A.N.B. v. Hancock, 2013 ABQB 97

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: A.N.B. v. Hancock, 2013 ABQB 97 Date: 20130212 Docket: 1203 05969 Registry: Edmonton Between: A.N.B. Respondent (Plaintiff) - and - Dave Hancock, acting as; Honourable Dave Hancock Minister of Human Services, Carol Anne Patenaude, acting as; Carol Anne Patenaude Director of Children and Youth Services, Kathy Campbell, Lise Durand, Tom Sutton, Sue Paddon, Lisa Leavitt, Kerry-Anne Wierenga, Dean Schaff, Melina Long, Pam Vandermeleun, acting as; Agent for the Director of Children and Youth Services, Christina Nicholson, G. Perry, G.

Perrault, Jennifer Jackson, acting as; Peace Officer for Redwater RCMP Detachment, Jo Ann T. Quinn, Doug Lewis, Brian Kash, Greg Marchant, acting as; Crown Attorney, Deb Drisell, acting as; Chief Crown Prosecutor, Barb Petryk, acting as; Clerk of the Court/Manager - Provincial Family and Youth Court, P.E. Kvill, J.M. Filice, G.B.N. Ho, acting as; Provincial Family and Youth Court Judge, A.R. Applicants (Defendants) Restriction on Publication Identification Ban – See the Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act ,

section 126.2 . No one may publish the name or photograph of a child, or of the child ’ s parent or guardian, in a manner that reveals that the child is receiving, or has received, intervention services. NOTE: This judgment is intended to comply with the restriction so that it may be published.

_______________________________________________________ Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on February 25, 2013; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment. _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Associate Chief Justice J.D. Rooke _______________________________________________________ 1.

Introduction [ 1 ] A.N.B. [the “Respondent”] on April 19, 2012 filed a lawsuit against an assortment of government actors and employees, peace officers, lawyers, judges, and his former partner and the mother of his children, A.R. He claims a range of illegal conduct and demands $20 million “in gold and silver bullion”, and the return of his two children, “T.J.” and “S.M.”. [ 2 ] On January 29, 2013 I heard an application by a number of the Defendants in this action to strike out the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim and supporting Affidavit.

At that hearing I granted the application, struck the Statement of Claim (and therefore, the action). The action having been struck, I found it superfluous to strike his Affidavit in that struck action, so did not specifically do so - the effect is the same. [ 3 ] At that time I reserved the right to provide written reasons to further explain the basis for my decision. I believe that various aspects of this matter are novel and warrant written reasons for decision, and that the within reasons may also assist A.N.B. to better understand why his action, and its theoretical foundation, have no basis in Canadian law.

Further, A.N.B. left the courtroom, on his own decision, prior to the Applicants’ submissions on costs and my orders on that subject. These written reasons also explain the basis for those awards against A.N.B. 2. Background and Context [ 4 ] Some background context is helpful to explain this action. In 2009 A.N.B.’s two children were seized by Alberta Family Services [“Alberta”]. A.N.B. opposed this action. The Honourable Provincial Court Judge Ho [“Judge Ho”] in 2012 ordered that Alberta take permanent guardianship of four children, including A.N.B.’s two children. A.R. is the mother of all four children. A.

The Three Related Actions

[ 5 ] The aforementioned development led to three related legal actions. A.N.B., A.R. and C.L.B. (father of two of the children) have appealed Judge Ho’s decision to this Court. I am case managing that appeal proceeding which is set for hearing later this year. In this appeal A.N.B. is represented by experienced family law counsel. [ 6 ] A.N.B. presently faces criminal charges.

On September 13, 2011, A.N.B. pled guilty in Provincial Court to three charges (two counts of intimidating justice system participants, one count of criminal harassment) that related to illegal activities directed at employees of Alberta Children and Youth Services. The Court accepted a joint submission that A.N.B. be sentenced to time served (four months) and one year probation. [ 7 ] A.N.B.’s misconduct allegedly continued after that guilty plea, and he now faces a further set of criminal charges.

The Crown has elected to proceed by indictment, and A.N.B. has been committed to trial in this Court, following a preliminary inquiry in Provincial Court in December 2012. The date for that trial has not yet been set. A.N.B. was initially denied judicial interim release (bail) post-arrest on the charges he is currently facing, but has subsequently been granted bail.

One of A.N.B.’s bail conditions is that he obtain and continue to retain Defence Counsel, and he has retained an experienced criminal defence counsel. [ 8 ] The third action, and the subject of this decision, is a civil lawsuit initiated by A.N.B. [the “Civil Action”]. The style of cause describes two Plaintiffs of different but related names: • [A.-N.] of the [B.] Family, and • Trust #983170-321522-19305 otherwise known as the [A.N.B.] TM dba, or the [A.N.B.] HOLDINGS TM . [3] These are ‘both’ A.N.B.. The ‘double/split’ character invoked is simply a figment of A.N.B.’s imagination and not recognized in law.

I will comment on the basis for this duality at a later point. Suffice to say that throughout this Memorandum I will simply refer to A.N.B. as who and what he is, a single human being named A.N.B. B. A.N.B. ’s Allegations [4] As previously noted, the Statement of Claim in the Civil Action was filed on April 19, 2012.

It is irregular in form, for example embedding quoted passages from various legislation and legal texts, includes what appears to be a red thumb print surrounded by the text “SACRED OFFICE TRUSTEE 983170-321522-193058 SEAL”, is notarized without valid purpose, and is endorsed by: [A.-N.] of the [B.] family Divinus Partum, Deus Genus, Sovereign Free-will Man, Sacred Trustee Not in any federal zone, state, province, corporate municipality, or any other territory, abode, enclave, domicile, dwelling, residence, et al., implied or expressed.

Not subject to, or in accordance with, the jurisdiction of Canada, Crown, Queen, Commonwealth, United States, District of Columbia, City of London, Vatican, or any derivatives, agents/agencies, possessions or subsidiaries thereof; disclosed or undisclosed, released or unreleased, attached or unattached. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED The mind is competent, the blood flows, the flesh lives and the spirit is redeemed.

[5] The Statement of Claim references an affidavit, whose contents I will subsequently discuss. [6] The language of the Statement of Claim is unconventional, but I believe it intends to communicate the following, generally in the same order as within that document: 1. [A.N.B.] claims exclusive guardianship of his two children as “Guardian ‘in fact’”; 2. between December 15, 2008 and March 9, 2009, Lisa Leavitt and RCMP officers Nicholson, Perry, Perreault, and Shima conspired to abduct [A.N.B.]’s children, contrary to Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c.

C-46, ss. 122, 123 , 127 , 128 , 219 , 279 , 279.01 , 279.011 , 279.02 , 279.03 , 279.04 , 279.1 , 280 , 281 , 282 , 286 , 361 , 362(2) , 463 -467; 3. Lisa Leavitt, Cathy Campbell, Lise Durand, and RCMP officers Nicholson, Perry, Perreault, Shima, and Jackson conspired to deceive the court at a March 9, 2009 interim custody hearing before Provincial Court Judge Ho and that Lisa Leavitt fraudulently presented unsubstantiated hearsay evidence, together this being contrary to Criminal Code , ss. 122, 123 , 126 , 127 , 128 , 131 , 132 , 133 , 219 , 361 , 362 , 463 -467; 4.

