Gauthier v Starr, 2016 ABQB 213

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Gauthier v Starr, 2016 ABQB 213 Date: 20160414 Docket: 1603 04035 Registry: Edmonton Between: Adam Christian Gauthier Plaintiff - and - David Starr, Rob Ferrier, and John Werbiki Defendants _______________________________________________________ Decision and Reasons for Decision of the Associate Chief Justice J.D. Rooke _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] Adam Christian Gauthier [“Gauthier”] (although he wished to be called “Adam” (see infra )), on March 4, 2016 filed a

Statement of Claim in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, suing three individuals, David Starr, Rob Ferrier, and John Werbiki [the“Defendants”]. The Statement of Claim is extremely brief, so I will repeat its entire substance: On Oct. 30, 2015 David Starr did trespass against Adam Christian Gauthier. I require the restoration of my property.

I require compensation for damages. [2] The Statement of Claim is also unusual in that Gauthier has scratched out elements of the standard Alberta Rules of Court,Alta Reg 124/2010 [the “Rules” or individually a “Rule”] Form 10 and replaced “Plaintiff(s)” with “Prosecutor(s)”, and “Defendant(s)”with “Wrongdoer(s). [3] On March 15, 2016, Alberta Justice, on behalf of Rod Ferrier and Jon Werbiki, applied to have Gauthier’s action againstFerrier and Werbiki struck out under Rule 3.68 on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable claim against Ferrier and Werbiki, wasfrivolous, irrelevant and improper, and an abuse of process.

The Department of Justice Canada made a parallel application in relation toDavid Starr on March 22, 2016. [4] I granted the Defendants’ applications at the close of a hearing on March 31, 2016, and ordered costs against Gauthier. Atthat time I noted I would be providing a written decision and reasons to accompany my oral decision, and to document events thatoccurred at the March 31, 2016 hearing. II. The Law [5] The law in relation to a motion to strike a statement of claim is well developed and not in dispute.

Rule 3.68(1-3) authorizesthe Court to strike out a pleading, in whole or in part, if the pleading exhibits a number of defects: 3.68(1) If the circumstances warrant and a condition under subrule (2) applies, the Court may order one or more of the following: (

a) that all or any part of a claim ... be struck out; (

b) that a commencement document or pleading be amended or set aside; (

c) that judgment or an order be entered; (

d) that an action, an application or a proceeding be stayed.

(2) The conditions for the order are one or more of the following: ... (

b) a commencement document or pleading discloses no reasonable claim ... (

c) a commencement document or pleading is frivolous, irrelevant or improper; (

d) a commencement document or pleading constitutes an abuse of process; (

e) an irregularity in a commencement document or pleading is so prejudicial to the claim that it is sufficient to defeat the claim.

(3) No evidence may be submitted on an application made on the basis of the condition set out in subrule (2)(b). [6] An action may be struck under Rule 3.68 where it is plain and obvious, or beyond reasonable doubt, that the action cannotsucceed: Hunt v Carey Canada Inc., (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 959, 74 DLR (4th) 321. Pleadings should be considered in abroad and liberal manner: Tottrup v Lund, 2000 ABCA 121 at para 8, 186 DLR (4th) 226. A pleading is frivolous if its substanceindicates bad faith or is factually hopeless: Donaldson v Farrell, 2011 ABQB 11 at para 20, 197 ACWS (3d) 57.

A frivolous plea is oneso palpably bad that the Court needs no real argument to be convinced of that fact: Haljan v Serdahely Estate, 2008 ABQB 472 at para21, 453 AR 337. [7] A proceeding that is an abuse of process may be struck on that basis: Reece v Edmonton (City), 2011 ABCA 238 at para 14,335 DLR (4th) 600. Litigation that is commonly referred to as “vexatious” may be struck under either Rule 3.682(

c) or (

d) as that term issynonymous with impropriety and abuse of process: Wong v Leung, 2011 ABQB 688 at para 33, 530 AR 82; Mcmeekin v Alberta(Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 144 at para 11, 537 AR 136. [8] A pleading must provide a minimum threshold of information so that the defendant or defendants are able to provide ameaningful response. “Bald allegations” are not sufficient, and instead an intentional tort such as trespass requires “... material factssufficient to demonstrate an intentional wrongdoing ...”: G.H. v Alcock, 2013 ABCA 24 at para 58. III.

The March 31, 2016 Proceeding [9] The March 31, 2016 hearing for the Defendants’ applications did not go smoothly. When I first referred to Gauthier as “Mr.Gauthier” he responded:

Sir, if you could just call me “Adam” today, I actually don’t have a title, so just “Adam” would suffice. As a courtesy, and pursuant to his request, I referred to Gauthier as “Adam” for the remainder of the hearing, as he agreed to my request that he refer to me as “Justice Rooke”. [ 10 ] Gauthier explained the nature of his action in this manner: ... I was under the assumption today that I was coming here to deal with an application in chambers ...

