Long Lake Cottage Owners Association v. Thorhild (County), 2011 ABQB 337

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: Long Lake Cottage Owners Association v. Thorhild (County), 2011 ABQB 337 Date: 20110518 Docket: 1003 17215 Registry: Edmonton Between: Long Lake Cottage Owners Association Applicant - and - County of Thorhild No. 7 and Council of the County of Thorhild Respondents _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice R.P. Marceau _______________________________________________________ 1.

Introduction [ 1 ] This is an application for judicial review of the decision which the Respondent, Council of the County of Thorhild [“the Council”] made on or about the 14 th of April, 2010 to “discontinue the operations of the block wells” in the Hamlet of Long Lake [“Long Lake”]. The remedies sought by the Applicant are: (

a) an order declaring that the decision of the Council of the County of Thorhild of April 14 th , 2010 to discontinue operation of the wells at Long Lake is null and void; (

b) a permanent injunction preventing the Respondents from discontinuing the operation of the wells at Long Lake until a more

permanent source of potable water is made readily available to the Applicant by the Respondents; and (

c) costs. [ 2 ] Long Lake is located 1 ½ hours from the City of Edmonton along Highway 83, south of the Village of Boyle and northeast of the Hamlet of Newbrook, within the County of Thorhild. [ 3 ] The Applicant is a society pursuant to the Societies Act , R.S.A. 2000, c. S-14 and was incorporated to act on behalf of the residents of Long Lake in all matters. [ 4 ] In the 1950’s, the then Department of Lands and Forests of the Government of Alberta, drilled two water wells at Long Lake. Subsequently, another well was drilled.

In or about the early 1990’s, at the request of residents of Long Lake, the County obtained grant funding to drill additional wells. There are currently a total of 14 block wells in Long Lake. [ 5 ] None of the wells are connected to each other and they are used by seasonal as well as year-round residents of Long Lake. In some instances connections to the wells were made directly to the cottages via pipes. Other wells were used by residents to fill cisterns using temporary hose connections. Each well has a spigot on the outside of the well housing which can be used to fill containers.

All water from the wells is used only for domestic purposes. [ 6 ] The minutes of the Council of the County meeting on April 14 th , 2010, contains the following extract: Long Lake Hamlet Joyce Pierce, Director of Gas and Utilities, stated that after much Block Wells discussion with various provincial departments, local residents, engineering consultants and legal counsel regarding the health, safety and liability risk the current operation of the block wells in the Hamlet of Long Lake pose, Administration would like Council to consider the recommendation to discontinue the block wells and to look at different options available to them.

Resolution 136-2010 Moved by Cori Kuzyk that Council authorize Administration to discontinue the operation of the block wells in the Hamlet of Long Lake no later than October 31, 2010 and to further inform the residents in the Hamlet of Long Lake by registered letter documenting different options available to them regarding the block wells in the Hamlet of Long Lake.

CARRIED [ 7 ] The Long Lake residents were not informed that termination of water supply to Long Lake was an issue that would be addressed at the April 14, 2010 Council meeting. [ 8 ] On the 5 th of May, 2010, Dan Small, CMA County Manager wrote the following letter to the property owners of the Hamlet of Long Lake: Since many residences in the hamlet of Long Lake are directly hooked up to the block wells, this water system poses a significant potential health risk to residents as it is currently constructed.

Even after mitigating this risk by regularly testing the water and requiring the installation of backflow prevention equipment, ongoing discussions with Alberta Environment, the Long Lake Cabin Owners' Association (LLCOA), Alberta Health Services, and legal counsel have confirmed that this risk still remains unacceptably high even

though to date, potability of the water has not been an issue. Regrettably, at their meeting of April 14, 2010, the County of Thorhild Council decided that it would be in the best interest of both the hamlet and the County to discontinue providing water via this system as of October 31, 2010. However, Council remains committed to working with residents and the LLCOA in order to facilitate a reasonable transition. In the immediate term, there are two options available to the County in order to discontinue this service. They are as follows: 1.

The County of Thorhild will divest its ownership of the block wells by selling or transferring titles of the associated parcels of land to another party or parties if possible, subject to legal and planning requirements. It would then be the responsibility of the purchaser to determine by what standards the wells are to be operated and regulated. 2. If the property owners at the hamlet of Long Lake feel the above option is unacceptable or not viable, owners would then still be able to drill their own well or install cisterns for their private use on their own property.

