Fufa v University of Alberta, 2012 ABQB 594

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: Fufa v University of Alberta, 2012 ABQB 594 Date: 20120927 Docket: 1103 20194 Registry: Edmonton Between: Adane Fufa Appellant - and - University of Alberta Respondent _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice R.P. Marceau _______________________________________________________ Appeal from the Judgment by W.S. Schlosser, Master in Chambers Dated the 19 th day of June, 2012 Filed on the 19 th day of June, 2012 ( 2012 ABQB 405 , Docket: 1103 20194) Introduction

[ 1 ] This is an appeal from a Master ’ s decision dismissing the Appellant ’ s suit against the Respondent University. Before the Master, the Respondent successfully relied upon Rule 3.68, or alternatively, Rule 7.3 of the Alberta Rules of Court to dismiss the Appellant ’ s Statement of Claim: Alta Reg 124/2010 [ Rules of Court ]. [ 2 ] The standard of review of a Master ’ s decision is correctness as to all issues; namely correctness on the law and correctness as to the facts: Bahcheli v Yorkton Securities Inc. , 2012 ABCA 166 at para 30 .

Facts [ 3 ] The Appellant was a doctoral candidate in the Department of Rural Economy at the Respondent University of Alberta. He commenced his studies in 2007, but was slow to complete the necessary course work or secure a supervisor for his doctoral thesis. His progress was delayed for various reasons, including difficulties he had in passing the required preliminary examinations. He launched three separate appeals to the Chair of Rural Economy in relation to these preliminary examinations, and was granted an unusual third opportunity to write one of them.

According to the Graduate Coordinator, Professor Luckert, the normal progress for a student in their department was for students to complete their course work and preliminary examinations in two years. Mr. Fufa required 34 months. [ 4 ] Due to unsatisfactory academic performance, and upon receiving a recommendation from the Graduate Coordinator, the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research ( “ FGSR ” ) ultimately required the Appellant to withdraw from the doctoral program.

At this time, the Appellant was advised of his internal appeal rights. [ 5 ] The Appellant exhausted the internal appeals processes of the University. He appealed through the formal appeal channels, filing an appeal with the FGSR Academic Appeals Committee and an appeal of that decision with the Graduate Faculties Council Academic Appeals Committee. He contacted and received assistance from the OmbudService and ombudsman. He also submitted complaints and informal appeals of the decision and his alleged mistreatment to the President and Vice-President of the University.

None of these appeals were successful. [ 6 ] Instead of seeking judicial review of those decisions, the Appellant then filed a Statement of Claim containing a plethora of allegations against the University. Those claims were aptly summarized by the Master from the Appellant ’ s Statement of Claim: Fufa v University of Alberta , 2012 ABQB 405 at para 8 [ Fufa ] .

The basis of the claims are: conspiracy, negligence, breach of a duty of care (although this was characterized as “ negligence in duty of care and failure to act ” ), discrimination, abuse of power, undue influence, acting in bad faith and wrongful dismissal. Issues [ 7 ] The issues on appeal are: 1. Did the Appellant ’ s Statement of Claim plead no cause of action, such that it was capable of being struck pursuant to Rule 3.68(2)(b)? 2. If no, was the claim nevertheless able to be struck on the basis that

summary judgment was appropriate pursuant to Rule 7.3(1)(

b) or 3.68(2)(a), (c), (d), or (e)? 3. Interwoven with these two issues is the overarching issue of, in what circumstances, if any, a student may nevertheless have

recourse to the Courts after exhausting the internal appeals processes of a university. Analysis [ 8 ] I begin by setting out Rule 3.68 and the

summary judgment provisions of the Rules of Court : 3.68

(1) If the circumstances warrant and a condition under subrule (2) applies, the Court may order one or more of the following: (

a) that all or any part of a claim or defence be struck out; (

b) that a commencement document or pleading be amended or set aside; (

c) that judgment or an order be entered; (

d) that an action, an application or a proceeding be stayed.

(2) The conditions for the order are one or more of the following: (

a) the Court has no jurisdiction; (

b) a commencement document or pleading discloses no reasonable claim or defence to a claim; (

c) a commencement document or pleading is frivolous, irrelevant or improper; (

d) a commencement document or pleading constitutes an abuse of process; (

e) an irregularity in a commencement document or pleading is so prejudicial to the claim that it is sufficient to defeat the claim.

