Mew v. Mew, 2011 ABQB 531

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: Mew v. Mew, 2011 ABQB 531 Date: 20110902 Docket: 4810 018368 Registry: Red Deer Between: Edward Albert Mew Plaintiff - and - Linda Louise Mew Defendant Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on December 22, 2011; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment.

Editorial Notice: On behalf of the Government of Alberta personal data identifiers have been removed from this unofficial electronic version of the judgment. _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Madam Justice A.B. Moen _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction.............................................................................................................. Page: 2

II. Discussion.............................................................................................................. Page: 3 A. Division of matrimonial property............................................................... Page: 3 1. What constitutes the matrimonial property in this family?.......... Page: 3 2. Is there any matrimonial property left to be divided?.................. Page: 3

a) Monetary Assets................................................................ Page: 4

b) Matrimonial Home.............................................................. Page: 4

c) Canada Pension and Dow Chemical pension............... Page: 5 3. Was the division of the monetary assets, Canada Pension and matrimonial home just and equitable?................................................................................ Page: 5 4. Division of the Dow Pension......................................................... Page: 7 5. Can Mr. Mew claim his inheritance as an exemption?............ Page: 10 6. Miscellaneous Issues.................................................................. Page: 10 B.

Spousal Support...................................................................................... Page: 11 1. The parties' assets and means, now and in the future............. Page: 14 2. Ms. Mew's ability to contribute to her own support................... Page: 15 3. Mr. Mew's capacity to provide support...................................... Page: 17 4. The age and health of the parties............................................... Page: 17 5. Ms.

Mew's needs having regard to the accustomed standard of living while the parties resided together........................................................................... Page: 17 6. Mr. Mew's legal obligations to others........................................ Page: 17 7. Duration of support...................................................................... Page: 17 8. Quantum of spousal support....................................................... Page: 17

a) Mr. Mew's income............................................................ Page: 21

b) Ms. Mew’s Income........................................................... Page: 22 III. Conclusion............................................................................................................ Page: 24 I. Introduction [ 1 ] Edward and Linda Mew were married on September 13, 1975. They separated June 1, 2003. On June 6, 2003 they met with their bank financial advisor to separate all of their money assets. In 2003, Ms. Mew arranged for the division of Mr. Mew's Canada Pension Plan.

The only asset remaining at that time that was not divided was his Dow Chemical Pension. [ 2 ] On June 6, 2003 arrangements were made for an automatic deposit from Mr. Mew's bank account to Ms. Mew's banking account to cover spousal support. At that time Ms. Mew had a full time job as a teaching assistant having received her certificate in that occupation before she left Mr. Mew. [ 3 ] In June of 2005, they sold their matrimonial home and divided the equity equally.

[ 4 ] In 2006 and 2007, Mr. Mew received an inheritance from his mother and father's estates. [ 5 ] On July 16, 2007, they were divorced by a desk divorce after the divorce was severed from the Corollary Relief and Matrimonial Property action. Later that year, Mr. Mew remarried. [ 6 ] It is now June 2011, four years after the divorce, and eight years after the separation. The parties are before the court to determine the division of matrimonial property and spousal support. [ 7 ] The parties represented themselves in this six day trial. [ 8 ] The issues to be determined in this trial are as follows: 1.

Division of matrimonial property: a. What constitutes matrimonial property in this family? b. Is there any matrimonial property left to be divided? c. If so, what is it and how should it be divided? d. Can Mr. Mew claim his inheritance as an exemption? 2. Spousal support: a. Is Ms. Mew entitled to spousal support? If so, for how long is she entitled and to what quantum? II. Discussion A. Division of matrimonial property [ 9 ] The Matrimonial Property Act , RSA 2000, c. M-8, as am., is the statute in Alberta which sets out the requirements for division of matrimonial property.

That Act pertains to division of property between two people who were married. [ 10 ] In this case there are no issues with respect to exemptions relating to property that was owned by either party prior to the marriage. There is one exemption claimed respecting an estate left to Mr. Mew by his parents very shortly before the divorce was finalized in 2007. I shall discuss that issue later. [ 11 ] The Matrimonial Property Act provides that a spouse may make an application for division of matrimonial property. Matrimonial property is not defined in the Act.

Any claim for a matrimonial property order must be made by way of statement of claim. This is usually done, as it was in this case, in conjunction with a statement of claim for divorce. That Statement of Claim for Divorce and Division of Matrimonial Property was filed by Mr. Mew as plaintiff on July 6, 2006. Ms. Mew defended and counterclaimed on February 13, 2007. [ 12 ] The parties commenced their action for matrimonial property correctly and in time.

[13] The Matrimonial Property Act provides that an order under that Act may only be made if a judgment of divorce has beengranted, among other things:

section 5. The divorce was severed on April 11, 2007. A Divorce Judgment without oral evidence wasgranted on June 13, 2007. Further pleadings were then filed with respect tocorollary relief and division of matrimonial property. 1. What constitutes the matrimonial property in this family? [14] Mr. and Ms. Mew had monetary assets, a home and pensions. I shall discuss each of these assets as to how and when theywere divided and then discuss whether this division was fair. 2.

Is there any matrimonial property left to be divided? [15] The law is clear that matrimonial property is valued and divided as at the date of the trial, in this case June 2011: Mazurenkov. Mazurenko (1981), 1981 ABCA 104 , 30 AR 34 (CA) and confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Hodgson v. Hodgson, 2005ABCA 13. [16] Therefore, in the ordinary course I would determine the value of the property at the date of trial and then take into accountthe factors set out in

section 8 of the Matrimonial Property Act. If the property was acquired during the marriage the presumption is thatit is divided equally: section 7(4). The court must, however, consider whether it would be just and equitable to do so taking intoconsideration all of the matters set out in

section 8. Where property is claimed as exempt, there is no presumption of equal division. TheAct provides in s. 7(3) that the court is to calculate the increase in value of the exempt property to the date of trial and then to divide itequitably and justly. In considering whether it would be just and equitable, the court must apply the factors set out in s. 8. [17] The property acquired by the Mews during their marriage was modest. They came into the marriage with no property. Whenthey separated they had some monetary assets in the form of LIRAs and RRSPs, and a modest amount in the bank account.

Their debtswere likewise modest. Their only substantial asset was the matrimonial home. Mr. Mew had a Canada Pension. Ms. Mew had a modestclaim to a Canada Pension which value was not at issue in the trial. She had worked during the marriage until the children were born andthen not thereafter. Finally, Mr. Mew had a pension with Dow Chemical with which he had worked since 1999. [18] I set out below how and when all that property was divided. [19] It is Ms. Mew's position that I should value all of the matrimonial property in the hands of Mr.