In the longer term, the County is willing to discuss and investigate the viability of constructing a regional water distribution and wastewater collection system for the hamlet. A meeting date with all property owners in the hamlet has been set for Saturday, May 15, 2010 from 9:30 to 11:00 a.m. at the Long Lake Fire Hall to discuss these options in more detail. For further information you may contact Joyce Pierce at (780) 398-2804 or joyce@thorhildcounty.com.

County Council understands that this issue is a huge concern to hamlet property owners and hopes that effective communication and cooperation will result in an appropriate resolution. Your patience is greatly appreciated during this time of transition. Sincerely, Dan Small, CMA County Manager [ 9 ] The grounds stated in the Originating Notice of Motion for judicial review for quashing the decision of Council are: 1. unlawful reason in contradiction of

Section 41 of the Municipal Government Act , R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26 [“ M.G.A. ”]; 2. unreasonable notice under

Section 41 of the M.G.A. 2. Legislation [ 10 ] Two sections of the M.G.A. are particularly relevant: Duty to supply utility service 34(1) If the system or works of a municipal public utility that provide a municipal utility service are adjacent to a parcel of land, the municipality must , when it is able to do so and subject to any terms, costs or charges established by council, provide the municipal utility service to the parcel on the request of the owner of the parcel .

(2) If the system or works of a municipal public utility that provide a municipal utility service are adjacent to a parcel of land, the municipality may, when it is able to do so and subject to any terms, costs or charges established by council, provide the municipal utility service to the parcel on the request of the occupant of the parcel who is not the owner. ... 41 In accordance with its bylaws, a municipality may, for any lawful reason , (

a) discontinue providing municipal utility service after giving reasonable notice of its intention to do so , and (

b) remove the system or works of the municipal public utility used to provide the utility service. [Emphasis added.] 3. Standard of Review [ 11 ] The proper approach for judicial review was set by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 . That case indicates that the first step for a court engaged in a judicial review is to determine whether the appropriate standard of review for a particular body has been previously determined by the courts. [ 12 ] Here, the central question is whether the County had the jurisdiction to take the decision it did.

The standard for review of that category of review is clearly correctness: United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (City) , 2004 SCC 19 at para. 5 , [2004] 1 S.C.R. 485 ; 1254582 Alberta Ltd. v. Edmonton (City) , 2009 ABCA 4 at para. 12 , 448 A.R. 58 . [ 13 ] If a bylaw or resolution is within a municipality’s jurisdiction, then it is only reviewable if passed in bad faith or for an improper purpose: Associated Cab Limousine Ltd. v. Calgary (City) , 2009 ABCA 181 at paras. 19-20 , 457 A.R. 124 . 4.

Interpretation of M.G.A. , s. 34 [ 14 ] The Applicant argues that M.G.A. , s. 34 imposes a positive duty on the Respondents to provide the Applicants with water, and therefore the County had no authority to stop operating the wells. [ 15 ] In my view, s. 34 has a more restricted effect, and only means that if a municipal utility service is located on a parcel of land adjacent to another parcel, the owner of the other parcel may compel the municipality to extend the municipal service to the unserviced parcel.

While certainly the provision of potable water to its residents is a service provided by many municipalities, interpreting s. 34 to impose a positive duty on the municipality to provide water to any of its residents would mean that every individual farmer could demand that the County supply potable water to his or her farm residence, irrespective of cost or operational complications. [ 16 ] All municipalities are empowered to provide a water service and it would seem to be a given that municipalities which have large urban centres within their confines would at a minimum supply water to the residents of the urban centre.

However, there does not seem to be an obligation to do so unless the service is already available on an adjacent parcel of land . 5. The Policy Paper and Its Legal Effect

[17] The second basis on which the Applicant’s argue the Council’s decision was outside its jurisdiction flows from an earlierdocument created by the County and which addressed the Applicant hamlet: the Long Lake Policy Paper [“the Policy Paper”]. [18] Both parties agree that there are no bylaws which expressly guide the Respondents on terminating supply of water to theresidents of Long Lake. However, the Applicant argues that the Policy Paper is relevant, and has the effect of a bylaw.

