Park v. Slevinsky, 2010 ABQB 762

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: Park v. Slevinsky, 2010 ABQB 762 Date: 20101221 Docket: FL03 23416 Registry: Edmonton Between: Sandra Park Applicant - and - Shawn Slevinsky Applicant _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Madam Justice J.B. Veit _______________________________________________________

Summary [ 1 ] Relying on his evidence that, between 2005 and mid-2009, he was a stay-at-home Dad to the parties’ four children, aged 17, 14, 11 and 8, in this special chambers application Mr. Slevinsky asks for a shared parenting regime and for partner support. [ 2 ] In a cross-application, Ms. Park asks for a primary parenting order, for child support retroactive to July 1, 2009 based on imputed income to Mr.

Slevinsky of $40,000.00 since he has been able to earn that amount in the past and for a variation of an earlier parenting order by making it clear that it is only a permanent removal from Alberta, rather than a holiday outside Alberta, which is prohibited without the consent of the other parent or a further order of the court. [ 3 ] The parties’ cross-applications for parenting orders are both dismissed: because the affidavit evidence before the court is

[ 3 ] The parties’ cross-applications for parenting orders are both dismissed: because the affidavit evidence before the court is contradictory, the court cannot make a “final” parenting order in this chambers application. Similarly, the court can only make interlocutory orders with respect to child and partner support since full financial disclosure has not yet been made.

If either party were to bring an application to vary the provisions of the within decision, that party would have to establish a material change of circumstance from the circumstances which have been identified as the basis for the within interlocutory orders.

However, if either party moved to try the issues of parenting or support, they would have full latitude to do explore those issues. [ 4 ] On an interlocutory basis, parenting will continue as it has since June, 2009: the parents have joint guardianship of their children, i.e. have equal information about the children and make important decisions together concerning the children’s education, health and other aspects of their lives, and the mother has day-to-day parenting of the three younger children.

There will be generous, specified access to the father, which will include, at a minimum, alternate week-end - including long week-end as it occurs - access, half the Christmas, Spring break, and summer holidays, sharing the children’s birthdays, and Father’s Day. If the parties cannot agree on details of specified access, the court will set the schedule.

There will be no “right of first refusal” to the other parent if one parent cannot physically be present with the children during a parenting period; given the animosity between the parents and the ages of the children, certainty of access periods is a more important value than constant presence. There will be no police enforcement clause relating to the parenting times: such provisions should only be imposed as a last resort. [ 5 ] As of September 1, 2010, which is the date of Ms. Park’s application for child support, Mr.

Slevinsky will pay child support for the 4 children of the relationship based on income of $30,000.00; the parties will explore the potential for participating in the child support recalculation program. The only

section 7 expenses claimed by Ms. Park are school fees; those fees are not exceptional and are therefore not a proper s. 7 expense. [ 6 ] Ms. Park’s application for a modification to the April order which prevented each of the parties from removing the children from Alberta is granted: the modification will make it clear that neither party shall change the children’s residence from Alberta to any other province or any other country without the consent of the other parent or a further order of the court. [ 7 ] The court does not impute any income to Mr.

Slevinsky: no evidence even suggests, much less proves, that Mr. Slevinsky is deliberately underemployed with a view to avoiding child support obligations. [ 8 ] Mr. Slevinsky is entitled to partner support: the parties were in a 17 year relationship and had four children together; the breakdown of the relationship caused Mr. Slevinsky financial disadvantage, Mr. Slevinsky was out of the work force for a 5 year period, and Ms. Park earns considerably more than Mr. Slevinsky. For a one year period commencing September 1, 2009, Ms. Park will pay monthly partner support in the amount of $800.00. Mr.

