R v Hok, 2016 ABQB 335

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Hok, 2016 ABQB 335 Date: 20160620 Docket: 1504 00745, 1504 00747, 1504 00746 Registry: Grande Prairie Between: Action No. 1504 00747, 1504 00745 Shirley A. Hok Applicant -and- Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta Respondent -and- The Honourable David R. Shynkar, Provincial Court Judge, Provincial Court of Alberta Respondent (Not a party to this application) And Between: Action No. 1504 00746 Shirley A. Hok Applicant -and- Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta Respondent -and- The Honourable John D. Holmes, Provincial Court Judge, Provincial Court of Alberta Respondent

(Not a party to this application) _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Gerald A. Verville _______________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] The applicant, Shirley A. Hok, seeks judicial review of three decisions by two Judges of the Provincial Court of Alberta. In each case, Ms. Hok had applied to the Provincial Court pursuant to s 507.1 of the Criminal Code , RSC 1985 c C-46, for the issuance of process (i.e. a "private prosecution"), and in each case, the judge declined to do so. [ 2 ] On July 22, 2015, Judge John D.

Holmes declined to issue process against Cst. Brennan P. Goble, a member of the RCMP stationed in Grande Prairie, Alberta. Judge Holmes heard Ms. Hok's application in camera and, at the conclusion of the hearing, provided oral reasons for his decision not to issue process against Cst. Goble. [ 3 ] On September 16, 2015, Judge David R. Shynkar heard in camera applications by Ms. Hok in two separate but related matters to issue process against Michelle Sapp (also known as Michelle Baron) and D.B. The Crown advised that D.B. is a young person as defined in the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002 c C-1.

In written reasons dated September 18, 2015 (filed September 22, 2015), Judge Shynkar declined to issue process. The decision contains D.B.’s full name. [ 4 ] Though she does not identify the remedies by name, the Applicant asks this Court to apply the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and mandamus to review and quash the decisions of Judge Holmes and Judge Shynkar and compel these Provincial Court Judges to issue process against Cst. Goble, Ms. Baron and D.B. [ 5 ] Ms. Hok also seeks various other "remedies".

These "remedies" include dealing with Judge Holmes' and Judge Shynkar's alleged defamatory statements, sanctioning or reprimanding the two Provincial Court Judges and compelling the Crown Prosecutor's office to provide a "decent, unbiased… good and ethical Crown Prosecutor" to prosecute the offences identified in her private information. [ 6 ] As agent for the Attorney General, Crown Counsel appeared before Judge Holmes and Judge Shynkar under s 507.1(4) of the Criminal Code , and filed submissions opposing Ms. Hok's application before this Court. The Crown takes issue with some of the materials that Ms.

Hok has filed in the present application and suggests that it is new evidence that was not presented to Judge Holmes or Judge Shynkar. [ 7 ] Further, the Crown seeks an order from this Court directing that Judge Shynkar’s written decision be revised to identify the young person as D.B. While the decision has been filed it has not been published. In my view the appropriate manner to deal with this issue is for the Crown to make a formal application before Judge Shynkar in Provincial Court.

Background [ 8 ] Michelle Baron, her husband, Ryan Baron, and their children were at all material times next-door- neighbors of Ms. Hok in Grande Prairie. D.B. is Ms. Baron's minor son. They had been neighbors since about March of 2011. There were ongoing conflicts between them for many years. [ 9 ] The neighbours accused each other of various things including verbal attacks, gawking into and out of each other's homes, damage to property, trespass, inappropriate or suggestive gestures, taunting, threatening gestures, and so on. Ms. Hok alleged that Mr.

Baron has driven into her garbage cart on more than one occasion, and that he or the Barons' children have damaged her property and have encouraged their dog to trample on her property. Throughout this dispute, Ms. Hok lodged over 850 complaints (by her own admission) against the Barons with the RCMP, municipal By-law Enforcement officers, Members of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta, Members of Parliament, and others. The Barons have also lodged complaints against Ms. Hok with the RCMP. [ 10 ] This animosity culminated with Cst. Goble laying criminal harassment charges against Mr. Baron and Ms.

Hok on June 26, 2015. Prior to June 26, 2016, Ms. Hok had had no dealings with Cst. Goble, though she has a long history of dealings with other members of the RCMP. Cst. Goble issued an Appearance Notice to Ms. Hok dated June 26, 2015.

[ 11 ] While Ms. Hok was satisfied with the charge against Mr. Baron, she was of the view that Cst. Goble went too far in also charging her. Ms. Hok alleges that by laying the criminal harassment charge against her, Cst. Goble also breached s 264 (criminal harassment) of the Criminal Code . She further alleges that Cst. Goble contravened s 300 (publishing of defamatory libel known to be false) and that his actions in charging her contravened s 128(a) (misconduct of an officer executing process). [ 12 ] Through the disclosure process in her own criminal harassment proceedings, Ms.

Hok became aware of two emails dated June 30, 2015 that were sent by Michelle Baron and D.B. to a Cst. Skidmore, also a member of the RCMP in Grande Prairie. Cst. Skidmore then forwarded these emails to Cst. Goble. Ms. Hok alleges that the content of these emails was false and therefore sought to lay private informations against Ms. Baron and D.B. Each of these informations includes three counts: s 137 (fabricating evidence), s 140(1)(a) (public mischief) and s 300 (publishing defamatory libel known to be false). [ 13 ] Throughout the documentation that Ms.

Hok has filed in the judicial review applications, including sworn affidavits, and in her hearings before Judge Holmes and Judge Shynkar, Ms. Hok accuses the RCMP, mental health authorities, the Crown Prosecutors and the Provincial Court of various conspiracies against her. She repeatedly accuses the Barons of being pathological liars, and various judicial or police officers of acting unethically. She also accuses Mr. Baron of being part of the "U of A mafia". Private Informations [ 14 ] The relevant portion of s 504 of the Criminal Code provides: 504.