I was under the impression I was going to before a Master in Chambers and they would have jurisdiction to deal with this since this is a common law tort, it is a trespass against me, which is an infringement of a fundamental right or freedom and, y’know, if they are unaware that that’s what a trespass is then that’s not my problem. There is a claim, and I do have a right to have a lawful determination on the matter ...

I confirmed that this was a chambers hearing with myself as the judicial adjudicator. [ 11 ] Gauthier, near the commencement of the hearing, presented an Amended Statement of Claim that I accepted for filing with the Court. Counsel for the Defendants did not object to this step, an amendment before the pleadings closed, as of right: Rule 3.62(1)(a). The Amended Statement of Claim is similar to the original March 4, 2016 Statement of Claim, though it provides some additional details. It now reads in full: 1.

On October 30, 2015 David Starr did trespass upon Adam Christian Gauthier’s property, both real and intrinsic. 2. On November 2, 2015 Jon Werbiki did trespass upon Adam Christian Gauthier’s property. 3. On Mach 4, 2014 Rob Ferrier did trespass upon Adam Christian Gauthier’s property. 4. On December 22, 2015 Rob Ferrier did trespass upon Adam Christian Gauthier’s property. [There are no paragraphs numbered 5 or 6.] Remedy sought 7. The immediate restoration of my property. 8. Compensation for damages. (Sum/Value to be determined) 9.

Order to safeguard Adam Christian Gauthier’s property against future trespasses. [ 12 ] Gauthier also supplied a document titled “Notice”. He asked: A notice is something you give to the public, is this a public court sir? Is this case held on the public record? I replied that it was not my job to respond to questions, and that I put no weight on the “Notice” since it was neither an affidavit, nor properly sworn, nor a form of document approved for use in the Court. I, however, did permit placing the “Notice” on the Court file as argument only. The “Notice” is attached as

Schedule A. [ 13 ] Gauthier also sought to have the Defendants found in default. This step is clearly unavailable at this stage as Rule 3.42(

b) indicates no default may be entered if the defendants have applied to have a statement of claim struck under Rule 3.68. [ 14 ] Counsel for Ferrier and Werbiki explained that her clients were employees of the Alberta Justice, a Provincial Prosecutor and Crown Prosecutor, respectively. She, on their behalf, took the position that Gauthier’s application should be struck out either as it failed to provide anything more than a bald allegation, or was frivolous and vexatious. Counsel for the other applicant, Starr, explained that Starr is a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police stationed in St.

Albert, and echoed the position taken by Alberta Justice, adding that Gauthier’s Statement of Claim did not meet the criteria set in Rule 13.6 for pleadings, “restoration of property” is not a tort remedy, and that “intrinsic property” is not a category known to law. [ 15 ] Gauthier interrupted the proceedings and spoke out of turn on many occasions. He “objected” to the characterization of Starr, Ferrier, and Werbiki as “Defendants”: They are not Defendants as named on the Statement of Claim. They are actually wrongdoers. That’s a specific amendment I made.

He also demanded the proceeding advance under a special status: “... This court needs to move under the inherent jurisdiction of Queen’s Bench, I am a man of no title. ...”. When I instructed that Gauthier sit, he replied “I sit of my own volition.” [ 16 ] After a further interruption I warned Gauthier that he was to wait his turn and then respond to the Defendants’ submissions, and if he did not do so he would be removed from the courtroom.

Gauthier responded “Please stop talking to me like a child.” I again stressed Gauthier should wait his turn to speak. [ 17 ] Gauthier also complained that Sheriffs were present in the courtroom: Sir, they’re intimidating me, there is no reason for them to be here in a civil proceeding. This isn’t criminal. There isn’t any reason for them to be here. I’m a little nervous . [ 18 ] At this point it became apparent that Gauthier was clandestinely recording the hearing with a camera which was deployed in his open briefcase on the counsel table. That led to the following exchange:

Myself: Adam, do you have a camera with you? Gauthier: Ah yes sir, I do, for my own records in this proceeding. Myself: Then you can shut it off. You can shut it off. Gauthier: I don’t wish to do so. [ 19 ] I then ordered Gauthier removed from the courtroom by the Sheriffs. Gauthier was not authorized to record the proceeding, and, in any case cameras, are entirely banned from the Court of Queen’s Bench (Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, “Electronic Wireless Devices Policy” (January 2012)). Gauthier had persistently refused to follow the Court’s instructions.

His presence in the courtroom, in the circumstances evident, was an abuse of the process of the Court. Gauthier was also in contempt of court by his refusal to stop recording the hearing after my instruction. [ 20 ] The proceeding then continued in Gauthier’s absence, and I sought submissions from counsel for the Defendants in response to Gauthier’s Amended Statement of Claim.

After those submissions, I concluded that Gauthier’s action should be struck on the basis it makes nothing more than bald allegations of the alleged misconduct, and these bald allegations did not provide the required material facts to permit the Defendants to make a meaningful response, per Tottrup v Lund and G.H. v Alcock . In this case there was no dispute that the Defendants are state actors: an RCMP officer and prosecutors, all authorized government representatives. Gauthier would need to provide more to advance a valid tort claim against these individuals. IV.