Slevinsky needs funds to allow him to establish a separate household, after a long period of partnership. Also, he is entitled, in the short term, to share in Ms. Park’s income so as to have a reasonable opportunity of re- establishing his economic self-sufficiency. Partner support is limited to one year because retail is not an area where seniority has any particular benefit, so the 5 year hiatus from the market should not negatively affect Mr. Slevinsky’s long-range income earning potential. 1. Background

a) Factual [ 9 ] The parties began a relationship in approximately 1992 and ceased cohabitation in June 2009. They are the parents of 4 children who are 17, 14, 11 and 8 years old. Mr. Slevinsky is 38 years old and Ms. Park is 41 years old; they do not have agreements on any of the disputes which bring them to court. [ 10 ] In March, 2010, Ms. Park obtained an ex parte restraining order against Mr.

Slevinsky; in April, 2010, on the hearing of the confirmation of that order, a mutual no-contact order was imposed between the parents, arrangements were put in place for the pick-up of the children, and the court ordered that neither parent was to remove the children from Alberta without consent of the other parent or order of the court. On July 7, 2010, this court found that Ms. Park had breached the April order by taking the children to British Columbia, ordered the children to be returned to Edmonton, granted the father one “make-up” week-end access period, and ordered costs of $300.00 against Ms.

Park; those costs have not been paid. [ 11 ] The affidavits filed by the parents for this application are contradictory including on the parenting issues; not only the quality of parenting, and the wishes of the children, but even the amount of time spent parenting are in dispute. The affidavits are also contradictory with respect to life style and physical confrontation.

[ 12 ] At this stage of the proceedings, the parties have not yet made full financial disclosure to one another. The court orders that, by July 1 of each year henceforth until there are no longer any children entitled to support, the parties will exchange the financial information required by the Federal Child Support Guidelines. For the purposes of this hearing, the court takes Ms. Park’s guideline income as $105,000.00, being a 3 year average based on gross income of $120,000.00 for each of 2008 and 2009 and $75,000.00 for 2010. For the purposes of this hearing, Mr.

Slevinsky’s gross income for 2010 is assumed to be $30,000.00. [ 13 ] Neither of the parties is living with a new adult partner.

b) Legislative [ 14 ] In Alberta, the general view is that children are entitled to the same level of support whether or not their parents are married, that parents are entitled to the same level of parenting of their children whether or not the parents are married, and that adult interdependent partners are entitled to the same level of partner support as if they were married.

However, it is important to note the differences between the Divorce Act and the Family Law Act ; for ease of reference, the principally relevant provisions of the Family Law Act are reproduced in Appendix A. [ 15 ] Although the date of the commencement of the partnership between the parties is not clearly established in the affidavits before the court, it is clear that theirs is a long-standing relationship that satisfies the criteria set out in the Adult Interdependent Partnership Act for being adult interdependent partners. 2.

Parenting [ 16 ] The parties’ cross-applications for parenting orders are both dismissed: the affidavit evidence before the court is contradictory; therefore, the court cannot make a “final” parenting order in this chambers application. [ 17 ] Similarly, the court can only make interlocutory orders with respect to child and partner support since full financial disclosure has not yet been made.

In the result, other than changes that may be required once full financial disclosure has been made, if either party were to bring an application to vary the provisions of the within decision, that party would have to establish a material change of circumstance from the circumstances which have been identified as the basis for the within interlocutory orders. However, if either party moved to try the issues of parenting or support, they continue to have full latitude to do so.

a) Interlocutory parenting [ 18 ] On an interlocutory basis, parenting will continue as it has since June, 2009, which is that the parents will have joint guardianship of their children, i.e. have equal information about the children and make important decisions together concerning the children’s education, health and other aspects of their lives, and the three younger children will live with their mother who will have the right and responsibility of making decisions concerning the children’s day-to-day care and routine. [ 19 ] In coming to the conclusion that, on an interlocutory basis, the children should remain in the mother’s day-to-day care, I have taken the following into account: - although Mr.