Lisa Leavitt and Kerri-Anne Wierenga have held [A.N.B.]’s children “hostage”, and said he would never see his children again unless he cooperated, contrary to Criminal Code , ss. 122, 123 , 279.1 , 279.02 , 279.04 ; 5.

Lisa Leavitt, Kerri-Anne Wierenga, and Brian Kash filed frivolous and vexatious claims to “intimidate, defame, and villanize”, which is also an attempt to “abduct and forcibly confine” [A.N.B.]’s children, contrary to Criminal Code , ss. 122, 131 , 132 , 133 ; 6. [A.N.B.] has a right to do “anything necessary” to protect his family on the basis of Criminal Code , ss. 37, 38 , 39 , and that is “a basic human right and fundamental to North American juris prudence” [sic]; 7.

Lisa Leavitt, Kerri-Anne Wierenga, Lise Durand, Cathy Campbell, Tom Sutton, and [A.R.] fraudulently and without lawful authority intervened and deceived the Court, contrary to Criminal Code , ss. 122, 123 , 280 (1-2), 131-142, 463-465; 8. all decisions made by the Director of Children and Youth Services and his agents (Cathy Campbell, Lise Durand, Tom Sutton, Lisa Leavitt, Kerri-Anne Wierenga, Sue Paddon, Melina Long, and Pam Yandermulen) have harmed [A.N.B.]’s children and led to unsatisfactory placement of [A.N.B.]’s children; 9. the Director of Children and Youth Services is incompetent, biased, and should be disqualified from any future decisions that relate to [A.N.B.]’s children; 10. interaction between [A.N.B.]’s children, RCMP officers, and persons acting for the Director of Children and Youth Services has “… caused very noticeable and irreversible mental and emotional harm to all members of the [B.] family.”; and 11. a key claim that I will reproduce in full: Finally, I claim that THE FAMILY AND YOUTH COURT OF ALBERTA, and/or any other de’facto court has no consent, authorization nor lawful authority and no right to make judgments or decisions concerning/regarding the children [T.J.] and [S.M.] of the [B.] family without the express written consent of [A.-N.] of the [B.] family, Guardian ‘in fact’ and Sacred Trustee of the [B.] Family Trust, as referenced in Security Agreement ANB-09041971-SA, PPSA registered in Alberta, and UCC-1 registered in Washington and Deed of Trust registered with the IRS.

Therefore, the Director and all agents of the Director of CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES,

and/or agents of the CROWN and or GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTA, et al, involved in this matter are in violation of the Canadian Criminal Code, the Privacy Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, the Canadian Bill of Rights, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.C.C., the Commercial Affidavit and International Property and Copy Right Law, and are liable for tort damages. [7] The Statement of Claim does not expand further on the details of the alleged misconduct. [8] The Affidavit includes the following documents: 1. a “Commercial Security Arrangement”, numbered “ANB-09041971-SA”; 2. a copy of a Ohio Certificate of Birth for [A.N.B.], and a note that on the back (presumably of that certificate) is the following text: NON-NEGOTIABLE CHARGEBACK TIMOTHY F.

GEITHNER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY I ACCEPT FOR VALUE ALL RELATED ENDORSEMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH UCC 3-419, HRJ 192 AND PUBLIC LAW 73-10 CHARGE MY PRIVATE UCC-CONTRACT TRUST ACCOUNT EXEMPTION IDENTIFICATION # 115742126 FOR THE REGISTRATION FEES AND COMMAND THE MEMORY OF [A.N.B.] ACCOUNT NUMBER 115-74-2126 TO CHARGE THE SAME TO THE DEBTOR’S ORDER OR YOUR ORDER PRE-PAID COMMON STOCK PRIORITY-EXEMPT FROM LEVY POSTED: CANADA POST OFFICE REGISTERED MAIL NUMBER: RT071902290CA CERTIFIED ACCOUNT-INVOICE# 115742126 [signed apparently by A.N.B.] DATE: DECEMBER 14, 2009 3. a copy of an Ohio Department of Health Certificate of Live Birth for [A.N.B.]; 4 a copy of a Fort Hamilton Hospital Birth Record for [A.N.B.];

5. a copy of [A.N.B.]’s Certificate of Baptism in the Roman Catholic Church; 6. a Canadian Immigration Identification Record for [A.N.B.]; 7. a UCC Financing Statement for [A.N.B.] Holdings; 8. an Alberta Personal Property Registry Verification Statement that [A.N.B.],[A.N.B.] Holdings, and A.N.B.’s two children are debtors to [A.N.B.]; 9. a Canada Revenue Service statement of the Employer Identification Number for the [A.N.B.] Family Trust; 10. a (difficult to read) Alberta Personal Property Registry Verification Statement (seemingly) between [A.N.B.] (debtor) and [A.N.B.] (secured party) for $100 billion Canadian dollars; 11. photocopies of various of A.N.B.’s other identification documents; 12. three documents entitled “Notice of Understanding Intent, and Denial of Governance”, all dated January 23, 2009, and directed to Governor General Michaelle Jean, Lieutenant Governor General Norman L.

Kwong, and Prime Minister Stephen Harper; 13. three documents entitled “Notice Claim of Right”, dated February 12, 2009 and addressed to the same persons as in the previous item 12; 14. a certificate titled “Private Registered Bond for Setoff” which, as I read it, purports to instruct the U.S.

Treasury Department to deposit 100 billion U.S. dollars in a bank account; 15. a “Live Borne Record” of “[A.N.B.]”, issued from the “one heaven GREAT REGISTRAR”, and marked with a graphic that includes the text “GREAT SEAL ONE HEAVEN SUPREME COURT” and “SEAL ONE HEAVEN JUDGE”; and 16. a “Deed of Trust”, numbered 983170-321522-193058, between “OH3170-321522-193058”, “also known by the name [A.N.B.], [A.N.B.] HOLDINGS” and [A.N.B.], dated “UCADIA Time: 8-3210-3-1-28-2”. 3. Preliminary Issues A.

A.N.B. is an Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [ “OPCA ”] Litigant [ 9 ] There are several preliminary issues that I will address prior to entering into the substance of the application. The first is that A.N.B.’s materials include indicia and arguments characteristic of a phenomenon reviewed in Meads v. Meads , 2012 ABQB 571 [“ Meads ”], “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments” [“OPCA”].

In brief, OPCA concepts are legally incorrect schemes marketed and promoted by a collection of conmen [“OPCA gurus”] that claim to allow a person to avoid or impose legal obligation outside of recognized legal processes. [ 10 ] OPCA schemes are associated with OPCA indicia, unusual motifs that are unique to or strongly associated with OPCA

concepts and schemes. These OPCA indicia do not, themselves, make a person’s claim invalid ( Meads , at paras. 202, 632 ; R. v.

Martin , 2012 NSPC 115 at para. 9 ), however they are a useful cue to distinguish OPCA litigation. [ 11 ] A.N.B.’s materials are rife with OPCA indicia, including the fingerprint seal ( Meads , at para. 215 ), the unusual way he has structured his name (a combination of the ‘dash colon’ and ‘clan/family/house’ motifs) ( Meads , at paras. 206-210 ), the existence of double names with one in all capitals ( Meads , at paras, 211-212), his claim of copyright and trade mark in his own name ( Meads , at para. 213 ), and notarization where unnecessary ( Meads , at para. 216 ).

