University of Alberta v. Chang, 2011 ABQB 595

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: University of Alberta v. Chang, 2011 ABQB 595 Date: 20110930 Docket: 0303 15662, 0203 03831 Registry: Edmonton

Between: Action No. 0303 15662 The Governors of the University of Alberta Plaintiff (Respondent) - and - Lung-Ji Chang and AMDL Inc. Defendants (Lung-Ji Chang - Applicant) And Between: Action No. 0203 03831 Acuvector Group Inc. Plaintiff - and - Lung - Ji Chang, AMDL Inc., John Tkachuk, JGT Management Services Limited, Briana Bio-Tech Inc., and AMDL Canada Inc. Defendants - and - Lung - Ji Chang Plaintiff by Counterclaim - and - John A. Knebel, John A. Knebel Professional Corporation, Coolcadia Corporation, Neil Dunwald, Dunwald & Co. Ltd., Cheryl Knebel and Acuvector Group Inc. Defendants by Counterclaim

Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on January 5, 2012; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Donald Lee _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] In the mid-1990s, Dr. Chang, while working at the University of Alberta (“the U of A”) was involved with research, development and attempts to patent certain bio-technology to be used to treat cancer and other diseases. [ 2 ] As for marketing the technology, Dr.

Chang, aided by several other individuals and corporations, developed a plan to fund the development of the technology and market the technology. Part of the plan was to have a corporation, Acuvector Group Inc. (“Acuvector”), hold an exclusive licence over the technology. To facilitate this, Dr. Chang and Acuvector, entered into a Technology Transfer Agreement where Dr. Chang gave Acuvector an exclusive licence over the technology on conditions that Acuvector successfully raises certain minimum amounts of money for the technology's development by certain time lines.

It is submitted that Acuvector failed to meet these requirements and Dr. Chang properly terminated the Technology Transfer Agreement. [ 3 ] The University of Alberta was a shareholder in Acuvector and through a Relationship Agreement with Acuvector and Dr. Chang, allowed the technology to be licensed exclusively to Acuvector. The U of A's patent policy regarding employees gave it a right to 33.3% of the net profits generated by the patented technology.

There were other requirements under that policy, including an annual reporting requirement. [ 4 ] After the formal repudiation of the Technology Transfer Agreement by Dr. Chang, he then associated with AMDL, an American corporation, to raise the funds required to market this technology. AMDL has subsequently reorganized corporately and is now known as Radient Pharmaceuticals Corporation (“Radient”). [ 5 ] This present dispute arises out of the dissolution of the Technology Transfer Agreement and in particular concerns the rights and obligations of Dr. Chang and the U of A.

The U of A maintains that its patent policy still applies and Dr. Chang has violated that policy since the repudiation of the Technology Transfer Agreement. [ 6 ] Dr. Chang maintains that, upon repudiation of the Technology Transfer Agreement, he obtained full ownership and control over that technology as per the terms of the agreement and the Relationship Agreement with the U of A. He also maintains he made no net profit on his patents so, even if the patent policy applied, he would not owe the U of A any money. [ 7 ] The U of A filed a Statement of Claim against Dr. Chang and AMDL on August 29, 2003.

It obtained an order to serve Dr. Chang, now an American resident, and AMDL, an American corporation, ex juris . After the servis ex juris order was obtained, Dr. Chang was served by registered mail sent August 23, 2004. Dr. Chang filed his Statement of Defence on November 15, 2004.

[ 8 ] The U of A then filed its Affidavit of Records on January 11, 2005. Dr. Chang filed his Affidavit of Records on August 10, 2006. Since that date, nothing significant has happened on this matter. The U of A has done nothing on this file since January 11, 2005, and nothing of significance has happened on this file, done by either party, since August 10, 2006. [ 9 ] It is submitted that the defendant's memory has faded during this long period of delay. This delay has also caused the defendant to abandon some of his patents and has devalued others.

