Roncal Inc. v Anderson, 2013 ABQB 453

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: Roncal Inc. v Anderson, 2013 ABQB 453 Date: 20130809 Docket: 1203 05201 Registry: Edmonton Between: Roncal Inc. Appellant - and - Donald Everett Anderson and Teresa Cecilia Anderson Respondents _ ________________________________________ ______________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr.

Justice Donald Lee _________________________________________ ______________ [ 1 ] This is an appeal from the Assessment Officer’s decision by Roncal Inc. on the basis the amount of fees awarded are inordinately low considering the work done on the matter, and accordingly should not have been reduced.

It is submitted that this was not a run-of-the-mill foreclosure matter in that there were substantial negotiations and communications between the law firm and the defendants, in which it was necessary amongst other things to monitor and be involved in two other actions, and to administer their payment arrangement. [ 2 ] In this matter foreclosure proceedings were commenced in April 2012, and in June 2012 a redemptions order – judicial advertising was obtained. The advertisement was published but there were no offers.

A law firm then obtained a tender search, filed affidavits showing the publication and lack of tenders and applied for an order for foreclosure. In order to file the affidavit of publication, a fiat was needed because the law firm had delayed the advertisement of the property to give the defendants time to bring the mortgage

current. The application for an order for foreclosure was to be heard on September 14, 2012, however it was adjourned at the request of the defendants to September 28, 2012. On September 28, 2012 the Court granted an order setting out a payment arrangement, with payments being made to the law firm on a monthly basis. [ 3 ] The plaintiff Roncal in this matter was the third mortgagee. Apparently both prior mortgages were also in default, and they had both commenced foreclosure proceedings. Roncal’s counsel submits that they had to monitor the actions of the prior mortgagees in order to protect Roncal’s security.

In total the law firm prepared three arrears letters for the defendants. [ 4 ] The bill of costs was assessed on January 15, 2013, with one of the defendants in attendance. The fees were reduced from $6,862.20 to $4,000; non-taxable disbursements were reduced from $622 to $350; and taxable disbursements were reduced from $3,362.10 t $3,247.10. The total reduction therefore was from $11,357.33 to $7,959.46. Analysis [ 5 ] In reviewing the transcript in this matter, one of the Defendants Mr.

Anderson, before the Assessment Officer, seems to indicate that at one point at least the Plaintiff’s statement of arrears was paid off, and that those payments totaled over $10,000. Furthermore Mr. Anderson seems to indicate on the record that there never were any arrears with the TD Bank, who appeared to be the second mortgagee. Further Mr. Anderson described having paid $16,000 as of January, 2013 to the first mortgagee Investors Group, which however still left them five months in arrears with Investors Group. [ 6 ] In response to these submissions before the Assessment Officer, Mr.

Maggisano indicated that although the defendants made payments, and might have been current, their mortgage was still not in “good standing” in that proof of insurance, proof of paid property taxes and proof that the first and second mortgages were in good standing were not provided. When these items were not provided, Mr.

Maggisano indicated that these problems led to increased legal fees which at the time of the foreclosure were in the range of about another $3,000. [ 7 ] The Assessment Officer after hearing these representations, and going through the court file concluded that there was not a lot outside the ordinary for residential foreclosure matter, and accordingly reduced the fees from that being sought of $6,862.20 to a flat fee of $4,000 all inclusive .

Specifically the Assessment Officer then dealt with the issue of the difference between the recommended tariff of fees used in Calgary compared to that used from Red Deer north. From the application for an order for foreclosure to the redemption order, the Edmonton fee hovered between $2,000 and $2,500. The Assessment Officer specifically rejected the Calgary fee guidelines which, as supplied to me now by counsel, would award fees of approximately $4,140 for these items as listed below: PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES TO OBTAIN COSTS IN FORECLOSURE ACTIONS COMMENCED AFTER APRIL 1, 2004 1.