In what cases justice may receive information Any one who, on reasonable grounds, believes that a person has committed an indictable offence may lay an information in writing and under oath before a justice, and the justice shall receive the information, where it is alleged (

a) that the person has committed, anywhere, an indictable offence that may be tried in the province in which the justice resides, and that the person (

i) is or is believed to be, or (ii) resides or is believed to reside, within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice; (

b) that the person, wherever he may be, has committed an indictable offence within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice ... [ 15 ] In the case of privately-laid information, s 507.1 sets out the process for a hearing by a provincial court judge. This

section states in part: 507.1(1) Referral when private prosecution A justice who receives an information laid under

section 504, other than an information referred to in subsection 507(1), shall refer it to a provincial court judge, ... to consider whether to compel the appearance of the accused on the information. 507.1(2) Summons or warrant A judge ... to whom an information is referred under subsection (1) and who considers that a case for doing so is made out shall issue either a summons or warrant for the arrest of the accused to compel him or her to attend before a justice to answer to a charge of the offence charged in the information. 507.1(3) Conditions for issuance The judge ... may issue a summons or warrant only if he or she (

a) has heard and considered the allegations of the informant and the evidence of witnesses; (

b) is satisfied that the Attorney General has received a copy of the information; (

c) is satisfied that the Attorney General has received reasonable notice of the hearing under paragraph (a); and (

d) has given the Attorney General an opportunity to attend the hearing under paragraph (

a) and to cross-examine and call witnesses and to present any relevant evidence at the hearing. 507.1(4) Appearance of Attorney General The Attorney General may appear at the hearing held under paragraph (3)(

a) without being deemed to intervene in the proceeding. 507.1(5) Information deemed not to have been laid

If the judge ... does not issue a summons or warrant under subsection (2), he or she shall endorse the information with a statement to that effect.

Unless the informant, not later than six months after the endorsement, commences proceedings to compel the judge or designated justice to issue a summons or warrant, the information is deemed never to have been laid. … [ 16 ] A s 507.1 hearing judge has two obligations: (1) determine whether the private information is valid on its face and (2) determine whether the evidence discloses a prima facie case of all elements of the offences identified in the information: R v Park , 2014 ONSC 1733 [ Park ]; R v Grishpun , 2004 BCCA 579 [ Grishpun ]; R v Halik , 2010 ONSC 125 [ Halik ]. [ 17 ] In a s 507.1 hearing, the judge weighs competing interests and protections.

They include the right of a private informant to seek justice and the right of a potential accused to not be called before the court to respond to charges without just cause: R v D'Angola , 2015 BCSC 1337 [ D'Angola ] at para 111 ; R v Edge , 2004 ABPC 55 at paras 23-25 . [ 18 ] The s 507.1 hearing is an additional safeguard to protect against "spurious allegations, vexatious claims, and frivolous complaints barren of evidentiary support or legal validity": R v McHale 2010 ONCA 361 at para 74 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2010] SCCA No 290 (see also R v Ambrosi , 2014 BCCA 123 [ Ambrosi CA] at para 24 ). [ 19 ] No appeal lies against a decision of a s 507.1 hearing judge; the appropriate way to proceed is through an application for certiorari and mandamus : R v Ambrosi , 2012 BCSC 1261 at para 40 [ Ambrosi SC], aff'd 2014 BCCA 123 [ Ambrosi CA], leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2014] SCCA No 320. [ 20 ] The remedy of mandamus allows a reviewing court to require a judicial officer (in this case Judge Holmes or Judge Shynkar) to exercise his or her jurisidiction: D'Angola at para 103 .

However, this remedy is limited as it cannot be used to compel a judicial officer to exercise his or her jurisdiction in a particular manner: Ambrosi SC; D'Angola at para 103 . Standard of Review [ 21 ] Certiorari may be invoked only where there has been a lack of jurisdiction or where jurisdiction has been lost: Ambrosi SC at para 31 . For mandamus to lie, the reviewing court must determine whether the s 507.1 hearing judge made a jurisdictional error, or failed to exercise his or her discretion judicially, according to law: R v Thorburn , 2010 ABQB 390 [ Thorburn ] at para 11 ; Park at para 10 .

When considering whether the hearing judge exercised his discretion judicially, the reviewing court should defer on questions of fact: Thorburn at para 12 .

A provincial court judge's decision not to issue process from a private information is a question of mixed law and fact, and "should not be interfered with provided the record discloses facts that may be the basis for those decisions" ( Thorburn at para 13 , emphasis in the original). [ 22 ] In other words, issues of jurisdiction are reviewed on a correctness standard and the review of the decision of the s 507.1 hearing judge is done on a reasonableness standard. Analysis [ 23 ] The Crown objects to the so-called new evidence that Ms. Hok has purported to file in the present applications.

While some of what she has filed is styled as an "affidavit", much if not all of it is essentially argument or a re-hashing of evidence already before the Court. Some of it is also irrelevant to these applications. Accordingly, I attach little to no weight to the new evidence. [ 24 ] I turn now to a review of the respective decisions of Judge Holmes and Judge Shynkar. Judge Holmes' Decision [ 25 ] The oral decision of Judge Holmes is contained on pages 34-36 of the July 22, 2015 amended hearing transcript, (Holmes Transcript). [ 26 ] After hearing evidence from Ms.

Hok, reviewing her sworn information and other documents filed in support of the s 507.1 hearing, and hearing submissions from Ms. Hok and the Crown, Judge Holmes found that the private information against Cst. Goble was valid on its face. However, he found there was no evidence to support the elements of the various offences, as set out below. Count 1 -

Section 264 (Criminal Harassment) [ 27 ] Sections 264 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code state:

(1) No person shall, without lawful authority and knowing that another person is harassed or recklessly as to whether the other person is harassed, engage in conduct referred to in subsection (2) that causes that other person reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear for their safety or the safety of anyone known to them.

(2) The conduct mentioned in subsection (1) consists of (

a) repeatedly following from place to place the other person or anyone known to them; (

b) repeatedly communicating with, either directly or indirectly, the other person or anyone known to them;

(

c) besetting or watching the dwelling-house, or place where the other person, or anyone known to them, resides, works, carries on business or happens to be; or (

d) engaging in threatening conduct directed at the other person or any member of their family. [ 28 ] Judge Holmes determined with respect to this count that there needed to be evidence that Cst. Goble had no authority to act as he did. Ms. Hok asserted that Cst. Goble acted outside the scope of his authority after she informed him that her neighbour, Mr. Baron, was an unreliable and untruthful person.