The money he has put into these patents to obtain and maintain them is a wasted expense because of this delay as patents only protect technology for a certain limited amount of time. [ 10 ] It is submitted that potential licensees of the defendant's patents have lost interest in investing or licensing the defendant's patents because of this lawsuit, and a related lawsuit with Acuvector. It is submitted that these lawsuits have had a chilling effect on the marketability of the technology. [ 11 ] The Applicant submits that the Court should use its discretion under Rule 4.31(

a) to dismiss the U of A action for delay. [ 12 ] It is noteworthy that the Rules of Court do not require that a “thing” be done by a plaintiff with respect to any particular party. In contrast, the Rules simply speak of the action being significantly advanced and as such, a “thing” could be done by any party to the litigation. [ 13 ] The Respondent the U of A argues that Rule 4.31 requires all of the following elements: (

a) an inordinate delay; (

b) an inexcusable delay; and (

c) a delay that is likely to cause serious prejudice to the applicant. [ 14 ] The Applicant must prove the presence of inordinate delay. Inordinate delay only occurs when there has been delay that is “much in excess of what was reasonable having regard to the issues in the Action and the circumstances of the case”. [ 15 ] The issues in this application are as follows: A. Have five or more years expired from the time the last thing was done in the Actions that materially advanced the Actions? B. Is there a standstill agreement in place to prevent the operation of Rules 4.33 and 15.4? C.

Has the delay been inordinate, inexcusable, and seriously prejudicial warranting dismissal of the Actions pursuant to Rule 4.31? D. Are the two Actions inextricably connected such that the U of A can rely on the things done in the AcuVector Action to argue that the U of A Action was also significantly advanced? The U of A’s Argument: Issue A: Rules 4.33 and 15.4 do not apply because 5 years have not expired

[ 16 ] Since the filing of a Statement of Defence is clearly a procedural litigation step required by the Rules of Court , such a filing by AcuVector on May 8, 2009 in response to the Counterclaim by Dr. Chang, it is submitted constitutes a thing that was done to significantly advance the AcuVector Action as well as the U of A Action due to the inextricable links that exist between the Actions. [ 17 ] It is submitted that the filing of an Affidavit of Records is clearly a procedural litigation step required by the Rules of Court , and therefore such filings by Dr.

Chang on August 10, 2006 in both Actions also constitute things that were done to significantly advance both Actions. [ 18 ] Both of the above procedural litigation steps were completed within the 5-year period immediately prior to the commencement of the current Applications in April of 2011 and therefore it is submitted five or more years have not expired since the time the last thing was done in the Actions that materially advanced the Actions Issue B: Rules 4.33 and 15.4 do not apply because a standstill agreement is in place [ 19 ] It is submitted that there is a standstill agreement in place to prevent the operation of Rule 4.33 and Rule 15.4.

The effective date of the standstill agreement is March 15, 2011 and the earliest that the 5-year period could have commenced is May 9, 2009 upon AcuVector filing its Statement of Defence to Dr. Chang's Counterclaim (or alternatively March 26, 2009 upon the filing of a Statement of Defence to Dr. Chang's Counterclaim on behalf of 4 of the other Defendants by Counterclaim in the AcuVector Action, or in the further alternative on August 10, 2006 upon the filing of Dr. Chang's Affidavit of Records).

In light of the fact that the standstill agreement was clearly in place before the expiry of any applicable delay-related limitation period, the Respondent submit that Rules 4.33 and 15.4 cannot be invoked. Issue C: The Actions should not be dismissed because there has been no delay which is inordinate, inexcusable and seriously prejudicial to the Applicant There has been no inordinate delay : [ 20 ] Several letters were sent to counsel for Radient which attempted to move the litigation forward by conducting Questioning of Radient's representative. [ 21 ] Mr.

Ariura confirmed that discussions regarding the costs owed to AcuVector by Radient as a result of the Security for Costs applications were taking place between counsel for AcuVector and counsel for Radient between May 2009 and February 2010. [ 22 ] The time during which the Security for Costs Application and subsequent Appeal brought by AMDL were being determined constituted a substantial portion of the period characterized as a delay.

Furthermore, the interaction between counsel for AcuVector and counsel for Radient with respect to costs following these interlocutory proceedings also accounted for a substantial portion of the alleged period of delay. [ 23 ] The Respondent has not demonstrated indifference with respect to the pursuit of their claims. Counsel for the Applicant did not respond to the written requests from counsel for the Respondent regarding Questioning dates and as a consequence, the Respondent proceeded to serve the Applicant’s counsel with Appointments in order to compel the attendance of Dr.