Fee Guidelines: The following are the guidelines for fees to the respective stages. It should be noted that these guidelines are for fees only. G.S.T., Disbursements and photocopying are in addition to these fees: Current Guideline (

a) Statement of Claim $1,000.00 $1,150.00 (

b) Order/Nisi/Sale (including statement of claim) $2,000.00 $2,300.00 (

c) Immediate Final Order $2,100.00 $2,415.00 (

d) Complete with Final Order $3,200.00 $3,680.00 (

e) Immediate Rice Order $2,300.00 $2,645.00 (

f) Complete with Judicial Sale (Order Nisi included) $3,600.00 $4,140.00 (

g) Complete with Tender Sale (Order Nisi included) $3,600.00 $4,140.00 (

h) ExParte Applicatons (For each further exparte order on the same day) $ 250.00 50.00 $287.50 $57.50 (

i) Writ of Possession $ 750.00 $862.50 (

j) Writ of Enforcement $ 100.00 $115.00 ****************************************************************************** NOTE: Inspection fees – allow $25.00 per visit plus GST reasonable inspections would be in the summer time every 2 weeks, winter every 1 week. Ask for a full report if there has been any delay or concerns. This should be placed under OTHER CHARGES.

Mileage is allowed at 38 cents/km – check receipts) a specific amount of mileage must be indicated on the bill. [ 8 ] Not only is there a significant difference between the so-called Edmonton tariff, and Calgary tariff, my understanding is that counsel seems to be of the opinion that any work or effort over and above the standard forms can be charged in addition to the fee guideline. In other words matters such as were involved in the present case where the parties were obviously attempting to bring the arrears up to date were all additional billable items.

The fee guidelines were sort of a mandatory minimum charge below which there would never be any reduction from. As I understand this type of minimum charge, it is improper and arguably a form of price fixing, although I understand from counsel that the Fee Guidelines have been created and approved by the Calgary Masters.

[9] I conclude that such a minimum charge approach seemingly advocated by counsel to fee billing should be discouragedpursuant to the reasoning found in David M. Gottlieb Professional Corp v Nahal, 2013 ABCA 154 at para 6: Mortgages are generally drafted and priced on the basis that the interest on the funds advanced that is payable to the mortgagee will be"net" of related expenses. That principle is often respected when costs of foreclosure proceedings are being awarded.

It is, however,generally undesirable to have a system whereby litigants are entitled to full indemnity for their legal costs, regardless of whether theywin or lose. This can lead to the prosecution of speculative litigation, and can encourage over litigation. The principle that the successfulparty is entitled to costs reflects the fairness of not requiring a successful party to bear all the expense of litigation.

But the proviso thatthe successful party is entitled to some costs, but not complete indemnity, reflects the public policy in restraining litigation. [10] Since the collection of disputed arrears and attempts were made to bring the mortgages up to date were significant issuesherein, Master Waller’s decision in CIBC Pro Mortgages Inc v Walji, 2001 ABQB 169 is relevant, especially paragraphs 2 through 9: 1 MASTER WALLER:-- Too swift arrives as tardy as too slow.

Shakespeare Romeo and Juliet Lawyers who conduct foreclosures like to do so with military precision, secure in the knowledge that they have an iron clad contractualindemnity for costs. Occasionally their zeal must be tempered by a court's review of their overreaching costs. This is one such case. 2 The defendant, Mr. Walji fell behind in his mortgage. A demand letter was issued by solicitor, Mr. Vickers, and Mr. Waljiresponded quickly by paying all arrears including an inspection fee of $75.00 and a legal fee of $277.50 for the demand letter. In hishaste to serve his client, Mr.

Vickers issued the demand letter without having first obtained a statement of condominium arrears. WhenMr. Walji paid the claimed indebtedness, he was advised by a member of Mr. Vickers' staff that if there were condominium arrears, theywould have to be paid as well. 3 It transpired that there were in fact arrears of condominium fees and so Mr. Vickers again wrote to Mr. Walji giving him a shortperiod to pay the fees or a foreclosure would ensue. Mr.

Walji in fact attended upon the condominium corporation to pay the fees butthey directed his cheque to other obligations he apparently owed the condominium corporation. Having not received a confirmation thatthe condominium fees had been paid the plaintiff paid those fees of some $1500.00 and Mr. Vickers again demanded payment togetherwith a further inspection fee of $75.00 and a legal fee of $277.50. 4 Some discussion ensued as to a proper accounting for the funds that had been received but while those discussions were ongoing.Mr. Vickers filed his statement of claim. Both Mr.

Walji and his sister Tasnim Datoo contacted Mr. Vickers by telephone and expresseda willingness to immediately pay the condominium arrears and both have deposed in filed affidavits that Mr. Vickers advised them to payhim $4,000.00 immediately or he would foreclose the home. Mr. Walji at that point in time didn't have the funds to pay all the moneydemanded by Mr. Vickers and he shortly thereafter contacted counsel who now brings this application before the court for a decision thatthe acts of Mr. Vickers were oppressive and the plaintiff's claimed costs are excessive. 5 In the meantime, Mr.

