S.D.K v. R.D.K, 2011 ABQB 245

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: S.D.K v. R.D.K, 2011 ABQB 245 Date: 20110408 Docket: 4803 144705 Registry: Edmonton Between: S.D.K. (also known as S.D.L.) Plaintiff - and - R.D.K. Defendant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Madam Justice S.J. Greckol _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] The parties commenced cohabitation in June of 1998. They married on September 4, 1999 and had one child, A.T.K., born July 28, 2000.

As well, the Plaintiff (who now goes by her name of S.D.L.) brought into the marriage a son from another relationship, C.L, born June 8, 1994. The parties separated January 2, 2008, although they remained under the same roof for many months. R.D.K. left the matrimonial home in September 2008. Having proved the legal requirements, the parties are granted their divorce. [ 2 ] S.D.L. is presently 35 years old and R.D.K. is 46 years old. [ 3 ] Parenting issues have been resolved. The remaining issues to be determined are the division of matrimonial property and the

setting of quantum for child and spousal support. II. Facts [ 4 ] S.D.L. filed a Statement of Claim for Divorce and Division of Matrimonial Property on January 31, 2008.

R.D.K. filed a Statement of Defence on December 22, 2010. [ 5 ] S.D.L. obtained an Interim Order from Hawco J. on September 17, 2008 directing that the children reside primarily with S.D.L., with generous access to R.D.K.; S.D.L. have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and R.D.K. vacate the home within two weeks; the home be listed and sold; R.D.K.’s Guidelines income was $144,876; R.D.K. pay $2,029 per month for the support of the children of the marriage commencing on October 1,2008; R.D.K. pay $2,000 per month as spousal support commencing October 1, 2008 and until further order, with a review once the Plaintiff began working full-time; and the parties split the utility costs of the home until it is sold. [ 6 ] In accordance with this Order, R.D.K. has had parenting time with A.T.K. at least every second weekend, and on vacations.

This arrangement has worked well given R.D.K.’s work

schedule and neither party seeks a change. The only issue they have had concerns travel. It is now agreed that each will be free to take A.T.K. out of the province on appropriate notice and provision of contact information to the other party. The details will be set out in the judgment roll as agreed between counsel. [ 7 ] R.D.K. does not dispute that he was in loco parentis to C.L., now 17 years of age and in Grade 10, when C.L. was between the ages of five and 15 years. C.L. has known no other father.

R.D.K. acknowledges his obligation to support C.L. as a child of the marriage under the terms of the Divorce Act . The Court has not been advised whether the terms to resolve the duration of that support have been resolved. If they have, those terms are to be included in the judgment roll. If not, I reserve jurisdiction to deal with that matter. [ 8 ] C.L. is an accomplished young man. He maintains average grades at school and plays triple AAA hockey, with junior teams courting him. According to R.D.K., his relationship with C.L. has disintegrated because C.L. has taken his mother’s side in the separation.

Neither parent has assiduously fostered the relationship between C.L. and R.D.K., which is a shame since both C.L. and R.D.K. have much to give to each other and would mutually benefit from continuation of the father and son relationship which they had for 10 years. [ 9 ] R.D.K. has worked in road construction since high school. He has held managerial positions and continues to do so. His work history is summarized below: Years Employment 1986 - 1994 Worked with Thompson Brothers Construction (Thompson). 1990 or 1992 (about) Formed K.

Consulting to contract out his services. 1994 Started work with Prairie Road Builders (Prairie). 2001 Started discussions with owner of Prairie about purchase of shares in company.

2004 Prairie Road Group (PRG) formed with three partners. Prairie transferred to PRG. April 2006 Constructively dismissed. June 2006 Returned to Thompson and continues that employment. May 15, 2007 Settled wrongful dismissal law suit for $250,000 including legal fees. [ 10 ] R.D.K. had a home when he began co-habiting with S.D.L.. The sum of $20,000 from the proceeds of the sale of his home was invested as a down payment in the matrimonial home. The parties are agreed that this amount is properly exempt.

He also brought RRSPs into the marriage, the values of which are agreed to be exempt from the matrimonial property regime. [ 11 ] R.D.K. was constructively dismissed from Prairie and successfully sued. The parties dispute whether the settlements funds are matrimonial property. A portion of those funds went to use for family needs, a portion to use by R.D.K. for his personal needs, while the remainder is unspent. [ 12 ] S.D.L. worked for Prairie at the time she met R.D.K. in 1998.

She was employed until their son was born, and then remained in the home looking after the family, caring for the children, and assisting with the paperwork associated with her husband’s occupation. When the parties separated, she obtained odd jobs for the first year and then enrolled in Grant McEwan, completing the legal assistant program in the spring of 2010. She now holds a permanent job at a law firm. [ 13 ] R.D.K. has paid child and spousal support in accordance with the order of Hawco J. order since October 1, 2008, although he contends that his income has decreased.

He did not pay utilities on the house as required. In compliance with the order, the house was sold in July 2009 for the sum of $425,000. By consent order of Erb J. dated August 25, 2009, each party received an interim distribution in the sum of $100,000. The parties disagree about how to deal with this interim distribution. Of the proceeds from the sale of the house, $202,000 remains in trust to be dealt with in accordance with the matrimonial property division. [ 14 ] The parties have since moved on. S.D.L. purchased a townhouse for herself and the two children.

R.D.K. rents a home from Wayne Battle, a friend and General Manager at Thompson. S.D.L. has the bulk of the matrimonial furnishings, although she offered to share with R.D.K.. He has purchased his own new furnishings. There is no dispute in terms of the furnishings, but there are issues with respect to various financial transactions by each of the parties which have occurred since separation. III. Issues [ 15 ] The issues to be determined are: (

a) child support; (

b) spousal support;

(

c) other retroactive adjustments; (

d) division of matrimonial property; and (

e) costs. IV. Analysis A. Child Support 1. Guidelines income [ 16 ] R.D.K. was in loco parentis , father to C.L., from the beginning of his co-habitation with S.D.L. on or about June 1998, through the marriage in September 1999, and until the parties’ physical separation in September 2008. That is a period of ten years - formative years as C.L. was five years old when R.D.K. took on the role of a parent to him. C.L. is now 17 years old.