Slevinsky swears that he was the primary parent of the children from 2005 to mid-2009, the children have now been living with their mother since July 1, 2009; - it is possible that the children are living in the premises in which they had lived for some considerable time prior to the break-up of their parents. In any event, Mr. Slevinsky left the home in which the family had been living and moved to a one bedroom apartment, without taking any furnishings with him. At the time of his departure, Mr. Slevinsky obviously was of the view that the children would be living with their mother;

- the father does not deny that the oldest of the children chooses not to spend any time with him. It would not be appropriate to separate the siblings. [ 20 ] Because of the tenuous nature of the relationship between the parties at this time, it is not possible to leave the parenting issue as one in which the father will have generous access: it is necessary to specify access. As of the date of the application, the parties had not agreed on specified access. Given the nature of the parenting arrangement for a period of 5 years up to the summer of 2009, although the children will live with Ms.

Park, there will be alternate week-end access - including long week-ends which occur on an access week- end - to the father; in addition, Mr. Slevinsky will equally share with Ms. Park all of the major school holidays, including Christmas, Spring break and summer vacation. If the parties are not agreed on any aspect of the specified access, they will let me know by January 14, 2011, and I will set the terms of the specified access. No parenting order is made with respect to the 17 year old child.

The 14 year old child has just turned 14; at this time, that child will therefore be included in the specified access parenting schedule; if, however, the mother continues to take the position that that child will not see the father, that matter should also be raised with me by January 14, 2011, and I will determine whether that child is included in the parenting order. [ 21 ] I will not order a “right of first refusal” component to the specified parenting order.

The level of animosity between the parents at this time suggests that it is in everyone’s interest to minimize the need for communication between the parents. More importantly, it is in the children’s best interests to have predictability around parenting times; the children are old enough to weather variations within the overall specified parenting regime. Therefore, if the parent who has the responsibility of parenting is unable to physically be with the children during a particular parenting period, that parent will arrange for alternative, responsible, care for the children.

b) Removal of the children from Alberta [ 22 ] Ms. Park’s application for a modification to the April order which prevented the parties from removing the children from Alberta is granted: the existing order will be modified to make it clear that neither party shall change the children’s residence from Alberta to any other province or any other country without the consent of the other parent or a further order of the court. [ 23 ] Because the court which heard Mr. Slevinsky’s application for contempt declined to find Ms.

Park in contempt of the April order of this court, I assume that the court was at least satisfied that Ms. Park had not intended to change the children’s residence in July, 2010. In the result, the April 21, 2010 order should be modified to make it clear that the children can be taken on holidays outside the province, so long as the parent who takes them outside the province does not interfere in the other parent’s parenting time.

However, neither of the parents will attempt to change the usual residence of the children to a place outside Alberta, without the other parent’s prior consent in writing, or a further order of the court.

c) Police enforcement clause [ 24 ] There will be no police enforcement clause in support of parenting times. [ 25 ] Police enforcement clauses are a final resort; it is only in the exceptional situation that parenting and police should be linked in a child’s mind. [ 26 ] Although in the material filed in support of his contempt application Mr. Slevinsky stated that he believed that Ms. Park was re-locating the children to British Columbia and although he again states his fear that Ms.

Park will attempt to move to Vancouver, given the outcome of the contempt hearing, I assume that the court did not find that, in July, 2010, Ms. Park had attempted to move the children to British Columbia. Once the wording of the March order is clarified, there is no reason to believe that either of the parties will breach a court order regulating parenting time. 3. Imputing income

[ 27 ] The court does not impute any income to Mr. Slevinsky: no evidence even suggests, much less proves, that Mr. Slevinsky is deliberately underemployed with a view to avoiding child support obligations. In Alberta, the law is clear that mere unemployment or underemployment is not a sufficient basis for deeming income; before income can be imputed to an unemployed or underemployed parent, the court must be satisfied that the lack of full employment is due to deliberate avoidance of child support obligations. [ 28 ] Ms. Park states that Mr.

Slevinsky was fired from his job in 2005; assuming that to be the case, Ms. Park’s own evidence establishes that this is not a situation where a parent chooses to terminate employment. Indeed, her evidence establishes that Mr. Slevinsky has not been financially successful. Mr. Slevinsky states that he was unsuccessful in his 2005 employment because the parties had decided, together, to organize their affairs so as to nurture Ms. Park’s employment where she had been successful rather than Mr. Slevinsky’s employment. [ 29 ] Mr.

