Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, 2014 ABQB 771

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, 2014 ABQB 771 Date: 20141216 Docket: 1403 09800 Registry: Edmonton Between: Bank of Montreal Plaintiff and Defendant by Counterclaim - and - Aileen J. Rogozinsky also known as Aileen Janet Rogozinsky Defendant and Plaintiff by Counterclaim _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of W.S. Schlosser , Master in Chambers _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] Aileen Janet Rogozinsky obtained a Mastercard from the Bank of Montreal in 1999.

This credit card was periodically replaced in the period up to 2014. Ms. Rogozinsky continued to use and make payments on that credit card until March 20, 2014. Then she stopped. Her credit card was suspended in May. On June 25, 2014 she owed $27,064.46 and was liable for annual interest of 12.9%.

[ 2 ] On July 7, 2014 the Bank sued for the outstanding balance. Ms. Rogozinsky denied that obligation, argued the Bank was ‘estopped’ from advancing that claim, and, on August 21, 2014, counterclaimed for $6,072,000.00. [ 3 ] On November 7, 2014 the Bank took out an application for

summary judgment under Alberta Rules of Court , Alta Reg 124/2010, Rule 7.3. Ms. Rogozinsky, in response, applied to dismiss the Bank’s action, and sought other ancillary orders intended to advance her counterclaim. [ 4 ] I heard these applications on November 19, 2014. Ms. Rogozinsky was assisted by her husband, Anton Rogozinsky, who is not a party. After hearing arguments, and admitting a document that summarized the Rogozinsky’s argument as an exhibit, I granted

summary judgment in favour of the Bank, and dismissed Ms. Rogozinsky counterclaim. [ 5 ] At that hearing I indicated that the Bank had advanced the necessary evidence to establish the outstanding credit card debt. I ordered

summary judgment in favour of the Bank and dismissed the counterclaim. The judgment meant that interest will now drop from the credit card rate to the Judgment Interest Act rate of 1.10% [ 6 ] These reasons amplify on the oral decision given in Chambers. II. Timeline [ 7 ] The Bank filed a statement of claim on July 7, 2014 that alleged Ms.

Rogozinsky owed $27,064.46, interest at a rate of 12.9% per annum, calculated from June 25, 2014, onward, and solicitor/client costs as per the Mastercard agreement. [ 8 ] When an attempt was made to serve the Bank’s statement of claim later that day, the process server was informed by an unidentified male that Ms. Rogozinsky was not present. When the process server returned two days later he found a notice posted at the home entrance that read: NOTICE CALLERS BY APPOINTMENT ONLY. Cold-callers fine: $50,000 No Junk mail Please.

Private Property This led to an application for substitutional service that was granted by Master Smart on July 25, 2014. [ 9 ] Ms. Rogozinsky filed a statement of defence on August 21, 2014 which denied the alleged debt, and indicated: 1. Ms. Rogozinsky had on August 18, 2014 sought information “... about fractional reserve banking, GAAP matching principle, securitization, and selling of securitized items. ...”; 2. the Bank had no right to sue because it was “offered a cure ... to settle any alleged financial obligation ...”, and the failure of the Bank to respond to these offers to settle meant “...

William Downe was Estoppeled under private terms and conditions with Aileen Rogozinsky by Canada Post registered letters.”; 3. this also “breached Private Estopple” and “evoked [Ms. Rogozinsky’s] contractual agreement under private terms and conditions of estopple.”; 4. the Bank and its counsel infringed on “common-law copyright and trademark agreements”, and were billed for that; 5. there is a distinction between the names “Aileen J. Rogozinsky” and “AILEEN J. ROGOZINSKY”: the latter is a “legal entity”, while the former “... has a PERSON yet is not a PERSON; Aileen J.

Rogozinksy is a private-women.”, and: a) “... AILEEN J. ROGOZINSKY is radically different than Aileen J Rogozinsky unless proven to the contrary via STATUE and exhaustive pursuit of common-law

definitions.” b) “Aileen Rogozinsky asserts PLAINTIFF/Witten LLP has fraudulently created joinder or misrepresentation by addressing envelope to Aileen J. Rogozinsky while style of cause in STATEMENT OF CLAIM, contained inside envelope, is to legal person named as AILEEN J. ROGOZINSKY.” 6. Ms. Rogozinsky:

a) has not authorized the Bank’s counsel to participate in this proceeding, b) “... refuses to entertain any third party and/or solicitor intervention ...” on behalf of the Bank, and

c) denies any contractual relationship exists between Ms. Rogozinsky and the Bank’s law firm. 7. no man or woman has been harmed; 8. “The court does not have jurisdiction in this case over Aileen J. Rogozinsky; she does not consent in/to a lesser capacity with the public court ...”.

[ 10 ] Ms. Rogozinsky therefore seeks: 1. to have the Bank’s lawsuit dismissed “with prejudice”, or struck out per Rule 3.68; 2. “Costs as per private-estopple”; 3. removal of negative credit rating information “post haste”; 4. costs on a solicitor and his own client basis; and 5. that the “... STATEMENT OF CLAIM and related materials expunged from public registry ...” [ 11 ] The back of the statement of defence has a Canada two cent postage stamp affixed to the lower right corner, diagonally signed across and dated, apparently by Ms. Rogozinsky. [ 12 ] The same day Ms.

Rogozinsky filed a Counterclaim which states: 1. she has been harmed “by public exposure.”; 2. the Bank has breached “... private Estopple of which included infringement of common-law trademark/copyright of Aileen Rogozinksky© or AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™.”; 3. “The Plaintiff claims against the DEFENDANT under the terms of irrevocable private, estopple whereunder the DEFENDANT is forever barred from bring any and all claims, legal actions, orders, demands, lawsuits, costs, levies, penalties, damages, interests, liens and expenses whatsoever, against AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™.”; 4. “DEFENDANT put forth any claim without proper, answerable cause of action as private estopple supplants any else previously alleged.” 5. that the Bank is liable for “estopple fee schedule/ terms/conditions” and “breach of estopple / breach of trust”, in the amount of $6,073,000.00:

a) six million for trademark/copyright infringement, b) $73,000.00 billed for “... representative time ...”,

c) costs,

d) a restraining order to prevent the Bank or its agents “... from contacting or pursuing Plaintiff or AILEEN ROGOZINSKY.”, and

e) that the statement of counterclaim and related materials are “expunged from public registry.” [ 13 ] The Bank filed a statement of defence to the counterclaim on September 2, 2014, which denied these allegations. [ 14 ] Ms. Rogozinsky, on September 8, 2014, filed an amended statement of defence and amended statement of counterclaim. While most of the amendments are comparatively minor, Ms. Rogozinsky now also sought that the Bank withdraw “all pursuit of originating claim or related matters in exchange for mutual/counter withdraw of actions.” [ 15 ] On November 7, 2014 the Bank took out an application for

summary judgment. This application was supported by an October 16, 2014 affidavit of the bank’s witness, Daphne Werenka, that attached the original 1999 application for the Mastercard signed by both Rogozinskys, the current terms of its contract, and monthly statements for that card to August 2014. [ 16 ] Ms. Rogozinsky filed an application on November 17, 2014, supported by two affidavits, one from each of the Rogozinskys, both dated November 14, 2014. The application seeks: 1. an order dismissing the Bank action ( Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.37, 3.68), or 2. a number of remedies, including:

a) an order to provide an affidavit of records ( Rules 5.11-5.12, 5.5-5.7, 5.9);

b) an order to determine various terms including “agreement”, “person”, and “valuable consideration” ( Rules 5.2, 7.2);

c) the Court compelling Bill Chrimp admit “... facts of credit card securitization process in entireity” ( Rule 6.37), and that the CEO of the Bank disclose his personal assets “as per " self-executing security agreement " ”;

d) a

summary trial or civil jury ( Rules 7.5, 17(1)); e) “Costs and terms as per existing contract of private-Estoppel / self-executing service agreement in place by Aileen Rogozinsky ...” ( Rule 10.33) and “Costs of solicitor onto BMO”;

f) security for costs ( Rule 4.23); and g) “Consideration of laying of information’s against William Downe, CEO of BANK OF MONTREAL and Gregory D. Reid, Solicitor for BANK OF MONTREAL as parties forced involuntary servitude by forcing joinder through a person (U.H.D.R.).”

[ 17 ] The application explains that the basis for this application is: 1. the Bank and counsel for the Bank has breached a contract with Ms.

Rogozinsky, including “copyright/trademark”, a “self- executing agreement”, and “terms of Estoppel”; 2. the Bank’s chief executive officer is unjustly enriching himself, contrary to legislation: Bills of Exchange Act , RSC 1985, c B-4; “The financial administration Act” (jurisdiction is not indicated); Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act , SC 2000, c 17; and 3. the Bank is bound by “private, irrevocable Estoppel” and has no defence. [ 18 ] The two November 14, 2014 affidavits largely attach correspondence and receipts for that correspondence. I will discuss those below in more detail.