R.D.K. is the only father C.L. has known and does not dispute his on-going legal obligation to support C.L.. [ 17 ] The parties’ income over time was summarized by counsel as follows: Year S.D.L. R.D.K. 2008 $27,581 line 150 @ $162,412 +K. Consulting net income @ - - $18,725 = $143,687 2009 $27,703 line 150 @ $98,795 + K. Consulting net income @ $19,191 = $117,986 2010 $16,923.08 line 150 @ $90,380 + K.

Consulting net income @ $27,874 = $118,254 2011 $36,000 [ 18 ] The figures for S.D.L. will be her Guidelines income for the purpose of calculating her share of the children’s s. 7 expenses from October 1, 2008 onward. [ 19 ] S.D.L. submits that R.D.K.’s Guidelines income should be set at the amount in the interim order of September 2008, which was $144,876. She argues that R.D.K. is doing the same job as prior to separation, with his good friends who own and manage Thompson and to whom he sub-contracts.

She says that when she and R.D.K. were together, they shared incomes as they ran the business together, and their combined incomes totalled about $144,000 before taxes. That amount included payment from Thompson of $1,000 per month for use of R.D.K.’s rented Cadillac Escalade and $100 per day for use of his other equipment. Since separation, R.D.K. has taken less salary from the corporation. However, he has full use of the Cadillac Escalade, including gas, maintenance and insurance. She contends that, as a result, $15,000 should be added to his income for 2009 and $20,000 for 2010.

[ 20 ] S.D.L. also argues that the depreciation expenses shown in the 2009 and 2010 financial statements for K. Consulting for an asset described as “automotive” are not legitimate. The expense claimed in 2009 was $6,785 and in 2010 was $11,533. Both were in relation to an “automotive” asset with an original cost of $45,232. S.D.L. points out that this was the approximate value of the Cadillac.

However, she notes that the Cadillac was bought by Thompson in 2009. [ 21 ] S.D.L. argues that when the vehicle benefits, cell phone benefit and depreciation expense are added back in, R.D.K.’s Guidelines income should be $139,771 for 2009 and $149,788 for 2010. [ 22 ] R.D.K. argues that his Guidelines income should be set at his line 150 income, plus net profit in his corporation before taxes, as detailed in the

summary above. [ 23 ] Wayne Battle, General Manager at Thompson, leased the Cadillac from Edmonton Motors in 2007. One week later, K. Consulting took over the lease, paying $1,500 per month to GMAC. From 2007 to 2009, Thompson paid K. Consulting $1,000 per month for the use of the Cadillac. The lease was to end in June 2009. Thompson did not want to pay so much for use of the Cadillac and, therefore, paid out the lease for the sum of $45,000.

Thompson has owned the vehicle ever since, and has paid for gas and other expenses. [ 24 ] R.D.K. could not explain the reference to a capital asset described as “automotive” with a cost of $45,232 in the financial statements for 2009 and 2010, how his accountant obtained information about the value of the “automotive” item, or what other automotive asset of that value his company owns. He argued that he had other equipment that depreciated, However, those items were set out independently in the notes to the financial statements. [ 25 ] I conclude that K.

Consulting did claim depreciation for the Cadillac even though it did not own the vehicle throughout most of 2009 and 2010.The amount deducted for depreciation for 2009 and 2010 must be added back to the company’s net income and, in turn, R.D.K.’s income. [ 26 ] Throughout the relevant time period, R.D.K.’s use of the Cadillac truck has not changed. It is the only vehicle that he drives, although occasionally the owner’s daughter or other employees use it.

For purposes of calculating R.D.K.’s Guidelines income, the value of the benefit of his use of the Cadillac, now Thompson’s vehicle, for all of his personal needs must also be considered. K. Consulting was paying GMAC $1,500 per month to lease the truck and Thompson was paying K. Consulting $1,000 per month for use of the truck. [ 27 ] Counsel for R.D.K. indicates that in such circumstances it would be usual to add back one percent of the value of the vehicle per month for the use of the vehicle.

Applying that calculation, the sum of $5,040 per year would be added to income to represent the benefit R.D.K. received from use of the vehicle. [ 28 ] In my view, it is reasonable to assume that the $500 difference between the lease payment made by K. Consulting and the amount it received from Thompson can be attributed to R.D.K.’s personal use of the vehicle, amounting to $6,000 per year. This amount should be added back to his income for 2009 and 2010 on in order to account for the benefit he received from his use of the Cadillac and for the expenses associated with that personal use. [ 29 ] K.

Consulting also expensed the cost of repairs and maintenance in 2009 and 2010 (about $5,500 and $6,500 respectively), although it was Thompson that was paying those costs, at least for the Cadillac. Some of those expenses may have been occasioned by other equipment but, if so, R.D.K. did not identify that other equipment. R.D.K. explained the maintenance expense claimed by his company by stating that if damage to the vehicle was his fault, he would pay for it. However, there was no specific evidence of any such costs borne by his company.

In my view, given the paucity of evidence on this issue, any over-deduction for maintenance and repairs is roughly balanced by having added back into R.D.K.’s income the depreciation taken by K. Consulting and the benefit to him of use of the Cadillac for the whole of 2009 when, in fact, the vehicle was not purchased by Thompson until mid-way through that year. [ 30 ] R.D.K. said that he has two cell phones and that one of them is his personal phone, from which I infer that he makes the payments on it.

There will be no further sum added to income for his use of the company cell phone as R.D.K. is on call on a 24/7 basis.

[ 31 ] The Guidelines income for R.D.K. will be comprised of his line 150 income, plus net profit in the corporation before tax after adding back the amount wrongly claimed as an expense for depreciation, plus $6,000 per year for the benefit he received from his use of the Cadillac. [ 32 ] That sum is: 2009: $117, 986 plus $6,785 plus $6,000 = $ 130,771 2010: $118, 254 plus $11,533 plus $,6,000 = $ 135,787 [ 33 ] The Guidelines income set by Hawco J. in October 2008 was $144,876.

The Hawco J order was an interim order and there will be a retroactive adjustment to the child support payments made pursuant to that order on the basis that Guidelines income would have been set at $130,771 for 2009 and $135,787 for 2010 if all of this information had been before the Court. [ 34 ] The 2010 Guidelines income figures for each party will be used to determine child support on a go forward basis. The parties will include a provision requiring disclosure of corporate and personal income tax information on an annual basis so that adjustments can be made as necessary.

