Pickett v Walsh, 2016 ABQB 222

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: Pickett v Walsh, 2016 ABQB 222 Date: 20160416 Docket: 4813 005624 Registry: Ft. McMurray Between: Sonja Kim Pickett Plaintiff - and - John Peter Walsh Defendant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice W.N. Renke _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Sonja Pickett and John Walsh met in Fort McMurray. They began living together in August 1993. They were married in Centreville, Newfoundland, on August 5, 1994. They returned to Fort McMurray where they worked and raised a family.

They separated on January 3, 2013 and were divorced on August 27, 2014. They lived together about 19 ½ years, including the year preceding their marriage. [ 2 ] Ms. Pickett is now 45 years old; she was 42 when she separated from Mr. Walsh. Mr. Walsh is now 44 years old; he was 41 at separation. [ 3 ] Ms. Pickett and Mr. Walsh had two children. Both are over 18 and neither is currently a child of the marriage. [ 4 ] On February 13, 2015, Justice Eidsvik granted an Interim Order. In its material elements, this Order required Mr. Walsh to pay spousal support to Ms.

Pickett in the amount of $800 per month effective February 1, 2013 until further court order and declared the retroactive spousal support owing by Mr. Walsh to Ms. Pickett as of February 13, 2015 to be $19,200. Mr. Walsh was required to pay $200 per month towards the arrears commencing March 1, 2015. The Eidsvik Order based the retroactive spousal support award on guideline income for Mr. Walsh of $134,851 for 2013 and $134,000 for 2014 and on guideline income for Ms. Pickett of $40,000 for 2013 and 2014. As of January 2016, Mr. Walsh’s arrears stood at about $21,803.35.

On January 26, 2016, Justice Campbell granted a Stay of Enforcement of Mr. Walsh’s arrears for 90 days, subject to the restrictions in s. 32 of the Maintenance Enforcement Act and on the condition that Mr. Walsh pay $500 per month towards spousal support. At the time of trial, this Order had not yet been signed and filed; I understand that it has now been signed and filed. Justice Campbell’s Order did not otherwise reduce the amount of arrears or the amount of monthly spousal support payable by Mr. Walsh. [ 5 ] Ms. Pickett suffered a serious injury as a result of a slip and fall in February 2015.

She has been off work since the accident. In August 2015, Mr. Walsh was diagnosed with a serious heart condition. He is currently on long-term disability. Ms. Pickett has a new partner. He is ill, is not working, and has no insurance benefits. Mr. Walsh has remarried. His wife has become disabled. She is not

receiving disability insurance. [6] The Eidsvik Order set the action for trial respecting spousal support, matrimonial property issues, and any remaining issuesbetween the parties. [7] I heard the trial on February 25, 2015. The parties represented themselves. They conducted the trial with calm civility andfocus. I thank them for the seriousness and objectivity they brought to the proceedings. [8] The trial concerned two main issues – (

I) spousal support payable by Mr. Walsh to Ms. Pickett and (II) matrimonial propertydivision. By implication, the issue of (III) occupation rent was also raised. Child support had been in contention before the trial but theparties confirmed at trial that all child support issues had been resolved. The elements of my decision are summarized in part (IV). Myjob has been to try to work out the fair consequences of the end of marriage, when the parties have come from modest circumstances andnow find themselves in even more modest and less promising circumstances. I. Spousal Support A. Principles [9] Ms.

Pickett claimed spousal support from Mr. Walsh. I note that the Eidsvik Order was an interim order and set spousalsupport only “until further Order of the Court.” Moreover, it provided that spousal support may be “reviewed” at trial.

Section 15.2rather than s. 17 of the Divorce Act is engaged. I must determine whether Ms. Pickett is entitled to receive spousal support, the amount ofany spousal support, and the duration of spousal support. I must consider the objectives of spousal support set out in s. 15.2(6) of theDivorce Act:

(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (

b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above anyobligation for the support of any child of the marriage; (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. According to L.M.P. v L.S., 2011 SCC 64, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 775 at para 49, each of these objectives has equal weight and importance. [10] I must also take into account the factors bearing on spousal support set out in s. 15.2(4):

(4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration thecondition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including (

a) the length of time the spouses cohabited; (

b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (

c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. [11] Justice McLachlin, as she then was, has identified three bases for conceptualizing entitlement to spousal support - contractual,compensatory, and non-compensatory: Bracklow v Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420 at para 49. [12] I have taken into account the following considerations, which are relevant to entitlement, amount, and duration of any spousalsupport that Mr. Walsh should pay to Ms. Pickett (“the same factors that go to entitlement have an impact on quantum” (Bracklow atpara 50)): (

a) the parties’ ages; (

b) the length of the parties’ cohabitation; (

c) the functions performed by each party during cohabitation, including child care responsibilities; (

d) career diversion or sacrifice; (

e) contributions by one party to the earning capacity of the other; (

f) the condition, means, needs of Ms. Pickett; (

g) the effects of re-partnering by Ms. Pickett; and (

h) the condition, means, needs of Mr. Walsh. In the next section, I’ll discuss these considerations as they are informed by the evidence in the trial. In the

section to follow, I’ll provide

my conclusions respecting spousal support. B. Considerations bearing on Ms. Pickett’s Spousal Support Claim (

a) the parties’ ages [ 13 ] As indicated, Ms. Pickett is now 45 years old; she was 42 when she separated from Mr. Walsh. Mr. Walsh is now 44 years old; he was 41 at separation. The parties are young. Were there no other factors impinging on their abilities to work, Ms. Pickett would have the time to do any necessary vocational upgrading and she is young enough to have 20 more years of employment ahead of her. She would have the opportunity to become economically self-sufficient. Similarly, Mr. Walsh would not be at normal retirement age for another 20 years. Age would not be an impediment to his continuing to contribute to Ms. Pickett’s support. (

b) the length of the parties’ cohabitation [ 14 ] The parties lived together nearly 20 years. They were in a long term relationship. Generally, the longer the period of cohabitation, the stronger the claim for compensatory entitlement and the longer the duration of spousal support. (

c) the functions performed by each party during cohabitation, including child care responsibilities [ 15 ] Child care responsibilities were not the sole responsibility of either party. Both parties continued to work throughout the relationship. Child care was Ms. Pickett’s responsibility on her days off and Mr. Walsh’s responsibility on his days off. Ms. Pickett’s parents assisted when she and Mr. Walsh were working. [ 16 ] Ms. Pickett took maternity leave after the births of both children. She then returned to work. [ 17 ] The elder child was born in July 1994. The younger child was born in June 1996. Again, both are now over 18 and at the time of trial neither is a child of the marriage. (

d) career diversion or sacrifice [ 18 ] The parties worked during the marriage much as they did before their marriage and after their marriage. Neither moved to accommodate the other’s work. Neither gave up career advancement possibilities to promote the career of the other. Neither worked less to promote the career of the other. Neither worked more, or took on exceptional job responsibilities, to pay for the career of the other, except as indicated in the next subsection. Neither gave up educational opportunities for the other’s career. [ 19 ] At the time of the marriage, Ms.