Ms. Rogozinsky’s affidavit elaborates somewhat on her position, explaining that the Bank’s acquiescence meant it was estopped from advancing this lawsuit, and that correspondence from the Bank and its counsel, and the Statement of Claim was a violation of her “Common Law Copyright Notice”. [ 19 ] Ms. Rogozinsky also explains that she: 1. is “... neither an Alberta resident or non-resident; I am domiciliary, in fact I am domicile here by birth.”; 2. does not “accept joinder” between herself, “Aileen-Janet Rogozinksy”, and “AILEEN J.

ROGOZINSKY ALSO KNOWN AS AILEEN JANET ROGOZINSKY”; 3. “According to the "UNIVERAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS" "Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before law"; it is my choice, otherwise it is deemed that I am "held in slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms"; involuntary servitude is illegal.”; and 4. believes the Bank and its counsel have committed offences under Criminal Code , RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 302, 361, 363 and 423. III. The Party’s Submissions A.

The Bank [ 20 ] Counsel for the Bank observed that the existence and substance of the contractual relationship between Ms. Rogozinsky and the Bank that governs use of the Mastercard is well established. One term of the credit card contract was that activating a new credit card meant the customer had agreed to those standard contract terms. [ 21 ] The debt itself was documented. Ms. Rogozinsky is liable for all debt, including interest. The terms of the credit card agreement meant Ms.

Rogozinsky had agreed that, if successful, the Bank’s legal expenses in this dispute should be recovered on a solicitor-client basis. [ 22 ] As for the counterclaim, counsel reviewed aspects of Ms. Rogozinsky’s argument as disclosed in the court materials, and argued there was no basis in law for the claims involved. B. Ms. Rogozinsky [ 23 ] Mr. Rogozinsky spoke for Ms. Rogozinsky under Rule 2.23. He explained that he had been educating himself on the law and had mastered much in a short time. [ 24 ] Mr. Rogozinsky said that the correspondence in Ms.

Rogozinsky’s November 14, 2014 affidavit should explained why the Bank’s action was futile. She had made an offer to the Bank to pay the alleged debt, and had merely asked the Bank prove that debt existed in law. Her requests for evidence were reasonable. She asked for proof of a signature on the contract, along with financial records that meet GAPP accounting standards. [ 25 ] The Bank did not respond. She said that meant, because of “tacit procuration”, that the Bank had agreed to the substance of Ms.

Rogozinsky’s documents and had acknowledged that no credit card debt existed. [ 26 ] The Bank’s attempt to sue Ms. Rogozinsky despite that agreement was, therefore, a breach of “private estoppel”. The Bank’s action should therefore be struck out, under Rule 3.68, which deals with significant deficiencies in pleadings. [ 27 ] Mr. Rogozinsky gave a second reason why the Bank’s action should be dismissed. He had spoken to a Bank of Montreal securities expert who agreed that credit card debts are monetized and then sold on the bond market for multiple of their original value.

No money is ever loaned to pay for credit card purchases. The money that had paid for Ms. Rogozinsky’s credit card purchases was created by Ms. Rogozinsky’s signature. Money was printed when Ms. Rogozinsky signed the agreement. (I simply note at this point that this argument appears to be entirely circular: if the credit card agreement is unenforceable because it is “monetized”, it could never be sold.) [ 28 ] This, Mr. Rogozinsky argued, was fraud. The Bank had never revealed that it provided no funds via the Mastercard. There was, in fact, no contract at all between the Bank and Ms.

Rogozinsky because the Mastercard contract had no value, and no consideration has been provided by the Bank. This fraudulent process enriches bankers, and causes inflation:

That note, in my estimation, that the alleged note was bundled securitized and monetized to the bond market to institutionalizations at amultiple of its original value thus giving credence to the idea that there is fraud in fact in here and so as a result of this basic principleand the complexities of that subject ... [29] At one point counsel for the Bank referred to Mr. Rogozinsky’s submissions as “Freeman arguments”. Mr. Rogozinsky tookstrong exception to this, and indicated it is discriminatory to call someone a Freeman. At another point Mr.

Rogozinsky said he acceptedmy oath of office (though I do not believe I offered it). [30] At the conclusion of the proceeding I permitted Mr. Rogozinsky to enter a

summary of his arguments as an exhibit. IV. The Law of

Summary Disposition [31] Rule 3.68 allows the court to deal with significant deficiencies in pleadings. In O’Connor Associates Environmental Inc. v.MEC OP LLC, 2014 ABCA 140, our Court of Appeal said: [13] any pleading can be struck out under R. 3.68(2)(

b) if it discloses no reasonable claim or defence to a claim. On such anapplication, no evidence is admitted, and the pleaded facts are presumed to be true: R. 3.68(3). [14] The modern test for striking out pleadings was set out in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, 2011 SCC 42 at paras. 19-21,[2011] 3 SCR 45: The power to strike out claims that have no reasonable prospect of success is a valuable housekeeping measure essential to effective andfair litigation. It unclutters the proceedings, weeding out the hopeless claims and ensuring that those that have some chance of success goon to trial.

This promotes two goods – efficiency in the conduct of the litigation and correct results. Striking out claims that have no reasonableprospect of success promotes litigation efficiency, reducing time and cost. The litigants can focus on serious claims, without devotingdays and sometimes weeks of evidence and argument to claims that are in any event hopeless. The same applies to judges and juries,whose attention is focused where it should be – on claims that have a reasonable chance of success . . . Valuable as it is, the motion to strike is a tool that must be used with care. The law is not static and unchanging.

Actions that yesterdaywere deemed hopeless may tomorrow succeed. Before McAlister (Donoghue) v Stevenson, (FOREP), [1932] A.C. 562(U.K. H.L.) introduced a general duty of care to one’s neighbour premised on foreseeability, few would have predicted that, absent acontractual relationship, a bottling company could be held liable for physical injury and emotional trauma resulting from a snail in abottle of ginger beer. Before Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 (U.K.), a tort action for negligentmisstatement would have been regarded as incapable of success.

The history of our law reveals that often new developments in the lawfirst surface on motions to strike or similar preliminary motions, like the one at issue in McAlister (Donoghue v. Stevenson. Therefore,on a motion to strike, it is not determinative that the law has not yet recognized the particular claim. The court must rather ask whether,assuming the facts pleaded are true, there is a reasonable prospect that the claim will succeed. The approach must be generous and err onthe side of permitting a novel but arguable claim to proceed to trial.

This trend towards simplifying proceedings as soon as it is reasonable and fair has now been re-enforced in Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014SCC 7, a

summary judgment case calling for “a culture shift . . . in order to create an environment promoting timely and affordableaccess to the civil justice system. . . . moving the emphasis away from the conventional trial in favour of proportional procedures tailoredto the needs of the particular case.” Striking pleadings that have no reasonable prospect of success is consistent with this new culture. [15] Arcelormittal Tubular at para. 17 interpreted the Imperial Tobacco test as being: . . . unless there is binding authority holding that either there is at law no such cause of action as alleged or if there be one, that it wouldnot apply on the facts of the case at bar, then it cannot be said that the claim in question has no “reasonable prospect” of success.Whether there is any merit to this admittedly novel duty of care can only be determined at trial.

That, however, states the test too strictly. There are many reasons, other than the presence of “binding authority” that could deprive aclaim of any “reasonable prospect” of success. Binding authority would mean that there is essentially no prospect of success at all.Imperial Tobacco states that it is “not determinative” that a cause of action has not previously been recognized, but the opposite does nothold true; just because there is no “binding authority” does not mean that the claim has a reasonable prospect of success.

Indeed, inImperial Tobacco itself the challenged claims were all struck even though they were novel and there was no binding authority on thepoint. [16] The test for striking pleadings is to be found in Imperial Tobacco, which is binding authority in this province. In determiningwhether a novel claim has a “reasonable prospect” of success, many factors must be examined. The clarity of the factual pleadings isimportant. The existence of case law discussing the same or similar causes of action is relevant.

As noted in Imperial Tobacco, thecourts must be careful not to inhibit the development of the common law by applying too strict a test to novel claims. However, thecourts must resist the temptation to send every case to trial, even if some legal analysis is needed to determine if a claim has anyreasonable prospect of success: Kripps v Touche Ross & Co. (1992), (BC CA), 94 DLR (4th) 284 at p. 309, 69 BCLR(2d) 62 (CA). [32] I acknowledge that courts tend to give novel claims some latitude. Leeds v Alberta (Minister of the Environment) (1989),1989 ABCA 208 , 6 WWR 559 (CA); Ernst v EnCana Corporation, 2014 ABQB 672.

