MGN Constructors Inc. v. AXA Pacific Insurance Company, 2013 ABQB 216
Opinion
Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: MGN Constructors Inc. v. AXA Pacific Insurance Company, 2013 ABQB 216 Date: 20130412 Docket: 1003 17494 Registry: Edmonton Between: MGN Constructors Inc. Plaintiff - and - AXA Pacific Insurance Company Defendant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice R.A. Graesser _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction................................................................................................................ Page: 3 II.
Materials..................................................................................................................... Page: 8 III. Standard of Review..................................................................................................... Page: 8
IV. Positions of the Parties................................................................................................ Page: 8 AXA........................................................................................................................... Page: 8 MGN......................................................................................................................... Page: 10 V. Bond terms ............................................................................................................. Page: 11 VI.
Analysis .................................................................................................................. Page: 12 1. AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged when the subcontract was materially varied by the April 14, 2008 change order.................................................. Page: 13 2. AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged when the time for performance of the subcontract was extended into the 2009 construction season, without notification to AXA .......................................................................................................... Page: 16 3.
AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged because MGN failed to perform its obligation to Sprague-Rosser under the subcontract.......................... Page: 17 4. AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged when MGN terminated the subcontract on September 3, 2009, thereby rendering performance of AXA's obligations under the bond impossible. .................................................................................... Page: 17 5.
MGN's claim is not covered by the bond, as the bond covers performance of the work only and not damage or delay claims ........................................................... Page: 23 6. In any event, MGN failed to give timely notice of default to AXA, and AXA's obligations were thereby discharged............................................................................ Page: 26 VII. Repudiation ............................................................................................................ Page: 29 VIII.
Conclusion................................................................................................................ Page: 29 I. Introduction [ 1 ] AXA Pacific Insurance appeals the decision of Master Smart dismissing its
summary dismissal application. [ 2 ] Proland Corp. (not a party to this lawsuit) was the owner of a proposed industrial subdivision, Proland Industrial Park. Under a Servicing Agreement with the City of Edmonton, the subdivision and development authority for the proposed subdivision, Proland was required to construct roads and instal other services for the subdivision.
Under the Servicing Agreement, Proland provided the City with a letter of credit to secure its completion and warranty obligations. [ 3 ] In June, 2005 MGN Constructors Inc. contracted with Proland to be the general contractor for the construction of roads, services and drainage works required for the subdivision. MGN subcontracted certain of the work to Sprague-Rosser Contracting Co. Ltd. (also not a party to this lawsuit). Under the terms of the subcontract, Sprague-Rosser was to provide a performance bond to MGN.
The performance bond was a joint obligee bond including MGN ’ s bank as one of the obligees, presumably to secure MGN ’ s obligations to its bank. Nothing turns on the fact that this is a joint obligation bond, as no claim has been advanced by or on behalf of the bank. [ 4 ] The written subcontract between MGN and Sprague-Rosser is dated December 14, 2007 and was for $6,391,101.50. Work
was to commence in the spring or early summer of 2008 and was to be completed in 210 days (understood to be before the end of 2008), although no time provisions are actually contained in the written subcontract agreement. Those provisions are blank in the subcontract put in evidence on this application. [ 5 ] A change order to the December 14, 2007 subcontract was agreed between MGN and Sprague-Rosser by a written agreement dated April 14, 2008. The change order reflected a scope change to add roadwork and added $2,432,000 to the contract price.
The additional work was also to be completed in 2008. [ 6 ] AXA was not made aware of the change order at the time it was agreed to and documented. AXA issued the required 50% performance bond in favour of MGN dated May 12, 2008, referencing the December 14, 2007 subcontract, even though there were blanks unfilled in that document. There is no reference in the bond to the April 14, 2008 change order, although it had been documented before the bond was issued. [ 7 ] Work commenced and proceeded through 2008. By the end of 2008, however, the work had not been completed.
Sprague- Rosser estimates that it had completed 56% of the required work. MSN says it was less. [ 8 ] There were disagreements between MGN and Sprague-Rosser over the work in 2008, but there were no notices of default or other correspondence sent by MGN to AXA during 2008, at least none which have been put in evidence in these proceedings. Mr. Harold's Big Affidavit details MGN's position regarding Sprague-Rosser's performance of the work during 2008 and the losses it claims the Owners of the project suffered as a result.
There is no evidence from Sprague-Rosser directly on the issue of alleged 2008 defaults. [ 9 ] However, the evidence on the application includes a letter dated June 23, 2009 from MGN to Sprague-Rosser. It is signed by Mike Harold, President of MGN and was directed to Jeff Jessamine, President and CEO of Sprague-Rosser, along with Sprague- Rosser ’ s chief estimator, Matthew Mackay. [ 10 ] The letter confirms various things: 1. That MGN is satisfied with the work performed by Sprague-Rosser to that date; 2. That MGN owes $2,331,641.32 plus accrued holdback for work performed; 3.
That amount is acknowledged as being a debt due and owing by MGN to Sprague-Rosser “ without deduction or holdback whatsoever ” ; and 4.
That MGN intends to complete and pay for the remaining work on the terms and conditions contained in the subcontract, to a value of $4,256,409.50. [ 11 ] The letter states “ This letter is provided to Sprague-Rosser to provide Sprague-Rosser assurances that full payment will be made for the work completed to date and yet to be completed ” on the subcontract. [ 12 ] The letter followed discussions between MGN and Sprague-Rosser, as well as discussions between MGN and its bankers. [ 13 ] Work under the subcontract resumed after the letter of June 23, 2009. [ 14 ] It is certainly arguable that this letter reflects a settlement between Sprague-Rosser and MGN.
It is clear from Mr. Harold's Big Affidavit that by October, 2011 the effect of that letter is very much in dispute. [ 15 ] On August 24, 2009, Sprague-Rosser quit the site.
[ 16 ] On September 3, 2009, the City of Edmonton exercised its rights under the Servicing Agreement with Proland and called on Proland ’ s letter of credit for the purpose of engaging a replacement contractor to complete Proland ’ s servicing obligations. The City ’ s actions caused Proland to terminate the general contract between it and MGN the same day. [ 17 ] On September 3, 2009, MGN advised Sprague-Rosser that because MGN ’ s contract with Proland had been terminated, that had the effect of terminating the subcontract. [ 18 ] MGN then sent a notice of default to AXA on September 11, 2009.
It is important for this application to review the wording of the notice of default: With reference to the above mentioned bond, MGN Constructors Inc. hereby declares, in accordance with paragraph four of the Performance Bond, that Sprague-Rosser Contracting Co. Ltd. is and remains in default under the subject contract by reason of failure to perform the work.
MGN Constructors Inc. hereby calls upon the Surety, AXA Pacific Insurance Company, to remedy this default in accordance with the terms and conditions of the said bond. [ 19 ] AXA initially took the position with MGN that it had no obligation under the bond because MGN was in default of its payment obligations to Sprague-Rosser under the subcontract. [ 20 ] As more information became known, AXA revised its position to include that the bond had expired because the bonded subcontract had been terminated by MGN before AXA had any opportunity to perform its obligations under the bond.
AXA also took the position that there had in any event been material variations of the subcontract which had not been notified to or consented to by AXA, thereby discharging it from any obligations under the bond. AXA also took the position that MGN ’ s notice of default was late and insufficient, such that its obligations under the bond were discharged. [ 21 ] At some stage, Sprague-Rosser filed a builder ’ s lien against the lands in question, and litigation between Sprague-Rosser and MGN is ongoing relating to the validity of the lien and claims Sprague-Rosser and MGN have against each other.
That litigation is not before the court in this matter. [ 22 ] Eventually MGN sued AXA on the bond, and issued a statement of claim on October 13, 2010. After describing the contracts and the bond, the statement of claim goes on: 9. Sprague-Rosser, as Principal, abandoned the site and failed or refused to complete the performance of the work under the subcontract and in accordance with the terms of the performance Bond. 10.