Pickett was working at Safeway in Fort McMurray. She continued to work there after the marriage and after the births of the children. She worked at two jobs after Safeway, for about eight years each. She had medical difficulties in 2013, which resulted in a six month gap in employment. She then worked at a restaurant and janitorial supply company for a year, until February 2015, when she suffered an injury. She has been off work since. (

e) contributions by one party to the earning capacity of the other [ 20 ] When the parties met, Mr. Walsh was a home-care provider. He worked at two further jobs before obtaining a job with Kal Tire in Fort McMurray. Before getting that job, he completed a 3-month heavy equipment operator course at Keyano College. During this period, he was not working. He did obtain a student loan. The amount of the loan and the mode of its repayment was not in evidence. The loan would have mitigated the financial burden on Ms. Pickett, who was the sole family wage-earner in the three-month period.

By the end of their relationship, Mr. Walsh was earning substantially more than Ms. Pickett at his Kal Tire job – about $100,000 per year more. [ 21 ] The evidence supported the conclusion that the family income jumped considerably when Mr. Walsh obtained his position with Kal Tire. His better wages (beginning near the $100,000 mark, climbing to about $134,000 per year) were in place for about the last 6 years of the parties’ cohabitation. (

f) the condition, means, needs of Ms. Pickett [ 22 ] Ms. Pickett has a grade 12 education. She has no certifications, licences, or additional formal credentials. [ 23 ] In February 2015, Ms. Pickett slipped on ice and seriously hurt her shoulder. She has had surgery. She is expected to lose the full use of her arm. She is currently unemployed and has not worked since the accident. Her job prospects are poor. She is receiving medical treatment and shall receive employment counselling. She has not yet been assessed respecting retraining or steps to be taken to secure suitable new employment. [ 24 ] Ms.

Pickett has been receiving disability insurance coverage payments. She does not currently have insurance coverage for prescriptions. She expects to receive about $30,000 in disability payments in 2016. In 2015, her income will have been about $35,000,

which includes January and February payments from her last employer and disability payments. (

g) the effects of re-partnering by Ms. Pickett [ 25 ] Ms. Pickett has had a new partner for about the last three years. Their relationship began about a year after her separation from Mr. Walsh. Her partner is currently off work because of a medical condition. While he earned $68,000 in 2015, he now has no disability coverage or medical insurance income. [ 26 ] Re-partnering does not entail that compensatory support comes to an end. The foundation for the compensatory claim lies in the relationship between the original spouses.

A new partner or spouse is not responsible for having “caused” the payee spouse’s economic injury and the responsibility for that injury is not transferred to the new partner or spouse: Wolters v Wolters , 2013 ABQB 172 , Veit J at para 25; Heimbecker v Heimbecker , 2007 ABQB 645 , Graesser J at para 55. Paragraph 58(

d) of the Family Law Act (which does not apply in this case, but which provides a perspective on the economic impact of re-partnering), does urge consideration of (

d) the extent to which any other person who is living with the spouse or adult interdependent partner who is to receive support under the order contributes towards household expenses and thereby reduces the financial needs of that spouse or adult interdependent partner. [ 27 ] In contrast, re-partnering may bring non- compensatory support to an end, since the new partner takes on the obligation of support for the payee spouse: Wolters v Wolters at para 26 ; Heimbrecker v Heimbrecker at para 58. [ 28 ] The effect of re-partnering in context is muted. Ms.

Pickett’s partner is himself on medical disability and is not employed. He is not presently in a position to contribute economically to his relationship with Ms. Pickett. (

h) the condition, means, needs of Mr. Walsh [ 29 ] Mr. Walsh worked at a variety of jobs after the marriage. He would have been with Kal Tire eight years this September. [ 30 ] The children remained with Mr. Walsh after the separation. At the time, the elder was 18 and the younger 16. The children moved out only shortly before the trial. Ms. Pickett had been paying court-ordered child support for the younger child. While that obligation has been fulfilled, Mr. Walsh did not receive child support for about a year and a half following the separation. [ 31 ] In August 2015, Mr.

Walsh was diagnosed with a heart condition. He has not worked since August 26, 2015. Mr. Walsh’s heart condition is serious. A week prior to the trial he had another cardiac episode and he had a cardiogram on the Sunday before the trial. He is awaiting the results. He may never work again. [ 32 ] His rent is about $3,600 per month which is close to the net amount of the $5000 per month gross disability payment he receives from Great West. [ 33 ] Mr. Walsh too has re-partnered. He was married in July 2015. Two children and one grandchild are living at home. One child is 25, a single mom with health problems.

Her 1-year old lives with her. The other child is 19 and still in high school. Mr. Walsh’s wife had been on medical leave but her disability payments ceased as of February 3, 2016. She has no income. She is appealing the termination of her long term disability payments. With s. 58(

c) of the Family Law Act in mind (providing guidance only), Mr. Walsh’s wife cannot contribute to household expenses and increase his ability to provide support. Mr. Walsh pointed out that he has five mouths to feed with his disability income. C. Conclusions respecting Spousal Support 1. Entitlement (

a) contractual entitlement [ 34 ] There was no contractual basis for entitlement to spousal support. (

b) non-compensatory entitlement [ 35 ] Ms. Pickett is now disabled. It is not clear whether she will work again. Does her need, based on her disability, support a claim for spousal support against Mr. Walsh? [ 36 ] In my opinion, her need, based on her disability, does not support a claim for spousal support. The disability, real and serious as it is, had no connection with the marriage. It occurred as a result of a slip and fall that occurred some two years after the parties separated and after the parties had divorced.

