M.E.L. (P.) v. B.J.L., 2011 ABQB 72

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: M.E.L. (P.) v. B.J.L., 2011 ABQB 72 Date: 20110211 Docket: 4803 137592 Registry: Edmonton Between: B. J. L. Applicant - and - M. E. L. (P.) Respondent _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Case Management Rulings of the Honourable Mr. Justice A.W. Germain _______________________________________________________ 1. Introduction [ 1 ] The parties are the parents of a nine-year old son born July 2001, and a seven-year old daughter born September 2003.

The parents, who at the time both lived in Edmonton, were divorced in 2008 following a trial conducted by Justice Hillier ( M.E.L. v. B.J.L. , 2008 ABQB 252 , 167 A.C.W.S. (3d) 725). In his Judgment, Justice Hillier concluded that it was in the best interests of the children that custody and the children’s primary care be with their mother [M.E.P., or Ms. P.], but that the father [B.J.L. or Mr. L.] have specified access (at paras. 32-36).

In January of 2010, in the context of a mobility application, I reviewed this issue again during a three day viva voce special application (oral reasons only, court order dated February 1, 2010).

[ 2 ] The history of the file shows many years of discord with numerous interlocutory applications. There have been two case management judges assigned to assist these parents - the Hon. Mme. Justice Read (prior to divorce) and myself (appointed during the mobility conflict).

The rulings in this written decision flow from a case management chambers application conducted on December 20, 2010, but generally incorporates pre-existing decisions and orders within a new “go forward” parenting order. [ 3 ] While acting under my case management mandate, in January 2010 I reviewed the issue of parenting in connection with the mother’s request to relocate to Valleyview, Alberta. I concluded that it was still in the best interest of the children that they continue to reside with their mother in Valleyview.

To ameliorate the effect of the increased distance between the father and the children, I made an order that required the mother to transport the children to Edmonton the third weekend of every month. The passage of time has revealed that this visitation arrangement has not been followed. Since February 2010, when I made my mobility order, Mr. L. has only seen his children twice, first over the May long weekend in 2010, and the second occasion during the Christmas period of 2010.

He has elected not to attend in Valleyview to see the children, nor take them for summer access. [ 4 ] Taking into account the frequency with which the parties have historically litigated, I have previously ordered that these parents could no longer access the courts on these matters without prior approval. Succinctly, Mr. L. has been difficult to deal with, and he has not accepted my ruling that the children live with their mother in Valleyview.

His conduct, which I will describe later in greater detail, has led to a written request directing that he not contact the courthouse other than in writing. [ 5 ] In November of 2010, Mr. L. approached the court (in writing) and requested permission to apply to cite Ms. P., the mother, in contempt of court for failing to comply with the court ordered structure for his access to the children. Correspondingly, Ms. P. was granted leave to make her requests for changes to the parenting order. [ 6 ] Following on the November 2010 correspondence, Mr.

L. has requested the following relief that: 1. the court cite the mother in contempt for her failure to:

a) bring the children to Edmonton as contemplated by my initial parenting order,

b) have the children call their father on a regular basis,

c) send Mr. L. the children’s report cards and health information, and

d) most recently turn over the children to the father on December 17 at the start his Christmas access; 2. both sets of grandparents have only supervised access to the children; 3. he receive a maintenance holiday for the months of July, August and December on the basis that his access is the equivalent of shared parenting for those months; 4. the report cards and school

schedule for the children be directly sent to the father by the school; 5. the children’s doctor and dentist report directly to the father; 6. the children’s school be ordered to allow the father to stop in at the school to say “hi” to his children at anytime; and

7. Ms. P. subscribe to a telephone service with voice mail so Mr. L. may leave messages. [ 7 ] In addition, Mr. L. asked that the court consolidate all of the various orders now in effect relate to parenting and access. That would include Justice Hillier’s original divorce trial judgment and my various subsequent orders. Ms. P. agrees that this would be a good idea and I have therefore determined that I will consolidate all orders into one go forward document. As neither party are represented by legal counsel the court assumes responsibility for composing this order. [ 8 ] Ms.