Mew at trial by tracing whathe did with his share of the property to trial and then divide it equally between her and him. She appeared to concede that the propertyshe has is also susceptible to division in the same way. However, the evidence establishes that she has not been prudent in herinvestments. Therefore, the value of the property divided at the time of the separation has grown in Mr. Mew's hands and diminished inMs. Mew's hands. [20] I shall therefore discuss where all of the assets accumulated by the Mews during their marriage have been distributed sincethe separation.

a) Monetary Assets [21] Quickly after the separation, the parties agreed to the division of their monetary assets. [22] On June 6, 2003, a few days after Ms. Mew left Mr. Mew, the parties met with their TD Bank financial advisor to divide alltheir monetary assets. The parties agreed that the monetary assets were as set out in detail in Appendix A to these reasons as they weredivided that day.

b) Matrimonial Home [ 23 ] Their major asset was the matrimonial home. Mr. Mew remained in that home until September 2005 with the children. Then the home was sold and the equity was divided equally. Since then both parties have had an equal opportunity to use one-half of the funds as each of them saw fit. That asset is no longer available for division. [ 24 ] I note that Mr. Mew paid all the costs of maintaining that home and preserving the asset while he remained there. Further, there was a minor child of the marriage who lived in the home, and, finally, Mr. Mew paid Ms.

Mew $350 per month for most of the time between the separation and the sale of the matrimonial home. [ 25 ] This asset is no longer available for division.

c) Canada Pension and Dow Chemical pension [ 26 ] Another matrimonial asset, not divided on June 6, 2003, was the Canada Pension Plan in Mr. Mew's name. Ms. Mew herself arranged with Canada Pension to split that pension which was divided effective June 1, 2003. That asset is no longer available for division. [ 27 ] I note that Ms. Mew has made contributions to the Canada Pension Plan in the years 1972 to 1984 when she stopped working. She re-commenced contributing to the CPP in 2002 and continued to contribute to the year 2007. Since then she has contributed nothing.

This pension that she had accrued prior to the separation does not appear to have been split with Mr. Mew. However, he did not make an issue of this so I will make no findings about the division of Ms. Mew's CPP with Mr. Mew. [ 28 ] The only remaining matrimonial asset I must consider, therefore, is the pension that Mr. Mew has been accumulating with Dow Chemical since 1999.

Given that this asset has not been divided as yet, and remains to be divided, I do so later in these reasons. [ 29 ] I now turn to a discussion as to the division of the assets that are already divided and as to whether that division was just and equitable. 3. Was the division of the monetary assets, Canada Pension and matrimonial home just and equitable? [ 30 ] I must first ask myself if the division of assets on June 6, 2003 was just and equitable and whether I must trace all of the funds divided that day to the date of trial to determine if there should be another division of assets as suggested by Ms.

Mew. [ 31 ] Ms. Mew claims that the equal division of the monetary assets was unfair as she believed that Mr. Mew had kept assets of equal value but greater potential than the assets with which she was left. [ 32 ] She is mistaken. There was no evidence that her assets were less important than his. It appears to me that she thought that the LIRA which he kept somehow was different than the RRSPs that were attributed to her. I have no evidence that this is so. She may also have mixed up the LIRA which came in 1999 from his work with Methanex, and the Dow Chemical pension to which Mr.

Mew was entitled once he commenced work with Dow in 1999. That Dow pension has not yet been divided. I will discuss this family asset and its division later in these reasons. [ 33 ] I am satisfied from the evidence that the Mews' monetary assets were fairly divided in June 2003, that each party received half of the value as it was on the day they divided the assets, and that each party from that day forward had control over most of their

respective monies for the purpose of use or investment. There was an exception to the control issue that related to the locked-in Registered Investments Funds held by Mr. Mew for himself and those he held in trust for Ms. Mew (RIFs or LIRAs), none of which could be collapsed until the retirement of the party who held them or they reached the age of 55 years. Two RRSP funds in the name of Mr. Mew were held by him for the benefit of Ms. Mew but attributed to her in the division of property set out in Appendix A. Those funds could not be transferred to Ms. Mew or collapsed without a court order. Given that Ms.

Mew is entitled to those funds, I order that they be transferred into her name as part of her share of the monetary assets of this marriage. [ 34 ] The parties did not achieve this separation of their monetary assets through any formal agreement pursuant to the Matrimonial Property Act as is usual for the division of matrimonial property. Rather, they enlisted the assistance of their TD Bank financial advisor on June 6, 2003, who described both of them in his meeting with them that day as amicably dividing all of their monetary assets.

The TD financial advisor said that there was no animosity between the parties, that they agreed to everything, and he executed their agreement. Further, he was satisfied that all the monetary assets had been divided equally. [ 35 ] There is no doubt that the monetary assets and the proceeds of the matrimonial home were matrimonial property subject to division under section 7(4) of the Matrimonial Property Act .

In considering whether this court should vary the division of the assets that were divided by the parties, I must take into account whether it would be just and equitable to do so considering the factors in

section 8 and in particular

section 8 (

g) which requires consideration of “ the terms of an oral or written agreement between the spouses ” . [ 36 ] It is clear that in this case there was an oral agreement between the parties as to the division of their monetary assets and the division of the proceeds of the matrimonial home which agreement was made June 6, 2003 and June 2005. I must ask the question whether the division of monetary assets in June 2003 and the division of the equity in the matrimonial home in 2005 met the fundamental intention of the Matrimonial Property Act .

I will discuss the specifics in a moment but it is clear that those assets were divided equally at the relevant times. [ 37 ] I must be satisfied that this oral agreement was not unfair nor entered into by either of the parties under duress. In this regard, I heard the evidence of Russell Ingert, who was with the TD bank at the time in June 2003, who was the parties' financial advisor, and who took the instructions of both Mr. and Ms. Mew to divide their monetary assets. Mr. Ingert is now the Branch Manager of the same bank. In evidence, he described the meeting with Mr. and Ms.

Mew as cordial, with no animosity, no fighting or arguing. He stated that they simply wanted to divide their assets. He said that during the meeting the parties went through all accounts and divided everything equally. The parties had two chequing accounts, each taking one. They balanced their RRSPs and to the best of his knowledge everything was divided equally.

