Manawan Drainage District v Lutz, 2013 ABQB 8

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Manawan Drainage District v Lutz, 2013 ABQB 8 Date: 20130104 Docket: 1203 06674 Registry: Edmonton Between: Manawan Drainage District Applicant - and - Richard Anthony Joseph Lutz, Larry John Lutz, Albert Lutz and David Lutz and Surface Rights Board Respondents _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice J. J.

Gill _______________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] This judicial review application concerns decisions of the Respondent Surface Rights Board’s (“SRB”) Decision No. 2012/0136 and related Compensation Order No. 0288/2012 (collectively the “2012 Decision”). [ 2 ] In the 2012 Decision, the SRB awarded compensation to the individual Respondents (the “Lutzs”) in respect of a claim made pursuant to

section 34 of Drainage Districts Act , RSA 2000, c D-16 (the “ DDA ”) regarding loss or damage to crops resulting from certain actions undertaken by the Applicant, Manawan Drainage District (“Manawan”).

Background [ 3 ] The relevant facts in this matter are not in dispute. The case concerns flooding of farmland after a fixed weir gate was installed on Manawan Lake. [ 4 ] Manawan Lake is a Crown water body. The Lutzs owned and farmed a land legally described as SW 33-56-25-W4M (the “Land”) adjacent to Manawan Lake. [ 5 ] Manawan is a drainage district established by Order in Council in 1948. Manawan’s drainage district boundaries surround Manawan Lake.

Manawan has control over the drainage works relating to Manawan Lake and has been maintaining a water control structure on Manawan Lake since 1948. [ 6 ] Manawan is governed in part by the DDA and its two regulations, the Drainage Districts Regulation , Alta Reg 5/2001 ( DDR ), and the Compensation Regulation , Alta Reg 29/2002 ( Compensation Regulation ). [ 7 ] Under the DDA , the Manawan Board of Trustees have a number of powers, including the following:

a) the power to construct, maintain, repair, and replace drainage works and any necessary roadways, fences or other infrastructure related to the drainage works (sections 30-33);

b) the power to assess drainage rates (or taxes) payable in respect to each parcel of land (section 38). [ 8 ] Manawan exercised its powers and performed obligations solely under the DDA until approximately 1985, when regulators imposed obligations on Manawan under amendments to the then Water Resources Act .

One such obligation required Manawan to license its drainage works in accordance with that Act . [ 9 ] On May 16, 1985 Manawan was issued a license by the granting authority to “divert and use” certain quantities of water by maintaining and operating specified works. [ 10 ] Between 1990 and 2000, the water level in Manawan Lake fluctuated; and the various affected stakeholder groups voiced their concerns over the water fluctuation. By the year 2000, the existing control structure in Manawan Lake was deteriorating.

It was leaking and could not be repaired, and was apparently in imminent danger of collapse. [ 11 ] In 2003, it was determined that the level of Manawan Lake should be raised. [ 12 ] In considering the interests of all of the stakeholder groups, it was established that maintaining one metre of water in the deepest location of Manawan Lake was necessary.

For this purpose, a fixed weir at 2293.5 feet above sea level was required. [ 13 ] In 2004, Manawan replaced the water control structure on Manawan Lake with a fixed weir gate in accordance with project and engineering plans that were issued in 2003 (collectively the “Specifications”). The Specifications mandated, inter alia, a lake elevation

of 2293.5 feet and formed a part of an amended license ultimately issued by Alberta Environment to Manawan on November 21, 2005. [ 14 ] The fixed weir gate resulted in higher lake levels than those maintained by the old gate. [ 15 ] In the spring and summer of 2005, a portion of the Lutzs’ Land flooded as a result of the higher water level caused by the new weir gate. The flooding prevented the Lutzs from growing a crop on 20 acres of the Land closest to Manawan Lake. [ 16 ] On or about October 31, 2005 the Lutzs brought an application before the SRB, pursuant to

section 34 of the DDA and sections 3 and 7 of the Compensation Regulation claiming damages in the sum of $3,000.00 for the 20 acres of crop loss during the 2005 growing season (the “Claim”). [ 17 ] On July 20, 2006, the SRB held a hearing to determine the Claim; and on April 6, 2007, the SRB issued Decision No. 2007/0048 (the “2007 Decision”) which denied the entire Claim. [ 18 ] On or about June 1, 2010, Mr. Albert Lutz wrote to the SRB requested that the Board reconsider the 2007 Decision.