P. also seeks a number of directions from the court, specifically: 1. a preliminary ruling that only the contempt motion be dealt with at this time, 2. an order that the communication between the parties occur by e-mail, 3. that Ms. P at all times have the address where Mr. L. and the children will stay on access visits, and 4. that Ms. P. be relieved from the obligation to take the children to Edmonton. 2. Discussion and Case Management Rulings A. Preliminary ruling to limit the scope of Mr. L.’s application [ 9 ] Mr. L. received permission to apply that this court cite Ms.

P. in contempt for her failure to bring the children to Edmonton. Obviously, his notice of motion has expanded his prayer for relief beyond that scope. [ 10 ] While Ms. P. is technically correct in her preliminary application to ‘sever’ the contempt matter, I nevertheless have concluded that all issues raised by both parents should be addressed at this point. On November 1, 2010, Alberta brought into force a new Rules of Court ( Alta. Reg. 124/2010 ), and those rules include a number of “Foundational Rules”, general guiding principles.

One of these is that litigation should be conducted in a way that is cost effective: 1.2(1) The purpose of these rules is to provide a means by which claims can be fairly and justly resolved in or by a court process in a timely and cost effective way .

(2) In particular, these rules are intended to be used ... (

b) to facilitate the quickest means of resolving a claim at the least expense ... [Emphasis added.] [ 11 ] Rather than restrict Mr. L. in his relief I allowed him to argue all of his points as I believe that is the most efficient use of both the parties’ and court’s time. Therefore I will rule on all of each parent’s requests.

B. Consolidation of all prior orders [ 12 ] Both Justice Hillier’s divorce judgment of 2008 and my initial court order on the issue of mobility (dated February 1, 2010) indicated that Ms. P. would be the sole custodian of the children and would control the day-to-day parenting of the children. Their father would have specified access. Even though the parties are in complete disagreement as to how access should be structured and their ability to communicate with one another is nonexistent, the previous assignment of parental roles by Justice Hillier and myself remains in effect.

That said, a more detailed order is clearly necessary. I propose to attach that more detailed and consolidated order to these reasons. I hope that will result in more certainty, if not more happiness. [ 13 ] Some additional background is necessary to put the consolidated order in context. Ms. P. located to Valleyview in the spring of 2009 without the consent or approval of the court, and contrary to the judgment of Justice Hillier (para 35).

During the summer of 2009 there were numerous applications, and an expectation that a mobility hearing would occur either in the summer of 2009 or the early fall. [ 14 ] Parenting was not an issue in the summer of 2009 because the parents shared access during the summer months. Mr. L. had the last access cycle in late August 2009 and at that time enrolled the children in an Edmonton school. Alberta Children and Youth Services [“ACYS”] intervened in the file and Counsel for ACYS raised potential concerns on the fitness of both parents.

Coincidentally, in late September of 2009, the divorce trial judge, Justice Hillier, made an interim order which allowed the children to reside (on an interim basis) with their father pending the mobility hearing. That interim order thus did not follow the custody arrangement in the divorce judgment. [ 15 ] The mobility hearing was scheduled for November but only one half day was allowed. It rapidly became apparent that the number of issues between the parties were expanding rather than contracting, and that more time would be required.

Also, involvement of a professional psychologist was planned, and that psychologist would do an assessment of the parties. Further, Mr. L. was insisting on entering viva voce evidence. [ 16 ] It was at that point that I was appointed the second case manager. The earliest time we could get for a three-day viva voce hearing was early January 2010.

Thus, although both Justice Hillier’s initial trial decision and my mobility decision ruled that the children would reside with their mother, in fact at the actual time of the mobility hearing the children were residing with their father, and had done so for several months. During that period their mother exercised extensive access. [ 17 ] My initial mobility oral judgment led to a court order which was hastily crafted internally at the court, and which recognized that there was going to be a change of day-to-day parenting (back to the mother), in the middle of the school year.

I did not have confidence about how Mr. L. would react to the new arrangement. Some of the comments and concepts I expressed in my oral judgment did not make their way into the formal order and when these issues were brought to my attention I made the necessary corrections by way of amending order or supplemental order. [ 18 ] A case management judge does not have the same role as the trial judge. I have an ongoing relationship with the parties as the court attempts to referee their dispute on access and parenting. I emphasize that at no time did the underlying concept of my orders change: Ms.

