Austin v Austin, 2013 ABQB 562

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: Austin v Austin, 2013 ABQB 562 Date: 20130927 Docket: 4801 112673 Registry: Calgary Between: Stephen Arthur Austin Applicant/Defendant - and - Debra Jean Austin Respondent/Plaintiff _ ________________________________________ ______________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Madam Justice S.L. Hunt McDonald _________________________________________ ______________ I. Background [ 1 ] The parties were married on December 18, 1993, separated on May 1, 2001, and divorced on March 29, 2007. There is one child of the marriage, Pamela Jane Austin, born in 1994.

The mother has two children from a previous marriage and the father has a child from a previous relationship. In August 2001, the parties executed a Parenting, Support and Property Agreement (“Agreement”). [ 2 ] Clauses 32 and 33 of the Agreement address the costs of post-secondary education and child support reviews: POST SECONDARY EDUCATION COSTS 32. Stephen shall contribute the sum of $2,000.00 per year per child to an RESP account which is operated jointly by the parties until the child finishes high school. The costs of the child’s post-secondary education shall be paid firstly from the RESP.

If there is a shortfall, the child will be expected to make a contribution, the amount of which shall be discussed and agreed upon by the child and the parties. Thereafter, the parties will contribute to the shortfall proportionate to their incomes. If they cannot agree on his or her contribution they shall attend mediation before bringing a court application. CHILD SUPPORT REVIEW

33. The parties agree that the amount of child support shall be reviewed yearly. The parties shall provide each other with his or her personal income tax return by May 31 st and any other information relevant to determine that party’s current income from all sources as provided for in the Child Support Guidelines. Stephen will also provide his most recent corporate financial statements. The child support will be adjusted commencing June 1 in each year based on the income for the previous year.

If the parties cannot agree on what the appropriate guideline incomes are then they shall attend mediation before either brings a court application. [ 3 ] The Agreement was negotiated with the intention that both parties would consult one another in relation to Pamela’s expenses and work cooperatively and amicably to resolve disputes. The reality has been very different. History has proven these parties rarely agree on anything and in the rare instances when they reach agreement, they do not always follow through on their promises.

They come before this court in a viva voce hearing regarding child support for the one child of the marriage. [ 4 ] The Applicant father, Stephen Arthur Austin, seeks the following variation of an order issued by Madam Justice S. Martin on May 22, 2008: A. Terminating his obligation to pay child support directly to Ms. Austin. B. Directing that he continue to administer the existing RESP account and pay from it such funds as are required for Pamela’s post- secondary education expenses; C.

Determining the parties’ respective contributions to cover Pamela’s additional post-secondary expenses beyond what is covered by the RESP funds; D. Directing that his contributions to Pamela’s post-secondary education expenses be paid directly to her; E. Any other relief that this Court may allow as is necessary to give effect to the Order pronounced; and F. Costs of the application. [ 5 ] The Respondent mother, Debra Jean Austin, filed a cross-application seeking: A. An order determining the amount of retroactive

section 7 expenses payable to her; B. An order determining the amount of retroactive and ongoing child support payable (section 3 and

section 7) in respect of the Pamela’s post-secondary education; C. Such further and other relief that this Court deems necessary and appropriate; and D. Costs of her application. [ 6 ] Neither party voluntarily disclosed their annual income tax returns after the 2008 court hearing. The disclosure since provided came through formal Notices to Disclose required for this court hearing. Mr. Austin has not disclosed his corporate interests other than SAC Consulting; rather, he provided oral testimony at the hearing. II. Income [ 7 ] Both parties provided calculations of Mr. Austin’s guideline income.

The actual figures for SAC Consulting Ltd. for the fiscal year ending April 30, 2013 are not yet known as Mr. Austin has not yet filed the corporate income tax returns. Accordingly, I have accepted assumed figures agreed upon by the parties. [ 8 ] Mr. Austin sought to deduct some amounts from his line 150 total personal income, such as CA dues, capital losses, CPP overpayment, and carrying charges. Ms. Austin disputed these deductions. Mr. Austin sought these deductions relying upon expert evidence presented to Justice Martin in the 2008 hearing.

