St Croix v Crewe, 2015 ABQB 752

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: St Croix v Crewe, 2015 ABQB 752 Date: 20151127 Docket: FL03 33499 Registry: Edmonton Between: Lindsey Alison St. Croix Applicant - and - Shannon Michael Scott Crewe Respondent _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Madam Justice J.B. Veit _______________________________________________________

Summary [ 1 ] In this special chambers application, there is even a dispute about who is the applicant. Both parents ask the court to set retroactive child support, including s. 7 expenses, and to set parenting time. The father asks for the child support to be based on his salary from CN. Ms. St-Croix asks the court: to impute income of $100,000.00 to the respondent and to base support obligations on that amount; moreover, because of his alleged deliberate underpayment of child support, Ms. St. Croix asks the court to order Mr. Crewe to pay all outstanding child support in a lump sum.

She also asks for the right to make unilateral decisions about s. 7 expenses. Finally, the mother asks for retroactive and ongoing conjugal support. [ 2 ] There is no basis to impute income to Mr. Crewe: he was laid off and his replacement income provides relatively good

income, good benefits and security. His line 150 income is to be used to calculate support. [ 3 ] There is no basis to require Mr. Crewe to pay any arrears of child support in a lump sum: Mr. Crewe has faithfully complied with all court orders relating to child support. If there are any arrears of child support, they will be paid by Mr. Crewe at the rate of $350.00 per month until they are paid off. [ 4 ] Mr. Crewe’s retroactive child support obligation is to be calculated from October 1, 2012: an order of this court states that no claim for child support prior to that date can be brought.

For the last three months of 2012, Mr. Crewe slightly underpaid child support. For the year 2013, Mr. Crewe overpaid child support by several hundred dollars. The total child support Mr. Crewe should pay for 2014 is to be calculated on his total income for that year; part of his line 150 income is from other than employment, and that explains why some adjustment to his monthly payments was appropriately made during the year. For 2015, Mr.

Crewe’s child support obligation is to be calculated on his line 150 income; although he will not have received a T4 form from his employer until 2016, because his employment during 2015 was regular, it should be easy to calculate his actual total line 150 income within the next three weeks. [ 5 ] Ms. St. Croix must comply with previous court orders requiring her to provide receipts for daycare expenses. Ms. St. Croix is not given authority to unilaterally choose other s. 7 expenses. [ 6 ] Mr. Crewe’s expenditure of tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees to successfully defend Ms. St.

Croix’s claim that he stood as a parent to her older child is not relevant to his child support obligations; his debt would only become a potential factor if he were invoking hardship as a shield against paying the table amount of support. [ 7 ] The parties have agreed on parenting time for the father. Because the father left Alberta to relocate in Saskatchewan, the father will bear the onus of picking up, and delivering, his son for access periods. [ 8 ] On this application, Ms. St. Croix has not established a compensatory basis for conjugal support; there is no evidence that she was induced by Mr.

Crewe to give up her life in Newfoundland. Nor has she established a needs basis for current support; her application does not include copies of her bank accounts, credit card accounts, etc. However, on the breakdown of a family relationship where one party must leave the conjugal home, there is almost bound to be some financial disadvantage to the party who must leave. On the basis of the limited information available on this application, the court concludes that Ms. St. Croix suffered a financial disadvantage of $6,000.00 on the break-up of her relationship with Mr. Crewe. Mr.

Crewe will pay that amount, at the rate of $500.00 per month, commencing December 1, 2015, and continuing to December 1, 2016. Cases and authority cited [ 9 ] By the court : Costello v Calgary (City) 1997 ABCA 281 . 1. Background [ 10 ] In July 2014, Mr. Crewe filed a Family Law Act claim to vary child support, obtain a parenting plan, and remove a lis pendens on real property he owned. In August 2014, Ms. St. Croix responded to that application, and sought conjugal support. The parties then agreed to an adjournment and to an interim interim without prejudice consent order.

