VAS v Grace, 2014 ABQB 666

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: VAS v Grace, 2014 ABQB 666 Date: 20141104 Docket: 0303 08944 Registry: Edmonton Between: VAS Plaintiff - and - Melanie Grace, Robert Crawford, Kevin Yaremchuk, John Doe Cell Block Sergeant, Bob Wasylyshen (Chief of the Edmonton Police Service), Dianne Cameron, Pam Coulson, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta, Dan Szakacks, John Doe Correctional Officer #1, John Doe Correctional Officer #2, and Jane Doe Nurse Defendants Editorial Notice: On behalf of the Government of Alberta i dentifying information has been removed from this unofficial electronic version of the judgment. _ ________________________________________ ______________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Madam Justice J.B.

Veit _________________________________________ ______________

Summary [1] In May, 2001, VAS reported to the police that she had been the victim of a break-in at her residence which resulted, amongstother things, in the basement being partially flooded. The resulting police investigation disclosed no independent support for the allegedbreak-in. Ms. VAS repeatedly contacted police for follow-up on her complaint. The police learned that Ms. VAS had come to theattention of community mental health social workers, but had consistently refused their assistance. Ms.

VAS had also been investigatedby child welfare authorities but had been deemed competent to continue parenting her two young children. Having decided to offer Ms.VAS a choice between being arrested for public mischief (reporting a flood with intention to mislead) or deal with mental healthworkers, in the early evening of Saturday, June 2, 2001, a female police officer attended at Ms. VAS's home/business. The police officerwas warrantless and knew that she had no grounds to arrest Ms. VAS under the Mental Health Act. Once inside the premises, the policeofficer arrested Ms. VAS, who resisted.

Handcuffed and hobbled, Ms. VAS was taken to a police station and processed. She was firstallowed the opportunity of contacting a lawyer shortly after 2 a.m. on Sunday, June 3. Ms. VAS was brought before a bail justice of thepeace at 9:00 a.m. on Sunday, June 3. The police officer who represented the Crown at the bail hearing recommended against bail.Because Ms. VAS expressed a wish to contact counsel, her bail hearing was adjourned to Provincial Court on Monday, June 4; the justiceof the peace remanded her in custody. Ms.

VAS was then admitted to Edmonton Remand Centre where she was strip searched, clothed in"baby dolls" and lodged in a mental health unit where she was put under a 15 minute observation watch. On June 4, Ms. VAS wasaccompanied at her bail hearing by a duty counsel; she maintained her insistence of speaking with a lawyer. The presiding ProvincialCourt judge adjourned her bail hearing to June 7; that judge remanded her in custody. On June 8, Ms. VAS's status was changed by thecustodial authorities from the mental health detention ward to the medical ward; as a result, from June 9 onward, Ms.

VAS was clothedin normal institutional clothing, provided with slightly more freedom in her cell, such as being allowed reading materials, and wassubjected to less frequent observation. On June 11, 2001, Ms. VAS was granted bail. The criminal charges against Ms. VAS, publicmischief and resisting arrest, were withdrawn in October, 2001. [2] In this trial, Ms. VAS claims general damages of $100,000.00, special damages of $25,000.00, punitive damages, interestand costs. [3] Ms.

VAS's claim against the police defendants for false arrest and false imprisonment is allowed: the arresting police officerhad no subjective grounds for believing that Ms. VAS intended to mislead the police and, in any event, the evidence discloses noobjective basis for reasonable and probable grounds for Ms. VAS's arrest. Ms. VAS was detained by the police for two days. Shesuffered minor physical injuries during her arrest; however, the main damages Ms.

VAS suffered at the hands of the police were loss ofliberty, humiliation in front of her children, confinement and mental stress. [4] However, the police defendants are not liable to Ms. VAS for malicious prosecution: Ms. VAS has not proved the element ofmalice because, although the police action was taken for an improper purpose, i.e. getting mental health assistance for Ms. VAS, thatimproper purpose was formed in good faith. [5] Nor are the police defendants liable to Ms. VAS for punitive damages: although the actions of the police were wrongful, theevidence establishes that the police officer who arrested Ms.

VAS was honestly attempting to obtain mental health assistance for Ms.VAS. [6] Finally, the police defendants are not liable to Ms. VAS for the humiliation and various losses of dignity which she sufferedduring her incarceration at the remand centre: the police are not responsible for Ms. VAS's remand in custody. Although the policerecommended against Ms. VAS's release, the police did not unfairly state, or fail to state, any relevant fact to judicial officers.

The justiceof the peace and the Provincial Court judge were intervening actors who limited the responsibility of the police officers. [7] In the circumstances, Ms. VAS is entitled to receive $25,000.00 in damages from the police defendants, plus interest, pluscosts. Ms. VAS has not proved any special damages. [8] Ms. VAS's claim against the Government of Alberta is denied: the officials at the Edmonton Remand Centre met theirresponsibilities towards Ms. VAS, given the information available to them and Ms. VAS's guarded level of communication with theofficials. Cases and authority cited [9] By Ms.

VAS: Frey v Fedoruk, (SCC), [1950] SCR 517; Dix v Canada, 2002 ABQB 580; R v Storrey, (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 241; Nagy v Canada, 2006 ABCA 227; Criminal Code of Canada, s.140(1)(

c) and s. 129(a); MentalHealth Act RSA 2000 c.

M-13; Dixon v Hamilton (City) Police Service Board, [2011] OJ No. 3836 citing Whitehouse v Calgary PoliceService, (AB KB), [1979] AJ 608 (QB) (rev’d on other grounds Whitehouse v Calgary Police Service, [1980] ABCA214; Botiuk v Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd., [1995] 3 SCR 374; Hawley v Bapoo (2005), 76 OR (3d) (ON SC), rev’d on othergrounds Hawley v Bapoo, 2007 ONCA 503; Hunter v Southam Inc, (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 145; R v Colarusso, (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 20; R v Evans (1996), (SCC), 104 CCC (3d) 23 (SCC); R v Plant, (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 281; R v Edwards, (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 128; R v Feeney, (SCC), [1997] 2SCR 13; R v Dyment, (SCC), [1988] 2 SCR 417; R v Collins, (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 265; Ilnicki vMacLeod, 2005 ABCA 349 citing R v Clarke, (ON SC), [2003] 184 CCC (3d) 39 (OSCJ); Nelles v Ontario, (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 170; Klein v Seiferling, (SK KB), 179 Sask R 161; Proulx v Quebec, 2001 SCC66; Corrections Act RSA 2000 c.

