Filed 4/20/26 P. v. De La Cruz CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE DE LA CRUZ, Defendant and Appellant. B341725 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.

BA198877) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Jennifer Peabody, Executive Director, and Sydney Banach, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

2 I. INTRODUCTION Defendant Jose De La Cruz appeals from the denial of his petition for recall and resentencing under Penal Code1

section 1170, subdivision (d), arguing that the trial court erred when it concluded that his 45-years-to-life sentence was not the functional equivalent of a life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). We reverse. II. PROCEDRUAL BACKGROUND 2 In December 2000, the Los Angeles County District Attorney charged defendant with first degree murder in violation of

section 187, subdivision (

a) based on an offense he committed when he was 17. The District Attorney alleged that, in the commission of the offense, defendant: personally used and discharged a firearm within the meaning of

section 12022.53, subdivisions (

b) and (c); personally used a shotgun within the meaning of former

section 12022.5, subdivision (a)(1); and acted in concert with others in the commission of a hate crime within the meaning of former

section 422.75, subdivision (c). In February 2002, a jury found defendant guilty as charged and found true the three firearm allegations and the acting in concert allegation under former

section 422.75, subdivision (c). 1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Because defendant’s appeal from the denial of the trial court’s postjudgment order does not involve the facts of his underlying conviction, we do not include a factual

summary of the underlying offense.

3 The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life, plus a 20- year term “pursuant to [section] 12022.53[, subdivision] (d) . . . .” The court stayed the sentence enhancements based on the allegations under

section 12022.53, subdivisions (

b) and (c). In October 2003, a prior panel of this Division issued an unpublished opinion affirming the conviction. (People v. De La Cruz (Oct. 8, 2003, B158884) [nonpub. opn.].) On July 25, 2024, defendant filed a

section 1170, subdivision (

d) petition for recall and resentencing, arguing that he was eligible for resentencing because he was 17 years old at the time he committed the offense, had served 15 years of his 45- years-to-life sentence, and his sentence was “a de facto LWOP sentence within the meaning of [People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard)].” The prosecution opposed the petition, contending that because defendant would be 62 years old by the time he was eligible for parole, his sentence was not the equivalent of LWOP and that, in any event, because defendant was eligible under

section 3051 for an early release parole hearing, had already had a hearing under that section, and would be eligible for another hearing in July 2027, his sentence could not be considered the equivalent of LWOP. On October 22, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the petition and denied it, reasoning as follows: “I do not believe that [defendant’s sentence] is the functional equivalent of a life without possibility of parole. I think . . . defendant is eligible for parole—in fact, he’s already had a parole date that was denied, and it was put out three additional years. [¶] And even if he doesn’t get an earlier parole, I think he’s out in his 60’s; and,

4 certainly speaking from experience, 60 isn’t that old, and he still can . . . live a very fruitful life with regard to that time structure.” Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. III. DISCUSSION Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition for recall and resentencing under

section 1170, subdivision (

d) because: (1) the exclusion of juvenile offenders with “de facto” LWOP sentences from relief under that

section violates equal protection under Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608 and the cases which followed it3; (2) his eligibility for youthful offender parole under

section 3051 does not moot his petition to recall his sentence under

section 1170, subdivision (d); and (3) his 45-years-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP under the principles set forth in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras).

Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(

A) provides: “When a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.” That

section thus applies, by its express terms, to those juvenile offenders sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. But, in Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, the court concluded that “denying juvenile offenders, who were 3 Defendant also relies on the subsequent decisions of People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 (Sorto) and People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 for his equal protection analysis.

5 sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole, the opportunity to petition for resentencing [under

section 1170, subdivision (d)] violates the guarantee of equal protection.” (Id. at p. 612.) The Attorney General does not dispute that

section 1170, subdivision (

a) applies to juvenile offenders who have been sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP, but maintains that defendant’s 45-years-to-life sentence is not equivalent to LWOP for two reasons: (1) defendant’s current eligibility for early youth offender parole under

section 3051 and future eligibility at age 50 for elderly parole under

section 3055 render him ineligible for relief under

section 1170, subdivision (d); and (2) because his parole eligibility after serving 45 years, at age 62, is well within his expected lifespan, “‘by no stretch of the imagination’ can his sentence be called ‘de facto LWOP.’” As to the Attorney General’s first contention, this issue is currently under review and will be resolved by our Supreme Court in People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828 (Munoz). Pending that decision, we agree with the reasoning in Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608 that

section 3051 eligibility does not defeat defendant’s

section 1170, subdivision (

d) petition. (Id. at pp. 626–629; Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 440 [“offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms . . . are entitled to

section 1170[, subdivision] (

d) relief under the constitutional guarantee of equal protection” and “parole eligibility under

section 3051 does not render those offenders ineligible for relief under

section 1170[, subdivision] (d)”].) 4 4 Decisions subsequent to Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608―concluding that early parole eligibility under

section 3051

6 As to the Attorney General’s second contention, we disagree that defendant’s eligibility for parole, after serving 45 years, at age 62 renders him ineligible for relief under

section 1170, subdivision (d). In Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th 349, the Supreme Court held that 50 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP for a nonhomicide juvenile offender in the Eighth Amendment context.

Although the court did not address whether a sentence of 45-years-to-life would also be equivalent to LWOP, it made clear that, to pass constitutional muster, a sentence must provide a juvenile “a realistic hope of release and a genuine opportunity to reintegrate into society.” (Id. at p. 373.) In light of that guidance and the particular facts of this case, including that defendant was 17 when he committed the offense and will be 62 by the time he serves 45 years of his sentence, we conclude that defendant’s sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP and thus makes him eligible for relief under

section 1170, subdivision (d). We therefore reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings under

section 1170, subdivision (d). renders a juvenile offender ineligible for relief under

section 1170, subdivision (

d) relief— are on review in our Supreme Court with briefing deferred pending a decision in Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th 499. (See People v. Lara (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 484, review granted; briefing deferred Dec. 30, 2025, S294095; People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, review granted; briefing deferred Nov. 12, 2025, S292860; People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, review granted; briefing deferred Sept. 17, 2025, S292070.)

7 IV. DISPOSITION The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for recall and resentencing is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to conduct further proceedings under

section 1170, subdivision (

d) to determine whether defendant is eligible for resentencing under the provisions of that section. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS KIM (D.), J. I concur: MOOR, J.

People v. De La Cruz, B341725 HOFFSTADT, P. J., Dissenting. This case presents the following question: Did our Legislature have a rational basis, under equal protection principles, to grant ameliorative relief under Penal Code

section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to juveniles sentenced without the possibility of parole (LWOP) but to deny that relief to juveniles sentenced to a term of 45 years? Because settled equal protection principles permit our Legislature to address a problem one step at a time, our Legislature’s decision to take a first step to address lengthy juvenile sentences by extending ameliorative relief to the sentences most likely to be the longest (that is, LWOP) is a rational one. Thus, for any sentence shorter than the 50-year sentence that our Supreme Court’s decision in People v.

Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 369 has declared invalid (see People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650, 654 (conc. opn. of Hoffstadt, J.)), I would leave the line drawing to our Legislature. _____________________, P. J. HOFFSTADT