He cites the outdated 4th edition of Black ’s Law Dictionary ( Meads , at para. 229 ) and also makes reference to the “U.C.C.” or Uniform Commercial Code , a piece of American commercial legislation; irrelevant references to that legislation is highly characteristic of OPCA litigation ( Meads , at para. 228 ). [ 12 ] Further, the documents in the Affidavit clearly invoke a number of OPCA litigation strategies which I will subsequently discuss in more detail. [ 13 ] A.N.B. clearly is an OPCA litigant.

At the January 29, 2013 hearing he argued that he was not a “Freeman-on-the-Land”, which is an OPCA movement of persons who have adopted a common set of OPCA concepts, strategies, and a conspiratorial world-view: Meads , at paras. 168, 172-175 . A.N.B. nevertheless acknowledged that there are certain resemblances between his materials and those advanced in OPCA litigation that has occurred before Canadian courts. I note that in his “Notice of Understanding Intent, and Denial of Governance” and “Notice Claim of Right” documents he self-identifies as a “free-man-on-the-land”.

That does not affect the potential validity of his action, what is instead crucial is the legal substance of what he argues. His affiliations, though interesting, are therefore not directly relevant to this application. B. Crown Counsel are Anonymous [ 14 ] One unfortunate and highly troubling aspect of persons associated with OPCA litigation and movements is that members of these groups are known to direct both harassing and violent activities to the persons they identify as their enemies: Meads , at paras. 181, 257-263 .

These enemies are typically peace officers, government and court employees, lawyers, and members of the judiciary. This potential aggression flows from the false historical and theoretical constructs within which OPCA concepts are advanced. An OPCA litigant is typically advised (incorrectly) by a guru with whom he is associated, that the state has no hold over the litigant.

That is meant to indicate (again incorrectly) that any state action must be unlawful, and, in the result, the OPCA litigant is therefore (improperly) counselled to be free (and often encouraged) to strike back at his ‘oppressors’. [ 15 ] A.N.B. has previously been convicted of criminal misconduct directed to employees of Alberta Children and Youth Services. He claimed OPCA schemes made his actions legal.

A.N.B. has other criminal convictions. [ 16 ] On September 11, 2012, I received, and issued an Order, granting an application from certain Defendants herein that their lawyer be permitted to identify herself via a pseudonym, and that communication with A.N.B. be conducted in a manner that shields her identity. This application was supported by affidavit evidence that alleged A.N.B. had engaged in criminal activities, harassment, and threats directed to lawyers who have represented Alberta in actions that involve A.N.B..

Some of this alleged misconduct is the subject of the criminal charges A.N.B. now faces. [ 17 ] Similarly, in the present hearing the lawyer for the RCMP Defendants was identified only as “Justice Canada Counsel”. [ 18 ] This court-ordered block on information is absolute and extends to A.N.B.’s Counsel. They too have no right to know the identity of Counsel who represent the Defendants in this action.

I note that this precaution also applies to Alberta’s Counsel in the Queen’s Bench appeal of Judge Ho’s custody decision, who is the same lawyer who represented certain Defendants in the present action. [ 19 ] OPCA litigation and OPCA litigants represent an unusual and in certain senses unprecedented challenge to Canadian court procedures and processes. In Meads , at paras. 256 and 261 , I observed that novel court procedures may be necessary to respond to this new and potentially dangerous social phenomenon.

My Order that opposing Counsel are not required to provide their personal identification, including to Counsel acting for A.N.B., is, I believe, an appropriate and necessary response to the risk A.N.B. potentially represents to those who are part of the court, state, and legal apparatus.

[ 20 ] I believe that security precautions of this general kind should be broadly available where those precautions do not affect an OPCA litigant’s ability to advance and respond to arguments in court. A low threshold for these special procedures is therefore appropriate. A court may order a safeguard of this kind where a party establishes an air of reality to an actual or potential threat or danger. A.N.B.’s prior, admitted, criminal misconduct without question meets that threshold.

The serious charges for which he currently faces trial only strengthens the foundation on which the Crown’s application was based. [ 21 ] I leave to another day whether a person’s affiliation or self-identification with an OPCA movement with known violent propensities is a sufficient basis to order precautions of this kind. C. Preliminary Applications [ 22 ] A.N.B., at the beginning of this hearing, made four applications, which I will briefly address. i.

Application to Transfer this Lawsuit to the Federal Court [ 23 ] On January 23, 2012, A.N.B. made an application in writing to transfer this lawsuit to the Federal Court on the basis that internal government security bulletins that unfavourably depicted A.N.B. had caused prejudicial and negative beliefs against A.N.B. in “[a]ll provincial employees”. I do not believe A.N.B. extended that to include members of the judiciary. At the January 29, 2013 hearing I observed that I was not aware of any authority that permitted me to order that transfer, and A.N.B. then abandoned this application.

No specific costs were ordered as a result of his application. ii. Defences [ 24 ] In the same written application, A.N.B. also requested a stay of this hearing until all Defendants had filed their Statements of Defence. A.N.B. stressed that all parties should have proper notice of this matter and the application to strike. I concluded that it is not necessary that any or all defences be filed prior to this application, and dismissed this motion, because his Statement of Claim was doomed to being struck, as I did. No specific cost order was made against him as a result of his application. iii.

Substitutional Service [ 25 ] A.N.B. sought an order for substitutional service for certain Defendants to this action, as he explained he was unable to locate or serve those Defendants. I indicated that if the Defendants’ motion to strike was unsuccessful then I would order procedures to permit effective service of these persons. It was, instead, successful, such that this relief is redundant. iv. Motion that I Recuse Myself for Bias [ 26 ] A.N.B. argued that I ought to recuse myself from this proceeding as I am the justice who wrote the decision in Meads .

A.N.B. explained his application in this way: ... since you made the decision you have a sort of personal stake in upholding that decision, correct, and that I feel you might not be totally objective ... [ 27 ] The test for when a judge should recuse themselves and not hear a matter is provided in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada ,

2003 SCC 45 at para. 60 , [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259, and asks whether an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought through the matter, would conclude that it is more likely than not that a judge, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide it fairly. [ 28 ] I explained to A.N.B. that, since Meads has not been appealed, it is the law in Alberta. It would not matter whether I or another of my colleagues were to hear this application; the principles of stare decisis means we would each apply the same law. My situation is analogous of that of Justice Myers in R. v.

Lawson , 2012 BCSC 356 , 2012 D.T.C. 5069, where he, at para. 7, rejected an allegation of bias for his role in the conviction and sentencing of the OPCA guru Russell Porisky R. v. Porisky , 2012 BCSC 67 , [2012] 4 C.T.C. 160; R. v. Porisky , 2012 BCSC 771 , 2012 D.T.C. 5095): … no reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that a judge was biased because he had decided a prior case involving similar issues. That is something that occurs on a regular basis.

Furthermore, another judge would normally be bound to follow any applicable legal conclusions from my decision in Porisky under the principle of stare decisis. [ 29 ] I therefore declined to recuse myself from this matter. No costs were ordered against A.N.B. for this application. 4. The Parties ’ Submissions A. The Alberta Defendants [ 30 ] Ms.