C-29 s. 2 and s. 11; Bacon v Surrey Pretrial Service Centre, 2010 BCSC 805; Trang v Alberta(Edmonton Remand Centre), 2010 ABQB 6; United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Divito v Canada(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 47; R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26 , [2007] 2 SCR 292; R v A.D. , [2001]AJ No. 1441; Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1; Geary v Alberta (Edmonton Remand Centre),2004 ABQB 19; Criminal Trial Lawyers’ Association v Alberta (Solicitor General), 2004 ABQB 534; R v Sooch, 2007 ABPC 260,

varied on appeal R v Sooch, 2008 ABCA 186; R v Bal & Sidhu, 2014 ONSC 3063; R v Rathburn, 2004 YKTC 24; R v Gamble, (SCC), [1988] 2 SCR 595; Mission Institute v Khela, 2014 SCC 24; May v Warden of Ferndale Institute, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 SCR 809; R v Golden, 2001 SCC 83; Thorburn v British Columbia, 2006 BCSC 1613; Lamka v Waterloo PoliceServices Board, [2012] OJ No 5591; R v Suberu, 2009 SCC 33; R v Munoz, 2006 ABQB 901; R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41; Quebec(Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5; R v Swain, (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 933; R v Winko, (SCC),[1999] 2 SCR 625; Nova Scotia (W.C.B.) v Martin, 2003 SCC 54 , [2003] 2 SCR 504; R v Adamo, 2013 MBQB 225;Braithwaite v Ontario (Attorney General), 2006 HRTO 15, R v B.(D.), 2004 SKPC 43; C.(J.) v Forensic Psychiatric Services (1990), (BC SC), 65 BCLR (2d) 386 (BCSC); R v Oakes, (SCC), [1986] 1 SCR 103; Eldridge v BritishColumbia, (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 624; Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v N.A.P.E., 2004 SCC 66; Ward vVancouver, 2010 SCC 27; Mammoliti v Niagara Regional Police Service, 2007 ONCA 79; Henry v British Columbia (AttorneyGeneral), 2013 BCSC 665; Bilich v Toronto Police Services Board, 2013 ONSC 1445; Forrest v the Queen, 2012 ONSC 429;Bastarache v Canada, 2003 FC 1463; Abbott v Canada, [1993] FCJ No. 673; Chopra v T.

Eaton Co.

Ltd., 1999 ABQB 291; citingCrowe v Noon (1970), 16 DLR (3d) (Ont HC); Forster v MacDonald (1993), (AB KB), 14 Alta LR (3d) 225;Pearson v Mian, ; Hanisch v Canada, 2004 BCCA 539; Martel v Zaychuk, 2009 ABQB 6; Al-Harazi v RegionalMunicipality Niagara Police Services Board, (ON SC); Ilnicki v MacLeod, 2003 ABQB 676; affirmed Ilnicki vMacLeod, 2005 ABCA 349; Curry v Canada (Attorney General), 2006 FC 63 (TD); Hewer v Paquette, (BC SC). [10] By the Defendants, Edmonton Police Service: R v Storrey, (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 241; Lamka v WaterlooRegional Police Services Board (2012), 272 CRR (2d) 286 (ONSCJ); Allen v Alberta (Law Enforcement Review Board), 2013 ABCA187; R v Poirier (1989), (NB CA), 101 NBR (2d) 67 (NBCA); R v Volk, 1991 CarswellOnt 3581 (CJ); R v Fitt(1995), 1995 NSCA 47 , 139 NSR (2d) 186 (CA), aff'd (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 70; R v Grant, 2009 SCC 3; R vSpencer, 2014 SCC 43; Frazier v Purdy (1991), (ON SC), 6 OR (3d) 429 (ONGD); Proulx c Quebec (Procureurgeneral), 2001 SCC 66 , [2001] 3 SCR 9; Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board, 2007SCC 41; Kvello v Miazga, 2009 SCC 51; Thornton v Byers (1999), (ON SC), 173 DLR (4th) 568 (OCJGD); Whitenv Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18; Hashemian v Wilde, 2006 SKCA 126; Ward v Vancouver (City), 2010 SCC 27; Young v Ewatski,2012 MBCA 64; Henry v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2013 BCSC 665; Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 16, 25, 129,140, 495; Mental Health Act, RSA 2000, c M-13, s 10; Police Act, RSA 2000, c P-17, ss 38-41; Contributory Negligence Act, RSA2000, c C-27. [11] By the Defendants, Alberta: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being ScheduleB to the Canada Act (1982) (UK), 1982, c 11, ss 7, 12, 15; Corrections Act, RSA 2000, c C-29; Correctional Institution Regulation, AltaReg 205/2001; Smith v British Columbia (Attorney General), 1988 CarswellBC 335; Coumont v R, 1994 CarswellNat 599; Scott vCanada, [1985] FCJ No 35; Trang v Alberta (Director, Edmonton Remand Centre), 2010 ABQB 6, 2010 CarswellAlta 64; R v Jerace,2011 ABQB 50, 2011 CarswellAlta 107; R v Farrell, 2011 ONSC 2160, 2011 CarswellOnt 2604; Re Robertston, 2012 Carswell Ont4786; R v Walters, 2012 ABQB 83, 2012 CarswellAlta 116; R v Spracklin, 2013 ABPC 55, 2013 CarswellAlta 314; R v.

Spracklin,2014 ABQB 88, 2014 CarswellAlta 258; R v Marriott, 2014 NSCA 28, 2014 CarswellNS 210 (CA); R v Chan, 2005 ABQB 615, [2005] AJ No. 1118 (QB); Forrest v Kirkland, 2012 ONSC 429, 2012 CarswellOnt 909; R v Dipersio, 2003 CarswellOnt2819; R v Holness, 2004 CarswellOnt 6577; Big Plume v Strandburg, 1990 CarswellAlta 945; Colborne Capital Corp v 542775 AlbertaLtd, (AB KB), 1999 CarswellAlta 29 (CA); Oswald v Canada, [1997] FCJ No 203; Hickey v R, 2007 CarswellNat566; Squires v Canada, (NB KB), 2002 NBQB 309, 2002 CarswellNB 344. 1. Background [12] In May, 2001, Ms.