There was then a misunderstanding about the setting of a special chambers date. [ 11 ] In April 2015, Ms. St. Croix filed a claim under the Family Law Act asking the court to impute income to Mr. Crewe of $100,000.00, and for retroactive and ongoing conjugal and child support from December 2011 based on that imputed income. The mother also asked for an order confirming that she has primary day to day care of Mr. Crewe’s child. [ 12 ] The dispute about whose application this is, is representative of the degree of disagreement between the parties.

There is a dispute between them about the length of their conjugal relationship. Mr. Crewe acknowledges that he began an intimate relationship with Ms. St. Croix in approximately 2004 but swears that he did not live with Ms. St. Croix while both were living in Newfoundland. He mentions in support of his claim that he has a severe allergy to cats and therefore would have been unable to live with Ms. St. Croix even if he had wanted to. Mr. Crewe also relies on an affidavit from a police officer who is a neighbour of Mr.

Crewe’s parents who swears that Shannon Crewe lived at his parents’ home until he moved to Alberta in approximately 2006. [ 13 ] Ms. St. Croix asserts that prior to her relationship with Mr. Crewe, she had been separated for about one year from her then husband, she had gone back to school to obtain a high school equivalency, and had taken a course to obtain a home support worker diploma. She states that, at the time she began a relationship with Mr. Crewe, she did part-time shift-work as a health care aide earning $10.00 per hour. [ 14 ] Mr.

Crewe swears that he came to work in Alberta in November 2006 and lived in his employer’s staff housing until August 31, 2007. He acknowledges that Ms. St. Croix came to live with him in March, 2008. Between November 2006 and March 2008, Ms. St. Croix came to Alberta to visit him once. [ 15 ] When she moved to Alberta, Ms. St. Croix came with her child from a previous relationship.

In these proceedings, she has taken the position that she had made an agreement with the father of that child that she would not claim child support from him in exchange for his allowing her to leave Newfoundland and relocate in Alberta with the child. [ 16 ] After she came to Alberta, Ms. St. Croix had some sporadic employment. [ 17 ] The parties had a son together in early 2010. Ms. St Croix asserts that she was extremely ill during her pregnancy and had to take sick leave for that period of time and that she then went on maternity leave. [ 18 ] There is no suggestion that either Ms. St.

Croix’s son, or the parties’ son, has any special needs. All four persons lived together in rented accommodation until the separation of the parties. While the family was living together, Mr. Crewe was sometimes required to

work outside the country. There is, as might be expected, a difference of opinion between them about the date of separation. Mr. Crewe asserts that the parties separated in May, 2011 as a result of a dispute which involved caring for the two children in the household and in relation to which the police attended the residence. Mr. Crewe asserts that, from that day on, the parties no longer lived in a conjugal relationship. He concedes, however, that Ms. St.

Croix and the two children continued to live in the same house with him until she could find accommodation on her own in November, 2011; that accommodation was provided by social assistance. In August 2011, Mr. Crewe had purchased a home in his own name and this is one of the residences in which Ms. St. Croix lived although, according to Mr. Crewe, not in a conjugal relationship. [ 19 ] At some time after separation, Ms. St. Croix returned to school to become a medical office administrator.

She has lost two positions in that field; she asserts that her first employer told her that she was taking too many days off to look after things at home and her second employer said that she was unreliable. Ms. St. Croix indicates that she then took two part-time jobs. In December 2014, Ms. St. Croix began to work as a part time health care aide where she continued to be employed at the time of the application. She is paid $19.53 an hour and her minimum biweekly hours are 41.85. [ 20 ] Beginning in March 2012, and up to and including September 1, 2012, Mr.

Crewe voluntarily paid $1,000.00 per month in child support. [ 21 ] A claim for child support for the child in question was part of an application filed by the government on Ms. St. Croix’s behalf in April, 2012. Relying on s. 79 of the Family Law Act , Ms. St. Croix asserts that an application for conjugal support could not have been joined to the government’s application for child support. In September 2012, a consent interim order, the Sanderman order, was crafted on the basis of Mr. Crewe’s guideline income of $118,589.00 and the mother’s guideline income of $24,075.00.