In his decision Judge Holmes stated at page 35/ll 35-36: ...A policeman generally doesn't have all of the information, cannot make a decision in all cases who is telling the truth about something... [ 29 ] He also found no evidence that Cst. Goble would have known that laying the charge against Ms. Hok was causing or would have caused Ms. Hok to reasonably fear for her safety (page 36/ll 2-4). Count 2 -

Section 300 (Publishing Defamatory Libel) [ 30 ]

Section 300 of the Criminal Code states: Every one who publishes a defamatory libel that he knows is false is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. [ 31 ] With respect to the second count, Judge Holmes found no evidence established that Cst. Goble would have known that Mr. Baron's information was false. Though Ms. Hok believed that information to be false, there was no evidence to point to Cst. Goble's knowledge of the truthfulness of the information (page 36/ll 6-11). Count 3 -

Section 128(a) (Misconduct of Officers Executing Process) [ 32 ]

Section 128 states: Every peace officer or coroner who, being entrusted with the execution of a process, wilfully (

a) misconducts himself in the execution of the process, or (

b) makes a false return to the process, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. [ 33 ] Finally with respect to the third count, Judge Holmes stated: … I'm not satisfied that there was any evidence here before me that Constable Goble breached any duty relating to the execution of the process. ... … I couldn't find that in any of the evidence that was here today other than perhaps Ms. Hok's belief that that's the case. (page 36/ll 14- 16, ll 20-22). [ 34 ] Because of the insufficiency of the evidence, Judge Holmes declined to issue process.

Review of Judge Holmes' Decision [ 35 ] From a review of the transcript of the hearing before Judge Holmes, the material filed in relation to the hearing and on considering the submissions of the parties in the proceeding, I am satisfied that Judge Holmes acted within the jurisdiction afforded him pursuant to s 507.1 of the Criminal Code . Having found this, certiorari is not available. [ 36 ] This finding also limits the availability of mandamus .

Because Judge Holmes acted within his jurisdiction, this Court can only grant the remedy of mandamus if Judge Holmes failed to exercise his discretion judicially, according to law: Thorburn ; Park . [ 37 ] The overall lack of admissible evidence leads me to conclude that Judge Holmes exercised his discretion not to issue process judicially. Though Ms. Hok submitted large amounts of documents both for the s 507.1 hearing and for this judicial review, much of what she calls evidence is either not relevant to these proceedings or is really in the nature of argument.

Judge Holmes' findings of fact and his exercise of discretion are reasonable and entitled to deference. [ 38 ] Though I have concluded that Judge Holmes' findings were reasonable, I offer the following observations with respect to the various elements of the offences. Count 1 -

Section 264 (Criminal Harassment) [ 39 ] When considering the specific elements of the offence of criminal harassment, I note that Cst. Goble is a duly sworn police officer. Though Ms. Hok alleges that he is deceitful and unethical, there is no evidence to establish this. His dealings with Ms. Hok were within the scope of his duties and, therefore, he was acting with authority. This finding alone disposes of this offence. A further examination of the other elements of the offence leads to the same result. There is no evidence that Cst. Goble repeatedly followed Ms.

Hok from place to place, repeatedly communicated with her, directly or indirectly, beset or watched her dwelling place (or any other

place) or engaged in threatening conduct directed at her. Though Ms. Hok alleges that she is the victim of a broad police conspiracy,there is no evidence to support her assertion that she fears for her safety because of Cst. Goble's actions. Count 2 -

Section 300 (Libel Known to Be False) [40] In my view, determination of the elements of the offense described in s 300 requires consideration of ss 298-299 of theCriminal Code (in addition to those elements identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Lucas, (SCC), [1998] 1SCR 439 (SCC)). These sections state: 298(1) A "defamatory libel" is matter published, without lawful justification or excuse, that is likely to injure the reputation of anyperson by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or that is designed to insult the person of or concerning whom it is published. 298(2) A defamatory libel may be expressed directly or by insinuation or irony (

a) in words legibly marked upon any substance, or (

b) by any object signifying a defamatory libel otherwise than by words. 299 A person publishes a libel when he (

a) exhibits it in public, (

b) causes it to be read or seen, or (

c) shows or delivers it, or causes it to be shown or delivered, with intent that it should be read or seen by the person whom it defames orby any other person. [41] I am satisfied that there is no evidence to support the various elements. Nothing suggested that Cst. Goble had publishedanything. The only thing that might be considered a "published matter", in my view, is the Appearance Notice. However, if that were thecase, then every Appearance Notice issued by a police officer would fall under s 300 of the Criminal Code. Surely, that is not whatParliament intended. The dearth of other evidence in my view confirms that Judge Holmes' analysis was reasonable. Count 3 -

Section 128(a) (Misconduct of Officers) [42] Again, the lack of evidence of the elements of the third count is evident. There simply is no proof that Cst. Goble actedwilfully or that any of his actions constitute misconduct. Judge Shynkar's Decision [43] As noted above, Judge Shynkar heard oral evidence from Ms. Hok and considered oral and written submissions filed by herand Crown counsel (as agent for the Attorney General) on September 16, 2015. He then issued written reasons dated September 18,2015. The hearing dealt with two private informations; one against Ms. Baron and the other against D.B.

Other than the names andparticulars of each accused and other minor discrepancies, the two informations are substantially the same. [44] Though he noted that each information contained a superfluous "preamble" and "additional surplusage in the wording of theindividual counts", Judge Shynkar found that each information was valid on its face. [45] Central to his inquiry were the contents of a short email chain that begins with an email from Cst. Skidmore to Ms. Barondated June 29, 2015 requesting "a detailed statement in relation to the incident tonight with Shirley Hok". Ms.

Baron subsequentlyresponded on June 30, 2015 with a description of Ms. Hok's alleged behaviour that Ms. Baron found odd and offensive. [46] D.B. also sent an email describing the same or similar events on that day. Subsequently, on July 1, 2015, Cst. Skidmoreforwarded Ms. Baron's and D.B.'s emails to Cst. Goble. [47] Ms. Hok's evidence was that the behaviours described did not occur. She stated her belief that Ms. Baron and D.B. made their"false allegations" maliciously, for the purpose of seeing criminal proceedings wrongly brought against her, and to embarrass and insulther. [48] Ms.