Smith (pseudonym for Defendants’ Counsel) made arguments for the Defendants, Dave Hancock, Carol Anne Patenaude, Kathi Campbell, Lise Durand, Tom Sutton, Sue Paddon, Lisa Leavitt, Kerri-Anne Wierenga, Dean Schauf, Melissa Long, Pam Vandermeleun, Doug Lewis, Brian Kash, Greg Marchant, and Barb Petryk [the “Alberta Defendants”]. [ 31 ] The Alberta Defendants argued that A.N.B.’s action should be struck in whole or part on a number of bases: 1. it is so ill-defined that its subject cannot be discerned; 2. the basis for the lawsuit is a “foisted unilateral agreement”, which is a well known OPCA strategy that is vexatious, has no legal foundation, and has no possibility of success; 3. the lawsuit is a collateral attack on the Provincial Court decision of Judge Ho, which is presently under appeal; 4. the allegations are vague and lack particulars; and 5. no allegations of misconduct are made against a number of defendants: Dave Hancock, Carol Anne Patenaude, Dean Schaff, Jo Ann T.

Quinn, Doug Lewis, Greg Marchant, Deb Drisell, Barb Petryk, P.E. Kvill, and J.M. Filice. [ 32 ] The Alberta Defendants argued A.N.B.’s supporting affidavit should be struck under Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 3.68(4) [the “ Rules ”, or individually a “ Rule ”], as it has no legal meaning, is grounded in an identified and invalid OPCA strategy, and is frivolous, irrelevant, and improper. B. The Federal Defendants

[33] The Justice Canada Counsel represented Defendants Christina Nicholson, G. Perry, G. Perreault, and Jennifer Jackson [the“RCMP Defendants”].

The RCMP Defendants adopted the position of the Alberta Defendants that the action fails to provide the relevantparticulars of the alleged RCMP misconduct, is based on legally incorrect OPCA arguments, and is sufficiently incoherent that no legalresponse is possible. [34] The RCMP Defendants also note that A.N.B. has alleged conduct that is prohibited by the Criminal Code, but argued thatalleged violations of the Criminal Code cannot give rise to a civil cause of action: Direct Lumber Co. v.

Western Plywood Co., (SCC), [1962] S.C.R. 646, at 648. [35] The RCMP Defendants also investigated whether A.N.B.’s claims can be expressed in the form of a civil conspiracy, butobserved that the elements of that tort are highly specific: Canada Cement LaFarge Ltd. v. British Columbia Lightweight AggregateLtd., (SCC), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 452, at 471, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 385. However, those elements are not disclosed in A.N.B.’spleadings. [36] Further, the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected application of that tort in a family law context: Frame v. Smith, (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, at paras. 8, 40, 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81.

Moreover, and in any case, the Alberta family law legislation(Family Law Act, S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5; Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-12) provides a complete scheme,including how access and custody is arranged and enforced. A.N.B.’s action should be conducted within that legislative context. C. Ms. Jo Ann T. Quinn [37] Ms. Quinn, a lawyer, represented herself. She adopted the facts and reasoning of the Alberta and RCMP Defendants.

Further,she noted that she was not, in fact, acting as Crown Counsel, as alleged, but instead, in 2010, was appointed by the Office of LegalRepresentation of Children and Youth to represent A.R.’s children, including A.N.B.’s two children. [38] Ms. Quinn argued that she should be struck from this action as the Statement of Claim does not allege she engaged in anymisconduct, and in fact does not mention her at all outside the style of cause. I agree. D. A.R. [39] I asked A.R. whether she, as a Defendant in this proceeding, had any submissions to make on whether the action shouldproceed or be struck.

A.R. explained she did not understand what was going on, and simply observed that in her opinion “everyone isguilty”. 5. The Relevant Law [40] I do not believe there is any dispute on the correct test for when a legal action or defence may be struck. Rule 3.68 states: 3.68(1) If the circumstances warrant and a condition under subrule (2) applies, the Court may order one or more of the following: (

a) that all or any part of a claim or defence be struck out; (

b) that a commencement document or pleading be amended or set aside; (

c) that judgment or an order be entered;

(

d) that an action, an application or a proceeding be stayed.

(2) The conditions for the order are one or more of the following: (

a) the Court has no jurisdiction; (

b) a commencement document or pleading discloses no reasonable claim or defence to a claim; (

c) a commencement document or pleading is frivolous, irrelevant or improper; (

d) a commencement document or pleading constitutes an abuse of process; (

e) an irregularity in a commencement document or pleading is so prejudicial to the claim that it is sufficient to defeat the claim.

(3) No evidence may be submitted on an application made on the basis of the condition set out in subrule (2)(b). … [41] Collectively, the Applicants argue that the Rule 3.68(2)(b), (c), (d), and (

e) headings apply in this case. The threshold for amotion to strike is well established. An action or defence may be struck where it is plain and obvious or beyond reasonable doubt that theaction cannot succeed: Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 321. Pleadings shouldbe considered in a broad and liberal manner: Tottrup v. Lund, 2000 ABCA 121, at para. 8, 186 D.L.R. (4th) 226. A proceeding that is anabuse of process may be struck on that basis: Reece v. Edmonton (City), 2011 ABCA 238 at para. 14, 335 D.L.R. (4th) 600. 6.

Analysis [42] In general I have adopted the Applicants’ submissions. This leads to multiple grounds on which to strike parts or the whole ofthe Statement of Claim. A. No Alleged Misconduct [43] It is clear that the Defendants against whom no misconduct is alleged (Dave Hancock, Carol Anne Patenaude, Dean Schaff,Jo Ann T. Quinn, Doug Lewis, Greg Marchant, Deb Drisell, Barb Petryk, P.E. Kvill, and J.M. Filice) should be struck. A.N.B. hassimply not alleged they have done anything wrong. B.

Collateral Attack [44] Similarly, I accept that the demand by A.N.B. for the return of his children is a collateral attack on the 2012 decision of JudgeHo. The meaning of a collateral attack was recently explained by Justice Abella in British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) v.Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, at para. 28, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 422:

The rule against collateral attack similarly attempts to protect the fairness and integrity of the justice system by preventing duplicative proceedings.

It prevents a party from using an institutional detour to attack the validity of an order by seeking a different result from a different forum, rather than through the designated appellate or judicial review route … [Emphasis added.] [ 45 ] The RCMP Defendants argued that Alberta’s family law legislation provides a complete scheme that effectively displaces a potential tort remedy, which is another way of expressing that A.N.B.’s lawsuit is in the incorrect forum and therefore is a collateral attack. I agree.

A.N.B. can obtain the remedy he claims, return of his children, via the procedures in those statutes, if he meets the law that set those criteria. [ 46 ] Thus, the appropriate mechanism to challenge Judge Ho’s decision is an appeal to this Court, and that appeal is already underway. I therefore strike the child custody facet of A.N.B.’s Statement of Claim remedy. C. Incomprehensible Pleadings [ 47 ] The Applicants also argued that A.N.B.’s Statement of Claim is so ill-defined that it is impossible for the Defendants or Court to make a meaningful response.

This argument applies the reasoning in Kisikawpimootewin v.

