Lander v. Lander, 2011 ABQB 414

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: Lander v. Lander, 2011 ABQB 414 Date: 20110630 Docket: 4803 150608 Registry: Edmonton Between: Jeffrey John Lander Plaintiff - and - Jennifer Rhonda Lander Defendant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Madam Justice D.A. Sulyma _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The parties were married December of 1987 and separated September of 2007. They met while they both attended college in the United States and after marriage, both found youth jobs in Kelowna, B.C.

He obtained a good job in Kelowna and she worked part- time or volunteered at the church in Kelowna. The first child was born February, 1989. After that, the couple had another two children and at that time she was at home primarily with the children and ran a daycare out of her home. Mr. Lander had always been interested in hunting and that interest as it evolved into business ventures is a thread throughout their marriage. [ 2 ] The couple moved back and forth to Kelowna twice from Edmonton. In 2003

they last settled in Edmonton in what became their matrimonial home at the time of separation. At the time they purchased that home in 2003 Mr. Lander was working as a youth director with a church and also working with another individual on a hunting venture. During the same period of time, Mrs. Lander worked at various jobs, such as at Starbucks and at Westjet. These were temporary and short-term jobs. She is now 49 years of age and at age 40 she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, which has unfortunately progressed over the last years. [ 3 ] After separation Mr.

Lander paid the mortgage payments and some amounts of money towards lines of credit. The home was eventually sold in September, 2010 for $530,000.00. [ 4 ] Ms. Lander’s evidence was that she had very little knowledge of how Mr. Lander ran their affairs. For instance, she had always thought they jointly owned the matrimonial home and only found out it was in his name after separation. She was unaware of various lines of credit he obtained and unaware of the details of various of his business deals. She has been on AISH since February of 2010 at the sum of $1,188 per month.

She asks for an order for lump sum spousal support. [ 5 ] Mr. Lander testified. His cross-examination centred on his business dealings just prior to and after the date of separation. Prior to the date of separation he had started a big game hunting business which he ran in B.C. Unfortunately, at the time this was still a new business and not really profitable; the worldwide and U.S. recession occurred which greatly impacted the business. Post-separation he pursued other employment, such as in the oilfield, outside of the spring and fall hunting seasons. [ 6 ] Mr.

Lander’s testimony regarding his income and debts over the last years is indeed woeful. He admits he took out several lines of credit and drew on them without his wife’s knowledge. He borrowed heavily from his father. When questioned on amounts drawn and loaned to him and tracing, he stated he drew on these amounts as it was his only option. Otherwise he was facing “financial disaster”. In cross-examination Ms. Cochard on behalf of Ms. Lander attempted to trace monies he drew or borrowed and consistently Mr. Lander was unable to account for the money.

At one point when asked what he did with a certain sum, he stated “It probably went to whatever”. [ 7 ] It was also noted that his decision to stop paying the mortgage resulted in a greater mortgage debt and that indeed he had wanted Ms. Lander out of their matrimonial home and chose a forced foreclosure to effect this end. [ 8 ] It was established by cross-examination that Mr. Lander borrowed inappropriately and without means to pay back lenders over a number of years. He also apparently led a high lifestyle after separation as seen by some of his purchases and holidays taken.

He also by cross-examination was not particularly zealous about finding employment to earn income. This despite his own acknowledgement of liability for spousal support. At the end of the day his position here is that Ms. Lander should be entitled to money now in trust after payment of the debt to Revenue Canada and his parents and what he submits are proper debt claims for vehicles purchased. Facts Re CRA Claim [ 9 ] Prior to sale of the matrimonial home, the title was charged with two Certificates of lis pendens dated February 4, 2009 and March 9, 2010 respectively. Each of these were filed by Ms.

Cochard on behalf of Ms. Lander and pursuant to the Matrimonial Property Act . The Minister of Revenue (“CRA”) filed two writs respectively on July 8, 2010 for $44,039 and costs and $17,642 and costs. Affidavit evidence of Ms. Gee indicates these debt sums reflect primarily GST debt. These charges raise the issue of priority and what liability the two parties here have for this acknowledged matrimonial debt. Position of the Parties on Matrimonial Property [ 10 ] The parties ask for a divorce judgment. Ms. Cochard concedes that the husband’s payments on the house mortgages and some payments for Ms.