P. was granted custody and day-to-day parenting of these children in Valleyview, and Mr. L. was to have access. On communication a number of arrangements were proposed and attempted; some did not work, and alternatives have been followed. [ 19 ] Likewise, the order that is released with these reasons will not be exactly the same as the previous orders it replaces but the new consolidated order will maintain the anchor principles; that the children are to live on a day-to-day basis with their mother in Valleyview, who will have sole custody, and the father is to have specified access.

If the concepts expressed in this subsequent order do not serve all needs then the parties may contact me and arrange another case management conference. C. Supervised visits by the grandparents [ 20 ] Mr. L. asserts that the grandparents should not have unsupervised access to their grandchildren. The maternal grandparents live in the area of Valleyview and are close to the children. Mr. L.’s primary target appears to be his ex-father in law. Mr. L. alleges that Ms. P.’s father has threatened him and that Ms. P. was sexually assaulted by her father.

[ 21 ] During the three-day mobility hearing, I noticed that Ms. P.’s father attended in court to support his daughter and maintained a calm composure despite the fact that Mr. L. was making these very allegations. These allegations are denied completely by the mother, Ms. P. The suggestion that all grandparents, which I note includes Mr. L.’s own parents, should be supervised during their visits with these children is without merit or evidentiary foundation. The application to restrict visits by the grandparents is dismissed without further comment. D.

Reduction of maintenance during July and August and December, 2010 [ 22 ] Under the current access scheme, Mr. L. will have the children for 50% of the time when the children are not in school, specifically in July and August. In December the 10 to 14 days of Christmas Break were evenly split 50-50 between the parents. Mr. L. would have the children for only 25% of December. That is a total of five weeks custody, per year. [ 23 ] The law in Canada is not that child-support obligations cease or are reduced simply whenever both parents have equal access to a child.

In the case of a true shared parenting arrangement some accommodation in child support is often made but even that is dependent on the means and circumstances of the parents and not guaranteed. [ 24 ] The discretionary character of child support under a ‘shared’ parenting arrangement was examined in Contino v. Leonelli-Contino , 2005 SCC 63 , [2005] 3 S.C.R. 217. Where child support is shared there is not automatic reduction in a child support obligation, instead a different analysis is applied (para. 30).

Further, “... there is no presumption in favour of reducing the parent’s child support obligation downward from the Guidelines amount ...” (at para. 31). Most relevant, however, is simply the manner in which the shared parenting threshold is calculated. The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the lower court

interpretation of the Federal Child Support Guidelines , SOR/97-175, s. 9 threshold for where shared parenting exists: Where a spouse exercises a right of access to, or has physical custody of, a child for not less than 40 per cent of the time over the course of a year , ... [ 25 ] If access goes well Mr.

L. will have care of the children in total for at most five weeks in 2011. [Virtually none in 2010.] That does not meet the 40% per year threshold specified by Federal Child Support Guidelines , s. 9. [ 26 ] Furthermore, any reduction in child support should account for the mother’s fixed costs, which I note would continue throughout the year. Duplication of child support costs is a reason to not reduce child support obligations in a shared parent arrangement: Contino v. Leonelli-Contino , para. 78 . Mr.

L.’s application for a reduction in support for the periods of July, August, and December, where he has more access time projected, is therefore dismissed. E. A request for a direction allowing visitations at the school [ 27 ] Mr. L. is said to have had an awkward encounter at his children’s school in Valleyview. There is no real evidence to this regard before me however I do put on the record that my assistant reported receiving a call from the Superintendent of the Schools in Valleyview, who was concerned about Mr.

L.’s conduct when he unexpectedly approached the school to see his son. [ 28 ] Generally my experience has been that schools react respectfully to a parent if the school is approached with respect. Neither the school these children attend nor the relevant School Board have been made a party to this litigation. I believe that the school or its Board are within their prerogative to bar Mr. L. from the school grounds due to his disruptive behaviour if they conclude that is necessary.