Chang and the corporate representative of Radient. [ 24 ] Questioning has not yet been scheduled or conducted in the Actions because the Applicant did not respond to the requests and subsequent demands made by counsel for the Respondent within the applicable 5-year time periods following:

(

a) the filing of AcuVector's Statement of Defence to the Counterclaim of Dr. Chang on May 8, 2009; or alternatively (

b) the filing of Dr. Chang's Affidavits of Records in both actions on August 10, 2006. [ 25 ] The Respondent the U of A submits that the Applicant should not be permitted to complain in light of the fact that they refused to cooperate with the Respondent in order to significantly advance the litigation. Any delay in the Actions is excusable : [ 26 ] Dr.

Chang admits that he was aware of the letters sent to his counsel on behalf of the U of A and AcuVector requesting his attendance for Questioning. [ 27 ] The Respondent made efforts to compel the attendance of the reluctant witnesses by sending written requests and serving the Applicant’s counsel with Appointments for Questioning within the applicable 5-year time frame for taking the next litigation step in both Actions. [ 28 ] Given that the cost issues associated with the Security for Costs applications were being addressed by counsel for AcuVector and counsel for Radient for a considerable portion of the alleged period of delay, such delay with respect to the main Actions is indeed reasonable as there was extensive communication between counsel during this time and a continuing expectation that both Actions would proceed. [ 29 ] The alleged delay in these actions is not in excess of what is reasonable given the circumstances and, as such, is neither inordinate nor inexcusable. [ 30 ] Alternatively, if the delay is found to be inordinate, such delay is excusable by virtue of the interlocutory matters that were being attended to during such period of delay in addition to the requests made by the Respondent to proceed with Questioning during this period.

Therefore, there ought to be no presumption of serious prejudice. The Applicant is not likely to suffer serious prejudice due to the delay : . [ 31 ] Mr. Ariura confirms that he had discussions with instrumental Radient officers and board members on at least a yearly basis. Mr. Ariura confirms that the documents in Radient's Affidavit of Records are still available to Radient to refresh its corporate memory. Mr. Ariura confirms that Radient has an ongoing relationship with its former CEO, Gary Dreher. Mr.

Ariura confirms that Radient has contact information for Gary Dreher and William Thomson and that they are both available and could be contacted. Therefore, the alleged loss of Radient's institutional memory is not substantiated. [ 32 ] Dr. Chang was unable to confirm that all of the documentation pertaining to the alleged debts incurred by him associated with the technology development had been produced. Therefore, his allegations of prejudice in this regard cannot be confirmed. [ 33 ] Furthermore, undertaking # 1 to “produce all documentation in Dr.

Chang's control or possession with respect to the debts incurred by him with respect to the technology subsequent to August 10, 2006” was subsequently refused. Likewise, Undertaking # 2 to

“provide documentation substantiating the debts that Dr. Chang has alleged were owing to Topex Corporation” was refused. Undertaking # 3 to “provide all documentation pertaining to Dr. Chang's patent maintenance fees with respect to the patents listed in paragraph 23 of his U of A affidavit” was also refused. In

summary, Dr. Chang's allegations of financial prejudice have not been substantiated. [ 34 ] Dr.

Chang also admits that the people that he considered to have become unavailable to him could be located. [ 35 ] The Respondent submits that both Applicants have failed to establish that they are likely to suffer serious prejudice as a result of the continuation of the Actions. [ 36 ] Since the alleged delay was not inordinate in any event, any alleged actual prejudice could not have occurred during a period of inordinate delay and ought not to be considered. [ 37 ] In response to Undertaking # 4 during the Questioning on Dr. Chang's Affidavit, Dr.

Chang provided copies of correspondence with potential licensees between 2003 and March 20, 2005. The Respondent submits that any potential prejudice, which is not conceded, that may have been endured by Dr. Chang as a result of potential licensees refraining from doing business with him, was endured, if at all, prior to any period of potentially inordinate delay. Dr. Chang has provided no other evidence of the timing of his discussions with potential licensees. Furthermore Dr. Chang's counsel concedes that Dr. Chang cannot be certain what actually caused potential licensees not to proceed with business dealings.

Therefore Dr.

Chang's allegations in this regard also lack substantiation. [ 38 ] The documents relative to both Actions remain available and the Applicant is at liberty to review the documentation contained in 3 separate and extensive Affidavits of Records in both Actions in order to refresh their respective memories as required. [ 39 ] All of the individuals who are relevant to both Actions, with the exception of one potential witness whose necessity is questionable, are still available to be contacted for information relative to both Actions. [ 40 ] Accordingly, the alleged delay in these actions does not warrant a dismissal of the Respondent’s claims against the Applicant pursuant to Rule 4.31.