Slevinsky has been employed at a series of jobs since late 2008; he has gradually been improving his income from employment, but still earns dramatically less than Ms. Park. There is no basis in the evidence before the court to impute income to Mr. Slevinsky. 4. Child support [ 30 ] Obviously, Mr. Slevinsky must pay child support. On an interlocutory basis, the court uses the best information it has available; however, the financial disclosure is far from complete. [ 31 ] Each of the parties must complete the financial disclosure appropriate to the within applications, i.e. Ms.

Park - who should have provided her complete financial disclosure when she requested child support from Mr. Slevinsky - will now complete her financial disclosure. When she completes her financial disclosure, adjustments could be made to the interlocutory partner support order to reflect a material difference between Ms. Park’s actual gross income and the gross income that was used as the basis for the partner support order. Similarly, when Mr. Slevinsky completes his financial disclosure for the year 2010 (by July 1, 2011) there could be a re- calculation of child support if the disclosure established that Mr.

Slevinsky earned materially more or less than the $30,000.00 which is used as the basis for his child support obligation.

a) Baseline support [ 32 ] As of September 1, 2010, Mr. Slevinsky will pay child support for the 4 children of the relationship based on income of $30,000.00. [ 33 ] The parties will explore the potential for participating in the child support recalculation program. It would obviously be in their best interest, and also in the best interests of their children, if the cost of future variation applications could be avoided. [ 34 ] The court commences the child support obligation as of September 1, 2010 rather than July 1, 2009 as requested by Ms.

Park because the child support regime under the Family Law Act is similar to the child support regime under the Divorce Act , i.e. it is an application-based regime and Ms. Park only requested child support in September, 2010. Moreover, a request for child support commencing July 1, 2009 appears to be based on imputed income which, as discussed above, is inappropriate in the circumstances here. [ 35 ] Mr.

Slevinsky’s child support obligation for any particular child will cease when that child either reaches the age of 18 and is not continuing in full-time education, or, prior to having reached the age of 18, a child adopts an independent lifestyle: s. 49 Family Law Act .

b) Section 7 expenses [ 36 ] The only s. 7 expense claimed by Ms. Park are school fees. Those school fees are not exceptional; on the contrary, they are exactly the kind of expense for which child support payments provide. Therefore, at this time, there will be no s. 7 expenses added to the baseline support.

5. Partner support [ 37 ] Mr. Slevinsky is entitled to partner support for a one year period. [ 38 ] As the background facts underscore, the parties were relatively young when they commenced their relationship. Neither one of them had a track record in terms of employment. Although I do not have any information on their education levels, it appears as though their work history after they got together was of a relatively similar nature. [ 39 ] However, their partnership was similar to the partnership in most marriages, i.e. the parties did not agree on a financial regime.

a) Entitlement [ 40 ] In looking at the factors set out by the Legislature in s. 58 of the Family Law Act , I observe that the parties lived together for a long period of time. When comparing this length of time with the assessment of spousal support under the Advisory Guidelines under the Divorce Act , the relationship would qualify as a lengthy one with commitments to four children. [ 41 ] Mr. Slevinsky states that when he left the relationship in June 2009, he did not take any material goods with him. This is not disputed. Obviously, Mr.

Slevinsky needs furniture and furnishings to re-establish himself; moreover, he requires some amenities in order to effectively parent his children. It is also not disputed that Mr. Slevinsky earns considerably less income than Ms. Park. In other words, Mr. Slevinsky’s condition, means, needs and general financial circumstances are much worse than hers. [ 42 ] There is a dispute between the parties about the actual amount of parenting that Mr. Slevinsky did between 2005 and 2009. However, it is clear that during that relatively lengthy period, he was not regularly employed and he was doing some parenting.