Hok also adduced evidence in the form of transcripts and documents pertaining to other court proceedings that purport toshow that Ms. Baron and other members of her family have repeatedly provided untrue information to various authorities. She accusedthem of outright lies under oath. Judge Shynkar noted at para 18 of his written decision: The intended function of the exhibits tendered by Ms. Hok was to demonstrate that her neighbors had a long history of harassing her andof lying to the authorities and the Court. Arguably, that would constitute evidence of the intention of [Ms.

Baron and D.B.] to causedifficulty for Ms. Hok by way of the false allegations in the email. [49] Judge Shynkar next turned to a detailed consideration of each element of each offence in the informations. For the purposes ofhis analysis, he assumed that Ms. Hok's version of the facts was true, though he made no findings of fact to that effect. Count 1 -

Section 137 (Fabricating Evidence) [50]

Section 137 of the Criminal Code states:

137. Every one who, with intent to mislead, fabricates anything with intent that it shall be used as evidence in a judicial proceeding,existing or proposed, by any means other than perjury or incitement to perjury is guilty of an indictable offence and liable toimprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years. [51] When considering the first count, Judge Shynkar noted that the

section explicitly excludes perjury.

Section 137 applies to thecreation of a document "with the intention that it be used in a judicial proceeding" (para 21). He found that, in this case, there was noevidence that the email itself was fabricated. Though the contents of the email might be untrue, there was no evidence of anyone'sintention to use the email as evidence in a criminal proceeding. The emails themselves, though part of the disclosure package provided toMs. Hok in her own criminal harassment proceedings, would likely not be admissible as evidence. Rather, they represented informationas to what Ms.

Baron and D.B. might reasonably be expected to say at trial. [52] Accordingly, he found no evidence of the fabrication of anything contemplated in s 137. Count 2 -

Section 140 (Public Mischief) [53]

Section 140 of the Criminal Code states: 140(1) Every one commits public mischief who, with intent to mislead, causes a peace officer to enter on or continue an investigation by (

a) making a false statement that accuses some other person of having committed an offence; (

b) doing anything that is intended to cause some other person to be suspected of having committed an offence that the other person hasnot committed, or to divert suspicion from himself; (

c) reporting that an offence has been committed when it has not been committed; ... [54] Ms. Hok alleged that by intentionally providing false information to the RCMP thus causing the police to commence orcontinue an investigation, Ms. Baron and D.B. contravened s 140 of the Criminal Code. [55] In analyzing the elements of this offence, Judge Shynkar observed that the Appearance Notice in relation to Ms. Hok's owncriminal harassment charge was dated June 26, 2015. The June 29, 2015 email from Cst. Skidmore to Ms. Baron and D.B. requested astatement "in relation to the incident tonight".

Judge Shynkar found that there was no evidence that the provision of the emailedinformation caused a continuation of the previously existing investigation. Moreover, there was no evidence what, if anything, Cst.Goble did upon receiving the email, or whether he actually received it. Judge Shynkar explicitly found that Cst. Skidmore's forwarding ofthe email was not sufficient, by itself, to be considered a continuation or commencement of an investigation. Therefore, he foundinsufficient evidence to support the second count. Count 3 -

Section 300 (Publishing Defamatory Libel) [56] Judge Shynkar conducted a thorough review of s 300 of the Criminal Code (publishing defamatory libel).

In examining thisoffence, Judge Shynkar cited the Supreme Court of Canada case of R v Lucas, (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 439 (SCC), whichidentifies the essential elements: (1) a subjective intent to defame; (2) the impugned statements must go beyond "mere insults" andconstitute such a grave insult as to provoke outrage; and (3) the statement must have the effect of injuring a person's reputation. [57] Assuming for the purposes of his analysis that the description of the behaviour in the emails was false, Judge Shynkarobserved that Ms.

Baron and D.B. would have known it to be false and the emails are therefore some evidence that they sent falseinformation to Cst. Skidmore. However, even with that understanding, on the evidence before the Court, Judge Shynkar found that therewas insufficient evidence of Ms. Baron's and D.B.'s subjective intent to publish defamatory libel. The most that Judge Shynkar couldinfer from the content of the emails and their provision to Cst.

Skidmore was a "subjective intent to provide support for a criminalprosecution" (para 35). [58] He further found at para 36: ... the behaviour described in the email correspondence fell so far short of being gravely insulting and outrageous that it cannot beconsidered even some evidence of that. The behaviour described was essentially Ms. Hok making lewd and insulting gestures andmovements, fully clothed, in her home while visible to her neighbors through the window.

False reporting of such behaviour would alsonot expose her to hatred, contempt or ridicule of the magnitude and seriousness contemplated by the legislation. [59] Lastly, Judge Shynkar found that Ms. Baron's and D.B.'s emails "do not attribute any such horrendous behaviour to Ms. Hok,such that a court could infer reputational damage" (para 38). [60] As a result, Judge Shynkar found there was insufficient evidence to support the third count in each information. Residual Discretion [61] After concluding his analysis on the evidence, Judge Shynkar addressed his concerns regarding Ms. Hok's materials.

In hisview, they exhibited "a disturbing obsessiveness" and contained "a massive aggregation of information accompanied by apparentdifficulty in determining the relative importance and significance of the individual pieces of information" (para 43). He also noted "manydisjointed passages that border on stream of consciousness writing by someone whose mind is very sharp but moving at uncontrollablespeeds, with a consequent loss of coherence" (para 44).

[62] Further, Judge Shynkar noted Ms. Hok's evidence of "many, many complaints about poor treatment by her neighbors, by thepolice, by the medical profession, and by the legal profession" and her admission of "over 800 fax-complaints to the police and by-lawenforcement officers regarding her neighbors" – exclusive of telephone complaints (para 45).