VAS had been a hairdresser and owner of a hair salon for many years, most recently operating out of thefront part of her residence in west Edmonton. On a week-end in May, she and her two children had gone to visit her parents in a townoutside of Edmonton to celebrate the birthday of one of the children. When they returned home on Sunday evening, Ms. VAS concludedthat there had been a break-in at her residence: she says that there were crumbs everywhere, that her bed had been ruffled, that acomputer had been moved, etc. More notably, there were several feet of water in the basement. At the time, Ms.

VAS had been engagedin a home renovation project involving the building of a back deck; four holes had been dug for the deck supports and Ms. VAS reportedthat the outside garden hose was pointed into one of those holes and was still running. After shutting off the hose and getting a sumppump to remove the water from the basement, Ms. VAS reported the incident to police that night, alleging that someone had broken intoher home and intentionally caused the damage. [13] Ms.

VAS’s perception is that the police officer who first came to investigate her complaint, the defendant Grace, essentiallyrefused to take her complaint seriously and to investigate it. [14] The police perspective is that officer Grace investigated the complaint on May 21, 2001, the morning after Ms. VAS’s call,pointed out to Ms.

VAS that there seemed to be pry marks on the back door, but that they appeared to be old, and noted that nothing ofvalue had been taken even though there was expensive computer equipment in the home, that no equipment from the hair salon had beentaken, and that the home’s alarm system had not been activated. She asked Ms. VAS to put together a list of missing items and gave her avictim services card. [15] There is a dispute on the evidence about whether Ms. VAS told the police officer, on that initial contact, about Ms. VAS’sconcerns about stalkers. However, officer Grace testified that Ms.

VAS appeared to her to be a “little off”, a bit bizarre, veering off ontoother subjects while she was talking with the officer. Officer Grace testified that, after she left Ms. VAS, her overall impression was thatshe was “fabricating” the event. [16] Ms. VAS attended the police station in the afternoon of May 21 and, in her written statement, did provide extensive detailabout what she construed as surveillance and stalking of herself, her family, her business, her telephone service, her bank accounts, and

the theft of her wallet, her cell phone, etc. In that statement, she also complained that, on previous contact with the police service in relation to an earlier complaint, the police had made “false statements” to Social Services which resulted in an investigation by that agency. She also indicated that she had been drugged in the fall of 2000. She stated that she had an “unwanted guest” in her life who was trying to “drive us silly” either so that they could acquire her property or simply because they were obsessed with her family. [ 17 ] The police service became aware of Ms.

VAS's mental health history, including a relatively recent admission to the psychiatric wing of an Edmonton hospital where her discharge diagnosis, after a two week stay, was - psychotic disorder, not yet diagnosed. [ 18 ] The police service also became aware that the community mental health crisis team had had reports of Ms. VAS's behaviour, that the team was concerned about her mental health and also concerned by Ms. VAS's refusal to accept any assistance from them. [ 19 ] The police service also knew that child welfare had been asked to investigate Ms. VAS's mental health and had concluded that although Ms.

VAS had some unconventional behaviours, there was no basis for interfering with her parenting of her children. [ 20 ] The police service was also aware of Ms. VAS's insistent complaints to Telus that someone was interfering with, bugging, her telephone service. [ 21 ] Most importantly, perhaps, the police service was aware that a former police officer, now a private investigator, had reported to the police service that he was concerned that, because of her mental health issues, Ms.

VAS was vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous private investigators who might be only too happy to investigate her concerns about stalkers, etc. [ 22 ] Finally, Ms. VAS had made several contacts with the police concerning her break-in complaint, and did not appear to be satisfied with the action taken by police in relation to that complaint. [ 23 ] This is the context in which officer Grace was tasked to deal with Ms. VAS. Cst. Grace, as she then was, knew that she did not have the grounds to arrest Ms. VAS under the Mental Health Act . However, she decided to attend at Ms.

VAS's and to give her the option of either being charged with public mischief or of dealing with the community mental health workers who accompanied her. [ 24 ] The mental health workers themselves were well aware that they had no ability to diagnose people, no authority to arrest people, no authority to force people to cooperate with them, and no authority to treat people involuntarily. [ 25 ] Cst. Grace and the two mental health workers arrived at Ms. VAS's home/business shortly after 7:30 p.m. on the evening of Saturday, June 2, 2001. The front of those premises was taken up with Ms. VAS's hair salon. Ms.

VAS did not respond to the police call at her door. Cst. Grace asked the police dispatch service to telephone Ms. VAS and to alert her to their presence. Ms. VAS then approached the front door, but did not open it, then turned and walked into the beauty salon. The police officer and the mental health workers entered. [ 26 ] Ms. VAS asked them all to leave. As Ms. Cameron put it, “I recall that she told the police officer to leave". As Ms. Coulson put it, “[Ms. VAS] did not want us there; she did not want to talk. . .

She was adamant that she wanted us out of the house." When the police officer and mental health workers would not leave, Ms. VAS went to the telephone to call for help. Cst. Grace wanted Ms. VAS to "engage" with her; she touched Ms. VAS's arm to get her to put the phone down. Ms. VAS resisted and Cst. Grace wrestled with Ms. VAS. One of the workers went outside to call the two male police officers who had accompanied Cst. Grace to the location for back up if necessary, then entered the premises and assisted in subduing Ms. VAS by "directing her towards the ground" and eventually handcuffing and hobbling her. Cst.

Grace applied pressure to the side of Ms. VAS's throat to assist in subduing her. Throughout, Ms. VAS was an "active resister". [ 27 ] As Ms. VAS was being carried to the police car, Ms. VAS's children returned to their home from a nearby convenience store; Ms. VAS screamed at them to contact their father. [ 28 ] In the scuffle inside the premises, some personal papers of Ms. VAS's had been dislodged from a desk and strewn about the premises. The social workers picked up these papers, read through them, concluded that they consisted of nonsensical ramblings, and gave them to Cst.