It was to the best of his recollection that he met with them at the request of both of the parties. [ 38 ] My review of the evidence establishes that the monetary assets were divided equally and the equity in the matrimonial home was divided equally. [ 39 ] I now turn to a more detailed analysis of the division of monetary assets to ensure that the division was equitable. There is simply no evidence that Ms. Mew was coerced in any way to divide their assets - both the monetary assets and the home. Further, the presumption under the legislation is that the matrimonial assets will be divided equally. Ms.

Mew has not provided any evidence or reasons to suggest that the assets should have been divided unequally in her favour. [ 40 ] The division of the monetary assets made on June 6, 2003 is set out at Exhibit 1 Tab B1 in evidence and Appendix A to these reasons. All of the monetary assets were valued as at June 1, 2003. In evidence it was clear that Mr. Mew had made a spreadsheet shortly after these transactions which was given to Ms. Mew. The only items which were different in Exhibit 1 were the items f47s01 and f47s01-s (LIRAs). After the meeting with the financial advisor, Mr.

Mew was able to obtain the correct figures for those assets which he later substituted in the spreadsheet at Appendix A. Those amounts pertained to a pension that Mr. Mew had received cash value for when he had left Methanex in 1999. At that time, it was required that the monies be put into a locked in RIF not available to Mr. Mew until his retirement or he turned 55, whichever occurred earlier. [ 41 ] I find that the division of property on June 6, 2003 was fair and equitable and according to an oral agreement made between the parties at the time.

With the exception of the locked -in retirement funds, they each had their share of the assets to spend or invest as they saw fit. To go through the exercise now of calculating where all of that cash has gone tracing it through nine years would be futile as there could not possibly be any conclusion I could come to that would be more fair or just than the parties dividing those assets at the time of their separation. In this regard, I know that I am not strictly following Mazurenko and Hodgson .

It is however a futile exercise in calculation and I will not do so here because I would only come to the same conclusion.

[ 42 ] With respect to the equity in the matrimonial home, I come to the same conclusion for the same reasons. 4. Division of the Dow Pension [ 43 ] The only remaining matrimonial asset to be divided, then, is the Dow Chemical pension. [ 44 ] Mr. Mew left Methanex in 1999 during the marriage and on September 7, 1999 joined Union Carbide which later merged with Dow Chemical. It is the pension that he has accrued since September 1999 that is at issue here. [ 45 ] I have found above that the Methanex pension has been divided equitably. When Mr.

Mew left Methanex, the pension to which he was entitled was paid into a LIRA which he could not access until he was 55 and there are restrictions on how it can be withdrawn. Further, Ms. Mew was given a spousal RIF by Methanex in the amount of $46,408.00, which was similarly locked in and which was credited to her in the division of the matrimonial assets. When the monetary assets were divided between him and Ms. Mew, she was credited with half of the monetary assets by giving to her certain assets including RRSPs as set out above. Therefore, the only asset left to divide is the Dow Chemical pension. [ 46 ] Ms.

Mew had retained the services of an expert actuary, Patrick Johnston, to give an opinion as to the value of the Dow pension. I qualified him as such. [ 47 ] Mr. Johnston explained that for the purpose of dividing a pension, an expert would have to calculate the present value of the lifetime pension that accrued during the period of joint accrual. My task is to identify the “ lifetime ” of the pension and then to specify the date on which that pension had accrued to the benefit of both Mr. Mew and Ms. Mew. [ 48 ] Then, the pension fund will calculate that portion of the pension to which Ms.

Mew is entitled on a present value basis. [ 49 ] Ordinarily, when a court is dividing the matrimonial assets between the two former spouses, it need not divide each asset equally. Rather it may value all of the matrimonial property and then give specific assets to each party to ensure that there is an equitable distribution of the whole of the matrimonial property. [ 50 ] In the case before me, I have found that all property was divided except the Dow pension. Therefore, I must find the parameters in which the expert must calculate Ms. Mew's share of that pension.

She is entitled to one-half of the pension attributed to matrimonial property. [ 51 ] The Matrimonial Property Act requires that we value the matrimonial property at the date of the trial. Here the commencement date of the trial was June 13, 2011. Therefore, the value of the pension on that date is what must apply in this case for the purpose of valuing the asset that will be divided. I see no reason to change that date. The value of the pension on that date is really the present value of the whole of the Dow pension to which Mr.

Mew will be entitled at his retirement as calculated on June 13, 2011. [ 52 ] However, Ms. Mew is not entitled to half of the whole pension. [ 53 ] Matrimonial property is property obtained or accrued during the course of the marriage. Here the marriage ended in June 2007. Any property acquired by Mr. Mew after that date is not matrimonial property to the benefit of Ms. Mew. Unlike real property, a pension continues to grow for two reasons: first, the pension grows by contributions made by the beneficiary - in this case Mr. Mew. He continued to contribute to the pension after his divorce.

The second way the pension grew was through the investments made by the pension fund.

[ 54 ] In the normal course, the divorce and the division of matrimonial property happens at the same time. To determine whether a spouse is entitled to half of the pension at the date of divorce and the date at which the matrimonial property is divided, I must apply factors set out in

section 8 of the Matrimonial Property Act . [ 55 ] In this case, considering the factors in s. 8 of the Matrimonial Property Act , there is no reason that Ms. Mew should not get one-half of the pension during the period of joint accrual. However, any accrual to which Mr. Mew has contributed beyond the date of divorce cannot be divided in favour of Ms. Mew. The question is - what is the period of joint accrual? [ 56 ] I find that the period of joint accrual of the Dow pension is September 7, 1999 to June 13, 2007. [ 57 ] September 7, 1999 is when Mr.

Mew joined Union Carbide (which later merged with Dow Chemical) and commenced the pension which is the asset we are discussing here. June 13, 2007 is the date of divorce which in my view, must be the end of the period of joint accrual. [ 58 ] Therefore, I am directing Mr. Mew to direct the Dow Chemical pension to divide his pension according to the dates of joint accrual. The division of the pension during that period is to be one half to Ms. Mew and one half to Mr. Mew. The calculation of the pension is to take into account retirement by Mr.

Mew at the age of 60, given that the evidence was clear that his long-term intention was to retire at that age. [ 59 ] Finally, the pension administrator should take into account Mr. Mew's salary up to now, but make no assumptions about increases in his salary going into the future until he retires. The evidence before me was that Mr. Mew has cut back on the work that he is doing, and he is no longer doing over time. Therefore going into the future, Mr. Mew is unlikely to have significant salary increases. [ 60 ] With respect to the mechanism by which Ms.