Lander’s car loan could be considered as payments on account of retroactive child support. However the parties do not raise that issue here.

[ 11 ] With respect to matrimonial property, Ms. Cochard submits that the Court has discretion to divide matrimonial property unequally and should do so in this case as a result of unequal contribution to property and debt and the circumstances of the parties. Ms. Cochard points to the reality of the evidence of Ms. Lander being forced to live in her parents’ home in the last years and the concern with her progressive health problem. She notes that although Mr.

Lander did pay debts that could be attributed to spousal support he did not pay a sufficient amount to cover what could be characterized as payment to satisfy a present retroactive claim for spousal support. This especially so after the house was sold in 2010. She also notes Mr. Lander deliberately stopped paying the mortgage in December of 2009 to force the sale of the home as a factor the Court ought to consider in the determination of an unequal distribution. [ 12 ] Ms. Cochard urges the Court to attribute ongoing support to Ms.

Lander, not as spousal support per se, rather to direct such to a Court-ordered contribution to an RDSP. Alternatively that a lump sum be ordered with an annual interest payable into such a disability fund. [ 13 ] She notes there is not a lot of matrimonial property to distribute here. Also, importantly that Mr. Lander has had the benefit of matrimonial funds to the detriment of his wife and creditors. She submits it is clear that even when he did have income available he utilized the lines of credit to pay debt including his own personal debt.

This at a time that he should have been using his income to pay matrimonial expenses. She cites M.A.B. v. R.D.B. 2007 ABQB 438 as the relevant authority on this issue. For instance, here, Mr. Lander paid for a truck from a line of credit and then was able to deduct it as an expense of his business without any benefit to the family. Ms. Cochard points to various other and numerous instances of dissipation. In urging an unequal division she submits that M.A.B. (supra) indicates a solid precedent for the consideration and result of the issue of a party putting his own interests ahead of that of his spouse.

Here there is no paper trail whatsoever produced for debts and amounts claimed by Mr. Lander in the whole of his affairs. There are no promissory notes with respect to the debt he claims owed to his parents. Also, it was his unilateral decision to become a hunting outfitter and to borrow large sums from various unknown parties inappropriately both before and after separation. [ 14 ] Ms. Cochard notes that if the Court accepts her submissions with respect to an unequal division of matrimonial property, then the Court does not have to consider constructive and resulting trust issues raised by the Pleadings.

I do accept her submission and therefore do not find it necessary to consider issues of resulting and constructive trust. In the end Ms. Lander asks for the total proceeds remaining from the sale of the home after taking into account dissipation to disallow matrimonial debt as claimed by Mr. Lander. She further claims lump sum spousal support given that by the facts, Mr. Lander cannot be said to be a good risk for being properly responsible to pay continuing spousal support payments. Position of Mr. Lander [ 15 ] Mr.

Lander, self-represented, states he is not a bad guy although he was not a good steward with respect to business issues, time or money. He notes that the economy affected his business and it would be unfair for him to bear the whole burden of that cost. He notes he is a bad record keeper. He submits that the claim of matrimonial property must take into account issues of matrimonial debt. He notes that by the submissions of Ms. Cochard, which he does not oppose except for issues of debt, that Ms.

Lander would end up with a cash sum that he is not privy to and asks that any award of spousal support therefore be deferred. Otherwise, he concedes a liability for payment of spousal support. Issue of Priority and Payment of the CRA Lien [ 16 ] Mr. Body appeared in this trial on behalf of the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). The submission of the CRA is that Mr. Lander’s tax debt is a matrimonial debt that ought to be addressed before the division of matrimonial property. He notes that the evidence of Ms. Gee, an employee of the CRA, establishes these debts were clearly accumulated during marriage.

He submits the law provides and acknowledges that expenses of a taxpayer are to be paid after taxes. Here the majority of the debt claimed by the CRA is a GST debt. Thus, he submits that by law a taxpayer becomes a Crown agent to collect and remit these taxes. In this case the taxpayer (Mrs. and Mr. Lander jointly) failed to remit tax as required. Thus, he submits this tax debt ought to be paid from gross matrimonial assets and prior to any division of net matrimonial property. [ 17 ] Mr.