Although thecover page of the Long Lake Policy Paper states that the Policy Paper is included with Bylaw 989-98 for information and is not part ofBylaw 989-98, Bylaw 989-98, s. 6.3.13 establishing Long Lake direct control states that: The general purpose of this District is to provide for specific land use regulations for certain developments in the Long Lake area, giventhat circumstances are such that control by other Districts would be inappropriate or inadequate, having regard to environmentalconcerns, and the general public interest; and to better attain the goals and policies set out in the Long Lake Policy Paper. [19] The Policy Paper itself addresses water supply: Council shall consider the establishment and maintenance of additional community wells in the Hamlet of Long Lake when it isdemonstrated that there is a limited quantity of potable water and/or the quality of water is considered unfit for drinking. [Emphasisadded.] [20] The Policy Paper was adopted by Council on June 10, 1986.

After receiving further written argument on this point, I amsatisfied that applying the legislative definition of “regulation” and “enact” and “enactment” from

Interpretation Act, R.S.A. 2000 c. I-8,the Policy Paper was adopted by a resolution of the municipal Council and is in fact a regulation. The Respondent argue that it does notfollow from the fact the Policy Paper is a regulation that the Council had to consider the paper before discontinuing municipal servicesunder s. 41. [21] The Applicant relies on Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), (SCC),[1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, 88 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [“Oldman River”] for the proposition that the regulation binds Council and had the forceof law.

In the Oldman River the Court considered whether a “Guidelines Order” was “merely another form of administrative directivewhich cannot confer enforceable rights” or a “regulatory scheme that is “law” and enforceable through prerogative relief” (at 35). [22] In making the distinction, the Supreme Court quoted with approval R. Dussault and L. Borgeat, Administrative Law, 2nd ed.(1985), vol. 1, at pages 338-39: When a government considers it necessary to regulate a situation through norms of behaviour, it may have a law passed or make aregulation itself, or act administratively by means of directives.

In the first case, it is bound by the formalities surrounding the legislativeor regulatory process; conversely, it knows that once these formalities have been observed, the new norms will come within a frameworkof "law" and that by virtue of the Rule of Law they will be applied by the courts. In the second case, that is, when it chooses to proceedby way of directives, whether or not they are authorized by legislation, it opts instead for a less formalized means based uponhierarchical authority, to which the courts do not have to ensure obedience.

To confer upon a directive the force of a regulation is toexceed legislative intent. It is said that the Legislature does not speak without a purpose; its implicit wish to leave a situation outside thestrict framework of "law" must be respected. [23] The Respondent argues that even if the Policy Paper is a “law” which binds the Council, it does not on its face compel theCouncil to provide water service (i.e. the operation of the 14 wells) forever. This is technically so.

Nevertheless, two of the four otheritems under the heading “Management Goals” are: · to maintain or improve the quality of the recreational experience for the majority of lake users.

· to ensure the integrity, viability, and purpose of the existing development and uses at the lake. [3] From the evidence, I conclude that one of the existing recreational experiences was that of the cabin owners on Long Lake and “integrity of the existing development” included sources of potable water for the cabin residents. [4] Under the heading “Management Policies” the Policy Paper lists very specific development policies, some of which are phrased “development shall be prohibited unless”. Others have no “unless” and are simply prohibitions against certain developments.

These provisions under this heading are mandatory in nature, and indicate that the Council intended to bind itself and enforce these prohibitions. [5] The next heading is “Community Services” and contains three relevant provisions: · Council shall consider the establishment and maintenance of additional community wells in the Hamlet of Long Lake when it is demonstrated that there is a limited quantity of potable water and/or the quality of the water is considered unfit for drinking. · Council shall clear, post, and maintain walkways within shoreland reserves to improve pedestrian access to the lake. · Council shall ensure that local roads are adequately gravelled and maintained. [4] The last two provisions: “clearing, posting and maintenance of walkways” and “ensuring that local roads are adequately gravelled and maintained” again use language that appears to indicate the Council intended to bind the County. [5] The first provision begins with the phrase “Council shall consider ...” (emphasis added).

I conclude that is not mandatory language because “consider” implies the decision maker will review the circumstances and then decide to act or not. This directive also has a requirement that must be “demonstrated” before any “consideration” “shall occur”: “... when it is demonstrated that there is a limited quantity of potable water and/or the quality of the water is considered unfit for drinking.” [emphasis added].