On September 21, 2010 the Board issued Decision No. 2010/0624 which accepted the request for review, rescinded the 2007 decision and sent the claim back to a new panel for reconsideration as a hearing de novo . [ 19 ] On December 12, 2011, a new SRB panel held a hearing de novo in respect of the Claim under the DDA , s 34. [ 20 ] At this hearing, the Lutzs argued that they were entitled to damages for crop loss as a result of Manawan’s exercise of its power in replacing the control gate with a fixed weir gate. [ 21 ] On September 16, 2012, the Panel issued Decision No. 2012/0136 awarding damages to the Lutzs in the sum of $3,000.00, and costs in the sum of $14,253.51. [ 22 ] On May 12, 2012, the Applicant filed its application for judicial review of the 2012 Decision. [ 23 ] Relevant excerpts from the DDA , the Compensation Regulation , the Drainage Districts Regulation ( DDR ), the Municipal Government Act and the Public Lands Act are reproduced in Appendix “A” to this judgement.

Issues [ 24 ] The issues in this application are:

A) What is the appropriate standard of review?

B) Does the 2012 Decision meet the requisite standard of review? Issue

A) What is the Appropriate Standard of Review? [ 25 ] In Dunsmuir v New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 SCR 190 ( Dunsmuir ) , the Supreme Court of Canada set out two standards of review: correctness and reasonableness.

[ 26 ] The Court also outlined a process to be used to determine which review standard would apply. That process involve two steps. Firstly, a reviewing Court must ascertain whether the jurisprudence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the appropriate standard. Secondly, if this first inquiry proves unfruitful, the Court must proceed to an analysis of the factors to identify the proper standard of review. [ 27 ] The Applicant, Manawan submits that all issues identified in this judicial review involve questions of law and the standard of correctness should apply.

It submits that the SRB Panel made a number of errors of law: it failed to consider evidence; it missed an issue central to the dispute; and it failed to consider the governing law. [ 28 ] The Respondents submit that using a Dunsmuir analysis, the standard of reasonableness is the appropriate standard. This is the standard applied to SRB decisions made under the Surface Rights Act , RSA 2000, c S-24 ( SRA ) and should also be applied to the decisions of the SRB Panel made pursuant to the DDA .

Determining the Standard of Review [ 29 ] In view of the fact that the existing jurisprudence has not determined in a satisfactory manner the standard of review that is applicable to SRB decisions made under the DDA , I propose to conduct a contextual analysis utilizing the four factors that must be considered in determining the appropriate standard of review ( Dunsmuir at para 64 ), namely: 1. The presence or absence of a privative clause. 2. The purpose of the tribunal as a whole as determined by

interpretation of enabling legislation; 3. The expertise of the tribunal 4. The nature of the question at issue; 1) Privative clause [ 30 ] In this case, there is no privative clause in the DDA . 2) The purpose of the tribunal as a whole as determined by

interpretation of enabling legislation [ 31 ] Under the DDA , s 34(1) and the Compensation Regulation , s 3(1), the SRB Panel may determine whether or not compensation is payable and the amount of that compensation. The relevant

section of the DDA states: 34(1) Where a board of trustees exercises a power under the authority of sections 30 to 33, the owner or occupant of the land in respect of which the power is exercised may apply to the Surface Rights Board for compensation with respect to the exercise of that power. The relevant provisions of the Compensation Regulation states that: 3(1) An owner or occupant of land may apply to the Board for an order for the payment of compensation in respect of the following kinds of loss or damage suffered by the owner or occupant as a result of a board of trustees exercising its powers under sections 30 to 33 of the Drainage Districts Act : (

a) loss of or damage to livestock or other personal property of the owner or occupant;

(

b) damage to the owner’s or occupant’s land; (

c) loss of or damage to the owner’s or occupant’s crops. [ 32 ] The role of the SRB under the DDA does not appear to have been judicially considered However the purpose of the SRB under the SRA was discussed by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Imperial Oil and Resources v 826167 Alberta Inc , 2007 ABCA 131 , 404 AR 212 ( Imperial Oil ) . [ 33 ] Imperial Oil dealt with the SRB’s power under the SRA to grant right of entry orders and to determine compensation for loss.