Vickers continued to prosecute his clients action with zeal ordering a valuators report and filing a motion foran Order Nisi/Sale. He now claims fees of approximately $3500.00. 6 At an earlier hearing in this matter, I urged settlement between the parties but indicated that if settlement could not be achieved Mr.Vickers should file an affidavit disputing the allegations that he made a demand on about February 3rd, 2001, that the defendant pay$4,000.00 to resolve the matter.

Mr.Vickers did file an affidavit of one Karen Tassone a paralegal in his office who refuted the allegationby swearing: I have reviewed our file in this matter it being the practice of this office to place memos on files relative to telephone conversations withDefendants or otherwise and can find no record of the telephone conversation alleged by the Defendant in his Affidavit recently filed. 7 The affidavit of a compliant paralegal is a poor substitute for a sworn denial by the party alleged to have uttered the words. Evidencein this form deprive the defendant of any effective cross examination Kennett v.

Gill (AB CA), [1969] 71 W.W.R. 1Kerans, J.A. comments on the reliability of such affidavits in Schaffhauser Kantonalbank v.

Ulrich Chmiel Montenero International Co.,(Calgary C.A. 10023 p. 24 and 25 April 13, 1988): As to the adequacy of the affidavit, it is true that an affidavit based on information and belief in an interlocutory proceeding is admissiblebut it is also trued that, when it is based on hearsay, the Court may refuse to rely upon it. 8 I have no hesitation in finding that Mr.Vickers did in fact demand excessive fees on February 3rd, 2001 and that demand had theeffect of preventing the defendant from redeeming the mortgage.

I find that the plaintiff's solicitor acted throughout this foreclosure tooquickly and aggressively and without a degree of forbearance that could be characterized as fair dealing in the context of this action. Mr.Walji's actions in initially paying all the arrears demanded of him and his expressed willingness to pay the condominium arrearswarranted fairer treatment than that which was afforded to him by the plaintiff.

There is a balance between protecting a client's interestand dealing fairly with an individual who is unrepresented by counsel. 9 If a mortgagee commences proceedings too aggressively and without respecting the balance to which I have referred, he may bedeprived of his costs and indeed costs may be awarded against him. Canada Permanent Trust Co. v. Bernhardt (BCSC), [1978] 6 W.W.R. 393; Sunlife Trust Co. v. Newman [1996] A.J. No. 1203; Sunlife Trust Co. v. Palaschuk 2000 ABQB 672, [2000] A.J. No. 1128. 10 The plaintiff's foreclosure action is stayed for a period of fourteen (14) days to allow Mr.

Walji to pay all outstandingcondominium arrears. Costs as awarded under paragraph 11 herein may not be offset against the amount of outstanding condominiumarrears.

11 In these circumstances the plaintiff is denied it's costs with the exception of the initial legal fee for the demand letter and the initial inspection fee. The defendant is awarded the costs of this application on a party/party basis under column 2 of

schedule C. [ 11 ] Master Laycock dealt with a generally similar problem where it was alleged that there were no arrears owing in Bridgewater Financial Services v Arceno, 2003 ABQB 766 . At paragraph 19 and 20 he stated the obligation to pay costs for a collection of arrears in default is not an unconditional indemnity by the borrower to pay any and all costs: 1 MASTER LAYCOCK:— This foreclosure action was commenced March 24th, 2003. The defendants were served substitutionally and noted in default April 17th, 2003.

On April 24th, 2003, I granted a 6 month Order Nisi, the defendants now make application to set aside the Order Nisi and Praecipe to Note in Default. 2 In normal circumstances a draft proposed statement of defence is a requirement and prerequisite to setting aside a default judgment or noting in default. 3 The defendants argue that not only did they have an arguable defence to the action but they also argue that it is plain and obvious that the action should be summarily dismissed pursuant to rule 159.

The defendants argue that there was no default under the mortgage as of the day of commencement of proceedings and therefore the action should be dismissed in it's entirety and costs awarded to the defendants for this application. 4 The defendants also complain that plaintiff's counsel was akin to a runaway freight train after the commencement of the proceedings. The defendants argue that plaintiff's counsel showed unseemly haste in the prosecution in this matter in ordering of appraisals and affidavits of default.