The Plaintiff declared Sprague-Rosser in default of the Subcontract by letter in writing dated the 9 th day of September, 2009 and the Plaintiff notified the Defendant of the said Default by a letter in writing the 11 th day of September, 2009. 11. The Plaintiff, as Obligee, is entitled to be indemnified by the Defendant, as Surety, for all losses and damages sustained as a consequence of Sprague-Rosser ’ s failure to promptly and faithfully perform the Agreement, as Principal. 12.
Despite complaints by the Plaintiff the Defendant has failed or refused to comply with its obligations and undertakings under the Performance Bond, whereby the Plaintiff is liable for or has sustained loss and damages in an amount exceeding the Bond Amount, particulars of which include but are not limited to; correction of substantial deficiencies in Sprague-Rosser ’ s work, completion of the wet
services installation by others, completion of the surface works by others, fees, carrying costs and overhead, further particulars of which will be provided at the trial of this action. [ 23 ] AXA ’ s statement of defence, filed June 14, 2011, acknowledges issuing the bond, recites facts relevant to its defence and concludes: 16.
The Plaintiff, as Obligee, has failed to perform its obligations as to payment under the Subcontract and as same is a condition precedent to liability of the Defendant pursuant to the Performance Bond, the Defendant is not liable under the Performance Bond as alleged or at all. 17. the Plaintiff has effected material changes in the Subcontract as to price, scope of work and completion time without notice to the Defendant and to the prejudice of the Defendant and accordingly the Defendant is not liable under the Performance Bond as alleged or at all. 18.
The Plaintiff has failed to provide any adequate or timely notice of the failure of Sprague-Rosser to complete the Subcontract within either the frost-free season in 2008 originally contemplated or within any time subsequently agreed for completion. The failure to provide any adequate or timely notice of the alleged default of Sprague-Rosser under the Subcontract was to the material prejudice of the Defendant and accordingly the Defendant is not liable under the Performance Bond as alleged or at all. 19.
The prime contract between the Owner and the Plaintiff was terminated effective September 3, 2009 and the Subcontract was terminated as of that same date without any or any reasonable notice to the Defendant and prior to the notice of default received on September 11, 2009.
The Plaintiff being discharged of its obligations under the prime contract and having in turn discharged Sprague- Rosser of its obligations under the Subcontract, has rendered it impossible for the Defendant to perform any of its obligations pursuant to the Performance Bond and the Defendant is not liable under the Performance Bond as alleged or at all. 20. Alternatively, the Subcontract was terminated effective December 31, 2008 without any or any reasonable notice to the Defendant and accordingly the Defendant is not liable under the Performance Bond as alleged or at all. [ 24 ] AXA then applied for
summary dismissal of MGN ’ s statement of claim. The matter was heard by Master Smart, who reserved. His reasons for decision dated September 11, 2012 review AXA ’ s arguments and concludes: 5. It is perhaps trite to say that the
interpretation of a contract and its terms is not made in a vacuum but must be made in the context of the relevant facts and circumstances. The foregoing does not set out in detail all of the facts and circumstances presented to me in the materials and at the application. Axa, quite understandably, has characterized this matter as simply as possible in its argument for
summary dismissal. Although Axa has compelling arguments based on the evidence, I am irresistibly drawn to the conclusion that I do not have all of the relevant material evidence to properly determine if it supports the consequences and conclusions I am asked to infer in the context of the evidence presented. 6. In light of the foregoing, I am of the view that
summary dismissal of this claim is not appropriate in the circumstances. In reaching this conclusion I am mindful of the decision in Murphy Oil Co v. Predator , 2006 ABCA 69 regarding tendering of evidence by the Respondent when resisting
summary judgment. Rather, I reach this conclusion on the basis of De Shazo v. National Energy Co ., 2005 ABCA 241 , that is, I am not satisfied there are undisputed facts before me which necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is plain and obvious the claim ought to be dismissed. 7. The application is dismissed with costs payable to the Plaintiff in any event. [ 25 ] AXA appealed Master Smart ’ s decision and the appeal was heard by me on February 6, 2013. No new materials were filed or sought to be filed with respect to the appeal, so I am deciding the matter on the same record as was before the Master.
II. Materials [26] The relevant materials for the application are the pleadings, the affidavit of Betty Shellnutt of AXA sworn July 11, 2011 insupport of the application; the affidavit of Mike Harold sworn October 13, 2011 in opposition to the application (the “Big Affidavit”),and the further affidavit of Mike Harold sworn October 13, 2011 (the “Little Affidavit”). III. Standard of Review [27] The parties are agreed that the standard of review from a Master's decision is correctness, following Bacheli v. YorktonSecurities Inc., 2012 ABCA 166. [28] The parties are agreed on the appropriate test for granting
summary judgment, namely that the applicant must satisfy thecourt that "there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring trial" and that the applicant satisfy the court that it is "plain and obvious"or "clear" or "beyond real doubt" that the plaintiff cannot succeed in its claim. This principle comes from Canada (Attorney General) v.Lameman, 2008 SCC 14 and Tottrup v. Clearwater (Municipal District No. 99), 2006 ABCA 380. [29] As held in Paule L. Armeneau Professional Corporation v. Frank, 2012 ABQB 778 (and other cases), the old tests forsummary judgment or
summary dismissal have not been affected by the new Rules of Court brought into force in November, 2010. [30] I would point out, however, that the philosophy of the new Rules is less supportive of letting the parties have their day incourt, and the Rules are more focused on weeding out claims with no merit and determining what the real issues (worth trying) are.Thus, the old test of "no genuine issue for trial" which suggested that serious questions of law required a trial has been replaced with nogenuine issue of "material fact" requiring trial.
The difference is perhaps a subtle change, but if there are sufficient material facts onwhich to make determinations of law, a trial may not be necessary. The material facts must still be made out on the basis of eitheradmissions or admissible evidence. Contested material facts generally still require a trial. [31] In a broader concept, from a practice perspective, the question may be whether a full trial is necessary to determine the realissues in dispute between the parties, or whether it the issues can be revolved using something short of a full trial. It should beremembered that Donoghue v.
Stevenson, (FOREP), [1932] All E.R. Rep. 1 (Eng. H.L.) was a
summary dismissal orstriking application. IV. Positions of the Parties AXA [32] As Appellant, AXA argues that its application for
summary dismissal should have been granted on any of its arguments: 1. AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged when the subcontract was materially varied by the April 14, 2008 changeorder. That change order added over one third to the value of the subcontract, and the scope and quantity of work required under it. It iscommon ground that AXA was not notified of this change before it issued the bond. AXA states that this was a material variationwithout its consent, citing Marigold Holdings Ltd. v. Norem Construction Ltd., (1988), (AB KB), 60 Alta. L.R. (2d)289 (Q.B.), New Look Restoration Ltd. v.
Osgoode Developments Ltd., (1992), 8 C.L.R. (2d) 238 (Ont. Ct. J. Gen. Div.), anddistinguishing Five-Fifty Beatty Street Ltd. Partnership v. Markwood Construction Ltd., (1987), 33 C.L.R. 231 (B.C.C.A.); 2. AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged when the time for performance of the subcontract was extended into the 2009construction season, again without notification to AXA. AXA relies on Marigold Holdings and New Look Restoration arguing this wasa material variation of the subcontract obligations without its consent;
3. AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged because MGN failed to perform its obligation to Sprague-Rosser under thesubcontract (the non-payment issue); 4. AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged when MGN terminated the subcontract on September 3, 2009, therebyrendering performance of AXA's obligations under the bond impossible. For this point, AXA relies on Scott and Reynolds on SuretyBonds, (Toronto: Thomson, 2005), at 7-24.4. It also refers to Enercon Limited now General Concrete Limited v. Canadian GeneralInsurance Company, 1978 Ont. S.C. (Unreported); 5.