After all, the common law is a livingthing; continually growing and branching. [33] Rule 7.3 permits the court to dismiss claims summarily that have no merit. I acknowledge that the law in this area is in a state

of evolution and refinement. The current state of the law was helpfully summarized by the court in WP v. Alberta , 2014 ABCA 404 : [25] We note at the outset that the chambers judge, and the parties, applied the traditional test for granting

summary judgment, being whether the evidence disclosed a triable issue. Following the adoption of Rule 7.3 of the Rules of Court, which permits a party to apply for

summary judgment on (inter alia) the ground that there is no merit to a claim, this Court clearly rejected the threshold of “triable issue” or “a genuine issue for trial” in favour of a merit-based test: New R. 7.3 calls for a more holistic analysis of whether the claim has “merit”, and is not confined to the test of “a genuine issue for trial” found in the previous rules. Since one of the objectives of class proceedings is to provide affordable access to justice, these principles relating to

summary judgment are applicable to the class procedure as well. ( Windsor at para 14). Rule 7.3 of the new Alberta Rules of Court allows a court to grant

summary judgment to a moving party if the non-moving party’s position is without merit if the facts and law make the moving party’s position unassailable and entitle it to the relief it seeks. A party’s position is unassailable if it is so compelling that the likelihood of success is very high. ( Access Mortgage Corporation

(2004) Limited v Arres Capital Inc , 2014 ABCA 280 at para 45 , [2014] A.J. No, 1032 (QL) [ Access Mortgage ], citing Beier at para 61. [26]

Summary judgment is therefore no longer to be denied solely on the basis that the evidence discloses a triable issue. The question is whether there is in fact any issue of “merit” that genuinely requires a trial, or conversely whether the claim or defence is so compelling that the likelihood it will succeed is very high such that it should be determined summarily: Windsor at para 16; Beier at paras 56, 59-68 and 70. [ 34 ] It was plain that Ms. Rogozinsky’s defence and counterclaim disclosed no issues of merit requiring a trial and had no reasonable prospect of success.

On this basis I was able to deal with them summarily, in open court. V. Analysis [ 35 ] I will say from the outset that Ms. Rogozinsky’s documents and arguments had many of the hallmarks of pseudo-law carefully reviewed and classified by ACJ Rooke in Meads v Meads , 2012 ABQB 571 (especially at paras 203-241). I note that some of the language like ‘assumpsit’ comes from a medieval writ that was swept away by the Judicature Acts of 1875. Other terms like ‘tacit procuration’ sound legal but have no meaning at all. [ 36 ] I should say that the manner of expression adopted by Ms.

Rogozinsky does not necessarily affect the potential validity of her legal position. However court documents that adopt this form tend to put litigants in a separate category for procedural and security purposes, Meads , ANB v Alberta (Minister of Human Services) , 2013 ABQB 97 , 557 AR 364; Perreal v Knibb , 2014 ABQB 15 . [ 37 ] From a practical perspective, it immediately puts the litigant at a disadvantage; probably on par with asking to argue your case in Latin. [ 38 ] I do not know whether Ms. Rogozinsky paid for the ideas she attempts to rely upon in court.

But, when things seem to be too good to be true, they usually are. The long and the short of it is that Ms. Rogozinsky took the benefit of some $30,000.00 worth of credit. She acknowledged this by making payments and operating within the credit card terms as late as March of this year. To think that she wouldn’t have to pay this money back, simply by following a few steps and using a few special words, falls straight into the category of things that are too good to be true - at least from the debtor’s perspective. A. The Bank’s

Summary Judgment Application [ 39 ] I indicated in my oral reasons that the Bank had proven the alleged debt via the affidavit evidence advanced at the November 19, 2014 hearing. The terms of the contract were clear. The Bank provided a copy of the original Mastercard contract with the signatures of both the Rogozinskys. The amount due was established through the credit card receipt records. [ 40 ] Ms. Rogozinsky advanced four arguments against that result. I reject each. 1. Proof of the Contract and Debt [ 41 ] Ms.

Rogozinsky argued that the document evidence (copies) provided by the Bank was inadequate to prove both the existence of the contract and the debt. In this context copies are usually adequate, especially when they are supported with other evidence given under oath, unless there is a compelling reason to require the originals; such as an issue about whether documents have been altered or changed: The Law of Evidence in Canada , Sopinka et al, 3 rd ed. Lexis Nexis, para 18.24 (and the cased cites there). It is also specifically addressed in the Civil Code of Quebec , at art. 2841 and 2860 .

Banque Royale du Canada c. Minieozzi , 2013 OCCQ 6566, 2013 Carswell Que. 6850 at para 21 per Breault J. C.Q., affd. 2013 QCCA 1722 , 2013 Carswell Que. 9963 [ 42 ] There is no obligation on a creditor to prove a debt in the manner demanded by a debtor. As Justice Powers picturesquely observed in Royal Bank of Canada v Skrapec , 2011 BCSC 1827 at para 51 , (appeal quashed as without merit 2012 BCCA 10 ): The fact that a letter is sent to the bank, registered or otherwise, demanding that the bank prove its claim in a specific way, does not oblige them to do that.

He might just as well have asked the bank officers to dress in some specific costume and march down the street, if in fact the debts were owed. It does not mean they are required to do it. [ 43 ] In this case the Bank has provided an adequate and uncontested evidentiary basis for its claim. In a

summary judgment

application, once the Applicant has satisfied its evidentiary burden, the burden then passes to the Respondent to furnish cogent evidence to displace that evidence, or to show that there is plainly arguable merit to their position; neither of which happened here. 2. Monetizing and Securitizing the Credit Card Debt [ 44 ] Ms. Rogozinsky argued she needed the original version of the contract (referred to as a “promissory note”) to confirm that it had not been monetized and securitized .

However, that too is irrelevant: [ 45 ] I am informed by our in-house legal counsel, that this exact argument has emerged in litigation in the Republic of Ireland, where mortgage holders have claimed they should not have to repay a loan if it has been securitized: Kearney v KBC Bank Ireland Plc & Anor , [2014] IEHC 260 at paras 24-26; McCarthy & Ors v Bank of Scotland Plc & Anor , [2014] IEHC 340 at para 18. [ 46 ] In Freeman & Anor v Bank of Scotland (Ireland) Ltd & Ors , [2013] IEHC 371 Justice Birmingham observed at para 20 that what matters is the nature of the contract: … Quite simply the plaintiff drew down funds and thereby took on the responsibility to repay.

What the source of these funds was matters not a whit. … [ 47 ] Ireland has faced some economic challenges these last six years and is fertile ground for this type of invention by debtors. Suffice to say, this argument is equally invalid both in Canada and the Republic of Ireland. 3. “No Value Provided” Money for Nothing Scheme [ 48 ] I also rejected the argument that the Mastercard contract is nonexistent, or a fraud, because it in unsupported by consideration. As I understand it, the claim is that somehow the Bank never was the source of credit card funds. Instead money was created by the act of Ms.

Rogozinsky engaging in a purchase. [ 49 ] This idea that banks ‘create’ money was considered but rejected in Dempsey v Enviston Credit Union , [2006] BCSC 750. [ 50 ] This peculiar concept has emerged in other jurisdictions (again I am obliged to in-house counsel for this information). Thomas Bloy et al , in “Pseudo-law and Debt Enforcement”,

(2013) NZ Law J 47-50, 54, reviews this pseudolegal ‘money for nothing’ scheme, which he calls “no value provided”, and its antecedents.

This concept has been deployed in a number of New Zealand and Australian proceedings: Freeman v ASB Bank Ltd (August 22, 2012), Manukau CIV-2012-092-2176 NZ Dist Ct; Mortgage Holding Trust Company Limited v Mainwaring , [2010] NZHC 1435, affirmed [2010] NZCA 599; Permanent Custodians Ltd v Virgin Investments Pty Ltd & Anor , [2009] VSC 429. [ 51 ] Bloy explains how “no value provided” works (at p 54): The “no value provided” strategy effectively argues that only physical currency is money.

The argument says that when a bank advances funds under a loan it does not actually pay any money: it merely makes book entries or electronically transmits notional amounts to another bank. The funds, therefore, are not lent out of the bank’s existing reserves but are created at the time the loan is entered into. The legal effect of this, as contended by pseudolaw litigants, is either that the bank has failed in its duty to provide the loan in “dollars”, or that the loan is unsupported by consideration because the bank has not sustained a loss. The practical result is the same: the debtor does not have to repay .

