Gould v Gould, 2012 ABQB 403

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: Gould v Gould, 2012 ABQB 403 Date: 20120619 Docket: 4803 143974 Registry: Edmonton Between: Omer Roderick Gould Plaintiff (Defendant by Counterclaim) - and - Christine Marie Gould Defendant (Plaintiff by Counterclaim) Editorial Notice: On behalf of the Government of Alberta personal data identifiers have been removed from this unofficial electronic version of the judgment. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Eric F. Macklin _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction

[ 1 ] The Plaintiff father seeks shared custody of his three daughters who have been in the primary residential care of the Defendant mother since June 2008. The Defendant mother seeks an equal division of matrimonial property, retroactive and ongoing spousal support and retroactive and ongoing child support. II. Background [ 2 ] The Defendant met the Plaintiff in 1986 when she was 18 years old and he was 23. They began living together that year.

They married on June 30, 1992 and together had three daughters: • Gabrielle Rose Gould, born on [...], 1994; • Ginette Demi Gould, born on [...], 1997; • Guylaine Celine Gould, born on [...], 1998. [ 3 ] On April 1, 2007, the parties separated. However, they both remained in the matrimonial home until October 1, 2007. During the period of separation prior to October, the Defendant lived in the basement of the home. [ 4 ] After she moved out of the matrimonial home in October 2007, the Defendant resided for two months in a basement suite. She then moved to a townhouse in St.

Albert where she still resides with her three daughters. [ 5 ] On March 13, 2008, Justice Nielsen granted an interim order requiring the Plaintiff to pay child support to the Defendant in the sum of $1,355 per month commencing on April 1, 2008 together with a proportionate share of s. 7 expenses. Justice Nielsen further ordered the Plaintiff to pay spousal support to the Defendant in the sum of $500 per month commencing on April 1, 2008. [ 6 ] The Plaintiff continued to reside in the matrimonial home until it was sold in October 2009.

He is currently renting a one bedroom basement suite and lives alone. [ 7 ] On February 16, 2010, Justice Thomas granted a further interim order varying part of the Order of Justice Nielsen. Justice Thomas ordered the Plaintiff to pay child support to the Defendant in the sum of $1,540 per month commencing on January 1, 2010 and set the arrears for child and spousal support based on the amounts ordered by Justice Nielsen and then varied by Justice Thomas. [ 8 ] The parties were divorced on January 10, 2011. III. Discussion A.

Custody and Parenting Time [ 9 ] When the Defendant moved out of the matrimonial home in October 2007, the parties signed a written agreement respecting custody of the three children. The document was prepared by the parties and signed by them on October 3, 2007. The document provides that they “ agree to joint custody of their three children... ” . It also provides that custody will be shared on a seven-day rotating

schedule and the parties would jointly pay for the children ’ s needs. It further provides that there would be “ no child support paid ” to either parent. [ 10 ] The parties did share custody of their three daughters on a seven-day rotating

schedule until December 11, 2007. On that day, the Plaintiff had custody of the three children. There was a dispute between the Plaintiff and his oldest daughter which ultimately resulted in the oldest child going to live with the Defendant mother on a permanent basis.

[ 11 ] In June 2008, the Defendant ’ s mother passed away and she contacted the Plaintiff to request a temporary change to the custody agreement to allow the two younger girls to remain with her until the funeral.

When it came time again for the Plaintiff to have custody of the two, he asked the Defendant if she would care for the girls over the summer as he was working and had no one to watch them. [ 12 ] In September 2008, the Defendant called the Plaintiff and suggested an alternative custody arrangement whereby the girls would stay with her during the week to facilitate their attendance at school and they would stay with the Plaintiff on weekends. He agreed.

Notwithstanding this agreement, the Plaintiff made no arrangements to pick up the children on the weekends and they did not voluntarily go to his home. [ 13 ] Since December 2007, the Plaintiff has had very little parenting time with the eldest daughter.

She did attend at his brother ’ s funeral in New Brunswick in 2011 where there was some time spent together but other than that occasion, there has been very little parenting time between the Plaintiff and the eldest daughter. [ 14 ] Since 2008, there has been no parenting time whatsoever for the Plaintiff with the middle daughter as she refuses to spend any time with him. She did not go to New Brunswick for his brother ’ s funeral.