MGN's claim is not covered by the bond, as the bond covers performance of the work only and not damage or delay claims. Forthis point, AXA relies on Lac La Ronge Indian Band v. Dallas Contracting, 2004 SKCA 109 and Marigold Holdings Ltd. v. NoremConstruction, (1988), (AB KB), 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 289 (Q.B); and 6. In any event, MGN failed to give timely notice of default to AXA, and AXA's obligations were thereby discharged. For this,AXA relies on Marigold Holdings, New Look Restoration and Homes by Jayman Ltd. v. Kellam Berg Engineering & Surveys Ltd.,(1995), (AB KB), 29 Alta.
L.R. (3d) 1 (Q.B.), reversed on other grounds, (1997), 1997 ABCA 308 , 54 Alta.L.R. (3d) 272 (C.A.). MGN [33] MGN argues that the Master was correct in holding that "I am not satisfied there are undisputed facts before me whichnecessarily lead to the conclusion that it is plain and obvious the claim ought to be dismissed." [34] In response to AXA's arguments, MGN responds: 1. & 2.As to material variation, MGN relies on Five-Fifty Beatty Street Ltd. Partnership v. Markwood Construction Ltd.
It argues thatmaterial variation requires an analysis of the facts, and there is, as the Master held, an insufficient factual background to make adetermination on these issues; 3. MGN argues that there are factual issues which cannot be properly determined on a
summary judgment application relating towhether MGN was in default of its payment obligations to Sprague-Rosser and whether Sprague-Rosser was in default of itsperformance obligations under the subcontract. These can only be decided at trial; 4. Relying on Scott and Reynolds on Surety Bonds at 10-13, it argues that the termination of the contract does not necessarily endthe surety's obligations, thereby raising an arguable legal point; 5. As to the scope of a performance bond, MGN raises Whitby Landmark Development Inc. v. Mollenhauer Construction Limited, (ON CA), [2003] O.J.
No. 4000 (C.A.), which it argues comes to the opposite conclusion from the SaskatchewanCourt of Appeal in Lac La Ronge. There is thus competing appellate level authority and the point has not been dealt with by theSupreme Court of Canada; and 6. With respect to notice issues, MGN argues that this is a matter which requires careful analysis of the facts, and relies on MarigoldHoldings, New Look and Thomas Fuller Construction Co. (1958) v.
Continental Insurance Co., [1973] O.R. 202 (H.C.). [35] MGN points to a number of factual issues over the timeliness and quality of the work done by Sprague-Rosser in 2008, thediscussions leading to the issuance of the June 23, 2009 letter sent to Sprague-Rosser by MGN's president, the severity of any defaults by
Sprague-Rosser so as to require notice to AXA, and the magnitude and materiality of changes in scope, contract price and time for performance. All of these, it says, raise triable factual issues. These factual issues must be resolved before the legal issues can be properly determined. [ 36 ] MGN also argues, following Fraser Gate Apartments Ltd. v. Western Surety Co. , (1995), 21 C.L.R. (2d) 286 (B.C.S.C.) , varied at (1998), 38 C.L.R. (2d) 119 (B.C.C.A.) , that AXA had repudiated the performance bond before it made an election under the bond to perform its obligations.
It says there are triable factual issues here. [ 37 ] As a result of these issues, MGN argues that the Master did not err in dismissing AXA's application. V. Bond terms [ 38 ] Before proceeding to analyze the issues, it is helpful to repeat the relevant provisions of the performance bond in question. I note that it is the standard form of performance bond issued in the construction industry in Canada.
The operative portion of the bond is as follows: Whenever the Principal shall be, and declared by the Obligee to be, in default under the Contract, the Obligee having performed the Obligee ’ s obligations thereunder, the Surety shall promptly: 1. remedy the default, or; 2. complete the Contract in accordance with its terms and conditions or; 3. obtain a bid or bids for submission to the Obligee for completing the Contract in accordance with its terms and conditions and upon determination by the Obligee and the Surety of the lowest responsible bidder, arrange for a contract between such bidder and the Obligee and make available as work progresses (even though there should be a default, or a succession of defaults, under the contract or contracts of completion, arranged under this paragraph) sufficient funds to pay to complete the Principal ’ s obligations in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Contract and to pay those expenses incurred by the Obligee as a result of the Principal ’ s default relating directly to the performance of the work under the Contract, less the balance of the Contract price; but not exceeding the Bond Amount.
The balance of the Contract price is the total amount payable by the Obligee to the Principal under the Contract, less the amount properly paid by the Obligee to the Principal, or; 4. pay the Obligee the lesser of (1) the Bond Amount or (2) the Obligee ’ s proposal cost of completion, less the balance of Contract price. VI. Analysis [ 39 ] AXA need only succeed on one of its arguments above to be entitled to
summary judgment, or dismissal of MGN's claims against it. [ 40 ] There is no doubt that the materials before the court are only a small fraction of the correspondence between the parties and the records generated during the construction process. The task for the Master, and now for me in reviewing his decision for correctness, is to see if there are sufficient proven facts on which to make a determination that the plaintiff cannot get over all branches of the defendant's arguments (for questions of fact) and if there are sufficient proven facts on which to make determinations of questions of law or mixed fact and law.
[ 41 ] Master Smart referenced De Shazo v. National Energy Co . , 2005 ABCA 241 and Murphy Oil Co. v. Predator , 2006 ABCA 69 in regard to the task before him. [ 42 ] Murphy Oil recites with approval the following principles at para. 27: In
summary, the relevant principles are these: 1. A party bringing a motion for
summary judgment bears the legal onus of showing no genuine issue for trial. 2. There is no onus on the responding party to prove a genuine issue for trial. 3. If the applicant for
summary judgment discharges his/her onus on the material filed, a respondent who does not resist the application through admissible evidence risks judgment against him/her. That is an evidentiary burden. 4. There is no obligation on the respondent to file material. He/she can accept the risk described above. If the applicant fails to discharge his/her legal onus, the application will fail. 5. More commonly a respondent will provide admissible evidence opposing the motion. In that event, the court will consider all the evidence to determine whether the applicant has shown that there is no genuine issue for trial. [ 43 ] In De Shazo , the Court of Appeal summarized the principles applicable to
summary judgment at para. 17: [17] The test to be applied on a
summary judgment application is whether it is plain and obvious that the action cannot succeed. To justify deciding the matter without a trial the pleadings and evidence on the motion must show that the claim has no reasonable prospect of success: Boudreault v. Barrett , (1998), 68 Alta. L.R. (3d) 83 , 1998 ABCA 232 , at para 9 .
Summary judgment should not be granted if opposing affidavits clash on relevant facts: Wolfert v. Shuchuk , supra, at para. 10. The chambers judge should not assess the quality and weight of the evidence; that is a function reserved for a trial judge: Liu v. Tangirala , 2004 ABCA 171 , para 2 . [ 44 ] Some of the arguments raised by AXA are questions of fact alone, some are mixed questions of fact and law, and some are pure law. 1.
AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged when the subcontract was materially varied by the April 14, 2008 change order [ 45 ] I do not think that there is any doubt that a material, unconsented to variation in a surety's risks will discharge the surety's obligation in full. The authorities cited by AXA, Marigold Holdings , New Look Restoration and Five-Fifty Beatty Street are all to that effect.
That being said, the determination of whether a variation is material is essentially a question of fact. [ 46 ] To the extent that cases such as Marigold Holdings may be interpreted as saying that a large variation in the contract price or the scope of the work, or a lengthy extension in the time for performance (for example) is conclusive of such variation being a material variation in the surety's risks, I disagree. [ 47 ] The purpose behind discharging a surety when there has been a material variation in the guaranteed obligations is to protect the surety from facing uncompensated and otherwise unaccepted or unacceptable increased risks.