A practitioner may anticipate that this argument is in the wings if he or she receives a request, either by letter or court application, for three sets of documents from the bank, being: (1) validation of the debt (the “actual accounting”); (2) verification of the bank's claim (a sworn affidavit or even just a signed invoice); and (3) a copy of the original loan contract binding both parties. Some of these documents may be requested in “wet ink”. The debtor then informs the bank that he or she will be happy to pay the debt on receipt of those documents .

What is intended, but not made explicit at this stage, is that the debtor will later argue no physical currency was advanced and that there is, therefore, no obligation to repay. The debtor may also argue that because the loan shows his or her name in all-capital letters, it does not bind the debtor but only the “person”. The reasoning is explained by guru Mary Elizabeth Croft, who is credited as the inspiration for the pseudolaw website www.getoutofdebtfree.org. In her “spiritual economics” text How I clobbered every bureaucratic cash-confiscatory agency known to man , she states (in

Part I): The banks can’t validate the debt because they never sustained a loss; they can't verify any claim against me because l am not the NAME they are billing. They can’t produce a copy of the contract because one doesn’t exist. What exists is an unenforceable unilateral contract. [Italics in original, underlining added.] This is obviously the same argument advanced by Ms.

Rogozinsky. [ 52 ] Bloy continues to observe that several apparently legal but spurious authorities have been cited in support of this proposition: The troubling aspect of the “no value provided” strategy is that proponents believe they have legal authority to support it, which they willingly cite to counterparties and the court.

The two most commonly cited “authorities” are First National Bank of Montgomery v Daly (Justice Court, Credit River Township, Scott County, Minnesota, 9 December 1968) and the affidavit of Walker F Todd sworn in Bank One, NA v Harshabardhan (County Court, Oakland, Michigan, 1 September 2004). Neither the Daly case nor the Walker F Todd affidavit has any authoritative or persuasive value. The Daly decision was a maverick judgment by a lay justice of the peace, and was based on a jury finding that the bank loan had no consideration. In Permanent Custodians

Ltd v Virgin Investments Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 429, Forrest J described the Daly case as being “worthless as authority for any proposition in any court in this country” (ie Australia). The Walker F Todd affidavit is an affidavit by an economist who fundamentally misunderstood the principles governing the

interpretation of contracts. The affidavit ultimately had no effect on the proceeding in which it was sworn, where judgment was entered in favour of the bank. … [Italics in original.] The same Walker F. Todd affidavit appears in Royal Bank of Canada v Place , 2010 ABQB 733 , 504 AR 230 . [ 53 ] The “no value provided” scheme is also reviewed and rejected in three recent Irish judgments: Freeman & Anor v Bank of Scotland (Ireland) Ltd & Ors , (above) at paras 29-31; Kearney v KBC Bank Ireland Plc & Anor , (above) at paras 18-20; McCarthy & Ors v Bank of Scotland Plc & Anor , (above) at paras 7-18.

The last case provides a useful review of the ill-conceived basis for this idea: 7. So far as the illegally created currency argument is concerned, the plaintiffs drew my attention to an

article contained in Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2014, Q.1, entitled “Money Creation in the Modern Economy” by members of the Bank’s Monetary Analysis Directorate. It seems to me that the plaintiffs have completely misunderstood the thrust of that article. Of course, no one could deny that in a modern banking system banks can - and do - increase the money supply by the granting of loans and credits. In that particular sense - and I emphasise these words - a macro-economist might say that the banking system “creates” money by thus increasing the money supply.

This, however, is scarcely a new insight and simply reflects views which all the great economists - ranging from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman - have expressed from time to time. 8. All of this, however, is entirely irrelevant as a matter of law. At one point Mr. McCarthy seemed to argue that a loan could only be valid if something tangible (such as notes or coin) had been exchanged. At other times Mr. McCarthy suggested that he did not receive a loan of money at all, but rather that as the money advanced had been “created” by the bank, the underlying contract of loan was somehow invalid or inoperative.

The plaintiffs also allege that by reason of this the Bank is guilty of fraud or, as they put it, fraud in the factum. 9. It is, I think, a measure of the desperate straits in which some litigants have found themselves as a result of the collapse in the property market from 2008 onwards that arguments of this kind have been seriously advanced, not only in this case but in other recent cases of the same kind, both here and in other jurisdictions, most notably Canada. A version of this fanciful theory had been advanced in Dempsey v.

Envision Credit Union [2006] BCSC 750 where it was described in the following terms by Garson J.: “In his submissions on the motion, in the actions concerning him, Mr. Dempsey described the ‘money for nothing’ theory. He stated that the banks do not have money. Rather, they create money out of ‘thin air’…He says that the plaintiffs create money by signing promissory notes, and as soon as the promissory note is signed, the banks deposit money in their own statement of account. The bank does not place hard currency in the hands of the debtors. Mr.

Dempsey then charge interest on nothing and that is a criminal rate of interest because interest is charged on nothing. Mr. Dempsey states: “it is not like the old days when people used to go to the bank and, in the back room, count out dollars, there is no law that allows the banks to create dollars out of thin air.” 10.

It is scarcely a surprise that in Dempsey this argument was described by the British Columbia courts as “fanciful” and “completely devoid of merit.” Yet this has not deterred other litigants in this jurisdiction advancing similar arguments which are equally lacking in merit and which, indeed, lack any relationship to contractual or other legal realities. [ 54 ] Ms. Rogizinsky’s ‘money for nothing’ argument is legally and factually incorrect. It has been tried elsewhere without success.

It is an invention by someone who is in dire straits and is plainly without merit. 4. “Private Estoppel” [ 55 ] The last reason why Ms. Rogozinsky argues the Bank should not be able to collect the alleged debt is that it has agreed, or been “estopped”, from doing so. The basis of this argument is a set of four documents which I have reproduced (generally retaining the original format) in Appendixes “A” through “D”. Mr. Rogozinsky called this an “administrative procedure”.

It appears these four documents were sent in response to correspondence by the Bank which demanded payment of the outstanding credit card debts. [ 56 ] In the first conditional acceptance document [Appendix “A”], dated April 21, 2014, the Rogozinskys write to the CEO of the Bank and indicate they are “... happy to settle any financial obligation I might lawfully owe ...”, provided the Bank provides: 1. Validation of the debt (the actual accounting-both sides of ledger); 2.

Verification of your claim against me (via a sworn affidavit or a hand signed invoice in accordance with The Bills of Exchange Act R.S.C.1985); 3. A copy of the contract signed by both parties and therefore binding both parties. 4. Please also provide me with a true and certified copy (NOT photocopy) of the Original Note (Credit Agreement), under penalty of perjury and with unlimited liability and confirm that this Note, has never been sold.

Please also confirm the name of the individual who is the duly authorized representative from your company, who has carried out due diligence under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and what actions s/he has taken in relation to this account. [Emphasis in original.] These requests match the stereotypic “no value provided” correspondence identified by Bloy. [ 57 ] The Rogozinskys continue to explain that the Bank has ten days to comply, and failure to do so: ... will constitute your agreement to the following terms:

1. That the debt did not exist in the first place; OR 2. It has already been paid in full; AND 3. That any damages suffer, you will be held culpable; 4. That any negative remarks made to a credit reference agency will be removed; 5. You will no longer pursue this matter any further. 6. You agree to pay all fee schedules. [Emphasis in original.] [ 58 ] The second notice [Appendix “B”] is dated May 10, 2014, and essentially repeats the initial request, noting the Bank had not met the first ten day deadline, and provides another ten day opportunity for the Bank to reply.

The third notice [Appendix “C”], dated May 26, 2014, is essentially the same as the May 10 document except that it warns: ... if you sell the alleged liability pass it back to your client and/or appoint an agent to act on its/your behalf on this matter you will have broken our agreement and you agree to pay the following fee

schedule $ [3 times what they claim] for dishonoring our agreement, $1,000.00 per hour or part of it or Authorized Representatives time nunc pro tunc, $1,000.00 per recorded delivery or any other response nunc pro tunc and $1,000,000.00 ONE MILLION CANADIAN DOLLARS per unauthorized use of © or ™ nunc pro tunc any further contact is not now necessary, if however you deem a need to contact me by any method the fee is $100 per item payable in advance, place the cheque in the envelope; if no payment is made in advance the fee will rise to $1000.00 per item and you will also be held culpable for any cost incurred while recovering the debt you owe. [ 59 ] Ms.

Rogozinsky claimed that the Bank did not respond to any of these three documents, and that does not appear to be in dispute. [ 60 ] On July 10, 2014 the Rogozinskys sent the Bank CEO a document titled “Notice of Irrevocable Estoppel by Acquiescence.” [Appendix “D”].