In that case, the Alberta Court of Appeal described the purpose of the SRA and the compensation provisions and said (at para 16): The Board is a specialized tribunal whose members are selected for their knowledge and experience in assessing compensation payable by an operator to an owner based upon the loss of use of the area under lease, the adverse effect on the remaining land, and the nuisance, inconvenience and noise that might be caused by or arise from or in connection with the operation.

It is intended to be an expeditious yet fair method of determining compensation based in part on land values, comparable patterns of dealing, loss of use and adverse effect.

The Board is not called upon to make policy decisions but rather to resolve a lis between parties based on a procedure that is expeditious. [ 34 ] This analysis is applicable to the role of an SRB panel under the DDA and the Compensation Regulation ; it is a specialized tribunal intended to provide “an expeditious yet fair method to determine compensation.” 3) The Board’s Expertise [ 35 ] The subject matter which was before the SRB Panel (i.e. a claim for compensation) is completely within the SRB’s expertise.

The following comment by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Imperial Oil at para 15 is applicable to the SRB Panel: “Determining appropriate compensation requires a degree of expertise which the Board clearly possesses. As such its decision is entitled to some deference.

As noted in [ Mattel Inc v 3894207 Canada Inc , 2006 SCC 22 ], the practical ramification is that the decision of a board “should not be set aside lightly considering the expertise of those who regularly make such determinations”. 4) Nature of the Question in Dispute [ 36 ] The appropriate standard of review will generally vary with the nature of the question which is before the SRB. In other words, the applicable standard of review would differ depending on the characterization of the issue/question whether as one of law, mixed facts and law or facts.

Does this application raise an issue of Jurisdiction? [ 37 ] The Applicant submits that the within judicial review application raises an issue of jurisdiction as the SRB Panel’s Decision involved an

interpretation of section 30(1) of the DDA . The SRB panel incorrectly determined that Manawan had exercised a power under section 30(1) of the DDA and thereby wrongly assuming jurisdiction over the matter under the DDA . This was an error of law reviewable on the standard of correctness. [ 38 ] The Applicant argues that Manawan did not exercise a power under

section 30 of the DDA . Rather, Manawan built the new weir in compliance with obligations imposed on it by Alberta Environment under the provisions of the Water Act pursuant to a license. The SRB panel has no jurisdiction to consider the powers exercised under the Water Act arising from the license. These powers are within the jurisdiction of Alberta Environment and the Environmental Appeals Board. Persons affected by water license amendments (in this case the Lutzs) are entitled to request a review by the Director under

Part 7 of the Water Act and may also appeal to the Environmental Appeals Board under

Part 9 of the Water Act .

[39] The Respondents submit that this application essentially involves the SRB Panel’s determination of the issue as to whethercompensation is payable to the Lutzs, pursuant to the provisions of the DDA. They contend that determining whether the requiredconditions for payment of compensation exist in this case is a question of fact; or alternatively, the issue can be characterized as aquestion of mixed fact and law since the SRB applied the provisions of the DDA to the facts in the Claim by the Respondents in order todetermine the amount of compensation payable. [40] What is a question of jurisdiction?

Binnie, J in Dunsmuir at para 59 stated that: “We neither wish nor intend to return to the jurisdiction/preliminary question doctrine that plagued the jurisprudence in this area formany years. “Jurisdiction” is intended in the narrow sense of whether or not the tribunal had the authority to make the inquiry. In otherwords, true jurisdiction questions arise where the tribunal must explicitly determine whether its statutory grant of power gives it theauthority to decide a particular matter.