The order set baseline support of the child at $1,034.00 monthly plus $263.00 monthly for s. 7 child care expenses. “Arrears”, or more properly a nunc pro tunc retroactive award, were set at a total of $1,553.00; by inference, Mr. Crewe was to pay an additional $500.00 per month over and above the base line support and his proportionate share of the s. 7 expenses until the “arrears” were paid off. Ms. St. Croix was represented on that application. The Order contains the following provision: 3. . . .

The sum of $1,533.00 represents the total arrears for [the child in question] and no further order for retroactive support will be sought for that child. Mr. Crewe made all the payments required under the Sanderman order. [ 22 ] At some time in 2012, Mr. Crewe began a relationship with another woman; he is now living with that woman in Regina, where they have purchased a home. [ 23 ] The September 2012 interim consent also ordered a trial to determine if Mr. Crewe stood in place of the father of Ms. St. Croix’s older son. That trial was to be heard in January, 2013.

In December 2012, on consent, the trial was adjourned to a date to be determined. When the trial was heard in 2014, the court concluded that Mr. Crewe did not stand as a father, in loco parentis as lawyers used to say, relative to that child. Therefore, he had no financial obligations to that child. Ms. St. Croix was represented by legal aid on that application. [ 24 ] Mr. Crewe moved to Saskatchewan in January 2014. [ 25 ] In March 2014, the employment which Mr. Crewe had had since 2006 was terminated. He nevertheless continued to pay the $1,297.00 child support payment up to and including June 1, 2014. Mr.

Crewe commenced employment with CN as of May 26, 2014, in a training position, where his income was $900.00 per week. (In the event, his training period continued until the end of October, 2014.) Mr.

Crewe therefore applied for a reduction in his child support obligation. [ 26 ] On July 22, 2014, this court approved an interim interim consent order pursuant to which the father’s application was adjourned to August 2014, the father’s s. 3 child support obligation was reduced to $375.00 for July 1 and August 1, 2014 and his proportionate share for childcare expenses was reduced to 71%, payable upon the mother providing daycare receipts to him. Both parties were represented at the July 22 hearing. [ 27 ] It is not clear why Mr.

Crewe’s adjourned application was not in fact heard in August, 2014, but rather in July, 2015. On July 9, 2015, based on information that the father’s income was $40,800.00 yearly and the mother’s yearly income was $18,840.00, this court made an order that Mr. Crewe was to pay monthly s. 3 child support from November 1, 2014 to the conclusion of this special chambers application at the rate of $859.00 per month and that, for the same period of time, he was to pay 89.04% of their child’s childcare and kindergarten expenses within 30 days of the mother providing a daycare receipt to MEP.

In addition, for the same period of time, Mr. Crewe was to pay 89.04% of any further s. 7 expenses which were agreed to in writing, again within 30 days of the mother providing a receipt to MEP. (No agreement was ever reached concerning other s. 7 expenses.) Commencing June 1, 2015, Mr. Crewe was to pay an additional $350.00 towards any alleged arrears of support. Mr. Crewe has faithfully paid all of the amounts required by the July 9, 2015 order. That order also gave to Mr. Crewe 4 weeks of parenting time with his son during the summer; if Mr.

Crewe was up to date on his child support obligations as set out in that order, the parents were to share the driving to facilitate access with the father. [ 28 ] Ms. St. Croix advises that the only child care expenses she is incurring at the moment are child care and pre-kindergarten expenses. She states that Mr. Crewe has refused to provide his consent to s. 7 expenses which the mother believes are in the best interests of their son; she therefore asks to be allowed to register the parties’ son in two activities per season without the father’s consent.

The father asserts that the mother has failed to provide him with the receipts required by the various court orders; moreover, he claims that, when the mother is not employed, there is no reason for her to incur child care costs. [ 29 ] The father’s income for 2014 was $122,093.41, of which $75,764.39 was employment income and $45,300.00 was “other income”. [ 30 ] Ms. St. Croix acknowledges that Mr. Crewe’s income for 2013 was 112,838, i.e. approximately $6,000.00 per year less than the income on which the 2012 order was based.