Body refers to a number of cases which deal with the legitimacy of a Crown charge for tax debts as it relates to the division of matrimonial property where both parties have jointly accumulated the tax debt. These cases include Sparrow v. Sparrow , 2006 ABCA 155 , Carmichael v. Carmichael , 2007 ABCA 3 , Stein v. Stein , [2008] SCC 35 and Dhala v. Dhala , 2008 ABCA 259 . The cases also confirm that generally a joint tax debt ought to be considered a matrimonial debt distributed before any net distribution of property to the parties.

[ 18 ] In this case the main issue raised by the Crown, as argued by Mr. Body, is not the priority of the filed CRA writs. (I note these were filed after the two Certificates of lis pendens filed on behalf of Ms. Lander.) Rather he submits that as a result of the sale of the matrimonial home, and both of these parties being discharged from title, that any prior filings on title no longer exist as remaining charges. This includes the Certificates of lis pendens filed on Ms. Lander’s behalf.

As a result he submits that the CRA debt must be remitted to the CRA off the top of any proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home. He submits this distribution properly recognizes the priorities of title after sale of the matrimonial home. [ 19 ] Mr. Body notes that at this point in the proceedings the CRA does not consent to the Court finding the priorities were preserved after the sale of the house. This, in his submission, also affects any subsequent distribution of matrimonial property. So, an unequal distribution ought not to precede the CRA debt being recognized. Response of Ms.

Lander [ 20 ] With respect to details of the facts here, Ms. Cochard notes that in this case CRA was party to a consent order of Justice Yamauchi dated April 9, 2010 listing the property for sale, which preserved the charges.

Also she submits that despite the law that debt incurred by married parties under the Matrimonial Property Act ( MPA ) is divisible and cases which recognize the legitimacy of a charge arising from a joint tax debt incurred during marriage, that in this case property ought to be first distributed pursuant to an unequal division of the matrimonial property and the tax debt be only recognized as a charge thereafter. She did not cite a case directly authorizing this approach to distribution. [ 21 ] Ms.

Cochard relies on the MPA , which she submits is clear with respect to the rights of a party to litigation to give notice to the CRA of the position taken with respect to CRA debt and its priority. This occurred here and her filing of a lis pendens on behalf of Ms. Lander preceded any filing of writs by CRA on this title. Accordingly, the sequence of legitimate charges ought to be preserved. [ 22 ] As a matter of practicality and the law as it affects all practitioners in this province, Ms.

Cochard notes that if the filing of a lis pendens prior to the filing of a charge by CRA is ineffective to preserve the rights of the party who claims matrimonial property rights, then matters would come to a standstill in this province. That is, that to this point matrimonial lawyers have used the notice and lis pendens procedure to preserve the position of a party with respect to CRA debt. She submits it has always been the practice to regard that filing as preserving the right of a party despite sale of the actual property (the matrimonial home).

Were the Court not to recognize this practice, parties would be stymied and be forced to sit on property in specie until the conclusion of litigation. Ms. Cochard submits that this would enormously affect all parties in this position negatively and affect negatively the present practice of matrimonial lawyers in Alberta. The Law [ 23 ] Sections 7 and 8 of the Matrimonial Property Act: Distribution of property 7(1) The Court may, in accordance with this section, make a distribution between the spouses of all the property owned by both spouses and by each of them.

(2) If the property is (

a) property acquired by a spouse by gift from a third party, (

b) property acquired by a spouse by inheritance,

(

c) property acquired by a spouse before the marriage, (

d) an award or settlement for damages in tort in favour of a spouse, unless the award or settlement is compensation for a loss to both spouses, or (

e) the proceeds of an insurance policy that is not insurance in respect of property, unless the proceeds are compensation for a loss to both spouses, the market value of that property at the time of marriage or on the date on which the property was acquired by the spouse, whichever is later, is exempted from a distribution under this section.