These deductions are not available in this proceeding without evidence. [ 9 ] I find Mr. Austin’s guideline income for 2009 to 2012 to be as follows: 2009 2010 2011 2012 Income $155,238.00 $234,805.00 $238,030.00 $321,728.00 Monthly Table Amount of Child Support $1,350.00 $2,060.00 $2,095.00 $2,848.55 [ 10 ] Ms. Austin’s income has been substantially less than Mr. Austin’s over the same four year period, namely zero in 2009, $9,754.00 in 2010, $11,000.00 in 2011 and $41,196.00 in 2012. The reason for the reduction from her previous historical income is that

Ms. Austin went back to university from 2004 to 2008 and received a Doctor in Naturopathic Medicine degree. She is now in the process of building her practice in Naturopathic Medicine in Calgary. [ 11 ] Nevertheless, Ms. Austin proposes that the parties’ proportionate share of

section 7 expenses, retroactively and prospectively, should be apportioned 80% to Mr. Austin and 20% to herself. III. Overpayment of Base Child Support [ 12 ] Since 2008 up to and including August 2013, Mr. Austin has paid monthly child support of $1,951.00 on an imputed annual guideline income of $225,489.00 set by Justice Martin. [ 13 ] According to the calculations given to me at the hearing, this has resulted in an overpayment of $7,123.00 from October 1, 2009 to April 30, 2013 of

section 3 child support. [ 14 ] Mr. Austin has not brought an application for a re-adjustment of child support; however, his counsel requested the court take into consideration his overpayment by way of set off against any court-ordered payment of retroactive

section 7 child support. Ms. Austin agreed with this proposal. Given this agreement, I am satisfied that Mr. Austin can be given a credit of $7,123.00 to be set off against any retroactive

section 7 child support I find owing to Ms. Austin. IV. Retroactive

Section 7 Child Support [ 15 ]

Section 15.1 and 17 of the Divorce Act , RSC 1985, c 3 (2 nd Supp) provide statutory authority for awarding retroactive child support: 15.1(1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to pay support of any or all children of the marriage. 17(1) A court of competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, prospectively or retroactively , a support order or any provision thereof on application by either or both former spouses; … [ 16 ] The Supreme Court of Canada has clarified the law respecting retroactive child support orders in S(DB) v (G)SR; [W(LJ) v R(TA; Henry v Henry; Hiemstra v Hiemstra ], 2006 SCC 37 , [2006] 2 SCR 231 (the “ Henry ” case).

Justice Bastarache, for the majority, held that parents have an obligation to support their children in a manner commensurate with their income and that child support is the right of the child: Henry at para 54 & 60 . As much as possible, children are to be provided with the same standard of living they enjoyed when their parents were together and child support will vary based on the income of the payor parent: Henry at para 111 . [ 17 ] Ms. Austin filed her cross-application for retroactive

section 7 expenses on November 23, 2012 in response to Mr. Austin’s application for a variation of ongoing child support. She claims retroactive

section 7 expenses totaling $82,524. 00, Ex. 1 , Tab 4. The expenses include $59,000 for four years of private schooling at Webber Academy in Calgary, in addition to expenses for Pamela’s kickboxing and personal fitness programs, field trips to France and Ottawa, a campus tour to eastern Canada and various career counselling and university application related expenses. [ 18 ] Some of the claimed expenses date back to 2008 when Pamela commenced private schooling at Webber Academy. Ms. Austin claims for these expenses relying upon Mr.

Austin’s allegedly blameworthy conduct. [ 19 ] The general rule set out in Henry is that, assuming entitlement is established, an order for retroactive child support will go back no more than three years prior to the date the recipient parent gave effective notice to the payor parent of the requested change in support. Henry provides that retroactive orders can go back more than three years, however, if the payor parent engaged in blameworthy conduct.

Bastarache J explained at para 124: The date when increased support should have been paid, however, will sometimes be a more appropriate date from which the retroactive order should start. This situation can most notably arise where the payor parent engages in blameworthy conduct . Once the payor parent engages in such conduct, there can be no claim that (s)he reasonably believed his/her child’s support entitlement was being met. This will not only be the case where the payor parent intimidates and lies to the recipient parent, but also where (s)he withholds information.

Not disclosing a material change in circumstances — including an increase in income that one would expect to alter the amount of child support payable — is itself blameworthy conduct. The presence of such blameworthy conduct will move the presumptive date of retroactivity back to the time when circumstances changed materially.