Section 7 expenses [ 35 ] R.D.K. has not paid s. 7 expenses since the parties’ separation effective September 2008. As a result, these must be paid retroactively. (

a) Medical and dental expenses for C.L. [ 36 ] R.D.K. removed C.L. from his medical plan at the time of separation. It is agreed that dental and physiotherapy expenses should be paid. R.D.K. will pay his proportionate share of these expenses, amounting to $736, on a retroactive basis in accordance with the parties’ Guidelines income. There are no more medical/dental expenses as S.D.L. has an employer funded plan. (

b) Extraordinary expenses for C.L. [ 37 ] C.L. is a triple AAA hockey player. He is being drafted to play junior hockey and he is also doing well at high school. He is a credit to both his mother and to R.D.K.. R.D.K. acted as his father from the time C.L. was five until he was 15 years of age. He must finish the job by supporting him for so long as C.L. is a child of the marriage. [ 38 ] C.L.’s claimed s. 7 expenses, amounting to $19,009.34 since 2008, are for playing hockey at a very high level. They include the following: 2008/09 Bus Pass $ 55.00 Hockey Registration $ 760.00

Bantam AAA Tryout $ 110.00 Bantam AAA Team Fee $3,000.00 Bantam AAA Bingo $ 400.00 Concession $ 112.50 Equipment $ 739.15 Equipment $ 120.71 Equipment $ 720.88 Equipment $1,739.08 2009/10 Registration $ 800.00 Midget 15 AAA Tryout $ 120.00 Midget 15 AAA Team Fees $3,000.00 Equipment $1,789.17 Equipment -$ 367.50 2010/11 Registration $ 840.00 Midget AA Team Fees $2,500.00 Equipment $2,947.32 Gift Cards -$ 540.74 Hardware for Helmet $ 163.77 Total $19,009.34 [ 39 ] All of these are proper s. 7 expenses, except for the bus pass and the concession costs.

Counsel for R.D.K. argues that since C.L.’s devotion to hockey is almost a full time occupation, some of the cost should be born by the s. 3 support payments. By now, C.L. should be making some contribution to his hockey expenses. I agree that the s. 7 expenses for C.L. should be reduced somewhat, so that only two thirds of the total amount expended or expendable will be an allowable s. 7 expense. [ 40 ] The allowable

section s. 7 expense for C.L.’s hockey is two thirds of the total claimed (having deducted bus pass and concession costs: $19,009.34 - $167.50 ($55 + $112.50) = $18,841.84), amounting to $12,561.23. Each party will bear their proportionate share of that sum relative to their Guidelines income.

(

c) A.T.K.’s s. 7 expenses [ 41 ] In terms of A.T.K.’s s. 7 expenses, S.D.L. claims the sum of $1,586.01 expended since 2008, comprised of the cost of summer camp in 2009, scholastic books, hockey equipment, bus pass, hockey team seed cheque, and concession costs. R.D.K. is opposed to paying any s. 7 expenses for A.T.K.. Usually, it is agreed that such expenses will be shared by the parents, but as argued by R.D.K., most are not extraordinary expenses for these parties. There is one exception: the cost of summer camp must be shared.

I take into account the fact that S.D.L. is working full time out of the home, that R.D.K. has A.T.K. only every second weekend plus vacation time, and that the summer camp cost is tantamount to a child care cost. The allowable s. 7 expense for A.T.K. up to the end of 2010 is the amount $433 for summer camp. Each party will bear their proportionate share of that sum relative to their Guidelines income. 3. Conclusion on Child Support [ 42 ] The Guidelines income and allowable s. 7 expenses were provided to counsel. Counsel for S.D.L. used the following premises for the necessary calculations: (

a) The s. 7 expenses for C.L. of $12,561.23 was divided by 31 months (September 2008 to March 2011) for a monthly amount of $405.20. (

b) For 2008, the payor would owe his proportionate share of $1,620.80 for C.L.’s hockey expenses. (

c) For 2009, the annual hockey expense for C.L. was $4,862 and one-half of the medical/dental expense, plus the $433 summer camp expense for A.T.K., as it was incurred in that year. (

d) For 2010, the annual hockey expense for C.L. was $4,862 and the other one-half of the medical/dental expense. A.T.K. did not attend camp in 2010. (

e) For 2011, the annual hockey expense for C.L. is estimated to be $4,862. There are no more medical/dental expenses as S.D.L. has an employer funded plan. The payor’s share of C.L.’s hockey expense has not yet been paid. S.D.L.’s income has been adjusted to $36,000 to reflect her current income and R.D.K.’s income is presumed to be as it was in 2010. [ 43 ] Counsel for R.D.K. took no issue with these premises and calculations, which result in the following figures for child support: 2008 Hawco J. Order Year Guidelines Income Child Support (inclusive of s. 3 only) 2009 $144,876 $2,029 per month 2010 $144,876 $2,029 2011 $144,876 $2,029

2011 Divorce Judgment Year Guidelines Income Child Support (inclusive of s. 3 and s. 7 support) 2009 $130,771 $2,296 per month 2010 $135,787 $2,296 2011 $135,787 (subject to adjustment) $2,257 [ 44 ] A retroactive adjustment will be required. B. Spousal Support [ 45 ] This case falls in the most difficult category for determination of spousal support. It is neither a short term nor a long term marriage. It bears the hallmarks of a traditional marriage.

The contribution of each party during the marriage is accorded equal value: S.D.L. worked hard as mother and homemaker, contributing to the business undertaken by the family, and added to the family income by some outside work. R.D.K. worked hard also. He was focussed on success and, as a result, was away from home for extended periods of time, working on the construction of roads in Fort McMurray and elsewhere. His financial circumstances have not changed significantly despite the downturn in Alberta’s economy in 2008, and his future is assured.

S.D.L. has taken steps to upgrade, obtain retraining, and to become employed to assure her independence. 1. Approach to determination of spousal support [ 46 ]

Section 15.2(1) of the Divorce Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 provides that the court may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or both, as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse.