There is a career cost to that type of parenting and it is a cost which has to be shared between the partners. [ 43 ] There is no order or agreement between the parties concerning partner support. [ 44 ] There is no legal obligation for either of the parties to support anyone except their own children. [ 45 ] There is no other adult person living with either of the parties. [ 46 ] There is a dispute between the parties about what Mr. Slevinsky was doing between 2005 and 2009. Nevertheless, it is agreed that Ms. Park did very well in her career during that period.

The relatively meagre value of assets owned by the parties at this time is perhaps accounted for by the fact that an investment using money earned by the pair failed entirely. Ms. Park may be currently living in a home which the parties used to own, but in which they ended up as tenants because of the failed investment.

b) Amount [ 47 ] I have used the Federal Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines as a tool to assist in determining the amount of partner support that Ms. Park should pay to Mr. Slevinsky. [ 48 ] The amount which I have decided is appropriate, $800.00 per month, is based on Ms. Park’s average 3 year income of $105,000.00 and Mr. Slevinsky’s projected income for 2010 of $30,000.00 and on a 16 year relationship, which is conservative.

[ 49 ] Another benefit of the Advisory Guidelines is that they permit the use of ChildView 2010.2.0 calculations, which take into account child support obligations. Therefore, the resulting monthly payment does not interfere with Ms. Park’s obligations to the parties’ children.

c) Duration [ 50 ] In considering the duration of partner support, I have taken into account the nature of the work in which Mr. Slevinsky, and indeed Ms. Park, were both engaged during the course of their relationship; they were both employed in the hospitality industry and in retail. I proceed on the basis that, in these industries, seniority of employment is not an important factor in the total remuneration enjoyed by an individual. Therefore, the fact that Mr. Slevinsky has not been in the work force for approximately 5 years is not particularly damaging in his line of work. In

summary, Mr. Slevinsky is entitled to only short-term assistance from his former partner in order to get himself back on his own road to economic self-sufficiency. 6. Costs [ 51 ] If the parties are not agreed on costs, I may be spoken to within 30 days of the release of this decision. Heard on the 30 th day of November, 2010. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 20 th day of December, 2010. J.B. Veit J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Sotiria M. Pappas, Prof Corp. For Mr. Slevinsky Nancy M.R. Pearson, Prof Corp. For Ms. Park

Appendix A Extracts from the Family Law Act Division 2 Parenting Orders Parenting order S. 32 (2) A parenting order may contain any or all of the following: (

a) an allocation, generally or specifically, of the powers, responsibilities and entitlements of guardianship among the guardians; (

b) an allocation of parenting time, which may be by way of a schedule, unless a

schedule is unnecessary in the circumstances; (

c) a dispute resolution process for any or all future disputes regarding guardianship or parenting arrangements, if the process has been agreed to by the persons who are bound by that process; (

d) any other provisions that the court considers appropriate.

(3) Subject to any limitations imposed by the court, parenting time allocated to a guardian under subsection (2)(

b) is exclusive to that guardian.

(4) Unless the court orders otherwise, if a guardianship power or responsibility is allocated to one guardian, the other guardian or guardians remain entitled to make inquiries and to be given information about any significant matter that arises in connection with the exercise of that power or responsibility.

(5) In this section, “parenting time” means time during which a guardian has the power to make day to day decisions affecting the child, including having the day-to-day care and control of the child and supervising the child’s daily activities, whether the child is in the guardian’s presence or out of the guardian’s presence with the guardian’s express or implied consent. Terms and conditions 33(1) The court may make a parenting order for a definite or indefinite period or until a specified event occurs and may impose terms, conditions and restrictions in connection with the order as the court considers appropriate.

(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the court may include in a parenting order a term requiring a guardian who intends to change his or her place of residence or that of the child to notify the other guardian or guardians, at least 60 days before the change or within such other period before the change as the court may specify, of the change, the date on which the change will be made, and the new place of residence for the guardian or the child, as the case may be.