A payor parent cannot use his/her informational advantage to justify his/her deficient child support payments. [ 20 ] The court defined blameworthy conduct as anything that privileges the payor parent’s own interests over the child’s right to an appropriate amount of support: Henry at para 106 . [ 21 ] In compliance with the general rule, Ms. Austin claims retroactive child support back to October 1, 2009, which I accept as the appropriate date. She also claims expenses incurred for Webber Academy prior to October 1, 2009, citing Mr.

Austin’s blameworthy conduct. [ 22 ] First I must determine whether retroactive support is appropriate at all taking into consideration the reasons for Ms. Austin’s delay in bringing an application to share the

section 7 expenses, Mr. Austin’s conduct, including whether it amounts to blameworthy conduct, the circumstances of the child, and whether a retroactive award will result in hardship to Mr. Austin.

[ 23 ] It is up to the recipient parent to make an application in a timely manner for reimbursement if the parties are not in agreement as to

section 7 expenses. Ms. Austin did not make a timely application for sharing of these expenses, explaining that she did not want to, nor could she afford to, incur any further legal expenses. [ 24 ] While it is true Mr. Austin did not provide the annual financial disclosure required by Justice Martin’s 2008 order, Ms. Austin concedes she did not do so either. She argues, however, that her non-disclosure is not material in that she is the support recipient and her income was irrelevant to the child support calculation. [ 25 ] Mr. Austin argues that Ms.

Austin failed to consult him with respect to important decisions, including the claimed expenses. Further, he submits that Ms. Austin submitted no invoices for the expenses she incurred. He conceded in cross-examination, however, that he never requested such invoices. Mr. Austin particularly objects to contributing to the expenses incurred for Pamela to attend grades 9 through 12 at Webber Academy. In general, he argues that Ms.

Austin did not work co-operatively with him in making decisions about Pamela’s education and activities, nor did she seek to resolve disputes amicably, as required by clause 15 of the Agreement. [ 26 ] Ms. Austin explains she did not consult Mr. Austin because of his bullying and abusive behaviour, his historical refusal to pay for things she believed to be necessary and beneficial for Pamela’s welfare but with which he disagreed, and his negative history with her other two children. [ 27 ] Ms. Austin testified that Mr.

Austin had refused to pay his share of expenses in spite of prior agreement between the parties. She described an agreement reached in mediation, but not reduced to writing, in which Mr. Austin promised to pay half of Pamela’s Webber Academy expenses for Grade 9. She also referenced clause 28 of the Agreement which provides that Mr. Austin would pay for his proportionate share of Pamela’s Glencoe athletic expenses. [ 28 ] Mr. Austin admits the parties discussed splitting the Webber Academy expenses for the 2008/09 school year in mediation.

He explains that he was opposed to Pamela continuing at Webber Academy past Grade 9. He wanted her to attend a public school for high school, such as Western Canada High School where he attended. He mentioned that Western has an International Baccalaureate program and could provide better athletic programs. As well, Pamela would meet a more balanced student population. [ 29 ] Ms. Austin explained that she did pre-register Pamela for grade 10 at Western Canada High School, but having never received reimbursement from Mr.

Austin for Grade 9 at Webber Academy, she made her own decision about Pamela’s ongoing schooling and accommodated the child’s preference to continue there. [ 30 ] It is clear that neither party is innocent here. Ms. Austin made decisions without consulting Mr. Austin and delayed in bringing an application for reimbursement of potential

section 7 expenses. Mr. Austin engaged in blameworthy conduct in agreeing in mediation to pay half of the Grade 9 private schooling expenses and then reneging on his agreement. With respect to Pamela’s Grade 9 Webber Academy expenses, I find that Mr.

Austin should pay half of the $19,700.00 school fees, as well as half the $1,300.00 uniform cost. [ 31 ] Although there is no dispute that Pamela did extremely well at Webber Academy and achieved not only university entrance status but was also President of her Student Council, it is my view that private schooling is an extraordinary expense that should have been agreed upon by both parties prior to the expense being incurred.

I find support for this conclusion in the judgment of my colleague Wilson J in Steiger v Steiger , 1999 ABQB 74 who stated at para 4 that private schooling is “a matter calling for a decision between the mother, the father and the child, rather than the mother deciding” on her own. [ 32 ] Accordingly, I find there is no basis for a reimbursement to Ms. Austin for Pamela’s private schooling in Grades 10 through 12 at Webber Academy totaling $39,300.00. [ 33 ] I allow Ms.