Pursuant to s. 15.2(3), the court may make an order for spousal support for “a definite or indefinite period or until a specified event occurs, and may impose terms, conditions or restrictions in connection with the order as it thinks fit and just.” [ 47 ] The objectives of spousal support are set out in s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act : 15.2(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (

b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. [ 48 ] Entitlement to and quantum of spousal support are based on these objectives and the following factors outlined in s. 15.2(4) of

the Divorce Act: 15.2(4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration thecondition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including (

a) the length of time the spouses cohabited; (

b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (

c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. [49] The court can vary spousal support on application by either or both spouses under s. 17(1)(

a) and pursuant to s. 17(2) is to takeinto consideration the same objectives as those set out in s. 15.2(6). [50] In Bracklow v. Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420 at paras. 23 and 24, McLachlin J. discussed the twomain theories of marriage and spousal support reflected in the Divorce Act. The first is the "basic social obligation" model, founded onthe notion that marriage is a potentially permanent obligation.

Pursuant to this theory, the former spouse rather than the government hasprimary responsibility to provide for his or her ex-partner and to replace, to the extent possible, the lost income that the ex-partner used toenjoy during the marriage. This model is the basis for "non-compensatory" support. The second is the "independent" model of marriage,which provides the theoretical basis for compensatory spousal support.

Both models of marriage and spousal support allow for variationby contract. [51] As explained by McLachlin J., the basic social obligation model recognizes the reality that the longer a couple cohabit in afamily relationship, their affairs may become so intermingled that they cannot easily be disentangled. It also recognizes that manyseparating couples cannot move readily from the mutual support status of marriage to the independence status of single life.

In addition,it places the primary burden of support for a needy partner who cannot attain post-marital self-sufficiency on the partners to therelationship. [52] In assessing spousal support, the Court must consider the objectives set out in ss. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act and the factors setout in s. 15.2(4) of the Act, including the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse. Where the extent of theeconomic loss can be determined, compensatory factors may be paramount.

Where it cannot, the Court should consider need andstandard of living as the primary criteria along with the ability of the other party to pay. [53] The compensatory model was the focus of the Supreme Court of Canada in Moge v. Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3S.C.R. 813. In that case, L'Heureux-Dubé J., for the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada, indicated (at para. 43) that the Court inassessing spousal support should focus its inquiry on the effect of the marriage in impairing or improving each party's economicprospects.

She suggested (at para. 45) that equitable distribution of resources to alleviate the economic consequences of marriage ormarriage breakdown for both spouses can be achieved by spousal and child support, by the division of property and assets, or by acombination of both. [54] L'Heureux-Dubé J. clarified that the “means and needs” test is no longer the only criterion for support. All four objectives setout in ss. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act must be considered. No single objective is paramount. Self sufficiency is a goal of spousal supportonly where practicable. [55] Subsections 15.2(6)(

a) to (

c) in particular reflect the compensatory model of spousal support. According to that model, ifrelatively few advantages have been conferred or disadvantages incurred in the marriage, transitional support allowing for reintegrationback into the labour force may be all that is required. However, where there has been economic disadvantage of one spouse as a result ofthe marriage and its dissolution, long-term support or an alternative settlement will be required. According to L'Heureux-Dubé J.(at para.84), the longer the relationship has endured, the greater the presumptive claim to equal standards of living on its dissolution. She

suggested that the general economic impact of divorce on women is a phenomenon amenable to judicial notice. [56] In Ross v. Ross (1995), (NB CA), 16 R.F.L. (4th) 1 at paras. 14 and 15 (N.B.C.A.), Bastarache J.A., as hethen was, wrote: A just resolution of spousal support claims will take into account the economic effect of the marriage and its breakdown, the contributionof the spouses to the career advancement of each other, the standard of living enjoyed by each spouse during the marriage, as well as therequirement that both spouses seek to achieve self-sufficiency.

In all cases, nevertheless, both parties must be able to continue with theirlives, enter into new relationships and function independently of one another. The compensatory component of spousal support must not undermine the promotion of self-sufficiency, nor should it be determined inignorance of the fact that property division may have reduced economic disadvantages. It is in cases where it is not possible to determinethe extent of the economic loss of the disadvantaged spouse that the Court will consider need and standard of living as the primarycriteria, together with the ability to pay of the other party. 2.

Conclusion as to spousal support [57] The parties started living together in June 1998. They married on September 4, 1999, when C.L. was five years old. Theylived in British Columbia for a period of a year, in 1999 to 2000, and on April 1, 2000 moved into the matrimonial home in SpruceGrove. In July of that year, A.T.K. was born. When he was 18 months old, S.D.L. went back to work at a flexible full time job for abouta year. After that, except for odd jobs, she mostly stayed home, looking after the children, the home, and doing office work for K.Consulting.

In the years until R.D.K. was terminated from Prairie in 2000, he worked extremely hard and long hours, sometimes beinghome only for one weekend in a month, earning his salary plus healthy bonuses. [58] R.D.K. continued to work hard in the construction industry when he worked at Thompson. By the summer of 2006, themarriage was facing problems that continued through Christmas of 2007. In January 2008, S.D.L. filed for divorce. R.D.K. left thematrimonial home in September 2008. [59] The parties co-habited for one year and were married from September 1999 until now, about 11 and one half years.

In thatmarriage, they each gave their all: he worked hard and provided the financial resources; she worked outside the home some, but mainlywas responsible for the home and the children, largely on her own, while making some contribution to the business. R.D.K. has paidspousal support in the sum of $2,000 per month since the Hawco J. order, effective October 2008. [60] S.D.L., admirably, has re-equipped herself for independence, albeit at a standard of living much below that of her formerhusband. She upgraded her education at Norquest College in 2007, while the parties were still together.

After separation, in the 2008 -2009 period, she was unable to secure good employment. She found the separation difficult. She worked at what she could find,including Spruce Grove Bingo. In September 2009, she started the legal assistant program at Grant McEwan. She could not make endsmeet with the support payments alone ($2,000 spousal plus $2,029 child support) and, therefore, augmented her income with studentloans and credit.

In June of 2010, she graduated from the program and, after a two week practicum, took a full time position at a lawfirm, now earning $36,000 per year. [61] Counsel for R.D.K. argues that the spousal support payments should be set at $1,000 per month for a period of 18 months.Counsel for S.D.L. argues that for the 21- month period of separation, spousal support was inadequate, as shown by the debtaccumulated.