It claims that since the bank did not adequately prove its debt as required by the April 21, May 10, and May 26 notices that meant the Bank had agreed by “tacit procuration” that either the debt did not exist or had been paid. [ 61 ] In addition the Bank was prohibited from pursuing the credit card debts in the future: Notice that failure to provide Proof of Claim by BANK OF MONTREAL, has created a permanent and irrevocable estoppel by acquiescence, forevermore barring BANK OF MONTREAL from bringing any and all claims, legal actions, orders, demands, lawsuits, costs, levies, penalties, damages, interests, liens and expenses whatsoever, against AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™, or ANTON ROGOZINSKY™. [ 62 ] At the November 19 hearing Mr.

Rogozinsky characterized this correspondence as an attempt to compromise and settle the debt. As I stressed at that time to Mr. Rogozinsky there is no requirement for a creditor to compromise in the collection of a debt. They are entitled to it all, with interest. To be blunt, this correspondence was not an attempt at compromise, but instead a unilateral demand which in law has zero weight. [ 63 ] The Rogozinskys’ attempts to evade their debt with these documents are an example of a pseudolegal argument category identified in Meads v Meads at paras 447-528 as ‘foisted unilateral agreements’.

Foisted unilateral agreements have no effect in law: Papadopoulos v Borg , 2009 ABCA 201 at para 4 ; Henry v El , 2010 ABCA 312 at para 3 , leave refused [2011] SCCA No 138. [ 64 ] This group of pseudolegal strategies ignore a simple but critical legal principle: a contract cannot emerge out of silence because silence does not confirm a mutual understanding or “ consensus ad idem ” between the parties to that agreement: Meads v Meads , paras 458-469 . Rather, a binding agreement only occurs if acceptance is communicated : e.g. Felthouse v Bindley (1862), 11 CB (NS) 869 , 142 ER 1037 (UK Ex Ch) .

This is a fundamental principle of contract law: The Law of Contract , Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, 15 th ed. Oxford, p. 62; The Law of Contracts , 6 th ed. Waddams, Canada Law Book; paras 92 and following. [ 65 ] As Rooke, ACJ observed, using a pastoral metaphor, (at para. 463) this is simply a logical necessity: ... An objective person knows that he or she cannot usually be held bound in contract by simple receipt of an offer. Many OPCA foisted unilateral agreements feature language that demands its recipient respond or rebut an obligation by a certain deadline.

If not, then the agreement proclaims the recipient is bound by its terms. A moment’s consideration shows it is absurd that the law would respect that requirement. What if a document was received, but not read within the deadline? What if the document was received by an illiterate person, or one who did not understand the document’s meaning? Could they have a ‘meeting of the minds’? Of course not, no more than handing a document to a sheep and saying “By not repudiating this agreement, I may eat you.” establishes a mutual and common intent. [ 66 ] The Bank had no obligation to respond to these documents.

There are no legal consequences that flow from that inaction. Silence is neither acceptance, nor agreement. Nor is it an admission of any kind unless it is in response to a Formal Notice to Admit Facts, made in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Bank is not estopped from seeking to enforce and collect any outstanding debt. [ 67 ] Mr. Rogozinsky said that the Bank’s silence was agreement by “tacit procuration”. This phrase appears many times in the documents Ms. Rogozinsky filed with the Court. There is no such legal concept in Canadian law - it is an imaginary, made-up term. In

fact, the only occasions where that phrase ever appears in any reported Canadian judgment is in a document or argument that wasrejected as an OPCA foisted unilateral agreement scheme: Whitfield v Chrysler Credit Canada Ltd., at paras 5, 10-11; Williams vJohnston, (ON SC), [2008] OJ No 4853, 2008 Carswell (Ont) 7115 at para 3, (Ont SC),affirmed 2009 ONCA 335, 176 ACWS (3d) 609, leave refused [2009] SCCA No 266; Herbison v Canada (Attorney General), 2013BCSC 2020 at para 39, 2013 Carswell BC 3390, affirmed 2014 BCCA 461; R v Gerlitz, 2014 ABQB 247 at para 12. [68] Canadian courts have repeatedly concluded attempts to deny or avoid a debt by this vexatious litigation strategy are worthless.For example: Meads v Meads; Callaghan v McCaw; C.C. v J.M., 2010 SKQB 79, 351 Sask.

R. 55; Canadian Imperial Bank ofCommerce v Piedrahita; Gravlin et al. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839, 2005 Carswell BC 1443,140ACWS (3d) 447; Myers v Blackman, 2014 ONSC 5226; Drosdovech v Ashfield, 2010 FC 858, [2011] 1 CTC 12 (tax debt); Royal Bankof Canada v Place; Royal Bank of Canada v Skrapec; Whitfield v Chrysler Credit Canada Ltd. Unfortunately, the list seems to begrowing. [69] Canadian courts frequently encounter this general pattern of correspondence in attempts to evade debt collection.

This schemeis referred to in OPCA circles as the “Three Letters” or “Five Letters” procedure.

As is apparent from a review of the above cases and inother proceedings before this court, the correspondence used in the Three/Five Letters process follows a stereotypic pattern: The Conditional Acceptance: the target receives a document that says the OPCA litigant conditionally admits something, but the targethas to jump through some hoops to prove the admission. (It is not unusual that these hoops are onerous or impossible.) There is adeadline to do so and if that deadline is not met then the target is deemed to have accepted something, usually that there never was adebt.

The Dishonour Notice: once the deadline for the Conditional Acceptance is past the target is sent a notice warning that since the targetdid not respond to the Conditional Acceptance that means the target has accepted the intended result of the first document, such as thetarget has admitted there is no debt. This too is a foisted unilateral agreement because it also offers the target a chance to respond to thisand the Conditional Acceptance within a deadline. Failure to respond, of course, allegedly means the target has admitted the intendedresult.

The Second Dishonour Notice: this is basically a repeat of the first, again providing a new window for response. The Estoppel Notice: the Estoppel Notice document alleges that the since the target has not responded (or responded inadequately) to theprior three documents that means the target is now legally estopped from pursuing something, such as collection of a debt. The Judgment: the final document in the scheme is a ‘judgment’ which allegedly concludes the dispute. This document may take severalforms. A common variant is an “affidavit” which allegedly provides conclusive proof of something.

Another common kind of ‘judgment’is a notarized document that allegedly has the same (or superior) effect to a court document. [70] There are many variations on this basic scheme. Documents that serve the same purpose may have different names. In RoyalBank of Canada v Skrapec the first document in the process was called a “Conditional Acceptance upon Debt Verification” (para 39).The corresponding document in Royal Bank of Canada v Place was a “Demand for Disclosure” (at para 15), while in Whitfield vChrysler Credit Canada Ltd. this was called a “Notice for Cause”.

Myers v Blackman, at para 6 reproduces a ‘conditional acceptance’document titled “COUNTER OFFER” that targeted a law firm. The OPCA litigant in Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Lorin Rubbertv Boxrud, 2014 SKQB 221 started the Three/Five Letters procedure with an “Affidavit of Commercial Claim”: para 30. While thesenames vary the documents’ essential contents and function remain the same. [71] The Three Letters variation usually omits the ‘second dishonour notice’ and ‘the judgment’.

In this instance the Three/FiveLetters scheme used by the Rogozinskys omits ‘the judgment’ document, but otherwise conforms to the usual Five Letters pattern. [72] Bloy in his paper identified one particular OPCA material commercial source that markets this scheme: the website “Get OutOf Debt Free” (http://www.getoutofdebtfree.org/), which is operated by guru Mark “Ceylon” Laining. The template documents offeredby this UK-based OPCA scam match those used by the Rogozinskys.

It seems likely that this website and its guru are the source for Mr.Rogozinsky’s legal information. [73] Justice Harrington in Drosdovech v Ashfield, at para 15, neatly summed up: The Drosdovechs can speak all they like about administrative processes, their “Notice of Default and Opportunity to Cure”, settlement bysilence or inertia, collateral estoppels, failure to provide prima face evidence and “Petition for Agreement and Harmony within theAdmiralty...”, all they want. In fact and in law, they have no cause of action. These proceedings are frivolous, vexatious and an abuse ofprocess. 5.

Conclusion [74] I have rejected the various grounds Mr. Rogozinsky advanced in his argument that Ms. Rogozinsky is not liable for her creditcard debt. Since the Bank has proven the debt by affidavit evidence, I granted judgment in favour of the Bank. B. Ms. Rogozinsky’s Counterclaim [75] At the November 19, 2014 hearing I also concluded Ms. Rogozinsky’s Counterclaim should be struck out. Her claim has twoprimary sources. 1. Notice of Default Fee

Schedule

[ 76 ] First, she claimed various amounts on the basis of her “Fee Schedule”, which is part of the July 10, 2014 “Notice of Irrevocable Estoppel by Acquiescence” [Appendix “D”]. This document allegedly creates by “tacit procuration” a payment regime for certain activities by the Bank or its representatives: 1. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per invalid claim in writing, nunc pro tunc, 2. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per letter and/or notice sent by recorded mail, nunc pro tunc, 3. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per hour or portion thereof, of the Authorized Representative, 4.