A reduction in the risk is not something a surety can complain about.
[ 48 ] Having a blanket application of such principles leads to cases attempting to determine whether a 15% increase to the contract price is material or not, or whether a change must be over 20% to be material. [ 49 ] With respect, that sort of analysis misses the point. Changes in the contract price do not necessarily increase the risk of loss, especially in cases such as this one where the surety's dollar risk (represented by the face amount of the bond) has not changed. Changes, especially by way of change order, may be highly profitable.
Increased scope by itself, without an analysis of the difficulty or complexity or risks associated with such increased scope, or whether the scope change has been properly priced, says little. [ 50 ]
Schedule changes are similarly ambivalent. Additional time brings with it additional overheads, but may reduce the risk of delays. Additional time which takes construction activities out of unfavourable seasonal periods (which might require heating and are associated with lower productivities and other inefficiencies associated with unfavourable weather) may reduce costs and risks. [ 51 ] A bond issued by a compensated surety such as AXA is not an isolated transaction.
Bonding companies establish relationships with their clients, obtain security from their clients and often the principals of their clients, and establish reporting procedures. Financial statements are reviewed and the capacity of a client to perform work is analyzed. Premium rates are established and bonding capacity is established. Procedures are established for obtaining bonds, such as what information is required.
Procedures and thresholds also established to deal with change orders and variations in the work, as well as how the surety is entitled to be compensated for such changes. [ 52 ] Most construction contracts, including the one bonded by AXA here, entitle the owner (or general contractor) to require the contractor (or subcontractor) to perform additional work.
The owner generally has the right to make changes in the work and to make changes to the schedule. [ 53 ] By way of example, the subcontract here provides in SC6: The Contractor, without invalidating the Subcontract, may make changes by altering, adding to or deducting from the Work, and the Subcontract Price and Subcontract Time shall be adjusted accordingly. [ 54 ] AXA bonded that subcontract. There is no evidence that AXA required MGN to notify it of any changes, or to seek its consent to any changes. There is no evidence of what AXA required of MGN regarding changes.
There is no evidence at all of MGN's relationship with AXA. [ 55 ] By way of example, a bonding company which has assessed a contractor's capabilities to perform $100,000,000 worth of work in a given year may be concerned if the contractor takes on too much work. The contractor may be spread too thin and be unable to complete all of its obligations in the required time and to the required quality. Conversely, the bonding company may be concerned if the contractor does not have enough work.
The contractor's cash flow may be insufficient to support its overheads and general operation, threatening its ability to complete the work it is obliged to do. [ 56 ] Thus, a relatively small increase in scope and volume of work may take the contractor over the $100,000,000 threshold and cause the bonding company great concern.
If the contractor is short of work, a major scope addition to the contract may reduce the contractor's overall risk of failure. [ 57 ] These are all factual matters, requiring an assessment of the relationship between the contractor and the bonding company. [ 58 ] With respect to material change and variations in the risk, Ms. Shellnutt says in para. 16 of her affidavit: 6 AXA Pacific was materially prejudiced in respect of its obligations under the Performance Bond in that (
a) AXA was not notified
in a timely fashion of material changes to the obligation for which the Performance Bond was given; namely as to duration, price and scope of work, and (
b) termination of both the prime contract and the subcontract removed the obligations of both Sprague-Rosser and MGN to complete their respective contracts and accordingly it was not possible for AXA to meet its obligations under the Performance Bond by itself stepping in to complete or take other steps as per the Performance Bond. [ 59 ] Her statement that AXA has been materially prejudiced is a conclusion, not supported by any admissible evidence as to prejudice itself.
In my determination, there is no sufficient factual basis in the materials to determine whether there has been any material prejudice to AXA. [ 60 ] It is certainly surprising that MGN would increase Sprague-Rosser's scope by over a third, without requiring that the bond amount be increased.
It is equally surprising that Sprague-Rosser did not notify AXA that the contract price had been increased so much, before the bond had even been issued. [ 61 ] The amount of the increase is significant, but AXA needs to establish on admissible evidence that the change was material and that it was prejudiced in some way before it can claim that its obligations under the bond have been discharged by the unapproved change. [ 62 ] Material variation needs to be established on the evidence, and not on the basis of assumptions or fixed rules.
What is material and what is relevant to the risks will depend on a number of factors and will vary from job to job and contractor to contractor. [ 63 ] In my view, there are shortfalls in the evidence on this application that do not allow for a determination that AXA is bound to be successful in its defence on this ground. There are factual issues which must be determined before a proper analysis of material variation can be made. [ 64 ] Indeed, Mr. Harold ’ s Little Affidavit appends a “ Contract Status Report ” dated October 6, 2008. That report is a request for status sent by AXA to MGN.
In it, MGN reports that the “ revised contract price ” is $8,823,102. That would appear to take into account the large change order that AXA now complains about. It is certainly arguable that AXA cannot now complain about that being a material variation to their risk, when they became aware of a significant increase in the contract value in October, 2008. They had an opportunity to deal with any concerns at that time, and I do not think that a surety can wait in the weeds in the face of such disclosure and many months later raise the increase as a basis to invalidate the bond.
A further Contract Status Report describes the completion date as May, 2009. Again, AXA had an opportunity to deal with any concerns it had at the time it received the report. There are certainly issues to be tried on this. [ 65 ] I recognize that material variation is to be viewed from the surety ’ s eyes at the time of the alleged variation, and not after the fact with the benefits of 20-20 hindsight.
However, a material variation still needs to be determined on the objective standard of the “ prudent person ” ( Marigold at para. 19) and the test is not entirely subjective. [ 66 ] The Master was correct to reject this ground for
summary judgment. 2. AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged when the time for performance of the subcontract was extended into the 2009 construction season, without notification to AXA [ 67 ] I start my analysis observing that concerns over
schedule changes now raised by AXA are somewhat negated by it having issued a bond for a subcontract with no
schedule provisions in either it or the general contract above it. Both the subcontract and the general contract are silent on commencement and completion obligations. The general contract between Proland and MGN refers to schedules "agreed upon." There is no evidence of any agreed schedule. The Servicing Agreement provisions regarding completion are crossed out, and a completion date cannot be gleaned from it. [ 68 ] The subcontract has no start date, and leaves scheduling to the "Schedule attached hereto or as otherwise provided for by the Prime Contract". No such schedules are in evidence, if any exist. Ultimately, the subcontract says "The order and
schedule of the Work will be at the discretion of the Contractor in consultation with the Subcontractor."
[ 69 ] I can only conclude from the contract documents before me that scheduling was loosely dealt with at all levels of the contractual arrangements, and there is no evidence that
schedule was at all important to AXA. [ 70 ] In any event, my analysis of this ground of attack is essentially the same as above. There are not sufficient facts in evidence to make a determination that AXA was in any way prejudiced by the extension in the contract time. It was argued that AXA was denied the opportunity to assess further premiums in relation to the extended time. That may be, but there is no evidence of that.
Nothing in the materials says whether or not AXA was entitled to charge an additional premium, or how as between AXA and Sprague-Rosser contract extensions were dealt with. [ 71 ] It is not uncommon in construction for jobs to overrun their projected completion dates. Knowing that this was site work in Edmonton (and not in muskeg), it is well within judicial notice that it is easier, faster and less expensive to perform outside work involving earth moving, trenching, digging, and paving in warm dry conditions rather than cold winter conditions.