Canada , 2004 FC 1426 at para. 9 , 134 A.C.W.S. (3d) 396: a proceeding may be struck where it is based on incomprehensible arguments and allegations, and the defendant is “left both embarrassed and unable to defend itself” and the court faces “a proceeding so ill-defined that it is unable to discern an argument, or identify any specific material facts.” [ 48 ] While I understand how A.N.B.’s materials could be baffling to many readers, whether legally trained or not, I believe that the Meads decision provides a basis on which to review and understand the majority of A.N.B.’s materials and what would otherwise be potentially inscrutable OPCA documents and arguments.

In fact, the Alberta Defendants have meaningfully categorized and evaluated the OPCA strategy advanced by A.N.B., which leads me to conclude that the rule in Kisikawpimootewin v. Canada probably should not apply in this instance. D. No Material Facts [ 49 ] The Applicants argued that A.N.B. has not provided the necessary factual basis in the pleadings to defend against the alleged misconduct. I agree.

While a Statement of Claim does not have to detail every aspect of alleged misconduct (and indeed sometimes cannot because information may not be available at that stage), there is nevertheless a minimum threshold that must be met. In brief, the pleadings must be more than simple or “bare” allegations. This distinction is explained by the Court of Appeal in Tottrup v. Lund , at paras. 10-11 : … it is not the allegation of a duty at law that is critical, but the facts alleged supporting such a duty.

For example, a statement of claim alleging only that “A” breached a duty owed to “B” thereby causing damage does not, in my view, disclose a cause of action. Pleadings are allegations of fact and, in my view, where negligence is alleged, that allegation must be supported by facts capable of sustaining a determination that a duty was owed, that

an act or omission occurred breaching that duty, and that damages resulted. On a motion to strike it is the allegations of fact that must be examined to determine whether a cause of action exists. [ 50 ] A.N.B.’s Statement of Claim makes broad bare allegations but does not provide the minimum factual detail to substantiate the alleged wrongdoing. This is another basis to strike the Statement of Claim. E. Alleged Criminal Acts are Not a Basis for a Civil Claim [ 51 ] A.N.B. in many of his claims indicates that various Defendants have engaged in conduct that is contrary to the Criminal Code .

The Applicants argued that criminal misconduct is not, in itself, a basis for a civil action. This rule was recently applied by Justice Strekaf in Craik v. Alberta Treasury Branches , 2012 ABQB 373 , at para. 20 , and flows from the different and distinct purposes of criminal and civil legislation, as was identified in Direct Lumber Co. v. Western Plywood Co. , at 648:

… this criminal legislation gives no civil cause of action for its breach and I would affirm the judgment under appeal for the reasons given by Johnson J.A. that this legislation creating a new crime was enacted solely for the protection of the public interest and that it does not create a civil cause of action. … [ 52 ] In brief, criminal and civil law are different schemes, intended to meet different objectives.

A.N.B. has no right to prosecute or enforce criminal prohibitions – that authority belongs solely to the state and its delegates - though he has a limited right to initiate a criminal proceeding via Criminal Code , s. 504. If A.N.B. wishes to seek a monetary award of damages then he may sue based on breach of civil obligations, for example contract and tort. His pleadings, as I read those that relate to alleged breaches of the Criminal Code , do not do that. F.

Tort Conspiracy Remedies are not Available in a Family Law Context [ 53 ] A number of A.N.B.’s claims allege conspiracy among the Defendants to deny A.N.B. access to and custody of his children. The RCMP Defendants are correct that the Supreme Court of Canada in Frame v. Smith has prohibited litigation of that tort in a family law context. This is yet another basis on which to strike those portions of the Statement of Claim that recite that conspiracy. G.

A.N.B. has Absolute Authority Over His Children [ 54 ] A.N.B. states in his Statement of Claim that he has “… the only lawful claim ‘in fact ’ regarding the children [T.J.] and [S.M.] of the [B.] family, as evidenced by the [attached Affidavit]” (emphasis in original). He also argued that the state actors with whom he has interacted had no legal authority to affect his absolute control of his children.

I understand this to mean that he believes that provincial legislation that relates to child custody (including the Family Law Act ; Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act ; and Drug-endangered Children Act, S.A. 2006 , c.

D-17) has no application to him and his children, and that when employees of Alberta Children and Youth Services and members of the RCMP took steps that involved his children, then those steps were taken without legal authority. [ 55 ] Similarly, he appears to argue that the Provincial Court had no jurisdiction to make orders in relation to himself and his children, however he does not detail how the judicial Defendants in this action (Provincial Court Judges Kvill, Filice, and Ho) exceeded their authority.

I did not receive any explicit indication as to whether that alleged defect extends to myself and this action, though it would seem peculiar that a justice of this Court could hear and decide A.N.B.’s action, yet (allegedly) have no authority over him. [ 56 ] In his argument during the hearing on January 29, 2012, it became obvious that A.N.B.’s lack of consent is the basis on which he claimed he has unique and sole jurisdiction over his children, and that right was allegedly infringed upon by the Defendants: The spirit of the claim is I believe is what really counts. ...

I believe I have given everybody, you know, due notice and due chance to correct any mistakes that they have done, and nobody seems to want to reply. So then I have questioned the jurisdiction and the authority of the people making these decisions and nobody seems to be able to reply. With the research that I ’ve done I have come to the conclusion that in a free society the people are governed by consent, and I have removed my consent after the sham trial that they had and didn ’t bring back my children.

And I ’ve removed my consent to be part of their society because I do not believe they ’re following the mandates that are set out for them. And I believe everyone of these people that I have mentioned in this statement of claim has overstepped their mandate and abused their authority ... I don’t understand why they don’t think that this is a proper claim. I’m pretty clear, it says everything in the claim, pretty clear, in plain English. ... I basically question authority and nobody has any answers, and nobody wants to reply, and try to negotiate.

I figured this period of serving would given everyone time, a chance to negotiate on these matters and try to resolve this without coming to court, and that was my goal. They chose not to, they chose to fight this thing instead of negotiate. ... That right there shows the status of my claim. No one is willing to try to negotiate to a peaceful resolution. They all want to argue and fight.

I think if you read the claim it is very clear. I tried to make it clear enough that a 10 year old high school student could understand it. So if these people with their law degrees don’t seem to understand the merits of this claim, then I would suggest maybe they should have someone else take a look at it. ... I don ’t want to be a part of your society if that ’s how you guys operate. It seems tyrannical and oppressive to me, and that ’s not why the spirit and letter of this nation was founded. It ’s supposed to be a free country, and the test of any free country is to be able to leave unencumbered .

Obviously I can’t do that if they are holding my children hostages, and basically villainizing me and making our family estranged with no real authority that they can put on paper and show me that they can use . The only authority they have is the force they can use with the police. And there ’s no basis in the law for what they ’re doing . Everyone of them are overstepping their mandates. I’ve sent them notices letting them know.

It would be different if these people didn’t know ... but I’ve sent them all notices quoting laws and telling them hey, I don’t think you’re doing the right thing here, here’s some laws that says you’re not, they won’t answer, and they just want to keep on fighting over this when there’s a practical resolution in front of everybody’s face. I guess that’s my total submission here.

There’s not much really more to say other than I just don ’t consent to what they ’re doing to my children and I believe this being a free country that they need my consent . [Emphasis added.] [ 57 ] A.N.B. says he believes that government actors have no authority over himself and his children unless he consents to that authority. He says he has not consented and has ‘opted out’ of Canadian society and its legal restrictions, rules, and principles. [ 58 ] That, however, is not how things work.