The tribunal must interpret the grant of authority correctly or its action will be found to be ultravires or to constitute a wrongful decline of jurisdiction: D. J. M. Brown and J. M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action inCanada (loose-leaf), at pp. 14-3 to 14-6. An example may be found in United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary(City), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 485, 2004 SCC 19. In that case, the issue was whether the City of Calgary was authorized under the relevantmunicipal acts to enact bylaws limiting the number of taxi plate licences (para. 5, per Bastarache J.).

That case involved the decision-making powers of a municipality and exemplifies a true question of jurisdiction or vires. These questions will be narrow. We reiteratethe caution of Dickson J. in CUPE that reviewing judges must not brand as jurisdictional issues that are doubtfully so. (emphasis added) [41] In the present case, the SRB Panel did not have to determine whether

section 34 of the DDA gives it the authority to decide thecase. The questions to be decided by the SRB Panel were questions of fact or mixed law and fact that clearly fell within their authorityunder

section 34 of the DDA. Those questions were:

a) Did the board of trustees exercise a power under sections 30-33 of the DDA by building the weir?;

b) Was the exercise of that power in respect of the owner’s or occupants lands?; and

c) Did the owner or occupant of the specific land suffered compensable damages? [42] The SRB Panel did not have to conduct a statutory or legislative

interpretation of DDA, s 34; the Board only had to apply thatstatutory provision to the set of facts before it: see, Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc, (SCC), [1997] 1 SCR 748, 209 NR 20 at para 35 where the Supreme Court indicated that a finding of mixed fact and law involvesapplying a legal standard to a set of facts. [43] The questions raised by the Applicant concerning whether the decision of Manawan to replace the weir structure was pursuant toan obligation imposed under provisions of the Water Act , or whether or not Manawan had complied with terms of its license fromAlberta Environment or whether the Lutzs had other remedies under separate legislation were not relevant to the inquiry under

section 34of the DDA . These questions did not have to be addressed by the SRB Panel to determine if it had the authority to decide the matter.This application does not raise a question of jurisdiction. [44] The Applicant submits that this application raises several questions of law. For the reasons set out above, I disagree. But even if Iwere to accept that the application raises questions of law, the Supreme Court’s direction in Dunsmuir at para 55 is applicable to thiscase.

The SCC comments on questions of law and states: A question of law that is of “central importance to the legal system ... and outside the ... specialized area of expertise” of theadministrative decision maker will always attract a correctness standard (Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., at para. 62). On the other hand, aquestion of law that does not rise to this level may be compatible with a reasonableness standard where [other] factors so indicate. [45] In this case, the alleged questions of law are not of central importance to the legal system nor could it be said they are outside the

specialized area of expertise of the SRB. Conclusion on the Standard of Review [ 46 ] Based on the expertise of the SRB Panel, the mandate imposed upon it under the DDA and the nature of the questions to be decided, I find that the standard of review in this case is reasonableness. Issue

B) Does the Board’s Decision Meet the Reasonableness Standard of Review? [ 47 ] In Dunsmuir at para 47 , the Supreme Court describes a “reasonableness standard” and articulates a process for its application as follows: Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions.

Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.

Is there Justification, Transparency and Intelligibility within the Board’s Decision-Making Process? [ 48 ] A review of the reasons in their entirety shows that the SRB Panel set out the background of the case and the issues. It summarized the submissions of the Parties and referred to the appropriate legislation.

The decisions applied the relevant sections of the DDA and the Compensation Regulation and provided detailed reasons. [ 49 ] I note that the Applicant Manawan contends that the SRB Panel erred when it failed to consider and/or refer to the DDR (i.e. the Drainage Districts Regulation ) in the context of its provisions on tax assessment values vis-a-vis the effects on compensation. I disagree with that conclusion.

The Supreme Court of Canada recently reiterated that “administrative tribunals do not have to consider and comment upon every issue raised by the parties in their reasons”: Construction Labour Relations v Driver Iron Inc , 2012 SCC 65 at para 3 ; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board) , 2011 SCC 62 , [2011] 3 SCR 708 . [ 50 ] Further, I am satisfied that although the SRB did not explicitly refer to the DDR , the Board was sensitive to the taxation and assessment regimes which that regulation deals with and did discuss the subject matter in its Decision when it stated, inter alia , that: The Panel was not satisfied that the tax assessment values were intended to function as compensation; if the legislature had intended tax assessment to offset compensation ... it could have included a provision to that effect in the ... governing act; however, no such provision is to be found.