There has been no communication between the two. [ 15 ] The youngest daughter has spent more time with the Plaintiff but even she has only seen him on infrequent occasions for a few hours at a time. While she saw the Plaintiff as often as once per month until the fall of 2010, she only saw him three times in 2011 (aside from her attendance at the funeral in New Brunswick). [ 16 ] I believe the evidence of the Defendant that at no time did she deny parenting time for any of the children with the Plaintiff.

I also accept the evidence that the Plaintiff phones the Defendant ’ s home regularly, sometimes daily, in an attempt to speak with each of the children. He usually ends up leaving messages for all three children. [ 17 ] The oldest daughter testified at the request of the Plaintiff father. She is now 17 years of age and described the Plaintiff as abusive and controlling. She clearly resents the Plaintiff and maintains a very close relationship with her mother and her mother ’ s partner.

She also testified that the Defendant never prevented any of the children from visiting with the Plaintiff and, indeed, encouraged each of them to go to New Brunswick. The oldest and the youngest daughters both attended while the middle daughter refused. [ 18 ] Even if the signed agreement of October 3, 2007 was enforceable at any time, it clearly is not enforceable now. It has no impact on the rights of the parents at this time.

Circumstances relating to the oldest daughter clearly changed on December 11, 2007 and, with respect to the two younger daughters, they clearly changed by September 2008. [ 19 ] I am satisfied that the Plaintiff does love his children, but their best interests lie with the Defendant retaining primary residential care of the them. While the parties may have joint custody of the three children thereby entitling the Plaintiff to information regarding their education and health, he is not entitled to any specified parenting time with them.

The children are old enough to make choices and accordingly, I will grant the Plaintiff reasonable and generous parenting time with the children which can only be exercised in accordance with arrangements that the children agree upon. [ 20 ] The Defendant mother shall have primary decision-making authority. This authority relates to medical and dental care, schooling and extra-curricular activities. However, the Defendant shall notify the Plaintiff within one week of any decisions in those areas.

Further, the Plaintiff shall have the right to seek school records directly from the schools that the girls attend to the age of 18 and is further entitled to copies of their medical and dental records relating to any treatments they receive before they reach the age of 18. B. Matrimonial Property

[ 21 ] As noted above, the parties began residing together in 1986. They were married on June 30, 1992 and separated on April 1, 2007 when the Defendant moved into the basement of the matrimonial home. They physically separated when the Defendant moved out of the home in October 2007. [ 22 ] The following analysis deals with each item of matrimonial property, its value for the purpose of distribution and the resulting equalization payment required. 1. Matrimonial Home [ 23 ] The parties purchased a condominium in 2002 for $115,000. It was sold in October 2009 for $225,000.

After payment of the amount owing on a line of credit in the sum of $25,989.24, payment of two Visa accounts in the name of the Defendant totalling $10,383.33 and payment to each of the parties in the sum of $15,000, the sum of $46,359.12 remains available for distribution. [ 24 ] The line of credit was a joint line of credit which totalled $31,455 when the parties separated. The Plaintiff argues that a significant amount of the funds borrowed from the line of credit were used to purchase materials for renovations to the home and that most of the renovations were done by him.

He says that he should receive a larger credit for the balance of the sale proceeds as he not only did the majority of the renovations himself, but he also paid down a significant portion of the line of credit between the date of physical separation in October 2007 and the sale of the home in October 2009. [ 25 ] The Defendant testified that she too did some of the renovation work before the separation of the parties. Indeed, the Plaintiff acknowledged that the Defendant helped install flooring, did some painting and landscaped.

However, he maintains that he did the bulk of the work both before and after the date of separation. [ 26 ] There is evidence that both parties accessed funds from the line of credit for personal expenses after their separation. The Defendant says she took some funds ($3,000) because she was destitute. The Plaintiff used funds from the line of credit to pay spousal support and child support as well as some of his legal fees.

The Defendant also paid down the line of credit by approximately $1,800 over the course of a couple of years, an amount significantly less than the amount the Plaintiff says he paid ($45,000). [ 27 ] The evidence does not allow for any type of precise calculation as to the extent to which funds from the line of credit were used for renovation materials or personal expenses.

There is also no evidence as to whether and by how much the renovations completed by the Plaintiff after the separation might have increased the value of the home or resulted in a sale price greater than that which might have been realized had the renovations not been completed. [ 28 ] The line of credit was less (by $5,465.76) at the time it was paid out than it was at the date of separation. The Plaintiff must have paid at least $3,665.76 more than the Defendant (who paid $1,800) to bring it to that level.