Contract extensions without penalty do not necessarily add to the risks, and may lessen them. [ 72 ] Ms. Shellnutt does not deal with the impact of the time extension in any more detail than she did with the increased scope. [ 73 ] As noted above, AXA had knowledge through one of the Contract Status Reports it requested from MGN that the completion was not expected until May, 2009. AXA did nothing in regard to that knowledge, at least nothing that is referenced in the evidence before me. [ 74 ] There is thus an evidentiary vacuum on which to determine whether AXA was prejudiced by the delay.
Indeed, if as suggested in MGN's affidavit evidence, delays in 2008 were Sprague-Rosser's responsibility, an extension into 2009 for completion would likely be to its and AXA's benefit. [ 75 ] On the evidence before me, I see no merit to the argument that the December 14, 2007 subcontract was terminated when work was not completed in 2008, and that the work in 2009 proceeded under a new contract. That is not made out in the evidence or in law. [ 76 ] The Master was correct that this ground could not be dealt with properly on the evidence before him. 3.
AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged because MGN failed to perform its obligation to Sprague-Rosser under the subcontract [ 77 ] This is not a ground that was pressed by AXA. There is certainly evidence by way of AXA's affidavit materials suggesting that Sprague-Rosser was in default of its obligations in 2008. There is evidence by way of the June 14, 2009 letter in Ms. Shellnutt's affidavit that suggests that MGN was in default of its obligations to Sprague-Rosser, by way of the acknowledgment of significant indebtedness by MGN.
There is evidence that there were negotiations leading up to the letter of June 14, and there is evidence that Sprague-Rosser had agreed to go back to work and did. It is arguable that by accepting the June 14 letter and going back to work, Sprague Rosser waived any default on the part of MGN. [ 78 ] From all of that, however, it is unclear on the evidence whether MGN had defaulted in its obligations in some fashion. This was certainly the basis on which AXA initially resisted liability under the bond.
It added to its objections as more information was known. [ 79 ] In any event, the evidence on the application falls short of establishing that MGN was in default of its obligations. AXA is not bound to succeed in establishing this ground and requires more evidence, and evidentiary rulings in its favour, before this issue can be determined.
4. AXA's obligations under the bond were discharged when MGN terminated the subcontract on September 3, 2009, thereby rendering performance of AXA's obligations under the bond impossible. [ 80 ] On this subject, Scott and Reynolds says: If a surety bond is issued guaranteeing the performance of the contract, which subsequently becomes impossible to perform, the obligations under the bond would also become impossible, and therefore the surety would be relieved of any obligation under the bond. K.W. Scott and R.B.
Reynolds, Scott and Reynolds on Surety Bonds (Toronto: Thomson, 2005) at 7-24.4 [ 81 ] AXA argues that "Canadian courts recognize that the termination of a prime contract renders performance of a subcontract impossible, thereby relieving the Surety who bonded the subcontractor's work." [ 82 ] The main authority cited for that is an unreported Ontario Superior Court decision, Enercon . That case involved actions taken by the obligee without notice to the surety.
The obligee had terminated the bonded contract in circumstances which made it then impossible for the surety to take any performance-related steps. [ 83 ] That decision seems correct on its facts, but I do not accept that the above is a universal statement of law. Prime contracts may be terminated for any number of reasons, including the default of a subcontractor.
If a subcontractor's performance is so deficient that it causes the prime contractor to default in its obligations to the owner and the owner terminates the prime contract, it hardly lies in the mouth of the subcontractor's bonding company to say it has been discharged from its obligations. [ 84 ] Depending on the circumstances, the bonding company may have some defences, but impossibility of performance as a discharge of the bond must surely depend on the terminating event being caused by someone other than the bonded subcontractor. [ 85 ] You would expect that the termination of a prime contract would not come out of thin air, however.
If the subcontractor's performance is clearly causing delay to the project, interference with the work of others or the need for rework (for example), there would normally be some notice required to be given by the owner to the prime contractor to cure the default, before the owner can step in and correct deficiencies, or terminate the prime contract. [ 86 ] If the owner is taking such steps against the prime contractor and the prime contractor believes the problem lies with a subcontractor, you would expect the prime contractor to put the subcontractor on similar notice terms in accordance with the subcontract. [ 87 ] Here, there is no evidence of any notices of default to Proland from the City.
The Servicing Agreement provides a number of opportunities for the City to notify Proland of default and to call on the letter of credit securing Proland's obligations if such default is not cured within the specified time. [ 88 ] You would expect to see cascading notices of default: from the City to Proland, from Proland to MGN, from MGN to Sprague-Rosser and ultimately from MGN to AXA, each expecting the other to cure defaults blamed on the entity below. [ 89 ] Proland's general contract with MGN contains brief termination provisions and allows for termination "by providing Sixty days written notice".
It is not tied to default. [ 90 ] MGN's subcontract with Sprague-Rosser has a similar sixty day notice provision in it, having regard to the provisions of SC 18 and
Article 1C.
[ 91 ] No evidence has been put forward of the reasons for the City's calling of the letter of credit and completing the work required by the Servicing Agreement itself. From a review of the Servicing Agreement, it would appear that the City could only do so after giving some length of notice to Proland (likely 30 days). [ 92 ] There is no evidence that Proland passed on any notices received from the City to MGN, or treated MGN as being in default so MGN could cure any defaults and prevent the calling of Proland's letter of credit.
Had that occurred, you would expect that MGN would have provided similar notices to any of its subcontractors whom it considered to be in default and either the cause of or a contributor to the default raised by Proland. [ 93 ] On the face of the general contract, Proland could only terminate the general contract on 60 days notice to MGN. The evidence before me is that Proland terminated the general contract with no notice at all.
The validity of that is questionable. [ 94 ] The point of this chronology is to demonstrate that MGN may have been given no prior notice of termination and no opportunity to cure any defaults attributed to it or to its subcontractors. MGN had protected itself contractually by requiring 60 days notice of termination. If it had received appropriate notice, it could have passed on notice to Sprague-Rosser, giving Sprague-Rosser time to correct any defaults on its part. And MGN could have given notice to AXA as Sprague-Rosser's bonding company.
AXA would then have been in a position to take steps to investigate and protect its position, such as by working with Sprague-Rosser to correct any defaults or electing one of its alternative courses of action under the bond. [ 95 ] On the materials before me, there is no evidence to suggest that AXA was prejudiced by anything done or not done by MGN. MGN could give no notice of default, because it was not given one itself. This is not a situation where the obligee made performance impossible by its deliberate action.
While it did terminate the subcontract with Sprague-Rosser and Sprague-Rosser ’ s or AXA ’ s ability to be on site, MGN ’ s own ability to be on site had been taken away by the actions of the City and Proland. The termination of the bonded contract, while optically problematic, did nothing to take away AXA ’ s ability to step in and perform the remaining work itself.
That ability was already gone. [ 96 ] MGN could have notified Proland that its termination was wrongful, although under the terms of the general contract, the only "wrongfulness" would appear to be the absence of 60 days notice as default is not necessary for termination. It is unclear where taking such a position might have gotten anyone, as by then, the letter of credit had been called and the City was performing the work.
Further work under the general contract had been made impossible, although not necessarily because of anything MGN did or did not do. [ 97 ] By the terms of its subcontract, MGN exposed itself to termination without cause. Sprague-Rosser did the same, as the subcontract incorporates by reference the provisions of the general contract in
Article 1A. [ 98 ] And by the terms of its bond, AXA undertook a number of obligations all of which reference the terms and conditions of the subcontract. [ 99 ] From this, I conclude that the statement above from Scott and Reynolds is perhaps best described as a general principle, which is subject to a number of conditions, exceptions or qualifications. [ 100 ] That principle may be the case where the bonded contract has been validly terminated and there is no doubt that the Principal's obligations under the contract are at an end. But the contract may have been terminated as a result of the Principal's (Sprague-Rosser'
s) default, in which case the subcontract must be carefully analyzed to determine what steps had to have been undertaken by the Obligee (MGN) to terminate. If no notice is required, I find it difficult to accept that the Surety (AXA) would be discharged from any further obligations under the bond. That makes no sense. AXA cannot insist on more notice of termination than its Principal was entitled to, unless that is specifically required by the terms of the bond itself. [ 101 ] A performance bond must be read in the context of the contract it bonds.