She argues that until she obtained full time employment in June of 2010, she should have received $4,000 to $5,000 permonth and that she should be paid spousal support in the future for a three to five year period. [62] S.D.L. provided a budget that shows total expenses of $6,764.92 per month. However, $920 per month should be deductedfrom that for payments on debt that can be expected to be paid off on the conclusion of these proceedings. As well, the sum of $200 permonth for alcohol and tobacco typically would not be included as an appropriate budget item.

The remaining expenses amount to $5,645.S.D.L. earns about $3,000 per month before taxes. She will receive child support payments of $2,257. She has a short fall of at least $400per month, without considering the amount she must pay for taxes. She has no ability to save for retirement or for a rainy day.

[ 63 ] While S.D.L. was at home attending to family needs, R.D.K. was in the workforce honing his skills and advancing his career prospects. Although he should not be responsible for subsidizing her indefinitely, she is entitled to ongoing support on a needs basis, as shown, but also on a compensatory basis, because while she devoted ten years to family needs and was out of the workforce, R.D.K. devoted those ten years to career.

S.D.L. suffered economic disadvantage on separation, was required to downsize her home, lived on a significantly reduced income, retrained and worked outside the home, and continued to be primarily responsible for the children.

R.D.K. has less disposable income than before the separation, but resides in a large home, takes vacations and enjoys a lifestyle that appears largely unchanged. [ 64 ] Using the revised Guidelines income figures, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines suggest the following ranges of support: 2009 $1,976 to $2,713 2010 $1,812 to $2,630 2011 $1,261 to $2,084 [ 65 ] I am satisfied that the spousal support paid by R.D.K. in 2009 and 2010 at $2,000 per month should not be disturbed.

I have attempted to balance the needs of the family with the various sources of income and the various expenses since time of separation, including treatment of S.D.L.’s present debt as matrimonial debt. [ 66 ] A relevant consideration in setting spousal support is that S.D.L. continues to bear the lion’s share of the child rearing responsibilities. Their son, A.T.K., is with R.D.K. only every second weekend. S.D.L. cares for the children almost full time.

This too is work, a labour of love, but for which there is no financial compensation, although R.D.K. will reap the benefits of one, if not two, well raised young people in his life. This too requires time and energy and is a factor in awarding on-going spousal support. [ 67 ] Taking into account the history of this marriage, the roles played by the parties, the disparate career and income prospects of each, and the ongoing disproportionate contribution to child care by S.D.L., the spousal support commencing April 1, 2011 is set at $1,500 per month, to continue for a further three years, until March 31, 2014. C.

Other Retroactive Adjustments . 1. Utilities [ 68 ] According to the interim order of Hawco J. dated September 17, 2008, the parties were directed to split the utility costs of the home until it was sold. R.D.K. says he was unable to afford to pay his share. It is agreed that he will do so now. The total amount of utilities costs is $5,278.31, of which R.D.K.’s share is $2,689.15. 2. Costs to repair the matrimonial home [ 69 ] S.D.L. claims that R.D.K. should reimburse her for the expenses she incurred preparing the matrimonial home for sale. The total amount claimed is $2,787.08 .

R.D.K. agrees that the cost of the carpet cleaning is appropriately shared ($950). I have excluded the items that were expended for S.D.L.’s purposes (residential appraisal, locks changed). The balance of the costs will be shared:

Date Item Amount 9/28/2008 Sears Carpet Cleaning $950.21 10/31/2008 Lee Electric (Electrical in Garage) $78.75 1/4/2009 The Plumbing Guys Inc. (Tap/pipes below kitchen sink) $210.00 1/9/2009 The Home Depot (Supplies) $212.43 1/10/2009 The Home Depot (Supplies) $43.10 1/17/2009 310 Dump (Garbage Removal) $274.43 3/13/2009 Grove Decorating Centre (Paint for Walls/Ceiling in Basement) $451.16 4/4/2009 The Co-operators (House Insurance) $567.00 Total $2,787.08 [ 70 ] The total amount of repairs associated with preparation of the matrimonial home for sale is $2,787.08, of which R.D.K.’s share is $1,393.54. D.

Division of Matrimonial Property 1. Date of valuation [ 71 ] The issue of the proper date for valuation and division of matrimonial property was before the Court of Appeal in Hodgson v. Hodgson (2005), 361 A.R. 190, 2005 ABCA 13 . The court held that valuation and division must take place as of the date of trial, with any resulting inequities being dealt with by applying the factors set out in s. 8 of the Matrimonial Property Act , R.S.A. 2000, c. M-8 ( MPA ).

Section 8 considerations [ 72 ] As noted above, during the course of the marriage, each spouse contributed all of their resources, both personal and financial, to the family. The couple separated in January 2008, with actual physical separation occurring in September 2008. They have now divorced in April 2011.

[ 73 ] At the time of marriage, R.D.K. had more financial resources than S.D.L.. He had RRSPs, for which he is given an exemption, and he paid the down-payment on the matrimonial home from a previous home, for which he is given an exemption. [ 74 ] During the marriage, R.D.K. continued to work hard and advance his career in the construction industry while S.D.L. looked after the home, the children, and supported K. Consulting. Since separation, their financial lives have continued to be intertwined through support obligations, shared property and children.

S.D.L. has worked towards independence by establishing a new career as a legal assistant, graduating in the spring of 2010 and finding full time employment almost immediately. [ 75 ] The rule of equal division of property applies to this couple, except where the property is exempt, as determined below. Special considerations apply to the amount of money that was the subject of a prior distribution consent order made on a “without prejudice” basis. R.D.K. argues the proceeds distributed are no longer part of the matrimonial regime. S.D.L. contends they should be included as matrimonial property.

Special considerations also apply to the debt that has been incurred by S.D.L. since separation, and to the unrestricted use by R.D.K. of the settlement funds paid in relation to his wrongful dismissal law suit. 3. Proceeds of sale of matrimonial home and prior distribution [ 76 ] The matrimonial home was sold in July 2009 for $425,000. Each of the parties received $100,000 from the sale pursuant to the consent order of Erb J., dated August 25, 2009. R.D.K. invested this amount and still has it.

S.D.L. used the money to purchase a home for herself and the children ($66,000), paid for living expenses while in a hotel and between houses, paid for a washer and dryer, paid off her Visa and her line of credit ($30,000), and paid legal fees. Her house is now valued at $288,900. She has a mortgage of $225,820.48, with equity of about $63,080. [ 77 ] R.D.K. argues that the proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home, once distributed, need not be accounted for and that purchases or payments made with the money distributed need not be included in the property statements.