Austin’s claim of $7,200.00 for Pamela’s kickboxing and personal fitness programs at the Glencoe Club. [ 34 ] I find Pamela’s orthodontic expenses were contemplated by clause 30 of the Agreement and later addressed in mediation. Accordingly, Mr. Austin is responsible for his proportionate share of the total amount of $5,698.00 (Ex. 1, Tab 6). [ 35 ] I disallow the sums claimed of $3,567.00 for a field trip to France, $1,700.00 for a field trip to Ottawa, $600.00 for the Red Deer Drama Festival in 2010, 2011 and 2012, and expenses of $1,600.00 for a campus tour to eastern Canada.

It is my view that there should have been discussion and agreement as to the sharing of these expenses; alternately, Ms. Austin could have brought an application in court to deal with these expenses in a timely fashion. Similarly, Ms. Austin never contacted Mr. Austin to discuss purchasing a full size violin for Pamela, nor for violin lessons. I find that these expenses were never agreed to by the parties and should not be allowed retroactively. [ 36 ] I agree the balance of items claimed by Ms.

Austin in Ex. 1, Tab 4 including career counselling, application fees to universities, and transcript fees are properly claimable

section 7 expenses. Ms. Austin also claims for expenses incurred in setting up Pamela in Montreal for her first year of university (Ex. 1, Tab 9) in the total amount of $6,615.88. [ 37 ] I find that payment of these amounts retroactively will not cause Mr. Austin any hardship. [ 38 ] Accordingly, the total amount of retroactive

section 7 expenses I allow to Ms. Austin based on the table she presented in Ex. 1, Tab 4 is $22,378.00, in accordance with the calculation set out as follows:

Section 7 Expenses Total Amount Claimed Stephen Austin’s Portion Proportion Webber Academy 2008-2009 $19,700.00 $9,850.00 (1/2) Uniforms – Halpern/Top Marks $1,300.00 $650.00 (1/2)

Career Counselling, Dr. Chris Reid PhD $1,312.00 $1,050.00 (80%) Kickboxing & Personal Fitness @ $150 per month x 48 $7,200.00 $5,760.00 (80%) Application Fee, McGill $100.00 $80.00 (80%) Application Fee, UWO $130.00 $104.00 (80%) Application Fee, Queens $105.00 $84.00 (80%) Application Fee, UBC $62.00 $50.00 (80%) Transcript Fees $150.00 $120.00 (80%) Orthodontics $5,698.00 $4,558.00 (80%) TOTAL $35,757.00 $22,306.00 [ 39 ] Mr. Austin’s 80% proportionate share of the set up costs totalling $6,615.00 for Pamela’s first year of university is $5,292.00, thus the total retroactive child support owing is $27,598.00 .

V. Ongoing Child Support [ 40 ] Ms. Austin filed a further application on February 11, 2013 for an order determining the amount of child support payable (retroactive and ongoing) given Pamela’s enrolment at McGill University in September 2012. [ 41 ] I accept the line of reasoning expressed by Johnstone J in Wahl v Wahl , 2000 ABQB 10 at para 76 , 257 AR 212 that in circumstances where an adult child is attending university away from home, the Courts normally do not establish child support based upon the Guideline amount but rather resort to the condition, means and needs consideration set forth in s 3(2)(

b) of the Guidelines. [ 42 ] As Langston J stated in B(

L) v V(PA) , 2008 ABQB 623 at para 21 , 2 Alta LR (5 th ) 241: When children choose to pursue post-secondary education and in the course of doing so, also choose to no longer reside with either parent, the rationale for the application of the Guidelines falls to the wayside. [ 43 ] The judge explained the proper approach at paras 25-26: …the Court must determine the appropriate level “having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support”, as dictated by s. 3(2)(b).

In addition to s. 3(2)(b), it should be noted that s. 7 is also relevant. Section 7(1) states that a child support order may also provide for an amount to cover post-secondary education expenses, “taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation”.