Adam Christian Gauthier is an OPCA Litigant and a Vexatious Litigant [ 21 ] Appellate courts have instructed that judges have a responsibility when they encounter a self-represented litigant [“SRL”]. For example, the Canadian Judicial Council has stated that judges, amongst other participants in the justice system, “have responsibility to ensure that self-represented persons are provided with fair access and equal treatment by the court”:

Preamble, Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Person . This, however, does not amount to permitting a free right for a SRL to obtain a “do-over” and collect missing information: Williams v Williams , 2015 ABCA 246 . [ 22 ] As I noted in court, normally I would have considered adjourning this matter to permit an SRL, such as Gauthier, an opportunity to file a further and better Statement of Claim. The “Notice” he presented, which I rejected as evidence but did consider as an argument and brief of law, provided additional detail on the alleged “trespassing” by the Defendants.

Together, these would potentially be a basis to permit Gauthier the opportunity, as a ‘fair dealing’ SRL, to have an opportunity to continue this action. [ 23 ] However, Gauthier is no innocent babe in these woods. He has already established a pattern of intentionally abusing court processes. He employs a category of vexatious litigation strategies, which I grouped as Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments [“OPCA”] in Meads v Meads , 2012 ABQB 571 , 543 AR 215. These concepts purport to give individuals special, extralegal status and immunities thanks to hidden or concealed secret alternative laws.

OPCA litigation is, by its nature, vexatious: Meads v Meads , at paras 555-556, 582-584 ; Cormier v Nova Scotia , 2015 NSSC 352 at para 31 , 367 NSR (2d) 295; Fiander v Mills , 2015 NLCA 31 at paras 37- 39 , 368 Nfld & PEI R 80. OPCA litigants should be subjected to a broad restriction on potential litigation, because their “... sole motivation is to wreak havoc on the civil justice system ... these litigants seek only disruption as opposed to justice ...”: Tupper v Nova Scotia (Attorney General) , 2015 NSCA 92 at paras 52-53 , 390 DLR (4th) 651, leave denied [2015] SCCA No 520. A.

Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier [ 24 ] Gauthier is a participant in another lawsuit before the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. His home was the subject of a foreclosure proceeding, which Gauthier resisted by frivolous and vexatious OPCA arguments which are detailed in a decision of Master Schulz: Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier , 2015 ABQB 703 , 28 Alta LR (6th) 104. These include the following frivolous arguments, in some cases with my responses: 1.

His mortgage contract is a void bill of exchange because it offends the “Consumer Purchase” provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act , RSC 1985, c B-4, ss 188-192. 2. Gauthier should not be obliged to pay for his mortgage because banks “create money out of thin air” via a process called “book- entry credit.” Master Schulz identified the source of this scheme was an Australian text, Laurence F Hoins, How To Screw ‘Your’ Bank: What Bank? Any Bank , 2nd ed (Nowra: self-published, 1992), which had been universally rejected by Australian courts (see paras 71- 74). 3.

The lender had breached the Canadian constitution and international treaties. Both of these are irrelevant because the Charter does not apply to private entities such as corporations, and because no international treaty has any force or effect inside Canada unless that treaty is enacted via legislation. 4.

A “Strawman” double/split person scheme that Gauthier is not a legal or juristic person, and cannot be forced to associate with his “Strawman”. [ 25 ] Gauthier also argued that Meads v Meads is not a binding authority and is only obiter , but Master Schulz concluded that decision was not only a valid authority, but, due to its broad international acceptance and application, is, if not binding, at least highly persuasive: para 46.

Master Schulz classified Gauthier as an OPCA litigant: paras 47-48 . [ 26 ] Master Schulz at para 103 directed that Gauthier carefully review the judgment of Re Boisjoli , 2015 ABQB 629 , where an

OPCA litigant was declared a vexatious litigant and restricted from accessing Alberta courts. In conclusion, at para 104, Master Schulz warned Gauthier should expect sanctions if he continued to litigate on an OPCA basis: Beyond that, it would be a pity if Gauthier lost his home because he exercised poor discretion in his search for reliable sources of legal information. There are better alternatives than obsolete legal dictionaries, discounted texts like How to Screw ‘Your’ Bank, and Youtube videos of men scribbling on whiteboards.

The decision is, of course, up to Gauthier, however, he should think carefully before he makes statements such as: I can find no law that authorizes book-entry credit and thus must conclude it is fraudulent criminal activity which I cannot take

part in. ... He cannot expect the courts to view him as a ‘fair dealer’. When he makes such statements the Court may be inclined to accept the alternative that Gauthier’s appearance in court is for an improper and ulterior purpose. If so, Gauthier can expect negative consequences. [ 27 ] Unfortunately, Gauthier has not heeded this sage advice. B. d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen [ 28 ] Gauthier’s next documented OPCA activity resulted in a judgment from the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench: d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen , 2016 SKQB 101 .