However, the order was made on a “without prejudice” basis. [ 78 ] The parties had been apart for almost a year at the time this money was distributed. R.D.K. was paying both spousal and child support based on a Guidelines income slightly higher than that which I have set. S.D.L. had been living in the house rent-free while R.D.K. was in rental accommodation. The expenses for house maintenance and repair have been shared. S.D.L. was minimally employed. She also cashed in her $17,000 in RRSPs to augment her support payments.

She will not be credited with the value of these RRSPs, since the proceeds were used to defray living expenses. As well, she will receive reimbursement for house repairs and maintenance and will receive partial reimbursement for s. 7 expenses that she paid in this period. [ 79 ] There has been an interim equal distribution of $100,000 from the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

Considering the context in which the money was received and disbursed, as well as the considerations above, it is just and equitable that neither this distribution nor its sequella be re-visited. [ 80 ] There remains $202,000 in trust from the sale of the matrimonial home that will be divisible between the parties. 4. Exemptions (

a) Assets acquired prior to marriage [ 81 ] R.D.K., as agreed, receives credit for the $20,000 in pre-marriage assets he put towards the down payment on the matrimonial home. [ 82 ] R.D.K., as agreed, receives credit for RRSPs held prior to co-habitation, valued at $14,446 ($18,083 less 20 percent).

(

b) Settlement for wrongful dismissal law suit [83] As noted above, R.D.K. has worked in road construction since high school. He has mostly held managerial positions andcontinues to do so. From 1986 to 1994, he worked with Thompson. In about 1990 or 1992, he formed K. Consulting to contract out hisservices. In 1994, he started work with Prairie. In 2001, R.D.K. and three other managers started discussions with the owner of Prairieabout purchasing the company. This opportunity was provided by the company owner to four senior hardworking employees.

In 2004,R.D.K. formed PRG with three partners and the shares of Prairie were transferred to PRG. The arrangement was that each partner wouldbe paid $100,000 per year. If the profit in the business was $600,000 or more, each would receive a bonus of $150,000 and the ownerwould then be paid off. The business was worth about 13 million dollars. The four partners contemplated that in about eight years, thebusiness would be paid for. The business was so successful that the four partners could have paid off the owner in one year.

This causedthe owner to re-think the arrangement and the deal was not signed. [84] Other events overtook R.D.K.. He became privy to an e-mail in which his partners were discussing his dismissal. R.D.K.explained that he was trying to spend more time at home with his family. He had been working for Prairie for 12 years by then, and wasdevastated. In April 2006, he considered that he was constructively dismissed and commenced a law suit in which he ultimately wasvindicated. In June 2006, he returned to Thompson, where he works in a managerial position to this day.

On May 15, 2007, he settled thewrongful dismissal law suit for $250,000, receiving $195,000 after deduction of legal fees. The settlement was structured so that it wascharacterized as compensation for legal fees and “...the sum of $200,000 for the purchase of the K. shares” (the settlement funds). [85] R.D.K. argues that this sum, or what remains of it, is not matrimonial property. He maintains that the shares for which thesettlement funds were paid were a gift and exempt pursuant to s. 7(2)(

a) of the MPA, or represented a lump sum payable for wrongfuldismissal and damages in tort, exempt under s. 7(2)(

d) of the MPA. Alternatively, if they were an asset, he asserts they were acquiredstarting in 1994, five years prior to marriage, and vested on termination in 2006 (six years after the parties’ marriage in 1999), so thatonly about one-half of the settlement proceeds is matrimonial property. R.D.K. provides no authority for any of these propositions,except Hughes v. Hughes, 2006 ABQB 468, 410 A.R. 16, in which a wrongful dismissal lump sum settlement was paid and spent as anincome stream and therefore was not considered to be matrimonial property. [86] In Hughes, after thirty years of employment, Mr.

Hughes negotiated a severance package. He retired early and was paidcompensation for lost pension benefits and severance representing approximately one and one-half year's earnings. Ms. Hughes arguedthat, once the severance was deposited into his bank account, it became matrimonial property. She claimed a share, although they hadseparated four years prior to the pay out. The court held the severance payment received was meant to compensate Hughes for thetermination of his employment and to be an income stream for a period after his termination. It was not matrimonial property. [87] In MacDonald v.

MacDonald (1997), 1997 ABCA 409 , 209 A.R. 178 at para. 17 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.denied [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 49, the Alberta Court of Appeal heard an appeal from the decision of the chambers judge denying the wife’sapplication for variation in child support. The court commented as follows on the issue of severance received by the husband when hewas terminated from his employment: While it may be argued that the number of months of notice to which an employee is entitled on termination is reflective of past service,it cannot be denied that the monies payable are a direct income replacement.

The fact that the respondent receives the severance in alump sum or receives preferential tax treatment by transferring a large amount to his RRSP does not change its original characterizationas income. In fact, the respondent's ability to pay is enhanced because of this tax treatment since, had he worked the 21 month period, hewould have continued to pay tax at the highest rate leaving less money in his hands for support. These monies are intended to be anongoing income stream as if the respondent would be working throughout this period.

It should be added to any other income he earnsduring the period to determine his ability to pay... [88] In Sutton v. Davidson, 1999 ABCA 280, 244 A.R. 126, the Alberta Court of Appeal addressed the issue of how to treatseverance and other payments received by the husband after he was terminated from his employment during the course of the marriage.He had been given the equivalent of 10 months salary and had rolled it into an RRSP.

He successfully grieved his termination andreceived another payment and a share of his pension. [89] The court referred to its previous decision in MacDonald and applied the obiter comment made in that case that severance,

bonuses and stock options can be considered matrimonial property, depending on how they are dealt with after they are received. The husband in Sutton had deposited part of his termination payment into a joint account. The court held that, by doing so, he had treated it as joint matrimonial property. The court was satisfied that the trial judge had correctly treated the termination payment as property rather than income, reasoning at para. 30 that: “[i]ncome which is saved becomes property. It does not forever remain income.