Issue D: The Actions are inextricably connected and must proceed together [ 41 ] The filing of AcuVector's Statement of Defence to Dr. Chang's Counterclaim is a step thing that significantly advanced the AcuVector Action, and also the U of A Action due to the inextricable links that exist between both Actions. [ 42 ] The Actions must be characterized as inextricably linked due to the overlapping of parties, subject matter and time frames. [ 43 ] Mr. Ariura admits that both Actions relate to the same technology, that the time frames for both actions are overlapping, that Radient and Dr.

Chang are both defendants in both Actions, that the subject matter of both actions is the same and that the actions are very closely related. [ 44 ] During the Questioning on Affidavit of Lung-Ji Chang, counsel for Dr. Chang confirmed that the U of A Action and the AcuVector Action were closely related and that both actions should be heard together. Dr. Chang later concedes that both actions have correlated issues.

[ 45 ] The Actions are so inextricably linked that counsel for Dr. Chang has gone so far as to suggest that both Actions ought to be heard together. Furthermore, counsel for AcuVector made clear overtures to counsel for the Applicant with respect to the efficacy of having both companion Actions proceed simultaneously under case management. [ 46 ] Therefore it is submitted that the U of A can rely on a thing done in the AcuVector Action as being a thing that significantly advances the U of A Action as the issues are inextricably linked.

Moreover, the issues determined in either Action would be legally and factually determinative of the same substantive issues in the other Action as opposed to being merely practical matters, particularly if, as proposed, case management involving both Actions ultimately occurs. [ 47 ] For example, the effect of Dr. Chang's purported termination notice (as outlined in both of his Affidavits in relation to these Applications) will require simultaneous adjudication and will undoubtedly and significantly impact both Actions. Conclusion [ 48 ] The chronology of events relevant to this application is as follows: (

a) With respect to the AcuVector Action: (

i) On February 22, 2002, AcuVector filed its Statement of Claim; (ii) On June 6, 2002 Radient filed its Statement of Defence; (iii) On January 21, 2004 Radient filed its Affidavit of Records; (iv) On March 15, 2004 AcuVector filed its Affidavit of Records; (

v) On October 27, 2004 Radient's Application for Security for Costs was heard and the decision was filed on February 4, 2005; (vi) On May 11, 2005 Radient's Appeal of the dismissal of its Application for Security for Costs was heard and the decision was filed on June 8, 2005; (vii) On July 27, 2006, Dr. Chang filed his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim; (viii) On August 10, 2006, Dr. Chang filed his Affidavit of Records; (ix) On March 26, 2009, a Statement of Defence to the Counterclaim of Dr. Chang was filed on behalf of John A. Knebel, Cheryl Knebel, John A. Knebel Professional Corporation and Coolcadia Corp.; (

x) On May 8, 2009, AcuVector filed its Statement of Defence to the Counterclaim of Dr. Chang and counsel for AcuVector communicated its desire to

schedule examinations for discovery to counsel for the Applicant; (xi) Between May 15, 2009 and the filing of the Satisfaction Piece by counsel for Radient on February 18, 2010, counsel for the Respondent and counsel for Radient had discussions and exchanged several pieces of correspondence regarding the payment of costs by Radient to AcuVector in relation to the Security for Costs Application in 2004 and subsequent Appeal in 2005; (xii) On February 18, 2010, Counsel for Radient filed a Satisfaction Piece regarding the Order for Costs relating to the Security for Costs Application and Appeal; (xiii) On July 20, 2010, counsel for the Respondent made a written request for discovery dates from counsel for the Applicant; (xiv) On December 16, 2010, counsel for the Respondent reiterated the request for discovery dates to counsel for the Applicant; (xv) On March 4, 2011, counsel for the Respondent served counsel for the Applicant with Notices Appointments for Questioning in accordance with Rule 5.21 accompanied by the required allowances pursuant to Rule 6.17; (xvi) On April 20, 2011, Dr.

Chang filed his Application to dismiss both Actions for delay; and (xvii) On April 28, 2011, Radient filed its Application to dismiss both Actions for delay.