It is not the role of the courts to on an ex-parte basis supervise how schools relate to parents. [ 29 ] However, to the extent it is of assistance to Mr. L., I make clear that nothing in my order prevents him from visiting the school the children attend, during whatever periods of time that are permitted by the school, provided that Mr. L. complies with the

school’s rules of order and civility. I intend to continue in the court order the requirement that Ms. P. send copies of school reports concerning the children to Mr. L. F. A request for an order compelling doctors and dentists to report to Mr. L. [ 30 ] Mr. L. wants an order that the doctors and dentists who treat his children, be obliged to report to him on medical and dental treatment. Those persons are also not part of this litigation and I take judicial notice that doctors and dentists do not provide treatment reports and information without cost. [ 31 ] That said, I intend to positively direct Ms. P. to periodically supply Mr. L. a medical or dental

summary by way of an informational report, for both children. That report should include any mental health issues that emerge. G. Communication between parents [ 32 ] Mr. L. strongly objects to the parents communication by e-mail or in writing, and resists any such direction. He wants to be able to phone his ex-wife, so that they can discuss parenting issues and arrange access. Justice Hillier also noted the communication problem between these parents and directed all communication by e-mail [para 45]. Ms. P. opposes a telephone-based communication scheme and wants all communication to be in writing. Ms.

P. does not have a fax machine and does not own a cell phone. If from time to time she travels with a cell phone, one presumes that is because she has been lent a cell phone to offset the risk of the highway drive from Valleyview to Edmonton. [ 33 ] I will take judicial notice of the fact that although the highway from Valleyview to Edmonton is a divided highway, it is a highway in a portion of the province which has a high number of incidents of vehicle/wildlife encounters.

One must be particularly cautious on that road at all times, but particular in the evening and in winter conditions. [ 34 ] Frankly, the court understands Ms. P.’s preference. The court too has had to restrict Mr. L. from phoning the courthouse. His telephone calls have been to make demands, and he has expressed his anger about the court’s handling of the case in a loud, argumentative, and volatile way. Even his written correspondence is often rude, belligerent, and occasionally incoherent. Communications with Mr.

L. using any medium are always argumentative. [ 35 ] At the previous mobility hearing, this most recent hearing, and in her submissions, Ms. P. indicates that she simply does not want to talk to Mr. L. They have been divorced for several years. Their relationship was characterized as a stormy one, and Mr. L. has exhibited poor judgment and engaged in inflammatory rhetoric, so that I understand Ms. P.’s wish that future communication be in writing. [ 36 ] On this point I also note that Mr. L.’s position is inconsistent. For example, he indicates that he is unable to reach Ms.

P. on the phone to request access opportunity. However, those allegedly failed communications are not readily documented. If he were to accept the Court’s suggestion that he communicate by e-mail, he can obtain a more readily reviewed and reliable record. [ 37 ] Communication by phone has not worked. Therefore, I conclude that the better approach would be to go to a system where Ms. P. is entitled to notification, in writing, by e-mail. Mr. L. indicates he will not communicate with Ms. P. in writing by e-mail, in which case he will not see his children due to his stubbornness. Mr.

L. has satisfied me that he is computer literate, he has access to a computer, he can create a unique e-mail address for communication with Ms. P., and he can provide that e-mail address to his ex-spouse so that communications from that address will not be blocked. My ruling is consistent with that of the initial trial judge. [ 38 ] In addition, to deal with his concern that his ex-wife will block his e-mail, he may send a courtesy copy of his e-mails to my assistant, and my assistant will forward those messages on to Ms. P.

I should express in writing in this case management ruling that, we as a court, have had no difficulty communicating with Ms. P., and her e-mails are always polite, courteous, and informative. Further, although Mr. L. imputes false motives and bad faith to Ms. P., she has constantly expressed the desire to have their children see their father. Her handling of the late request for Christmas access in 2010 (which I discuss below) constituted concrete evidence of her willingness to allow Mr. L. access as long as she does not have to listen to him hector and badger her on the phone.

[ 39 ] I turn now to deal with Mr. L.’s request that his former wife be cited in contempt and her corresponding request that she be relieved of the obligation to drive the children into Edmonton on the third weekend of each month. H. Contempt application [ 40 ] Ms. P. admits that since the court order of January 2010 Mr. L. has only had weekend access to his children once. That visit occurred on the May long weekend. [ 41 ] Since Mr. L. has not had access to the children on the third weekend of each month for any month since my initial order, with the exception of the May long weekend, on first blush Ms.

P. would appear to be in contempt of court. However, Ms. P. states on the record that she supports access to the children by their father but explains that she does not want to speak to Mr. L. because of her history having being the subject of verbal abuse by him. The court has experienced some of that conduct first-hand. [ 42 ] In his stubborn, unbending fashion, although Mr. L. is technically able to communicate by e-mail he will not do so.