Part 3 Support Obligations

Definitions 46 In this Part, (a) “adult interdependent partner” includes a former adult interdependent partner; (b) “child” means a person (

i) who is under the age of 18 years, or (ii) who is at least 18 years of age but not older than 22 years of age, and is unable to withdraw from his or her parents’ charge because he or she is a full-time student as determined in accordance with the prescribed guidelines; . . . (h) “support order” means (

i) a child support order, or (ii) a spousal or adult interdependent partner support order, and includes an interim order for support made under

section 84. 2003 cF-4.5 s46; 2008 c15 s2 Division 1 Support of Child Obligation to support child

49(1) Every parent has an obligation to provide support for his or her child.

(2) The obligation under subsection (1) does not extend to a child who (

a) is a spouse or adult interdependent partner, or (

b) is under 18 years of age and has voluntarily withdrawn from his or her parents’ charge and is living an independent lifestyle. . . . Determining child support 51(1) In making a child support order, the court shall do so in accordance with the prescribed guidelines. Termination of child support order 55(1) Except where the court orders otherwise, a child support order terminates on the adoption or death of the child.

(2) The termination of a child support order does not affect any arrears owing under the order before it is terminated. Division 1.1 Child Support Recalculation Program

Definitions 55.1 In this Division, (a) “child support guidelines” means (

i) the Alberta Child Support Guidelines (AR 147/2005 ), (ii) the Federal Child Support Guidelines under the Divorce Act (Canada) , or (iii) child support guidelines established by another province under which child support is calculated in a manner that is substantially similar to the manner in which child support is calculated under the Alberta Child Support Guidelines (AR 147/2005 );

(b) “child support order” means an order respecting child support made under (

i) this Act, (ii) the Divorce Act (Canada) , or (iii) an enactment of another province respecting family law if the order has been registered under

section 18 of the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, but does not include a child support order that has no force or effect until it is confirmed by a court with jurisdiction to do so; (c) “Director” means the Director of the recalculation program designated under

section 55.11; (d) “payor” means a person who is obligated to pay support for a child pursuant to a child support order; (e) “recalculated amount” means the amount of child support determined after recalculation by the recalculation program; (f) “recalculation program” means the child support recalculation program established by

section 55.11; (g) “recipient” means a person who has a right to receive support for a child under a child support order. 2008 c15 s3 Child support recalculation program 55.11(1) There is hereby established a child support service to be known as the child support recalculation program.

(2) The recalculation program may, if a child support order meets the criteria established in the regulations under this Division, recalculate annually (

a) the amount of child support specified in the child support order that was determined in accordance with the applicable table of the child support guidelines, and (

b) the proportionate shares of any special or extraordinary expenses included in the child support order.

(3) The recalculation program shall perform a recalculation under subsection (2)

(

a) subject to

section 55.51, on the basis of updated income information, and (

b) in accordance with this Division, the regulations under this Division and the child support guidelines.

(4) The Minister may by order designate any individual as the Director of the recalculation program. 2008 c15 s3 Registration 55.2(1) Either a payor or a recipient may register a child support order with the recalculation program in the manner set out in the regulations under this Division.

(2) A child support order may be withdrawn from the recalculation program in accordance with the regulations under this Division. 2008 c15 s3 Prohibiting recalculation 55.21 If a court determines that recalculation of the amount of child support under a child support order by the recalculation program is inappropriate, the court may order that the amount of child support specified in the child support order is not to be recalculated by the recalculation program. 2008 c15 s3 Waiver 55.3 A payor and a recipient whose child support order has been registered with the recalculation program may agree in writing to waive a particular recalculation in accordance with the regulations under this Division. 2008 c15 s3 Recalculated amount 55.31 Subject to

section 55.4, if the recalculated amount differs from the amount of child support currently required to be paid by at least the prescribed amount, the recalculated amount is deemed to be the amount of child support required to be paid under the child support order effective 31 days after the day on which the payor and the recipient are notified in accordance with the regulations under this Division respecting the recalculated amount. 2008 c15 s3

Right to object 55.4(1) A payor or a recipient who does not agree with the recalculated amount may object, within 30 days after receiving notification respecting the recalculated amount, by commencing an application to a court to vary, suspend or terminate the child support order.