This decision reports that a convicted and imprisoned offender, Luc Bernard d’Abadie, is serving an 18 month prison sentence for trafficking in marijuana: para 2. d’Abadie attempted to obtain release from prison by using OPCA tactics. Gauthier participated in this litigation. [ 29 ] Initially it was d’Abadie who corresponded with the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench. First was a “Notice” that the trial judge “... obstructed justice by denying the common law ...”. Next was a “Claim” by “I, a Man, Luc” “Prosecutor” that “wrongdoers” had “trespassed upon my property”, and demanding $384,000.00: paras 3-4.

The similarities to Gauthier’s current litigation are difficult to miss. [ 30 ] Gauthier made his appearance on February 29, 2016 when he “a man, Adam”, by email, sent a letter to the local registrar. Justice Layh inferred “a man, Adam” was “Adam Gauthier” based on the message’s email address. “I, a man, Adam” was the “next friend of Luc d’Abadie” and required a hearing date “with respect to his claim of trespass”: para 7.

After some communications with the court registrar “I, a man, Adam” wrote to Justice Layh arguing “there have been several errors” with d’Abadie’s conviction and sentencing, and complaining that court staff had refused to file documents. “Adam” then requested a hearing “... to present the argument for an order of discharge in relations to the application for habeus [sic] corpus ad subjiciendum. ...” (para 6), and an application was received on March 2, 2016. [ 31 ] The d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen decision, at para 12, reproduces parts of a brief of law that was prepared by Gauthier, and, at para 15 , Justice Layh confirmed that Gauthier’s oral submissions were much the same: 1. d’Abadie is a man who does not hold any title; 2. d’Abadie is an idiot to legalese and not a member of the legal society; 3. under common law he has done no wrong because no man or woman has “come forward to press their claim on the record.”; 4. d’Abadie “... stands in his inherent jurisdiction at all times and was acting in a private capacity ...” and is therefore immune from legislation; and 5. marijuana production is a victimless crime and not an offence under the common law. [ 32 ] Justice Layh classified Gauthier’s brief and arguments as “... pseudo-law at best, but more frankly, legal gibberish”: para 15.

Layh J identified additional procedural deficiencies: that there was no evidence that Gauthier was actually authorized to represent d’Abadie, and that service of the habeas corpus application may not have been completed. In any case, the habeas corpus application was nothing more than an OPCA argument where so-called “common law” governs and legislation does not apply to those who have not entered into a contract with the state: paras 21-22.

Justice Layh concluded d’Abadie was lawfully imprisoned under an unappealed criminal judgment, and the habeas corpus application was dismissed. [ 33 ] As I observed at the March 31, 2016 hearing, there are more than enough indications in Gauthier’s Alberta litigation to confirm to my satisfaction that “I, a man, Adam” is none other than Adam Christian Gauthier. I agree with Justice Layh’s analysis of the OPCA schemes deployed in d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen , and only have a few, additional observations. The ‘no one has made a claim’ motif has been rejected by Canadian courts.

Criminal prosecution does not require an ‘injured party’: R v Desautels , 2012 SKPC 29 at para 54 , 2012 DTC 5079; R v Petrie , 2012 BCSC 2110 at para 12 , 107 WCB (2d) 29. [ 34 ] The “idiot to legalese” argument and other components of this decision betrays the identity of at least one of Gauthier and d’Abadie’s gurus: Karl Rudolph Lentz.

Lentz is a US OPCA guru who uses characteristic motifs, such as “i: a man; prosecutor”, and targets “wrongdoer(s)” who “trespassed on his property”, see for example: Lentz v Robert Bentley , Docket 2:12-cv-1014-MHT, US District Court, Alabama, Northern Division; Lentz v Department of Human Resources , Docket 2:13-cv-387-MEF, US District Court, Alabama, Northern Division. Lentz’s concepts work no better in Canada than in the US.

Lentz personally appeared in R v Zombori , (Williams Lake) 20130927 (BCSC), the trial of two Freeman-on-the-Land marijuana grow-op offenders, where the Court explicitly rejected Lentz as a litigation representative. Lentz appears to be nothing more than another OPCA guru fraud who has personally failed when he tried to apply his techniques. He and his ideas are not welcome in Canadian courts. C. The Present Action

[ 35 ] Gauthier’s initial and Amended Statement of Claim arguably could be the product of a poorly informed lay litigant, though taking the step of modifying the Rules Form 10 template Statement of Claim to make this an action where Gauthier is “Prosecutor”, and the Defendants are “Wrongdoers”, is a rather implausible innocent civil litigation error.