(3) The Court shall, after taking the matters in

section 8 into consideration, distribute the following in a manner that it considers just and equitable: (

a) the difference between the exempted value of property described in subsection (2), referred to in this subsection as the “original property”, and the market value at the time of the trial of the original property or property acquired (

i) as a result of an exchange for the original property, or (ii) from the proceeds, whether direct or indirect, of a disposition of the original property; (

b) property acquired by a spouse with income received during the marriage from the original property or property acquired in a manner described in clause (a)(

i) or (ii); (

c) property acquired by a spouse after a decree nisi of divorce, a declaration of nullity of marriage, a judgment of judicial separation or a declaration of irreconcilability under the Family Law Act is made in respect of the spouses; (

d) property acquired by a spouse by gift from the other spouse.

(4) If the property being distributed is property acquired by a spouse during the marriage and is not property referred to in subsections (2) and (3), the Court shall distribute that property equally between the spouses unless it appears to the Court that it would not be just and equitable to do so, taking into consideration the matters in

section 8. RSA 2000 cM-8 s7;2003 cF-4.5 s121 Matters to be considered 8 The matters to be taken into consideration in making a distribution under

section 7 are the following: (

a) the contribution made by each spouse to the marriage and to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made as a

homemaker or parent; (

b) the contribution, whether financial or in some other form, made by a spouse directly or indirectly to the acquisition, conservation, improvement, operation or management of a business, farm, enterprise or undertaking owned or operated by one or both spouses or by one or both spouses and any other person; (

c) the contribution, whether financial or in some other form, made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a spouse to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of the property; (

d) the income, earning capacity, liabilities, obligations, property and other financial resources (

i) that each spouse had at the time of marriage, and (ii) that each spouse has at the time of the trial; (

e) the duration of the marriage; (

f) whether the property was acquired when the spouses were living separate and apart; (

g) the terms of an oral or written agreement between the spouses; (

h) that a spouse has made (

i) a substantial gift of property to a third party, or (ii) a transfer of property to a third party other than a bona fide purchaser for value; (

i) a previous distribution of property between the spouses by gift, agreement or matrimonial property order; (

j) a prior order made by a court; (

k) a tax liability that may be incurred by a spouse as a result of the transfer or sale of property; (

l) that a spouse has dissipated property to the detriment of the other spouse; (

m) any fact or circumstance that is relevant. [ 24 ] The law is further outlined in Lobo v. Lobo , 1999 ABQB 107 at paragraph 76 :

76 Section 7(4) of the Matrimonial Property Act establishes a presumption of equality with respect to assets which are neither exempt nor incremental, but allows the Court discretion to consider the impact of the factors listed in s. 8. In Mazurenko v. Mazurenko , supra , the Alberta Court of Appeal considered the principles surrounding the presumption of equal division of non-exempt matrimonial property, stating (p.120): It would be extremely difficult, indeed impossible, to establish any formula for the application of the heads in s. 8. The legislation avoids formulation.

The court must, in my view, look at the relevant facts under s. 8 and then ask itself if it would be unjust or inequitable to divide the property equally. That conclusion would not be lightly reached. There must be some real imbalance in the contribution having regard to what was expected of each or attributable to the other facts in s. 8. [ 25 ] In M.A.B. v. R.D.B. , 2007 ABQB 438 , the Court stated at paragraph 41: [46] From the case law one can distil the following principles: 1.

Section 7(4) creates a presumption of an equal distribution of non-exempt matrimonial property, unless it would not be just or equitable to do so.

Section 8(

l) provides one of the factors that can lead to an unequal distribution where one spouse dissipates assets to the detriment of the other. 3. Dissipation does not necessarily result where an asset is worth less at trial than it was at separation. Dissipation requires a degree of intent although that intent does not necessarily have to extend to intentionally depriving the other spouse of a fair distribution of matrimonial property. It is sufficient if one spouse intends to dissipate the assets (usually for their own enjoyment), and that dissipation arises in detriment to the other spouse. 4.

There must be actual detriment to the other spouse. 5. The law generally does not find dissipation if the reduction in assets was due to reasonable expenditures made on behalf of the family or to maintain existing matrimonial assets. However, the court will look to see if the spouse could have paid those expenses out of income rather than by depleting assets. Purely personal expenses which do not benefit the other party that are paid out of matrimonial property may also be considered dissipation (even though prior to separation they might have been matrimonial expenses). 6.