That indicates the County must consider additional or alternative well services when the present Long Lake water supply is shown to be inadequate or unsafe. [6] There is no evidence either condition precedent has been met in the present situation. The language is permissive, not mandatory and deals with events not yet demonstrated. [7] I conclude that Council are not bound by this Policy Paper to provide potable water via the wells to the Long Lake residents, although the Council’s freedom of action is probably restricted by many other provisions of the Policy Paper.

The Policy Paper certainly implies that the County intended to continue to supply potable water and drill more wells, if necessary , to ensure a source of potable water for the residents. [8] If I were to consider whether the Council failed to consider what was relevant or considered what was irrelevant in coming to its April 10, 2010 decision, I would that Council failed to consider a very relevant factor and that is that the Policy Paper implicitly committed the County to supply potable water to the Long Lake residents on a long term basis and that the resolution to close the wells was a distinct and drastic reversal of policy.

Nevertheless, that kind of shift is permitted to avoid fettering municipal governments: Pacific National Investments Ltd. v. Victoria (City) , 2000 SCC 64 , [2000] 2 SCR 919 . I do not conclude Council were prohibited by the Policy Paper from closing the wells. 6.

Interpretation of M.G.A. , s. 41 [9] As I see it, a decision by the County to discontinue water supply to Long Lake is unauthorized if it does not comply with the

three prerequisites that are indicated in M.G.A.,s. 41: 41 In accordance with its bylaws, a municipality may, for any lawful reason, (

a) discontinue providing municipal utility service after giving reasonable notice of its intention to do so, and [10] Restated, a municipality may discontinue a municipal utility if it has: 1. done so in compliance with its bylaws, 2. for a lawful reason, and 3. after giving reasonable notice of the municipalities intentions. [11] I have commented on the Policy Paper, its operation as a bylaw, and that discontinuation of water supply to Long Lake didnot create an internal legislative conflict.

That leaves two further questions: 1. was the decision of Council lawful; and 2. was reasonable notice of its intention given? As the subsequent analysis will show, these two questions in fact become one and the same. A. “Lawful Reason” [12] Much argument was received on the meaning of the phrase “for any lawful reason”. The Respondents argue that the word“lawful” is capable of bearing two

interpretations, one narrow one, one broad. The definition provided in Black’s Law Dictionarysupports their view: Lawful: Not contrary to law; permitted by law. Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (West: 2009) at p. 965. [13] The Respondents brought to my attention paragraph 7 of the decision Boykiw v. Calgary (City) Development Appeal Board(1992), 1992 ABCA 95 , 90 D.L.R. (4th) 558, 127 A.R. 380 (Alta. C.A.): 7. The city responded that the word “lawful” in statute means lawful in the sense of “approved.” This gloss on the word evokespermission in the stronger sense of some form of governmental action.

The city contended for this view in reliance upon the undeniablepurpose of the Act, which is to regulate the use of land. The owner suggested instead of a weaker sense of lawfulness: the passiveacquiescence of the law. And he relied upon legislative history in preference to purpose.

[14] The Respondents submitted that the broader

interpretation of “lawful” in s. 41 is the proper

interpretation. In their brief, theywrote: Accordingly, a “lawful reason” denotes a reason that is not prohibited by law, is undertaken in good faith, and serves to further a validmunicipal purpose. This

interpretation of s. 41 accords with the open-ended language of the provision itself, the powers and dutiesconferred upon municipalities under

Part 3, Division 3 of the MGA, as well as the broad and purposive approach to

interpretation ofmunicipal legislation. [15] I am content to apply the broader

interpretation. However, applying this broader definition does not mean that a decision willsurvive judicial scrutiny because “there is no law against it.” In fact, the Respondents in their argument have acknowledged twosituations where a decision on its face “permitted by law” is prohibited by law, i.e. “made in bad faith” or “not for a valid municipalpurpose.” To that list, the Applicants argue should be added that a decision is prohibited by law if it is an abuse of the discretion given tothe municipality by the legislature. B.

Common-Law Obligations to Provide and Maintain Utility Service [16] “Lawful” also means not in conflict with the common-law. That leads to two questions: 1. Is there a common-law duty to supply a utility service to resident taxpayers of a municipality? 2. Is there a common-law duty to continue a utility service to resident taxpayers once supply of that utility has been initiated? [17] While counsel has not been able to identify caselaw to prove the first potential duty exists at common-law, there is clearauthority that a common-law duty exists to continue utility services.