This circumstances do not involve a disability that began during the marriage ( Bracklow at para 59 ) or that was latent during the marriage; the “take your spouse as you find him or her” principle was not engaged ( Bracklow at para 46 ); there was no issue of Mr. Walsh continuing to support Ms. Pickett as he had during the marriage ( Bracklow at para 48 ). Her present inability to work is not the result of factors arising from the marriage exposed or made operative by the physical injury.

See, by way of contrast, Rockall v Rockall , 2010 ABCA 278 at para 15 . [ 37 ] Holding a former spouse responsible for paying spousal support must be fair and just: Bracklow at para 48 . It would not be fair and just to hold the spouse responsible if none of the former spouse, the marriage, or its breakdown contributed to the disability

giving rise to the need. [38] As Justice McLachlin noted in Moge, ss. 15.2(6)(

a) and (

c) do not remove all reference to causality: the statute refers to injury“arising” from the marriage or its breakdown: Moge v Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 at 881 - 882. Even employingthe broad and commonsensical approach to causation mandated by Moge (McLachlin J at 882), it cannot be said that Ms. Pickett’s injuryhas any legally-cognizable link to the marriage. (

c) compensatory entitlement [39] Typically, long term relationships entail compensatory entitlement to spousal support for the lower-income former spouse.Ms. Pickett and Mr. Walsh’s relationship, however, was not typical. (

i) s. 15.2(6)(b) [40] Paragraph 15.2(6)(b) (“apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of themarriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage”) did not operate in Ms. Pickett’s favour. Thechildren remained with Mr. Walsh after the separation. (ii) s. 15.2(6)(a) [41] I do not find that compensatory entitlement is established through the typical considerations relevant to s. 15.2(6)(a)(“recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown”). [42] Ms.

Pickett worked before, during, and after the marriage. She was engaged in work of the same sort throughout. The partiesshared child care responsibilities. She did not forego any career advancement to support Mr. Walsh. She did not forego any education ortraining because of the relationship. Economically, she came out of the marriage as she went in. She was economically self-sufficientwhen she left the relationship.

The comments of Justice Sandomirsky in Rezansoff v Rezansoff, 2007 SKQB 32 at para 14 are apt: [14] I strongly suspect that had the petitioner not married the respondent, and had she attempted to endure her modest employmentopportunities, she would be in much the same financial situation today as she was prior to this marriage …. Causation is relative to thecompensatory claim upon which clause 15.2(6)(

a) is predicated. There really is no evidence of economic disadvantage which hasaccrued to the petitioner as a consequence of the marriage and its breakdown. See also Panara v Di Ascenzo, 2005 ABCA 47 at para 79. [43] At most, Ms. Pickett has a modest compensatory claim relating to the three month course taken by Mr. Walsh at KeyanoCollege.

Her periods of maternity leave, early in the relationship, did not support a finding of prejudice to her economic advancement. [44] Because of her economic self-sufficiency at the relationship’s end, based on her work throughout the relationship, s. 15.2(6)(d) (“in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time”) did not providean independent ground for compensatory support. [45] Nonetheless, the parties’ lives were intertwined for nearly 20 years and the end of the relationship did have an adverseeconomic impact on Ms.

Pickett. (iii) s. 15.2(6)(c) [46] In my opinion, s. 15.2(6)(c) (“relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage”) isthe best lens through which to view Ms. Pickett’s compensatory claim. The s. 15.2(6)(

c) perspective yields two conclusions. [47] First, when Ms. Pickett left the relationship, she had to re-establish a home for herself. The evidence did disclose that she tooksome personal items with her (although exactly what she took was not in evidence). I accept that twenty-first century living involvesmore than a roof, a bed, a bowl, and a spoon. It cost Ms. Pickett money to replicate the one-person equivalent of her former life, whichhad been some 20 years in the making. A precise price-tag for re-establishing a home is not required. [48] Mr. Walsh might well protest that Ms.

Pickett left so she should bear the economic consequences of her choice. But fault, ifindeed there was fault, cannot be considered in the spousal support analysis: s. 15.2(5) (“In making an order under subsection (1) or aninterim order under subsection (2), the court shall not take into consideration any misconduct of a spouse in relation to the marriage”). [49] Second, the long relationship of Ms. Pickett and Mr. Walsh produced a “merger” of their economic lives.

According to theSpousal Support Advisory Guidelines (http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/spousal-epoux/spag/index.html (SSAG’s)), the longerparties live together, the more integrated their economic lives and the stronger the claim to entitlement for support at the level of themarital standard of living: “the concept of merger over time ... incorporates both compensatory and non-compensatory rationales forspousal support.

Put simply, the idea is that as a marriage lengthens, spouses more deeply merge their economic and non-economic lives,resulting in greater claims to the marital standard of living:” §7; see §7.2. [50] This thinking reflects Justice McLachlin’s discussion in Bracklow at paras 30 and 31: 30 The mutual obligation theory of marriage and divorce, by contrast, posits marriage as a union that creates interdependencies thatcannot be easily unravelled.

These interdependencies in turn create expectations and obligations that the law recognizes and enforces.... 31 The mutual obligation view of marriage also serves certain policy ends and social values. First, it recognizes the reality that when

people cohabit over a period of time in a family relationship, their affairs may become intermingled and impossible to disentangle neatly. When this happens, it is not unfair to ask the partners to continue to support each other (although perhaps not indefinitely).

Second, it recognizes the artificiality of assuming that all separating couples can move cleanly from the mutual support status of marriage to the absolute independence status of single life, indicating the potential necessity to continue support, even after the marital “break”.... (On the “reasonable expectations” perspective, see Mitchell McInnes, “The Measure of Restitution” (2002), 52 University of Toronto Law Journal 163 at 210, fn. 168; and see Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s comments on “equitable distribution” in Moge at 849.) [ 51 ] From the standpoint of the reasonable expectations of a spouse in Ms.