If an asset is sold or otherwise reduced, the courts will not consider this dissipation if the proceeds can be traced to another asset. The replacement assets form part of the assets available for distribution. 7. If assets are sold for less than fair market value, the courts may determine whether the sale was done improvidently, hastily or fraudulently in deciding whether it was dissipation. If the sale is effected in accordance with pre-separation negotiations it may not be considered dissipation. 8.

The total amount actually dissipated "to the detriment" of the spouse is one-half of the amount by which the asset was reduced. 9. Ultimately it is in the discretion of the trial judge, based on the consideration of all the facts, to determine whether or not dissipation exists.

[26] With respect to spousal support ss. 15(2) of The Divorce Act applies. The law is summarized by McLean, J. in Corbeil v.Corbeil 2001 ABCA 220 , [2001] A.J. No. 1144 at paragraphs 29 to 33 as follows: [29] Spousal support in Canada is frequently referred to as (1) compensatory, (2) contractual, or (3) non-compensatory. Thesecategories are the product of the spousal support provisions of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.3 (2nd Supp.) (the "Act") and the case lawinterpreting that legislation.

The law of spousal support continues to evolve, particularly with regard to the balancing of the factors andobjectives contained in s. 15.2 of the Act to determine whether, and how much, support should be ordered. Compensatory support,premised on marriage being a joint endeavour, seeks to alleviate economic disadvantage by taking into account all the circumstances ofthe parties, including the advantages conferred on either spouse during the marriage. It is concerned with an equitable sharing of thebenefits of the marriage.

Contractual entitlement, on the other hand, flows from the express or implied agreements of the parties.

Finally,non-compensatory support may be ordered where it is fit and just to do so. [30] The jurisdiction to award maintenance under the Divorce Act is discretionary and dependent on the circumstances of each case.Section 15.2(1) of the Act provides: A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, or tosecure and pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or such lump sum and periodic sums, as the court thinks reasonable for the support ofthe other spouse.

The unrestricted ability to order maintenance as either a lump sum or as periodic payments, each carrying different tax implications, isindicative of the flexibility intended. The court's obligation is to determine what is reasonable, fair and just in the circumstances.Frequently, need will compel support in this circumstance. [31]

Section 15.2(3) re-affirms the broad scope of the judicial discretion, allowing a court to customize an order fitting the parties'particular situation. It provides:

(3) The court may make an order under subsection (1) ... for a definite or indefinite period or until a specified event occurs, and mayimpose terms, conditions or restrictions in connection with the order or interim order as it thinks fit and just. [32] The Act directs the court to consider certain factors when making spousal support orders.

Section 15.2(4) provides:

(4) In making an order under subsection (1) ..., the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and othercircumstances of each spouse, including (

a) the length of time the spouses cohabited; (

b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (

c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. The consideration of condition, means, needs and other circumstances is mandatory. A court shall consider these factors. [33] In addition, a court must be alive to the objectives of support, as set out in s. 15.2(6), when designing support orders. That sectionprovides:

(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (

b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. Analysis and Decision [27] The MPA establishes a prima facie presumption that matrimonial property is to be distributed equally. However, that presumption can be overcome in cases of appropriate evidence and the application by a Court of the discretion that should be applied where the evidence is such. Lobo v. Lobo (supra) and M.A.B. v. R.D.B. (supra) set out the principles that ought to be considered in ordering unequal distribution. [28] Ms.

Lander in my view was a silent and uninformed partner during the course of the years of her marriage which led to financial disaster for her and her family. Mr. Lander quite frankly went about pledging joint credit without regard to her or the family interest; after separation he lived a lifestyle without regard to family priorities and drew on joint lines of credit without in any way being able to account for money drawn. I find he personally organized the financial affairs of this family unit to the detriment of his wife and family.

This is particularly so with respect to the inevitable sale of the house and his drawing on and not accounting for large sums from lines of credit. He invested in businesses and supposedly paid bills but without a paper accounting trail that the Court can now follow. I also conclude from cross-examination evidence that he preferred to pay some of his creditors over others including the CRA and over his obligations to his family. [29] In the meantime, his wife was without dependable income on her own and facing a deteriorating medical condition.