(

b) With respect to the U of A Action: (

i) On August 29, 2003, the U of A filed its Statement of Claim; (ii) On October 14, 2004, Radient filed its Statement of Defence; (iii) On November 15, 2004, Dr. Chang filed his Statement of Defence; (iv) On January 11, 2005 the U of A filed its Affidavit of Records; (

v) On January 13, 2005 Radient filed its Affidavit of Records; (vi) On August 10, 2006, Dr. Chang filed his Affidavit of Records; (vii) On December 16, 2010, counsel for the Respondent wrote to counsel for the Applicant requesting discovery dates; (viii) On March 15, 2011, counsel for the Respondent served counsel for the Applicant with Notices of Appointments for Questioning supplemental to the Notices served on March 4, 2011 with respect to the companion AcuVector Action; (ix) On April 20, 2011, Dr. Chang filed his Application to dismiss both Actions for delay; and (

x) On April 28, 2011, Radient filed its Application to dismiss both Actions for delay. [ 49 ] Rule 4.31 of the Alberta Rules of Court states: Application to deal with delay 4.31 If delay occurs in an action, on application the Court may

a) dismiss all or any part of a claim if the Court is satisfied that the delay has resulted in significant prejudice to a party, or

b) make a procedural order or any other order provided for by these rules. [ 50 ] This Rule was recently interpreted in case Brar v. Pawa , 2010 ABQB 779 (Master) . The Court held at paragraph 37 that while the new rule does not mention the same considerations that were taken into account under the old rule such as inordinate, inexcusable delay, the test for dismissing an action for want of prosecution under the old rules still applies to the new rule. [ 51 ] The legal test to be applied under the old rule 244 was outlined in the case Kuziw v.

Kucheran Estate , 2000 ABCA 226 , where at paragraph 25 the Court stated to succeed in an application to dismiss an action for want of prosecution, the applicant must show:

a) inordinate delay

b) which is inexcusable, and

c) likely to seriously prejudice the applicant. Inordinate Delay [ 52 ] Whether a delay is ‘inordinate’ is determined in light of all the circumstances of a particular case ( Kuziw para. 30 ). The

burden of proof to show a delay is inordinate is on the applicant. There is a large measure of judicial discretion when determining if adelay is inordinate (Kuziw para. 32). Though inordinate delay can be difficult to articulate with precision that does not mean it cannot bespotted when it exists (Kuziw para. 23). Inexcusable Delay [53] Once inordinate delay is made out, the natural inference is that such delay is inexcusable (Kuziw para. 23). A finding ofinordinate delay shifts the onus to the respondent to rebut the natural inference that inordinate delay is inexcusable by providing anexcuse.

Serious (or Significant) Prejudice [54] Under the old rule, there was a statutory presumption of serious prejudice whenever there was inordinate and inexcusabledelay, as the Court in Kuziw stated at paragraph 27: Rule 244(4) materially affects the onus on the defendant/applicant that existed under the old rule. Proof of inordinate and inexcusabledelay is in and of itself prima facie evidence of serious prejudice to the party that brought the application. Without more, the applicanthas proven its case. [55] The case Brar v.

Pawa is authority that the presumption of serious prejudice caused by inordinate and inexcusable delay ispreserved under the new rules and that such prejudice is sufficient in and of itself to have the action dismissed without evidence from therespondent to rebut the presumption. [56] The Court of Appeal in Volk v. 331323 Alberta Ltd. (1998), 1998 ABCA 54 , 212 A.R. 64 (C.A.) outlined the nature of this presumption at p.70: The new rule [244(4) of the old rules] does, however, create a form of presumption of serious prejudice to the applying party where theother party has been guilty of inordinate and inexcusable delay.

By sub-rule (4) such delay “is prima facie evidence of serious prejudice”.This does not shift the overall burden of proof. The applicant must still establish a likelihood of serious prejudice before the action willbe struck under this Rule. The presumption may lead to dismissal unless there is evidence that at least raises a legitimate doubt about theexistence of serious prejudice to the applicant attributable to the delay.

In the absence of such evidence, the delay alone is sufficientproof of serious prejudice to warrant dismissal for want of prosecution. [57] If the respondent is able to show sufficient evidence to bring a legitimate doubt as to the existence of serious prejudice causedby the delay, the appellant must show actual prejudice in light of all the evidence (Kuziw para. 50). [58] For actual prejudice to be found, it must be prejudice that occurred during the period of inordinate delay. Prejudice thatoccurred during time other than the inordinate delay cannot be considered (Brar para. 41, Ravvin Holdings Ltd v.