All persons who are present in Canada are subject to its laws: the Canadian Constitution including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms , legislation passed by the three levels of government, as supplemented by the common law created by the courts. Those laws collectively both restrict conduct, structure our interactions and protect our rights and persons. [ 59 ] I will now review the mechanisms by which A.N.B. said he obtains his special status, and their defects. i.

A.R. ’s Lack of Authority [ 60 ] As a preliminary observation, A.N.B. does not seem to explain why he, as a biological parent, has the sole authority and custody of his children, other than what appears to be a quoted Latin phrase in his Statement of Claim: Partus sequitur ventrem. – The offspring follow the condition of the mother. This is the case of slaves and animals, but with regard to freemen, children follow the condition of the father. ~ 1 Bouv. Inst.

N. 167,502; [ 61 ] As I was unfamiliar with this principal I investigated, and learned that this is a concept of Roman civil law that related to the definition of slavery, and was applied in the United States as a basis for slave-owners to impregnate their female slaves then sell their own children as property: Thomas D. Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619-1860 (Studies in Legal History) (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), at pp. 43-52. Needless to say, this is not the law in Canada.

Here, male and female parents have equal rights and obligations in relation to their children. [ 62 ] The “partus sequitur ventrem” definition is what OPCA gurus and litigants refer to as a “legal maxim”, and these legal maxims are often sprinkled throughout OPCA documents and arguments.

Most legal maxims are a succinct restatement of some legal rule or concept, and historically have been collected as guiding principles of legal systems, for example in Francis Bacon’s 1630 text, Collection of Some Principal Rules and Maxims of the Common Law , and John Bouvier, Bouvier ’s Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia , published in 1856.

[ 63 ] Some legal maxims remain relevant in the modern context, for example the maxim that “those seeking equity must come with clean hands”: Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc. , 2006 SCC 52 , at para. 22 , [2006] 2 SCR 612. Others, like “partus sequitur ventrum” are either obsolete, irrelevant, or as in this case, obnoxious.

These are not magic incantations that, when invoked, will automatically trigger results, though unfortunately that is a common approach by which these traditional principles of law are misused in the OPCA context. [ 64 ] Suffice to say I see no basis why A.N.B. can legally claim to have authority over his children that would trump that of their biological mother. I will continue to his other schemes. ii.

The Affidavit and Its Documents [ 65 ] A.N.B. indicates in his Statement of Claim that the accompanying affidavit provides the basis for why he has “… the only lawful claim ‘in fact ’ …” [emphasis in original] to his children. The affidavit has attached a menagerie of documents, some of which are highly characteristic of OPCA litigation strategies. I will discuss several as they are the basis, as I understand it, of A.N.B.’s claims for both his sole authority over his children, and why the various Defendants have acted illegally. a.

The Contract Between the Divided/Split Person [ 66 ] A.N.B. appears to believe he has two halves, one which he calls “[A.-N.] of the [B.] family”, the other which is a trust with various titles - I will use one alternative, [A.N.B.] HOLDINGS TM , for simplicity. He says the lower case variant is the trustee of the upper case entity, and he (the physical human being) acts on its behalf. [ 67 ] A.N.B. is mistaken. He has only one aspect, and that is the one he sees in the mirror.

This bizarre and incorrect idea that a person has two intertwined halves, one corporeal and the other ‘something else’, is reviewed at length in Meads , at paras. 417-446 . [ 68 ] The Commercial Security Agreement document purports to be a contract or agreement between A.N.B.’s two aspects. It is “… a monologue without any legal relevance.”: Meads , at para. 727 . [ 69 ] The Commercial Security Agreement is quite typical of these kinds of contracts between the divided/split person, but also ineffectively foists ( Meads , at paras. 458-472 ) an assortment of obligations on the remainder of the world.

It purports to: annul A.N.B.’s obligations; unilaterally define

interpretation of language; and also incorporates a foisted unilateral claim that anyone who uses A.N.B.’s name has breached “common-law copyright” and “trade-mark”, and owes him (or them) $100,000.00 U.S., and costs, for each use of that name. A.N.B. labels the intellectual property element a “Self-Executing Contract/Security Agreement”, though it is not clear what that exactly is intended to mean.

Intellectual property claims of this kind and their invalidity are reviewed in Meads , at paras. 494-504 . ‘Agreements’ of this type so defy practical logic (let alone Canadian law) that they can only be described, as I said in Meads , as contemptibly stupid. [ 70 ] One final clause warrants mention for the fact that it seems to argue that anyone who disagrees with this document is required to inform A.N.B. within 20 days, and if they do not then that proves the Commercial Security Agreement is valid, and that the silent party is guilty of copyright infringement, and breach of other property and legal rights: 18.2 WAIVER OF TORT ...

If any living soul has information that will precede, supercede, controvert and/or overcome this signs and sworn AGREEMENT, in this commercial matter, they agree that [A.N.B.]© must be advised of the facts in the form of a rebutting signed and sworn affidavit , within twenty (20) days from recording of this AGREEMENT in the local and commercial venue, proving with particularity, by stating all requisite, actual, evident fact, and all requisite actual law, and not merely the ultimate facts or conclusions of law that; this AGREEMENT is substantially and materially false, sufficiently to change Secured Party or DEBTOR status, and/or terms of this AGREEMENT.

Furthermore; silence stands as consent to, and tacit approval of, the factual declarations here being established as fact and as a matter of Law ; and, this AGREEMENT by declaration, authorization, public posting, and/or commercial filing, will stand as

final judgment in this matter, and the copy claim herein stated will be in full force and effect against all parties, due, payable and enforceable by law.

The criminal penalties for commercial fraud is set forth by this AGREEMENT for violation of herein parties private property rights, and for breach of the common-law. [Emphasis in original.] [ 71 ] This entire document is worthless and has no legal meaning and relevance, other than an illegal attempt to enforce this document has legal consequences for its author, including the potential for criminal sanction, elevated costs, vexatious litigant status, and punitive damages: Meads , at paras. 524-527, 591-600, 612-613 . b.

The Various Birth and Identification Certificates and UCC and PPR Statements [ 72 ] I interpret the various birth and identification certificates and property interest registration documents to mean that A.N.B. has adopted some form of the A4V ‘money for nothing’ scheme described in Meads , at paras. 529-543 .

However, I do not find that any part of A.N.B.’s argument revolves on the A4V concept so its invalidity is not relevant to why his Statement of Claim was struck. [ 73 ] Nevertheless, I observe, in passing, that, when a ‘debt’ is secured both by and against the same person, registration of that ‘debt’ will likely have no legal effect. c. The Notices of Understanding, Intent, and Denial of Governance [ 74 ] A.N.B. has apparently mailed copies of his “Notice of Understanding, Intent, and Denial of Governance” to three senior persons in Canadian government.

In brief, these documents say that A.N.B. has discovered he is not necessarily subject to Canadian law, and has by his own choice ‘opted out’. Those officials had 20 days to respond and rebut this declaration. [ 75 ] I believe the overall tone and intention of this document may be captured by a short excerpt: I ... hereby deny my acceptance to governed [sic] by you, your office, or anyone representing your office and from any external fictional entity whatsoever!!! I was not fully informed, now I am, and I deny consent from this day forward. How do you like them chicks?