Mew will obtain the pension, my understanding is that there are restrictions in the pension contract as to how that pension can be paid out. The pension is to be paid out to Ms. Mew in accordance with the restrictions in the pension plan. Therefore, if the pension plan requires that her share of the pension be paid into a RIF, then her share of the pension shall be paid into that instrument. [ 61 ] If there are further directions required, the parties may approach me for those directions. 5. Can Mr. Mew claim his inheritance as an exemption? [ 62 ] Mr. Mew lost both of his parents within two years.

His father died on February 5, 2005 and his mother died on October 30, 2006. This occurred after the date of separation of the Mews. [ 63 ] On November 3, 2006, a payment out of the estate was made to Mr. Mew in the amount of $70,000.00. This was the first payment of funds he inherited and was made prior to the date of the divorce. The second payment made was on July 20, 2007 in the amount of $11,082.00 after the date of the divorce. This second amount paid after the divorce does not form part of the matrimonial property.

The question is whether the first payment does, and if so, to what extent. [ 64 ] Clearly, the inheritance is not matrimonial property. Mr. Mew inherited the first installment after the separation but while still married. Therefore, any accrual in the value of that money for the 7 months up to the date of the divorce could be matrimonial property. [ 65 ] Mr. Mew kept his inheritance separate from his other matrimonial assets. The $70,000.00 went into a separate bank account. Prior to the inheritance he had obtained a line of credit to fund the building of a new home for himself.

When he obtained the inheritance he immediately paid $64,000.00 on that line of credit which brought that line of credit down to almost $0.00 [there was $249.53 remaining].

[ 66 ] The evidence did not establish that there was more than a de minimis amount earned on the $70,000.00 until the divorce was finalized. Further, during that 7 months, Ms. Mew did nothing in the family to enhance any of the matrimonial assets. Therefore, none of the factors set out in s. 8 of the Matrimonial Property Act apply to provide Ms. Mew with any of the accrual of the value of the inheritance. [ 67 ] I find that Mr. Mew can claim the entire amount and any accrual as an exemption. 6.

Miscellaneous Issues [ 68 ] Although much of the evidence was irrelevant, I will comment here on some of the allegations made by Ms. Mew as to property to which she thought she was entitled. [ 69 ] There was evidence of property bought by Mr. Mew after the separation with the one-half of the matrimonial assets he had received on their division and his inheritance. Without going into detail, Mr. Mew was prudent in his investments and purchases of property. Ms. Mew was not. [ 70 ] Further, Mr. Mew re-married and Ms. Mew believed that she was somehow entitled to assets that belonged to the new Mrs. Mew.

Clearly that is not the case. [ 71 ] The division of matrimonial property as set out above was fair and equitable and whatever Ms. Mew did with her property was for her to deal with. Similarly whatever Mr. Mew did with his property was his to deal with. She cannot now claim a benefit from his prudent investments. Nor can she claim that property belonging to the new Mrs. Mew is in any way to be divided with her. [ 72 ] Similarly, any debts that either of them incurred since the separation of the property are their debts to deal with separately. [ 73 ] Finally, there was a Dow savings plan in Mr.

Mew's name which again is de minimis and I will not deal with it as matrimonial property. However, I point out, that Mr. Mew's income included this small amount he had put into the savings plan - it was with after tax dollars. Therefore, any consideration about spousal support would take this into account. [ 74 ] I also had evidence before me that Ms. Mew has recently complained (May 6, 2011) about Mr. Ingert's involvement in dividing the monetary assets.

Apparently, she has complained to him that he should have ensured that she had independent legal advice before he assisted the parties to divide the assets. [ 75 ] First, she has waited 8 years before she raised this. Second, she would have been entitled to no more than one-half of the matrimonial assets in any event. There was simply no evidence to support her having an unequal division of the matrimonial assets. There is simply no reason at law or equity for her to have received any more than she did and I do not imagine that any lawyer could have argued otherwise. [ 76 ] Ms.

Mew also made an issue of the RESPs for the children. I am satisfied that Mr. Mew spent those funds on the education of his children. Further, he paid support to the son when he went to post-secondary school in Edmonton. Ms. Mew paid nothing to support her son in his education. B. Spousal Support [ 77 ] Ms. Mew is claiming spousal support as far back as when the parties separated in June 2003. She filed her counterclaim in

February 2007 which is the first time she raised the issue of spousal support. Further, she is asking that I provide that she is to receive support as though Mr. Mew is continuing to work until he is 65 and she is claiming support to ensure that she has the standard of living that she enjoyed during her marriage. [ 78 ] At the date of separation, in the TD financial advisor's office at the bank, she agreed to be paid $600.00 per month by a direct transfer into her bank account by Mr. Mew on a monthly basis. At that time, she had obtained her Teaching Assistant certificate and was working as a Teaching Assistant.

In May 2004 Mr. Mew voluntarily increased that amount to $800.00 per month. He then voluntarily increased the amount to $1000.00. Finally, in 2007 this court made an order for spousal support on an interim basis in the amount of $2000.00 per month. Mr. Mew continued to pay this amount up to the time of trial and continues to pay this amount. [ 79 ] Ms. Mew made an issue that he continued to have benefits in his job, but she does not have them.

I would have expected that with her working and getting spousal support that she could have obtained medical benefits through a private plan had she chosen to do so. [ 80 ] The right to spousal support is not automatic on marriage breakdown. Rather, it will be ordered only in compliance with the provisions of s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act , RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp.), [ Divorce Act ], which provide in part: Spousal support order

(1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, or to secure and pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or such lump sum and periodic sums, as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse. Factors

(4) In making an order under subsection (1) ..., the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including (

a) the length of time the spouses cohabited; (

b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (

c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. [ 81 ] The Divorce Act also provides that I may not take into account spousal misconduct ( s. 15.2(5) ), that is, the fact the Ms. Mew left the home is irrelevant to this discussion. [ 82 ] The Divorce Act s. 15.2(6) sets out the objectives of a spousal support order:

(6) An order made under subsection (1) ... that provides for the support of a spouse should (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; ... (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. [ 83 ] The Alberta Court of Appeal analysed these provisions and identified three types of spousal support: 1. Compensatory support, which is premised on marriage being a joint endeavour, and which seeks to alleviate economic

disadvantage of a spouse by taking into account all the circumstances of the parties, including the advantages conferred on either spouse during the marriage. It is concerned with an equitable sharing of the benefits of the marriage. 2. Contractual entitlement, which flows from the express or implied agreement of the parties. 3. Non-compensatory support, which may be ordered where it is fit and just to do so: Corbeil v. Corbeil , 2001 ABCA 220 , (2001), 286 AR 330 at para. 29 (Alta. CA) as cited in Rockall v. Rockall , 2010 ABCA 278 . [ 84 ] In this case, the support to which Ms.