See also, paragraph 54 of this decision below. [ 51 ] Referring to the specific issues before the SRB panel. The first issue before the Board related to the Board’s exercise of its power to construct works under section 30(1) of the DDA . That power included the power to replace the control gate with a new weir gate. [ 52 ] On the issue of whether Manawan exercised the power under the authority of subsection 30 to 33 of the DDA , the SRB Panel said as follows:

First, the Panel finds that Manawan did in fact exercise a power under the authority of section[s] 30 to 33. Specifically, the Panel finds that Manawan altered or modified a drainage work under section 30(1) of the Act . The Panel also finds that the power was exercised in respect of the Lutzes’ land, because that land was affected by that exercise of power; namely, it was flooded. [ 53 ] As regards to the amount of damages, the panel analysed the evidence that was presented concerning the flooding .They concluded: The Panel therefore finds, pursuant to

section 7 (

a) of the Compensation Regulation , that the lost crops would have realized at least the $3,000.00 claimed by the Lutzes. [ 54 ] In relation to the issue as to whether or not damages should be awarded to the Lutzs, the SRB Panel addressed the various submissions from Manawan relating to the Municipal Government Act , the Public Lands Act and the License. It concluded: Manawan argued that damage from flooding due to drainage work is already compensated by taxation, and that consequently it cannot be compensated under the Act .

The Panel was not satisfied that the tax assessment values were intended to function as compensation; if the legislature had intended tax assessment to offset compensation under the Compensation Regulation in that way, it could have included a provision to that effect in the regulation itself or in its governing act; however, no such provision is to be found. In response to an argument from Manawan, the Lutzes contended that there is nothing in

section 34 of the Act , nor indeed anywhere else , to suggest that there is any relationship between compensation and taxation. The Panel concurs . [ 55 ] I am satisfied in reviewing the Reasons that there is justification, transparency and intelligibility within the SRB’s decision- making process. There is no difficulty understanding why the Board made its decision. The justifications for the SRB’s conclusions are clear. The Board addressed the submissions made by the Parties. Does the SRB’s Decision Fall Within a Range of Possible, Acceptable Outcomes which are Defensible in Respect to the Facts and Law [ 56 ] Section 34(1) of the DDA and

section 3 of the Compensation Regulation set out the process for claiming compensation and for the SRB to award it. The SRB Panel’s Decision finds that Manawan had exercised a power pursuant to the DDA . And the Board’s award of compensation in the circumstances of the Claim by the Lutzs, pursuant to the provisions of the Compensation Regulation , clearly falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes. [ 57 ] These outcomes were defensible in respect of the law and the evidence presented and submissions made to the SRB Panel. Conclusion [ 58 ] I find the decisions of the SRB Panel to be reasonable.

The application for judicial review is dismissed with costs. [ 59 ] If the parties cannot agree on costs they may arrange to speak to them Heard on the 14th day of December, 2012.

Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 2 nd day of January, 2013. J. J. Gill J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Ronald M. Kruhlak, Q.C. McLennan Ross LLP for the Applicant Heidi Meldrum Parlee McLaws LLP for the Respondents the Lutz’ Karen Sinclair-Santos Surface Rights Board & Land Compensation Board for the Respondent Surface Rights Board Appendix “A”

Drainage Districts Act , RSA 2000 c D-16

Definitions

(1) In this Act, (a) “drainage works” means any structure, device or thing designed to convey, store or stabilize water, including without limitation a dike, dam, weir, flood-gate, drain, basin, reservoir, canal, tunnel, pipe, bridge, culvert and ditch, and includes associated structures and equipment; .... (d) “occupant” means a person who, through an agreement with the Crown in right of Alberta, is entitled to possession of land that is owned by the Crown in right of Alberta; (e) “owner” means (ii) in respect of other land, the person who is registered under the Land Titles Act as the owner of the fee simple estate in the land, ...

