McMeekin v. Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 456

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: McMeekin v. Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 456 Date: 20120712 Docket: 1103 12194 Registry: Edmonton Between: Greg McMeekin Respondent/Applicant (Plaintiff) - and - Attorney General of Alberta / Crown Prosecutor ’ s Office Edmonton; A. Harriet & C. Lim Counsel for the Crown and Attorney General ’ s Office of Alberta, the Edmonton Humane Society: Shawna Randolph, Dr. Karen Lange, Lisa Callas, Deb Pope, Valerie E. Kensett, Holy Mcbride, Carolee Hofman, S/Cst.

Granysh, and John Doe ’ s of the Edmonton Humane Society Applicants/Respondents (Defendants) Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on August 31, 2012; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment. _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Madam Justice D.L. Shelley _______________________________________________________

I. Introduction................................................................................................................ Page: 3 II. Associated Legal Proceedings..................................................................................... Page: 4 A. The Animal Protection Action......................................................................... Page: 4 1. Trial #1 - Traffic Court - November 14, 2007..................................... Page: 4 2. Trial #2 - Traffic Court - June 30, 2008.............................................. Page: 5 3.

Trial #3 - Traffic Court - March 17, 2009............................................ Page: 5 4. Trial #4 - Traffic Court, November 12, 2009...................................... Page: 5 5. Trial #5 - Traffic Court, April 27, 2010............................................... Page: 5 6. Trial #6 - Provincial Court, June 24, 2010-June 21, 2011................... Page: 6 a. June 24, 2010......................................................................... Page: 6 b. December 14-15, 2010........................................................... Page: 7 c.

June 20-21, 2011.................................................................... Page: 7 7. Mr. McMeekin's Claim for Costs and Civil Remedies - Court of Queen ’ s Bench - July 22, 2011.......................................................................................................... Page: 11 8. Mr. McMeekin's Appeal of Burrows J. - Court of Appeal - September 6, 2011 Page: 11 9. Mr. McMeekin's Charter Costs Application - Provincial Court - October 11, 2011 Page: 11 B. The Dreyfuss Civil Actions........................................................................... Page: 12 1.

November 10 Hearing and Appeal.................................................... Page: 14 2. First Appeal of the November 10 Order............................................ Page: 14 3. December 21 Defendants' Motion to Strike, Mr. McMeekin's Pre-Emptive Appeal, and Mr. McMeekin's Second Appeal of the November 10 Order................... Page: 14 4. Dreyfuss Civil Action #2................................................................... Page: 15 a. Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 - Statement of Claim...................... Page: 15 b. Mr. McMeekin's February 16, 2012 Submissions.................. Page: 16 c.

February 23, 2012 McMeekin Submissions.......................... Page: 17 d. Formal Offers to Settle.......................................................... Page: 18 e. McMeekin v. Alberta (Attorney General) , 2012 ABQB 144 Page: 18 f. Mr. McMeekin's March 7, 2012 “ Application ” ...................... Page: 19 g. Mr. McMeekin's Post-Decision Emails.................................. Page: 19 5. February 1 Special Chambers Hearing.............................................. Page: 20 6. The March 29, 2012 Hearing............................................................ Page: 22 III. Mr.

McMeekin ’ s Litigation History........................................................................... Page: 22 A. The Liquor Store Contract............................................................................. Page: 22 B. Income Support Payment Judicial Review.................................................... Page: 25 C. Income Support Tribunal Defamation Action................................................ Page: 27 D. Deaf Pension Claim....................................................................................... Page: 29

IV. Analysis.................................................................................................................... Page: 30 A. The Motion to Strike..................................................................................... Page: 30 1. The Legal Test.................................................................................. Page: 31 2. No Meritorious Claim........................................................................ Page: 32 a. Crown Defendants................................................................ Page: 32 b.

The EHS Defendants............................................................. Page: 34 c. Conclusion............................................................................ Page: 35 3. The Factual Basis for Mr. McMeekin ’ s Claim.................................... Page: 35 a. Alleged Crown Misconduct................................................... Page: 36 b. Alleged EHS Misconduct...................................................... Page: 39 4. Mr. McMeekin as a Vexatious Litigant.............................................. Page: 40 B. Mr. McMeekin ’ s Application for

Summary Judgment................................... Page: 48 1. Rule 4.16.......................................................................................... Page: 48 2. Rule 13.12(2).................................................................................... Page: 50 3. Late Service of the Defendants' Statements of Defence..................... Page: 50 4. Conclusion........................................................................................ Page: 50 V. Conclusion................................................................................................................ Page: 51 I.

Introduction [ 1 ] In 2006 a dog, Dreyfuss, was observed in a closed automobile parked on Jasper Avenue in Edmonton. Witnesses were concerned. It was a hot day, and the dog was panting without any apparent source of water. Members of the Edmonton Police Service [“EPS”] were contacted, and the dog was seized by the EPS members and Edmonton Humane Society [“EHS”] Animal Protection Officers. [ 2 ] Greg McMeekin [“Mr. McMeekin”] was Dreyfuss’ owner, and was subsequently charged under the Animal Protection Act , R.S.A. 2000, c.

A-41, s. 2(1) [“APA”] for having caused or allowed Dreyfuss to become distressed [the “Animal Protection Action”]. Mr. McMeekin’s charge was stayed by the Crown on July 13, 2011. [ 3 ] On July 29, 2011 Mr. McMeekin filed a statement of claim against the Defendants [the “Dreyfuss Civil Action #1”], alleging various forms of misconduct. The Defendants are organized into two groups: The Crown Defendants : the Attorney General of Alberta / Crown Prosecutor’s Office Edmonton; A. Herriot, C. Lim, Attorney General’s Office of Alberta; and The EHS Defendants : Edmonton Humane Society, Shawna Randolph, Dr.

Karen Lange, Lisa Callas, Deb Pope, Valerie E. Kensett, Holy McBride, Carolee Hofman, S/Cst. Granysh, and John Doe’s of the Edmonton Humane Society.

[ 4 ] Mr. McMeekin’s most recent materials name other persons and entities as Defendants. They are not parties. Mr. McMeekin added those individuals without authorization from the Court. [ 5 ] In brief, Mr. McMeekin alleges that two Crown Prosecutors in the Animal Protection Action (“Mr. Herriot” and “Mr. Lim”) engaged in a wrongful prosecution, while the EHS Defendants mistreated Dreyfuss and made statements that defamed Mr. McMeekin. I will later discuss the substance of Mr. McMeekin’s claims in more detail. [ 6 ] There have since been a number of hearings that involve the Dreyfuss Civil Action #1. Mr.

McMeekin has represented himself throughout the Animal Protection Action and the subsequent Dreyfuss Civil Actions. [ 7 ] This decision has two subjects: 1. an application by the Defendants to strike the Dreyfuss Civil Action #1, pursuant to Alberta Rules Of Court , Alta Reg 124/2010, s. 7.3 [the “ Rules ”, or individually a “ Rule ”]; and 2. a demand by Mr. McMeekin to:

a) strike the Statements of Defence filed by the Defendants:

i) as defective, ii) due to the Defendants’ refusal to participate in alternative dispute resolution processes; or iii) due to late service; and

b) order

summary judgment in favour of Mr. McMeekin. [ 8 ] Mr. McMeekin’s applications and arguments extend further. However, that is the legal substance of his complaint, which flows from a chambers hearing before Master Schlosser in November 10, 2011. II. Associated Legal Proceedings [ 9 ] The path to this point is a lengthy one. I believe it is helpful to outline what occurred in both the Animal Protection Action, the subsequent Dreyfuss Civil Action #1, and a parallel and now defunct proceeding, Dreyfuss Civil Action #2. A.

The Animal Protection Action [ 10 ] On June 7, 2006, Dreyfuss was seized, taken to the EHS, and treated for heat exhaustion. The following day Mr. McMeekin was charged. On May 30, 2007, Mr. McMeekin pled not guilty. Many hearings followed.

1. Trial #1 - Traffic Court - November 14, 2007 [ 11 ] The first trial was on November 14, 2007, before Commissioner O’Neill. The Crown was represented by Mr. Herriot. Mr. Herriot is the “A. Harriet” named in this action. [ 12 ] At the beginning of the proceeding Mr. McMeekin complained that he had not received disclosure of any materials from the Crown. There were apparently about 50-60 pages of notes, reports, and statements. The Commissioner concluded that the Crown’s failure to disclose was a consequence of the usual procedure in a traffic court, where disclosure is not automatic but is, instead, by request.