Representative’s time, nunc pro tunc, 5. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per attempt to contact by telephone and/or mobile phone 6. $1,000,000 (ONE MILLION CANADIAN DOLLARS) per Authorized © or ™ infringement. [ 77 ] All these amounts must then be paid within 21 days of the Bank being billed. Ms. Rogozinsky’s November 14, 2014 affidavit attaches two such ‘bills’, dated May 26, 2014 and August 7, 2014. At trial Ms.

Rogozinsky counterclaimed for $73,000.00 on this basis. [ 78 ] Fee schedules are a common OPCA foisted unilateral agreement motif ( Meads v Meads , at paras 505-523 ) and are nothing more than “tools of [attempted] intimidation”: Meads v Meads , at para 523 , see also Gidda v Hirsch , 2014 BCSC 1286 at para 84 . They are intended to deter persons from enforcing their proper rights and obligations. [ 79 ] I reject this claim on the same basis that I dismissed Ms. Rogozinsky’s “Private Estoppel” argument. Ms. Rogozinsky’s claims based on her “Fee Schedule” are illegal and should be struck out.

These claims are frivolous, and attempted to advance a counterclaim on this basis is vexatious: Meads v Meads . 2. Common Law Copyright Notice [ 80 ] Ms. Rogozinsky’s November 14, 2014 affidavit included a document entitled “Common law Copyright Notice”, which I have reproduced and attached as Appendix “E”. This document was sent to the Bank. In brief, this is another foisted unilateral agreement that claims if someone uses Ms. Rogozinsky’s name without her permission then she can bill them $1 million. This is the alleged basis for $6 million of Ms.

Rogozinsky’s counterclaim. [ 81 ] One of the alleged occasions where the Bank breached Ms. Rogozinsky’s “Common law Copyright” in her name was that her name was used, without authorization, on the Bank’s statement of claim. [ 82 ] However, the “Common law Copyright Notice” does not merely stop with Ms.

Rogozinsky’s name, but also extends to her biological and physical properties (para 5) and “... absolute control and mastery over the peaceful possession of [his or her] body, mind and mental facilities ...”, which, the bank is apparently interfering with by asking that the debt be repaid. [ 83 ] Other courts have been confronted with the same bizarre, inexplicable claims, for example Gravlin et al. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al , at para 9 ; Dempsey v Envision Credit Union , 2006 BCSC 1324 2006 Carswell BC 2142, 60 BCLR (4th) 309; Hajdu v Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) , 2012 ONSC 1835 at paras 23-25 ; Squamish Indian Band v Capilano Mobile Park , 2011 BCSC 470 at para 62 , affirmed 2012 BCCA 126 , 318 BCAC 239.

In each case the court concluded these nonsensical documents and the associated claims were entirely without merit. [ 84 ] Dennis Larry Meads, the OPCA litigant who was the subject of Associate Chief Justice Rooke’s comprehensive analysis in Meads v Meads , is yet another person who claimed this kind of intellectual property interest. He too also employed a copyright and trade-mark notice that was reproduced in that decision. It and Ms.

Rogozinsky’s document share common passages, suggesting that these two items are related and descend from a common ancestor. [ 85 ] Meads provides a thorough rebuttal to this entire concept: there is no such thing as a “common law” copyright or trade-mark as both property interests are the result of legislation (paras 501, 503), copyright cannot subsist in a personal name (para 502). At para 504 we find: The entire ‘my name is copyright/trade-mark protected’ scheme has an overwhelmingly juvenile character. People necessarily use names in everyday interaction, commerce, and most certainly in court.

Does it make any sense that any person who were to correspond with Mr. Meads would be liable to him for $100 million dollars simply because they put his name in the address? Could people operate in this regime? Must we all address one another by arbitrary nicknames or some kind of functional description? The answer to these questions is an overwhelming “no.” [ 86 ] The alleged misuse of Ms.

Rogozinsky’s name in the Statement of Claim and other court and litigation documents also offends the old and established principle of the privilege that operates in court proceedings ( Munster v Lamb (1883), 11 QBD 588, 52 LJQB 726 (UK CA) , including filed documents ( Hall v Baxter (1922), 22 OWN 207 at 209 (Ont HC) ). [ 87 ] Ms. Rogozinsky’s alleged breach of copyright and trade-mark damages are frivolous. Her attempts to enforce them are without merit and had no prospect of success. 3.

Costs [ 88 ] The intended target of these strategies should typically be indemnified for their costs to respond: Meads v Meads , at paras 525, 596 ; Williams v Johnston , at para 15 ; MBNA Canada Bank v Luciani , 2011 ONSC 6347 at para 17 . In this case, the Bank sought,

and was allowed, solicitor-client costs as had been agreed to in the Mastercard agreement. 4. Other OPCA-Related Arguments [ 89 ] At various points Ms. Rogozinsky used a number of different variations on her name, for example “©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Representative for AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™”. Ms. Rogozinsky’s statement of defence includes more references to her having a kind of duplicate, doppelganger status. She “... has a PERSON yet is not a PERSON; Aileen J. Rogozinksy is a private-women.”, and: ... AILEEN J. ROGOZINSKY is radically different than Aileen J Rogozinsky unless proven to the contrary via STATUE and exhaustive pursuit of common-law

definitions. [ 90 ] This double/split person motif, is exhaustively reviewed in Meads v Meads , at paras 417-446 . As Justice Gauthier observed in Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) v Stanchfield , 2009 FC 99 at para 17 , 340 FTR 150: ... The whole notion of there being a second capacity distinct from the one of a natural person or human being is a pure fiction, one which is not sanctioned by law. One can describe nothing in any terms one wishes; it still remains nothing . [Emphasis added.] [ 91 ] Last, I observe that Mr. Rogozinsky appears to be badly misinformed on the nature of the courts.

He was of the view that the Court was a corporation and “... is found on the public stock exchange via Dun and Bradstreet.” In 1158997 Alberta Inc v Maple Trust Company , 2013 ABQB 483 , 568 AR 286 a vexatious OPCA litigant, Derek Johnson, argued “... that the Court of Queen’s Bench is a registered corporation that profits from the sale of debt.” (para 81). VI. Conclusion [ 92 ] I ordered

summary judgment in favour of the Bank, and that Ms. Rogozinsky pay its costs on a solicitor-client basis. Ms. Rogozinsky’s counterclaim was struck out. [ 93 ] My last observation is to simply stress to Mr. and Ms. Rogozinsky that their use of pseudolegal concepts has not and will not provide them any benefit. OPCA strategies are instead a potential basis for unfavourable cost orders, such as indemnity costs in favour of the bank, vexatious litigation and litigant declarations, and findings of criminal or contemptuous misconduct: Meads v Meads , Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114 .

It would not be difficult to imagine legal costs in a case such as this exceeding the face value of the original debt plus interest. [ 94 ] All of the foregoing is little more than an application of the principles set forth in Meads v Meads . The particular approach taken by Ms. Rogozinsky appears to be relatively new to Canada. My hope, and the purpose of this exercise, (which may not be a model of judicial economy) is that a fuller treatment might head some others off at the pass. Heard on the 19 th day of November, 2014. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 16 th day of December, 2014. W.S.

Schlosser M.C.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Raymond Steen Witten LLP for the Plaintiff and Defendant by Counterclaim

Anton Rogozinsky and Aileen J. Rogozinsky for the Defendant and Plaintiff by Counterclaim Appendix “A” – Conditional Acceptance NON-NEGOTIABLE ©Anton of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Representative for ANTON ROGOZINSKY™ and all derivatives thereof ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Representative for AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™ and all derivatives thereof c/o 31 Claireview Road Edmonton, AB. TSA3X2 Attn: William Downe or current CEO of BMO MasterCard 1 First Canadian Place 100 King Street West Toronto, ON MSX lAl (Disregard registered letter RW777965354CA-should it arrive) Monday, April 21, 2014 1J.

Re: Account Number(S): 5191 2300 5055 2448 and 51912301 6833 5850 Dear William Downe, I would be happy to settle any financial obligation I might lawfully owe, as soon as I have received the following documentation from you: 1. Validation of the debt (the actual accounting-both sides of ledger); 2. Verification of your claim against me (via a sworn affidavit or a hand signed invoice in accordance with The Bills of Exchange Act R.S.C.1985 ); 3. A copy of the contract signed by both parties and therefore binding both parties. 4. Please also provide me with a true and certified copy (NOT photocopy) of the

Original Note (Credit Agreement), under penalty of perjury and with unlimited liability and confirm that this Note, has never been sold. Please also confirm the name of the individual who is the duly authorized representative from your company, who has carried out due diligence under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and what actions s/he has taken in relation to this account.