[ 31 ] The mother asserts that her income for 2014 was $12,554.71. It is not clear why her income in that year was approximately half of the income she apparently earned, or was capable of earning, in 2012 according to the Sanderman order. [ 32 ] There is a dispute between the parties concerning parenting of their son: Ms. St. Croix asserts that the father rarely has asked for access whereas Mr. Crewe asserts that the mother has thwarted access. In any event, as the child is now of school age, and since it is Mr.

Crewe who moved away from Alberta, it is clear that the father’s access can only take place during the Christmas and spring school breaks and during the summer school holidays. [ 33 ] It was inappropriate for Ms. St. Croix to include in her material a copy of a draft agreement which was never executed by the parties: this document was clearly part of settlement negotiations, is privileged and is therefore inadmissible: see, Costello : 91 In J. Sopinka, S.N. Lederman and A.W.

Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada 2d ed. (1992), the conditions that must be present for privilege to be recognized are stated in the following terms: (

a) a litigious dispute must be in existence or within contemplation; (

b) the communication must be made with the express or implied intention that it would not be disclosed to the court in the event negotiations failed; and (

c) the purpose of the communication must be to attempt to effect a settlement. 92 It is, of course, well established that communications exchanged in the course of settlement negotiations often satisfy those criteria and accordingly are held to be privileged and inadmissible. For the same reason, nor should the mother have referred, in para. 44 of her affidavit of September 10, 2015, to matters which arose during mediation. 2.

Father’s income [ 34 ] There is no basis for imputing income to the father; he was laid off from one job and obtained another one which is, although having lower salary, presumably at least as good in terms of benefits which are at least as good, and perhaps better than those in the private sector, and which is presumably much more secure than is employment available in the private sector in Alberta at this time. 3. Child support

a) Retroactive support [ 35 ] Because it is not clear to me how much child support Mr. Crewe has paid from October 1, 2012 to the present, and since I do not understand the “Statement of Arrears” prepared by the Province of Saskatchewan, all I can do is to set out what the father should have paid. The parties will then have to agree on what Mr. Crewe has paid and then account for any over- or under- payment. If there has been an underpayment, I adopt the same technique as that of Read J. and order Mr.

Crewe to pay any net underpayment of child support at the rate of $350.00 per month commencing on January 1, 2016 until he has paid those arrears. [ 36 ] There is no basis for making retroactive, or arrears of, or net underpayment of child support in a lump sum: Mr. Crewe has always complied with court orders concerning the payment of child support. [ 37 ] If there is a net overpayment of child support by Mr.

Crewe, that overpayment will be deducted at the rate of $350.00 per month, commencing on January 1, 2016 until he has been fully compensated for the overpayment. [ 38 ] The difficulty of accounting for actual income versus projected income underlines the importance of having regular, but no more frequent than yearly, adjustments to child support obligations based on the income for the prior period. [ 39 ] Although the mother claims retroactive child support to 2011, the September 2012 order was clear: “no further order for retroactive support will be sought for that child”.

The maximum retroactive date for child support would therefore be October 1, 2012. The mother’s own evidence states that, for 2012, Mr. Crewe’s income was $120,000.00 rather than the $118,589.86 on which the Sanderman order was based. Therefore, for the period October 1- December 31, 2012, Mr. Crewe should have paid an additional $ 11.00 per month in s. 3 or baseline support, or a total underpayment for 2012 of $33.00. [ 40 ] For 2013, Mr. Crewe should have been paying s. 3 child support based on income of $112,838.00 rather than income of $118,589.86.

During 2013, he therefore overpaid child support by a total of $876.00 ($1,034.00 instead of $961.00, or $73.00 per month for 12 months). [ 41 ] For 2014, Mr. Crewe should have been paying base line child support based on income of $122,093.41. In other words, during 2014, Mr. Crewe should have paid total s. 3 child support of $12,756.00 ($1,063.00 per month for 12 months). Since a material portion of Mr. Crewe’s line 150 total income did not come from employment, it is possible that it is non-recurring income; in any event, Mr. Crewe accepts that he should pay child support based on his total income.