Pickett’s circumstances (not what her subjective expectations might or might not have been), Ms. Pickett could reasonably expect, after investing 20 years with Mr. Walsh and bearing him two children, to continue to share in the good fortune of his Kal Tire employment, so that her new standard of living would at least approximate the standard of living during the relationship. The hardship she faced on being left to only her own resources attracted a measure of compensation. [ 52 ] Again, it is immaterial that she left the relationship. [ 53 ] Therefore, Ms.

Pickett did establish entitlement to spousal support under, in particular, s. 15.2(6) (

c) of the Divorce Act . 2.

Amount and Duration [ 54 ] I am aware of direction provided by the SSAG’s without child support formula (SSAGs, http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl- lf/spousal-epoux/spag/p3.html#a333 at 3.3.3): • The amount of spousal support is 1.5 to 2 percent of the difference between the spouses’ gross incomes for each year of marriage, to a maximum range of 37.5 to 50 per cent of the gross income difference for marriages of 25 years or more (The upper end of this maximum range is capped at the amount that would result in equalization of the spouses’ net incomes — the net income cap.) • Duration is .5 to 1 year of support for each year of marriage, with duration becoming indefinite (duration not specified) after 20 years or, if the marriage has lasted 5 years or longer, when the years of marriage and age of the support recipient (at separation) added together total 65 or more (the “rule of 65”).

I am also aware that the SSAG’s are not binding: Sawatzky v Sawatzky , 2008 ABCA 355 at paras 16-17 ; Neighbour v Neighbour , 2014 ABCA 62 at para 15 ; McCulloch v Bawtinheimer at para 41; V.S. v A.K. 2005 ABQB 754 , Trussler J at paras 17-25. (

a) amount [ 55 ] Two general considerations relating to the nature of Ms. Pickett’s compensatory claim are important to the amount of spousal support. First, Ms. Pickett does not have “typical” spousal support entitlement under ss. 15.2(6) (a), (d), or (b). Second, aside from the modest three month investment in Mr. Walsh’s Keyano College program, her entitlement is founded on her need for “starting again” costs and on her expectations respecting continuation of the family standard of living. As for the last, after the separation she was on her own with no children.

Bringing her personal standard of living in line with the family standard of living would therefore require significantly less than (say) an equal division of the difference between the parties’ gross incomes. [ 56 ] I find that the amount of $800 per month set by Justice Eidsvik was an appropriate valuation of Ms. Pickett’s entitlement to spousal support – for the period that Mr. Walsh remained at work at Kal Tire. I note that child support payable by her was in arrears for the first year and a half of separation. (

b) duration [ 57 ] The duration assessment has two elements. (

i) total duration/termination of support obligation [ 58 ] In theory, given the long relationship of the parties and as the SSAG’s suggest, the obligation to pay spousal support could be indefinite or at least last long after the parties’ separation. But again, the nature of Ms. Pickett’s entitlement is important. The three month investment in the Keyano College program would not require a long period of spousal support. Neither would the need to assist Ms. Pickett with starting over.

The most significant feature of her entitlement claim turns on her reasonable expectations concerning the maintenance of the family standard of living. [ 59 ] On the evidence, the parties’ standard of living was not high, especially during their first 13 years, before Mr. Walsh got the Kal Tire job. So far as the evidence disclosed, for the first two-thirds of the parties’ relationship their earnings were about the same. Had the relationship ended after 13 years, Ms. Pickett would not have had any significant “standard of living” claim. She had been earning about half of the family money.

She would have continued to earn that amount after separation, without the children or Mr. Walsh. She would have been about as well off after separation as before. [ 60 ] On the evidence, only in about the last 6 years of the relationship did the parties’ family income substantially increase. [ 61 ] Reasonable expectations concerning the family standard of living, then, would not be based on nearly 20 years of Mr. Walsh earning a Kal Tire level salary. Instead, the expectations would be based on the investment of 13 years plus about 6 ½ years at a higher total family income.

[ 62 ] In my opinion, given all the circumstances, including the three month Keyano College course, the need for starting again support, and expectations concerning the family standard of living, the duration of spousal support should be set at 6 years from separation. That is, Mr. Walsh’s obligation to pay spousal support will end as of December 31, 2018. (ii) duration and ability to pay [ 63 ] Mr. Walsh ceased working in August 2015. He is on long-term disability. His disability payments cover his rent, but leave little additional funds either for himself or his dependents. Mr.

Walsh did not apply to suspend support payments in 2015. This significant and material change in his personal circumstances arose after the Eidsvik Order. [ 64 ] I have taken into account of the comments of the Court of Appeal in Haisman v Haisman (sub. nom. R.H. v M.H .), 1994 ABCA 249 commencing at para 24 : [24] Where the past inability to make child support payments as they came due has lasted for a substantial period of time, but the former spouse did not apply during that time for a variation order, the situation may be different.

On a later application to vary, a judge will have to decide, with the benefit of hindsight, whether it would have been appropriate to suspend enforcement of the support order during the time when the former spouse was unable to pay, or whether at least a temporary reduction in the child support payments would have been in order. A judge should view with considerable skepticism any claim that a reduction in the support payments, temporary or indefinite, would have been proper.

However, if he or she decides that it would, the judge may for this reason reduce accordingly the arrears of child support which have built up. In my view this is a special circumstance.... [26] A present inability to pay arrears of child support does not by itself justify a variation order. It may justify a suspension of enforcement in relation to the arrears for a limited time, or an order providing for periodic payments on the arrears.

However, in the absence of some special circumstance, a variation order should only be considered where the former spouse has established on a balance of probabilities that he or she cannot pay and will not in the future be able to pay the arrears. [27] In short, in the absence of some special circumstance, a judge should not vary or rescind an order for the payment of child support so as to reduce or eliminate arrears unless he or she is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the former spouse or judgment debtor cannot then pay, and will not at any time in the future be able to pay, the arrears. [ 65 ] In my opinion, retroactive spousal support was properly awarded by Justice Eidsvik commencing February 1, 2013.

Further, her declaration of the arrears owing as of February 13, 2015 is confirmed. That determination shall not be disturbed. [ 66 ] However, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that effective September 1, 2015, a material change in circumstances beset Mr. Walsh. His heart health deteriorated to the point that he had to cease work. He began to receive disability insurance. His income diminished very significantly. If establishing a material change in circumstances is necessary (despite the interim nature of the Eidsvik Order and its reference to “review” of spousal support at trial), Mr.