Plaintiff's counsel counters by suggesting that he should not be penalized for the efficiency of his foreclosure practice. While I note lengthy argument took place on these issues, the real issue is whether or not there was a default in the mortgage when the statement of claim was filed March 24th, 2003. At the examination on affidavits, the plaintiff's corporate officer confirmed that the monthly payments on the mortgage were current when the statement of claim was issued.

The corporate officer alleges that the default was a result of the defendants failing to pay their condominium fees which the plaintiff paid pursuant to the terms of the mortgage. 5 Wilhelmina Arceno swears in her affidavit that she and her mother are the registered owners of the property and that they were both on family business in the Philippines from June 2002 to February 2003. In their absence her sister Corazon Kourdi was in charge of the condominium. 6 On January 21st, 2003, the plaintiff received notice from the condominium corporation of outstanding arrears.

They made a demand for payment and spoke to Corazon Kourdi about the arrears. She advised the plaintiff's officer that arrangements would be made to pay the arrears. In fact she paid $500.00 against the condominium corporation arrears. On March 10th, 2003, the plaintiff's officer was advised by the condominium corporation that $500.00 had been paid but there was still arrears.

On March 11th, 2003, the plaintiff's officer attempted to contact Corazon Kourdi but had no success and forwarded the file to Vickers & Associates for action. 7 On March 13th, 2003, Vickers and Associates forwarded a demand letter to the defendants requiring payment of the condominium arrears together with interest and discharge fees of $964.60, inspection fees of $75.00, legal fees and disbursements of $277.50. 8 Wilhelmia Arceno swears in her affidavit that, on March 20th, 2003, she received a notice from Larlyn Property Management Ltd., that the condominium fees were in arrears in the amount of $939.00.

She immediately went to the management company who agreed to accept a cheque post dated to March 29th, 2003 to settle the arrears. 9 Wilhelmia Arceno swears that because she did not regularly pick up her mail the letter from Vickers & Associates was not received by her until after she made her payment arrangements with Larlyn Property Management Ltd. Believing the matter had been concluded directly with the property management company, Ms. Arceno ignored the letter from Vickers & Associates.

Vickers' letter said in part: Our client requires proof of payment of the condominium arrears to be submitted by certified cheque or bank draft payable to Vickers & Associates no later than 12:00 noon on March 21st, 2003, failing which our instructions are to commence foreclosure proceedings.

No partial payments will be accepted or extensions granted. 10 On March 24th, 2003, the plaintiff mailed a cheque to the condominium management corporation in the amount of $1,136.87 without checking to see if the defendants had made payment or arrangements for payment. 11 At the cross examination of the corporate officer undertook to indicate when the March 24th cheque cleared Bridgewater's account.

The undertaking has not been answered. 12 Counsel for the defendants argues that this action never would have proceeded if the plaintiff on March 24th, 2003 phoned the condominium management corporation to see if the arrears had been settled or if counsel for the plaintiff, before filing the statement of claim, called the condominium management corporation to inquire about the condominium payment arrears. 13 Counsel for the plaintiff responds that they shouldn't have to phone daily to inquire about outstanding arrears; that they are entitled to assume that the demand letter would be responded too, and that they are also entitled to assume that the defendant was receiving documents forwarded by his office. 14 The facts are clear that the defendants were in default in their covenants contained in the mortgage on March 20th, 2003 for failing to maintain their condominium fees.

However, the defendants were not in default in their covenants in the mortgage on March 24th, 2003 when these proceedings were commenced. The plaintiff is not entitled to assume anything. It must prove with evidence that the defendants were in default in the payments of the principle, interest or condominium fees on March 24th, 2003. That is what the statement of claim alleges. The evidence is entirely to the contrary. The defendants were current on their monthly mortgage payments to the plaintiff and the condominium arrears had been satisfied with the condominium management company.