(3) No evidence may be submitted on an application made on the basis of the condition set out in subrule (2)(b). [ 9 ] The test for striking a statement of claim under Rule 3.68 is as follows: assuming that the facts as stated in the statement of claim can be proven, is it ‘ plain and obvious ’ that the plaintiff ’ s statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, as identified by the Master in Abbasi v Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance Co. , 2003 ABQB 760 [ Abbasi ] . Another instance under Rule 3.68 where a claim is capable of being struck is where the Court has no jurisdiction. [ 10 ] In relation to an application for

summary judgment, the Alberta Rules of Court state as follows: 7.2 On application, the Court may at any time in an action give judgment or an order to which an Appellant is entitled when (

a) admissions of fact are made in a pleading or otherwise, or (

b) the only evidence consists of records and an affidavit is sufficient to prove the authenticity of the records in which the evidence is contained. 7.3(1) A party may apply to the Court for

summary judgment in respect of all or part of a claim on one or more of the following grounds:

(

a) there is no defence to a claim or part of it; (

b) there is no merit to a claim or part of it; (

c) the only real issue is the amount to be awarded. [11] If the application is successful, the Court has the power to grant a variety of remedies, one of which is dismissal of all or partof a claim in the action: Rules of Court, Rule 7.3(3). [12] In a concurring decision, Slatter J.A. made the following statement in regards to the test for

summary judgment: “the test forsummary judgment has been variously stated to be whether there is “no genuine issue for trial”, or whether the action is “bound to fail”,or if it is “clearly without merit”: Murphy Oil Co. v Predator Corp., 2006 ABCA 69": Gayton v Lacasse, 2010 ABCA 123. The test canbe summarized as being satisfied when the Appellant demonstrates there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring trial: GuaranteeCo. of North America v Gordon Capital Corp., (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 423 at para 27, as cited in Blood Tribe v Canada(Attorney General), 2012 ABCA 206. [13] The onus is on the applicant for

summary judgment, in this case the Respondent University, to demonstrate that the claim hasno merit. Once this is established, the onus then shifts to the respondent, Mr.

Fufa the Appellant, to show in his affidavit that the claimdoes indeed have merit. [14] Keeping the appropriate Rules of Court in mind, I turn now to address the underlying issue of when a student may haverecourse to the judiciary despite exhausting the internal appeal mechanisms of an academic institution. [15] It is well established that the Post-Secondary Learning Act, SA 2003, c P-19.5, provides the University with sole authorityover academic matters including admissions, grading, passing and failing, discipline, and appeals from any and all of those decisions.The Act creates a variety of appeal mechanisms from decisions made within an educational context and academia under the finalauthority of the University Board of Governors and the General Faculties Council.

This grants the universities autonomy in makingacademic decisions: Yen v Alberta (Advanced Education), 2010 ABQB 380 at paras 34-36 [Yen]. [16] As a result of this autonomy, in the absence of a flagrant disregard as to the rules of natural justice, the Alberta Courts havebeen reluctant to interfere with decisions of an academic nature where a dissatisfied student has attempted to utilize the judiciary tocircumvent the legislation and the university’s authority: Yen; Rittenhouse-Carlson v Portage College, 2009 ABQB 342 [Rittenhouse];Naimji v University of Alberta (1988), (AB KB), 87 AR 357 (Q.B.). [17] In Yen, Browne J. wrote at paragraph 38: In Tillack v The Governors of the University of Calgary (unreported), February 8, 1983, Prowse J. came to a similar result.

An appeal tothe Court of Appeal against this decision was dismissed. In a memorandum of judgment delivered from the bench on October 12, 1983,Laycraft J.A. stated: It is also implicit in the procedures that they are to be effective. To say that the appellant may follow them and when he doesn’t like theresult, go to Court, is to say that the parties deliberately agreed upon a process which would be singularly ineffective.

Surely, it isimplicit in such elaborate procedures that they were intended as a final adjudication and the mere fact that the Universities Act does notsay that in so many words does not mean in our opinion that this meaning should not be implied. Had the appeal process been defective,the appellant may well have been able to have the defects reviewed and corrected and a new and correct process carried out by resort tothe appropriate perogative [sic] writs.