I also accept his evidence that some renovation materials were purchased using the line of credit, and that he also paid down the line by a portion of the cost of the materials. Again, due to the extreme difficulty in determining the precise amounts from the evidence, I will arbitrarily attribute to the Plaintiff an additional $5,000 credit for materials purchased for the renovation after the date of separation. [ 29 ] The Plaintiff did continue to reside in the matrimonial home after the date of separation until the sale of the home and did pay the mortgage, taxes and utilities.

These payments may all be considered to have been made in lieu of rental payments which he would otherwise have been obliged to make. [ 30 ] Finally, while the two Visa accounts paid out of the sale proceeds (totalling $10,383.33) were both in the Defendant ’ s name, I accept the testimony given by the Defendant that the balance owing was approximately the same as that owing on the date of the parties ’ separation, and therefore I deem it to be a matrimonial debt. [ 31 ] All of this evidence, as inadequate as some of it was, particularly regarding the line of credit, cost of materials for renovation and the effect of the renovations on the value of the home, leads to a division of the remaining proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home on the basis of the Plaintiff being entitled to $8,665.76 more than the Defendant.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff is entitled to $27,512.44 and the Defendant is entitled to $18,846.68 out of the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the house. Each is also entitled

to a proportionate share of any interest that has accrued on the balance held in trust. 2. Vehicles [ 32 ] Three vehicles (a Chevrolet Country Cruiser, a Ford Escape and a Ford Extended Cab) were retained and sold by the Plaintiff for a total of $8,700. The Defendant does not dispute those values. [ 33 ] The Defendant retained a Dodge Caravan which she sold for $600.

While the Plaintiff referred to a letter sent by her lawyer indicating that it had been sold for $1,000, I accept the explanation by the Defendant that the letter was in error and the actual sale price was $600. [ 34 ] Each is entitled to the sum of $4,650 from the sale of the vehicles and the Plaintiff must therefore account to the Defendant for the sum of $4,050. 3. Furniture [ 35 ] There was no estimate tendered with respect to the value of the furniture retained by the Plaintiff and the value of the furniture taken by the Defendant following the separation.

The Plaintiff testified that the bulk of the furniture he retained had been obtained during the course of the marriage from Value Village. He sold the furniture to his sister for $1,000, though he retained use of it. [ 36 ] Without any other evidence as to value, I will set the value of the furniture retained by the Plaintiff at $2,000 and the value retained by the Defendant at $1,000. The Plaintiff must account to the Defendant for the sum of $500. 4. RRSPs [ 37 ] Two RRSPs purchased before the parties separated were redeemed by the Plaintiff in 2009 and 2010. The total amount redeemed was $10,220.61.

There was no evidence given as to the tax consequences that flowed from the redemption but, given the Plaintiff ’ s employment income those years, I will assess the likely tax liability on the redeemed funds at approximately 30%. Accordingly, for the purposes of calculating the value of matrimonial property and its distribution, I will assess the value of the RRSPs redeemed by the Plaintiff at $7,154.64. The Plaintiff must account to the Defendant for the sum of $3,577.32. 5. Bank Accounts [ 38 ] The Plaintiff retained a Canada Trust account with a balance of $1,636.20 as at October 2007.

The Plaintiff had a further account with a balance of $108.96 as at October 2007 which he retained. [ 39 ] The Defendant retained a President ’ s Choice bank account which totalled $2,668.47 as at October 2007 but that amount included a gift from her mother in the sum of $2,500. Accordingly, I value her retained account at the date of separation at $168.47. [ 40 ] Accordingly, for the purposes of distributing matrimonial property, I value the accounts retained by the Plaintiff at $1,745.16 and the value of the account retained by the Defendant at $168.47.

The Plaintiff must account to the Defendant for the sum of $788.35. 6. Additional RRSP through Plaintiff ’ s Employer [ 41 ] As at the date of separation, a group RRSP plan to which the Plaintiff was a member through his employment had a value of

[ 41 ] As at the date of separation, a group RRSP plan to which the Plaintiff was a member through his employment had a value of $19,000 (the balance on April 1, 2007 was actually $18,920.26 but I have rounded it up to $19,000 as I consider the appropriate date for calculation to be the date of physical separation in October 2007). [ 42 ] After separation, the Plaintiff and his employer both continued to contribute to the group RRSP plan and as at August 15, 2011, the total value of the Plaintiff ’ s RRSP account was $45,885.08. [ 43 ] The Defendant argued for one-half of that total value on the basis that matrimonial property values are determined as at the date of trial.