If it is earned and saved within the term of the marriage then it is property subject to distribution.” [ 90 ] In Tabata v. Smith , 2001 ABQB 776 , 297 A.R. 168, both spousal support and matrimonial property were in issue. The wife claimed a portion of the severance package received by her husband about one month prior to their separation. Bensler J. applied the test set out in MacDonald and Sutton and determined that the severance package should be dealt with as property. Not only did she consider how the payment had been treated, but also when it had been dealt with by the husband.

She held that when the husband rolled most of the severance payment into an RRSP, it effectively became property for the purposes of matrimonial property distribution. [ 91 ] Bensler J. noted at para. 37 that the severance in that case was compensation for loss of income which would have occurred after the parties separated and that the wife had contributed little to the acquisition of the severance package. She concluded that an equal division of the severance package would not be just and equitable and instead distributed it 90/10 in favour of the husband, valuing it as at the time of trial.

Bensler J. advised that any inequity in the distribution arising from that valuation date had been accounted for in the 90/10 split awarded. [ 92 ] In the present case, R.D.K.’s opportunity to purchase shares in Prairie was not gratuitous. The shares were not a gift. The transfer of shares in Prairie to the four partners was intended to be paid for over time and into the future.

The shareholders thought that it would take eight years to pay out the approximately 13 million dollars required. [ 93 ] The settlement funds were paid as a result of a constructive dismissal law suit and said to be payment for shares held by R.D.K.. They appear to be damages for breach of contract, not damages in tort. Regardless, the settlement funds were paid in a lump sum, mingled with family resources and invested. They were not intended or used as an income stream. R.D.K. was almost immediately re-employed by Thompson. The decision in Macdonald is determinative: income “...which is saved becomes property.

It does not forever remain income. If it is earned and saved within the term of the marriage then it is property subject to distribution.” [ 94 ] I know of no authority that would exclude part of this sum from the matrimonial regime, nor can I do so on the basis of justice and equity under s. 8, since in the years leading up to the dismissal, the parties were a joint economic unit. The settlement funds of $189,000 were used to pay for the Chevrolet Tahoe ($49,000); air conditioning for the house ($5000); credit card debt ($3000); and a stock account for R.D.K. to use for investment ($40,000).

The settlement funds were treated as matrimonial property. [ 95 ] There was $82,000 left of the settlements funds at the time of separation. Of that, R.D.K. used $10,000 to pay Mr. Battle for furnishings for the home that R.D.K. rents from him. He spent $16,000 on additional furnishings and legal fees, and $21,000 on personal taxes. R.D.K.’s expenditure of this matrimonial property ($49,000) since separation is considered below. Out of the original settlement funds, $33,000 remains. 5. K. Consulting Ltd. [ 96 ] The parties are agreed that K.

Consulting is worth $41,217 and is divisible matrimonial property. [ 97 ] The property owned by the company includes a 2009/2010 yellow quad, 2005 Yamaha Grizzly, the ATV trailer and testing equipment. [ 98 ] The yellow quad ATV is used by R.D.K. for work to view projects in the bush and test the soil to determine conditions for road building. It is worth about $16,000, or near the purchase price. It pulls a 25-foot trailer that hauls the auger equipment used for soil testing. The 2005 Yamaha 66 FTR Grizzly formerly served this purpose.

The yellow quad, the Grizzly, the ATV trailer and the testing equipment make up the net value of K. Consulting. 6. Value of chattels

[ 99 ] There is no issue over furniture, most of which remained with S.D.L., although she offered R.D.K. his choice of items. R.D.K. spent at least $20,000 of the parties’ joint property (the settlement funds) on furniture. 7. Vehicles [ 100 ] The parties are agreed that S.D.L.’s Chevrolet Tahoe is worth $24,000.

The loan for the car was paid out from the proceeds of R.D.K.’s wrongful dismissal damages. [ 101 ] As noted above, Thompson is now the owner of the Cadillac and R.D.K.’s virtually unrestricted use of this vehicle is accounted for by adding the value of its use back to his income. [ 102 ] R.D.K. owns a 2000 Polaris snowmobile. He says that, in top condition, the snowmobile would be worth $2,500, but that he has crashed it and it is worthless.

It is 11 years old, and I accept that it should not be accorded any value. [ 103 ] The Yamaha Raptor is an ATV for A.T.K.’s use and is ascribed no value. [ 104 ] The Kodiak was S.D.L.’s quad and was traded in on the yellow quad, the value of which is included in the value of K. Consulting. [ 105 ] S.D.L. contends that a boat and trailer R.D.K. has been using for leisure purposes can be presumed to belong to him. R.D.K. denies ownership. He says that the boat and trailer belong to the owner of his employer, who permits his management staff and families to enjoy its use.

He provided an invoice from the Iron Garage in Stony Plain, dated January 15, 2009, showing the sale of a boat and trailer from the Garage to Larry Thompson. The Iron Garage apparently is a company that holds the legal title to various leisure vehicles owned by the Thompson family. [ 106 ] There is no evidence that R.D.K. owns the boat and trailer that he has been using, Therefore, it is not included in the matrimonial property regime. 8. Investments [ 107 ] R.D.K. has RRSPs valued at $120,030. The parties agree that he has an exemption valued at $14,446 ($18,083 less 20%).

The balance are matrimonial assets and their value will be shared between the parties or in kind, if they agree to do so. [ 108 ] S.D.L. had $17,000 in RRSPs, but cashed them in after June 2008 and spent the proceeds to assist with support for herself and the children. R.D.K. argues dissipation, but there is no evidence of such. In the two year after separation, S.D.L. was minimally employed, was affected by the separation, and was not able to support herself and the children on the s. 3 support payments.

The only argument made with respect to dissipation is that S.D.L. took the children on a ski holiday and stayed at the Rimrock Hotel in Banff for a weekend. R.D.K. cannot be heard to complain about this: he has gone on a cruise vacation and a vacation to Cuba since the separation. This sum should not be considered as part of the divisible matrimonial property as there is no evidence it was used for purposes other than legitimate support of S.D.L. and the children. 9.

Matrimonial debts [ 109 ] In 2009, one year after separation, S.D.L. received $100,000 from the interim distribution of the proceeds of the matrimonial home and used some to pay off matrimonial debt. For the reasons set out above, that amount will not be revisited.