The Commissioner concluded that pre-trial and automatic disclosure would have been appropriate, given the nature of the proceeding. [ 13 ] The Commissioner invited Mr. McMeekin to either review the materials during a break, adjourn to allow for disclosure and review, or request a stay. The Crown and Commissioner discussed whether this proceeding should be heard in Provincial Court. The Commissioner concluded he had jurisdiction to hear a stay application. Mr. McMeekin requested a stay, which was denied. A new trial was set for June 30, 2008. [ 14 ] Mr.

McMeekin requested that the Commissioner order that a veterinarian be on staff with the EHS at all times. However, after review of the APA, the Commissioner concluded that legislation provided no mechanism for him or another court to order that step. That was the jurisdiction of the Legislature. The Commissioner suggested Mr. McMeekin contact Student Legal Services and/or Legal Aid for assistance in the Animal Protection Action, and explained the nature of these services. 2.

Trial #2 - Traffic Court - June 30, 2008 [ 15 ] The June 30 proceeding was adjourned because there was no real time reporter available to assist Mr. McMeekin, who is deaf. 3. Trial #3 - Traffic Court - March 17, 2009 [ 16 ] The next trial was before Commissioner Ackroyd. Mr. McMeekin did not attend. The proceeding continued in his absence, and Mr. McMeekin was fined $1,500.00. On April 17, 2009 Mr. McMeekin appealed the ex parte conviction. He was successful, and a new trial was set for November 12, 2009. [ 17 ] The alleged defamation occurred after the March 17 hearing. 4.

Trial #4 - Traffic Court, November 12, 2009 [ 18 ] The Crown was represented by Mr. Lim, who is also a named Defendant. Mr. Lim was the Crown prosecutor in this and all subsequent aspects of the Animal Protection Action. A Crown witness was not available and so the proceedings were adjourned to April 27, 2010. 5. Trial #5 - Traffic Court, April 27, 2010 [ 19 ] The next attempt to conduct the Animal Protection Action was before Commissioner Yaverbaum. The Crown agreed that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ,

Part 1, Constitution Act, 1982 , being

Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [the “ Charter ”], s. 11(

i) was relevant to the potential consequence of the alleged misconduct. That affected the potential sanction faced

by Mr. McMeekin. [ 20 ] Mr. McMeekin argued that he had experienced unfair delay in the resolution of the Animal Protection Action, effectively constituting a breach of his Charter s. 11(

b) right to a timely trial. Mr. McMeekin demanded money to compensate for his costs and an apology. Commissioner Yaverbaum concluded that the emergence of this issue required transfer of the Animal Protection Action to the Provincial Court. [ 21 ] The transcript discloses considerable confusion. Mr. McMeekin demanded that the trial continue, but also refused to “waive his rights”. Mr. McMeekin rejected a suggestion that he take advantage of the assistance of duty counsel: that was just “lawyers scheming”. Mr. McMeekin characterized the trial as a “sting operation”.

He insulted the Commissioner: “this level of court is just a joke”. 6. Trial #6 - Provincial Court, June 24, 2010-June 21, 2011 [ 22 ] The next attempt at trial was conducted before Provincial Court Judge Johnson. This proceeding was heard over five days, spread over an almost one year period. a. June 24, 2010 [ 23 ] The beginning of trial was marked by what might be called applications by Mr. McMeekin. One was an allegation of abuse of process. When asked if this was a Charter , s. 11(

b) application to stay the animal distress charge, Mr. McMeekin denied that was the case, but insisted he had kept that option available. Mr. McMeekin continued his demand that the Court order the EHS to keep a veterinarian on staff. [ 24 ] The second application related to a “notice of motion” that had been filed two days prior to the hearing. This was an allegation of defamation that claimed various non-criminal or non- Charter remedies, and named various persons not involved in the Animal Protection Action. Judge Johnson carefully explained to Mr.

McMeekin that the alleged misconduct and the remedies sought required a separate civil proceeding, and could not be addressed in the Animal Protection Action. She instructed that, if Mr. McMeekin wished to pursue those allegations, he should file a statement of claim with the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. From the description of the notice of motion, it appears very similar to the statement of claim ultimately filed in the Dreyfuss Civil Action #1. [ 25 ] Judge Johnson informed Mr. McMeekin that he could obtain assistance from Student Legal Services, an alternative that Mr.

McMeekin rejected. [ 26 ] Two witnesses were heard and cross-examined by Mr. McMeekin. A central focus of that cross-examination was an allegation that EHS personnel had told Mr. McMeekin he had to either pay a fine or Dreyfuss would be euthanised. This suggestion was consistently rejected. [ 27 ] At one point Mr. McMeekin claimed the Crown had not met its disclosure obligations, but then refused to accept the material in question. It was later established that Mr. McMeekin had already received the disputed material.

The trial had taken longer than anticipated, and was adjourned until the next available date, in December. Much of June 24 was spent on the McMeekin applications, and Mr. McMeekin’s cross-examination of the Crown witnesses. b. December 14-15, 2010 [ 28 ] Mr. McMeekin did not attend on December 14. On December 15 it was established that the transcript of the June 24 hearing recorded an incorrect date for the December hearing. Mr. McMeekin’s absence was therefore excused. Mr. McMeekin also claimed to have not received correspondence that indicated the correct December 14 hearing date.

[ 29 ] Several EHS and EPS witnesses took the stand. Mr. McMeekin continued to pursue his allegation that a conspiracy existed among EHS personnel to extort fines from persons to pay for the operation of EHS facilities, and that Dreyfuss faced euthanasia. The witnesses consistently responded that the decision to seize Dreyfuss and charge Mr. McMeekin was made in good faith and in the best interest of the dog’s well-being. They denied Dreyfuss had been drugged. [ 30 ] A final witness, a veterinarian, was unable to attend court due to heavy snowfall and unsafe road conditions.

The veterinarian lived in a rural location. [ 31 ] Mr. McMeekin on numerous occasions did not respond to court directions. At two points Judge Johnson temporarily adjourned the hearing and left the courtroom so that Mr. McMeekin would calm down. Again, Mr. McMeekin’s cross-examinations were lengthy and often repetitious. [ 32 ] At the end of the hearing, Mr. McMeekin demanded money to pay for his costs. Judge Johnson explained she had only a very limited authority to make an order of that kind, but would entertain that possibility at the conclusion of the trial. The proceeding was adjourned until June. c.

June 20-21, 2011 [ 33 ] At the beginning of the proceeding Mr. McMeekin claimed the trial was unfair, and questioned Judge Johnson’s objectivity. The final witness, the veterinarian, took the stand. The expert qualification process was very disorganized as a consequence of Mr. McMeekin’s refusal to follow Court instructions. [ 34 ] Mr. McMeekin’s conduct can fairly be described as argumentative and defiant. He often disregarded court instruction. Judge Johnson again on two occasions temporarily adjourned the proceeding and left the courtroom in an attempt to restore order and calm Mr. McMeekin.

Several exchanges that occurred during the Court’s attempt to direct Mr. McMeekin’s cross-examination warrant particular attention: June 20, 2012 transcript, at p. 84: The Court: Mr. McMeekin, I am going to excuse this witness unless you have any proper questions for her. If you want to give evidence yourself, then you will have a chance. She is here. She has come today to assist the Court. If you do not have any more questions for her, then I am going to go – ask Mr. Lim if he has any. Then I am going to ask her some myself. Mr. McMeekin: Yeah. Nothing wrong. The Court: And then I am going to let her go. Mr.

McMeekin: I think that your judgment is flawed. The Court: Well – Mr. McMeekin: You know what I think? I don’t even think I’m going to get a fair trial in here either. The Court: Well, Mr. McMeekin, I am doing my best. Now, --

Mr. McMeekin: Yeah, I think – The Court: – she is here – Mr. McMeekin: – you’re bought and paid for. [ 35 ] Judge Johnson then warned Mr. McMeekin that his conduct has come “very close to the line”. A sheriff had to intercede before Mr. McMeekin sat down and ceased his interruptions. [ 36 ] Judge Johnson proceeded to ask a number of questions of the expert veterinarian. That led to more interruptions by Mr. McMeekin. He was told repeatedly to “Be quiet.” That instruction was ignored: June 20, 2011 transcript at pp. 89-90 Mr. McMeekin: She never even seen the dog.

The Court: I am asking her a question about the term she has used. Mr. McMeekin: How can she possible apply it? You can’t. The Court: Mr. McMeekin, -- Mr. McMeekin: Did you see the dog? The Court: – I want to get through this trial and you are making it very, very difficult for me. Now just be quiet. I have a couple questions. Then the Crown’s case – Mr. McMeekin: It’s speculation. The Court: – will be in. I understand your position. ... Mr.

McMeekin: The truth is if she had been there ... doing her job, then she would have – The Court: You now, I am going to ask the sheriff to remove you from the courtroom so that I can finish answering – asking these questions.