In determining the amount that the order should provide for, s. 7(2) states that the guiding principle in applying s. 7(1) is to have the expense “shared by the spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the contribution, if any, from the child. a. RESP Funds [ 44 ] Stephen Austin holds and continues to manage a CIBC Wood Gundy RESP for Pamela’s benefit. In accordance with the discussions and agreement of the parties during submissions, I order that Mr.

Austin continue to administer the plan. [ 45 ] I also order that funds be paid from the RESP to Pamela in two instalments for each school year: one-half on or before the end of the third last business day of August and the other half on or before the third last business day of December for a total of $15,000.00 for the school year commencing September 2013, $15,000.00 for the school year commencing September 2014 and $16,600.00 for the school year commencing September 2015. Mr.

Austin has undertaken to top up the sum for the 2015/2016 school year if there is less than the full sum of $16,600.00 remaining in the RESP account. Accordingly, he is ordered to do so, if it is required. [ 46 ] Mr. Austin has undertaken, and I so order, that he make the necessary arrangements to have the funds transferred directly from the RESP account into Pamela’s bank account.

I have received written confirmation that $7,500.00 was transferred to Pamela from the RESP on September 9, 2013 to comply with this Order. [ 47 ] The parties agree the sum of $13,400.00 was advanced to Pamela from the RESP for her first year at McGill (the 2012/2013 school year). I ordered above a proportionate sharing of the expenses incurred to set up Pamela at McGill in her first year. I make no further order with respect to Pamela’s first-year expenses. b. Proposed Budget for Pamela’s University Expenses

[ 48 ] The parties differ in their approach to a proper budget for Pamela’s ongoing university expenses. [ 49 ] To supplement the RESP funds, Mr. Austin expects Pamela to earn approximately $8,000.00 per year. He proposes he pay his proportionate share of Pamela’s remaining expenses after sitting down with her to discuss and agree on a reasonable budget. [ 50 ] Ms. Austin proposes a budget at Ex 1, Tab 10. She suggests the budget should be decided in advance so each party understands his or her respective contributions.

She does not want Pamela to negotiate with her father in respect of her estimated expenses, given Mr. Austin’s historical refusal to pay for expenses that he deemed unnecessary. She argues Mr. Austin exhibited this kind of controlling behaviour throughout their years of co-parenting and provides as examples his refusal to pay his share of the Grade 9 Webber Academy fees and orthodontic expenses in spite of prior agreement between the parties. [ 51 ] I find Mr. Austin is inclined towards controlling behaviour. He has a history of not paying for expenses he deems unnecessary or for which he disapproves.

I assume he and Pamela will have different views as to what is a reasonable expense. Furthermore, since separation he has not been responsible for Pamela’s day to day expenses thus he is not up to date on the likely cost of her living expenses. He and his daughter have reconciled just recently, having been incommunicado for several years. Given the parties’ history and the history of his relationship with Pamela, I find Mr.

Austin’s proposal that he and Pamela can “work it out” to be unduly optimistic. [ 52 ] It is my judgment that the parties would do much better if a budget were prescribed up front and that each party were ordered to pay a monthly sum to fund Pamela’s university education. As such, I am left to consider the budgetary sums proposed by the parties in their submissions. They both estimated Pamela’s annual expenses to attend McGill, and not surprisingly, their budget amounts differ. [ 53 ] Mr. Austin submitted a “best guess” budget of the funds necessary to pay for four years at McGill.

His budget assumed that RESP funds would be paid directly to Pamela, that Pamela would put the $5,000.00 inheritance expected from her grandfather towards her education, and that Pamela contribute $30,000.00 from summer earnings towards her education over four years (Ex. 2). Mr. Austin did not provide specific details or headings for Pamela’s anticipated expenses, nor did he take into account likely tuition increases. [ 54 ] I find the expected savings of $30,000.00 proposed by Mr. Austin to be unreasonable. He believes Pamela could achieve this through part time employment or even student loan funding, but Mr.

Austin adduced no evidence of availability of such financing for Pamela. [ 55 ] Ms. Austin submitted a Projected University Expense Budget (Ex. 1, Tab 10). She proposes the court approve this budget as an accurate estimate of Pamela’s expenses to complete her undergraduate degree at McGill. Ms. Austin has taken into account potential annual tuition fee increases of 10%. She proposes that Pamela save $5,500.00 from her summertime earnings to pay for her own entertainment, personal grooming and gift expenses and has kept such expenses out of the budget. [ 56 ] I find that the sums in Ms.