Judge Shynkar stated that the sheer volumeof complaints "increases my concern regarding apparently disordered thought processes" (para 45). [63] Judge Shynkar considered his residual discretion in the context of where the deponent of an information displays significantsymptoms of thought disorders. He stated that even if he had found evidence to support the elements of the offences identified in the twoinformations, relying on Thorburn, he would have invoked his residual discretion and declined to issue process on either information.

Review of Judge Shynkar's Decision [64] I have reviewed the record provided in the Return to Magistrate filed on behalf of Judge Shynkar, together with the transcriptof the hearing, and the material filed with respect to that hearing and this judicial review and considered the oral submissions of theparties. [65] Unlike the hearing before Judge Holmes, Ms.

Hok attempted to adduce more evidence in the hearing before Judge Shynkar.However, there are still concerns about sufficiency of the proof of the elements of each alleged offence. [66] Applying a similar analysis as in my review of Judge Holmes' decision, I am satisfied that Judge Shynkar was acting withinhis jurisdiction during the s 507.1 hearing. The requirements for certiorari are not met. I am also satisfied that Judge Shynkar exercisedhis discretion judicially. He reviewed the evidence and submissions before him and provided cogent written reasons. In my view, hisdecision to not issue process is reasonable.

Therefore, I decline to grant either certiorari or mandamus. [67] Though I have concluded that Judge Shynkar's findings were reasonable, I offer the following observations with respect to thevarious elements of the offences. Count 1 -

Section 137 (Fabricating Evidence) [68] The evidence that is alleged to be fabricated must be admissible: R v Boyko, (SK CA), [1945] 1 WWR 521,[1945] 2 DLR 568 (Sask CA). The emails would not be admissible as evidence. If, at a trial, Ms. Baron or D.B. committed the offence ofperjury, they could be prosecuted under s 132. However, their drafting of the emails and/or sending them to Cst. Skidmore is insufficientto bring their actions within the offence of fabricating evidence. As Judge Shynkar correctly pointed out, s 137 covers things other thanperjury. Count 2 -

Section 140 (Public Mischief) [69] Before considering the actions described in s 140(1)(a)-(c), the Court must first consider whether the impugned actionscaused a peace officer to enter or continue an investigation. It was on this basis that Judge Shynkar disposed of the matter. Though Ms.Hok suggests that the emails caused Cst. Goble to continue his investigation, there simply is no evidence that any additionalinvestigation or charges arose from the allegations contained in the emails from Ms. Baron and D.B. Count 3 -

Section 300 (Publishing Defamatory Libel) [70] Much of Ms. Hok's argument on this offence focuses on the publishing aspect of the offence. She strenuously argued that theemails sent from Ms. Baron and D.B. to Cst. Skidmore, and later forwarded to Cst. Goble are "public" because they are "in the system".In support of this assertion, Ms.

Hok relies on R v Stinchcombe, (SCC), [1991] 3 SCR 326, a leading case on disclosure,where Sopinka J wrote for the Court (at p 333): … [T]he fruits of the investigation which are in the possession of counsel for the Crown are not the property of the Crown for use insecuring a conviction but the property of the public to be used to ensure that justice is done… [71] Though Sopinka J refers in this passage to the fruits of police investigation being public property, in my view, this does notequate with them being public. The word "public" is not defined in the Criminal Code.

Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed defines it as"Relating or belonging to an entire community, state, or nation; Open or available for all to use, share, or enjoy" (s.v. "public"). [72] Disclosure by the Crown of the fruits of police investigation to an accused in criminal proceedings does not result indissemination of the material to the "public".

A member of a community would have no right to attend at the Crown's office or a policestation and ask to view the records in a file. [73] A review of s 298 indicates that there can be no defamatory libel unless something is (1) published, (2) without lawfuljustification or excuse, (3) likely to injure the reputation of any person. If any of these requirements are not met, there can be nodefamatory libel. [74] Notwithstanding my analysis of the meaning of the word "public", the publishing requirement set out in s 299(

c) is met if aperson "shows or delivers the libel, or causes it to be shown or delivered, with intent that it should be read or seen by the person whom itdefames or by any other person". The email from Ms. Baron and D.B. to Cst. Skidmore is sufficient to satisfy the first requirement. [75] A fundamental problem with Ms. Hok's position is the second requirement of this offence. In the circumstances of this case,the response to a police officer's emailed request for particulars of Ms. Hok's alleged behaviours gives Ms. Baron and D.B. a lawfuljustification or excuse.

The emails came about in the course of a police investigation. This does not mean that a response to a policerequest would always be a lawful justification or excuse. However, on the evidence available in this judicial review application, it

suffices. [ 76 ] Finally, with respect to the third requirement, I agree with Judge Shynkar that the reputational injury that Ms. Hok received, if any, as a result of the emails does not rise to the level contemplated in the Criminal Code or in Lucas . [ 77 ] Though I arrived at the same conclusion as Judge Holmes and Judge Shynkar on s 300 of the Criminal Code in a different manner, this does not affect the reasonableness of the exercise of their discretion. The standard of review is reasonableness and not correctness. Other Remedies [ 78 ] As mentioned in paragraph 5 supra Ms. Hock seeks various other remedies.

Suffice it to say, such "remedies" are outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The issues raised are however germane in the context of considering whether to issue a vexatious litigant order. Vexatious Litigant Order [ 79 ] Both of the Provincial Court Judges expressed concerns with respect to the nature of the proceedings before them. As noted above, one of the purposes of the s 507.1 hearing is to protect against vexatious and frivolous litigation.

Judge Shynkar, under the heading “Residual Discretion” (paras 42-50), articulated these concerns in detail. [ 80 ] I share their concerns given the massive amount of paper that Ms. Hok has filed for these applications and her apparent inability to let go of past proceedings. Moreover, by her own admission, Ms. Hok institutes numerous complaints and proceedings when matters are decided differently than how she would decide them – criminally, professionally, or otherwise. Though I note that many of the issues identified in her materials may begin with valid concerns, Ms.