[ 110 ] In the period September 2009 to spring 2010, S.D.L. was at school. Support payments did not meet her needs. As a result, she took out student loans and incurred credit card debt. This debt accrued because S.D.L. used the money to up-grade her education and outfit herself for future independence. When she commenced work in the spring of 2010, she was working at a junior level and continued to accrue debt in the sum of $37,307. [ 111 ] After separation, R.D.K. had the benefit of personal use of the funds from the wrongful dismissal settlement that was matrimonial property.

The difference between the $82,000 remaining at the time of separation and the $33,000 that remains now, some $49,000 was available to him for furnishings, legal fees, and personal taxes. Otherwise, he would have had to go into debt to make ends meet, as did S.D.L..

S.D.L.’s debts in the sum of $37,307 consist of: Item Amount CIBC Visa: $5,632.00 CIBC Loan to pay credit card debt: $26, 792.13 Student Loan $4,025.00 Student Loan $858.00 Total $37,307.00 [ 112 ] Given that S.D.L.’s present debt was accrued while R.D.K. spent the wrongful dismissal settlement funds that was matrimonial property to augment his income, it is just and equitable that the balance of those funds ($33,000) be applied directly to defray S.D.L.’s debts that are matrimonial debt.

To the extent R.D.K. has received a greater benefit from those funds, I find that he was entitled to spend some family funds on furnishings. [ 113 ] R.D.K. has a significantly better opportunity to earn future income than does S.D.L.. She will not have long term spousal support due to the medium length duration of the marriage. They should start off on an equal footing insofar as that is possible. [ 114 ] S.D.L.’s present debt, which is matrimonial debt, will be paid for from the wrongful dismissal settlement proceeds.

Neither the debt nor the remaining settlement proceeds will be included in the matrimonial property statements. VI.

Summary and Conclusions A. Child Support [ 115 ] The Guidelines income set by Hawco J. in October 2008 was $144,876. The Hawco J. order was an interim order and there will be a retroactive adjustment to the child support payments made pursuant to that order on the basis that R.D.K.’s Guidelines income would have been set at $130,771 for 2009 and $135,787 for 2010, had all the information been before the Court.

[ 116 ] The allowable s. 7 expense for A.T.K.’s summer camp costs is $433. [ 117 ] The allowable s. 7 expense for C.L.’s hockey is two thirds of the total claimed (having deducted bus pass and concession costs: $19,009.34 - $167.50 ($55 + $112.50) = $18,841.84), in the amount of $12,561.23. [ 118 ]

Section 7 expenses also include medical and dental expenses amounting to $736. [ 119 ] R.D.K. is to pay his proportionate share of the s. 7 expenses based on the parties’ Guidelines incomes. [ 120 ] The parties will include a provision in the judgment roll for disclosure of corporate and personal income tax information on an annual basis so that adjustments can be made as necessary. B. Spousal Support [ 121 ] S.D.L. will receive support payments of $1,500 per month for a period of three years from April 1, 2011 to March 31, 2014. C. Other Retroactive Adjustments . 1.

Utilities [ 122 ] The total amount of utilities costs payable is $5,278.31, of which R.D.K.’s share is $2689.15. 2. Costs to repair the matrimonial home [ 123 ] The total amount of repairs was $2,787.08, of which R.D.K.’s share is $1,393.54. D. Division of Matrimonial Property [ 124 ] The rule of equal division of property applies to this couple, except for exempt property and where certain special considerations apply, as noted in the body of this decision. 1.

Proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home and prior distribution [ 125 ] There has been an equal interim distribution of $100,000 from the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home. Considering the context in which the money was received and disbursed, as noted above, it is just and equitable that neither this distribution or its sequella be re-visited. [ 126 ] There remains $202,000 in trust from the sale of the matrimonial home that will be divisible between the parties.

2. Exemptions [ 127 ] R.D.K., as agreed, receives credit for $20,000 as a result of his carrying forward pre-marriage assets to the down payment of the matrimonial home. [ 128 ] R.D.K., as agreed, receives credit for RRSPs held prior to co-habitation, valued at $14,446 ($18,083 less 20 percent). 3. Wrongful dismissal settlement funds [ 129 ] The wrongful dismissal funds are matrimonial property. There remains $33,000 of those funds, which will be used to pay off S.D.L.’s debt. 4. K. Consulting Ltd. [ 130 ] The parties are agreed that K. Consulting is worth $41,217 and is divisible matrimonial property. 5.

Value of chattels [ 131 ] The parties are agreed that S.D.L.’s Chevrolet Tahoe is worth $24,000 and it is matrimonial property. [ 132 ] Thompson is now the owner of the Cadillac and R.D.K.’s virtually unrestricted use of this vehicle is accounted for by adding the value of his use of it to his income. [ 133 ] The Polaris should not be accorded any value. [ 134 ] The Yamaha Raptor is an ATV for A.T.K.’s use and is ascribed no value. [ 135 ] The Kodiak was S.D.L.’s quad and was traded in on the yellow quad, the value of which is included in the value of K.

Consulting. [ 136 ] There is no evidence that R.D.K. owns the boat and trailer that he has been using, so it is not within the matrimonial property regime. 5. Investments [ 137 ] R.D.K. has RRSPs valued at $120,030. The parties agree that he has an exemption valued at $14,446 ($18,083 less 20 percent). The balance are matrimonial assets and their value is to be divided between the parties or in kind, if they agree to do so. [ 138 ] S.D.L. had $17,000 in RRSPs, but cashed them in after June 2008 and spent the proceeds to assist with support for herself and the children.

This sum should not be considered as part of the divisible matrimonial property as there is no evidence it was used for purposes other than legitimate support of S.D.L. and the children.

6. Matrimonial debt [ 139 ] S.D.L.’s present debt was accrued while R.D.K. spent matrimonial property, the wrongful dismissal settlement funds, to augment his income. S.D.L.’s present debt, which is matrimonial debt, will be paid for from the remainder of the dismissal settlement funds ($33,000). Therefore, neither the debt nor the remaining settlement funds will be included in the matrimonial property statements. E.

Reservation of Jurisdiction and Costs [ 140 ] I reserve jurisdiction to determine any issues not yet dealt with in this action, to correct any editorial errors, or to deal with the issue of costs if there is no agreement. Heard on the 22 nd day of March, 2011. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 8 th day of April, 2011. S.J. Greckol J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Jerry D. Kiriak for the Plaintiff Michael L. Pollock for the Defendant