15 If Bridgewater's cheque dated March 24th, 2003 was negotiated by the condominium management corporation, the plaintiff mayhave an action against the condominium corporation for improperly cashing the cheque but it can not be used as a foundation for thisaction. 16 It is therefore ordered that the Order Nisi and Praecipe in Note in Default be set aside, the defendants have leave to file a statementof defence denying default had occurred under the mortgage. Upon filing their defence the defendants will also be entitled to

summaryjudgment dismissing this action entirely. During argument the defendants also asked for costs against the plaintiff and their counselpersonally. There was no mention of costs against counsel in the notice of motion and should the defendants wish to apply for such anorder, they must do so on notice to Vickers & Associates. 17 Cases referred to me by counsel for the defendants dealing with costs include CIBC Mortgages Inc., v. Walji [2001] A.J. No. 280,2001 ABQB 169; Sunlife Trust Co. v. Newman [1996] A.J. No. 1203; Sunlife Trust Co. v. Palaschuk [2000] A.J.

No. 1128, 2000 ABQB672. 18 Master Waller in Walji in paragraph 1 stated: Lawyers who conduct foreclosures like to do so with military precision, secure in the knowledge that they have an iron clad contractualindemnity for costs. Occasionally there zeal must be tempered by a courts review of their over reaching costs. This is one such case. 19 In the Newman foreclosure, proceedings were commenced for an outstanding balance of $1,248.93. Master Alberstat stated inparagraphs 9 - 11: 9.

The obligation to pay costs for a collection of arrears in default in payment is not unconditional indemnity by a borrower to pay allcosts regardless of any circumstances that might arise. The mortgagee also has to be reasonable, not only in attempts to collect arrears butalso in litigation process. 10. When such a small amount is owing compared to security lodged, the plaintiff ought to take more reasonable steps to collect thearrears before launching expensive procedures such as foreclosure. 11.

I do not think the steps taken by the mortgagee to collect the balance owing prior to commencing these proceedings were reasonable. 20 Even where there is default in a mortgage, if the mortgagee commences proceedings to quickly and aggressively, costs may beawarded against him: Canada Permanent Trust Co. v. Bernhardt (BC SC), [1978] 6 W.W.R. 393. Where there is nodefault under the mortgage, costs will assuredly be ordered against the plaintiff. The defendants have been successful and shall beawarded costs taxed on a solicitor and his own client basis of the proceedings.

Underlining is mine. [12] Finally, Master Smart discusses this area of what he described as Cinderella Payments and collection compensation as followsas para 13 of AGF Trust Company v Soos 2012 ABQB 747: Lenders consider recovery proceedings on delinquent mortgages an unfortunate inconvenience and expense. They have over the yearsconsistently looked to ways to reduce costs. As part of that strategy lenders have downloaded more and more responsibility to lawyersincluding many of the administrative responsibilities that their staff used to perform.

Lenders may demand their lawyers do their clericaland administrative work but that does not make those things legal services recoverable against a mortgagor. Nonetheless, lawyers areunhappy with the increasing responsibilities imposed upon them and have recently sought both aggressive increases in the guidelines aswell as attempting to identify and isolate specific items for additional compensation. Historically, the latter was restricted to applicationsfor preservation orders, substitutional service orders and the like.

An example for compensation now being sought relates to the receiptof a "cinderella" payment. (An unfortunate and demeaning moniker adopted and used by many legal counsel, an ostensible attempt atanalogy and characterization that escapes me.) This circumstance arises when the lender agrees to accept or in my view far too often onlywhen the court orders that the mortgagee receive payments from mortgagors towards arrears. Despite the sophisticated computerizationexisting today it seems lenders don't wish to receive payments at their branches as communication of receipt with the law firms would beextra work.

It is almost invariably the practice now that payments on arrears, at the request of the lender, must be made directly to thelaw firm. This, of course, is an administrative burden on the law firm but performing the services of a bank teller hardly warrants alawyer processing fee of $150 per payment as proposed. Although not applicable to this case, in my view if lenders want lawyers toreceive their deposits then they can pay the lawyers for that. Conclusion [13] It is submitted by Applicant’s counsel that the standard of review in these matters is found at para 16 and 17 of Fraser MilnerCasgrain LLP v.

Kristof Financial Inc. 2012 ABQB 359: 16 When one reviews the many cases that deal with appeals from decisions of review officers (or taxing officers, as they wereformerly known), there are certain principles that emerge. A review officer's decision is entitled to curial deference: 509703 at para 11.Why? A review officer's "duties commonly call for him to do this type of vetting because of the nature of his position and the expertisethat he gathers in carrying out those duties": Carr & Co v. Markdale Ltd. (1996), (AB KB), 46 Alta LR (3d) 324 atpara 20 (QB) ["Carr & Company"]. See also McLennan Ross v.