The difference in the income sources explains why, on the one hand, it was appropriate to reduce his monthly payment but, on the other, why it is also appropriate that he should now catch up on his total child support obligation for that year. [ 42 ] We are now virtually at the end of 2015. I note that, because Mr. Crewe’s income from employment for 2014 consisted of only $76,000.00 from employment, it is possible that, for 2015, his total child support obligation will be considerably lower than that for 2014. I assume that, in 3 weeks, Mr.

Crewe’s actual s. 3 child support payments and his actual income for 2015 will both be ascertained or ascertainable; his s. 3 child support for 2015 will therefore be easy to calculate. [ 43 ] As indicated above, I leave it in counsels’ hands to calculate what Mr. Crewe actually paid for s. 3 support and to account for

that amount relative to what he should have paid relative to his line 150 income. As a result of that calculation, if Mr. Crewe owes s. 3 support, he will pay that by way of an additional $350.00 per month payment until the arrears are paid off; if Mr. Crewe has overpaid support, the amount of the overpayment will be deducted from his ongoing support obligation at the rate of $350.00 per month until the overpayment has been fully compensated. [ 44 ] The fact that Ms. St. Croix brought an unsuccessful application to have Mr.

Crewe declared to be a person standing in the position of a father to her older child and that this litigation in 2014 did not cost her anything but cost Mr. Crewe tens of thousands of dollars is not a factor which should be considered on this application. It would only be considered if Mr. Crewe were claiming hardship relative to his ability to pay the appropriate table amount. Since there is no question of his ability to pay that amount, his legal debt is not relevant on this application.

b) Ongoing support [ 45 ] .On an ongoing basis, Mr. Crewe will pay child support based on his gross income from employment according to the federal child support tables as adopted by provincial legislation in s 1(1) of

Schedule 1 of the Alberta Child Support Guidelines.

c) Section 7 expenses [ 46 ] Mr. Crewe must pay his proportionate share of his son’s s. 7 expenses. [ 47 ] As to what proportion that is, it appears that in 2012 and in subsequent s. 7 court decisions, Ms. St. Croix was assumed to be able to earn at least minimum wage. It is not clear why that same approach should not be used on this application. Ms. St. Croix has only stated that she missed work as a medical office administrator because of her children; in light of the fact that the parties’ son has no special needs, and incidentally that Ms. St.

Croix’s other son has no special needs, it is not clear why her children are causing Ms. St. Croix to miss work: for example, there is no evidence of the child’s need for medical attention as mentioned in her affidavit of September 10, 2015 at para. 47. Indeed, it seems that Ms. St. Croix has not been missing work in her current employment. There is no evidence on this application about the level of income Ms. St. Croix could expect in a full-time job as a medical office administrator. Because of this lack of certainty concerning the facts relative to proportionality, and because of Mr.

Crewe’s greater income than that of Ms. St. Croix, on this application, Mr. Crewe’s proportionate share will be based on his current, i.e. 2015, income from employment and Ms. St. Croix’s current, i.e 2015, income from employment. Ms. St. Croix is, however, on notice that if this matter goes to trial, she will be required to provide evidence supporting her inability to work full time. [ 48 ] As to what those s. 7 expenses are, although Ms. St.

Croix states on one occasion that she has provided all the receipts for day care and for kindergarten as required by court order, in another place she contests the reasonableness of those orders, and suggests that she has perhaps not provided the receipts as required. I re-iterate the requirements of the previous orders: Ms. St. Croix must provide receipts for day care before Mr. Crewe is obliged to pay his proportionate share of them.

Normal school costs, e.g. for pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, or primary school are part of what the baseline support pays for; if there are any extraordinary education-related expenses, those will have to be assessed individually. [ 49 ] Mr. Crewe states that he should not have to pay for day care for his son when the mother is not working. The difficulty with that approach is that some, maybe most, day cares do not provide such ad hoc day care, or at least not at rates which are viable. If this matter goes to trial, Ms. St.