In various case management letters sent to him, I have encouraged this approach to create an evidentiary track and allow me to see in writing whether one or both of the parents are being reasonable and unreasonable. I conclude that Mr. L. wishes to use the phone to continue to intimidate, harass, and abuse his ex-wife. That objective simply conveniently fits with his role as an aggrieved parent being denied access. It is instructional to note that Mr. L. has never exercised his right to access on the first weekend of every month. He has to pay the transportation costs associated with that access. Further, Mr.

L. gave no evidence of any other attempt to meet his children in Valleyview, except for the aborted attempt at the schoolyard (see para. 27 of this judgment) and on Friday, December 17 when he was driving through Valleyview and proposed to pick up his children in his work truck to start his Christmas access period. [ 43 ] Ms. P., gives us a full explanation for all of these alleged contempts. For the months of February, March, and April, she did attend with the children at the drop-off point in Edmonton only to have to go back home with the children because Mr. L. did not appear.

She indicates he simply will not e-mail her to confirm his intention to be at the drop-off / pick-up point and therefore she is reluctant to embark on a road trip which is over three hours each way without confirmation from Mr. L. In short, she says that she did not drive the children into Edmonton because Mr. L. did not confirm with her that he would be at the pick-up point to receive them. As that arrangement is a condition for Mr. L.’s access, this explanation is a reasonable excuse. [ 44 ] Ms.

P.’s explanation could logically be true and it would be wrong to hold anybody in contempt for what they believe is a proper compliance with a court order. That said, I am highly suspicious that Ms. P., who I conclude is greatly distressed by Mr. L.’s calls, may have simply avoided receipt of his calls or any call she suspects is from him. [ 45 ] Issues arose in relation to the Christmas access in 2010 which post-dated the materials filed for the December application. In their submissions before me on December 20 I was led to believe that Mr.

L. simply drove through Valleyview as part of his job on December 17, and that he expected the children to be at the drop-off point even though no prior arrangements had been made. Mr. L. attempted to engage the police at that time but they did not participate. Mr. L. subsequently raised this issue with me on December 20. [ 46 ] Ms. P.’s oral explanation at that hearing was not made under oath, as her affidavit had already been filed. She said that once again no communication had been received from Mr. L., and she was not prepared to immediately turn over the children simply because Mr.

L. had arrived, without any previous announcement or agreement on the transfer. However, at the oral hearing on December 20 Ms. P. again reaffirmed that she would allow Christmas access. She recognized it was Mr. L.’s turn for Christmas access. Her request was that she should not have to do any driving. [ 47 ] Mr. L. took a position in open court on December 20, 2010 that he would not drive to Valleyview to pick up his children for Christmas. That appeared to end the Christmas access issue, as there is no order in effect that compels Ms. P. to drive the children for the Christmas access.

I therefore advised the parties that I would issue this judgment in January and would not be making an interim Christmas order.

[ 48 ] Surprisingly, on December 21, Mr. L. indicated in writing to the court that he could go to Valleyview on Christmas Eve (December 24) to pick up his children and when I contacted Ms. P. through my judicial assistant, on December 21 2010, she graciously agreed to a Christmas visit as long as the pre-existing condition that Mr. L. both pick up and deliver the children remained in effect. This showed a generosity of spirit and a reasonableness on the part of Ms. P. which I found refreshing, as it was open for her to say that Mr.

L. had his chance to ask for Christmas access in open court but stubbornly refused. [ 49 ] Following the Christmas access Mr. L. wrote to me criticising the court for referring to the Christmas access order as a negotiated one, as he did not agree with the ordered obligation that he do all the driving. Mr. L. reaffirmed that he did not agree to communicate in e-mail if he had to return the children early. It was negotiated in the sense that we made a proposal to Ms. P., on behalf of Mr. L., to allow late access and she agreed! Mr.

L. did not get all that he requested, but one rarely does in a negotiation. [ 50 ] Although I remain suspicious that Ms. P. has deliberately attempted to circumvent the court order by limiting her availability to Mr. L. by telephone, I am unable to find that Mr. L. has proven this on a balance of probabilities and therefore the contempt application is dismissed. I. A continued obligation on Ms. P. to drive the children to be with their father [ 51 ] In court on December 20 Mr. L. asserted that he wants access to his children, but that for that access Ms. P. will do all the driving to and from Valleyview.