Mercantile Bank of Canada (1988), 1988 ABCA 224 , 59 AltaLR (2d) 369 at para 6 (CA) ["McLennan Ross"]. The Alberta Court of Appeal in McLennan Ross went on to say that, "the taxingofficer's function is a specialized one and he may have to bring his own experience and expertise to bear" (at para 12). 17 Curial deference, however, is not absolute. A court hearing an appeal from a review officer's decision may interfere if the reviewofficer "operated on a wrong principle and thereby fell into error": McLennan Ross at para 6, citing Cape Breton Landowners v.

StoraKopparbergs Bergslags Aktiebolag (1983), (NS CA), 33 CPC 1, 146 DLR (3d) 369, 58 NSR (2d) 193, 123 APR(NSCA); Petty v. Bishop & McKenzie (1977), 2 AR 241 at 243 (QB). An error in principle may include a situation where the quantum

that the review officer awards is inordinately high or low: McLennan Ross ibid; 509703 at para 11. Similarly, a court hearing an appealfrom a review officer's decision may interfere if the review officer makes an error concerning the scope of the retainer agreement underwhich the parties are operating: Brown v. Snyder & Associates, 2004 ABQB 899 at para 20 ["Brown"]. Finally, a court hearing anappeal from a review officer's decision may find that the review officer made a finding of fact that is clearly in error: Carter v.

Blake(1982), 41 AR 418 at para 7 (NWTCA) ["Carter"]. [14] Recently another standard of review can be found at para 38 of Repchuk v Silverberg 2013 ABQB 305: 38 A review officer may fall into error in at least the following ways: 1. erring in fact, for which a party must demonstrate that the fact as found is "clearly in error": Sweetgrass First Nation v. Rath &Company, 2013 ABQB 165 at para 27 [Rath & Co ], FMC v. Kristof Financial Inc, 2012 ABQB 359 at para 17, 215 ACWS (3d) 1010[FMC ], McLennan Ross v.

Keen Industries Ltd (No 2) (1988), 1988 ABCA 224 , 86 AR 311 at para 7 (CA) [McLennan Ross 2]; 2. erring in principle (law), which will be shown if a party can demonstrate that the review officer proceeded on an erroneous principle,failed to apply a required principle or that the award of the review officer is so high or low as to betray an error of principle: Rath & Coat para 27, McLennan Ross 2 at paras 6, 13; 3. erring in true questions of jurisdiction (law), for which a standard of correctness will apply: Rath & Co at para 20, Panther PetroleumLtd v.

Code Hunter, 2002 ABQB 158 at para 16, 112 ACWS (3d) 225, MacKimmie Matthews v. Hector (1998), 1998 ABCA 278, 219 AR 163 at para 7 (CA); and 4. failing to provide a hearing that is procedurally fair, for which a standard of correctness will apply: Anderson v.

Alberta SecuritiesCommission, 2008 ABCA 184 at para 30, 437 AR 55 [Anderson ]. [15] For the reasons cited in the decisions I have quoted from, applying either or both standards of review, I see no error inprinciple or reversible error with respect to the Assessment Officer’s reduction of the fees from $4,000 to $6,862.20. [16] The Assessment Officer also disallowed fax filing fees of $124 for the reason that Roncal was free to choose whatever lawfirm they wanted, but because this was an Edmonton matter, the Assessment Officer did not think the defendant should be paying faxfiling fees and the circumstances with this I find no disagreement. [17] The Assessment Officer also disallowed a $45 inspection fee as something the Defendants should not be responsible for.

Inthis regard I see no reason to interfere with the Assessment Officer’s decision. The Assessment Officer reduced the process server invoice from $129 to $83 because she only allowed a $30 service fee instead of $60;and a mileage charge of 50 cents a kilometer which was reduced from 70 cents a kilometer. I agree with the Assessment Officer’s viewon this given that there is a standard kilometer charge of 50 cents a kilometer for all government expense travel.

A $30 service fee ratherthan $60 appears much more reasonable as well. [18] In the result, I uphold the Assessment Officer’s conclusions in this matter in their entirety as they demonstrate no reviewableor other error, and are subject to deference based on the Assessment Officer’s specialization. Heard on the 31st day of July, 2013. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta, this 9th day of August, 2013. Donald Lee J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: N. Maggisano for the Appellant No Appearance for the Respondents