(2) At the time an application under subsection (1) is commenced, the person who commenced the application shall notify the recalculation program in writing in accordance with the regulations under this Division.

(3) Where an application has been commenced under subsection (1), the operation of

section 55.31 is suspended pending the determination of the application and the child support order continues in effect as if the recalculation had not been made.

(4) Where an application has been commenced under subsection (1) but (

a) the application is withdrawn, or (

b) the application is dismissed by the court, the payor becomes liable to pay the recalculated amount in accordance with

section 55.31 as if the application had not been commenced.

(5) For the purposes of this section, commencing an application includes complying with any mandatory prerequisites or requirements of the court in respect of the application. 2008 c15 s3 Income information 55.41(1) A payor or recipient whose income information is necessary for the purpose of recalculation shall provide to the recalculation program updated income information as required by the regulations under this Division at the times and in the manner set out in the regulations under this Division.

(2) The requirement for a payor or recipient to provide updated income information under subsection (1) does not replace or affect any other obligation of the payor or recipient to provide financial disclosure or any right of a payor or recipient to request financial disclosure. 2008 c15 s3 Division 2 Support of Spouse or Adult Interdependent Partner

Obligation to support spouse or adult interdependent partner 56 Every spouse or adult interdependent partner has an obligation to provide support for the other spouse or adult interdependent partner. Spousal or adult interdependent partner support order 57(1) Subject to this section, the court may, on application by a spouse or adult interdependent partner, make an order requiring a spouse or adult interdependent partner to provide support for the other spouse or adult interdependent partner.

(2) The court may make an order under this

section only if . . . (

b) in the case of adult interdependent partners, (

i) one or both of the adult interdependent partners have obtained a declaration of irreconcilability under

section 83, (ii) the adult interdependent partners are living separate and apart, or . . . Factors 58 In making a spousal or adult interdependent partner support order, the court shall consider (

a) the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse or adult interdependent partner, including (

i) the length of time the spouses or adult interdependent partners lived together, (ii) the functions performed by each spouse or adult interdependent partner during the period they lived together, and (iii) any order or arrangement relating to the support of the spouses or adult interdependent partners, (

b) any legal obligation of the spouse or adult interdependent partner having the support obligation under the order to provide support for any other person, and

(

c) the extent to which any other person who is living with the spouse or adult interdependent partner having the support obligation under the order contributes towards household expenses and thereby increases the ability of that spouse or adult interdependent partner to provide support, and (

d) the extent to which any other person who is living with the spouse or adult interdependent partner who is to receive support under the order contributes towards household expenses and thereby reduces the financial needs of that spouse or adult interdependent partner. Misconduct 59 In making a spousal or adult interdependent partner support order, the court shall not take into consideration any misconduct of a spouse or adult interdependent partner, except conduct that (

a) arbitrarily or unreasonably precipitates, prolongs or aggravates the need for support, or (

b) arbitrarily or unreasonably affects the ability of the spouse or adult interdependent partner having the support obligation under the order to provide the support. Objectives of spousal or adult interdependent partner support order 60 A spousal or adult interdependent partner support order should (

a) recognize any economic advantages and disadvantages to the spouses or adult interdependent partners arising from the relationship or its breakdown, (

b) apportion between the spouses or adult interdependent partners any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the relationship over and above the obligation apportioned between the spouses or adult interdependent partners pursuant to a child support order or a child support agreement, (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses or adult interdependent partners arising from the breakdown of the relationship, and (

d) insofar as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse or adult interdependent partner within a reasonable period of time. Termination of spousal or adult interdependent partner support order

63(1) Except where the court orders otherwise, a spousal or adult interdependent partner support order terminates on the death of the spouse or adult interdependent partner in respect of whom support is paid.

(2) The termination of a spousal or adult interdependent partner support order does not affect any arrears owing under the order before it is terminated.