I hereby give you ten (10) days to reply to this notice from the above date with a notice sent using recorded post and signed under full commercial liability and penalties of perjury, assuring and promising me that all of the replies and details given to the above requests are true and without deception, fraud or mischief. Your said failure to provide the aforementioned documentation within ten {10) days, from the above date, to validate the debt, will constitute your agreement to the following terms: 1. That the debt did not exist in the first place; OR 2. It has already been paid in full; AND 3.

That any damages suffer, you will be held culpable; 4. That any negative remarks made to a credit reference agency will be removed; 5. You will no longer pursue this matter any further. 6. You agree to pay all fee schedules. Please Note: I wish to deal with this matter in writing and I do not give your organization permission to contact me by telephone. Should you do so, I must warn you that the calls could constitute ‘harassment’ and I may take action under The Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act.

Yours sincerely, By: By: Sovereign ©Anton of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Agent and Representative for ANTON ROGOZINSKY™ [signature: Anton of the family: Rogozinsky] By: Sovereign ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Agent and Representative for AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™ [signature: Aileen of the family: Rogozinsky]

No assured value, No liability. Errors & Omissions Excepted. All Rights Reserved. WITHOUT RECOURSE - NON-ASSUMPSIT Calls maybe recorded Appendix “B” – Second Notice NON-NEGOTIABLE ©Anton of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Representative for ANTON ROGOZINSKY™ and all derivatives thereof ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Representative for AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™ and all derivatives thereof c/o 31 Claireview Road Edmonton, AB.

TSA3X2 Attn: William Downe or current CEO of BMO MasterCard 1 First Canadian Place 100 King Street West Toronto, ON MSX lAl May 10, 2014 Re: Account Number(S): 5191 2300 5055 2448 and 5191 2301 6833 5850 Dear William Downe or current CEO, I wrote to you on requesting the following documentation, so that I may settle any financial obligation I might lawfully owe: 1. Validation of the debt (the actual accounting--both sides of ledger); 2. Verification of your claim against me (a sworn affidavit or a hand signed invoice in accordance with The Bills of Exchange Act R.S.C.1985 ); 3.

A copy of the contract signed by both parties and therefore binding both parties. 4. Please also provide me with a true and certified copy (NOT photocopy) of the Original Note (Credit Agreement), under penalty of perjury and with unlimited liability and confirm that this Note, has never been sold. Please also confirm the

name of the individual who is the duly authorized representative from your company, who has carried out due diligence under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and what actions s/he has taken in relation to this account.

As you have failed to provide the aforementioned documentation to validate your claim, I hereby give you ten (10) days to reply to this notice from the above date with a notice sent using recorded post and signed under full commercial liability and penalties of perjury, assuring and promising me that all of the replies and details given to the above requests are true and without deception, fraud or mischief. Your said failure to provide the aforementioned documentation within ten (10) days, from the above date, to validate the debt, will constitute your agreement to the following terms: 1.

That the debt did not exist in the first place; OR 2. It has already been paid in full; AND 3. That any damages suffer, you will be held culpable; 4. That any negative remarks made to a credit reference agency will be removed; 5. You will no longer pursue this matter any further. 6. You agree to pay all fee schedules.

Yours sincerely, By: By: Sovereign ©Anton of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Agent and Representative for ANTON ROGOZINSKY™ [signature: Anton-David: Rogozinsky] By: Sovereign ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Agent and Representative for AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™ [signature: Aileen-Janet: Rogozinsky] No assured value, No liability. Errors & Omissions Excepted. All Rights Reserved. WITHOUT RECOURSE - NON-ASSUMPSIT Calls maybe recorded

Appendix “C” – Third Notice NON-NEGOTIABLE ©Anton of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Representative for ANTON ROGOZINSKY™ and all derivatives thereof ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Representative for AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™ and all derivatives thereof c/o 31 Claireview Road Edmonton, AB.

TSA3X2 Attn: William Downe or current CEO of BMO MasterCard 1 First Canadian Place 100 King Street West Toronto, ON MSX lAl Monday, May 26, 2014 Re: Account Number(S): 51912300 5055 2448 and 51912301 6833 5850 Dear William Downe or current CEO I wrote to you on requesting the following documentation, so that I may settle any financial obligation I might lawfully owe: 1. Validation of the debt (the actual accounting---both sides of ledger); 2. Verification of your claim against me (a sworn affidavit or a hand signed invoice in accordance with The Bills of Exchange Act R.S.C.1985 ); 3.

A copy of the contract signed by both parties and therefore binding both parties. 4. Please also provide me with a true and certified copy (NOT photocopy) of the Original Note (Credit Agreement), under penalty of perjury and with unlimited liability and confirm that this Note, has never been sold. Please also confirm the name of the individual who is the duly authorized representative from your company, who has carried out due diligence under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and what actions s/he has taken in relation to this account.

As you have failed to provide the aforementioned documentation to validate your claim, I

hereby give you ten (10) days to reply to this notice from the above date with a notice sent using registered mail and signed under full commercial liability and penalties of perjury, assuring and promising me that all of the replies and details given to the above requests are true and without deception, fraud or mischief. Your said failure to provide the aforementioned documentation within ten (10) days, from the above date, to validate the debt, has now constituted your agreement to the following terms: 1. That the debt did not exist in the first place; OR 2. It has already been paid in full; AND 3.

That any damages suffer, you will be held culpable; 4. That any negative remarks made to a credit reference agency will be removed; 5. You will no longer pursue this matter any further. 6. You have not proven any debt, if you sell the alleged liability pass it back to your client and/or appoint an agent to act on its/your behalf on this matter you will have broken our agreement and you agree to pay the following fee

schedule $ [3 times what they claim] for dishonoring our agreement, $1,000.00 per hour or part of it or Authorized Representatives time nunc pro tunc, $1,000.00 per recorded delivery or any other response nunc pro tunc and $1,000,000.00 ONE MILLION CANADIAN DOLLARS per unauthorized use of © or ™ nunc pro tunc any further contact is not now necessary, if however you deem a need to contact me by any method the fee is $100 per item payable in advance, place the cheque in the envelope; if no payment is made in advance the fee will rise to $1000.00 per item and you will also be held culpable for any cost incurred while recovering the debt you owe.

Yours sincerely, By: By: By: Sovereign ©Anton of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Agent and Representative for ANTON ROGOZINSKY™ [signature: Anton: Rogozinsky] By: Sovereign ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Agent and Representative for AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™ [signature: Aileen: Rogozinsky] No assured value, No liability. Errors & Omissions Excepted. All Rights Reserved.

WITHOUT RECOURSE - NON-ASSUMPSIT Calls maybe recorded Appendix “D” – Estoppel Notice NON-NEGOTIABLE ©Anton of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Representative for ANTON ROGOZINSKY™ and all derivatives thereof ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Representative for AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™ and all derivatives thereof c/o 31 Claireview Road Edmonton, AB. TSA3X2 Attn: William Downe or current CEO of BMO MasterCard 1 First Canadian Place 100 King Street West Toronto, ON MSX lAl Wednesday, July 10, 2014 Notice of Irrevocable Estoppel by Acquiescence Notice to Agent is Notice to Principal.

Notice to Principal is Notice to Agent Ref: Account Number(S): 5191 2300 5055 2448 and 5191 2301 6833 5850 Dear William Downe or current CEO With reference to the letters dated May 26, 2014 - RW966930788CA, May 10, 2014 - RW966930496CA, and April 21, 2014 - RW777965371CA all delivered by recorded mail. In those letters I asked you to provide the following reasonably requested specific items: 1. Proof of Claim that the alleged liability has been created in the form of an original contract. 2.

Proof of Claim that the alleged liability exists in the form of a verified true bill signed by your client and charged to AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™ or ANTONROGOZINSKY™.

pursuant to the The Bills of Exchange Act R.S.C.1985 3. Proof of Claim that BANK OF MONTREAL has the legal right and lawful authority to attempt to enforce collection of the alleged liability in the form of Proof of Agency. I herby serve Notice that failure to provide Proof of Claim by BANK OF MONTREAL, has created a permanent and irrevocable estoppel by acquiescence, forevermore barring BANK OF MONTREAL from bringing any and all claims, legal actions, orders, demands, lawsuits, costs, levies, penalties, damages, interests, liens and expenses whatsoever, against AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™, or ANTON ROGOZINSKY™.