At the time the bond is issued, if the bonding company does not like the default provisions in the contract, it can refuse to issue the bond. Here, there is no evidence that AXA had any difficulty with the subcontract, or the general contract incorporated by reference into it.
[ 102 ] The bonding company's obligations are triggered in accordance with the wording of the bond. Strict compliance with the wording of the bond is required. The pre-conditions to liability to the Obligee are that: 1. The Principal is in default of its obligations under the bonded contract; 2. The Principal has been declared by the Obligee to be in default; and 3.
The Obligee has performed its obligations under the bonded contract. [ 103 ] There is no requirement of notice specified in the bond, but clues to the notice requirements are found in the Surety's obligations once the Principal is in default and has been declared to be in default. [ 104 ] The Surety may: 1. remedy the default; or 2. complete the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions; or 3. arrange bids for completion of the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions, paying any excess over the cost of completion and the original contract price, to a maximum of the bond amount; or 4. pay the Obligee the lesser of the bond amount or the cost of completion less the balance of the contract price. [ 105 ] Despite some
interpretations flowing out of Lac La Ronge and Whitby Landmark , I do not agree that to be liable under the bond, the Surety must have available to it all of the options. [ 106 ] Some defaults are incapable of being remedied. If the default is with respect to the timeliness of construction, it may be impossible to complete the contract within the allotted time.
I do not think a surety is discharged because the magnitude of the default by its Principal is so great that it cannot be cured. [ 107 ] The Surety may not be able to complete the contract when its Principal is in default and has been declared to be in default. Prime Contracts frequently provide that general contractors may only subcontract the work to subcontractors who are approved by the owner.
Bonding companies are insurers, not contractors, and they may not be qualified or capable of completing the work, and it may in some cases be reasonable for an owner to refuse to allow the defaulting subcontractor's bonding company to perform the work. It does not seem reasonable that a bonding company could expect to be discharged from liability in cases where it was reasonably concluded by the owner that the bonding company was not capable of completing the work.
It cannot be assumed that a bonding company will in all circumstances be given the right to complete the work itself. [ 108 ] There may be insufficient time to arrange for a completion contractor. Some defaults (especially ones relating to safety issues) may need to be dealt with urgently. Many prime contracts and subcontracts allow for taking the work out of a defaulting party's hands very quickly and with little or no notice. Where
schedule is important (and it almost always is) there may be no time to have a proper tender process. [ 109 ] With respect to payment, the Surety can always pay the bond amount. The issue is what the Surety is entitled to by way of deductions. The cost of completion and related expenses incurred by the Obligee can always be determined after the fact. [ 110 ] There are also many permutations and combinations of potential events. It may not be clear whether there is a default. That may be highly contentious.
If the Obligee declares the Principal to be in default, and the Principal denies that, Obligee may nonetheless terminate the contract. If it is later determined that the Obligee was correct and the Principal was wrong, the contract was validly terminated. Yet that determination is long after the Surety could have done anything about the situation other than pay the bond amount or some lesser sum adjusted in accordance with the formula in the bond itself. [ 111 ] It is also not uncommon for there to be a dispute over whether the Obligee has performed its obligations under the contract.
The Principal may take the position that its default was the result of defaults by the Obligee. The contract may well be terminated in the face of such a dispute, and it will be some time before it can be determined that who was correct.
If it is ultimately determined that the Obligee was not in default, that determination will be made long after the bonding company could do anything under the bond but pay. [ 112 ] It is unlikely and commercially unreasonable to expect a bonding company which is comfortable with the security it holds from the Principal to ignore the Principal's position in the dispute and make its own independent determination that its Principal is in default and quickly exercise one of its options.
It is equally unlikely for the Surety to disagree with its Principal's position that the Obligee is in default, and quickly step in over the Principal's objections and take over the job (if possible). [ 113 ] In my view, there are no absolutes as to the effect of termination of the bonded contract. The real issue relates to the giving of notice to the bonding company so that it can investigate and make an informed decision as to what it will do. Sureties are entitled to be relieved of some or even all of their obligations if they have been unfairly prejudiced by the Obligee.
I do not view termination of the bonded contract any differently. In some cases, that will work to the considerable prejudice of the Surety. In other cases, it may be of little consequence. Where any prejudice has not been caused by the Obligee, it is difficult to see why the bonding company should be the beneficiary of some intervening act outside the reasonable control of the Obligee. [ 114 ] Essentially, this is a fact driven area, not driven by absolute requirements.
It is clear that a surety is not an insurer, but there is sometimes a fine line between an insurer's obligations and a surety's. [ 115 ] One need only look to AXA's initial response to MGN's notice of September 11, 2009: "Our initial investigation leads us to conclude the captioned Bond is Void due to your failure to pay Sprague-Rosser Contracting Co.
Ltd. in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract." It continues: "If this information is incorrect, we request you outline the basis of the Default Notice in accordance with the contract and the Performance Bond providing all relevant information leading up to your Notice including but not limited to the tender call, bid specifications, addenda, contract documents, all correspondence and memos/notes to file pertaining to this project and the Bond." [ 116 ] This is hardly the response an Obligee would expect to receive if the bonding company was intent on attempting to cure a default, complete the work itself, or start a bidding process for completion. [ 117 ] I need not determine any of these issues.
There is insufficient evidence for me to determine if termination of the prime contract resulted from or was materially contributed to by defaults of Sprague-Rosser. There is no evidence as to whether AXA has been prejudiced by its inability to cure any defaults, take over the work or arrange for a completion contractor.
In fact, the evidence suggests that AXA was unlikely to do any of those things because of the information it had obviously received from Sprague-Rosser: MGN is in default. [ 118 ] Regardless of how these issues unfold, it is clear from the circumstances that entities other than MGN and Sprague-Rosser made future performance of MGN's and Sprague-Rosser's obligations under the prime contract and the subcontract impossible because the work had been taken out of the hands of Proland. It would have been futile for AXA to attempt to cure any default.
It would have been futile for AXA to try to take over the work or arrange for a completion contractor. None of that was possible a week before AXA received notice of default. Sprague-Rosser was not given an opportunity to cure any defaults as instead of receiving a notice of default, it received a notice of immediate termination. [ 119 ] It is unclear what MGN knew of the situation between the City and Proland. None of that is in evidence. But when Proland terminated the prime contract presumably with no notice to MGN, MGN had no choice but to terminate the Sprague-Rosser subcontract in accordance with SC 18.
[ 120 ] In my view, any issues relating to impossibility of performance are entwined with prejudice, which in turn is closely connected with notice. [ 121 ] There is not enough evidence to determine any of these issues, and it cannot be said that AXA has established that it is bound to succeed in this defence. [ 122 ] The Master was correct in refusing
summary judgment on this ground. 5. MGN's claim is not covered by the bond, as the bond covers performance of the work only and not damage or delay claims [ 123 ] This is an interesting area, and not just one of academic interest. There are two camps, one which holds that the scope of the surety's obligations under a performance bond are limited to performance of the work. This has been referred to in learned articles as the "bricks and mortar" approach. Support for that is found in Lac La Ronge and Saskatchewan Housing Corp. v. Canadian Surety Co ., (1988), Sask. R. 158 (C.A.), as well as in articles by J.S.