His time for so doing is long since expired and this action is at most a colourable attempt to obtainthat review out of time. [18] A number of decisions indicate the manner in which claims of an academic nature are approached. The Master correctlyidentified this, and cited from the decision of Browne J. in Yen, which provides a detailed

summary of the law in this area: Fufa, at para9. As did the Master, I find it useful to reproduce an excerpt from Browne J.’s decision:

[40] Gill J., in Rittenhouse-Carlson, in reaching his decision summarized the law in regard to the relationship between students andan educational institution: 1. A student who is registered and paid tuition in a post secondary program is in a contractual relationship with the institution. Thestudent must be taken to know and accept the regulations of the institution in determining academic matters set out in documents such as the university calendar. Wong v. University of Toronto (1989), (ON SC), 79 D.L.R (4th) 652 (Ont. D.C.) Court has nojurisdiction to deal with academic matters. 2.

A student is bound by the requirements set for the program by the post secondary institution and the academic policies, and isrequired to follow and knows, or should know, what is required to satisfy the program’s requirements. Courts have no power to intervenemerely because it is thought that the standards are too high, or that the student’s work was inaccurately assessed; 3. The relationship between a student and a post-secondary institution has a contractual foundation, which gives rise to duties in bothcontract and tort. Bella v. Young, 2006 SCC 3 (at para. 31). 4.

The standard of care owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff can be ascertained from the terms of the contract between the parties.Further, those whose professional responsibilities include the exercise of power over the careers and future lives of fee paying studentsare required to take the necessary care to get their facts straight before taking a potential career ending action in relation to a student.They are required to have reasonable cause to take action. Bella v.

Young, 2006 SCC 3 , [2006] 1 S.C.R. 108, 2006 SCC 3(S.C.C.) at para. 34. [41] Courts typically do not interfere if a student does not pass a course, unless fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of the institutionis proven: Doane v.

Mount Saint Vincent University and Maloney, (1977), (NS SC), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 297; 24 N.S.R.(2d) 298 (N.S.S.C.T.D.) at para. 34. [42] The Courts are reluctant to intervene in decisions of educational institutions relating to academic evaluation, save where theAppellant has shown that he or she was treated with such manifest unfairness that there was a flagrant violation of the rules of naturaljustice: Dawson v. University of Ottawa, (1994), 72 O.A.C. 232; 48 A.C.W.S. (3d) 341 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at para. 7, aff’d [1995] O.J. No.2733 (Ont. C.A.). [43] A

summary of these cases confirms that a contract exists between a student and an educational institution, and further confirmsthat the terms of the contract governing the relationship are contained in the university calendars, internal admission, withdrawal andappeal procedures and academic policies.

Within that contract, the University owes a duty of care to a student - a duty of fairness inmaking career-ending academic decisions. [44] The standards for a university degree and the assessment of a student’s work are so clearly vested in the university that theCourts have no power to intervene merely because it is thought that the standards are too high, or that the student’s work wasinaccurately assessed, in the absence of a denial of natural justice: Houston v. University of Saskatchewan (Joint Senate - CouncilBoard of Student Appeals), (SK KB), [1994] 4 W.W.R. 387; 117 Sask.

R. 291 (Q.B.) at para. 17. [19] The claim in Yen was ultimately struck pursuant to the old Rule 129 as disclosing no cause of action in the pleadings, as theclaim was of an academic nature and therefore strictly within the purview of the university. A portion of the statement of claim in Yendisclosed tortious acts which were not characterized as academic in nature. Those were tort claims for intentional infliction of mentalsuffering and conspiracy.

Both of those claims were also ultimately struck as an abuse of process: Yen, at paras 51-55. [20] The Yen decision also commented upon the Rittenhouse decisions of both Justices Gill and Lee. In Rittenhouse, an initialapplication was brought before the Court for advice and direction, which was heard by Lee J. In the introductory paragraph of Lee J.’sdecision, it is alluded to that the College sought to have the claim dismissed in its entirety: Rittenhouse-Carlson v Portage College, 2008ABQB 486 at para 2. However, that issue is not addressed in the decision of Lee J.

The comment was made in Yen, that it was ananomaly that the Rittenhouse case proceeded to trial at all, given the academic nature of the dispute: Yen, at para 39.