Grace as they might assist in demonstrating that Ms. VAS was in need of mental health assistance. [ 29 ] Ms. VAS was taken to police headquarters where she remained uncooperative, "feigning a faint" as one police officer put it. [ 30 ] Because she was yelling, the police put Ms. VAS in a cell which had some noise protection. Eventually, Ms. VAS was allowed to use a telephone to attempt to reach a lawyer at approximately 2:20 a.m. early in the morning of Sunday, June 3, 2001. [ 31 ] Ms. VAS was then brought before a bail justice of the peace at 9:00 a.m. on June 3.

The police officer who represented the Crown opposed bail. The police officer outlined the service's concerns in this way: . . . the accused had been repeatedly putting in calls for service to the Edmonton Police Service, alleging break and enters, stalkers, her residence being bugged, contractors are out to get her and that Telus is tapping her telephone lines. When police arrived, investigations revealed that the accused's allegations are false. During the past two weeks, the following file numbers have been generated . . . . The accused currently has full custody of her two sons . . .

There is a serious concern that the accused is suffering from a mental disorder even though she denies it. She was offered assistance through the Mobile Mental Health Crisis Team who were on scene during the arrest but she adamantly refused their help.. . . Crown is requesting that bail be denied and the accused held for mental examination. The accused at this time does not appear to be a danger to herself yet she appears to be suffering from unaddressed mental problems. . . . [she was] diagnosed by Dr. C as paranoid and delusional. The accused is in denial and refuses treatment or assistance. . . .

In February of 2001, she repeatedly called the police for a

period of time and now the pattern is repeating itself. It is the investigator's opinion that the accused is in need of some serious mental health assistance as her problems are escalating and beginning to affect her sons' lives. She recently flooded her basement to the extent of 2 to 3 inches of depth. The investigator has concerns that if left unaddressed the accused may cause other potential dangerous events to occur. The investigator requests her mental examination as a much needed preventative measure in order to ensure the safety of the accused and her sons. . . .

Due to the accused's extraordinary behaviour, business people who have come in contact with her have reported her to police. [ 32 ] The justice of the peace was concerned about the whereabouts of the accused's children, but was advised that they were with their father. [ 33 ] There followed some conversation between the justice of the peace and Ms. VAS about a lawyer. Ms. VAS said that she had spoken with a lawyer's assistant, but there had obviously been some serious miscommunication because that assistant expected Ms. VAS to appear at the lawyer's office on Monday.

The justice of the peace then said, in response to Ms. VAS's request to be released: . . . I have to make up my mind whether I'm going to hold you or let you go. And I'm just about to say that I'm going to hold you over for a day. I asked you if you wanted to get a lawyer here. [ 34 ] To which, Ms. VAS responded: I tried, sir, and he told me it does not go this way, sir. I can phone him again. [ 35 ] The justice of the peace then adjourned the hearing for two hours. [ 36 ] When the hearing resumed, Ms. VAS again asked to be released “on her own recognizance” and to adjourn the bail hearing until the next day.

The justice of the peace replied: . . . I'm quite prepared to mark this file - Bail not spoken to - you stay in custody, go in front of a judge with your lawyer tomorrow morning. Do you want to do that? [ 37 ] Ms. VAS replied: Yes, but I must go home. [ 38 ] The justice of the peace then remanded Ms. VAS in custody until the next day and asked for her to be given a psychiatric examination at the Remand Centre. [ 39 ] Ms. VAS was then taken to the Remand Centre. Following that institution's regular policy, Ms. VAS was strip searched.

Although no fingers were inserted into any of her cavities, she was, for example, required to squat and cough with a view to ensuring that nothing was hidden in her vagina. After the shower and strip search, Ms. VAS was clothed in "baby dolls" a shift-like garment, sleeveless, without zippers, buttons or belt, made of heavy grade, presumably unrippable, material. She was not allowed underwear. She was then housed in unit 2DMH, a mental health unit which, amongst other features, had a protocol of observation of inmates every 15 minutes. There were no beds in the cell in which Ms.

VAS was placed and which she usually shared with one other inmate during the time of her incarceration; the two mattresses were placed directly on the floor, with about 2 feet between them. There was a toilet, with no cover, in the cell. The inmates were kept in the cell for approximately 22 hours a day. During the period of her incarceration, Ms. VAS did not have access to the outdoors. [ 40 ] The next day, Monday, June 4, Ms. VAS had had the opportunity of speaking with a psychiatrist before being brought to court, but had declined to speak with him.

The psychiatrist reported to the Provincial Court judge that Ms. VAS had told him that she refused to answer any questions without her lawyer being present. The psychiatrist could therefore not give any opinion to the court about whether Ms. VAS was fit to plead. Ms. VAS was assisted at the court proceedings by a duty counsel. That lawyer did not ask the psychiatrist any questions. Indeed, that lawyer essentially reported the same type of contact with Ms. VAS which the psychiatrist had experienced, i.e. Ms.

VAS had told him that she did not want to speak with anyone until she had had the opportunity of speaking with a lawyer. Duty counsel suggested that the matter be put over for a day or two to give Ms. VAS the opportunity of talking with the lawyer whose name she had mentioned. However, the Provincial Court judge thought that a day or two would not realistically provide sufficient time for consultation, and put the matter over for 7 days to June 11. [ 41 ] On June 8, 2001, Ms. VAS's status at the Remand Centre was changed from the mental health unit to the medical unit.

Amongst other changes, this meant that, from June 9 to the end of her incarceration, Ms. VAS was allowed to wear institutional clothing rather than baby dolls. [ 42 ] On June 11, Ms. VAS re-attended at a provincial court bail hearing; she was assisted by a lawyer. She was granted bail. [ 43 ] On October 22, 2001, the charges against Ms. VAS were withdrawn. 2. Police interaction with Ms. VAS [ 44 ] In assessing the evidence relating to police interaction with Ms. VAS, I have not relied on Ms. VAS's evidence: the independent, objective evidence establishes that Ms. VAS is not a reliable historian.