The relevant case is Tsawwassen Indian Band v. Delta (Corporation) (1997), (BC CA), 149 D.L.R. (4th) 672 at paras. 36-48, 95 B.C.A.C. 241 (B.C.C.A), leave refused[1997] S.C.C.A. No. 539. Tsawwassen Indian Band v. Delta (Corporation) was an appeal of two British Columbia Supreme Courtdecisions, Tsawwassen Indian Band v. Corp. Of Delta, (BC SC), 1996, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 739 (B.C.S.C.), and 238709B.C. Ltd. v. Salmon Arm (District of), (B.C.S.C.), both of which centered on when a municipality or municipaldistrict could discontinue services to an Indian Band. In Tsawwassen Indian Band v.

Delta (Corporation) the service in question was afire-fighting service, while 238709 B.C. Ltd. v. Salmon Arm (District of) involved a comprehensive set of utilities. [18] The British Columbia Court of Appeal in both cases confirmed that municipal services had to be continued for a certainperiod. The key conclusion was that a municipality is restricted in its ability to terminate provision of utilities. A decision of the PrivyCouncil, Canada (Minister of Justice) v.

Levis (Town), (UK JCPC), [1919] A.C. 505 (P.C.), provided the common-law principle that a duty may exist to continue utility service, but that duty depends on the relationship between the parties: TsawwassenIndian Band v. Delta (Corporation), at para. 40. [19] The court at para. 42 then explained the spectrum of relationships: 42 ... the common law ... can be viewed as a continuum where the extent of the obligation owed depends upon the nature of therelationship between the parties.

For example, if in a given situation an individual property owner asked a municipality to continue toprovide services even though the owner was not or would not be obligated to continue to pay taxes, it is arguable that the common lawwould impose upon the municipality a duty to supply this single property owner with services indefinitely, subject only to reasonablecompensation being paid for the services.

On the other hand, if the relationship involved two independent taxing authorities of roughlyequal size, both with the ability to put in place the necessary infrastructure, it is arguable that the common law would allow one of theparties to terminate the provision of services to the other with a relatively short period of reasonable notice. [Emphasis added.] [20] One end of the range, an individual property owner, has an indefinite right to uninterrupted utility service. Turning to M.G.A.,s. 41, that means that there would never be a lawful reason to end service to this kind of property owner.

Ending utility service to theindividual property owner would always be a breach of the municipality’s common-law duty.

[21] On the other extreme are what could be called two equivalent municipal or other government entities. Each has similar ability to raise funds, and organize and operate utilities. One of these two entities could, lawfully, terminate provision of utilities to the other, provided the disconnected party had reasonable notice (para. 48). [22] Why the different treatment? The duty to continue supply of utilities has a functional and practical objective, to prevent interruption of critical services and functions.

The individual resident cannot practically replace the broad integrated infrastructure of a municipal utility service. A larger entity can. Therefore, in Tsawwassen Indian Band v. Delta (Corporation) , the British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that reasonable notice would be sufficient time for all reasonable alternative service arrangements to be made .

At para. 43 the Court of Appeal explains that the duration of reasonable notice is a question of the capacities of the relative parties: 43 ... there are several criteria which are helpful in assessing the relationship between given parties and determining the exact nature and extent of the common law obligation which may or may not be owed.

Without attempting to set out an exhaustive list, some of the more important factors include: the relative size of the parties; the resources available to each of the parties including the ability to raise revenue; the ability to implement or maintain new and existing infrastructure ; the experience each party may already have in providing the services in question; and the length of time over which the service has already been provided by one of the parties. [Emphasis added.] [23] Interestingly, this means the “lawful” aspect and “reasonable notice” requirements of M.G.A. , s. 41 to some degree overlap.

A municipality may never lawfully end utility service to some kinds of utility recipients. In other instances, a municipality may lawfully stop providing a utility, but it has to provide a reasonable notice. That means s. 41(1)(

a) is a codification of an aspect of the common-law obligation explained by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Tsawwassen Indian Band v. Delta (Corporation) . [ 24 ] I am therefore content to interpret the reasonable notice provisions in the M.G.A. as conforming with the common-law requirement identified by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Tsawwassen Indian Band v. Delta (Corporation) . Reasonable notice to discontinue utility services is notice sufficient to allow the disconnected party/entity to arrange for alternative supply of that service.