Mr. McMeekin: Why don’t you just remove yourself from the court. The Court: Are you prepared to be quiet so that I can ask my questions? Mr. McMeekin: Don’t expect me to sit here and listen to you feed a bunch to speculation to the court. We already know what your judgment’s going to be. The Court: I am going to ask the sheriff to take you outside while I ask those questions, and then he will bring you – Mr. McMeekin: Well, why don’t you just continue on the whole trial without me? The Court: Well, it’s awfully tempting, Mr. McMeekin – Mr. McMeekin: You’ve already made up your mind.

The Court: – but that would not be fair. Mr. Sheriff, would you please take – Mr. McMeekin: Oh, but this is fair. The Court: – him outside. The Sheriff: All right, sir. Mr. McMeekin: So how am I supposed to cross-examine when I don’t have ... when I don’t have the information? The Sheriff: All right. Let’s go. The Court: Well, just a minute. You can have the information if you will sit here and be quiet. Will you sit here and be quiet until she is finished? Will you? Will you sit here – Mr. McMeekin: I don’t care. The Court: – and be quiet? Mr. McMeekin: Whatever you want to do. The Court: Okay.

Mr. McMeekin: You want me to leave? I can leave too. The Court: I do not want you to – Mr. McMeekin: Hey, well – The Court: – leave. Mr. McMeekin: Well, make up your mind. The Court: I just want to finish – Mr. McMeekin: I’ve just had about enough – The Court: – asking her questions. Mr. McMeekin: – of you and your speculation. It’s just speculation. The Court: Are you prepared to sit down and be quiet? This will take five minutes. Can you be quiet for five minutes? Okay.Thank you. [37] These excerpts are not the only instances where Mr.

McMeekin ignored court instruction, and questioned the independence ofJudge Johnson and the fairness of the proceeding. These are illustrative of the proceeding as a whole, and the manner in which Mr.McMeekin conducted himself. [38] Mr. McMeekin called an EHS witness in the afternoon. The following day Judge Johnson declared a mistrial in response toclaims by Mr. McMeekin that the Court could not give him a fair trial. [39] On July 13, 2011, Mr. Lim stayed the charge against Mr. McMeekin. 7. Mr. McMeekin's Claim for Costs and Civil Remedies - Court of Queen’s Bench - July 22, 2011 [40] Mr.

McMeekin then appeared before Justice Burrows of this Court, in what Mr. McMeekin characterized as an appeal of theresult of Trial #6 and the decision of the Crown to stay the animal welfare charge. This ‘appeal’ appears to be in the form of the June 24,2010 “notice of motion” that alleged defamation and demanded civil remedies. Mr. McMeekin also demanded costs, which the Court andCrown concluded was an R. v. Askov, (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 355 application. Burrows J.concluded there was no remedy for the ‘appeal’, that Mr.

McMeekin needed to advance his civil claim in that context, and that an Askovapplication should be directed to the Provincial Court, not the Court of Queen’s Bench. 8. Mr. McMeekin's Appeal of Burrows J. - Court of Appeal - September 6, 2011 [41] Mr. McMeekin appealed Justice Burrows’ decision, which led to a reported decision of Bielby J.A.: R. v. McMeekin, 2011

ABCA 253 . The ‘appeal’ was irregular, and requested: 1. $110,000.00 in costs, 2. an order compelling the provincial court registry file a bill of costs Mr. McMeekin had prepared, 3. an order compelling various media sources to release telecasts and documentaries aired on March 17 and 18, 2008, and 4. $10,000.00 in costs for the appeal. [ 42 ] Justice Bielby interpreted this appearance as an application for leave to appeal, which she rejected. Mr. McMeekin had apparently alleged that Crown counsel at the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench ‘appeal’ had mislead the court.

That allegation was not reflected in the transcript. Mr. McMeekin was directed to apply to Judge Johnson on the issue of costs. 9. Mr. McMeekin's Charter Costs Application - Provincial Court - October 11, 2011 [ 43 ] The final step in the Animal Protection Action was an application for costs by Mr. McMeekin, heard by Judge Johnson on October 11, 2011. That application was dismissed on November 29, 2011. Judge Johnson filed written reasons, which are reported as R. v. McMeekin , 2011 ABPC 359 . Mr. McMeekin advanced this costs claim as a Charter, s. 24(1) remedy: para. 2. Mr.

McMeekin’s position was that the Crown is liable for costs when it abandons an action: paras. 21, 23. This argument and the allegation of Crown misconduct was rejected: para. 35. Many delays were Mr. McMeekin’s own fault, or a consequence of court structure. A stay would have been Mr. McMeekin’s remedy, if he had been injured: para. 33. [ 44 ] This decision is under appeal at the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. Mr.

McMeekin demands many of the same remedies sought in the Dreyfuss Civil Actions: Compelling the Alberta Attorney General’s office and The Edmonton Humane Society To Pay: General, Aggravated and Punitive damages to the Accused, for Actions relating to Prejudice, Abuse of Process, defamation, Act of Malice by Mr Harriet’s, Mr Lim and the Attorney Generals of Alberta’s office and the Edmonton Humane Society Approx $ 10,000,000.00 ... [sic] B. The Dreyfuss Civil Actions [ 45 ] The documentation submitted by Mr. McMeekin is generally irregular in form and content.

In many cases an “affidavit” will incorporate legal arguments and caselaw. Applications seek remedies that are unrelated to the matter at hand. For example, the November 18, 2011 appeal of the Master’s decision also demands an order to prohibit an attorney from representing the Defendants. Rules and caselaw are often cited out of context. The contents of many documents overlap, and any given document may repeat the same language in more than one place. The net effect is a collage. [ 46 ] Text is often in bold, underlined, or in capitals. Unusual formatting is commonplace.

For ease of review, I have not always replicated those features when quoting from Mr. McMeekin’s documentary materials. [ 47 ] The result is that many of Mr. McMeekin’s materials are opaque. For ease of understanding I have, in certain instances, “distilled out” what I conclude are the legal issues, allegations, and relevant legal processes that have occurred in 2011-2012. In that sense my account of the Dreyfuss Civil Action #1 and associated proceedings is a ‘reconstruction’. From my review of the relevant materials I observe that other Queen’s Bench justices have taken the same approach.

[ 48 ] The Dreyfus Civil Action #1 Statement of Claim was filed on July 29, 2011. It alleges: 1. malicious mistreatment and neglect of Dreyfuss by the Edmonton Humane Society and its employees; 2. that Mr. Herriot extorted donations to EHS, “a sting operation for the girls at the Edmonton Humane society...” [sic]; 3. Mr. Lim and Mr. Herriot:

a) orchestrated various delays in the Animal Protection Action as an abuse of process and with malicious intent; b) “fabricated” Charter issues in the Animal Protection Action;

c) abused their qualified privileges for personal gain and to benefit the EHS; and

d) sought to establish a “... [p]recedent case for individual or personal benefit ...”; and 4. the March 17, 2009 proceeding where Mr. McMeekin was absent was an ex-parte proceeding that was an “abuse of judicial privileges” and an abuse of process; 5. out of court statements by Mr. Herriot, and EHS personnel were defamatory, an “unstoppable campaign” of: ... carefully orcastrated spiteful, High-handed, malicious planed attack on Mr.

Mcmeekin his reputation and his character on the front steps and ground of the Edmonton court house. [sic] 6. the unilateral stay of proceedings in the Animal Protection Action by Mr. Lim was an abuse of “Judicial Privileges” that occurred once Mr. McMeekin had proven the malicious misconduct and neglect of the EHS; and 7. that Judge Johnson’s declaration of a mistrial in the Animal Protection Action was wrongful: “the only way Judge Johnson could protect the Crown was by calling a mistrial”. [ 49 ] Mr.

McMeekin seeks a variety of remedies: 1. travel and other costs for the Animal Protection Action of $110,000.00; 2. general, aggravated, and punitive damages of $10,000,000.00 for misconduct in the Animal Protection Action: “unreasonable delays, Prejudice, Abuse of Process, defamation, Act of Malice” [sic]; 3. “a review of Mr [Herriot’s] and Mr Lim’s conduct through The Upper Law society of Canada and Alberta and Canada the Attorney Generals office as well as any other reviews or actions the Courts sees fit to impose.” [sic];

4. that charges be laid against the EHS for its neglect of Dreyfuss and “... using him in a photo opt for personal gains” [sic]; and 5. a payment of $100,000.00-$1,000,000.00 to kennels and animal shelters in the Northwest Territories, as directed by Mr. McMeekin. [ 50 ] Since then a number of applications and appeals have occurred. 1. November 10 Hearing and Appeal [ 51 ] On November 10, 2011, Master Schlosser heard applications by Mr.