Tatrallyay, "Sticks and Bricks Revisited: Performance Bond Liability After Whitby Landmark ", (2001), 4 C.L.R. (3d) 13 and R.B. Reynolds, " Whitby Landmark : Much Ado About Nothing ", (2002), 12 C.L.R. (3d) 23 . [ 124 ] The other camp holds that a performance bond covers all of the Principal's obligations under the bonded contract, not just those relating to physical construction. Support for that position is found in Whitby Landmark and curiously an earlier Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision, Regina (City) v. Graham Construction & Engineering Ltd. , 2001 SKCA 3 .
A description of the two camps is found in a helpful
article by D.S. Glaholt and M. Rotterdam, " Sorting out Whitby Landmark ", http://www.glaholt.com/conference- papers.html. [ 125 ] The distinction usually arises is in the context of delay damages or other monetary claims under the contract as opposed to "true" completion costs. In Whitby Landmark , the issue was whether or not the owner had a covered claim for its expected share of cost savings under the construction contract when those savings did not materialize due to contractor defaults. The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that it did.
The net effect of Lac La Ronge was that the bonding company was not liable for liquidated damages for delay. In calculating the bonding company's liability to the owner, the owner was not permitted to deduct these damages from the cost to complete. [ 126 ] Were it necessary for me to decide the case on this basis, I prefer the reasoning of Justice Lamek at trial and the Ontario Court of Appeal in Whitby Landmark , and the trial judge ’ s reasoning in Lac La Ronge, to that of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.
I fail to see how a surety can arrange for completion of the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions unless it is responsible for any acceleration costs to meet the original schedule, and any delay damages the owner is entitled to if the
schedule is not met. Otherwise, that would mean in cases where it is not possible, even by herculean acceleration efforts, to complete the work on
schedule after the Principal's default, the blameless owner would be unable to deduct its legitimate delay damages from the amount otherwise owed to the defaulting Principal. That in my view distorts a fair
interpretation of "the amount properly paid by the Obligee to the Principal". [ 127 ] As between the Obligee and the Principal, the Obligee will in most circumstances (other than with respect to some builder ’ s lien obligations) be able to deduct damages for non-performance from amounts otherwise payable to the Obligee. [ 128 ] I recognize that this may turn on the
interpretation of the specific contract, and the law in the jurisdiction relating to set off, but I would not place so narrow an
interpretation on "the amount properly paid by the Obligee to the Principal" as did the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. [ 129 ] None of those decisions is binding on me. The only Alberta case on point is Marigold Holdings and Conrad J.'s (as she then was) comment at para 121: [121] The obligations of the surety upon the declaration of default are to remedy the default, complete the contract or have someone else
complete. Their obligation is not simply to pay for whatever went wrong. The funds are there to ensure that the surety does complete or repair to the extent of the funds. It is significant in interpreting that clause to note that not only is the repair or completion the obligation of the surety but, resulting from those obligations, the surety has rights. He has an election as to how he wishes to proceed. He can hire someone else to repair or complete.
As it contemplates his repair of the default, the default is surely the principal ’ s default, not the work of some other third party and the obligation must extend only to that default. [ 130 ] With respect, that is a general statement and it does not represent a detailed analysis of the arguments on both sides. That case turned on notice and prejudice, and I do not consider that statement to be a universal description of the scope of a performance bond. To the extent that it is interpreted to be such, I respectfully disagree. [ 131 ] I agree that the law as to the scope of performance bonds is unclear.
Ontario has one
interpretation. Since 2003 performance bonds in Ontario are not limited to "bricks and mortar". Since 2004, performance bonds in Saskatchewan are so limited. The point has not been expressly decided in Alberta, and while this may be the case to do so, there are no sufficient facts as yet which would allow for a determination of that issue to be made with a proper factual foundation. [ 132 ] It would appear that the claims by MGN against Sprague-Rosser are related to delay and deficiencies and incomplete work.
To the extent they relate to deficiencies and incomplete work, they would be within the scope of the bond under both Lac La Ronge and Whitby Landmark . Delay damages may be recoverable under Whitby Landmark , but not under Lac La Ronge . A proper factual basis is necessary to have the scope issue determined in Alberta.
While a full trial may not be necessary for that, it is premature on the evidence on this application for such a determination to be made. [ 133 ] I thus conclude that AXA has not satisfied me that it is bound to succeed in establishing that any claim by MGN is outside the scope of the bond. [ 134 ] The Master was correct in refusing
summary judgment on this basis. [ 135 ] I observe that this uncertainty has remained across Canada for over a decade. The forms of performance bond used throughout the country are common, and generally mirror the one here. Why bonding companies have individually and collectively done nothing to resolve the uncertainty by way of clear wording in the standard forms of performance bond is curious. The industry could create two types of bonds with different pricing: one for bricks and mortar only and the other for all contractual obligations. Unfavourable
interpretations, even by the Supreme Court, can be reversed by carefully constructed language. Without amendments one way or the other, until the Supreme Court decides between Whitby Landmark and Lac La Ronge , uncertainty across the country will continue and there will be different regimes in different provinces. [ 136 ] Glaholt and Rotterdam make note of the absence of amendments in their article, referred to above. Hunt J. points to uncertainties in bond wording in Homes by Jayman , a 1995 decision. Yet these uncertain contract wordings continue to come before the courts. 6.
In any event, MGN failed to give timely notice of default to AXA, and AXA's obligations were thereby discharged [ 137 ] Conrad J. points out that the performance bond in Marigold Holdings did not contain any notice provisions: [122] I agree that the bond does not provide notice as a pre-condition in the sense that a lack of notice could provide a technical defence to the surety.
However, in its simplest form I am satisfied the bond provides that while the obligee has the right to determine when default has occurred, if he is going to look to the surety on a default he had better let him know before anyone else does repairs; the surety has the right to repair, inspect and determine the nature of the default and responsibility therefor. [ 138 ] It is noteworthy that the form of bond 25 years later in this case similarly contains no notice provisions.
[139] The purpose of notice is well described by Conrad J., although she was dealing with the surety's right to complete or performthe work itself and not notice of default generally. [140] Notice and prejudice are bound together, whether it be in relation to material changes in the risk, or the availability of thevarious options for the bonding company faced with a declared default by its Principal. [141] There is no stand-alone notice requirement under the bond.
AXA argues that the notice given by MGN was insufficient, andrelies on Marigold, New Look and Homes by Jayman. [142] Whitby Landmark is also a notice case.
There, despite favourable findings (from the obligee’s perspective) being made inrelation to the scope of the bonded obligations, the bonding company avoided liability on the basis of the absence of proper notice to it.The trial judge, affirmed by the Court of Appeal, concluded that the bonding company was not given a timely opportunity to "takeadvantage of whatever leverage may have been available to it with (the Owner)." (at para. 35). [143] In Marigold Holdings, notice was given but after the owner had taken steps with respect to completion itself.
That was foundto have prejudiced the bonding company, and they were discharged. [144] In Homes by Jayman, Hunt J. (as she then was) discharged the surety because it had not been given the opportunity toexercise its contractual rights under the bond. As in Marigold Holdings, by the time notice was given to the bonding company, the ownerhad already engaged others to complete the deficient work. [145] In New Look, Doyle J. applied Marigold Holdings and Thomas Fuller Construction to the situation there. The obligee hadperformed work after the principal’s default, but without notice to the surety.
Doyle J. found that: There was no declaration of default as required under the terms of the bond and no opportunity to remedy any default or complete thecontract between New Look and Osgoode in accordance with its terms and conditions nor any opportunity to obtain bids and makeavailable funds from time to time as work progressed. The prejudice suffered by Halifax was the lack of opportunity to inspect and consider its position and make offers once the Third Partyclaim was issued.
There is no indication in the file when the Third Party claim was served on Halifax but tenders for the exterior facaderestoration closed on October 12, 1988, seven days after the issue of the claim and Magus' contract was dated October 27, 1988 (paras 38and 39). [146] Fraser Gate Apartments Ltd. v. Western Surety Co., decided around the time of Marigold Holdings, refers to Johns-Manville Canada Inc. v. John Carlo Ltd. (sub nom. Citadel General Assurance Co. v.