Quack, quack ...hey? ... my name is [A.N.] of the [B.] family, I am a free sovereign man, I wish to govern myself ... I am not on a fictitious corporation, created by a fictitious government, which is subsidiary to a fictitious country/corporation, with the only goal being commerce and profits, with no regard to human life and love, and compassion, and happiness.

I am not subject to your petty, degrading, unfair, unreal, unjust statute laws and by-laws or anything else you people seem to hold above me to claim authority over me. [sic, emphasis in original.] The complete notice to Prime Minister Stephen Harper is reproduced as an appendix to the R. v. A.N.B. , 2012 ABQB 556 (Michalyshyn J.). [ 76 ] These kinds of documents are ubiquitous in Freeman-on-the-Land circles, and I have received (personally or institutionally) similar ones addressed to my office.

They have no legal effect and do not defeat state or court authority: Meads , at paras. 405-413 . [ 77 ] A.N.B. has, in fact, been made aware that this Court has already concluded his Notice of Understanding, Intent, and Denial of Governance document is worthless: R. v. A.N.B. , at paras. 44-51 . He did not appeal that finding. [ 78 ] Similarly, I find this document is also no basis for A.N.B.’s claims of authority and does not give credence to the maintenance of his Statement of Claim.

d. The Notice Claim of Right [ 79 ] Subsequent to the 20 day ‘rebuttal’ period in the Notices of Understanding, Intent, and Denial of Governance, A.N.B. apparently mailed the three senior government officials documents entitled “Notice Claim of Right”. These state that since A.N.B. has not received any reply to his Notices of Understanding, Intent, and Denial of Governance, he presumes those have been accepted and are in force. This is a common error by OPCA litigants.

In fact, neither the government nor any other person has any obligation to respond to what may be described, in an excessively generous characterization, as an offer to contract: Meads , at paras. 458-472 . [ 80 ] The remainder of the document is a “fee schedule”, and a list of rights claimed. The fee

schedule is a list of fines (payable in gold or silver) to which A.N.B. claimed he is entitled under certain circumstances, such as if he is detained ($5,000.00 per hour), shackled or handcuffed ($100.00 per minute), and for receipt of “fraudulent correspondence”, which includes documents that have “no jurisdiction”. Fee schedules are a kind of foisted unilateral agreement which, in law, provide no benefit or rights to those who claim rights based on these documents: Meads , at paras. 505-511 . An attempt to assert a fee

schedule can, however, have serious deleterious consequences, as I have previously mentioned. [ 81 ] Several of the claimed rights are relevant to this matter: Furthermore, I claim the document, Agreement #ANB-09041971-SA is lawful; and, is in full force in part or in whole. I also waive all statutory obligations and by-laws, and claim, and/or reserve the following rights and duties, including, but not limited to: ... 21. The right to not interact with statutory enforcement policy officers. 22.

The right to not interact with peace officers if they have no directly observed me breaching the peace, or are no in possession of an affidavit of truth signed under full penalty of perjury, by the signor. ... 26. The right to be principal party in the affairs of my self, and my offspring. [ 82 ] I agree with Justice Michalyshyn R. v. A.N.B. , at paras. 44-51 ) that this unilateral declaration has no legal relevance or effect. The “Notice Claim of Right” documents are not a basis for A.N.B. to claim he has been mistreated because he did not consent to the actions of the Defendants. e.

UCADIA Materials [ 83 ] Last, A.N.B. has attached a “one heaven Great Register Live Borne Record” and “Deed of Trust”. It is not clear what relevance A.N.B. purports to put on these materials as I do not believe they directly relate to his argument that he has not consented to state and court authority. They do, however, disclose an unusual litigation strategy. [ 84 ] I perceive that the “Live Borne Record” is intended as a new or replacement birth certificate for A.N.B., which presumably would sever any old link between A.N.B. and his previous associations with the United States and Canada.

It also seems to purport establishment of a double/split person to replace any others that might exist. The Live Borne Record text, in part, reads:

By the Power and Authority vested in US by the Divine Creator against all other lesser claims of right, in accord with

Article 42 ofPactum De Singularis Caelum, We hereby certify as a First, True and Original Certificate of Title against all other lesser claims of titlefrom the highest of all The Great Register and Public Record of One Heaven, also known as the Great Book of Souls, also know as theGreat Book of Life, containing the following entry and inscription of a True Person of a True Trust, being: [A.N.B.] and upon the lawfulgift, grant and conveyance of certain Divine Rights of Use, also known as Divine Property, also know as Divinity by the Divine Creatorfrom a Divine Trust of the same name as the abovementioned True Trust hereby lawfully possesses immutable and irrevocable Rightsover the name granted to them at brith, their flesh, their energy and labour and their mind and divine spirit with all other claimed priorrights, liens, surety, cestui que vie truss, bonds, or other devices or instruments by an inferior trust, corporation or estate automaticallynull and void from the beginning.

Receipt of this Live Borne Record is acknowledgment and acceptance by the holder before all Heavenand Earth as witness to fully abide by the facts and terms herein. This is then followed by several seals, one from the “One Heaven Supreme Court”. I am not aware of the (alleged) scope of thisimpressively titled institution’s jurisdiction. [85] The “Deed of Trust” describes “Canon Law” which “... means the twenty-two (22) books of Canon law known collectively asAstrum luris Divini Canonum”.

The “Deed of Trust” includes this definition: “Canon means a Rule of Law from the highest possiblelaw prescribed by the twenty-two (22) books of Canon law known collective as Astrum Luris Divini Canonum, also known as LivingBody of Divine Canon Law and the highest of all Original Law.” [86] The Deed of Trust indicates A.N.B. is now solely subject to Canon Law: 3.26 Governing law This deed is governed by Canon Law in any Jurisdictions that recognize Rule of Law. [87] Unfortunately, the Deed of Trust does not instruct where one might find these 22 books that are “highest of all Original Law”.However, this Court has had some previous exposure to this concept, and is aware that these materials have been written by AustralianOPCA guru Frank O’Collins, who has invented an entire separate and codified legal system (Meads, at para. 376) that may be viewed atthe “UCADIA” website.

Jurists and scholars, take note! [88] Stating that one has set themselves, unilaterally, under a different and imaginary law has no effect on the jurisdiction andauthority of the Canadian state and courts. Even if the “One Heaven Supreme Court” and its “Canon Law” had some relevance inCanada, then this Court’s inherent jurisdiction would expand to make this Court the appeal court for this “legal” domain: Brotherhood ofMaintenance of Way Employees v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 495, at para. 6, 136 D.L.R. (4th)289.

Thus, the UCADIA materials are not merely a house built on a foundation of sand, but a house built on the illusion of a foundationof sand. A.N.B. cannot legally purport to ‘opt out’ and ‘deny his consent” via this mechanism. f.

Summary [89] A.N.B. said he does not consent to be subject to the authority of Alberta’s child welfare services, the RCMP, and ProvincialCourt of Alberta. Unfortunately for him, any such consent is immaterial. As Justice Moir observed in R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288,at para. 32: “[t]his teaching is not only wrong in the sense that it is false. It is wrongful. That is, it is full of wrong.” [90] Near the end of my oral decision, A.N.B. said he did not understand how his consent is irrelevant in a free country governedby the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. If he reads the first

section of that document he will obtain a better understanding of the

Constitutional structure of this Country: 1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonablelimits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. [Emphasis added.] The scope of those reasonable limits is explored in many Canadian cases, with the basic principles set in R. v. Oakes, (SCC), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200. [91] Thus, rights in this Country are not absolute.