Walsh has established grounds for revisiting the effects of the Eidsvik Order under s. 17(4) of the Divorce Act from and after September 1, 2015. From the perspective of Haisman , Mr. Walsh has been unable to pay child support at the amount set in the Eidsvik Order or at all since September 1, 2015. Mr. Walsh does not have an ability to pay ongoing spousal support, because of his health, employment, and income circumstances. [ 67 ] I therefore vacate all spousal support arrears and any associated interest and charges relating to spousal support payments accruing or payable on or after September 1, 2015.

I am vacating this portion of support owing because it was not properly payable by Mr. Walsh. On my jurisdiction to take these steps, see CAG v SG , 2012 ABQB 529 , Jones J at paras 101 – 106. [ 68 ] To be clear, I do not vacate amounts owing by Mr. Walsh for the period February 1, 2013 to August 31, 2015. [ 69 ] No ongoing support is payable by Mr. Walsh from and after September 1, 2015, until further court order based on a material change in Mr. Walsh’s medical and financial circumstances. That is, his obligation to pay support is suspended. It is possible, even if unlikely, that Mr.

Walsh’s medical condition will improve. If it does and if there is a material change (i.e., a significant increase) in Mr. Walsh’s income, his obligation to pay spousal support may be revisited as of the effective date of his increased income. Regardless, Mr. Walsh’s obligation to pay spousal support will terminate on December 31, 2018. 3.

Summary of Spousal Support [ 70 ] Ms. Pickett has established entitlement to spousal support. The appropriate amount of that support was $800 per month as set by the Eidsvik Order. The duration of Ms. Pickett’s entitlement to spousal support is 6 years. Mr. Walsh’s obligation to pay spousal support shall terminate on December 31, 2018. [ 71 ] However, no spousal support is payable by Mr. Walsh effective September 1, 2015, because of his limited income. His obligation to pay spousal support is suspended.

His obligation to pay spousal support may be revisited if there is a material change in his income, keeping in mind that his obligation to pay support shall end on December 31, 2018. [ 72 ] Mr. Walsh remains responsible for the spousal support arrears owing for the period February 1, 2013 to August 31, 2015, along with interest and associated charges. 4. Stay of Arrears Payments [ 73 ] Justice Campbell’s Order staying enforcement was not appealed. The 90 day stay will end on or about April 25, 2016. [ 74 ] Paying $500 per month towards spousal support owing exceeds Mr. Walsh’s capacity to pay. Again, Mr.

Walsh is contending

with a material change in his health, employment, and income circumstances.

These circumstances were not addressed or foreseeable at the time of the Eidsvik Order. [ 75 ] I rely on the authority of rule 1.3(2) (“A remedy may be granted by the Court whether or not it is claimed or sought”), ss. 15 and 17 of the Divorce Act , the inherent jurisdiction of the court, and s. 8 of the Judicature Act : 8 The Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction in every proceeding pending before it has power to grant and shall grant, either absolutely or on any reasonable terms and conditions that seem just to the Court, all remedies whatsoever to which any of the parties to the proceeding may appear to be entitled in respect of any and every legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them in the proceeding, so that as far as possible all matters in controversy between the parties can be completely determined and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning those matters avoided.

I grant a stay of Mr. Walsh’s obligation to make payments respecting the spousal support arrears (spousal support amounts and associated interest and charges owing from February 1, 2013 to August 31, 2015) on the condition that Mr. Walsh pays $200 per month towards those arrears. The payments shall commence on May 1, 2016 and payments shall be made by the first day of each month thereafter until the arrears are paid in full.

With respect to this form of stay, see CAG v SG at paras 117 – 122 and Kowalski v Kowalski , 2009 ABQB 294 , Burrows J at para 8. [ 76 ] This Order does not suspend or affect any proceeding taken under s. 32(3) of the Maintenance Enforcement Act . Should Mr. Walsh’s medical condition improve to the point that he is able to work, I urge the Director under to exercise the discretion under s. 22 of the Maintenance Enforcement Act to reinstate Mr. Walsh’s operator’s licence. Without a licence, he cannot carry on his trade.

If he cannot carry on his trade, he will continue to lack the funds to pay the arrears and, potentially, to pay further support to Ms. Pickett. [ 77 ] I shall require the parties to exchange income tax information annually, for the duration of the spousal support obligation. II. Matrimonial Property [ 78 ] I understand that the parties were judicially requested to prepare statements of their matrimonial property. While affidavits were filed, no Matrimonial Property Statements in the form required by the Matrimonial Property Regulation and s. 31 of the Matrimonial Property Act were filed.

The Court of Appeal clearly directs that the date of trial is the date for the determination of the assets of the parties, the valuation of the assets, and the division of the assets: Hodgson v Hodgson , 2005 ABCA 13 , paras 18 – 22 ; 30, 32 – 33.

The parties, however, tended to focus on the assets as they were at the time of separation rather than at the time of trial. [ 79 ] Nonetheless, I have proceeded with the division of matrimonial property analysis because • the parties had been in the system for some time and a further delay to a new trial date (when I would be available, being seized) would not be in their interests; • the parties did not and do not have significant assets; in the circumstances, given the evidence, I could make reasonable determinations respecting assets and their value on the date of trial; • I had the evidence that the parties considered important and that the parties had been addressing for some time; and • “the [trial] process (1) [allowed me] to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) [allowed me] to apply the law to the facts, and (3) [was] a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result” than adjourning for further information: adapting Hryniak v Mauldin , 2014 SCC 7 , [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, Karakatsanis J at para 49.

A. Assets 1. Inapplicable Property Categories [ 80 ] The parties did not have any “financial assets” or “corporate, business, or trust interests” at the time of trial or at the time of separation. At neither time were they owed money. At neither time did they own precious metals, collections, works of art, or household items of high value, although, as will be discussed below, the value of the household items they did own was in issue. 2. Real Property [ 81 ] The parties are renting now. Prior to separating, they had been living in a residence in Fort McMurray which they owned (the Greenbrier Property).