A municipality that terminates utility services without providing sufficient notice has acted unlawfully. [ 25 ] At the present time, the Long Lake residents fall towards the ‘individual property owner’ of the spectrum. The two Indian Bands involved in Tsawwassen Indian Band v. Delta (Corporation) had ‘seceded’ from their former municipality and begun collecting their own tax revenue. Here, that option is not available to Long Lake. It is a hamlet within a county and has no legislative or taxing power.

Other arrangements, that I will discuss in more detail, could be found. [ 26 ] What is critical is that when the Council voted to end supply of water to Long Lake it did not appropriately take into account the time, organization, and logistics involved to organize an alternative source for potable water. This is not a question of a municipality exercising its discretion, but rather the absence of a prerequisite to that discretion. By choosing to discontinue service in 5 ½ months I conclude the County did not meet its common-law or codified obligation to provide reasonable notice.

In both senses the County has not adhered to the requirements of M.G.A ., s. 41. [ 27 ] It is obvious that the Council in this case gave no real consideration to what alternative arrangements could be made. The Respondents in their letter to Owners summoned the Owners summarily to a meeting on May 15, 2010 where, literally at gunpoint, the cabin Owners were told of their options. 1.

The County would sell or transfer the titles to the wellsites to another party or parties, if possible, subject to legal and planning requirements and the purchasers would then determine standards ... [ 28 ] No thought was given to how long it would take for legal and planning requirements. No consideration was given to the fact that the association has no power to tax, no power to raise funds, etc. and it has no experience in supplying utility services. One can speculate that Summer Village status might be a solution, but the letter did not even allude to a timeline and mechanism to obtain that status.

Similarly, the various documents that indicate the reason why the County chose to discontinue water supply focus on potential County liability and not the practical aspects of creating an alternative water supply or water supply administration.

[ 29 ] As for the other options contemplated, digging their own wells or installing cisterns for private use, the Respondents have led evidence that the County in the past has refused to grant a permit for drilling new wells. It is far from certain that new wells would be approved especially in the effectively 5 ½ month period allotted.

The Respondents also led evidence that trucking water from another available source, the Town of Boyle, some 30 kilometres away, was not economically reasonable. [ 30 ] To be generous, the notice by the County was no more than negotiation by ultimatum, without any consideration of the relative positions of the parties and without consideration of the time required to find an alternate solution, if indeed one exists. [ 31 ] The Applicants have a right to demand and receive ongoing and uninterrupted water utility services until a viable alternative scheme is arranged.

The County has the right to be paid for the cost of that utility. The April 14, 2010 council decision is quashed and Resolution 136-2010 of the County of Thorhild is declared null and void. The County lacked jurisdiction to make that order in the absence of the lawful requirement of adequate notice. 7. Alternative Arrangements [ 32 ] The common-law obligation on the County of Thorhill means it cannot stop operating the Long Lake wells until a viable alternative scheme to provide that service can be planned.

I see this as likely being best achieved by both parties cooperating to find a workable arrangement for supply of water to Long Lake. Long Lake might organize as a Summer Village: M.G.A. I understand Summer Villages are municipalities with legislative and taxing powers, like the County. [ 33 ] Another alternative may be a water supply cooperative, organized under Cooperatives Act , S.A. 2001, c. C-28.1, that owns the hamlet water supply: Potable Water Regulation , Alta Reg 277/2003, s. 1(1)(i)(ii). 8.

Injunction [ 34 ] I expressly make no finding that the County can never lawfully and with reasonable notice cease to supply potable water to the Long Lake Cabin Owners and therefore I am not prepared to grant an injunction that the County be enjoined from ceasing to operate the wells for the benefit of the Long Lake Cabin Owners until there is a satisfactory replacement.

I am especially not prepared to grant an injunction that the County continue to supply water to the cottage owners until a full underground water and sewer system is installed as that would be tantamount to making a political decision which is the purview and mandate of the County Council. 9. Costs [ 35 ] The parties may speak to costs by appointment. Heard on the 8 th day of April, 2011. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 18 th day of May, 2011.

R.P. Marceau J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: K.D. Wakefield, Q.C., Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP for the Applicant Derek J. King, Brownlee LLP for the Respondents