Croix is on notice that she will be required to provide evidence of the policy at the parties’ son’s day care. [ 50 ] Ms. St. Croix states that she should be able to choose s. 7 expenses without Mr. Crewe’s consent. This is not appropriate. Ms. St. Croix appears to consider that all extracurricular expenses could be s. 7 expenses; she as failed to note that it is only extraordinary extracurricular expenses which are even claimable as s. 7 expenses. In any event, she has failed to provide any evidence on this application of any extraordinary extracurricular expenses which would be appropriate for the parties’ son.

Nor has she provided any evidence about the kind of extraordinary extracurricular expenses for any programs in which her other son is, or has been, enrolled, and which might cause some difficulty between the children if the younger boy were not provided with the same opportunities as his older step-brother. 3. Parenting [ 51 ] There is a dispute between the parties about whether the mother has facilitated or hindered access between the father and his son. However, in light of the fact that the son is now of school age, that the boy’s parents live in different provinces, and that Ms. St.

Croix has had primary care of the parties’ son throughout his life, there is no point in attempting to resolve that dispute since there is no question of the fact that Ms. St. Croix will remain the parent with primary care of that child. [ 52 ] The mother does not object to the father’s proposal for parenting time as set out in para. 15 of his affidavit sworn on September 2, 2015. In

summary, the father will have parenting time: - on the Saturday following the end of the school year for two weeks and from the second last Saturday in August for two weeks; - for the whole of the Christmas school holiday in all odd numbered years and the mother will have that time during all even numbered years; - for the whole of the Easter/Spring school break in all odd numbered years.

The pick-up will be on the Saturday after the last day of school before the break and the return date will on the Saturday before school resumes. [ 53 ] There is a dispute between the parties however about where the access exchanges should take place: the father proposes exchanges at Battleford, Saskatchewan whereas the mother argues that, since the father moved away from the family’s residence in Alberta, he should be responsible for picking up and delivering his son for access.

I agree with the mother. [ 54 ] It is not necessary to determine at this time whether, in the future, the parties’ son could travel to Regina as an unaccompanied

minor on an airline; when he reaches the age where this is possible according to airline protocols, the question can be raised. 4. Conjugal support [ 55 ] Ms. St. Croix claims conjugal support on both a needs and a compensatory basis. She asserts that she gave up her life in Newfoundland and moved across the country only for Mr. Crewe so that he could excel in his career and they could be a family. [ 56 ] I observe that when Ms. St. Croix had legal advice in September, 2012, the issue of conjugal support was not raised by her then lawyer. Ms. St.

Croix asserts that that was because a claim for conjugal support could not be joined to a claim for child support pursuant to the provisions of s. 79 of the Family Law Act . With respect, there is no connection between a claim for spousal support and the procedures identified in s. 79 of the Family Law Act which refer to a claim for social assistance benefits.

However, I have been advised that, although there is no legal impediment to joining a claim for spousal support with a claim for child support in family law proceedings, where those proceedings are initiated by legal aid, that service does not pursue partner support on behalf of income support recipients because child support is their priority and because they do not have the resources or training to assist individuals with conjugal support claims. Therefore, the failure of Ms. St.

Croix’s then legal aid lawyer to advance a conjugal support claim in earlier proceedings cannot be taken into account as suggesting that such a claim was not advanced as soon as it could and should have been. [ 57 ] There is no reliable evidence on this application that Ms. St. Croix gave up a life in Newfoundland, with all which that implied including free education, maintaining a family relationship with the father of her then child, her part-time job, etc. at Mr. Crewe’s request or as a result of an inducement offered by him. Mr. Crewe therefore has no financial responsibilities for Ms. St. Croix’s decisions.

It must also be noted that Ms. St. Croix and Mr. Crewe were not a family prior to Ms. St. Croix’s arrival in Alberta in the Spring of 2008. [ 58 ] Nor is there any reliable evidence that, after she came to Alberta, Ms. St. Croix suffered any financial or economic disadvantage as a result of her relationship with Mr. Crewe, at least until the birth of the parties’ child in early 2010. The fact that Ms. St. Croix had many, albeit short-lived, employments tends to support Mr. Crewe’s claim that he insisted that Ms. St. Croix either work or go back to school; this was not a situation where Ms. St.