Hok's actions suggest an obsessive inability to let matters go. [ 81 ] Section 23(2) of the Judicature Act , RSA 2000, c J-2, sets out various behaviours that constitute vexatious litigation: 23(2) For the purposes of this Part, instituting vexatious proceedings or conducting a proceeding in a vexatious manner includes, without limitation, any one or more of the following: (

a) persistently bringing proceedings to determine an issue that has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction; (

b) persistently bringing proceedings that cannot succeed or that have no reasonable expectation of providing relief; (

c) persistently bringing proceedings for improper purposes; (

d) persistently using previously raised grounds and issues in subsequent proceedings inappropriately; (

e) persistently failing to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings on the part of the person who commenced those proceedings; (

f) persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions; (

g) persistently engaging in inappropriate courtroom behaviour. [ 82 ] In Chutskoff v Bonora , 2014 ABQB 389 , aff'd 2014 ABCA 444 [ Chutskoff ], Michalyshyn J conducted a thorough review of the law surrounding vexation litigation at paras 80-93. He identified specific indicia that are common in this type of litigation. The list is comprehensive, but not exhaustive. Rather than repeat the indicia verbatim, I highlight those that apply in the present situation (citations omitted):

a) Hopeless proceedings – seeking forms of relief that cannot be obtained;

b) Escalating proceedings – grounds and issues rolling forward into subsequent actions, including simultaneous active overlapping actions;

c) Bringing proceedings for improper purposes – proceedings intended as revenge, harassment, to oppress, or to inflict harm; proceedings conducted in retaliation to other persons' successes or their failure to cooperate with the Applicant, including unwarranted complaints to professional bodies;

d) Unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and misconduct, including claims of judge and lawyer deception, fraud, perjury, conspiracy, tampering of records and transcripts, and other conspiratorial misconduct made without the positive evidence legally required to support such allegations; pleadings replete with allegations that may be unfounded in fact or merely speculative with language that is vitriolic, offensive or defamatory;

e) Scandalous or inflammatory language in pleadings or before the Court. [ 83 ] Any of these indicia are a basis to classify a legal action as vexatious: Chutskoff at para 93 .

In addition to these indicia, when deciding whether a litigant is engaged in vexatious litigation, courts can look at the entire history of the dispute (including activities both inside and outside court) and other litigation and court history: Chutskoff ; Kavanagh v Kavanagh , 2016 ABQB 107 at para 66 . [ 84 ] Recently, in RO v DF , 2016 ABCA 170 , the Alberta Court of Appeal noted that vexatious litigation and vexatious litigants are not the same (at paras 38-39).

What seems to be the distinguishing hallmark is whether the vexatious behaviour is directed at only one party or whether it is directed at a broader range of persons.

[ 85 ] The present case is different from that in RO , as Ms. Hok has taken issue with many people. Though some of the targets of her complaints (including Cst. Goble and other members of the RCMP) are connected in some fashion to the ongoing neighbourhood dispute between Ms. Hok and the Barons, it is clear from the evidence before the Court that Ms. Hok's actions are not directed solely at the Barons. [ 86 ] I turn now to consider the evidence before the Court (much of it provided by Ms. Hok herself) and the other documents filed by Ms. Hok to determine whether she is engaging in vexatious litigation, using the indicia from Chutskoff. (

a) Hopeless proceedings – seeking forms of relief that cannot be obtained [ 87 ] As previously noted, Ms. Hok seeks various forms of relief that fall outside the jurisdiction of this Court. In the Application for Judicial Review of Judge Holmes' decision, Ms.

Hok seeks the following remedies (quoted verbatim, using the same spelling, grammar, formatting, style and emphasis as in the original): 8) I want a reversal/the over-turning/the dismissal of judge/Holme’s refusal to issue process of my private prosecution → in order to allow the private prosecution to proceed to trial – to ensure the “proper administration of justice” et al → because I have a right to “due process” et al. 9) I want the removal/voiding/striking-out of judge/Holme’s false and slanderously defamatory statements that I had been vexatious to apply for a private prosecution et al. 10) I want there to be the reprimadation/sanctioning of judge/Holme’s “breach of service” (because of his insulting+disrespect of me and his blatant display of judicial misconduct and abuse of process et al). 11) I want a decent, unbiased and good and ethical Crown Prosecutor to proceed – via taking charge of my private prosecution-case . [ 88 ] Ms.

Hok uses similar language in the Application for Judicial Review of Judge Shynkar's decision. (

b) Escalating proceedings – grounds and issues rolling forward into subsequent actions, including simultaneous active overlapping actions [ 89 ] Before Judge Holmes, Judge Shynkar, and this Court, Ms. Hok has felt the need to re-hash all prior happenings with the police, mental health professionals, court and other proceedings. It appears that, in Ms. Hok's eyes, the present applications are a culmination of all prior proceedings. [ 90 ] For example, after Judge Holmes asked Ms. Hok to help him understand the evidence on the charges in the information before him, Ms.

Hok used the better part of five pages of the transcript to set out the "history" of the matter before she even arrived at the date on which she had her dealing with Cst. Goble. Throughout that dialogue, she frequently referenced alleged false arrests, mental health review panel decisions, action through some kind of ombudsman, complaints before the College of Physicians and Surgeons, detention in remand, etc. The transcript is replete with references to various complaints processes – both informal and formal. [ 91 ] Though the evidence is not clear, in her Brief for the present applications, Ms.

Hok references her obtaining an ex parte restraining order against Mr. Baron in 2013. A review of Court of Queen’s Bench records reveals that Ms. Hok has initiated various actions: • Action No. 1304 00259 – Shirley A. Hok v Ryan Baron; • Action No. 1404 00582 – Shirley A. Hok v QE II Hospital Psychiatric Unit et al; • Action No. 1404 00583 – Shirley A. Hok v RCMP PACT Unit et al; • Action No. 1504 00632 – Shirley A.

Hok v Grande Prairie Crown Prosecutors Office et al; • The three present judicial review applications. [ 92 ] In the materials available to this Court, it appears that the grounds and issues from all prior dealings relating to the Barons and various medical, police, legal, and judicial officials have rolled forward, culminating in the present applications. (

c) Bringing proceedings for improper purposes – proceedings intended as revenge, harassment, to oppress, or to inflict harm; proceedings conducted in retaliation to other persons' successes or their failure to cooperate with the Applicant, including unwarranted complaints to professional bodies [ 93 ] Ms. Hok has acknowledged lodging complaints against the Barons, RCMP members, health professionals, her past lawyers, and others.