Mew is entitled is compensatory support. Mr. Mew does not contest this. Her right to compensatory support arises from the nature of their relationship and responsibilities in the marriage which was, to some extent, a disadvantage to her in providing a means by which she could support herself after the separation. [ 85 ] Mr. and Ms. Mew met in high school. Mr. Mew took up welding after high school. Soon, his career took off and he began getting decent jobs and making decent money as a millwright. Ms. Mew worked full time at financial institutions. She earned about half of Mr. Mew's income. [ 86 ] Mr. and Ms.

Mew co-habited for two years before they married on September 13, 1975.Their marriage was for 28 years up to the date of separation, 32 years until the divorce. For the first 8 or 10 years of the marriage she worked in a number of banks. They were careful in those years and she contributed to the assets of the marriage. Then they had two children. She was 30 when she had their first child, a daughter. The daughter developed childhood insulin dependent diabetes at about the age of three. The son had asthma. Mr. and Ms. Mew decided that Ms. Mew would stay home with the children. [ 87 ] Ms.

Mew was involved very heavily with her children given their illnesses. For example, the daughter had to have three or four injections of insulin a day and had to have her blood tested 3 or 4 times per day. She also had to be carefully monitored as to her food intake every day. Constantly, Ms. Mew had to be on top of her daughter's illness. It was stressful. Because of her son's asthma, he had to be on a ventilator two or three times a day. When her son was about 8 or 9, his asthma stopped. [ 88 ] Mr. Mew went to work which sometimes included him working out of town.

He also sometimes went on trips with the company for the purposes of education. Mr. Mew came home every evening when he was occasionally not working out of town or when he was not working overtime. [ 89 ] Ms. Mew's responsibilities included taking care of the home, and preparing his meal when he came home. She stayed home with the children carrying out general household duties and she home-schooled the children for Kindergarten and Grades one and two given their illnesses.

She home-schooled her daughter until she was in Grade five. [ 90 ] Compensatory support compensates a spouse for a role they take in a marriage in which they have not been able to forward their career so that the other spouse may do so. In this case, the evidence is clear that Mr. and Mrs. Mew agreed that she would take the primary child care role so that Mr. Mew could earn an income for the family. This selection of special roles in the family is recognized in the Matrimonial Property Act as set out above. Spousal support under the Divorce Act also recognizes this principle.

In a case where there has been a long term marriage, it is expected that the parties will share in the advantage that one spouse has had in furthering his/her career. However, the Divorce Act also acknowledges that a spouse should be encouraged to become independent, not relying on their former spouse any more than is necessary. [ 91 ] Because of stress, Ms. Mew had trouble sleeping and was put on medication in 2001 for depression. She claimed that she had been depressed for a number of years but did not produce the appropriate medical evidence to support this claim. [ 92 ] From all of these, I conclude that Ms.

Mew is entitled to compensatory spousal support. That is, she is entitled to spousal support to compensate her for her role in the marriage which contributed to Mr. Mew's success in his career.

[93] Ms. Mew argues that I should apply the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG). With respect to the application of theSSAG, the Alberta Court of Appeal has found that they do not have the force of law and that a trial judge is obligated to conduct a properanalysis according to the criteria set out in the Divorce Act: Rockall at para. 18. [94] Alberta courts have considered the relevant circumstances for spousal support identified in Bracklow v. Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 420, 169 DLR (4th) 577, for example Hamilton v. Wallace, 2008 ABQB 90 at para. 14, 52 RFL (6th)331, Abbott v.

Abbott, 2010 ABQB 585 at para. 35, Gordon v. Towell, 2009 ABQB 415 at para. 39, 74 RFL (6th) 264, Desimone v.Straub, 2010 ABQB 462 at para. 120: (

a) the parties' assets and means, now and in the future; (

b) the claimant's ability to contribute to his or her own support; (

c) the payor's capacity to provide support; (

d) the age and health of the parties; (

e) the claimant's needs, having regard to the accustomed standard of living while the parties resided together; and (

f) the payor's legal obligations to others. 1. The parties' assets and means, now and in the future [95] I have set out in detail above the parties' assets and the division of those assets. Ms. Mew received her fair share (half) of theassets. Therefore, any spousal support could only relate to the income that Mr. Mew has generated and will continue to generate for ashort period of time which income is reflective of his working throughout the marriage, increasing his skill and income earning ability. [96] Once Mr.

Mew retires, he will be living from the assets he has accumulated since the separation including from his familyinheritance. Ms. Mew has retained half of the family assets accrued during the marriage and will have to live on those assets in herretirement. Specifically, she has a share of the pensions (Canada and now Dow), and some retirement savings funds. Any income fromthose assets will provide her with the income she will receive after Mr. Mew retires. As I set out in these reasons, Mr. Mew gaveevidence which I accept that his intentions are that he retire at 60 years of age.

This is not unreasonable and appears to have beenunderstood by both of them for some time. [97] Therefore, Ms. Mew is entitled to compensatory spousal support since separation and up to the date Mr. Mew turns 60 yearsof age. Beyond that, she is not entitled to spousal support. 2. Ms. Mew's ability to contribute to her own support [98] Ms. Mew claims that she is not able to contribute by virtue of illness among other things. [99] She did produce a letter from Dr. Prins dated April 15, 2011 which stated that he had been Ms. Mew's physician since 2007.Dr.

Prins pointed out that he is a family doctor and not a specialist in occupational medicine. He disclaimed that his letter was an expertopinion.

[ 100 ] In the letter, he described her medical conditions and her ability to work. He described her “ chronic depression and insomnia ” as stable but not in complete remission. He also says that because she had been able to present herself in court there must be a significant improvement. [ 101 ] I observed Ms. Mew in court for six days - five of them full court days. She appeared to me to be able to carry on full time and organize herself and concentrate when it was important to do so. [ 102 ] Dr.

Prins identified an injury in her foot which occurred in 2003 and which he said would eventually result in arthritis. For this reason, he did not recommend that she work in a job which required full day's standing. [ 103 ] He also identified cholangitis with emergent cholecystectomy which she had in the fall of 2006 and for which she was off work for a period of two months. He said that she has recovered fully from the surgery. [ 104 ] Dr. Prins updated his letter on May 25, 2011 in which he identified three other medical concerns.