It was sold in 2013. On the evidence, the proceeds were paid to mortgagees and used to defray sale costs. No net proceeds remained. No real property interests exist to be divided. 3. Pensions and RRSPs [ 82 ] Despite Ms. Pickett’s assertions, Mr. Walsh did not have a union pension. Neither did he have any pension other than the “profit sharing pension” provided through Kal Tire. [ 83 ] The evidence respecting this pension was inadequate. Mr. Walsh testified that its value was about $5,000. His employer, Kal

Tire, made contributions if it earned profits. The present value of the pension and its employer contributions were not supported by documentary evidence. Neither, though, was Mr. Walsh cross-examined on these points. In particular, he was not cross-examined on tax returns filed as exhibits to (e.g.) his affidavit of December 15, 2014. Mr. Walsh did not testify respecting the timing of his contributions to this plan, besides indicating that he did not commence contributing until he had been with Kal Tire for two years (in 2010).

Neither did he provide testimony or other evidence respecting withdrawals from the plan or plan losses. No argument was made that a higher value should be attributed to the pension. [ 84 ] I observe that even if the amount of the pension were significantly higher than as indicated in testimony, the application of provisions such as ss. 7(3)(c), 8(c), 8(d)(ii), and 8(

f) of the Matrimonial Property Act might have reduced the amount available for distribution. [ 85 ] Nevertheless, in the circumstances, I will consider the full $5,000 of this asset as being available for division. [ 86 ] Ms. Pickett did not testify to having any pension. 4. Vehicles [ 87 ] Ms. Pickett did not testify to owing any vehicle at the time of trial. [ 88 ] Mr. Walsh owns a 2008 Dodge Ram truck. This was acquired during the marriage. However, after the parties separated, Mr. Walsh took on responsibility for the full amount owing on the vehicle, some $15,000. Mr.

Walsh testified that at the time of separation this amount exceeded the value of the vehicle. Mr. Walsh paid the amount owing. The vehicle is not now worth more than $15,000. Mr. Walsh should receive a credit for absorbing the full amount of this matrimonial debt. I therefore value this asset at nil for the purposes of property division. I note that an adjustment respecting matrimonial debt relates to truck payments. This is discussed below. 5. Other Property [ 89 ] The evidence did not disclose Ms. Pickett’s current personal property.

On the evidence, she did come into possession of some personal items after leaving the matrimonial home but the the majority of goods, in her testimony, were left behind. It would be fair to conclude that the evidence did not support any finding that she has amassed personal property of any substantial value. Much of her present property would have been acquired after separation. For the purposes of division, her personal property, which I will assume is used minor personal and household items, shall be valued at nil. [ 90 ] The parties’ attention was focused on goods acquired during the course of the marriage.

There was (with one exception referred to below) no reference in evidence to any s. 7(2) property. I will review the major goods and categories of goods at issue. Some of the property was sold or thrown away after the separation. I mention this property only to confirm that it was not dissipated. [ 91 ] There was no expert valuation evidence. I might have been justified in rejecting all of the parties’ opinions respecting valuation on the ground that they were interested litigants: see White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co. , 2015 SCC 23 , Cromwell J at para 45.

However, the goods in question are consumer goods about which ordinary consumers such as the parties are qualified to have opinions. Indeed, informal and formal marketplaces depend on ordinary consumers having opinions about prices and values. [ 92 ] I have preferred the testimony of Mr. Walsh to that of Ms. Pickett respecting the valuation of property. Ms. Pickett tended to provide values that had no foundation in past events or in objective comparators. Mr.

Walsh, in contrast, provided detailed testimony about the history of the assets in question, including their purchase price and circumstances of purchase; he also provided photographs of goods and attempted to provide objective references to comparator prices, as in the internet searches attached to Exhibits 13 and 14. This is hardly the best evidence, but at least it is some evidence. Mr. Walsh also referred to present-day value rather than purchase price.

The evidential showings were proportional to the nature of the goods. [ 93 ] The appropriate orientation to the valuation of these goods is not their original purchase price, their replacement value as new items, or their value on the date of separation. Rather, the valuation issue is what the goods would fetch if sold on the date of trial. My conclusions respecting values of the items reflect the parties’ testimony, considered in terms of the natural market for the goods. That is, the value of the goods reflects the amounts that would be paid in a yard sale, garage sale, or rummage sale.

I took into account that the prices of used goods are driven down by the availability of low-priced new goods through a variety of retail outlets, including Walmart and “liquidation” stores. Moreover, the used good market has been expanded through online media such as Kijiji. As supply increases, price goes down. (a) 1995 Sportsman Travel Trailer [ 94 ] Ms. Pickett valued the travel trailer at $3,260, and attributed the further amount of $1,000 to the trailer contents including a barbeque, bedding, pots and pans, and camping accessories. Mr.

Walsh observed that the value of the personal items (like bedding) was insignificant, since no one would purchase these goods used. Further, items like pots and pans can be purchased very cheaply new at (e.g.) Walmart. The contents had no significant value. Mr. Walsh estimated the potential sales price for the travel trailer at $2000 - $2,500. However, in Exhibits 13 and 14, the “book value” of the unit (supported by a “price checker” search) showed an average retail of $3260; and Mr. Walsh wrote that the item could be sold for about $3,100. I set the value of this trailer at $3,000. (

b) dirt bikes

[ 95 ] These were motorcycles valued by Ms. Pickett at $2,500 each. Mr. Walsh testified that they were purchased 9 years ago. They were Honda “knock-offs”. The purchase price was $2,600 total for both bikes. One was wrecked. The other was given to their son and later sold. The property no longer exists and is not relevant to the matrimonial property division. (

c) Konker Motors 400 Quad [ 96 ] Ms. Pickett valued this vehicle at $2,500. Mr. Walsh testified that it was purchased new for $4,800. Three months after it was purchased the manufacturer went out of business. Parts cannot be obtained for it. It requires brakes and a carburetor. It has not been operable since 2013. I find that it has no significant value. (

d) couch - sectional [ 97 ] Ms. Pickett testified that this item retailed for $3,200 and was bought used for $2,000. Mr. Walsh testified that it was bought used for $475 second-hand. It was thrown out because it was soiled. The property no longer exists and had no significant value. (

e) bedroom set [ 98 ] Ms. Pickett valued the bedroom set at $1,000 (including a bedframe and two dressers), which she claimed was purchased new. Mr. Walsh testified that the set was purchased used from friends who were moving back to Newfoundland for $200. The set did not include a box spring mattress. I find that the present-day value of the bedroom set is $100. (