This is not surprising, in part because of the passage of time between the events with which this trial is concerned, in part because of Ms. VAS's mental health at the time of the events in question, and, in part because of the very stressful nature of the events in question. [ 45 ] Similarly, I have not relied on the evidence given by Ms. VAS's children, in part because of their age at the time of the events

in question, the passage of time, and the lack of any contemporary record kept by themselves of the events in question. [ 46 ] In a general way, I have not relied on the evidence of police officer Grace except when her evidence is confirmed by contemporary records which were not created for the purpose of this litigation. Again, this is not surprising as officer Grace was swept up in events at Ms. VAS's residence and was therefore not in the best position to report on those events. [ 47 ] There is no essential disagreement between these parties on the applicable legal principles.

For example, the parties agree that if the police do not have a warrant entitling them to be on private property, they cannot access that property except with the consent of the owner, which consent is implied when the private property consists of business premises which are open for business. The dispute here relates to the circumstances in which the police came to be, and remain, within Ms. VAS's property. [ 48 ] The parties also agree that the police power to arrest depends upon the existence of objectively reasonable and probable grounds.

A police suspicion will only, in certain situations which have no application here, justify taking investigatory measures. The factual disputes here relate to the characterization of the grounds for Ms. VAS's arrest. [ 49 ] It is also agreed that police responsibility for an arrest can terminate as a result of an intervening event, such as the making of a decision by a judicial officer. The dispute here relates to whether the police officer who represented the Crown at Ms.

VAS's original bail hearing misrepresented the facts, either by commission or by omission. [ 50 ] Finally, the fact that two police disciplinary hearings absolved Cst. Grace of any wrongdoing is not directly relevant to the decisions required in this trial. However, the evidence given under oath before those tribunals can, of course, be used pursuant to normal principles of examination and cross-examination in the examination of witnesses at this trial.

a) Unlawful presence in Ms. VAS's premises [ 51 ] When officer Grace and the two mental health workers arrived at Ms. VAS's premises, they realized that the beauty salon was not open for business. This is made clear by the fact that they did not simply open the door and walk in; had they been of the view that these were business premises that were open for business, as for example, a grocery store during business hours, they would have treated the premises as open business premises. On the contrary, officer Grace waited until a police dispatcher had telephoned Ms. VAS and Ms.

VAS had approached the front door before opening the door and walking in. [ 52 ] I accept that, when the police officer and the mental health workers entered Ms. VAS's salon, they did so on the basis of an implied invitation to enter. That implied invitation consisted in Ms. VAS turning her back and allowing the people on the doorstep to enter rather than closing and locking her front door. Moreover, the context included the fact that Ms. VAS had asked for a police attendance at her premises to continue the investigation into her break-in complaint. [ 53 ] However, once the three women were inside, Ms.

VAS made it known that she had been expecting a different female police officer, and ordered the three women to leave. The evidence of the two mental health workers is consistent on this point: as Ms. Cameron testified, Ms. VAS continued to ask Cst. Grace to leave. Indeed, one of the mental health workers testified that it was not unusual for them to be asked to leave premises, and for them not to leave when asked. The police officer, however, should have known better. There was no warrant allowing the police to enter Ms. VAS's premises. Therefore, the police could only legally be inside Ms. VAS's premises if Ms.

VAS consented to their presence there. Once Ms. VAS withdrew her consent to the police presence within her premises, and the police failed to obey her wishes, the police officer and the mental health workers became trespassers on Ms. VAS's property.

b) Unlawful arrest of Ms. VAS [ 54 ] When officer Grace went to Ms. VAS's premises in the evening of June 2, she had no reasonable and probable grounds to charge Ms. VAS with public mischief. Indeed, it is probable that officer Grace did not even have a personal belief that Ms. VAS was intentionally misleading the police. Although officer Grace testified that one of the possible scenarios that she was facing was one in which Ms. VAS was deliberately misleading police, given all of the information which officer Grace had on June 2 concerning Ms.

VAS's mental health, it does not seem possible that officer Grace could have subjectively concluded that Ms. VAS was deliberately misleading the police. [ 55 ] In any event, it is clear that, objectively, there were no reasonable and probable grounds on which to charge Ms. VAS with public mischief. The evidence of Ms. VAS's delusional illness was overwhelming and, given the former police officer's concerns about Ms. VAS's vulnerability, the illness was ongoing and perhaps even florid. Moreover, as the mental health workers testified, there was no urgency in Ms. VAS's situation: although Ms.

VAS was a bother to the police and to Telus, as officer Grace herself acknowledged, Ms. VAS was not a danger either to herself or to others. [ 56 ] The situation became worse when officer Grace prevented Ms. VAS from using her telephone. Officer Grace had no authority to lay hands on Ms. VAS. Officer Grace had no legal basis to arrest Ms. VAS and Ms. VAS had every right to resist the police officer's attempts to physically arrest and subdue her.

c) Intervening actions terminate police responsibility [ 57 ] Although the police recommended against granting bail to Ms. VAS, I have concluded that the action of the justice of the peace in remanding Ms. VAS in custody was an intervening action which terminated police responsibility for Ms. VAS's detention.

[ 58 ] In coming to that conclusion, I have reviewed the statements made by the police at the original bail hearing on June 3; the subsequent bail hearings on June 3 and June 4 were, of course, informed by the information acquired at the first hearing. [ 59 ] The police position at the bail hearing could, of course, have been perfect, in the sense that a report would have been made of every bit of information the police had acquired in relation to Ms. VAS.

However, the onus on the police is not that high: their responsibility is not to mislead either directly or indirectly. [ 60 ] Here, the police emphasized that Ms. VAS had made repeated complaints to the police and others such as Telus about strange happenings and that the police had concluded that the allegations themselves were "false". In the context of that hearing, "false" meant objectively untrue, i.e. there was no break-in to Ms. VAS's residence, there was no bugging of her telephone lines, etc.

This was not a misrepresentation; on the contrary, this statement was correct, i.e. the police had good reason to conclude that there had not, in fact, been a break-in at Ms. VAS's. [ 61 ] The police continued by informing the justice of the peace about the context within which the conclusion that there had been no break-in had to be assessed. They reported that she was actively parenting her two children. The police stated: "The accused at this time does not appear to be a danger to herself". The police accurately reported the fact that Ms.

VAS had been hospitalized for mental illness and that she had been diagnosed as delusional. They accurately reported that Ms. VAS refused treatment and assistance. They accurately reported the level of involvement of the mobile mental health crisis unit with Ms. VAS prior to the flooding event and at the scene of the arrest. The police did not exaggerate the extent of the flooding of Ms. VAS's basement, even though they did not explain how, because of the construction project currently underway at Ms. VAS's residence the flooding could well have been accidental. The police accurately reported that Ms.