In my view, this is an incorrect and unfair method by which to calculate the value of an RRSP for the purposes of distribution when additional contributions have been made by the party holding the RRSP after the date of separation.

That is, while the Defendant is entitled to an equal share of the RRSP value as at the date of separation and any appreciation in the value of that portion of the RRSP to the date of trial, she is not entitled to a share of the additional contributions made after the date of separation nor the appreciation of the additional contributions since that time due solely to the efforts of the Plaintiff. [ 44 ] This approach was accepted in the cases of Kraft v Kraft , 1998 ABQB 623 and Adams v Adams , 2011 ABQB 306 , 5 RFL (7th) 258 where it was found to be unjust and inequitable to distribute the present value of RRSP assets when no contribution whatsoever to their acquisition or growth after separation was made by the party seeking a portion of the amount.

In my view this is the appropriate approach in this case. [ 45 ] The Defendant is entitled to share in the value of the RRSP as at October 2007 together with the increase in value of that portion of the RRSP to the present. No evidence was led as to how much that portion has increased in value so I will arbitrarily assess its increased value at 4% per year since October 2007. As a result, I value that portion of the pension to which the Defendant is entitled to an equal share at $22,894. The Defendant is thereby entitled to a share of the RRSP valued at $11,447. 7.

Additional Debts [ 46 ] It is appropriate to recognize joint debts accumulated during the course of the marriage and, particularly, when one of the parties maintains responsibility for payment of the debt. I have already considered the joint line of credit and the two Visa debts in the name of the Defendant in considering the distribution of the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home. [ 47 ] One additional debt incurred by the Defendant following the date of separation is a government student loan totalling $9,105.

This relates to a personal fitness training program which will ultimately result in the Defendant being qualified as a fitness trainer. During the marriage, she took courses in reflexology and had become qualified as a reflexologist. However, she was unable to earn a steady income sufficient to support herself and her children as a reflexologist. [ 48 ] The student loan debt incurred by the Defendant was incurred to help her achieve the ultimate goal of economic self- sufficiency. It is one of the considerations in determining the issues relating to spousal support.

In determining entitlement to matrimonial property, I do not consider the government student loan to be a joint debt to which the Plaintiff must contribute. It is a debt incurred by the Defendant after separation and I will consider it in determining an appropriate amount and duration for the payment of spousal support by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. 8. Conclusion on Matrimonial Property [ 49 ] Following the directions above, the Plaintiff is obliged to pay the Defendant the sum of $20,362.67.

This amount shall be paid to the Defendant out of the balance owing to the Plaintiff of $27,512.44 (plus any accrued interest) from the sale of the matrimonial home. The remaining RRSP which totalled $45,885.08 as at August 15, 2011 shall be retained by the Plaintiff. C. Child Support

[ 50 ] The interim orders granted by Justice Nielsen on March 13, 2008 and Justice Thomas with respect to child support and spousal support were based on the facts before them. They were interim orders only.

The following decision is based on a full trial with viva voce evidence and fulsome argument. [ 51 ] The Plaintiff ’ s income since separation has been as follows: • 2007 $91,903.06 • 2008 $91,741.57 • 2009 $91,281.12 (includes $8,725.91 in cashed RRSPs) • 2010 $61,086.71 (includes $1,495.70 in cashed RRSPs) • 2011 $60,780.00 [6] The Defendant ’ s income since separation has been as follows: • 2007 $14,634.86 • 2008 $24,115.72 (includes $2,500 in spousal support) • 2009 $31,653.00 (includes $6,000 in spousal support) • 2010 $27,461.00 (includes $2,944.33 in spousal support) • 2011 $26,309.07 (includes $6,000 in spousal support) [6] The Plaintiff has been obliged to pay child support since the date of separation.

During the period when the parties had shared custody on a seven-day on/seven-day off basis, he remained obliged to pay the setoff amount between the amount the Defendant was obliged to pay him when he had custody, and the amount he was obliged to pay the Defendant when she had custody. [7] For the purposes of calculating the Plaintiff ’ s child support obligations, his income for the years 2009 and 2010 will be reduced by the value of the RRSPs included as taxable income on his returns.

Those RRSPs have already been taken into account in the distribution of matrimonial property and, as outlined above, the Defendant is entitled to one-half of the value of those RRSPs. It would be unfair to the Plaintiff to have those amounts included in his income for the purposes of calculating child support obligations when the Defendant is already entitled to receive one-half of their value. [8] From December 2007 to September 2008, the Plaintiff was obliged to pay the Defendant a greater portion of child support given that the eldest daughter had gone to live full-time with the Defendant.