f) freezer [ 99 ] Ms. Pickett valued the freezer at $800 and testified that it was purchased new. Mr. Walsh testified that it was purchased second hand from the friends who moved back to Newfoundland, for $250. I set its present-day value at $100. (

g) laptop computers [ 100 ] Ms. Pickett referred to two laptop computers, an Acer and a Dell. The Acer was Ms. Pickett’s. It was three years old. The Dell computer was purchased for Mr. Walsh by his union. He is entitled to retain it so long as he remains with the union. The Dell, then, is exempted from the matrimonial property division either under s. 7(2)(

a) of the Matrimonial Property Act (gift from a third party) or because it belongs to the union and not to Mr. Walsh. No estimate of the value of the Acer laptop was in evidence. Because of its low value, I do not take it into account in the division of matrimonial property. (

h) desk top computer [ 101 ] Ms. Pickett referred to a desk top computer with printer and scanner. Mr. Walsh testified that this set had been 8 – 9 years old and obsolete before it was disposed of prior to the parties’ separation. It is not relevant to the division of matrimonial property. (

i) Sony video camera [ 102 ] Ms. Pickett and a friend won this camera. Ms. Pickett claimed that it was in Mr. Walsh’s possession. Mr. Walsh denied possessing the camera and did not know what happened to it. I find that it is not in Mr. Walsh’s possession and it is no longer is matrimonial property. (

j) Canon digital camera [ 103 ] This camera is 5 – 6 years old. Mr. Walsh testified that it was purchased for about $200 and it is still worth about $50. I adopt that valuation for the purposes of the distribution of matrimonial property. (

k) goods in shed [ 104 ] Ms. Pickett referred to some golf clubs, skis, ski equipment, and some Christmas decorations left in a shed, with a total value of $3,000. Mr. Walsh denied having the golf clubs, on the grounds that neither he nor Ms. Pickett play golf. The skis and ski equipment belong to the parties’ son. The nature of the Christmas decorations was not particularized and I find that the decorations have no significant value. I do not take these goods into account in the division of matrimonial property. (

l) home furnishings [ 105 ] The matrimonial home contained the usual sorts of items, including pots and pans, curtains, bedding, and small appliances. Ms. Pickett provided a detailed list of home furnishings in Exhibit 10. [ 106 ] Mr. Walsh provided his estimate of the value of many of the items referred to by Ms. Pickett in his Exhibits 13 and 14. He valued the household goods (net of goods discussed above) at about $1,160. I will round up that valuation of the used household items to $1,200.

[ 107 ] The stove, dishwasher, and clothes washer and drier were sold along with the Greenbrier Property. [ 108 ] I realize that a home contains a lot of small goods which may have a low present-day value but that are costly to buy new when one is starting a new home. Ms. Pickett’s award of spousal support, though, takes into account the costs of starting over. Care must be taken not to double-count the costs of starting over in the property division. (

m) personal items [ 109 ] Ms. Pickett identified four personal items that she simply wanted returned to her – a graduation ring, a necklace and pendant (“#1 Mom”), a horseshoe ring, and a “bunny clip” dental device, which I understood to be a type of retainer. She valued this clip at $400. [ 110 ] Mr. Walsh denied having any of these items. [ 111 ] If any of these items are located in Mr. Walsh’s possession, I direct him to return them to Ms. Pickett. B. Debt [ 112 ] The parties did not testify to current matrimonial debt. Instead, the testimony related to debts existing at the time of separation.

This focus was fair so far as it went, since if a party had been compelled to take on responsibility for more than his or her proper share of earlier debt, that should be taken into account in the division of property. [ 113 ] I discussed the 2008 Dodge truck loan above and will not reconsider it here, except in connection with the line of credit matter below. 1. Greenbrier Property [ 114 ] The Greenbrier Property was subject to two mortgages. The first mortgagee had indicated in June 2012 that it would not renew its mortgage because the value of the property was less than the amount owed.

The parties were not in a position to remortgage the property. Since it was going to be foreclosed no mortgage payments were made after June 2012. The parties obtained a court order permitting the sale of the home to pay the mortgage debts. The home was sold and the mortgage debts discharged. Both parties were responsible for the mortgage amounts and both benefitted by the payment of the mortgagees. [ 115 ] Ms. Pickett’s concern is that Mr. Walsh remained in the house without paying the mortgage while she had to pay rent. Mr. Walsh, though, was looking after the children of the marriage.

He was responsible for the upkeep of the home and putting it into a condition in which it could be sold. Ms. Pickett benefitted from the non-payment of the mortgage; she didn’t pay personally. I find no unfairness in these circumstances warranting recognition in the property division. 2. Direct Energy Bill [ 116 ] Ms. Pickett was concerned that a bill in the amount of $1,072.40 was received from Direct Energy after the sale of the Greenbrier Property: Exhibit 3. [ 117 ] Both parties were named as responsible for the bill.

The bill was for power required for the Greenbrier Property prior to and including the date of sale. It was a legitimate claim against both parties. [ 118 ] The evidence did not disclose who actually paid this bill. In particular, it did not support a finding that Ms. Pickett personally paid 100% of the amount owing in relation to this bill. I will assume that both shouldered their equal responsibilities for the bill. It therefore has no impact on the property division. 3. Telus Telephone Bill [ 119 ] Ms. Pickett was concerned with a telephone bill that she received after the separation in the amount of $400.

This bill was in her name. [ 120 ] Mr. Walsh provided an explanation. The bill related to her telephone and internet service after separation. This was not a matrimonial debt but Ms. Pickett’s debt. It should therefore not be taken into account in the property division. 4. Ms. Pickett’s Car Loan [ 121 ] Ms. Pickett retained a 2010 Dodge Charger sedan automobile after the separation. It was financed. The security agreement named both parties. The vehicle loan went into arrears. The last payment was made in September 2012. Mr. Walsh’s testimony – which was not contradicted by Ms.