They were injuries to two of her fingers on her left hand from a work-related injury in 2005; recurrent urinary tract infections from October 2006 to January 2007 which has resolved; eustachian tube disorder since March 2007. [ 105 ] Generally the two letters from Dr. Prins did not identify anything that would indicate to this court that Ms.

Mew could not obtain and retain a full time job at minimum wage. [ 106 ] Unfortunately, this court did not have the benefit of an occupational therapist who could give an opinion about her capacity to work either full time or part time with these conditions and at what occupation. I only observed her for six days in court and could see nothing that would inhibit her from working full time. From my experience, I have observed others in my courtroom with depression that were capable of holding down a full time job.

I also have the benefit of an opinion from the Workers' Compensation Board described below. [ 107 ] Ms. Mews has training and a certificate. During the latter part of the marriage she went to Red Deer College to obtain a certificate in the teacher assistant program. She finished this program in 2003 when she was 49 or 50 years old. Ms. Mew has a work history in that occupation. She was working as a teacher's assistant when the parties separated. [ 108 ] After the separation she was injured on the job. She was on workers' compensation for some time. Then she returned to work for a period of time on contract.

When her contract was terminated she did some work in food services for seniors. The Workers' Compensation Board deemed her fit to return to work in May 2004. [ 109 ] I find that she is capable and has been capable of working to support herself since the separation. There have been very short periods when this was not so. One of them was the time she was covered by Workers' Compensation. The only other time was when she was legitimately off work during the two month period in which she was recovering from surgery. [ 110 ] Ms.

Mew says that she could not work and has not done so since 2008 because of the necessity of working full time on her court case since then. She said that she could not commit to a client because of the time required to prepare her case. In fact, she complained several times about the fact that Justice Bast had ordered the trial to go ahead in June 2011 and that Justice Bast had not given her enough time to prepare. Justice Bast's order was made in January 2011 which, in my opinion, was more than adequate time for her to prepare even if she had been working full time. Certainly Mr.

Mew represented himself and had been working full time. [ 111 ] Ms. Mew also explained in a document at trial that she had reduced her working hours to a minimum to avoid paying tax. She stated: “ For tax purposes it may not be to my benefit to work more than 15 hours per week. ” : Exhibit 1, Tab M.

[ 112 ] Ms. Mew said that her pay scale was $10.00 per hour as a teaching assistant and working with seniors. Mr. Mew put in evidence about the pay scale for teacher assistants in the school district in which they both reside. [ 113 ] I find that she can and should work and that the amount she should contribute is a thirty-five hour week at $10.00 per hour. This amounts to an income of $350.00 per week. Given that she should be expected to work about 50 weeks a year, this amounts to an annual income of $17,500.00 per year. I note that this amount is very generously low.

I have calculated her spousal support based on this income going forward from 2006. 3. Mr. Mew's capacity to provide support [ 114 ] Mr. Mew will work until he is 60 years old. He is capable of providing a full time income until then, although the evidence established that he will not be making any substantial increases in his income until then. His income has decreased and levelled off recently because he is no longer able to work the long hours required for overtime in his current occupation. However, there is no indication that he cannot continue to work full time until he turns 60. 4.

The age and health of the parties [ 115 ] I have considered this subject above. In general, there is no health reason that Ms. Mew cannot work for about 35 to 40 hours per week, nor is there any reason that Mr. Mew cannot work until he is 60 at his normal salary. 5. Ms. Mew's needs having regard to the accustomed standard of living while the parties resided together [ 116 ] Neither of these parties have lived more than a basic lifestyle throughout their marriage. The matrimonial property has now been divided equally. All that is left for Mr. Mew is to share his income with Ms.

Mew to acknowledge her contribution to the marriage and to his career. [ 117 ] There is no possibility that either of Mr. or Mrs. Mew can live the way they did together. The assets they have accumulated, as I set out above, are modest. 6. Mr. Mew's legal obligations to others [ 118 ] Mr. Mew has subsequently, in 2007, remarried. However, the evidence supports that his new wife is independently able to support herself. Mr. Mew does, however, have his new wife as a potential dependent. 7. Duration of support [ 119 ] This topic was discussed above. Given the circumstances, Mr. Mew must pay support until he turns 60.

After that, the parties will have to rely on pension income. If they choose to work and generate income, that is their choice but it will not result in Mr. Mew having to pay spousal support for Ms. Mew. The long-held expectation of the parties was that he would work until 60. To provide spousal support after that time would be “ double dipping ” as Mr. Mew would have to pay support from the income of the matrimonial assets to which he was entitled, being his one-half share. 8. Quantum of spousal support [ 120 ] I must now consider how much Mr. Mew is required to pay Ms.

Mew in spousal support since the separation. The type of

spousal support to which she is entitled, as set out above, is compensatory support. [ 121 ] Spousal support will be quantified based on Mr. Mew sharing his income with Ms. Mew until his retirement. From this will be subtracted the amount she is expected to earn annually and the amounts he has already paid. [ 122 ] Ms. Mew's application for spousal support was made in 2007 when she filed her counterclaim in the divorce action filed by Mr.

Mew in 2006. [ 123 ] The first question that I must answer is whether this Court is entitled to go back to 2003 for an assessment of spousal support that should have been paid by Mr. Mew to Ms. Mew. [ 124 ] The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that similar considerations in the context of retroactive payment of child support as set out in DBS v SRG , 2006 SCC 37 , [2006] 2 SCR 231 are relevant in deciding the suitability of a “ retroactive ” award of spousal support: Kerr v Baranow , 2011 SCC 10 at paras 207-209 , [2011] 1 SCR 269 .

The factors to be considered are the needs of the recipient, the conduct of the payor, the reason for the delay in seeking support and any hardship the retroactive award may occasion on the payor spouse: para 207. [ 125 ] In this case, Ms. Mew did not make an application for spousal support until 2007 when she filed her Counterclaim to the Statement of Claim for Divorce. In the circumstances, she had been receiving spousal support as I will set out below, in an amount to which she agreed.

This amount was intended to supplement her income as a teachers' assistant, an occupation in which she was fully involved before she left the marriage. [ 126 ] Therefore, I will not award additional spousal support up to 2006, given the date of the Counterclaim was 2007. [ 127 ] She and Mr. Mew agreed on the amount of spousal support taking a number of factors into consideration. First, she agreed to the amount of $600.00 for spousal support on the basis that she was working and would not pay child support. After the separation, Mr. Mew agreed to pay Ms.