Again, it will be necessary to calculate the precise amount in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines and set off the amount the Defendant was obliged to pay the Plaintiff from the amount he was obliged to pay. [9] Finally, from September 2008 to the present, the Plaintiff was obliged to pay child support to the Defendant for her care of all three children.

Child support shall continue to be paid by the Plaintiff in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines and while the children remain children of the marriage. [10] With respect to s. 7 expenses, the Defendant submitted a list of expenses incurred on behalf of each of the three children. The school fees listed, however, are not s. 7 expenses. They are ordinary expenses incurred by the custodial parent. [11] In reviewing the list provided, it is my view that the following items are proper s. 7 expenses:

• a “reasonable” portion of the cost of a wireless stick, being $700; • medical/dental expenses not covered by insurance; • NAIT registration fee; • rugby costs and equipment or personal fitness training (not both); • babysitting course; • reasonable Tae Kwon Do expenses; • Codega counselling; [8] With respect to past and ongoing medical/dental expenses, the Defendant had been under the impression that the policyprovided by the Plaintiff’s employer had been cancelled at the request of the Plaintiff, thereby eliminating the coverage of these expensesfor the children.

The Plaintiff testified that it was only cancelled with respect to the Defendant but coverage still exists for each of thethree children. This confusion on the part of the Defendant undoubtedly resulted in additional expenses being borne by the Defendant.The confusion was understandable in light of how it occurred (a comment made by a pharmacist) and the Plaintiff remains obliged to payhis proportionate share of those expenses.

However, to the extent that any of those expenses may now be submitted to his insurer, theparties may do so and the Plaintiff will remain obliged to pay only the proportionate share of the balance that has not been paid by eitherhis insurer or the Defendant’s insurer. [9] With respect to ongoing medical/dental expenses, the Plaintiff shall provide the name and policy number of his insurer sothat the expenses may be forwarded directly by the Plaintiff to both her insurer and the Defendant’s insurer.

The Plaintiff must account tothe Defendant for any reimbursement by his insurer and he remains obliged to pay the difference between the amounts paid by insurersand the total amount incurred. [10] With respect to other s. 7 expenses, such as Tae Kwon Do, the Plaintiff is obliged to pay his proportionate share.Extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities must be reasonable, taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation tothe child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child.

Copies ofreceipts for s. 7 expenses shall be provided by the Defendant to the Plaintiff within six months of incurring the expense. D. Spousal Support [11] The Supreme Court of Canada in Moge v Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 813, [1992] SCJ No 107 andBracklow v Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 420, [1999] SCJ No 14 emphasized the requirement for a Court toconsider all four objectives set out in s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act in determining an equitable sharing of the economic consequences ofthe marriage or its breakdown.

Accordingly, in determining whether support is appropriate and for what period of time, the Court must: (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (

b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above anyobligation for the support of any child of the marriage; (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. [12] The parties began residing together in 1986. Around 1989, the Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury and was unable towork regularly until 1997, though he did work sporadically and did earn some income during that time. Essentially, however, theDefendant supported the Plaintiff and their family through her employment as a bank teller between 1988 and 1997.

[13] After the birth of each of the two older daughters, the Defendant went on maternity leave. She returned to work, however, six months later while the Plaintiff remained at home caring for the children. [14] When their third daughter was born in 1997, the Defendant stayed home and the Plaintiff went back to work.

The marriage then assumed a more traditional form with the Plaintiff working full-time and often extended overtime hours, while the Defendant stayed home and looked after the children, maintained the household and did the majority of the cooking, cleaning and laundry. [15] In 2001 and 2002, the Defendant took courses in reflexology and obtained a certificate entitling her to practise as a reflexologist. In 2003 and 2004, the Defendant opened a home-based reflexology business, though she continued in her role as the primary caregiver and maintaining the household.

She also worked part-time between January 2006 and March 2006 with Statistics Canada and as a slot machine attendant in the summer at the Northlands Casino. The Defendant is now employed as a casual employee at the Sturgeon Hospital earning $19.25 per hour. [16] A monthly budget prepared on November 23, 2011 estimates the Plaintiff ’ s monthly needs at $3,049.87. The budget, however, includes legal fees of $1,000 which are no longer required, leaving an estimated monthly budget of $2,049.87.