After sale of the home she was forced to rely on the generosity of her parents and remains in that position. [30] Applying the M.A.B . factors in sequence of importance, I find Mr. Lander did dissipate assets to the actual detriment of Ms. Lander. On the evidence I cannot conclude any of his expenditures were made to maintain matrimonial property (as opposed to his personal financial interests). Although he did pay the home mortgage for a period of time, it certainly was not paid from income, and he ultimately forced a sale of the matrimonial home to cover his own personal need, not that of his wife and family.

I cannot find any reliable tracing of monies to other joint assets. I do find dissipation has been established. [31] I conclude that in these circumstances the only appropriate division can be that of an unequal division. Ms. Lander was in my view a hostage in the financial affairs of this marriage both before and after separation and ought not to be the person who pays for decisions made that did not include her input. It is my order that she be granted the whole of the monies collected from the sale of the matrimonial property to date. This will be calculated as per Ms.

Cochard’s matrimonial property distribution accounting as amended at trial. My decision recognizes the premise that her right to unequal distribution has been preserved and precedes any CRA charges or rights now claimed. These funds will provide her with capital. Mr. Lander alone may then garner the benefits of transactions regarding his business, other properties and debts. I am of the view this unequal distribution accords to MPA principles and that it does not fly in the face of the general rules regarding the treatment of joint matrimonial debt. On the latter point I find Ms.

Lander has established an exception to the general rule as contemplated in Sparrow (supra) , that it was Mr. Lander who appropriated money that should have been used to pay taxes for his own exclusive use. [32] By the provisions of Section 15(2) of The Divorce Act , I find that Ms. Lander has established an entitlement to ongoing spousal support. This is a long-term marriage. She played a traditional role and did not pursue any lucrative career. She faces significant

health problems at 49 years of age. Mr. Landers concedes his liability for spousal support. [33] With respect to the issue of quantum of spousal support, I note that Ms. Lander has been successful in an unequal division of matrimonial property which by law is unusual and does allow her an additional property benefit over her needs at this time. I take this into account and award her entitlement to spousal support commencing in one year from the date of this judgment at a sum to be determined by a Queen’s Bench Court.

This is not a remedy that I am enamoured with but do believe that it is appropriate in the circumstances of this case. Also, by that time Mr. Lander ought to have a more determinable income. [34] I order the appropriate lump sum be calculated by Ms. Cochard and payable into a RDEP. CRA Debt [35] The argument of Mr. Body on behalf of the CRA is, as he acknowledged, novel. Mr. Body is obviously an experienced lawyer in the area of tax.

He admitted that the cases he submitted in support of his present position did not include any case which determined that a Certificate of lis pendens filed by a party on title would cease to secure the party’s position when the land is sold. [36] I cannot interpret the provisions of debtor law and the MPA so as to uphold this position. In my view that would eliminate the very purpose of the filings and the ability to argue appropriate distribution by law at the end of any matrimonial property action.

Also, such a conclusion would fly in the face of matrimonial property practice in this province which I accept Ms. Cochard is accurate in summarizing for the Court. Quite simply, if it was the purpose of the Matrimonial Property Act that the charge was ineffective post-sale of property, then it would have said so. [37] Here, Ms. Lander acknowledged that the breakdown of the marriage occurred at the same time as the hunting business collapsed due to the worldwide and especially U.S. recession. She acknowledges that the CRA debt was incurred before the parties separated.

However, her position is that she has been asked to take the brunt of the recession when he was the person who profited, or at least spent and borrowed money. I have accepted her position and I have accepted that as a result it is appropriate the unequal distribution precede the effectiveness of the CRA charge. [38] Accordingly, I direct that the matrimonial property be divided as I have ordered and distributed to Ms. Lander prior to any accounting by her for this debt to the CRA.

I also find that the Certificates of lis pendens have priority over the CRA writs and were properly continued after sale of the home to preserve Ms. Lander’s MPA rights. The CRA will now have to look to Mr. Lander with respect to this debt. [39] I have made MPA orders and directed a future spousal support determination. I have also dealt with the CRA claim. Costs may be addressed. Heard on the 22 nd day of November, 2010 Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta, this 30th day of June, 2011.

D.A. Sulyma J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Jeffrey John Lander on his own behalf Renee R. Cochard, Q.C. for the Defendant George F. Body for Canada Revenue Agency