McMeekin that: 1. a number of media outlets produce copies of reporting on the March 17, 2009 decision of Commissioner Ackroyd, and 2. the Defendants’ Statements of Defence should be struck on a number of grounds, and various remedies awarded to Mr. McMeekin. The order to produce documents was granted, while the application to strike was adjourned for a special chambers hearing before a Master at a later date. 2. First Appeal of the November 10 Order [ 52 ] On November 18, 2011, Mr.

McMeekin challenged the Master’s order to adjourn, alleging that there was no basis for that step as the matter had already been concluded in his favour. Justice Veit heard this challenge on December 2, 2011, which she characterized as an appeal of Master Schlosser’s November 10 decision. Mr. McMeekin demanded a cost award of $20,000.00 for the appeal. Justice Veit ruled that costs would be addressed at the upcoming special chambers hearing. 3. December 21 Defendants' Motion to Strike, Mr. McMeekin's Pre-Emptive Appeal, and Mr. McMeekin's Second Appeal of the November 10 Order [ 53 ] On December 5, 2011 Mr.

McMeekin filed an application for a Rule 5.12(1)(

a) penalty and cost award for an allegedly defective Affidavit of Records. In December 15, 2011 written representations, Mr. McMeekin demanded $20,000.00 and that the Defendants be noted in default. That repeats his November 10 demands. [ 54 ] On December 5 and 7 the Defendants applied that Dreyfuss Civil Action #1 be struck as it had no merit and there were no issues for trial. [ 55 ] On December 21, 2011, Justice Gates heard all these motions, and what he identified as an appeal of the November 10 Decision by the Master. December 16 written representations by Mr.

McMeekin seem to indicate this appeal was a challenge to the Master’s then future special chambers hearing on Mr. McMeekin’s application to strike the Defendants’ Statements of Defence, and to note the Defendants in default. Mr. McMeekin says “... Master Schlosser eroded in his judgement by not ruling on this application” [sic]. Mr. McMeekin continued that: Master Schlosser had no grounds to award special chambers ... Master Schlosser ignored Mr Mcmeekin’s application and affidavit ... he has assisted the Crown counsel & Humane society in their attempts to create unreasonable delays ... [sic]

Mr. McMeekin demanded Master Schlosser be removed from any future proceedings and that Mr. McMeekin be award $20,000.00 in costs. [ 56 ] Mr. McMeekin also filed an “affidavit” on December 20, 2011 that combines an appeal of the November 10 Master’s decision, a demand for judgment in favour of Mr. McMeekin, removal of the Master, double costs, and other remedies. This document also states: The application is ... in no way or form relates to Mr Mcmeekin’s APPEAL TO MASTER Schlosser’s Order or decision(

s) therefore it should be considered a separate application ... [sic] [ 57 ] Justice Gates dismissed the “appeal” of the November 10 order and set a February 1, 2012 special chambers hearing to address the substance of Mr. McMeekin's and the Defendants’ motions to strike. He also instructed that Mr. McMeekin file no more applications or appeals prior to the February 1 hearing. This last order led to a second legal action, “Dreyfuss Civil Action #2”. 4. Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 [ 58 ] Between December 20, 2011 and January 31, 2012, Mr.

McMeekin unsuccessfully attempted to file a “(Revised) Statement of Claim” for the Dreyfuss Civil Action #1. The document was refused on the basis of Justice Gates’ December 21 order. Mr. McMeekin proceeded to cross out “(Revised)” and filed the document to initiate a new civil action against the original Defendants and a number of new parties. This started Dreyfuss Civil Action #2, which was ultimately terminated on March 7, 2012, when Justice Marceau granted the Defendants’ motion to strike: Mcmeekin v. Alberta (Attorney General) , 2012 ABQB 144 .

The events and documents in Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 and Justice Marceau’s decision are relevant to the present proceeding. a. Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 - Statement of Claim [ 59 ] The Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 Statement of Claim largely restates the allegations and submissions in the Dreyfuss Civil Action #1 Statement of Claim, but does introduce a number of new allegations: 1. that Master Schlosser was directed by Defence counsel Tim Hurlburt [“Mr. Hurlburt”] to ignore the Defendants’ default and allow the lawsuit to continue; 2. that Mr. Hurlburt “fabricated” a court order; 3. that Mr.

Hurlburt and Kerry Whittaker [“Ms. Whittaker”] directed three Court of Queen’s Bench judges to not:

a) remove Master Schlosser from the Dreyfuss Civil Action #1, and

b) find the Defendants in Dreyfuss Civil Action #1 in default and award the damages sought by Mr. McMeekin; and 4. that the media outlets that were ordered to produce documents had engaged in various forms of misconduct. [ 60 ] The Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 Statement of Claim also expands the remedies sought by Mr. McMeekin:

1. Mr. Hurlburt and Ms. Whittaker are added to the ‘Upper Law Society of Canada’ review; 2. Mr. McMeekin demands $1,000,000.00 in damages each from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Global National T.V.; and 3. $158,000.00 in costs. [ 61 ] CanWest Productions and Shaw Media are named as Defendants, but no relief was apparently sought against those parties. [ 62 ] On February 10 and 13, 2012 the Defendants applied to have the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 struck as frivolous and vexatious, and for not disclosing a cause of action. A hearing was set for February 17, 2012. b. Mr.

McMeekin's February 16, 2012 Submissions [ 63 ] Mr. McMeekin filed an “Application for Civil Contempt, Abuse of Process, and Misconduct” and an “Affidavit” on February 16, 2012, in relation to the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2. The “Affidavit” is largely an index of the various remedies sought. The “Application” seeks: 1. various procedural steps; 2. that the “Crown Persecutors Office” be noted “in civil contempt, abuse of process, and misconduct”, and that Mr. Hurlburt, Ms. Whittaker, and a “Mrs.

Burns” be noted in contempt; 3. an award of $36,000.00 in punitive damages; 4. that these persons “be removed from further practice without pay until the status of their licence to practice is deturmined by the Upper Law Sociaty of Canada” [sic]; 5. that Master Schlosser, Justices Gates, Goss and Veit be ‘removed’ from the Dreyfuss Civil Actions #1 and #2 for “engaging in judicial misconduct, misscarriage of justice, abuse process and failing to follow the Rules of the Queens Bench” [sic]; 6. all remedies in the Dreyfuss Civil Actions #1 and #2 Statements of Claim as the Defendants are in “full default”; and 7. an increase in the sums directed to the “Dreyfuss Mcmeekin opportunity program”, discussed below, to $1,000,000.00. [ 64 ] Mr.

McMeekin continued to make various allegations, including: 1. the Defendants had “Fabricated Masters Orders in attempts to mislead the Courts and The Plaintiff”; 2. the December 21, 2012 Gates’ order was prepared by Ms. Whittaker before the application and Justice Gates was under the influence of the Attorney General;

3. Master Schlosser’s November 10 order was a personal favour to Mr. Hurlburt; and 4. the February 1, 2012 special chambers application (discussed in more detail below) was “... nothing more than abuse of process, Judicial Misconduct and Miscarriage of Justice”. [ 65 ] Mr. McMeekin also demanded that the February 16, 2012 application be heard by a panel of no fewer than three Justices, other than Justices Gates, Veit, and Goss. c. February 23, 2012 McMeekin Submissions [ 66 ] Justice Marceau appears to have permitted up to 20 pages of written argument at the February 17 hearing. Mr.

McMeekin filed a document that largely repeats the arguments, claims, and allegations previously made in the Dreyfuss Civil Actions #1 and #2. Paragraph 32 is interesting: 32) It is likely that Justice R. Marceau will turn a Blind eye to Civil contempt by Mr Hurlburt/Mrs Whittaker and the Judicial Misconduct and Miscarriage of Justice by Master Schlosser those documents have also been included in these submissions. He is in Charge of his own destiny there.

But If these matters are settles there will be no need for an investigation and those issue will be left for the Judicial to resolve from within. [sic, emphasis in original.] [ 67 ] Mr. McMeekin also suggests yet further (substantially) elevated punitive damages may be warranted: 50) while Punitive damages should be determine by the courts as a disciplinary action so no submission will be made to that, but 250,000.00- 500,000,000.00 would serve as a good deterrent to other Crown lawyers for code of conduct.

The General and aggravated damages of 10,000,000.00 are sought by Mr Mcmeekin in light of the Hardship faced by him and his family, the damage his reputation has received, the stress and anxiety that has occurred over the past 5 years for delays ect [sic, emphasis added.] d. Formal Offers to Settle [ 68 ] The next day Mr. McMeekin filed with the Court copies of unsigned and undated “Formal Offers to Settle”. The legal relevance of these documents are questionable. However, the contents are of interest. Mr.