VAS had no criminal record and was not currently the subject of any charges other than those which were the subject of the hearing. [ 62 ] Faced with the information provided by the police, the bail judge was in a position to make an independent decision about whether Ms. VAS should be granted bail. Parliament has made it clear that reasonable bail is a constitutional right.

The Criminal Code itself states that there are only three justifications for jailing an accused before their trial: an objective concern that remand in jail is necessary to ensure their attendance at court proceedings, an objective concern that remand in jail is necessary to prevent a breach of the safety or security of others, the commission of other crimes, or an interference with the administration of justice, and an objective concern that the release of the accused will have a negative impact on the community's reliance on the justice system.

The courts have made it clear that the third justification for pre-trial detention can be invoked only in rare circumstances. [ 63 ] The police presentation at the bail hearing clearly did not allege any concern relating to the first justification for denial of bail: Ms. VAS was a middle-aged woman, with the responsibility of being the primary parent for two sub-teenaged children, operating a business in Edmonton, and who had no criminal record. There was clearly no concern relating to whether she would appear in court when required. [ 64 ] The only possible basis on which bail could have been denied to Ms.

VAS was the second ground. The police did not misrepresent the level of threat Ms. VAS presented at the time of the bail hearing; the bail judge knew that Ms. VAS had not been arrested under a Mental Health Act warrant as being a danger to herself or to others. The bail judge knew that the only thing the police knew for certain with respect to Ms. VAS's dealings with others, such as the police service and Telus, is that she was a bother, a nuisance, to them because of her repeated requests for service. At its highest, the level of concern expressed by the police was that Ms.

VAS's behaviour was becoming more bizarre and that her need for mental health treatment appeared to be becoming more acute. However, no immediate danger was suggested [ 65 ] In those circumstances, the justice of the peace could well have released Ms. VAS: the Crown did not establish any necessity to keep Ms. VAS in jail on June 3 when she had been at liberty for all of the days since May 20 when she had made the "false" report. The only thing which had happened since May 20 was that a "pattern is repeating itself" of Ms. VAS telephoning police with requests for service.

It is obvious that the criminal justice system is not the appropriate mechanism to deal with mental health issues which have no criminal component. [ 66 ] In

summary, once the bail judge decided to remand Ms. VAS in custody, the Edmonton Police Service had no further responsibility for Ms. VAS's detention. The civil liability of the Service is therefore limited to the false arrest and the detention for the two days from June 2 to June 3, 2001.

d) Injuries [ 67 ] The injuries suffered by Ms. VAS as a result of the actions of the Edmonton Police Service included physical injuries, which were the red marks around her wrists presumably as a result of the handcuffing, and the emotional and psychological injuries relating to her deprivation of liberty. [ 68 ] Ms. VAS's physical injuries were transient in nature. [ 69 ] Prior to attending at Ms. VAS's premises, the police were aware that Ms. VAS was the primary parent of two young children. As things transpired, Ms.

VAS realized that her children witnessed her being carted off to a police car in obvious distress; the fact that she had exposed her children to that kind of traumatic event must surely have been very hard on Ms. VAS emotionally. [ 70 ] In addition to the deprivation of liberty which she suffered, Ms. VAS was also subjected to an invasion of her privacy when the police allowed Ms. VAS's personal writings to be read both by the mental health workers and by officer Grace herself. [ 71 ] There is no evidence of special damages suffered by Ms. VAS as a result of the unlawful arrest and detention.

For example, although there would presumably be no loss of business income because Ms. VAS's detention occurred on a Saturday after her business was closed for the day and Sunday when she presumably would not have been open for business, Ms. VAS may have paid a lawyer to

appear for her at the bail hearing on June 11, 2001. However, although Ms. VAS believed that she did pay the lawyer who appeared for her, she was unable to find any confirmation of the amount she paid. [ 72 ] There is no expert evidence on any possible long term effect of the unlawful arrest and detention on Ms. VAS's already fragile emotional state. Therefore, the court can assume only that Ms.

VAS would have suffered the same level of distress as would be experienced by any middle-aged, middle-class person with no prior criminal record having been arrested in such a dramatic way. [ 73 ] Perhaps more as a result of human compassion by the officers involved rather than EPS policy at the time, the Edmonton Police Service did not subject Ms. VAS to a strip search when they processed her at the HQ detention cells. Ms. VAS was wearing only light clothing at the time of her arrest, and she was only subjected to a pat-down.

In the event, the EPS complied with the standard of the law established by the Supreme Court of Canada - also in 2001 - which is that, because strip searches constitute such an infringement of human dignity, they cannot be carried out merely as a matter of course upon arrest.

e) Malicious prosecution [ 74 ] The Edmonton Police Service is not liable to Ms. VAS for damages for malicious prosecution. [ 75 ] In coming to this conclusion, the court determines that although the police committed an error of judgment in using the criminal justice system to try to deal with Ms.

VAS's mental health problems, there was no malice on the part of the police in doing so, i.e. the police used the criminal justice system for an improper purpose, but their objective was formed in good faith. [ 76 ] The good faith of officer Grace was displayed by her attendance in the company of two community mental health workers; it is clear that officer Grace was primarily trying to get help for Ms. VAS which help the officer honestly believed Ms. VAS needed. [ 77 ] Finally, in analyzing the police response to the situation presented by Ms.

VAS's mental health problems, the court recognizes that the events with which this trial is concerned occurred well over a decade ago. Society's appreciation of the ways in which mental health issues should be dealt with has, hopefully, evolved since then; it is possible, therefore, that if a situation exactly like the one confronting officer Grace were to arise today, the civil liability of the police service would be treated differently.

f) Punitive damages [ 78 ] The Edmonton Police Service is not liable to Ms. VAS for punitive damages. [ 79 ] In coming to that conclusion, the court relies on the same basic analysis as it applied in relation to the absence of malice, i.e. the police committed an error of judgment, but there was an objective basis for their concern about Ms. VAS's mental health and their purpose in using the criminal justice system for an improper purpose was formed in good faith.

g) General damages [ 80 ] The Edmonton Police Service is liable to Ms. VAS for $25,000.00 in general damages. [ 81 ] The award of general damages cannot be compensatory in the same way that an award for special damages is directly based on the calculation of a plaintiff's loss. Rather, an award for general damages is a notional amount, meant to recognize the existence of injury rather than to assess an amount of personal injury. [ 82 ] Here, Ms. VAS was a particularly vulnerable victim of the police error of judgment because of her existing mental condition and her status as a law-abiding citizen.

