at p. 1080.) “For example, juvenile offenders sentenced to 50 years to life might 4 In this regard, the sentences at issue in Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby are distinguishable. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 612 [103 years to life]; Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 440 [140 years to life]; Bagsby, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1046 [107 years to life].) Even without considering Lawson’s entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing, a term of 50 years to life is not a sentence that guarantees death in prison.

11 accrue conduct credits while in prison that would meaningfully shorten their sentences, while a life without parole sentence could not be modified by credits, even if accrued.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the Legislature could “rationally restrict relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole because of the most severe consequences they faced, despite the possibility that they committed crimes more egregious than juvenile offenders serving lesser sentences, such as 50 years to life.” (Ibid.) In sum, Lawson fails to show that

section 1170(d)’s limitation on eligibility to those sentenced expressly to LWOP has no rational basis and is therefore unconstitutional as applied to a juvenile offender sentenced to 50 years to life. A plausible basis exists for the disparity. It is not for us to second guess the Legislature’s wisdom, fairness, or logic. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.) DISPOSITION The trial court’s order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS MORI, J. We concur: ZUKIN, P. J. COLLINS, J.