Pickett – was that she left the vehicle with him so it could be repossessed. It was repossessed in January 2013 and Ms. Pickett was provided with a Notice of Intention to Sell or other Disposition by the creditor, Scotia Dealer Advantage Inc. of British Columbia: Exhibit 2. The vehicle, apparently, was sold. [ 122 ] No expert evidence respecting British Columbia law was tendered. If, however, the governing law were that of British

Columbia, it appears that the creditor would have been entitled to seize or sue; the creditor elected to sue; and so the debt was extinguished: Personal Property Security Act , RSBC 1996, c. 359, s. 67. If the governing law were Alberta law, the creditor could have seized and sued: Personal Property Security Act , RSA 2000, c. P-7, s. 61(4). The financing agreement was not in evidence so no firm conclusions may be drawn. [ 123 ] In any event, both British Columbia and Alberta would have two-year limitation periods to commence the action for the outstanding amount of the arrears: Limitations Act , RSA 2000, c.

L-12, s. 3; Limitation Act , SBC 2012, c. 13, s. 6. The Alberta Limitations Act would apply to an action commenced in Alberta pursuant to s. 12. If the vehicle was sold in February, 2013 as indicated in the Notice and if time began to run for limitation purposes from that date (it could have started to run earlier and there is no evidence supporting a finding that it started to run later), the limitation period expired in early February, 2015. There was no evidence that any action had been commenced against Ms. Pickett or Mr.

Walsh respecting the car loan. [ 124 ] I conclude that this matrimonial debt was effectively extinguished by the time of trial. 5. Truck Debt and the Line of Credit [ 125 ] After the parties separated some payments respecting the Dodge truck were made from Ms. Pickett’s account. Ms. Pickett provided evidence that she was reimbursed for one of these payments. However, payments totalling about $1,000 were also taken from her account after separation. The evidence did not support a finding that she was reimbursed for these payments. [ 126 ] Mr.

Walsh provided evidence that he had been responsible for the parties’ line of credit debt (with TD Auto Finance). At the time of separation the amount owing was about $2,000. He did not provide evidence of what the current balance is or of the amounts of his payments. [ 127 ] The line of credit would be a matrimonial debt, with each party having 50% responsibility for it, or – as well as it can be determined on the evidence – with each party having responsibility for $1,000 of the debt. But since Ms. Pickett overpaid respecting the truck (which I have permitted Mr.

Walsh to retain without including its value for equalization purposes) she has a set-off against her line of credit obligation. Hence, her overpayment credit and her line of credit responsibility cancel one another out. [ 128 ] There is no extant matrimonial debt requiring equalization and no evidence that Ms. Pickett should receive compensation for matrimonial debt that was unfairly made her responsibility after separation. C. Equalization [ 129 ] The following matrimonial property remains in Mr.

Walsh’s possession or control: Property Value pension (RRSP) $5,000 2008 Dodge truck travel trailer bedroom set freezer digital camera home furnishings $ 0 $3,000 $ 100 $ 100 $ 50 $1,200

Total $9,450 [ 130 ] Under s. 7(4) of the Matrimonial Property Act , taking the factors in s. 8 under consideration, the value of this property should be divided equally. Mr. Walsh shall therefore pay to Ms. Pickett, as an equalization payment, the amount of $4,725 ($9,450 divided by 2). [ 131 ] I confirm that Mr. Walsh shall retain his pension or RRSP. [ 132 ] In light of Mr. Walsh’s current health and financial circumstances, the $4,725 shall be paid to Ms.

Pickett in 8 installments of $590.63, with the installments being due on the following days: July 1, 2016 October 1, 2016 January 1, 2017 April 1, 2017 July 1, 2017 October 1, 2017 January 1, 2018 April 1, 2018 [ 133 ] Of course, Mr. Walsh may chose (finances permitting) to pay all amounts owing by some earlier time. III. Occupation Rent [ 134 ] After the parties separated, Ms. Pickett rented accommodations. Mr. Walsh remained in the Greenbrier Property. The children remained in the home with him. The Greenbrier Property was mortgaged. The last mortgage payment was made in June 2012. So, unlike Ms.

Pickett, after separation Mr. Walsh made neither rent nor mortgage payments. Should Ms. Pickett receive some additional compensation from Mr. Walsh in the nature of occupation rent? [ 135 ] In my opinion, occupation rent was not payable by Mr. Walsh. I rely on the first principle identified by Slatter J, as he then was, in Kazmierczak v Kazmierczak , 2001 ABQB 610 , affd 2003 ABCA 227 at para 96 (QB): (

a) The spouse who is not in possession generally should not be entitled to occupation rent if the other spouse is occupying the premises with the children of the marriage, and is not making a claim for support or a contribution towards the expenses of the house. The children were with Mr. Walsh. He did not make a claim for spousal support or for a contribution towards the expenses of the house. Ms. Pickett’s expenses were been taken into account in the spousal support awarded to her. I also refer to my comments respecting the Greenbrier Property debt above. IV.

Summary: Elements of the Decision A. Spousal Support [ 136 ] The spousal support order shall include the following terms: 1. No ongoing spousal support is payable by Mr. Walsh to Ms. Pickett effective September 1, 2015 until further court order based on a material change in Mr. Walsh’s circumstances. 2. Mr. Walsh’s obligation to pay ongoing spousal support to Ms. Pickett shall terminate on December 31, 2018. 3. Mr.

Walsh remains responsible for retroactive spousal support and spousal support arrears as well as associated interest and charges for the period February 1, 2013 to August 31, 2015 (the “Arrears”), as set by the Eidsvik Order. 4. There shall be a stay of Mr. Walsh’s obligation to pay the Arrears on the condition that Mr. Walsh pay $200 per month towards the discharge of those Arrears, commencing May 1, 2016 and payable on the first day of each month thereafter. B. Matrimonial Property [ 137 ] Mr. Walsh shall make an equalization payment respecting the parties’ matrimonial property in the amount of $4,725.

This amount shall be paid to Ms. Pickett in 8 installments of $590.63, with the installments being due on the following days: July 1, 2016

October 1, 2016 January 1, 2017 April 1, 2017 July 1, 2017 October 1, 2017 January 1, 2018 April 1, 2018. C. Costs [ 138 ] Each party shall bear his or her own costs. Heard on the 25 th day of February, 2016. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 14 th day of April, 2016. W.N. Renke J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Sonja Kim Pickett Self-Represented Litigant John Peter Walsh Self-Represented Litigant