That requirement was certainly never contemplated in Justice Hillier’s order, although that issue was less relevant due to the fact that both parties then lived in Edmonton. Nor, when I issued the mobility order, did I contemplate that Ms. P. would do all the driving. Ms. P. did have a limited requirement to drive the children to Edmonton to see their father the third weekend of each month, but that obligation was conditional on proper communication to ensure that Mr. L. would be ready at the pick-up point. [ 52 ] Turning first to Mr. L.’s demand that all of his access requires Ms.

P. transport the children, that requirement is simply neither practical nor warranted. Mr. L. has a driver’s license, in fact he drives a truck for a living. He has been observed by Ms. P. to have access to a vehicle, although he denies ownership of any vehicle. Mr. L. is certainly able to access a vehicle when it is important to him because he enjoyed Christmas access with his children and arranged for the driving both ways. He pays relatively little maintenance and no spousal support in part because of employment issues. He has extensive maintenance arrears.

He has recently taken on another obligation by fathering another child; on December 20 he advised the court that he has entered into a relationship with another woman and his new child. There is simply no basis for me to expand Ms. P.’s obligation to provide transportation so that Mr. L. can access his children. [ 53 ] It was contemplated by me in the mobility application that Ms. P. would take on the burden to drive the children to Edmonton the third weekend of each month. In making that direction I was attempting to create a reasonable accommodation for the fact that Ms.

L. had relocated and that development put a substantial distance between Mr. L. and his children. That third weekend arrangement is the full extent of Ms. P.’s obligations to provide transportation for the children. Christmas and summer access were never anticipated to be a part of the mother’s obligations. To make this arrangement clear the new order will explicitly indicate that Ms. P. must transport the children to Edmonton on the third weekend in January, February, March, April, May, June, September, October and November.

In short, out of a 12 month period, she will have to drive the children into Edmonton the third weekend of each of those nine months. [ 54 ] Ms. P. urges me to relieve her of that obligation. In fact, due to circumstances which she says were triggered by Mr. L., she has had the obligation of effectively turning the children over to their father only once. On three other occasions she has made that attempt without success. The initial order from the mobility hearing was that Ms.

P. would be responsible for some of the transportation cost; that plan was based on several factors including her willingness to do so as a compromise. Ms. P. made that offer orally in court and explained there was an ongoing requirement that she might have frequent business in Edmonton, as the oldest child was seeing a counsellor and there was some expectation that this counselling would continue. Ms. P. also acknowledged she had a general requirement from time to time to go to Edmonton for shopping and other business purposes. Now, Ms.

P. cites economic hardship and indicates that the monthly commute concept has not worked, and asks it be discontinued. [ 55 ] In fairness to Mr. L., the concept has not been adequately tried as there have been “bugs” in the proposal that made it difficult for both parties. Again, this revolves around communication and while we want to look forward in this case, it bears again repeating that I view Mr. L. as the author of many of the communication problems. Ms.

P.’s application to be relieved of her responsibility to drive the children to Edmonton the third weekend of each month is dismissed, but the order by which she is obliged to drive them will be changed. The new arrangement will hopefully be an improvement and reduce communication conflict.

[ 56 ] Therefore, on a go forward basis for the third weekend of each month access, Mr. L. must notify Ms. P. in writing no later than 5:00 P.M. on Thursday at her e-mail address to confirm that he will be at the pick-up point in Edmonton to receive his children the following day. Ms. P. may not block his e-mail address and Mr. L. will provide an e-mail address to the court for these communications. The court will forward that e-mail on to Ms. P. [ 57 ] If Mr. L., has indicated that he will be present to receive the children and he fails to attend to pick up the children then Ms.

P. is not required to drive the children the next month. In short, if Mr. L. forces Ms. P. to drive the children into Edmonton and their father is not at the pick-up point to receive them, as set out in the formal order, then for the next following month Mr. L will only enjoy access on the third weekend of the month if he attends in Valleyview and picks up the children. Further, recognizing the maintenance paid by Mr. L. is not adequate to properly fund all the children’s needs, it is clear that Ms.