Ghitter, 2008 ABCA208 at para. 47). [59] Actual prejudice can take two forms. It can be prejudice that affects the ability of the applicant to defendant himself at trialsuch as lost witnesses, destroyed documents or faded memory. Prejudice can also be found collaterally in the difficulty a litigant has inconducting his affairs with an action hanging over his head (Kuziw para. 53).

[ 60 ] Fading memory can cause serious prejudice in cases with complicated fact patterns where the actual sequence of events can become convoluted over time ( Brar para. 43 ). Also, the Court in Cooke v. Calgary Civic Employees Benefit Society , [2003] A.J. No. 1725 (Alta Q.B.) noted at para. 32 that discoveries and the production of records do not necessarily record all events that may be relevant to trial and that the memory of the parties as to what actually happened in relation to the documented matters are still important.

Inordinate Delay [ 61 ] In the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff filed its Statement of Claim on August 29, 2003. This was served around late August 2004 by registered mail. On January 11, 2005, U of A filed its Affidavit of Records. It has taken no formal step to advance this litigation since January 11, 2005; or more than six years. It did request the defendant to file an Affidavit of Records, something that was done on August 10, 2006. Since that time, a period of 4 years and 9 months has passed and no further step has been taken to advance this litigation. I conclude that this is an inordinate delay.

Inexcusable Delay [ 62 ] If this delay is inordinate, the onus is on the respondent to prove that the delay was excusable. I conclude that the respondent is not capable of excusing this delay. Though this file is not overly simplistic and does involve several parties, this does not make it excusable to not take the basic steps required to advance all civil litigation such as arranging for examinations for discovery of the opposing parties. Serious Prejudice [ 63 ] If the delay is found to be inordinate and inexcusable, serious prejudice is presumed to have been incurred by the applicant.

This is a rebuttable presumption, but one that is strong enough in itself to have the action dismissed. The respondent then must show sufficient evidence to displace the presumption by raising a legitimate doubt of the existence of serious prejudice. If the respondent is able to do this, the applicant must then show actual prejudice in light of all the evidence. In addition to this rebuttable presumption, the applicant has evidence of actual prejudice incurred as a result of the inordinate delay. [ 64 ] For prejudice to be shown, it must be the result of the inordinate delay and not any other delay.

The prejudice can directly affect the applicant's ability to defend himself at trial or he could have suffered collateral prejudice such as economic or other prejudice. [ 65 ] In the present case, the applicant has a fading memory of the events described in the Statement of Claim. The complexity of this case makes it one where the sequence of events and conversations may become convoluted over time, despite the documentation that does exist in regard to the sequence of events that led to this dispute. The loss of this memory therefore is actual prejudice going to the ability of Dr.

Chang to defend himself at trial. [ 66 ] Also the applicant has suffered collateral prejudice. The dispute in this case deals with bio-technology protected by patents. Patents only protect technology for a limited amount of time, and it is vital for commercial success to develop that technology during the patent period.

The effect of this law suit on Dr. Chang is such that he has been unable to develop the technology he invented, and with the patent period down to only several years of protection remaining, he will be unable to develop this promising technology in a commercially viable manner. [ 67 ] Furthermore this prejudice occurred entirely during the periods of delay in this litigation. There was little time from the breakdown of the relationship regarding Dr. Chang and the plaintiff and the commencement of this lawsuit. There was no time for delay in that period to affect Dr.

Chang's memory or postpone the development of his patents. In fact, he very quickly found another source of funding to develop his patents with AMDL. Any prejudice that has occurred to Dr. Chang will almost exclusively be confined to the areas of inordinate and inexcusable delay which comprise most of the time that has passed between the breakdown of relations between the parties and the present time. Heard on the 20 th day of September, 2011. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 29 th day of September, 2011. Donald Lee J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Stephen G.

Parker, Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP for the Plaintiff (Respondent) University of Alberta Aron M. Bookman, Carfra & Lawton, Victoria, B.C. For the Defendant (Applicant) Dr. Chang _______________________________________________________ Corrigendum of the Reasons for Judgment of The Honourable Mr. Justice Donald Lee

_______________________________________________________ Please note that Docket No. 0203 03831 has been added to the first page, and the style of cause has been corrected to include this action.