She has filed these complaints through formal complaint mechanisms and informally to Members of Parliament, Members of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta, the Premier of Alberta and the Alberta Justice Minister. [ 94 ] As a sampling of Ms. Hok's admitted behaviour, I quote from portions of the September 16, 2015 hearing transcript (Shynkar Transcript) page7/ll 28-41 and page 8/l 33 to page 9/l 8:

A Let’s see on February 25th, 2011, I was falsely arrested by Constable Violet MacFarlane, Tricia Abar of the PACT team under false accusations of having severe mental disorders of paranoia and false accusations of having been walking around on my driveway the night before threatening with a knife. Now, those are both false, but they falsely arrested me and drove me to the QUE2 [sic] Hospital where I was wrongfully detained for a month’s time, et cetera, but I was successfully vindicated in all of that and I can prove that.

I won my – my complaint against the Alberta review panel – the mental health review panel by going through the Ombudsman and I’ve got the proof to back that and I’d also taken on the psychiatrist and I had taken on Dr. Trevor Theman about that whereby they have to have proof of their false accusations of severe mental disorders and they didn’t have any, so I bested Dr. Trevor Theman about that… … Okay. And then the PACT team of Constable Violet MacFarlane and Constable Ken Patrick, et al, tried to wrongfully arrest me again on October 22nd, 23rd, 24th, and 25th of 2012.

They were banging on my door, et cetera, so I called Alberta Justice and they put me through to Pat Harris, and I spoke with her, et cetera, and – oh, first I tried to call – I called Ray Noble, the superintendent, but I was only able to leave a message. I said stop this PACT unit because they’re – they’re persistently hounding and harassing me… So, then I called Alberta Justice and they put me through to Pat Harris… … but in the ensuing time I had won my complaint against Dr.

Trevor Theman at the College of Physicians and Surgeons because the psychiatrists didn’t have any – any proof or verification of me having any severe mental disorders… [ 95 ] In the hearing before Judge Holmes, Ms. Hok answered an inquiry from Crown counsel about her difficulties with Mr. Baron as follows (Holmes Transcript page 21/l 38 to page 22/l 18): Q … and you've informed the court you've had numerous difficulties with Mr. Baron? A Massive. Q Massive. And… A Read my complaints. There's over 800 faxed complaints alone. Q Right. And as regards Mr. Baron you have complained to the RCMP in Grande Prairie?

A Correct. Q You have complained to - - A Bylaw. Q - - to Bylaw Enforcement Services in Grande Prairie. You have complained to - - have you complained to your MLA as well? A I've done just a little bit in regards to not getting any response or any kind of feedback from other complaints, but the MLA ignored me. Q Right. And did you complain to your member of parliament as well? A Yes. That's more like against Steven Blamey (phonetic) and Ian McPhail (phonetic), the federal level. [ 96 ] At page 30 of the Holmes Transcript, Ms.

Hok further details complaints against her former lawyers and some medical professionals. [ 97 ] In the Applicant's Brief (Holmes’ Judicial Review), Ms. Hok states (at paras 18-19; again, form, grammar, spelling, emphasis all in the original): 18) Be aware of the fact that I have already made around FORTY valid fax-complaints to the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP [the CPC ],(now the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP [the CRCC ]) against the massive amount of unprofessional misconducts and criminal acts et al done via the unethical local RCMP-members!

My first complaint began on April 8/2011 (against cunning, sadistic Cst. Violet MacFarlane of the RCMP/PACT-unit et al) – and I never stopped et al. 19) However – know that my highly valid complaints (against the unethical collusive mob of the local RCMP) had been ALL falsely and unethically and slanderously dismissed… first falsely dismissed via the local RCMP-detachment’s complaint-investigator et al; and then subsequently falsely dismissed/turned-down via the “Review Unit”/ CPC (now the CRCC ). It had been one false dismissal after another after another et al – that was and is defamatory about me et al! (

d) Unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and misconduct, including claims of judge and lawyer deception, fraud, perjury, conspiracy, tampering of records and transcripts, and other conspiratorial misconduct made without the positive evidence legally required to support such allegations; pleadings replete with allegations that may be unfounded in fact or merely speculative with language that is vitriolic, offensive or defamatory

[ 98 ] The Applicant's Brief (Holmes’ Judicial Review) contains many allegations of conspiracy by state actors including members of the RCMP, the Crown Prosecutors and the Courts.

To illustrate (spelling, grammar, formatting and emphasis in the original): 3) … But – while I had clearly met the necessary criteria of the required elements of the offences (and even more)… know that process-hearing judge /Holmes (along with that demented Crown Prosecutor of Brenda Scragg) had falsely turned-down the “ issuance of process ” of my “ private information ” – while also having overtly slandered and defamed me to boot by adding insult to injury et al! WHY!?!

Was there a pay-off involved – or what / suppose you tell me. 4) Know that process-hearing judge/Holmes had finalized his demeaning defaming of me by his having stated that MY private information’s process-hearing of July 22/2015 had “ some evidence that the motivation for the charges may be what they call vexation ” et al… but HUH! Know that process-hearing judge /Holmes’ statement had been a form of slanderous defamation et al, and a form of intimidation et al!

Know that process-hearing judge /Holmes had been enthusiastically assisted via that severely malevolent Crown/Brenda Scragg (the Scragg of those THREE separate false prosecutions against absolutely innocent me /the victim – stemming from the false charges laid via the unethical cops on May 28/2013 , August 16/2013 + ; and June 26/2015 et al)! … 7) But – what I have been unethically subjected to (via the BIG GOVERNMENT ’s public-service component of the triad of that law-enforcement/Crown prosecution /courts ) regarding MY three individual judicial reviews (that are CONCERNING the failure of the provincial process-hearing judge to issue processes – along with their defamation of me while at MY three “private prosecution informations” / “507.1” process hearings ) is what is basically known as the OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE committed by those process-hearing judges of J.D.