[ 21 ] In the trial of Rittenhouse , Gill J. set out the claim he was adjudicating upon in paragraph 1 as follows: The Plaintiff was a student in the Health Care Aide program ( “ the program ” ) offered by the Defendant Portage College ( “ the College ” ) between February and June of 2004. As a result of failing the practicum component of the program the Plaintiff did not graduate. In this action the Plaintiff alleges wrongful and malicious actions by the College including negligence and breach of contract.

The Plaintiff claims general, punitive and special damages. [ 22 ] It is apparent from this decision that Gill J. examined the actions of the College academic staff and would have granted a remedy had he found wrongful actions on their

part including breach of contract or malicious conduct. He acknowledged that the internal appeal procedures had to be followed but he also acknowledged that wrongful and malicious actions by the College could lead to an independent remedy.

Gill J. clearly made the finding that the actions of the College had been made in good faith, and there had not been a breach of contract, breach of duty, or any other wrongful act by the College: Rittenhouse , at para 98 . [ 23 ] What is gleaned from a review of this jurisprudence is that there is precedent for allowing a remedy where there has been a flagrant denial of natural justice. However, the Appellant in this case did not seek judicial review of the decision made by the University.

Rather he sought to be transferred to another department or be granted his prayer for damages in tort and breach of contract as set out in the Statement of Claim. [ 24 ] Consequentially, as the pith and substance of the claims disclosed in the matter before me are academic in nature, all stemming back to the Appellant ’ s termination in the doctoral program, the Court has no jurisdiction to intervene unless the Appellant was treated with such manifest unfairness that there was a violation of the rules of natural justice or there was tortious conduct.

As was the case in Yen , there are other areas of concern raised by the Appellant which do not fall strictly within the domain of academic issues. These can be summarized as the claims for tortious conspiracy, breach of a duty of care, negligence, acting in bad faith, abuse of process, and wrongful dismissal. [ 25 ] The Appellant in his affidavits identifies correspondence between faculty members, which led to a recommendation that he be required to withdraw from the PhD program. These excerpts the Appellant contends evidence the University ’ s attempt to conspire to terminate his PhD program.

The excerpts the Appellant refers to can be summarized as follows, and are subsequently reproduced in their entirety:

(1) Evidence from the beginning of his PhD program of a difficulty in taking direction;

(2) While the Appellant ’ s progress within the PhD program is adequate, but his ability to retain a supervisor is in jeopardy; and

(3) Transfer inquiry to other department. [ 26 ] The relevant excerpts are reproduced in order of the summarized points above: Email correspondence between Dr. Harrington and Ms. Fowler, May 26, 2011: He simply does not follow guidelines given, or will not follow guidance given because he believes he knows best, which is probably the underlying problem with his PhD studies from the beginning, and continues to be the problem with respect to his acceptance of the reality that his Department and Faculty have decided to terminate his studies.

Email correspondence between Doctors Harrington, Rude, Swallow and Luckert, March 8, 2011: Thanks for the clarification and for the heavy lifting on this file. James, Marty Luckert and I briefly discussed this issue this morning. At this point, I do not think that we can say that we provided sufficient warning to Adane. Since he started serious work on the Ethiopia nutrition-poverty case a few weeks ago, I would say that his performance has been adequate. However, now that he is stating that he has so much trouble working with James and I, we can move along the line of “ failure to secure a supervisor ” .

We agree that he would provide a specific output by tomorrow. At this point, we propose to wait until after tomorrow before drafting a formal letter along the

lines you indicate below. Email correspondence between Dr. Harrington and the Appellant, March 8, 2011: I have emphasized that it is vital that you secure a supervisor or co-supervisors within your department in order to continue with your studies, and I can only urge you once again to work with your department. A subsequent email to the same effect was sent on April 27, 2011.

The excerpt is as follows: Failure to secure a supervisor for your studies can be grounds for terminating a program of graduate studies and I have warned you in the past about the potential consequences of your allegations and complaints and their negative effect on your efforts to secure a supervisor for your studies. Email correspondence between Dr. Harrington and Dr. Humphreys, March 14, 2011: Many thanks for your reply. I appreciate the situation. I should clarify that I am not looking for assistance in securing a transfer, and nor was Rural Economy, which wishes to terminate the student ’ s program.