Austin’s proposed budget are reasonable and will eliminate the need to renegotiate each year. It requires Pamela to contribute funds from income earned through summer employment for her own entertainment, personal grooming and gift expenses. I accept that $5,500.00 is a reasonable amount to expect Pamela to contribute each year.

The only expenses I disallow are $759.00 per year for violin lessons and one-half of the “other” expense. [ 57 ] Accordingly, I calculate each party’s expenses to be as follows: 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 Total $32,800.16 $33,415.67 $34,837.59 Less: Violin $759.00 $759.00 $759.00 Less: ½ Other $1,000.00 $1,000.00 $1,000.00 Less: RESP $15,000.00 $15,000.00 $16,600.00 Balance to be funded $16,041.16 $16,656.67 $16,478.58 80% Stephen Austin $12,832.93 $13,325.34 $13,182.87 20% Debra Austin $3,208.23 $3,331.33 $3,295.72 Sept./13 to Apr./14 Sept./14 to Apr./15 Sept./15 to Apr./16 Stephen Austin 8 x Monthly Deposit $1,604.12 $1,665.67 $1,647.86 Debra Austin 8 x Monthly Deposit $401.03 $416.42 $411.96 [ 58 ] I order each party to pay the indicated monthly amounts directly into Pamela’s bank account in eight equal monthly instalments from September 1 st to April 1 st each year for her three remaining years at McGill.

If Mr. Austin does not pay the amounts as ordered I expect Ms. Austin to file a prompt application to be heard by me so the order can be amended making the amounts payable to Ms. Austin; the payments can then be enforced, if necessary, through the Maintenance Enforcement program. [ 59 ] If Pamela returns to Calgary for the summer and lives with Ms. Austin, I order Mr. Austin to pay $2,000.00/month child support to Ms. Austin for each month while Pamela is resident in Calgary, to be paid on the first of each month during the summer break period.

If Pamela chooses to study abroad during her time at McGill, the parties can make further application to the court to address their respective financial responsibilities if they are unable to agree.

VI. Miscellaneous Issues [ 60 ] The day after final submissions, I received correspondence from Ms. Austin’s counsel claiming an underpayment of

section 3 child support for the period May to August 2013 based on Mr. Austin’s 2012 guideline income. She submits that he should have paid $2,848.55/month rather than the $1,951.00/month paid. She seeks to deduct the total underpayment of $3,590.20 from the overpayment of $7,123.00 discussed earlier in these reasons. This argument should have been presented in argument in the hearing and I reject it, leaving Mr. Austin’s overpayment credit at $7,123.00. [ 61 ] For the same reason, I reject Mr. Austin’s suggestion that he should receive a credit totaling $7,804.00. He argues he should not have paid

section 3 child support at all between May 1 and August 30, 2013 now that Pamela attends university. [ 62 ] Pamela is expected to receive a $5,000.00 inheritance from her Grandfather’s estate. I have not included this sum in any of my calculations as the funds have not been received. The funds will be Pamela’s property and can be directed towards whatever purpose indicated by her grandfather’s will, the cost of studying abroad or any other purpose. [ 63 ] This Order in no way precludes either party from making an application to this court should Pamela study towards a second degree. VII.

Conclusion [ 64 ] Effective September 1, 2013 no child support is payable by Mr. Austin to Ms. Austin except for the summer months if Pamela returns to Calgary to live with her mother, as set out earlier in these reasons. [ 65 ] The retroactive child support amount totaling $27,598.00 shall be set off against the agreed upon overpayment of $7,123.00. Accordingly, Mr. Austin shall pay to Ms. Austin the sum of $20,475.00 no later than October 15, 2013. [ 66 ] The RESP payments and monthly contributions towards Pamela’s university education shall be paid as described earlier in these reasons.

Each party will double their respective monthly payment on October 1, 2013 to compensate for the fact that the release of these reasons is after September 1, 2013. [ 67 ] In view of the mixed results in these applications, I hereby direct that each party bear their own costs. Heard on the 4 th and 6 th day of September, 2013. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 27 th day of September, 2013. S.L. Hunt McDonald J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: V.A. (Bud) MacDonald, Q.C. for the Applicant/Defendant Elaine Lenz, Q.C. for the Respondent/Plaintiff