Holmes et al. … 20) An so – as Ian McPhail/ CRCC et al had unethically and defamatorily dismissed ALL of my wants of RCMP misconducts et al dealt with, I have since taken-on that criminally demented & negligent and slanderously libel (and even more) Ian McPhail/ CRCC et al. He had been committing the offence of “ malfeasance in office ” ; along with violating my Charter Rights to have safety et al, and violating my right to have ethical public service et al while his having been an enabler/accomplice/a “party to the offences” , etc. – and a hell of a lot more!

It’s been as if the RCMP are and were “ above the law ” – while their having been aiding-and-abetting the hounding- and-harassment/terrorism of me et al. 21) And – intertwining the problem of the RCMP+ was the harassment/terrorism et al of that Ryan Baron (of Baron Oilfield Supply/U of A Mafia et al)…. [ 99 ] Other allegations in the Applicant’s Brief (Holmes’ Judicial Review) include alleged false incarceration by duty counsel Christian Banks, and "hearing-judge/ Morris Golden along with schizoid/accomplice Chief Crown Steven Hinkley" (at para 14(d)); a "running-series of conspiratorial judges" (at para 14(e)); the "deceitfully unethical" Cst.

Goble (at para 29); being "put before still another diabolically unethical" judge (para 33); that "the 'local'" Crown prosecution service and judicial system has been proven to be "severely unethical and unfair and unjust towards" her (para 37); “dirty cops” (at para 40); etc. [ 100 ] In her November 30, 2015 Affidavit, Ms. Hok states at para 38 (spelling, grammar, formatting and emphasis in the original): And, after I had read judge/Shynkar’s “ Decision of the Honourable Judge D.R. Shynkar” of September 18, 2015 (that was sent to me via assistant chief judge /Morris Golden’s office et al) I was absolutely LIVID!

So, I compiled my 10-page fax-compliant of October 12/2015 to our Premier of Alberta /Rachel Notley! ... Know that I am of the firm belief that judge/Shynkar is a filty liar and a disgusting psychopath and unjust and unfair et al – and a menace to me! Know that when a judge (or anyone else for that matter) claims that a person’s reputation only matters if they are say some BIG STUPENDOUS PUBLIC NOTORIETY person et al, then that derogatory judge (to me) is a disgusting #@^&%#@# / worthy of contempt et al! (

e) Scandalous or inflammatory language in pleadings or before the Court [ 101 ] Many of the passages from Ms. Hok's evidence, submissions and filed materials quoted above fall within this category as well. In addition, the descriptors she uses to describe her neighbours, members of the RCMP, Crown Prosecutors, judges, and others include: "Maleficent-like" (Ms. Hok's November 30, 2015 Affidavit at para 26, referencing Ms. Baron); "pathological liar" (November 30, 2015 Affidavit at para 34, referencing Ms. Baron); "savage psychopath" (November 30, 2015 Affidavit at para 34, referencing Mr.

Baron); "filthy liar and a disgusting psychopath" (November 30, 2015 Affidavit at para 38, referencing Judge Shynkar); "severely incompetent and unethically biased" (November 30, 2015 Affidavit at para 44, referencing a Crown Prosecutor); and so forth. [ 102 ] One of Ms. Hok's complaints that she faxed to the RCMP on June 26, 2015 before being charged herself is illustrative of the scandalous and inflammatory language that she is wont to use. This fax is part of Exhibit 7 in the hearing before Judge Shynkar.

The beginning of the fax reads (spelling, grammar, style, and emphasis in the original): Re: COMPLAINT, AGAIN, against the CRIMINAL HARASSMENT et al perpetrated via psychotic lunatic/pathological-LIAR/perjurer → Ryan Baron (of Baron Oilfield Supply – that’s with U of A Mafia et al)

Summary on Indicia of Vexatious Litigation [ 103 ] Considering the foregoing, I am satisfied that Ms. Hok is engaging in vexatious litigation. Court's Power under the Judicature Act

[ 104 ] When a person engages in vexatious litigation, the Court has power to limit that person's access to the courts: s 23.1 of the Judicature Act . Subsection 23.1(1) states: 23.1(1) Where on application or on its own motion, with notice to the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General, a Court is satisfied that a person is instituting vexatious proceedings in the Court or is conducting a proceeding in a vexatious manner, the Court may order that (

a) the person shall not institute a further proceeding or institute proceedings on behalf of any other person, or (

b) a proceeding instituted by the person may not be continued, without the permission of the Court. [ 105 ] On the Court's own motion, I direct that a copy of these Reasons be forwarded to the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General as notice of this Court's intention to make a determination as to whether Ms. Hok is a vexatious litigant. The Minister may, if desired, make written submissions within 30 days of receiving such notice. Ms. Hok may also file written submissions on the same issue within 30 days, if she so desires.

Until such time as this Court receives written submissions within the 30-day period and makes a ruling as to whether Ms. Hok is a vexatious litigant, Ms. Hok shall not file any material on any court file or institute or further any court proceedings without the permission of this Court. This order does not apply to the written submissions referred to above, in relation to the Special Chambers Application in Court of Queen’s Bench action number 1504 00632 scheduled to be heard July 5, 2016 (provided that application proceeds as scheduled), or to any appeal that may lie from these Reasons.

Conclusion [ 106 ] Based on the information that Ms. Hok has provided, it is clear that she believes that a failure of a tribunal or court to act in her favour is evidence of collaboration by state actors to conspire against her. The reality is that she simply has not satisfied the requirements of s 507.1. Judge Holmes and Judge Shynkar both acted within their jurisdiction in deciding the matters before them. Their decisions are reasonable and entitled to deference. I decline to grant any of the remedies that Ms. Hok seeks. [ 107 ] Within 30 days, Ms.

Hok and the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General may file written submissions setting out their positions as to (1) whether Ms. Hok should be declared a vexatious litigant on a permanent basis, (2) whether her access to Alberta Courts should be restricted, and (3) the scope and form of those restrictions. Heard on the 8 th day of June, 2016. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 17 th day of June, 2016. Gerald A. Verville J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Shirley A. Hok Self-Represented Applicant Ms. Alison Magill (Justice and Solicitor General, Edmonton Regional and Rural Response Office)

for the Respondent