I was simply hoping for the cold facts to present to the student about the likelihood of a transfer, since the student seems to thing [sic] that it would be easy to transfer. I was hoping that you would say that an applicant for transfer would need to put together an application that would be considered by the graduate committee, with this application including information on what the student has done since coming to the U of A, and I was hoping that you would advise that the student would have to start from the beginning e.g. that his courses in Rural Economy would not count towards an Economics degree.

Your advice on the non-acceptability of the courses is very useful. Frankly, I am trying to convince the student that a voluntarily [sic] withdrawal is his best option, but the student is being unrealistic and seems to think he can transfer. I have explained that a transfer requires the acceptance of the receiving department, and so your message is helpful in that it is clear that there is no space in Economics.

On my return next week, I will be advising the student that a transfer to Economics is not an option, and thus I will go ahead with my decision to accept the recommendation from Rural Economy to require the student to withdraw. In follow-up to this internal communication received by FGSR, an e-mail was sent to the Appellant, May 17, 2011: As you requested at our meeting of 10 May 2011, I have also contacted the Department of Economics to inquire as to the possibility of a transfer from the PhD program in the Department of Rural Economy to the master ’ s program in the Department of Economics.

I have received advice from the Associate Chair, Graduate Studies in the Department of Economics, Professor Brad Humphreys, that the Economics Department would not be able to accept your transfer to that department. I was also advised that the Economics Department would not give credit for the courses that you did in Rural Economy.

As I explained to you in an email sent in January, without the approval of the departments involved, the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research cannot arrange a transfer. [ 27 ] Upon a thorough review of the correspondences, I conclude that the Appellant has not demonstrated the faculty were tortiously conspiring to have him withdrawn from the PhD program. What the correspondence indicates is the Appellant ’ s failure to follow direction within his program from the very beginning and as a result, his difficulty securing a supervisor for his doctoral thesis.

It is not evidence of subterfuge on the part of the University in not supplying him with a supervisor to force him to withdraw from his program. It was made quite clear that the onus to secure a supervisor was on the Appellant. In the result, the correspondence does not evidence a breach of contract or a breach of duty of care on the part of the University. [ 28 ] Additionally, the Appellant contends that the University ’ s discrimination is evidenced from their denial to sanction his study of economics in Ethiopia. This was simply not the case.

This denial was not legal discrimination, but rather academic, as this course of study was not approved by the Faculty. There was no evidence it was done in bad faith. [ 29 ] As a final matter, I will address the case law cited by the Appellant. The Appellant cites the following cases which deal with

judicial review and are distinguishable therefore on that basis alone, as this is not an instance where judicial review has been sought:Carlson v University of Saskatchewan, 2000 SKQB 322; Pridgen v University of Calgary, 2012 ABCA 139; Sharma v University ofCalgary (1990), (AB KB), 107 AR 50 (Q.B.); Sahi v University of Saskatchewan, 2011 SKQB 49; Freeman-Maloyv York University (2004), (ON SCDC), 189 OAC 22 (Ont. Div. Ct.).

The remaining cases cited by the Appellant aredistinguishable on their facts, and summarized in the paragraphs that follow. [30] The case of Hozaima v Perry, 2008 MBQB 199 involved a dental student who was dismissed from her program after failingto obtain a passing grade on an examination. The student alleged the University had discriminated against her by failing to treat likeanswers in a like manner to her successful classmate counterparts.

This case is distinguishable on the basis that the allegations ofdiscrimination were specified and substantiated by some evidence. [31] In Olar v Laurentian University (2007), CCLT (3d) 257 (Ont.

S.C.J.), the defendant University was negligent in providingmisleading promotional materials as to the availability of transfers between engineering programs with various universities, and istherefore distinguishable. [32] In Radhakrishnan v University of Calgary Faculty Assn. (1995), 1995 ABCA 498 , 178 AR 221 (C.A.), a tenuredprofessor was dismissed from his position with the university in a manner contrary to the formal dismissal procedures.