McMeekin states he will discontinue Dreyfuss Civil Action #1 if, by February 28, 2012: 1. the Defendants pay $158,000.00 in costs; 2. the Attorney General pays $8,000,000.00 in general, aggravated and punitive damages; 3. the EHS pays $1,000,000.00 in aggravated and punitive damages; 4. $100,000.00 is donated to Northwest Territories kennels and animal shelters of Mr. McMeekin’s choice; 5. Mr. Herriot and Mr. Lim are reviewed by the “Upper Law society of Canada and Alberta”; and

6 charges are laid against the EHS for its neglect and sedating of Dreyfuss and “... using him in a photo opt for personal gains” [sic], with “damages paid to NWT Animals shelter of Mr Mcmeekin’s Choice - Amounts of $10,000.00”. [sic] e. McMeekin v. Alberta (Attorney General) , 2012 ABQB 144 [ 69 ] The Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 applications to strike, for default judgment, and other remedies were heard on February 17, 2012, then followed by written submissions from Mr. McMeekin. On March 7 Justice Marceau: 1. struck the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 action, 2. denied the various remedies sought by Mr.

McMeekin, and 3. awarded $2,500.00 in costs. [ 70 ] Justice Marceau concluded that the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 and Dreyfuss Civil Action #1 claims were largely the same. Mr. McMeekin’s steps to initiate and pursue the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 were an attempt to circumvent Justice Gates’ December 21 order, an abuse of process, and vexatious. Marceau J. observed that the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 met several of the Dykun v. Odinshaw , 2000 ABQB 548 criteria for a vexatious proceeding.

Either Rule 3.68 or the court’s inherent authority to control its own processes to prevent abuse were a basis to strike the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2. [ 71 ] The new allegations were also struck under Rule 3.68. Justice Marceau reviewed Rule 3.30, which provides a basis for why the Defendants were not in default for not having filed a Statement of Defence. The individual allegations against the new Defendants were wrong in law, contradictory, or sweeping generalizations. Mr. McMeekin had attempted to re-litigate the November 18, 2011 decision of Justice Veit.

Justice Marceau also observed that allegations of misconduct against government actors, lawyers, and the courts are a “common feature of vexatious litigation”. [ 72 ] Further, the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 was frivolous as having no hope of success, and inherently vexatious. Justice Marceau notes at para. 32 the troubling history of this dispute: ... Finally, the history of this litigation, while less than a year long, is already marked with numerous improper allegations, attempts to re-litigate settled issues, and general abuse of the process.

In light of this, I have no difficulty finding the remaining allegations to be vexatious. [ 73 ] Justice Marceau considered but did not order that Mr. McMeekin be prohibited from filing applications without leave of the court, per the Judicature Act , R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2, s. 23.1. f. Mr. McMeekin's March 7, 2012 “Application” [ 74 ] The same day that the Marceau judgment was released, Mr. McMeekin filed a further “Application” in the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2. This application seeks an order finding the Defendants in default and demands the various remedies identified in previous hearings.

This application is set for “after Special Chambers hearing Mar 29 2012”. g. Mr. McMeekin's Post-Decision Emails

[ 75 ] On March 16, 2012 Mr.

McMeekin sent the Defendants an email that was provided to the Court: Mrs Gilbert Mr Early please inform Mr Early that he is wasting my time hopes that his client will not have to pay me at least 10 million dollars he has no case. even if he succeeds in paying off another Justice i will pursue this action to the supreme court of canada The cost to his client will only escalate from here on in my filed offer to settle is still open to him with cost added at the rate set out by justice Marceau so each time i file it will cost him 25000.00 plus disbursements disbursements are expected to cost him 3,000.00 to 6,000.00 each time i have to appear.

Based on Justice Marceaus cost evaluation for the crown i realize that i grossly under estimated my cost in this action and will adjust those cost according. These proceedings have cost Me 6 years of my life and extreme hardship for the people around me one will likly die because of this little charade so that Mr [Herriot] could run around with his pecker in is hand and use the Justice system to run a sting operation to embexxel donations from honest pet owner they druged my dog up to use him for a photo opt and abused him.

Your client has no case i can prove each and every alligation do not waste my time with offers to settle under my proposed settlement The Justice department will also pay they cxan pay off justice Like Marceau but i dont think that they will be successful in the supreme court of canda, Im going to expose them for the criminals that they really are . [sic, emphasis added.] [ 76 ] Mr. McMeekin also “cc’ed” Justice Marceau’s assistant several email responses to Ms. Burns of Alberta Justice. In these emails Mr.

McMeekin alleges wrongdoing, including: ... pay off and influace a justice into Miccarrage of justice and JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT ... ... Your office has PAID OFF ANOTHER JUSTICE THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT JUSTICE JUSTICE MARCEAU HAS DONE THIS ... ... Your ability to influence justices within alberta courts has been well documented it will be dealt with ... 5. February 1 Special Chambers Hearing [ 77 ] Mr. McMeekin’s written arguments and “affidavit” for the February 1 special chambers hearing largely reiterate his November 10 statements, though he now also alleged: 1.

Master Schlosser will commit “judicial misconduct” and “miscarriage of justice” to cover up for the Attorney General,

2. counsel for the Defendants had ‘fabricated’ an order, and 3. that various media outlets had failed to comply with the November 10 order to provide documentation. [ 78 ] The “affidavit” also demands: 1. that the court dismiss or stay all charges against “the Accused with cost and damages paid to the accused”; 2. that Global National T.V. and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation each pay $10,000,000.00 for defaming Mr.

McMeekin and their participation “... in photo Scandal containing a heavily sedated Canine named Dreyfuss (Mr Mcmeekin’s Dog)”; and 3. $250,000,000.00-$500,000,000.00 in punitive damages would be appropriate “as a good deterrent to other Crown lawyers for code of conduct.” Mr. McMeekin requests that $500,000.00 of the punitive damages for a fund administered by Mr. McMeekin, the “Dreyfuss Mcmeekin opportunity program”, for aboriginal youth in remand. [ 79 ] Master Schlosser was assigned to hear the Special Chamber’s hearing to consider Mr.

McMeekin's and the Defendants’ reciprocal motions to strike their opposites’ pleadings. When Master Schlosser became aware of the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2, he recused himself and directed the matter be heard by a Queen’s Bench judge, pursuant to Court of Queen's Bench Act , R.S.A. 2000, c. C-31, s. 13. [ 80 ] Mr. McMeekin responded that Master Schlosser had no authority to direct that step, as he did not have an application and a supporting affidavit for this hearing, and stated: Now you know why I made these allegations against you.

It’s nothing more than abuse of process and judicial – judicial misconduct on your part. Now I think it’s going to keep on happening with individual judges. The chief judges have rules before you on – on – your – on -- on my application to – appeal from your judgment, but all three of them ignored the fact I wanted you removed from proceedings and here you are today. So I think that in order for – on order for me to get a fair hearing I (indiscernible) three judges before me in order to get a fair hearing because the Crown Prosecutors just keep paying you guys off. Mr.

McMeekin alleged Master Schlosser had not followed appropriate court procedure and threatened a complaint to “the judicial society”, and the proceeding ended with the following exchange: Mr. McMeekin: You’re a disgrace to the bench. You just – just – (indiscernible) – somebody’s – somebody’s uncle or somebody put you up there? Master Schlosser: My only regret, sir, is I do not have contempt powers. Mr. McMeekin: I don’t care. You’re an example of everything wrong with the judge’s system. 6. The March 29, 2012 Hearing

[ 81 ] Given the numerous steps that have led to this point, I will attempt to pare this matter down to a manageable size. I conclude that the matter before me is the full special chambers hearings that was directed by Master Schlosser on November 10, 2011. I will not consider any arguments relating to the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2; challenge of Justice Marceau’s decision is properly the jurisdiction of the Alberta Court of Appeal. [ 82 ] That means that Mr. McMeekin’s March 7, 2012 “Application” in the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2 is a nullity, and gives Mr. McMeekin no status in this hearing.

He still has his motion to strike and note in default from November 10, and any subsequent applications that are properly a part of this proceeding record. III. Mr. McMeekin ’s Litigation History [ 83 ] Mr. McMeekin has been busy. In recovering Justice Marceau’s decision on the Dreyfuss Civil Action #2, I located other cases that report Mr. McMeekin’s court activities.

He has initiated other actions in addition to the Dreyfuss Civil Actions #1 and #2, and his various attempts to resurrect or claim costs in relation to the Animal Protection Action. [ 84 ] These reported cases feature conduct and patterns that are relevant to the present application. A. The Liquor Store Contract [ 85 ] Between 2008-2010 Mr. McMeekin was involved in litigation that related to an opportunity to operate a liquor store in Hay River. This dispute led to a series of five reported decisions. [ 86 ] The facts of the dispute are reviewed in McMeekin v.