She was falsely arrested and detained for 2 days. There is no evidence of loss of reputation or suggestion of violence of the type which justified a higher award in Hanisch . There is no evidence of ongoing, or triggering, mental or physical suffering as a result of the arrest and detention. In all the circumstances, an award of $25,000.00 is appropriate given the mental anguish, humiliation, and loss of liberty suffered by Ms. VAS. Ms. VAS is, of course, entitled to interest on this amount. If the parties are not agreed on costs, I may be spoken to within 30 days of the release of this decision. 3.

Alberta Government's interaction with Ms. VAS [ 83 ] The defendants Cameron and Coulson were employees of Alberta at the material time. However, those defendants were not acting independently from the Edmonton Police Service; rather, they were taking direction from officer Grace. Therefore, Alberta bears no separate liability for their actions. [ 84 ] The thrust of Ms. VAS's claim against Alberta relates to the conditions of her incarceration at the Edmonton Remand Centre. I have concluded that Ms.

VAS's claim against Alberta must be denied. [ 85 ] As in relation to the claims against the EPS, there is no essential difference between the parties concerning the nature of the legal responsibility of the Remand Centre to Ms. VAS: Alberta agrees that it was required to provide safe custody for Ms. VAS, in a

facility staffed by persons trained to respect the rights and inherent dignity of the inmates who are in their custody. Fairness also requires the court to remain alert to the fact that the events with which this trial is concerned happened over a decade ago, in a different remand centre from the one which exists today, and in a climate which was less sophisticated relative to the rights of inmates than exists today. The dispute between the parties rests less on the nature of the obligation due to Ms. VAS than on whether the facts of Ms.

VAS's incarceration justify an award of damages. [ 86 ] From that perspective, let me then address Ms. VAS's particular concerns. [ 87 ] When she was admitted to the Remand Centre, Ms. VAS was strip searched. As the Supreme Court of Canada reminds us, even the most sensitively conducted strip search is highly intrusive. Based on the evidence of the administrator of the centre to the effect that, where cavity searches were necessary they were performed by medical staff, the court concludes that the strip search which Ms.

VAS suffered did not involve the exploration of body cavities; nevertheless, the search itself is highly demeaning. The issue is whether having a policy of strip searches for persons who were admitted to the remand centre is defensible.

Alberta has provided a satisfactory explanation for the necessity of a strip search upon admission to the institution: because of the minimal amount of information available to the custodial authorities about individual detainees, because there were different degrees of police search prior to admission, and because each new detainee will be exposed to some members of the inmate population, it is necessary to ensure that no new detainee is bringing drugs or any other type of contraband into the institution. [ 88 ] After she was strip searched, Ms.

VAS was required to wear "baby dolls", a shift-like garment made of strong material. Alberta has provided a satisfactory explanation for the necessity of such clothing: where, as here, a preliminary assessment of a detainee indicates a mental health concern, the custodial institution's first obligation is the protection of the detainee, including protection from self-harm. Baby dolls are designed to prevent a detainee from being able to tear the cloth with a view to harming themselves or harming others. The wearing of baby dolls was an incident of having been assigned to a mental health ward. While Ms.

VAS has called a psychiatrist who testified that baby dolls were not a feature of any psychiatric hospitals with which he was familiar, and therefore not in themselves necessary for the protection of potentially suicidal patients, that psychiatrist has little experience of custodial institutions and was therefore not in a position to express an opinion about the use of baby dolls in that setting. [ 89 ] There was no evidence that Ms.

VAS herself suffered from any infringement of her modesty as a result of having to wear a baby doll garment: the evidence was that some baby dolls were indeed larger than others and that they gaped at the armholes, thereby potentially exposing the wearer's breasts. However, there was no evidence that this happened to Ms. VAS. [ 90 ] There was also evidence of some complaints about being cold as a result of having to wear baby dolls.

However, the evidence was that the temperature in the Remand Centre was kept at 19 degrees which, given the time of year, meant that inmates would not be cold even if they were only clothed in baby dolls. [ 91 ] Alberta has provided a satisfactory explanation for Ms. VAS's assignment to a mental health unit in the custodial institution: the ERC had a carefully planned protocol to deal with assignment of inmates to various units. The admitting nurse at the Remand Centre was an experienced registered nurse who conducted a complex interview of Ms. VAS, learned about Ms.

VAS's previous psychiatric exposure, was concerned about Ms. VAS's poor eye contact and apparent inability or unwillingness to respond to questions, and concluded that there was a realistic concern in the circumstances that Ms. VAS might be a suicide risk. Not only was Ms. VAS's mental health history a concern, but a custodial institution is, of course, a stressful place for most detainees, and is especially traumatic for people, like Ms. VAS, who have never previously been incarcerated; in those circumstances, it was necessary to ensure that adequate observations and supports were in place to try to protect Ms.

VAS from the most devastating effect of incarceration, which is suicide. An additional objective of this initial assessment was to provide observation until the new inmate could be assessed by a psychologist and a psychiatrist. Alberta has established that, in light of the high risk of devastating harm to Ms. VAS, the protocol followed on her initial assessment - which admittedly errs on the side of caution - was reasonable. [ 92 ] Alberta has also provided a satisfactory explanation for the continued assignment of Ms. VAS to the mental health unit until June 8, 2001.

The ERC had a program in place which included daily rounds to check on the inmates, more access than the general population to a psychologist and a psychiatrist, and the opportunity to request access to the psychiatrist. Dr. Friend, the psychiatrist called by Ms. VAS, saw Ms. VAS for the first time on June 4. He characterized her story about the events leading up to her incarceration as a "strange story". Ms. VAS denied any suicidal ideation; even then, Dr. Friend assessed her as being a "low" suicide risk rather than a "no" suicide risk. Dr.