I am satisfied that this is a low estimate and that his actual monthly budgetary needs are closer to $2,500. [17] A monthly budget prepared by the Defendant indicates monthly needs totalling $3,837.24. This budget includes costs relating to the children. [18] Both parties contributed to the couples ’ finances through working outside of the home and caring for children for certain periods of time until separation.

Despite his years at home caring for the children, the Plaintiff has good earning potential. [19] While I am satisfied that the Defendant is attempting to become economically self-sufficient, I am also satisfied that she is unable to do so yet. She has made efforts since the date of separation to improve her financial situation and increase her employment opportunities and income. She is taking a course in personal fitness training which, she hopes, may be used in conjunction with her certificate in reflexology to provide a basis for a steadier and higher income flow.

In order to do so, she has incurred a debt in the form of a student loan which now totals $9,105. [20] Despite the Defendant ’ s attempts to earn an income as a reflexologist, she was unable to earn an amount sufficient to provide for her own support, let alone that of anyone else.

Her contributions and sacrifices following the birth of the parties ’ third child resulted in an economic disadvantage to her as she left her long-standing employment as a bank teller to care for the children while the Plaintiff returned full-time to the workforce. [21] The Defendant ’ s ongoing responsibilities for the children following the breakdown of the marriage has also resulted in adverse financial consequences to her. The responsibilities she has undertaken for the care of the children when out of school has caused her a disadvantage in seeking regular and full-time employment.

In my view, the Defendant continues to suffer economic hardship and, despite attempts, she has not yet been able to become economically self-sufficient. However, given her relatively young age (44), the Defendant has many more years in which to maximize her earning potential. [22] Further, as indicated above, I also consider it appropriate to take into account the financial obligations incurred by the Defendant in her attempts to achieve economic self-sufficiency.

That is, I believe it appropriate to take into account the fact that she has an outstanding student loan which was incurred for the purpose of advancing her education and developing a new skill set. [23] Given the traditional role in which she lived for the last ten years or so of the marriage prior to the separation, and given her needs as evidenced by her monthly budget and her income, I am satisfied that the Defendant is entitled to retroactive and ongoing spousal support on both a compensatory and means and needs basis.

[24] Bearing all of these factors in mind, it is my view that an appropriate award for spousal support payable by the Plaintiff from the date of separation in 2007 to the end of 2009, given the respective incomes of the parties, is $1,000 per month. For the years 2010 to the present and ongoing, again bearing in mind the change in income levels, the Plaintiff is obliged to pay the sum of $750 per month in spousal support. [25] The Defendant is scheduled to graduate from her course in personal fitness training in April 2013.

In my view, the Plaintiff is obliged to pay spousal support up to and including October 2013 so as to afford the Defendant an opportunity following graduation to obtain an employment position that closely, if not fully, provides her with economic self-sufficiency. [26] If the Defendant has not achieved economic self-sufficiency by October 2013, she is at liberty to seek an extension of the order for payment of spousal support for up to another full year. Should she do so, the Court may consider entitlement, duration (up to one year) and quantum. E.

Child and Spousal Support Arrears [27] As can be seen by the foregoing analysis, the amounts the Plaintiff is obliged to pay the Defendant for retroactive child support and spousal support will necessarily result in arrears given that they exceed the amounts provided for in the order of Nielsen J. of March 2008. A portion of the arrears shall be paid out of the remaining amount owing to the Plaintiff out of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home after equalization payment to the Defendant.

In the event that the parties are unable to reach an agreement on an appropriate method by which the balance of the arrears shall be paid, they may see me. IV. Conclusion [28] The parties will maintain joint custody of their three daughters. The Defendant mother shall continue in her role as the primary decision-maker. The Plaintiff is entitled to be notified of any decisions relating to the medical and dental care of the children as well as their schooling and extra-curricular activities within seven days of such decisions being made.

The Plaintiff is entitled to obtain school records directly from the schools that the girls attend and is entitled to copies of their medical and dental records relating to any treatments received before they reach the age of 18. [29] The matrimonial property shall be divided in accordance with the directions provided above. The Defendant is entitled to retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support in accordance with the findings for each provided above.

Should the parties have any difficulties in determining the precise amounts required to be transferred or a method by which the arrears should be paid, they may see me. Heard on the 4 th day of June 2012. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 19 th day of June 2012. Eric F. Macklin J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances:

Omer Roderick Gould appeared on own behalf Collista Coles, Barr Picard for the Defendant (Plaintiff by Counterclaim)