Mew $600 per month as spousal support commencing in July 2003. It was the evidence of Mr. Mew that the amount of $600.00 was paid in consideration of the fact that Ms. Mew was working full time as a teacher's assistant and was not paying him any child support by this agreement. The son, who was in high school, stayed with Mr. Mew in the matrimonial home and later the daughter and her baby moved back in with him. The daughter became pregnant when she was 16 years old and moved out. However she returned to the matrimonial home when the baby was quite young. Mr.

Mew's arrangement with the daughter was that she would look after the granddaughter and Mr. Mew would pay for the room and board. [ 128 ] Second, it would be unfair in those circumstances for me to change the amount of spousal support because it goes back a very long way and there was not a significant change in circumstances until at least Mr. Mew sold the matrimonial home and moved himself and the children to another home in 2005. By that time his income had increased sufficiently that an application for spousal support could have been made.

However, the son was still a child of the marriage and it could reasonably be expected that Ms. Mew would work and help to support him. She did not. Mr. Mew, however, continued to support his son at the Red Deer Community College and at NAIT until end of term in spring 2008. [ 129 ] I find that Mr. and Ms. Mew agreed on spousal support in the amount of $600.00 taking into consideration those things set out above. [ 130 ] In May 2004 Mr. Mew unilaterally increased the monthly spousal support payment to $800.00 per month which he paid until July 2006. Further, as of June 2004, he also paid Ms.

Mew $350.00 as rent for the matrimonial home until it was sold in June 2005 with a possession date in September 2005. Mr. Mew, therefore, was paying $1150.00 per month in spousal support and Ms. Mew was paying nothing to support her children. He ceased paying the extra $350.00 when the matrimonial home was sold. From the time of the separation until the home was sold, Mr. Mew paid the mortgage and other expenses on the matrimonial home, ensuring that the matrimonial property was in good standing preserving the matrimonial asset. [ 131 ] I note that Ms.

Mew thought she should get more than $350.00 a month for occupation rent from Mr. Mew, but she did not

take into account that he was paying the mortgage and other expenses for the home to preserve it as a matrimonial asset and for which she received half of the equity. Therefore, $350.00 was a fair amount of occupation rent to pay. I also note that the children were living in that house and Ms. Mew was not paying child support. [ 132 ] In August, 2006, he increased his spousal support payments to $1000.00 per month but was not paying the $350.00 per month at that time so effectively he reduced his spousal support.

In 2007 he commenced paying $2000.00 per month in accordance with a court order of the Queen's Bench made on March 14, 2007. [ 133 ] I also note that Mr. Mew, to enable Ms. Mew to obtain a home prior to the sale of the matrimonial home, co-signed a loan to bridge-finance the down payment on one-half of a duplex in her name. That loan was advanced on August 29, 2005. She ultimately paid that loan (bridge financing) with her proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home. [ 134 ] From the above, it seems fair that I should consider what Mr. Mew should pay for spousal support commencing in 2006.

This is after the matrimonial home was sold and before the court order directing him to pay $2000.00 per month. During this time is was reasonable to expect that Ms. Mew was working and that she continues to work up to the time that Mr. Mew retires. [ 135 ] I turn now to what would have been fair for Mr. Mew to pay in spousal support. To do this I am taking into account what Mr. Mew was earning and what he would have paid according to the SSAG. I have set her income at $17,500.00 per year. Given her income in the first year of her teaching assistant position, this income is low.

However, given that her employment history has been inconsistent and non-existent at times, I have imputed her income. Further, when I considered what Mr. Mew ought to have paid, I reviewed the range in the SSAG and have taken an amount at the lower end of the range to factor in my impression of Ms. Mew that she has not taken responsibility for her actions and poor work history. [ 136 ] In taking into account that Ms.

Mew was entitled to compensatory support given that she stayed home to look after two needy children, I also consider the goal set out in the Divorce Act concerning spousal support, that is, that we should attempt to “ promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time ” . It is now eight years since the separation - well beyond a reasonable period of time. There is no apparent reason why Ms. Mew could not and did not go to work. She was 49 at the time of separation and had a two year certificate from a community college giving her a profession of teaching assistant.

My impression of her at the trial was that she felt entitled to be looked after by Mr. Mew. Because she has not taken advantage of her education, that is not something that should be the responsibility of Mr. Mew. [ 137 ] Ms. Mew worked for eight years while married to Mr. Mew and before they had children. Her work record appears spotty and it does not appear that she was setting out to establish a career for herself when she had the opportunity to do so.

However, even if she had advanced her career prior to the children, after about 17 years (when the parties separated), the skills and advancement she could have achieved prior to the birth of the children would have been out of date and she would have had to start over again. This factor is, therefore, neutral. [ 138 ] Spouses are entitled to compensatory support because that spouse has given up her/his career opportunities to enable the other parent to pursue fully his/her career without worries about the care of the children and other household matters. In this case, the parents agreed that Ms.

Mew should stay home and look after the household so that Mr. Mew could pursue his career. Even though Mr. Mew suggested that he put in an unusual amount of effort to assist Ms. Mew at home when he was there, I find that this marriage was a traditional marriage for about 17 years in which Ms. Mew was the primary care giver and Mr. Mew advanced his career. [ 139 ] In these circumstances, given Ms. Mew commenced her career when she was about 49 years old, she could not reasonably be expected to develop her career to the extent that she stands on an equal footing with Mr.

Mew as far as income earning potential is concerned. It is in order for a court to order compensatory support in this case. In the circumstances of this case, I impute an income to her to reflect her education and her capability of earning an income. I impute an annual income to her as set out above commencing in 2006 of $17,500.00 annually. As I said earlier, I consider this to be low compared to what she earned in her first year but I have compensated for this by selecting spousal support at the low end of the range.

a) Mr. Mew's income

Year Gross Income* 2003 $80,902.17 2004 $94,042.37 2005 $99,129.15 2006 $96,297.13 2007 $108,312.13 2008 $113,979.58 2009 $91,349.51 2010 $103,467.55 * from Notices of Assessment Line 101 income. [ 140 ] Since 2010 Mr. Mew's pay stubs show $6,825.00 per month or about $82,000.00 for 2011. [ 141 ] With respect to his ability to continue to earn the high incomes he has been earning he explained that given his age and the stress of the matrimonial issues, he had been on stress leave for about six weeks and the doctor told him to cut back on his work. In the six months prior to the trial he had another stress leave.