Board’s power to construct works 30(1) A board of trustees may construct, replace, extend, alter, modify, dismantle, abandon, operate and maintain drainage works.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the board of trustees and its employees and agents have the same powers as are conferred on the Minister and the Minister’s surveyors, engineers, foremen, agents, workers and servants in respect of public works under the Public Works Act, and in that respect sections 22 to 24 of that Act apply with necessary modifications. Right to use 31 A board of trustees has the right to use the space occupied by its drainage works and any adjoining land that is necessary for the purpose of carrying out its powers and duties in respect of the drainage works. Construction of crossings, fences 32 A board of trustees may (

a) where an owner’s land is severed from other land of the owner by reason of drainage works, construct or provide for the construction of a crossing to provide access to the land, and (

b) erect fences that it considers necessary along its drainage works or along roadways. Work outside drainage district 33(1) If as a result of a board of trustees’ carrying out its powers and duties in respect of its drainage works, water flows on and causes or may cause damage to land or roads outside the drainage district, the board of trustees may undertake any work to relieve or otherwise remedy the situation causing the damage as part of the drainage works.

(2) In the carrying out of its powers and duties in respect of its drainage works a board of trustees may, if it considers it necessary to do so, continue the drainage works outside the drainage district for the purpose of carrying off the water by a channel or outlet, and the cost of that work shall be considered to be part of the cost of the drainage works authorized in the drainage district.

(3) When it is necessary to continue drainage works beyond the limits of a drainage district, the board of trustees may, with the consent

of the Minister and after consulting with any affected municipalities, continue the works on, along or across a road allowance and from any such road allowance into or through a municipality until a sufficient outlet is reached. Compensation 34(1) Where a board of trustees exercises a power under the authority of sections 30 to 33 , the owner or occupant of the land in respect of which the power is exercised may apply to the Surface Rights Board for compensation with respect to the exercise of that power.

(2) The Minister may, for the purpose of conducting proceedings before the Surface Rights Board under subsection (1), make regulations (

a) prescribing the provisions of the Surface Rights Act that apply in whole or in part, (

b) defining terms used in this Act that are not otherwise defined under this Act, (

c) modifying any provisions prescribed under clause (a), and (

d) generally governing proceedings before the Surface Rights Board. Compensation Regulation , Alta Reg 29/2002 Definition

(1) In this Regulation, (a) “Board” means the Surface Rights Board; (b) “board of trustees” means a board of trustees of a drainage district. Scope of Regulation 2 This Regulation makes applicable with modifications certain provisions of the Surface Rights Act for the purposes of applications under

section 34 of the Drainage Districts Act . Application to Board 3(1) An owner or occupant of land may apply to the Board for an order for the payment of compensation in respect of the following kinds of loss or damage suffered by the owner or occupant as a result of a board of trustees exercising its powers under sections 30 to 33 of the Drainage Districts Act : (

a) loss of or damage to livestock or other personal property of the owner or occupant; (

b) damage to the owner’s or occupant’s land;

(

c) loss of or damage to the owner’s or occupant’s crops.

(2) The Board may accept an application only if (

a) the amount claimed as compensation does not exceed $3000, (

b) the application is made not later than 2 years after the last date on which the loss or damage is alleged to have occurred, and (

c) the application contains or is accompanied with documents that contain the following information to the satisfaction of the Board: (

i) the name of the owner or occupant and the name of the relevant board of trustees; (ii) a description of the nature and extent of the loss or damage and the date or dates on which it occurred; (iii) the legal description of the land on which the loss or damage occurred; (iv) the amount of compensation being sought; (

v) a detailed description of the steps taken to resolve the dispute.

(3) The Board may require the owner or occupant to provide any additional information that the Board considers is necessary in order to allow it to properly deal with the application.

(4) The owner or occupant shall give a copy of the application and supporting documents and a copy of any additional information referred to in subsection (3) to the board of trustees at the same time it gives the application and supporting documents or the additional information to the Board.