However, the “Notice” that Gauthier presented in the March 31, 2016 hearing makes very obvious that Gauthier has learned nothing from his previous court interactions and the advice that he should educate himself on Canadian law as it really is, rather than watching “Youtube videos of men scribbling on whiteboards.” ( Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier , at para 103 ). [ 36 ] The “Notice” is rife with OPCA motifs. That is perhaps surprising since Gauthier is obviously familiar with Meads v Meads , and is aware that judgment indicates OPCA schemes and concepts are invalid.

Perhaps he believes ‘his law’ is better. I will highlight some of the fallacies in the Notice, and their implications for the validity of Gauthier’s action as a whole. [ 37 ] Gauthier identifies the civil action as “the property of Adam Christian Gauthier”, and purports that counsel for the Defendants are interlopers who are attempting “... to trespass on my case.” This is, of course, ridiculous. A lawsuit is not property that is purchased with filing fees.

Arguments that appropriate legal representatives are third party interlopers is a well-recognized and rejected OPCA motif, for example Myers v Blackman , 2014 ONSC 5226 , 2 PPSAC (4th) 318; Royal Bank of Canada v Skrapec , 2011 BCSC 1827 at para 51 , appeal quashed as without merit 2012 BCCA 10 . [ 38 ] The “Notice” also indicates the pseudolegal basis of Gauthier’s claim. At para 7 he says “my claim of right was accepted.” At para 14 he defines his injury as “Compensation to be calculated using the fee

schedule that was accepted with my claim on right on May 23, 2014.” This indicates that Gauthier subscribes to the Freeman-on-the-Land concept that a foisted unilateral agreement document called a “Claim of Right”, or sometimes more formally a “Notice of Understanding Intent and Claim of Right”, can be sent to governments and/or the courts. This concept, unknown to real law, is that if the “Claim of Right” is not explicitly rebutted and rejected that, supposedly, means the Freeman-on-the-Land has ‘opted out’ of the law.

This concept has been rejected innumerable times by Canadian Courts, including Meads v Meads at paras 382-387 ; R v Petrie , 2012 BCSC 2110 at paras 41-51 ; Szoo’ v RCMP , 2011 BCSC 696 at paras 17-21 , 43-45; ANB v Hancock , 2013 ABQB 97 at paras 74-78 , 557 AR 364; R v ANB , 2012 ABQB 556 at para 49 , 570 AR 146; Jabez Financial Services Inc. v Sponagle , 2008 NSSC 112 at paras 14-15 , 18, 264 NSR (2d) 224; R v Sands , 2013 SKQB 115 at para 18 , 416 Sask R 279.

Recently, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in Fiander v Mills at para 40 concluded that a court that encounters a litigant who uses ‘opt out of legislation’ arguments can presume that litigant is engaged in vexatious litigation for an improper and abusive purpose. [ 39 ] The more damning component of Gauthier’s stated basis for damages is it flows from a “fee schedule”. Fee schedules are foisted unilateral agreements that define certain penalties for government, institutional, and court actors engaged in their legal duties: Meads v Meads at paras 505-523 . OPCA fee schedules have one purpose: intimidation.

These documents are intended to deter state and court actors from the proper exercise of their obligations: Meads v Meads at para 527 ; Fearn v Canada Customs 2014 ABQB 114 at para 199 , 94 Alta LR (5th) 318; and more generally Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky , 2014 ABQB 771 at para 78 , 18 Alta LR (6th) 1; Gidda v Hirsch , 2014 BCSC 1286 at para 84 ; R v Sands at para 18 . Asserting a foisted unilateral agreement against a public official is harassment: R v Boxrud , 2014 SKQB 221 at para 46 , 450 Sask R 147.

I recently concluded in Re Boisjoli at paras 58-69 that an attempt to enforce a spurious OPCA-based debt on a peace officer was prima facie intimidation of a justice system participant: Criminal Code , RSC 1985, c C-46, s 423.1. [ 40 ] From my review of the “Notice”, I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that Gauthier’s litigation against the Defendants herein is OPCA litigation, and that it is being conducted without a valid basis. I further conclude that, in advancing this action, Gauthier either knows he is acting in defiance of Canadian law or is willfully blind to that fact.

He is clearly aware of Meads v Meads , though he does not like it. He was specifically directed to review Re Boisjoli and Fiander v Mills by Master Schulz in Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier . It is not that Gauthier does not know what the law is. He just does not care. He apparently wants to get back at government actors who have offended him, and will attempt to abuse the Court’s processes to do that. [ 41 ] I note in passing that Gauthier’s “Notice” includes unsourced

definitions of “Lawful” and “Legal”. The definition of “Lawful”, “according to natural law and the principles of fundamental justice”, does not appear anywhere in any reported Canadian judgment. Out of curiosity I searched for that definition with the “Google” search engine to see where it might come from. I found no results. My search for “Legal”, “the customs and rules of the legal society and the acts and regulations created by man”, was equally futile. It appears Gauthier just makes up

definitions of established words as he likes. At least that is consistent with his other legal research practices. [ 42 ] There is a particularly ridiculous OPCA misconception that “lawful” and “legal” have different meanings. They don’t. Even using the standard bible of OPCA litigants, Black’s Law Dictionary , (9th ed) shows these words mean exactly the same thing: Lawful, adj. (13c) Not contrary to law; permitted by law <the police officer conducted a lawful search of the premises>. See LEGAL. Legal, adj. (15c) ... 2.