Friend agreed that it is not always possible to rely on self-reporting in relation to matters such as suicide risk since one aspect of that type of mental illness is a lack of insight into one's mental health. Indeed, Ms. VAS's unwillingness to accept psychiatric assistance even though it was recommended by Dr. Friend was evidence of her lack of insight into her own situation. Dr. Friend could not say whether, when he met with Ms. VAS on June 4, he had had access to her discharge

summary from Grey Nuns hospital in November 2000 with a diagnosis of psychosis, not yet diagnosed. Although Dr. Friend's chart note on June 4 was that Ms. VAS should be moved to 5C, on the same line a note was also written that she was to stay on 2DMH, the mental health unit. Evidence established that 5C was a unit for detainees with either less acutely ill mental health issues or low functioning capacity, but that it was an all-male unit. Dr. Friend next saw Ms. VAS on June 7 when he described her pre-incarceration story as "convoluted" and "nonsensical".

On June 7, he concluded that she should be kept on 2DMH at least in part because mentally ill inmates do not normally mix well with the anti-social personalities of many of the inmates in the general population. [ 93 ] On June 8, Ms. VAS's mental health assessment was upgraded, she was assigned to the medical unit and, as of June 9, she was allowed to wear institutional clothing rather than the baby dolls. [ 94 ] There is no evidence that, at any stage of her incarceration, Ms. VAS was required to wear a baby doll garment as punishment or for any reason other than a valid one linked to Ms.

VAS's own protection. [ 95 ] Ms. VAS complains that the baby doll garment was rough on her skin and that she was not allowed to wear a t-shirt under the baby doll to alleviate that discomfort. Although it is true that Ms. VAS was denied the privilege of wearing a t-shirt under the baby doll and there appears to have been no reason for such a denial, she was provided with some cream to ease the rubbing of the garment on her shoulders. The denial of a t-shirt does not give rise to a claim for damages.

[ 96 ] Ms. VAS complains that she did not have effective access to a telephone. However, the evidence establishes that Ms. VAS had some access to a telephone because she was able to retain a lawyer. The evidence from the ERC administration is that phones were available in the unit where Ms. VAS was detained and that a program was in place to ensure that the telephone service was maintained. Ms. VAS has not proved that she was denied telephone access. [ 97 ] Ms. VAS complains that she was held in a cell almost continuously with another inmate for an average of 22 hours a day.

While the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners - which is not domestic law in Canada but which informs Canadian assessments of conditions in custodial institutions - states that untried prisoners should sleep singly in separate rooms, in 2001, a double cell for prisoners on remand for relatively short periods of time was not an unacceptable practice. [ 98 ] Similarly, although Ms. VAS was not provided either with access to open air or to physical and recreational training during a daily period of exercise during her incarceration at the Remand Centre, in 2001, given Ms.

VAS's relatively short stay at ERC, these departures from the UN Rules were not unacceptable practices. [ 99 ] Also, while Ms. VAS and the other inmates at ERC were generally referred to as "offenders" even though they had not been convicted of any crime, in 2001, given Ms. VAS's relatively short stay at ERC, this failure to treat an unconvicted prisoner as a person who is presumed to be innocent was not an unacceptable practice. [ 100 ] Although Ms.

VAS was not provided with a pillow, her bedding was "sufficient" in the context of the UN Rules: there was a rational basis for depriving inmates of pillows which was, essentially, the same reason that some had to wear baby dolls, i.e. the need to protect the safety and wellbeing of the inmate. Although the mattress provided to Ms. VAS was relatively thin, it was "sufficient". [ 101 ] Although Ms. VAS did not, in the event, have any visitors while she was at ERC, there was no evidence that she was deprived of the opportunity of having visitors. [ 102 ] Ms.

VAS argues that her constitutional right to equality before the law was breached because the ERC did not provide a female equivalent to unit 5C where male inmates suffering from mental illnesses which were not acute and low functioning inmates were housed. There are two problems with that claim. The first is technical: Ms.

VAS did not sufficiently plead a breach of her equality rights coupled with a claim for s. 24(1) Charter damages to allow Alberta to properly respond with evidence about the number of female inmates who would have been appropriate residents of any such unit and the cost of providing such accommodation for female inmates. The second is substantive: although there was one indication from a psychiatrist that Ms. VAS should be placed on 5C, that psychiatrist not only agreed with her placement on 2DMH, but, on a second visit, confirmed that that was the correct placement for her.

It will be recalled that the weight of the evidence supports a common sense observation that, as the ERC psychologist put it - jail is a harsh place for an individual on a first admission. It was therefore reasonable for the ERC, to the extent that it was able to do so, to protect Ms. VAS from interaction with other inmates who might further victimize her. [ 103 ] There is no evidence that Alberta treated Ms. VAS in a stereotypical way because of her mental illness. On the contrary, the fact that Ms.

VAS's status within the institution was changed during the relatively short time she spent there establishes that the institution was alert to the need to assess every inmate individually and to monitor every inmate's adjustment to the custodial setting. [ 104 ] In

summary, Alberta has proved that nothing done at the ERC went beyond what was necessary to achieve a legitimate aim: keeping Ms. VAS safe during her incarceration. Nothing done by the ERC staff was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. The procedures and protocols employed by the ERC in 2001 accorded with public standards of decency and propriety. No conditions of Ms. VAS's imprisonment were unusually severe or degrading. [ 105 ] Finally, it goes without saying that the ERC had no responsibility for Ms.

VAS's arrest and subsequent remand: as the ERC psychologist put it - I am a psychologist, not a police officer; I did not know why Ms. VAS was in custody. [ 106 ] In the result, although the days she spent at the ERC were obviously very difficult for Ms. VAS, Alberta did not fail in its duty to her as an inmate. Therefore, Ms. VAS is not entitled to damages from Alberta. If the parties are not agreed on costs, I may be spoken to within 30 days of the release of this decision. Heard December 2 and 3, 2013 and June 16-27, 2014. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 4 th day of November, 2014. J.B.

Veit J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances: Erika Norheim, Kate Engel, Student-at-law, Engel Law for the Plaintiff, Ms. VAS Lorena Harris, Andrea M. Simmons, Dentons Canada LLP for the Defendant, Edmonton Police Service Nicole Pfeifer and Neil Boyle, Alberta Justice for Alberta Defendants