(5) The Board may refuse to accept an application where it is not satisfied that the parties have made reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute. ... Order for compensation 7(1) In determining the amount of compensation to which an owner or occupant is entitled, the Board may consider (

a) in the case of loss of or damage to crops, the amount the crop might have been expected to realize if sold on the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer on the date the crop was damaged or destroyed, (

b) in the case of loss of livestock, the amount the livestock might have been expected to realize if sold on the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer on the date on which the loss occurred, (

c) time spent and expenses incurred by the owner or occupant in recovering livestock that strayed as a result of the board of trustees’ exercise of its power, and (

d) any other factors the Board considers appropriate in the circumstances.

(2) In making an order for the payment of compensation, the Board may fix certain amounts payable in the manner and over the periods that the Board decides.

(3) The Board may order the board of trustees to pay interest on any or all of the compensation payable on and from the date and at the rate prescribed by the Board .... ...

Additional powers of the Board 11 The Board may (

a) rehear an application before deciding it, (

b) review, rescind, amend or replace an order for the payment of compensation, and (

c) with or without a hearing, amend an order for the payment of compensation to show as a party a person who is neither an owner or occupant of the land concerned, and to make compensation payable to that person, when the Board is satisfied that that person is legally entitled to receive the compensation that would otherwise be payable to an owner or occupant. Drainage Districts Regulation , Alta Reg 5/2001

Definitions 1 In this Regulation, (a) “Act” means the Drainage Districts Act ; ... (d) “board” means the board of trustees of a drainage district; ... (f) “qualified assessor” means a person who is registered as an accredited municipal assessor of Alberta under the Municipal Assessor Regulation (AR 84/94) and is (

i) designated by the Minister to act as an assessor for the purposes of the Drainage Districts Act , or (ii) appointed under the Municipal Government Act as a designated officer for the purposes of the Drainage Districts Act . General assessment 2(1) A board shall ensure that a general assessment for the 2000 assessment year is made of all land in the drainage district.

(2) A board shall conduct general assessments in subsequent years as directed by the Drainage Council. ... Making assessments 5(1) For the purposes of assessments of land in a drainage district, the valuation standard of the land is the agricultural use value of the land, regardless of whether the land is being used for farming operations.

(2) An assessment of land in a drainage district must (

a) be based on agricultural use value, (

b) be made by a qualified assessor, and (

c) be made in accordance with the Alberta Drainage Districts Minister’s Guidelines , as amended from time to time, published by the Department of Environment and Sustainable Resource Development. Municipal Government Act , RSA 2000, c M-26

Interpretation 1(1) In this Act, … (s) “municipality” means (

i) a city, town, village, summer village, municipal district or specialized municipality, (ii) repealed 1995 c24 s2 , (iii) a town under the Parks Towns Act, or (iv) a municipality formed by special Act, or, if the context requires, the geographical area within the boundaries of a municipality described in subclauses (

i) to (iii); …. Non-negligence actions 528 A municipality is not liable in an action based on nuisance, or on any other tort that does not require a finding of intention or negligence, if the damage arises, directly or indirectly, from roads or from the operation or non-operation of (

a) a public utility, or (

b) a dike, ditch or dam. Public Lands Act , RSA 2000, c P-40 Title to beds and shores, etc. 3(1) Subject to subsection (2) but notwithstanding any other law, the title to the beds and shores of

(

a) all permanent and naturally occurring bodies of water, and (

b) all naturally occurring rivers, streams, watercourses and lakes, is vested in the Crown in right of Alberta and a grant or certificate of title made or issued before, on or after May 31, 1984 does not convey title to those beds or shores. (2) Subsection (1) does not operate (

a) to affect a grant referred to in subsection (1) that specifically conveys by express description a bed or shore referred to in subsection (1) or a certificate of title founded on that grant, (

b) to affect the rights of a grantee from the Crown or of a person claiming under the grantee, when those rights have been determined by a court before June 18, 1931, or (

c) to affect the title to land belonging to the Crown in right of Canada.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), a river, stream or watercourse does not cease to be naturally occurring by reason only that its water is diverted by human act.