Northwest Territories (Liquor Commission) , 2008 NWTSC 67 , 169 A.C.W.S. (3d) 957. Mr. McMeekin was an unsuccessful bidder on this business opportunity. Justice Schuler explained Mr. McMeekin’s claims, a hybrid of judicial review and damages claims, in this way: 5 Mr.

McMeekin's Originating Notice requests the following relief, which I have paraphrased somewhat for clarification: 1. review of the Commission's award of RFP number LC-RFP-2006-01 regarding a retail liquor outlet and warehouse space; 2. review of the method used to apply the Business Incentive Policy; 3. restitution in the form of 15 months of payments made to Hay River Liquor Retailers "while without bondage"; 4. that the remaining term of the contract awarded, 8 years and 7 months, be awarded to Mr.

McMeekin; and 5. the resignation of the Commission's General Manager and the Deputy Minister of Finance for mismanagement of the RFP. The Liquor Commission moved to have the originating notice struck. [ 87 ] Mr. McMeekin had ignored the limitation period for the ‘judicial review component’ of his action. Mr. McMeekin explained he did that because “... he decided to put the community's interest in the zoning issue first, before his own personal interest in the claims

he wishes to pursue.”. That argument was rejected by the court. The demand for the resignation of government officials was outside the court’s jurisdiction, frivolous, and vexatious. Other aspects of the claim were moot. [ 88 ] Mr. McMeekin had initiated this action via an originating notice, while certain of the claims would have been properly expressed in a statement of claim. Justice Schuler gave Mr. McMeekin a 30 day window in which to file a statement of claim that captured the breach of contract aspects of this action. [ 89 ] Justice Schuler’s decision was subsequently confirmed in McMeekin v.

Northwest Territories (Liquor Commission) , 2010 NWTCA 1 . At para. 13 the Court summarizes the basis for Mr. McMeekin’s appeal: The appellant, who as already noted is self represented, does not appear to raise any errors made by the chambers judge but rather simply reiterates the arguments he made previously. [ 90 ] The next decision in this series, McMeekin v. Northwest Territories (Liquor Commission) , 2008 NWTSC 87 , 173 A.C.W.S. (3d) 362, relates to the statement of claim authorized by Justice Schuler. Mr.

McMeekin filed that statement of claim, but also the same day filed a notice of motion for the same remedies. Subsequently Mr. McMeekin filed notices of motion to declare the matter entered for trial and assigned to case management. [ 91 ] The Liquor Commission sought orders to strike the duplicative notice of motion, correct irregularities in the statement of claim, and strike the action. [ 92 ] Justice Charbonneau struck the duplicative notice of motion, dismissed Mr. McMeekin’s other motions, and ordered Mr. McMeekin to correct the defective statement of claim. Mr.

McMeekin’s attempts to move the matter to trial were premature, and Justice Charbonneau (at paras. 18-19) warned that was inappropriate as trial procedure is important and safeguards the rights of all participants: There are cases where, for various reasons, the parties agree to forego some of these procedural steps. ... But absent such agreement, a party cannot impose short cuts on another. That is so even if that party sincerely believes that there will be no benefit to following the usual procedures. What Mr.

McMeekin is asking the Court to do is set aside all of the usual rules for the sake of expediency, over the protests of the other party. The Court cannot do that. The Liquor Commission has the right to raise the issues it has raised about the validity of the statement of claim, and to obtain rulings before matters proceed further. [ 93 ] The Liquor Commission’s motion to strike was dismissed as the issues identified were better addressed by revision to the statement of claim. [ 94 ] The next decision addresses a motion by Mr. McMeekin to end the liquor store action, summarily, in his favour: McMeekin v.

Northwest Territories (Liquor Commission) , 2009 NWTSC 4 . Mr. McMeekin filed a motion that the Liquor Commission be noted in default as he alleged the Commission had not filed a statement of defence within the deadline required by the court rules. That motion was dismissed, that deadline was not in play because the defence had made a request for particulars. Mr. McMeekin had only responded to certain of those requests. The court provided detailed instructions and a timeline for the next steps in a civil procedure: paras. 10-17. Mr.

McMeekin was warned that non-compliance with court procedure may lead to expensive cost awards. [ 95 ] The last reported decision, McMeekin v. Northwest Territories (Liquor Commission) , 2009 NWTSC 30 , also addresses civil procedure issues that arose from applications by both litigants. Mr. McMeekin refused to inspect documentary material and instead demanded copies, and alleged other relevant material had not been disclosed but provided no evidence to substantiate that claim. A demand for confidential information that related to third parties was rejected. Mr.

McMeekin had received extensive answers to many requests for particulars, and that met the defendant’s obligations. [ 96 ] The Liquor Commission requested Mr. McMeekin to post security for costs. It observed that Mr. McMeekin had failed to pay a costs award in a related Court of Appeal decision, the action was frivolous and vexatious, and Mr. McMeekin lacked assets to pay

costs. Though Mr. McMeekin argued a requirement to pay security for costs would deny him access to a fair trial, Vertes J. ordered the matter would be terminated unless Mr. McMeekin deposited $15,000.00 in the next 60 days. [ 97 ] Justice Vertes (at para. 10) made an interesting observation on Mr. McMeekin’s conduct: It should also be noted that throughout these proceedings the plaintiff has represented himself. He has received a great deal of assistance from the court's registry staff so that he does not get bogged down with procedural irregularities.

It is evident that he has familiarized himself with the rules. I say evident because, since the exchange of pleadings, this case has become bogged down with motions of one sort or another . [Emphasis added.] [ 98 ] I do not believe the result of this trial is reported. B. Income Support Payment Judicial Review [ 99 ] A series of judgments relate to Mr. McMeekin’s challenge of a decision of the Northwest Territories to cut off income support that Mr. McMeekin receives as a consequence of his hearing impairment: 1. McMeekin v.

Northwest Territories (Department of Education, Culture and Employment) , 2010 NWTSC 27 , 209 C.R.R. (2d) 243, March 29, 2010; 2. McMeekin v. Northwest Territories (Department of Education, Culture and Employment) , 2010 NWTSC 56 , July 6, 2010; and 3. McMeekin v. Northwest Territories (Department of Education Culture and Employment) , 2011 NWTSC 1 , January 5, 2011. [ 100 ] The first decision explains the history of this dispute. Mr. McMeekin had received a disability benefit, but had not provided the provincial authorities with his income tax records, as was required by legislation. Mr.

McMeekin claimed that to file tax returns would be fraud. In 2009 his benefits were terminated. Mr. McMeekin appealed unsuccessfully to two administrative tribunals. He then challenged the tribunal decisions via judicial review. [ 101 ] Justice Vertes rejected Mr. McMeekin’s bases for the judicial review, but ordered a new hearing due to a defect in the appointment procedure for the subordinate administrative tribunal. Some of Vertes J.’s comments in relation to Mr. McMeekin are relevant here. Mr.

McMeekin advanced many claims not recognized by law or available in a judicial review: 12. ... in this case the applicant advances numerous claims which have no basis in law or procedure. He seeks a full review of the government's policies related to income assistance. He claims "compensation" for helping the government to develop practices and procedures dealing with appeals made by people with disabilities. He wants an investigation into the conduct of certain officials. He seems to think that the words "judicial review" connote some all-encompassing review of anything and everything. [ 102 ] Mr.

McMeekin made “careless” allegations of fraud and discrimination. When asked to substantiate his allegations, he offered no evidence. He advanced issues that are questions of social policy, rather than law. [ 103 ] At para. 13 Justice Vertes noted Mr. McMeekin, though self-represented, had developed significant understanding of court operations: The applicant is self-represented. He, like most self-represented litigants, has difficulties with some of the complex legal principles and procedural issues that apply to every case. But, he has proven himself to be adept at learning the basics.

And he has engaged in other litigation before this court. ...

[ 104 ] Justice Vertes heard the second judicial review on this issue, a decision reported as McMeekin v. Northwest Territories (Department of Education, Culture and Employment) , 2010 NWTSC 56 . The territorial government had appointed a properly constituted new appeal tribunal to consider whether Mr. McMeekin’s disability benefit should be discontinued, which it was. Mr. McMeekin failed to attend the hearing, acknowledged that failure to attend was his fault, and requested a new hearing, which was denied. That decision to refuse a rehearing was the basis for this second judicial review. [ 105 ] Once again, Mr.

McMeekin sought remedies outside those available on judicial review. He alleged that a requirement to disclose his income tax records was an invasion of privacy. Mr. McMeekin’s allegation that the board members were biased as they were lawyers or in some manner linked to the territorial government was rejected. The ex parte proceeding was not only appropriate, it was required by legislation. [ 106 ] Mr. McMeekin had also challenged the board’s decision in two ways.