It is important that you acknowledge and understand that this is not a letter but a legal notice, which is a different specie of correspondence all together. I hereby declare that the law of agent and principal shall apply and that service upon one is service upon another. Furthermore, your failure to provide Proof of Claim in the form of the above reasonably requested specific items comprises the tacit procuration of BANK OF MONTREAL’s agreement to the following terms and conditions. 1. That the debt did not exist in the first place; OR 2. It has already been paid in full; AND 3.

That any damages I suffer, you will be held culpable; 4. That any negative remarks made to a credit reference agency will be removed; 5. You will no longer pursue this matter any further. 6. You have not proven any debt, if you sell the alleged liability, and/or appoint an agent to act on its/your behalf on this matter you will have broken our agreement and you agree to pay the following fee

schedule Fee

Schedule Any further invalid claims against AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™, or ANTON ROGOZINSKY™ and/or attempting to contact the Authorized Representative(

s) by mail, mobile phone and/or telephone will constitute the agreement of BANK OF MONTREAL to the following Fee Schedule: 1. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per invalid claim in writing, nunc pro tunc, 2. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per letter and/or notice sent by recorded mail, nunc pro tunc, 3. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per hour or portion thereof, of the Authorized Representative, 4.

Representative’s time, nunc pro tunc, 5. $1000.00 (ONE THOUSAND CANADIAN DOLLARS) per attempt to contact by telephone and/or mobile phone 6. $1,000,000 (ONE MILLION CANADIAN DOLLARS) per Authorized © or ™ infringement. All fees are payable in Twenty One (21) days of date of bill, as evidenced by recorded

delivery tracking number. Without malice or mischief, in sincerity and honor. Yours sincerely, By: By: By: Sovereign ©Anton of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Agent and Representative for ANTON ROGOZINSKY™ [signature: by: Anton: Rogozinsky] By: Sovereign ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky Authorized Agent and Representative for AILEEN ROGOZINSKY™ [signature: by: Aileen: Rogozinsky] No assured value, No liability. Errors & Omissions Excepted. All Rights Reserved.

WITHOUT RECOURSE - NON-ASSUMPSIT Calls maybe recorded Appendix “E” – Common Law Copyright Notice NOT-NEGOTIABLE Common law Copyright Notice April 18, 2014 1. All rights are hereby reserved with regard to common law copyright of trade-names/trade-marks, as well as any and all derivatives and variations in the spelling of said trade-names/trade-marks belonging to ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky, which shall include [without limitation] all usernames/handles used in [his or hers] online activities.

Said names may neither be used, nor reproduced 1 neither in whole nor in part, nor in any manner whatsoever, without the prior, express, written consent and acknowledgment of ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky (hereinafter known as “Secured Party”), or by [his or hers] implied consent in the event that [he or she] has published, distributed or broadcast any of [his or hers] intellectual property for educational or entertainment purposes in any medium, which will be automatically revoked in the event of false and malicious statements being made or bad faith being demonstrated by any individual or juristic person, as well as the agent of said individual or juristic person, (hereinafter known as “the User”), who may not use any work associated with Secured Party’s names for financial gain or benefit of any kind, under any circumstances, for any purposes whatsoever. 2.

With the intent of being contractually bound, the User consents and agrees that upon service of, and/or Public Notice of these terms of use, they shall not display, recreate, reproduce, nor otherwise use in any manner, whether knowingly or unknowingly, any of the common law trade-names/trade-marks (and all versions and derivatives thereof) belonging to Secured Party, nor the artwork of any of [his or hers] names, nor any derivative thereof, nor any variation in the spelling of any of [his or hers] names (and all versions and derivatives thereof) without [his or hers] prior, express, written consent and acknowledgment, unless otherwise expressly agreed between the User and Secured Party or stipulated by the terms and conditions of this notice.

3. For the avoidance of doubt, Secured Party neither grants, nor implies, nor otherwise gives consent for any unauthorized use of [his or hers] names (and all variations and derivatives thereof) or intellectual property, and any such unauthorized use is strictly prohibited and the Unauthorized User will become liable for substantial charges. 4.

Secured Party is not now, nor has ever been, an accommodation party, nor a surety, for any of [his or hers] names, nor for any derivative thereof, nor for any variation in the spelling of said names, nor for any other juristic person, legal entity or individual, and is hereunder indemnified against any and all claims, legal actions, orders, warrants, judgments, demands, liabilities, losses, depositions, summonses, lawsuits, costs, fines, liens, levies, penalties, damages, interests and expenses whatsoever, both absolute and contingent, as are due and as might become due, now existing and as might hereafter arise, and as might be suffered by, imposed upon and incurred by any of [his or hers] names for any and every reason, purpose and/or cause whatsoever, issued without Secured Party’s express authorization or consent or material evidence demonstrating [his or hers] direct involvement in any action for which [his or hers] name(

s) is/are alleged to be liable. 5.

Common Law Copyright is also claimed by Secured Party over any and all means of identification of [his or hers] person, defined as; all fingerprints, footprints, palm prints, thumbprints, hand-prints, toe-prints, RNA materials, DNA materials, blood and blood fractions, biopsies, surgically removed tissue, body parts, organs, hair, teeth, nails, semen, urine, feces, excrement, other body fluids and matter of any kind, and breath samples, voice-print, retinal image, and the description thereof, and all other corporeal identification factors, and said factors physical counterparts, any and all body tissues of any kind, in any form, and all records and record numbers, including the results, recorded or otherwise, of all and any tests performed on any material relating to [his or hers] names, and information pertaining thereto, as well as any visual image, photographic or electronic, notwithstanding any and all claims to the contrary. 6.

Secured Party retains absolute control and mastery over the peaceful possession of [his or hers] body, mind and mental faculties, to the extent that no medications, foods or otherwise may be administered to [him or her] in the absence of [his or hers] freely given full formal consent without breaching the terms of this notice. Self-executing Security Agreement in Event of Unauthorized Use. 7.

Under the terms of this notice, the User consents and agrees that any use of any of Secured Party’s names (and all variations and derivatives thereof) or intellectual property [other than Authorized usage], constitutes unauthorized usage, which automatically contractually binds the User and renders this notice a Security Agreement, wherein the User becomes the Debtor of Secured Party and unreservedly agrees that:

(1) The User grants Secured Party a security interest in all its assets, land and personal property, and all of the User's interest in assets, land and personal property, in the sum of $1,000,000.00 (ONE MILLION CANADIAN DOLLARS) per occurrence of the unauthorized use of any of the names belonging to Secured Party [the unauthorized use fee], as well as for each and every occurrence of the use of any and all variations and derivatives thereof, as well as any variations in the spelling of those names, plus costs and the right to claim triple damages in the event of the User’s failure to cure its default.

(2) The User authenticates this Security Agreement wherein the User is “Debtor” and ©Aileen of the family Rogozinsky is “Secured Party”, and wherein the User pledges all of its assets, land, consumer goods, farm products, inventory, equipment, money, investment property, commercial tort claims, letters of credit, letter-of-credit rights, chattel paper, negotiable and/or non-negotiable instruments, deposit accounts, accounts, documents and general intangibles, as well as all its interests in all such foregoing property, now owned and hereafter acquired, now existing and hereafter arising, and wherever located, as collateral for securing the User’s contractual obligation in favor of Secured Party, for its unauthorized use of Secured Party’s name(

s) and/or intellectual property.

(3) The User consents and agrees with Secured Party’s filing of a Financing Statement in the UCC filing office, and/or with any county recorder or registrar, wherein the User is named as “Debtor” and the name used without authorization is named as “Secured Party”, or any other name that Secured Party deems appropriate.

(4) The User consents and agrees that said Financing Statement described above in paragraph “(3)” is considered continuing, and further consents and agrees with Secured Party’s filing of any continuation statement necessary for maintaining Secured Party’s security interest in all of the User’s property and interest in property, pledged as collateral in this Security Agreement and described above in paragraph “(2),” until the User's contractual obligation theretofore incurred has been fully satisfied or a waiver has been expressly granted in signed writing by Secured Party.

(5) The User consents and agrees with Secured Party’s filing of any Financing Statement, as described above in paragraph’s “(3)” and “(4),” as well as the filing of any Security Agreement, as described above in paragraph “(2)”, in any legal proceeding deemed necessary by Secured Party in the enforcement of the terms of this notice.

(6) The User consents and agrees that any and all such filings described in paragraphs “(4)” and “(5)” above are not deemed to be unfair or unenforceable or unconscionable, and that the User will not claim that any such filing is false, frivolous or vexatious, on the basis that, in good faith, Secured Party hereunder agrees to waive any obligation that arises from an innocent error or omission that is subsequently rectified by the User within 14 days of service of notice of its copyright infringement.

(7) The User agrees that it i

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