He produced medical prescriptions that set out the requirement for him to reduce his workload and provided for short periods of leave. I note that I did not have a proper medical report that would confirm on an expert basis that he is suffering from depression. However, now that Mr. Mew is getting older, he cannot be expected to work the kinds of hours, including overtime, that he has been working up until recently. This will, of course, impact on his annual income and the spousal support that he must pay Ms.

Mew. [ 142 ] Nevertheless, a drop in his income from $118,000.00 to $82,000.00 for the balance of his working life appears to be rather a large amount. Therefore, I will set his income at about $100,000.00 for 2011 going forward to retirement. [ 143 ] In addition to his salary, he is renting the Blackfalds house he bought with the proceeds of a house he built in Blackfalds after the separation and paid for in part with his inheritance and sweat equity and in part with the proceeds of his share of the matrimonial property.

This property is, therefore, not property which we can include for the purpose of calculation of his income. The rent he is paid is $1275.00 per month and the expenses he incurs are $603.82. Therefore he is earning about $674 per month net income. I am not attributing the income he earns from the rental property because that would be “ double dipping ” . He is renting that property instead of living in it because of his new marriage. He is living at his new wife ’ s property.

If he is earning some income as a result of prudent investments, it would be unjust and “ double dipping ” to distribute some of that income to Ms. Mew. It is true, he is also benefiting from a new relationship and from exempt property. [ 144 ] Therefore, for the purpose of determining spousal support, I shall only take into account his Dow Chemical income which is set out above, and the income I have imputed to him of about $100,000.00 per year to retirement at age 60.

He is now 57 so it is reasonable for me to set his income at that amount for the purpose of spousal support payable to his age 60, so that neither party needs to return to court prior to his retirement.

b) Ms. Mew ’ s Income

[ 145 ] At the time of the separation Ms. Mew was working full time as an educational assistant for the Lacombe School Board.

I set out her income in the following table: Year Line 150 Explanation 2003 $26,723.00 Income**, WCB* 2004 $15,418.00 Mostly employment, WBC* 2005 $29,733.61 Employment, dividends, RRSPs* 2006 $28,294.00 Employment, dividends, RRSPs* 2007 $26,519.71 Spousal support, employment, miscellaneous 2008 $48,973.00 Spousal support, RRSP income, employment 2009 $24,000.00 Spousal support 2010 $31,113.00 Spousal support, RRSP income *did not show her spousal support on her income tax return. **of this amount, about $19,000.00 was employment income, the balance was WCB. [ 146 ] Her WCB payments in 2003 and 2004 were as a result of her injuring an ankle when she was supervising children on the playground as part of her employment as a teachers' assistant.

I can take it that her WCB payments were not more than she would have earned that year as a teachers' assistant. [ 147 ] I note that she was de-registering her RRSPs at some points since the separation. This is unfortunate because they will not be available for retirement. However, with the retroactive spousal support award, she will be able to replenish some of the RRSP monies and with prudent investments will have support for her retirement. [ 148 ] I set out below the calculations for the difference between what Mr.

Mew paid and what he should have paid using the SSAG as a guide for the years 2006 to the present. I have considered that Mr. Mew was taking responsibility for looking after the children in the first few years after separation. [ 149 ] Mr. Mew has made the following support payments since 2006: Year Total 2006 $11,975.00 2007 $21,500.00 2008 $24,000.00

2009 $24,000.00 2010 $24,000.00 Sub Total $105,475.00 [ 150 ] Taking into account the income of Ms. Mew imputed at $17,500.00 per year, and the lower end of the range calculated in the SSAG, Mr. Mew ought to have made the following support payments: Year Spousal Support 2006 $29,500.00 2007 $34,000.00 2008 $36,200.00 2009 $27,700.00 2010 $32,200.00 Total $159,600.00 [ 151 ] Given that Mr. Mew has paid $105,475.00 for the years 2006 to 2010 inclusive, and during that period he should have paid $159,600.00 from 2006 to the end of 2011, Mr. Mew therefore owes Ms.

Mew $54,125.00 in spousal support for the period up to December 31, 2010. Thereafter, Mr. Mew will pay spousal support monthly until he retires at the age of 60. The amount he must pay monthly for 2011 until his retirement is based on an income of $100,000.00 which takes into account the factors set out above. Therefore, he must pay $2,800.00 per month for 2011 and up to his retirement when his spousal support obligations cease. [ 152 ] Given that we are now in the month of August, and that Mr.

Mew is paying $2,000.00 per month for spousal support, he owes $3,200.00 in addition to the amount that he has paid for the year 2011 ($16,000.00). [ 153 ] His total spousal support arrears are, therefore $57,325.00. III. Conclusion [ 154 ] The Dow pension will be divided by the Dow pension authority as set out herein. [ 155 ] Mr. Mew owes Ms. Mew $57,325.00 in retroactive spousal support up to August 31, 2011. He shall pay Ms. Mew $2,800.00 per month in spousal support commencing 1 September 2011 and shall continue to pay her that until he reaches the age of 60 when the spousal support payments to Ms.

Mew will cease.

[ 156 ] Mr. Mew may apply to the Court of Queen ’ s Bench in Red Deer, Justice Bast, if he needs further direction concerning payment of the retroactive spousal support. [ 157 ] Given that the parties were self represented, there shall be no costs awarded, save for the cost of the expert which Mr. Mew shall share one-half of the cost of preparing the report and appearing at trial upon being presented with receipts from Ms. Mew. The expert was necessary for the court to understand the division of the Dow pension. Heard on the 13 th day of June, 2011.

Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 30 th day of August, 2011. A.B. Moen J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Edward Mew Self Represented Linda Mew Self Represented

________________________________________________ Corrigendum of the Memorandum of Decision of The Honourable Madam Justice A.B. Moen _______________________________________________________ In paragraph [139] $17,250.00 has been changed to $17,500.00. Mr. Mew ’ s income in the table at paragraph [139]

a) was changed from line 150 of his Notice of Assessment to line 101 and reads as follows: Year Gross Income* 2003 $80,902.17

2004 $94,042.37 2005 $99,129.15 2006 $96,297.13 2007 $108,312.13 2008 $113,979.58 2009 $91,349.51 2010 $103,467.55 * from Notices of Assessment Line 101 income. The support payment table at paragraph [150] was changed to read as follows: Year Spousal Support 2006 $29,500.00 2007 $34,000.00 2008 $36,200.00 2009 $27,700.00 2010 $32,200.00 Total $159,600.00 In paragraph [151], $171,500.00 was changed to $159,600.00 and $66,000.00 was changed to $54,125.00. In paragraphs [153] and [155] $69,200.00 was changed to $57,325.00.