Established, required, or permitted by law; LAWFUL <it is legal to carry a concealed handgun in some states> ... In case Gauthier would prefer an obsolete Black’s Law Dictionary , I also checked the first edition of that dictionary. Its

definitions for “Lawful” and “Legal” in no way resemble Gauthier’s homemade constructs, either. D. Vexatious Litigation Activities [ 43 ] The character and nature of vexatious litigants was recently reviewed by Shelley J in Kavanagh v Kavanagh , 2016 ABQB 107 . She observed at para 64 that while vexatious litigants may be motivated in a number of different ways, what unites them is their functional effect: ... All misuse legal procedure in a manner that has no valid purpose, and, as a consequence, causes harm to involved litigants and the waste of court resources. While non-legal dictionary

definitions of “vexatious” focus on

an act being wrongful, harassing, malicious, or

intended to annoy, the legal meaning is this word is broader. A vexatious proceeding is one that in effect abuses or misuses legalprocesses. [44] The principles and indicia to identify vexatious litigation were recently reviewed in Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 atparas 80-93, 590 AR 288, affirmed 2014 ABCA 444, 588 AR 303.

Justice Michalyshyn indicated the methodology applied when a courttests whether a person has engaged in vexatious litigation: 1. the entire history of a dispute, including activities both inside and outside court, is considered, 2. other litigation and court history is relevant, and 3. a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts. [45] Chutskoff v Bonora at para 92 identifies and details 11 different indicia of vexatious litigation. One is advancing OPCAstrategies.

In Re Boisjoli I added a further category to that list, that an attempt to use court processes to further criminal activity is also anindication of vexatious litigation. [46] Gauthier obviously has a history of OPCA litigation, and that continues despite him being advised to learn the real law. Hislitigation history also discloses other indicia of vexatious litigation.

His “legal gibberish” habeas corpus application rejected in d’Abadiev Her Majesty the Queen is obviously a collateral attack intended to circumvent the effect of a court order: Stout v Track, 2013 ABQB751 at paras 79-82, 84-87, 574 AR 59, affirmed 2015 ABCA 10, 9 Alta LR (6th) 341.

All three of his actions are hopeless proceedingsthat cannot offer a reasonable expectation to provide relief: Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2, s 23(2)(c); Dykun v Odinshaw, 2000ABQB 548 at para 42, 267 AR 318, affirmed 2001 ABCA 204, 286 AR 392, leave denied [2001] SCCA No 442. [47] Gauthier has engaged in ‘escalating proceedings’ (Dykun v Odinshaw at para 42; Big Bear Hills Inc v Bennett Jones AlbertaLLP, 2010 ABQB 764, 507 AR 21; McMeekin v Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 456 at paras 203, 205, 543 AR 132; Arabi vAlberta, 2014 ABQB 295 at para 104, 589 AR 249), in that he targets individuals who were involved in previous legal disputes, such aslawyers (prosecutors).

There are a number of potential purposes for Gauthier’s litigation against the Defendants, such as revenge, toharass, or greed, but in any case he has obviously initiated these proceedings for an improper purpose (Judicature Act, s 23(2)(c); Dykunv Odishaw at para 42), because he knows or should know he cannot be successful. [48] Gauthier’s d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen litigation is clearly a “busybody” lawsuit with him acting as an “officiousbuttinsky”: Wong v Giannacopoulos, 2011 ABCA 206 at para 4, 510 AR 234, leave refused 2011 ABCA 277, 515 AR 58; Peddle vAlberta Treasury Branches, 2004 ABQB 608, 133 ACWS (3d) 253.

Gauthier, without question, met the criteria for “engaging ininappropriate courtroom behaviour” (Judicature Act, s 23(2)(g); Allen v Gray, 2012 ABQB 66 at para 44, 532 AR 252, appeal dismissedfor want of prosecution 2013 ABCA 176, 553 AR 124) by his conduct at the March 31, 2016 hearing. [49] This, in total, represents seven independent bases on which I could classify Gauthier as having engaged in vexatious litigation.I therefore find, as fact, that Gauthier is a vexatious litigant. [50] The only question that remains on that front is whether his access to the Alberta courts should be restricted per Judicature Act,s 23.1.

I conclude he is entitled, as a matter of procedural fairness, to make submissions on that point (Lymer v Jonsson, 2016 ABCA32), though I note that Master Schulz has warned Gauthier of the implications of his OPCA litigation practices in Crossroads-DMDMortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier at para 103, so he cannot be unaware of this possible consequence in this Gauthier vStarr action. V. Costs, Restricted Court Access, and Additional Steps [51] The Defendants were entirely successful at the March 31, 2016 hearing. They are therefore presumptively due litigation costsfrom Gauthier: Rule 10.29(1).