A.N.B. may not prefer to be subject to state or court limitation on his activities,but nevertheless he is potentially subject to legal limitation and sanction unless he can demonstrate those limitations are unconstitutional.He has neither done, nor attempted to do so. [92] A.N.B.’s arguments concerning his lack of consent are legally incorrect, and as that is the legal lynchpin of his Statement ofClaim, I struck the entire Statement of Claim as having no foundation in Canadian law.

Since his ‘no consent’ argument is derived solelyfrom an assortment of OPCA ‘magic hats’ strategies that attempt to defeat court authority, his litigation is also frivolous and vexatious:Meads, at para. 556. That too is another basis on which I struck this action: Reece v. Edmonton (City), at para. 14. [93] As a final note, I emphasized to A.N.B. that his claims that he and his children have been mistreated by various Albertagovernment workers, judges, RCMP officers, and their mother, are a potential basis for him to initiate a civil lawsuit.

Any such lawsuit,however, must be made under and apply Canadian principles of law, both statute and common law, and be processed according to therules and procedures set for, and by, this Court. These are the rules that he may follow, if he chooses. However, he is not entitled tosimply make up what he wants the law to be. 7. Costs [94] A.N.B. was entirely unsuccessful in this application and so is presumptively required to pay the other parties court costs: Rule10.29(1).

A.N.B. left the courtroom after I struck his action as contained in the Statement of Claim and therefore did not take theopportunity I would have given him make submissions on what costs against him would be appropriate, if any. [95] The Defendants argued that they should receive solicitor and own client indemnity costs for their having to reply to an actionthat was fatally flawed, frivolous and vexatious, and which flows from OPCA strategies. I agree.

A.N.B.’s lawsuit had no basis in law,and it would be unjust for any of the Defendants to experience any deleterious effects for having been dragged, unnecessarily, into court. [96] This Court has a broad authority and discretion to order costs: Rules 10.28-10.33. In Brown v. Silvera, 2010 ABQB 224, atparas. 29-35, 488 A.R. 22, Justice Moen surveyed scenarios where elevated and indemnity costs were appropriate.

Some examplesinclude: • solicitor and client costs are awarded where the conduct of a party has been ‘reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous’: Walsh v.Mobil Oil Canada, 2008 ABCA 268, at para. 112, 440 A.R. 199; Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9 at para. 26,[2004] 1 S.C.R. 303; Young v.

Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 at 134, 108 D.L.R. (4th) 193; • solicitor and client costs might suffice to satisfy the objectives of deterrence and punishment that would otherwise be served by apunitive damage award: Colborne Capital Corp. v. 542775 Alberta Ltd., 1999 ABCA 14, at para. 294, 228 A.R. 201; College ofPhysicians & Surgeons, 2009 ABQB 48, at paras. 4 23, 468 A.R. 101; • misconduct during the litigation can surely be found if there is no reasonable basis on which to commence, or continue, litigation:College of Physicians & Surgeons, at para. 33;

• a proceeding that was based on groundless allegations and was a type of conduct that should be discouraged: College ofPhysicians & Surgeons, at para. 33; • justice can only be done by a complete indemnification for costs: Foulis v. Robinson (1978), (ON CA), 21O.R. (2d) 769, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 134 (Ont.

C.A.); and • there is evidence that the plaintiff did something to hinder, delay or confuse the litigation, where there was no serious issue of factor law which required these lengthy, expensive proceedings, where the positively misconducting party was “contemptuous” of theaggrieved party in forcing that aggrieved party to exhaust legal proceedings to obtain that which was obviously his: Max SonnenbergInc. v. Stewart, Smith (Canada) Ltd., (AB KB), 48 Alta. L.R. (2d) 367, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 75 (Alta.

Q.B.). [97] In Meads, at para. 598 I observed: Many, if not most, of these characteristics emerge in a typical proceeding that involves OPCA concepts and litigants. The character ofthat misconduct is further aggravated by the fact that OPCA litigants enter into the courts wielding tools that they anticipate will disrupt,if not break, the system, and thereby defeat genuine legal rights. [98] At para. 631 of Meads, I indicated this general principle: ... innocent parties [should] be indemnified for the legal costs associated with OPCA litigation.

No, or little, cost should flow to a litigantwho is abused by OPCA strategies. [99] The Alberta Defendants requested a costs award of $10,000.00, which includes disbursements. Ms. Smith indicated that thetotal cost incurred to respond to this action was actually $12,500.00, but the Alberta Defendants did not seek that entire amount. TheRCMP Defendants indicated their expenses would be indemnified by a sum of $7,500.00, which includes disbursements. The Albertaand RCMP Defendants are entitled to those respective amounts. [100] Ms.

Quinn calculated that during the time she had required to respond to A.N.B.’s lawsuit she would have earned $2,500.00. Iorder A.N.B. pay costs in that amount to indemnify Ms. Quinn. 8. Conclusion [101] As I held in the oral hearing, for which this Memorandum provides reasons, A.N.B.’s Statement of Claim in this action isstruck, and this lawsuit is ended. [102] A.N.B. shall pay costs as follows: $10,000.00 to the Alberta Defendants; $7,500.00 to the RCMP Defendants; and $2,500.00 to Ms.

Quinn. [103] As a final observation, I encourage A.N.B. to remain throughout any future court hearings at which he appears, so that he may,if he follow the court’s procedures, make submissions on any matter that may affect him. As in Meads, and another Memorandum ofDecision I am soon to release in a criminal case, his absence will neither assist him, nor prevent the Court from making all necessary

decisions. Heard on the 29 th day of January, 2013. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 12 th day of February, 2013. J.D. Rooke A.C.J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: A.N.B. for the Plaintiffs Jane Smith (a pseudonym) for the Defendants Dave Hancock, Carol Anne Patenaude, Kamthi Campbell, Lise Durand, Tom Sutton, Sue Paddon, Lisa Leavitt, Kerri-Anne Wierenga, Dean Schaff, Melissa Long, Pam Vandermeleun, Doug Lewis, Brian Kash, Greg Marchant, and Barb Petryk Justice Canada Counsel for the Christina Nicholson, G. Perry, G.

Perreault, and Jennifer Jackson Jo-Ann Quinn for herself A.R. for herself _______________________________________________________ Corrigendum of the Memorandum of Decision of The Associate Chief Justice J.D. Rooke

_______________________________________________________ 1. Publication Ban added. 2. In paragraph [1] the initials of the children were changed from “T.-L” to “T.J.” and “S.-L” to “S.M.” 3. In paragraph [12] 11. the initials of the children were changed from “T.-J” to “T.J.” and “S.-L” to “S.M.” 4. The Respondent’s (Plaintiff) name throughout the Decision was changed to initials A.N.B., or variations thereof. 5. The Applicant’s (Defendant), mother of the children, name throughout the Decision was changed to initials A.R. 6. The name of the other parent of A.R.’s children was changed in paragraph [5] to initials C.L.B.