Croix arrived in Alberta and was never employed. [ 59 ] The parties were together for approximately 1 ½ years after the birth of their child. There is a dispute about why Ms. St. Croix did not return to the work force after her maternity leave expired. However, given the fact that Mr. Crewe acknowledges that he was sometimes required to work outside Canada, it is likely that, with her relative lack of education and relative lack of training, Ms. St. Croix contention that the kind of work that she might have expected would not have been an economic choice given the cost of child care for infants.

That does not equate, however, to loss of career or even employment opportunities when employment income for the period was provided by the government. [ 60 ] After the conjugal separation of the parties in May 2011, Ms. St. Croix, her son and the parties’ son continued to live in accommodation provided by Mr. Crewe until November 2011. This hiatus gave Ms. St. Croix approximately a six month period during which she did not have to pay for accommodation or food and in which she could begin to adjust to the new situation. At that point in time, the economic disadvantage Ms. St.

Croix suffered as a result of her relationship with Mr. Crewe arose from the care of one infant, in addition to the care of a child who was approximately 8 years old. Mr. Crewe was paying child support for his son. [ 61 ] There is no reliable evidence on this application of current need for conjugal support by Ms. St. Croix: Ms. St. Croix is, apparently, in almost exactly the same position she was in when she left Newfoundland in 2008, with a part-time job in the health service industry. Indeed, when Mr.

Crewe’s child support payment is increased to reflect his total income in 2014, there will essentially be no deficit in Ms. St. Croix’s budget, especially if one added into her budget the child support which she is now presumably receiving from her older son’s father. Overall, there is virtually no evidence on this application from Ms. St. Croix about her financial situation: there are no banking records, no credit card records, no outline of the services she was receiving from social assistance. Indeed, it is not even clear if Ms. St. Croix is still living in Leduc while she is working in Devon.

Nor is there any evidence about the parties’ standard of living while they were living together. As indicated above, there is no evidence about what type of extraordinary extracurricular activities Ms. St. Croix’s older son was enrolled in. The amount of child support provided by Mr. Crewe was the amount which is appropriate for a parent earning over $100,000.00 a year; that amount of child support presumably is more than enough to allow Ms. St. Croix to spend some money on the normal extracurricular expenses which that level of child support would allow. The fact that Ms.

St Croix’s father has provided her with $200.00 or $400.00 a month for living expenses is not evidence that this responded to a need on Ms. St. Croix’s part. [ 62 ] Certainly on this application, with the parties’ son at school, there is no evidence about how the mother’s ability to work full time has been impaired as a result of her responsibility for caring for that child. [ 63 ] Although the parties had only lived together as a family for approximately 3 years, there was presumably some financial disadvantage to Ms. St. Croix arising from the breakdown of the relationship.

There is no direct evidence on this issue. However, I note that Ms. St. Croix indicates that, in December 2012, she borrowed money from her father to buy a car; it is therefore likely that, while she was with Mr. Crewe she had access to a vehicle and that the breakdown of that relationship deprived her of that mode of transportation and required her to rely on public transportation. Mr. Crewe swears that he had always made it clear to Ms. St. Croix that he would not support her – that she had to find employment or go to school. The fact is, however, that Mr. Crewe allowed Ms. St.

Croix to become financially dependent upon him for approximately 3 years; she therefore needed some buffer to regain the financial independence she had at the time she began to live with Mr. Crewe. While a trial will be necessary to determine the contested facts relating to conjugal support, on the basis of the very limited material available on this application, I would award Ms. St. Croix $6,000.00 as compensation for the financial disadvantage she suffered as a result of the breakdown of the relationship. This interim conjugal support award will be paid by Mr. Crewe to Ms. St.

Croix at the rate of $500.00 per month beginning December 1, 2015 and on the first day of every month thereafter for a period of 12 months. 5. Costs [ 64 ] If the parties are not agreed on costs, I may be spoken to within 30 days of the release of this decision.

Heard on the 15 th day of September, 2015. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 26 th day of November, 2015. J.B. Veit J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Humaira Ahmad, Barr Picard for the Applicant, St. Croix Deborah Baradziej, Trilogy Family Law for the Respondent, Crewe