I, at the hearing, ordered that Gauthier pay Alberta Justice, and the Department of Justice Canada $500.00each, immediately, which is the Rules,

Schedule C, column 1, amount for a contested application without written briefs. [52] I also ordered that Gauthier is prohibited from making any further court filings in relation to the three Defendants until thosecourt costs have been paid in a manner that is acceptable to the Defendants.

I add the “acceptable to the Defendants” proviso to this orderbecause of Gauthier’s OPCA predilections and to reinforce that he should avoid OPCA ‘money for nothing’ scams such as “A4V”(Meads v Meads at paras 531-543), promissory note and bills of exchange frauds (Meads v Meads, at paras 544-547; Re Boisjoli), andWeRe Bank cheques (Servus Credit Union Ltd v Parlee, 2015 ABQB 700). [53] I invited the Attorneys General to apply to have Gauthier’s access to the Alberta Courts restricted per Judicature Act, s 23.1, ata future hearing date to be set.

If the Attorneys General do not choose to take that step then the Court may do so on its own motion. Ibelieve the former alternative is preferable as the Attorneys General may be aware of additional alleged litigation misconduct byGauthier that is relevant to the Court’s deliberations on that point. [54] An OPCA litigant is not an appropriate litigation representative: Perreal v Knibb, 2014 ABQB 15 at para 36, 8 Alta LR (6th)55; Hill v Hill, 2008 SKQB 11 at para 30, 306 Sask R 259; R v Dick, 2002 BCCA 27 at paras 16-17, 163 BCAC 62; Law Society ofBritish Columbia v Boyer, 2016 BCSC 342 at para 38.

Gauthier’s Saskatchewan litigation indicates he is willing to intermeddle in otherpersons legal affairs, apparently without legal authorization.

Watson J (as he then was) in Peddle v Alberta Treasury Branches,denounced the intervention of a third party “officious buttinsky” OPCA litigant, “Daniel David: Peddle” in other parties’ litigation, andmade a series of strict orders under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its processes. [55] Individuals have a constitutional right to access Canadian courts: “... if there is a justiciable right, then there must be a courtcompetent to vindicate the right ...”: Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Canadian Liberty Net, (SCC), [1998] 1

SCR 626 at para 32 , 157 DLR (4th) 385. There is no such equivalent right of a third party to represent another individual. As the late Justice Nash observed in R v Main , 2000 ABQB 56 at para 36 , 259 AR 163, an advocate who “... has demonstrated an intention not to be bound by rules and governing procedures in court ...” should not be permitted to represent a litigant. [ 56 ] Gauthier’s litigation history and persistent OPCA litigation in the face of clear instructions to discontinue his worthless pseudolegal strategies warrants “officious buttinsky” attention.

Following Peddle v Alberta Treasury Branches , I therefore order: 1. Adam Christian Gauthier is ordered to identify himself only by his legally correct name, “Adam Christian Gauthier”, in any future communications, documents, filings, or other interactions with the Alberta Provincial Court, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, and Alberta Court of Appeal. 2.

Gauthier is prohibited from acting as an agent, next friend, McKenzie Friend (from McKenzie v McKenzie , [1970] 3 All ER 1034 (CA) and Rules 2.22-2.23), or any other form of representative in court proceedings before the Alberta Provincial Court, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, and Alberta Court of Appeal. 3.

The Clerks of the Alberta Provincial Court, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, and Alberta Court of Appeal shall refuse to accept or file any documents or other materials from Adam Christian Gauthier unless Adam Christian Gauthier is a named party in the action in question. [ 57 ] Gauthier has now been warned and warned and warned again. He has been pointed to the correct law, but has preferred “Youtube videos of men scribbling on whiteboards”, books with confidence building titles such as “ How To Screw ‘Your’ Bank ”, and frauds like Karl Lentz.

He has now spent enough time in court to know its basic procedures and rules but, apparently, in his view, those apply to someone else. His answer to court directions is “I don’t wish to do so.” [ 58 ] Gauthier does not get to make up what the law is. He can learn about it, if he chooses. Law is not secret, though it is, at times, complex. Courthouses include law libraries so that members of the public can access recognized and authoritative legal resources. The CanLII website provides what is probably the best, free to the public, collection of jurisprudence and legislation in the world.

But Gauthier has not taken advantage of these resources. That is his loss. [ 59 ] He prefers his own special, magic law, which apparently he gets to make up and define all by himself. Unfortunately for him, if he persists on that path that will bring him no benefit, but only further hardship. In my oral decision I made an observation that Gauthier did not have the advantage of hearing, since he was outside the Court, so I will repeat it in these written reasons for his benefit. OPCA litigants can straighten up. One example was Dennis Larry Meads, the OPCA litigant in Meads v Meads .