This isdistinguishable from the present case, where the formal internal appeals processes were followed. [33] The case of Bella v Young, 2006 SCC 3, is also distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canadaupheld an award of damages to a student who had been dismissed from her program after professors reported her to Child ProtectionServices as a potential sex offender without reasonable grounds. The issue therefore was not essentially academic, as was the matterbefore the Master. [34] Bartman v University of Prince Edward Island, (P.E.

H.R.C.), involved discrimination based on agecomplaints from three tenured professors, and issues of pension benefits pursuant to a collective agreement. Additionally, as the issuehad previously been decided by the Human Rights Commission panel, only damages and loss of income were at issue. Again, it isdistinguishable on this basis. [35] In Barbour v UBC, 2006 BCSC 1897, an application for certification as a class action proceeding was sought against theuniversity for restitution for parking fines collected pursuant to the university’s alleged ultra vires parking regulations.

Aside from anacademic institution being a named defendant, the nature of the dispute was not academic. [36] The present case is also distinguishable from R v Whatcott, 2012 ABQB 231, where the applicant’s Charter rights tofreedom of expression were infringed, as well as Yellowbird v Lytviak (1997), (AB KB), 210 AR 81 (Q.B.), whichconcerned allegations of negligent treatment of an infant following her birth at a university hospital. [37] In 3414493 Canada Inc. v University of Alberta, 2009 ABQB 509, an assignment of a lease was in dispute between theplaintiff corporation and the university.

The nature of the dispute, concerning assignment and contract law principles, is thereforedistinguishable from the present matter arising from an academic context. [38] Abbasi concerned a claim of an insured against their insurer and insurance adjuster for breach of a duty of good faith,injurious falsehood and negligent misrepresentation. Although the latter two claims were dismissed as disclosing no cause of action, themotion for

summary judgment was dismissed in regards to the breach of duty claim as there was conflicting case law on an importantpoint of law. It is distinguishable on this basis, as well as the facts. [39] The case of Nelles v Ontario, (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 170, concerned a nurse charged with the murder of fourinfants at Toronto’s Hospital for Sick Children, withdrawal of those charges and subsequent suit for malicious prosecution, and isdistinguishable on the facts. [40] Koslowski v Courier, 2009 FC 883, concerned an application for

summary judgment based on copyright infringement. That

application was granted as the infringement was clear on the facts presented. [ 41 ] There were no factual discrepancies in the two cases the Appellant cites involving motor vehicle accidents, and the only issue for determination was the quantum of damages to be awarded. The applications for the matters to proceed via

summary trial was granted in both instances: Pecek v Fedun , 2007 ABQB 133 ; Lawson v Le , 2006 ABQB 872 . [ 42 ] In

summary, the entirety of the case law cited by the Appellant is either distinguishable on the basis that this is not an application for judicial review, or on the facts. I will now turn to address my conclusion. Conclusion [ 43 ] The Master did not indicate whether he was dismissing the action under Rule 3.68 or 7.3. Clearly, the bald allegation of tortious conduct on the part of the faculty staff is sufficient to deny the remedy sought by the Respondent pursuant to Rule 3.68(2)(b).

However when the claim is analyzed in light of the materials submitted by the parties pursuant to the other provisions provided for in Rule 3.68(2) and 7.3(1), it becomes clear dismissal of the claim in its entirety is the appropriate remedy. The grounds for dismissal are as follows: (

a) In regards to the claims of an academic nature, the Court has no jurisdiction [Rule 3.68(2)(a)]; (

b) I find the allegations of tortious conduct alleged in the statement of claim frivolous [Rule 3.68(2)(c)]; (

c) The statement of claim is a result of unsuccessful exhaustion of the University ’ s internal appeal mechanisms, and in reality an attempt to circumvent the legislation granting Universities autonomy over decisions of an academic nature. In this regard, I find it is an abuse of process [Rule 3.68(2)(d)]; and lastly; (

d) I am satisfied that the University discharged its burden in demonstrating that there is no merit to the claim of the Appellant. Further, the Appellant was unable to demonstrate that his claim did indeed have merit [Rule 7.3(1)(b)]. [ 44 ] In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the Order of the Master affirmed. The parties may speak to costs by appointment. Heard on the 12 th day of September, 2012. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 26 th day of September, 2012. R.P. Marceau J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances: Adane Fufa (Self-Represented) for the Appellant Anthony Slemko Parlee McLaws LLP for the Respondent