Johns-Manville Canada Inc.), (SCC), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 513, where it is stated that when the obligee discovers that a problem is no longer trivial, it must put the matter inthe hands of the surety or the surety will be prejudiced (at para. 83) [147] The question of what notice must be given, and when it must be given, are thus questions of fact: when did the obligee(MGN) discover that the problem was no longer trivial? [148] There is no evidence of that.
There is no indication as to when MGN learned of any trouble between Proland and the City, orif it knew before September 3, 2009 that the City had given notice of default of some sort to Proland. [149] We do not know why the City was sufficiently unhappy with Proland to call on its letter of credit and take the work awayfrom Proland. We do not know what notice, if any, the City gave to Proland. We do not know if Proland gave any notice beforeSeptember 3 to MGN.
[ 150 ] If MGN had notice of a problem which "was no longer trivial" and did not give timely notice of that to Sprague-Rosser and AXA if it considered that Sprague-Rosser's performance of the subcontract was implicated in the problems, AXA may have a strong argument that it has suffered prejudice. [ 151 ] However, on the evidence, AXA got a notice that MGN was in default demanding that AXA perform its obligations. The notice on its face satisfies the requirements of the bond: that the obligee be declared to be in default.
The notice was sufficient to cause AXA to investigate, and within a week AXA had determined that MGN was in default. Implicit in that reply was that AXA was not going to do anything further until MGN satisfied it that MGN was not in default. [ 152 ] In any event, it is difficult to see that AXA suffered any prejudice by the timing of the September 11 notice. True, the notice could have been given earlier.
But if the first MGN learned of defaults and termination was September 3, and the termination of its general contract was a fait accompli by that date, I cannot see any prejudice to AXA resulting from the interval between September 3 and September 11. On September 3, AXA could not have cured the default, taken over the work or arranged for a completion contractor.
All of that had been taken out of MGN's hands by Proland and the City. [ 153 ] If there is a notice issue, with the necessary prejudice to support it, the issue would presumably be that there should have been notice well before September 3 so AXA could have become involved in the problem and used whatever leverage it had available to it to protect its (and perhaps Sprague-Rosser'
s) position. [ 154 ] Mr. Harold ’ s Little Affidavit may not be helpful to MGN. He says in that affidavit that Sprague-Rosser was in default of its obligations on November 19, 2008. From Mr. Harold ’ s affidavit, it is obvious that there were difficulties between MGN and Sprague- Rosser in the fall of 2008. Mr. Harold characterizes the difficulties as default by Sprague-Rosser. The cases do not require that a bonding company be notified of all defaults, but if the obligee expects the bonding company to be responsible, it should involve the bonding company as soon as it is aware of a major problem.
That is more likely a statement of good practice than it is of law, but it is common sense. Actual notice requirements will depend on the provisions of the contract as well as prejudice to the surety. [ 155 ] Nevertheless, it is very likely unhelpful for MGN to rely on 2008 default by Sprague-Rosser in the context of attempting to hold AXA responsible, when AXA only became involved in default issues in the fall of 2009. [ 156 ] Mr. Harold suggests that AXA had notice of default in the fall of 2008 as a result of the indication on the status report that the work was behind.
However, MGN reported that the completion date was still projected to be November, 2008 so it does not automatically follow that Sprague-Rosser was in default, or that there was a major problem brewing. [ 157 ] Similarly, responding to a similar request from AXA December, 2008 indicating that the work was late with unsatisfactory progress and with completion estimated to be in the spring of 2009, is unlikely to amount to a notice of default.
There is nothing in either document suggesting that MGN expected the bonding company to do anything, and no significant concern is expressed. [ 158 ] The real effect of these documents is likely something which must be determined with evidence to put them into context. [ 159 ] The issue of when notice should have been given, and what the notice should have consisted of, are again factual issues for which there is presently an insufficient factual matrix with which to make a proper determination. [ 160 ] The extent to which the letter of June 14, 2009 resolves all outstanding issues between MGN and Sprague-Rosser is yet to be determined, and there is insufficient information on that subject for the court to make a proper decision.
Similarly, the issue as to whether MGN should have been including AXA in any negotiations with Sprague-Rosser, either to avoid prejudicing AXA or to avoid arguments that the 2009 arrangements are new, unbounded arrangements, need a greater factual foundation to be decided. [ 161 ] I cannot conclude that AXA is sure to succeed on this defence, and find that the Master was correct in dismissing the
summary judgment application on this ground as well.
VII . Repudiation [ 162 ] As I have upheld the Master ’ s decision on each of AXA ’ s six points for
summary dismissal, it is not necessary for me to consider MGN ’ s argument that AXA repudiated its obligations under the bond by its conduct once notice was given to it on September 11, 2009. That will in any event turn on facts which are not yet fully before the Court. VIII. Conclusion [ 163 ] AXA may well succeed in establishing that the major change order was a material variation in its risk and that it was prejudiced by not being notified of it before it issued the bond. That a variation of that magnitude is material is not presumed or pre- determined by fixed percentages. Prejudice is not presumed by law.
A determination to either effect will require an analysis of AXA's relationship with Sprague-Rosser, and AXA's risk analysis at the time the bond was issued. [ 164 ] AXA may succeed in establishing that it was prejudiced when the contract time was extended into the summer or fall of 2009. Prejudice from a contract extension is not presumed.
That will depend on AXA's risk analysis, the relationship between AXA and Sprague-Rosser and many other relevant facts. [ 165 ] AXA may succeed in establishing that the arrangements in the summer of 2009 evidenced by the letter of June 14 amounted to a new contract, not subject to the bond. A determination to that effect will require significant evidence as to how that letter came about, as well as an
interpretation of the effect of the letter in the context of the parties' discussions and the status of the overall project. [ 166 ] AXA may also succeed in establishing that termination of the subcontract which had the effect of depriving it of some of the options generally available under the performance bond had the effect of discharging the bond.
That will depend on the underlying reasons why the City took the work away from Proland, and the extent to which (if at all) defaults by Sprague-Rosser caused or contributed to the City's actions. [ 167 ] AXA may succeed in persuading the court that any claims by MGN are outside the scope of a performance bond. To do so, however, it will have to establish what those claims are, and presumably that the claims are financial and not connected to the bricks and mortar.
The distinction is at this stage arguable in Alberta and depends on a sufficient evidentiary background to decide the issues. [ 168 ] Finally, AXA may be successful in proving that it has been prejudiced by the absence of notice, or late notice from MGN. Again, prejudice is not presumed. To do so, it will have to show that MGN was aware of problems affecting Sprague-Rosser and it did not involve AXA in sufficient time for AXA to fairly consider its options. That again needs many more facts than are presently in evidence. [ 169 ] In short, AXA may succeed in the litigation.
It may not take a full trial to determine one of these defences. All AXA need do is establish one of them. However, AXA has not met the burden on it of proving that it is bound to succeed, or that MGN's claim against it is hopeless (to paraphrase the actual tests). The onus on this application, on all aspects of it, was AXA's. I find that AXA has not met that onus. [ 170 ] It follows that my decision is to dismiss the appeal, finding that the Master's decision was correct. [ 171 ] Costs here and below should go to MGN, but to be paid at the end of the cause.
[ 172 ] I am indebted to the parties for their able written and oral arguments. Heard on the 6 th day of February, 2013. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 11 th day of April, 2013. R.A. Graesser J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Mr. Robert D. Gillespie (Robert D. Gillespie Prof. Corp.) for the Plaintiff MGN Constructors Inc. Mr. Daniel P. Carroll, QC (Field LLP) for the Defendant Axa Pacific Insurance Company
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