P. is disproportionately shouldering the cost of care of these children by living in a lower-cost community and having available some indirect assistance from her parents. As a result, for those months where Ms. P., drives the children to Edmonton, the cost of that travel, up to a maximum of $150 per visit, will be treated as a

section 7 expense. [ 58 ] Additionally, as previously ordered, if Mr. L. relieves Ms. P. of the burden of transportation on the third weekend of any month by himself picking up the children in Valleyview he will receive a reduction in his child support by $150 per month, applied against the arrears. Finally, as previously ordered, if inclement or dangerous weather conditions make the drive to Edmonton from Valleyview unsafe, then the access will take place the next weekend. [ 59 ] In

summary, Ms. P.’s application to end her obligation to drive the children to Edmonton the third weekend of each month is dismissed. However, to relieve the stress caused to Ms. P. by her contact with Mr. L., Mr. L. will have to take the initiative to communicate by e-mail to Ms. P. He has adamantly stated that he will never do this and, if so, Ms. P. will never have to drive the children to Edmonton. [ 60 ] It is not my intention that this driving obligation continue indefinitely and I therefore grant Ms. P. leave to bring on an application to revisit this obligation in December of 2011.

By that time, another year will have gone by, Mr. L. may well be in better financial circumstances, and the children will be one year older. Perhaps there may be other options available for access. J. Has Ms. P. been in contempt of providing reports and other information? [ 61 ] Mr. L. alleges Ms. P. has ignored the court’s order that she supply Mr. L. with reports about his children. Therefore, Mr. L. must prove that allegation on a balance of probabilities. Ms. P. has indicated that she mailed report letters to Mr. L. and they came back unclaimed. Mr.

L. refuses to provide an e-mail address where he may receive e-mail reports. In the absence of the necessary evidence Mr. L. has not proven on a balance of probabilities that Ms. P. breached this provision and therefore Mr. L.’s application to have Ms. P. cited in contempt on this ground is also dismissed. To again assist the parties in communication Mr. L. will have to get an e-mail address and on a go forward basis Ms. P. will be directed in the revised order to continue to report in writing to Mr. L.’s e-mail address. K. Information to be supplied by Mr. L. [ 62 ] At the case management meeting Mr.

L. indicated that he has formed an attachment with another woman and is now the father of another child. It is reasonable for Ms. P. to have full information on the identity of the woman who will be assisting Mr. L. in caring for his children and the address at which the children will stay when they are with their father. [ 63 ] When questioned about this matter at the case management meeting, Mr. L. advised that his name is not on any lease and that the only evidence he might have to prove he lives anywhere is the mailing address for his phone bill.

He does, however, admit that he received the letter sent to him by Ms. P. which contained her affidavit for this application. It is not unreasonable for the guardian and primary parent of these children to know where the children are and with whom they are residing. Therefore, on a go forward basis, a condition for Mr. L. to exercise any access is that he provides the following to Ms. L.: 1. a copy of the lease for the residential premises in Edmonton in which he resides,

2. a confirmation in writing signed by the tenant that Mr. L. resides with the tenant, 3. the phone number of any land line at the premise, and 4. an e-mail address. These requirements are to provide Ms. P. peace of mind as she will continue to drop off the children in a public location and pick them up at that location. This information will also assist the police in their investigations if either parent breaches the order. 3. Conclusion [ 64 ] At the request of the parties the parenting structure created in part by the order of Mr.

Justice Hillier and by the various orders of the case management process are consolidated in one new parenting order which will be filed and delivered to the parties. The new parenting order reconfirms the previous parenting arrangement of February 2010, but modifies and streamlines communication issues and is proactive in attempting to head off future disputes. Mr. L.’s application to cite Ms. P. in contempt is dismissed as is Ms. P.’s application to end her obligation to transport the children to Edmonton on the third weekend of each month. 4.

Collateral Orders [ 65 ] Neither party will file any further applications relating to their parenting issues and responsibilities without the consent of either the case management justice, or in his absence the Associate Chief Justice of Alberta, or in both their absences, the family law supervisor Justice Read. Mr. L. is prohibited from contacting the courthouse other than in writing which may be faxed to a phone number, or e-mailed to Justice Germain’s assistant. The appropriate e-mail address and fax number will be supplied to the parties by letter. 5.

Costs [ 66 ] The parties represented themselves, and as the success between the parties was mixed no costs are ordered against either party. Heard on the 20 th day of December, 2010. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 17 th day of January, 2011. A.W. Germain J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances: M. E. L. (P.) Appeared on her own behalf B. J. L. Appeared on his own behalf