After he received a detailed explanation of why his arguments were false he abandoned those, and moved to resolve his litigation with the assistance of the Court. He chose to be a ‘fair dealer’ in his litigation, and was treated as such. Other former OPCA litigants have followed the same path. That option is open to Gauthier, though I have to admit that he appears to be less promising candidate for “waking up”, given his conduct to this date. However, one can hope for that, for his own benefit, if nothing else.

At a minimum, one can only hope that with his accumulating history of in-court fiascos, no one with any sense would listen to Gauthier as a source for legal advice or information. [ 60 ] As a final note to Gauthier, I understand that his camera was not seized by the Sheriffs and presumably he may have retained some recordings from the March 31, 2016 hearing. I can assure him that if he decides to make any improper use of that recording - i.e., any use or broadcast of that recording - then he will be in contempt of court. Heard on the 31 st day of March 2016.

Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 14 th day of April 2016. J.D. Rooke A.C.J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Adam Christian Gauthier representing himself.

Deanna Matchett Alberta Justice representing Rod Ferrier and Jon Werbiki Robert Drummond Department of Justice Canada - Prairie Region representing David Starr

Schedule A: March 29, 2016 “Notice” Notice March 29, 2016 I, Adam Christian Gauthier make oath and say that the following is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, 1. The case held on the public record with file number 160304035 at the Edmonton court of Queen’s Bench court house is the property of Adam Christian Gauthier. The only individuals who can respond or file things in this case, are those named as wrongdoers on the claim. 2. All matters relating to this case must be heard before a Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench acting as a court of inherent jurisdiction. 3.

Who is "Department of Justice Canada", and why are they attempting to trespass on my case? 4. A trespass is a common law tort; it is the infringement or denial of a fundamental right or freedom. 5. On October 30, 2015 David Starr did trespass upon my property . He waited outside my home with no less than 4 other men, names unknown, and performed an unlawful arrest that led to more than 72 hours of solitary confinement. David Starr told me he had done so under the orders of John Werbiki. 6.

John Werbiki chose to advise David Starr and then to advance matters in provincial court after receiving notice of Adam Christian Gauthier’s status and intent to challenge the constitutionality of the charges. 7. Rob Ferrier is the man that started this whole mess back on March 4, 2014 when having never interacted with me in any way, yelled aloud in the crowded St. Albert court foyer, “this man has warrants!” and then scuttled away. That led to an arrest where I was detained for more than 12 hours, the majority being in solitary confinement without being feed anything.

I forgave this trespass in my filing from March 18, 2014 which was heard on May 23, 2014 when my claim of right was accepted. I never knew the name of the man from the court room that day until December 22, 2015 when we met for a second time. 8. In the morning of December 22, 2015 before court opened I approached the docket to check the list. When I did so a man asked what my name was, I responded with Adam. He immediately became agitated and told me he knew me. He said that he had warned me before and was going to warn me again that I didn’t want to talk to him about my matters.

I asked his name to which he responded Mr. Prosecutor. So I asked for his first name and he then tried to have me removed from the room by the bailiff. The bailiff, knowing I had done nothing wrong made no attempt to remove me. I asked again for the man’s name. I told him I didn’t recognize him and I wanted to know who I was talking to. He went on to describe our March 4th 2014, interaction. He made some other rude remarks and then simply refused to speak to me. Just after this I asked the clerks at the front counter for his name and they told me, Rob Ferrier. 9.

Rob trespassed upon my property on March 4, 2014 and then again on December 22, 2015 both times at the St. Albert court house. Subsequently the trespass on March 4, 2014 lead to me spending a total of 44 days in unlawful confinement and the theft of 4 pieces of real property. 10. These interactions have caused damage loss and harm to me, Adam Christian Gauthier and I do have an enforceable right to a lawful determination on these matters and compensation in the event that the actions by David Starr, John Werbiki and Rob Ferrier where indeed unlawful. 11. Compensation is to be calculated using the fee

schedule that was accepted with my claim on right on May 23, 2014.

12. The application to dismiss this claim filed by “Department of Justice Canada” should be denied and no further filings by this entityaccepted by the court with respect to this matter. The only individuals who may files in this case are those men named as wrongdoers. 13. All correspondence with me in respect of this matter must be sent via verified mail rather than registered mail.

Property (n.) c. 1300, properte, “nature, quality,” later “possession, thing owned” (early 14c., a sense rare before 17c.), from an Anglo-Frenchmodification of Old French propriete “Individuality peculiarity: property” (12c., Modern French proprete; see propriety), from Latinproprietatem (nominative proprietas) "ownership, a property, propriety, quality,” literally “special character” (a loan-translation ofGreek idioma), noun of quality from proprius “one’s own, special” Trespass M. (A.) v.

Ryan, (SCC), [1997] 1 SCR 157, 1997 CanLll 403 (SCC} 80 .... “finally, the common law torts of defamation and trespass further recognize the validity of an individual’s claim to fundamentalprivacy interests.” Lawful 1. According to natural law and the principles of fundamental justice. Legal 1. The customs and rules of the legal society and the acts and regulations created by man.