He initiated an appeal to the ‘upper’ disability benefit appeal tribunal, but also bypassed the ‘upper’ appeal tribunal and instead immediately launched a judicial review after the decision of the ‘lower’ appeal tribunal. Mr. McMeekin explained this as “he has no faith in the Appeal Board.”. This failure to take advantage of alternative non-judicial remedies was another basis to deny Mr. McMeekin’s application. [ 107 ] Perhaps unsurprisingly, Mr. McMeekin then also challenged the decision of the ‘upper’ appeal tribunal. It had concluded that termination of Mr. McMeekin’s disability benefits was appropriate.

Justice Richard noted, at para. 18, that some of the remedies sought in this judicial review were duplicated in a civil action against the tribunal and territorial government, which had by that time been struck (see McMeekin v. GNWT (Dept. of Education, Culture & Employment) , 2010 NWTSC 89 ). Again, many remedies sought were outside the court’s jurisdiction. [ 108 ] The documentation filed to support the judicial review was irregular: 22 In launching this judicial review application, the Applicant filed two documents on November 12, 2010 - an Originating Notice and an affidavit sworn by the Applicant.

The affidavit document contains no factual allegations, merely submissions and arguments similar to those contained in the Originating Notice, and is thus mis-labelled as "affidavit". [ 109 ] Mr. McMeekin’s allegations of bias were rejected. For example, the resumes of the board members did not “attract even a suspicion of partiality or bias.”. Similarly, a connection to the territorial government did not affect the board’s impartiality.

There were numerous spurious and irrelevant issues in the applicant’s submissions: 30 Any other "grounds" that might be gleaned from the Originating Notice are not properly within the scope of judicial review of the Board's decision, for example, whether government ought to administer its disability benefits programs and income assistance programs together or separately, and whether lottery winnings ought to be taxable, or deductible from social assistance benefits. 31 Much of the Applicant's oral submissions to the Court on the hearing of the within (third) judicial review application were extraneous to the matter before the Court and consisted of either,

a) a rant against government policies, or

b) self-aggrandizing statements that he was not involved in these appeals and litigation for himself but rather for all NWT residents. [ 110 ] Mr. McMeekin was re-litigating the same issues. Justice Richard concluded at para. 32 that this “... constitutes an abuse of the Court's process.” C. Income Support Tribunal Defamation Action [ 111 ] In May of 2010, Mr. McMeekin sued the Northwest Territories Department of Education, Culture and Employment, alleging he had been defamed by certain Department employees. Two reported cases address this action: McMeekin v. GNWT (Department of

Education, Culture and Employment) , 2010 NWTSC 66 , August 11, 2010; McMeekin v. GNWT (Dept. of Education, Culture & Employment) , cited above. [ 112 ] The first action relates to a motion by Mr. McMeekin, which alleged the department’s statement of defence was not filed in time, requested the defendant be noted in default, and demanded final judgment and damages. Charbonneau J. dismissed the application.

She observed that, while the relevant court rules required that the statement of defence is filed in 25 days, that deadline may be extended by steps such as a demand for particulars, as occurred in this case. [ 113 ] Very shortly before the hearing Mr. McMeekin filed a second application, demanding again

summary judgment and damages. The Minister argued this compromised his ability to respond. Justice Charbonneau refused to hear the McMeekin application and instead scheduled a single hearing to address the reciprocal motions to strike. Mr. McMeekin demanded costs, which were denied. [ 114 ] The second reported decision arises from that scheduled hearing. It provides the details of Mr. McMeekin’s allegations. Various unsupported allegations were no basis for a claim against the defendants. Mr.

McMeekin’s demands for costs were unreasonable, particularly as he had received costs in related litigation where he was successful. His claim for retroactive support benefits to the date of his birth was not supported by the relevant legislation. [ 115 ] The alleged defamation occurred during the hearings that were the subject of the McMeekin v. Northwest Territories (Department of Education, Culture and Employment) , 2010 NWTSC 56 judicial review. The persons who allegedly defamed Mr. McMeekin were the members of an income support appeals committee who were meeting, in private, to discuss a response to Mr.

McMeekin’s refusal to disclose his financial records. Mr. McMeekin had been invited to attend this hearing, but had not appeared. [ 116 ] The alleged defamation is found in a partial transcript of the hearing. Mr. McMeekin’s case worker explains to the committee members that Mr. McMeekin’s failure to comply is a consequence of his disabilities, a pathological and total lack of trust, schizophrenia, and a failure to take medication to assist with those conditions. The committee members discuss what kind of representation might assist Mr. McMeekin, though his case worker explained that Mr.

McMeekin would almost certainly refuse any such assistance. [ 117 ] Justice Cooper observed that Mr. McMeekin had failed to identify what speech was defamatory, that the alleged tortfeasors had not been named in the action, and one was absent from the meeting. All participants were protected by qualified privilege and the case worker had not spoken with malice. There was no case against the defendant. Mr. McMeekin’s action was struck. [ 118 ] Mr. McMeekin demanded

summary judgment against the defendants, security for costs, and filed additional late materials to amend his statement of claim to further increase the damages claimed. These motions were denied. [ 119 ] Justice Cooper makes the following comment on Mr.

McMeekin’s conduct at para. 44: I should add that had the Defendant’s claim been denied or merely successful in part and were the action to continue, I would have ordered security for costs against the Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 633(1) on the basis that the Plaintiff failed to pay three previous bills of costs as ordered by this court (see affidavits of Peter Maher and Blair Barbour) in a previous action and because I have good reason to believe the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious and that the Plaintiff has insufficient assets in the Territories to pay costs. [Emphasis added.] D.

Deaf Pension Claim [ 120 ] More recently Mr. McMeekin has been in a dispute with the Federal Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, which resulted in two reported decisions: McMeekin v. Canada (Human Resources and Skills Development) , 2011 FCA 165 , May 31, 2011; and McMeekin v. Canada (Human Resources and Skills Development) , 2012 FC 58 , January 16, 2012. [ 121 ] The Federal Court of Appeal decision provides a background to the matter. In 2006 Mr. McMeekin applied for a Canada

Pension Plan disability pension. His hearing impairment was the basis. His initial application was denied but ultimately he was granted a pension from 2005 onward. It seems Mr. McMeekin had refused to undergo a required medical examination, but once that step occurred the pension was granted. [ 122 ] Mr. McMeekin sought judicial review of the order, asking for “numerous remedies” and a longer retroactive pension period. He alleged a secret meeting between Justice Desmarais, a member of the Pension Appeals Board, and the Minister. The Minister sought further details on this alleged misconduct. Mr.

McMeekin failed to respond to the questions and his action was dismissed. [ 123 ] The Federal Court of Appeal decision is an appeal of that order. Mr. McMeekin demanded an extensive range of remedies, which include: 1. various costs awards totalling $60,000.00 and a further $500,000.00 for “hardship brought on by unreasonable delays and abuse”, 2. “an order declaring the Minister to be in default”, 3. disclosure of all information relating to Mr. McMeekin, 4. “an order granting Mr. McMeekin

summary judgment in this application because of unreasonable delay, abuse of process, abuse of privilege and abuse of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ”, 5. $10,000,000.00 in damages, 6. close to 10 years of retroactive pension, and 7. “an order compelling the Minister to introduce legislation to assist deaf people to receive disability pensions without further determination”. [ 124 ] Noting Mr. McMeekin’s “consistent complaints about the many years of delay”, the court concluded any alleged delay in service was irrelevant and allowed Mr.

McMeekin more time to answer the Minister’s inquiries. [ 125 ] Sharlow J.A. then warns Mr. McMeekin to focus his court activities to subjects that are relevant: [27] First, contrary to Mr. McMeekin’s apparent understanding, this Court has no jurisdiction, in the context of an application for judicial review of a decision of the Pension Appeals Board, to compel the Minister to pay damages or to introduce legislative amendments. It would be counter productive for Mr.

McMeekin to reassert such claims in this proceeding. [28] Second, this Court has no jurisdiction to require the payment of retroactive disability benefits except in accordance with the Canada Pension Plan. Nor does this Court have the jurisdiction to order the payment of retroactive disability payments as compensation for alleged wrongful behaviour on the part of the Minister, Ministerial officials, or counsel for the Minister. Again, it would be counter productive for Mr. McMeekin to reassert such claims in this proceeding. [ 126 ] Justice Sharlow concludes:

[32] Finally, I note that Mr. McMeekin alleges in the affidavit included in his motion record that the Minister or counsel for the Minister acted improperly in influencing Justice Trudel to make her order of April 7, 2011. That allegation is unsupported by any evidence on the record. Mr. McMeekin is advised that it is considered an abuse of the Court’s process to make unsubstantiated allegations of improper behaviour in connection with Court proceedings.

Such an abuse of process could result in the dismissal of this application. [ 127 ] The subsequent Federal Court decision denies review of a costs order against Mr. McMeekin. The chronology provided at para. 3 indicates that, on June 28, 2011, Mr. McMeekin’s judicial review had been dismissed. IV. Analysis A. The Motion to Strike [ 128 ] The Crown Defendants and the EHS Defendants argue that Mr. McMeekin’s action is defective in separate ways.

The Crown Defendants say they are shielded by prosecutorial discretion, while the EHS Defendants observe that the statement of claim was filed outside the limitations period, nullifying Mr. McMeekin’s claim. [ 129 ] The Crown filed affidavits from Mr. Herriot and Mr. Lim. The EHS Defendants submitted an affidavit of Stephanie McDonald, executive direction and CEO of the Edmonton Humane Society. [ 130 ] There are two further bases on which I will consider a motion to strike. The first is the logical corollary of Mr. McMeekin’s argument before me. Both Mr.

McMeekin’s documentary materials and his oral submissions insist that the misconduct by Mr. Herriot, Mr. Lim, and the EHS was plain and obvious from the transcripts of the relevant hearings. Mr. McMeekin repeatedly invited me to review the transcripts that are parts of the Crown’s materials, and from that I would know that this action could have only one possible outcome - in his favour. [ 131 ] Second, I have previously reviewed Mr. McMeekin’s activities in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in relation to this matter. I will evaluate whether the manner in which Mr.

McMeekin has conducted himself is vexatious, and, if so, whether that warrants termination of his claim against the Defendants. 1. The Legal Test [ 132 ] I will first evaluate the application by the Defendants that the Dreyfuss Civil Action #1 be terminated and

summary judgment ordered in favour of the Defendants. The authority for that application is provided by Rule 7.3(1).

Summary judgment can be ordered where there is no merit to a claim, or part of it: Rule , 7.3(1)(a). [ 133 ] The test is well established. Rule 7.3(1) applies the same criteria and analysis as Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 390/1968, s. 159(b): Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. v. Executive Centre at Manulife Place Inc. , 2011 ABQB 189 at para. 11 , 48 Alta. L.R. (5th) 178; Encana Corp. v. ARC Resources Ltd. , 2011 ABQB 431 at para. 7 . [ 134 ] The Supreme Court of Canada has recently restated the test and threshold for meritless claims in Canada (Attorney General) v.

Lameman; Papaschase Indian Band No. 136 (Descendents of) v. Canada (Attorney General); Papaschase Indian Band No. 136 v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2008 SCC 14 at paras. 10-11 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 372 [“ Canada v. Lameman ”]: ... The

summary judgment rule serves an important purpose in the civil litigation system. It prevents claims or defences that have no chance of success from proceeding to trial . Trying unmeritorious claims imposes a heavy price in terms of time and cost on the parties to the litigation and on the justice system. It is essential to the proper operation of the justice system and beneficial to the parties that claims that have no chance of success be weeded out at an early stage. Conversely, it is essential to justice that claims disclosing real issues that

may be successful proceed to trial. For this reason, the bar on a motion for

summary judgment is high. The defendant who seeks

summary dismissal bears the evidentiaryburden of showing that there is "no genuine issue of material fact requiring trial" ... The defendant must prove this; it cannot rely on mereallegations or the pleadings ... If the defendant does prove this, the plaintiff must either refute or counter the defendant's evidence, or risksummary dismissal ... Each side must "put its best foot forward" with respect to the existence or non-existence of material issues to betried ...

The chambers judge may make inferences of fact based on the undisputed facts before the court, as long as the inferences arestrongly supported by the facts ... [Emphasis added.] 2. No Meritorious Claim a. Crown Defendants [135] The Crown Defendants suggest that the best way to characterize the principal complaint directed against Mr. Herriot and Mr.Lim is that they engaged in a malicious prosecution. In this instance that malicious prosecution includes the unusual element that Mr.McMeekin also alleges that Mr. Lim’s decision to discontinue the Animal Welfare Action is also malicious.

That is, quite obviously, acurious assertion. [136] The Crown suggests that separate defamation and conspiracy allegations exist, but I believe that Mr. McMeekin’s allegations ofCrown misconduct are best grouped as a particularly broad instance of wrongful prosecution, which included illegitimate intentions (forexample the ‘sting operation’ on behalf of the EHS and the Crown prosecutors obtaining personal benefits), collusion with andmanipulation of judicial officials, and the objective of creating a publicized precedent case by making an example of Mr. McMeekin. [137] The Crown cites Miazga v.

Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339 as providing the current approach to prosecutorialmisconduct. Generally, policy limits court review of the decisions of the Attorney General and Crown prosecutors: [47] In exercising their discretion to prosecute, Crown prosecutors perform a function inherent in the office of the Attorney Generalthat brings the principle of independence into play.

Its fundamental importance lies, not in protecting the interests of individual Crownattorneys, but in advancing the public interest by enabling prosecutors to make discretionary decisions in fulfilment of their professionalobligations without fear of judicial or political interference, thus fulfilling their quasi-judicial role as “ministers of justice” ... the public good is clearly served by the maintenance of a sphere of unfettered discretion within which Crown attorneys can properlypursue their professional goals. [138] While a Crown prosecutor is potentially liable in tort (Nelles v.

Ontario, (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, 60D.L.R. (4th) 609), the form of misconduct that triggers that kind of sanction cannot arise from errors in judgment or discretion or evenprofessional negligence (Nelles v. Ontario, at p. 199). [139] The requirements of this tort are strict. Miazga v. Kvello Estate at para. 48 cites R. v.

Power, (SCC), [1994] 1S.C.R. 601 at 614-615, 117 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 269 for its description of that threshold of misconduct required: ... courts have a residual discretion to remedy an abuse of the court’s process but only in the “clearest of cases”, which, in my view,amounts to conduct which shocks the conscience of the community and is so detrimental to the proper administration of justice that itwarrants judicial intervention. ... the abuse of process ... requires overwhelming evidence that the proceedings under scrutiny are unfair to the point that they arecontrary to the interest of justice. ...

Where there is conspicuous evidence of improper motives or of bad faith or of

an act so wrong that itviolates the conscience of the community, such that it would genuinely be unfair and indecent to proceed, then, and only then, shouldcourts intervene to prevent an abuse of process which could bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Cases of this nature will be

extremely rare . [Emphasis added.] [ 140 ] Miazga v. Kvello Estate , at para. 50 , states a judge should not second-guess a Crown prosecutor: ... the public interest in setting the threshold for such liability very high, so as to deter all but the most serious claims against the prosecuting authorities, and to ensure that Crown liability is engaged in only the most exceptional circumstances. [ 141 ] The tort has four elements ( Miazga v.

Kvello Estate , at para. 3 ): To succeed in an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the prosecution was: (1) initiated by the defendant; (2) terminated in favour of the plaintiff; (3) undertaken without reasonable and probable cause; and (4) motivated by malice or a primary purpose other than that of carrying the law into effect. [ 142 ] The Crown argues that Mr. McMeekin’s action fails on the third and fourth elements. Mr. Herriot and Mr. Lim had both subjective and objective belief of a reasonable and probable cause which provided a basis for the Animal Welfare Action. I agree.

The reported documentary events of June 7, 2006, and Mr. McMeekin’s acknowledgement that he owned and controlled Dreyfuss provide that foundation. I therefore conclude that the action against the Crown Defendants cannot succeed. [ 143 ] The Crown also argues Mr. McMeekin has not demonstrated that Mr. Herriot and Mr. Lim acted in a malicious manner and with malicious intent. It notes that in Miazga v.

Kvello Estate , at para. 81 , malice is a positive, intentional, improper purpose: By requiring proof of an improper purpose, the malice element of the tort of malicious prosecution ensures that liability will not be imposed in cases where a prosecutor proceeds, absent reasonable and probable grounds, by reason of incompetence, inexperience, poor judgment, lack of professionalism, laziness, recklessness, honest mistake, negligence, or even gross negligence. [ 144 ] I have reviewed the evidence before the Court and concluded there is nothing to support the allegations made by Mr. McMeekin.

I develop that review more fully below. That is a second basis on which the action by Mr. McMeekin against the Crown Defendants must fail. [ 145 ] The Crown also observes that the defamation allegation directed at Mr. Herriot is not detailed as required by Rule 13.7(f), and that, given Mr. Herriot’s involvement in this matter ended in 2008, his potential defamatory speech would have occurred at an earlier point that falls outside the two year limitation period for civil litigation. I generally agree with that proposition.

However, the pleadings deficiencies could be cured by amendment of the statement of claim, and that might reveal a differe

[…]