R v Wruck, 2016 ABQB 370

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Wruck, 2016 ABQB 370 Date: 20160712 Docket: 130383854Q1 Registry: Edmonton Between: Her Majesty the Queen Crown - and - Shawn Lee Wruck Defendant Restriction on Publication Witness identity – See the Criminal Code ,

section 486.31. By Court Order, the identity of Officer A, Officer B, Officer C, Officer D and Officer E must not be disclosed in the course of these proceedings. NOTE: This judgment is intended to comply with the restriction so that it may be published. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Madam Justice D.L. Shelley In relation to the Voir Dire concerning the “Mister Big” Operation referred to as “Project Kolumbo” _______________________________________________________

Background [ 1 ] Undercover officers initiated contact with Mr. Wruck through his then common-law partner, Ms. Wilson. The initial contact between Ms. Wilson and a female officer, B, occurred on November 20, 2012. Between November 21 and November 26, there were phone calls and text messages between them. On November 28, B and Ms. Wilson had lunch and on December 1, they celebrated Ms. Wilson’s birthday. On December 12, Ms. Wilson invited B into the residence she shared with Mr. Wruck. While B was there, Ms. Wilson introduced her to Mr. Wruck over Facetime. On December 13, B suggested that her “boyfriend” (Officer

C) would like to meet her and they should all go for dinner. [ 2 ] Following an exchange of text messages thereafter, B and Ms. Wilson arranged a get-together for 7:00 pm on December 19, at the staged “home” of B and C. Mr. Wruck, Ms. Wilson and their son were all present for this first meeting between Mr. Wruck and C. At some point during this evening, Ms. Wilson mentioned to B that Mr. Wruck was talking about things he should not be. B overheard Mr. Wruck tell C to “Google” him or look him up on the Internet, and observed C doing so. [ 3 ] C confirmed B’s testimony regarding Mr.

Wruck’s comments concerning Googling him on the Internet. He confirmed that this comment had followed their discussion regarding Mr. Wruck’s problems with a previous girlfriend, which had followed C’s comments concerning his problems with a previous girlfriend. Mr. Wruck indicated that he had “gotten rid of” his problem girlfriend. When C asked him how he had done this, Mr. Wruck indicated that he had had two aboriginal women kill her, indicating that one was named Fryingpan and both were members of the Red Alert. Mr.

Wruck described observing one of these women choking his previous girlfriend “until her eyes rolled back in her head”. He indicated that he had disposed of her body. C said that, after making this comment, Mr. Wruck went to the bathroom. When he returned, he said he could not believe he had told C what he had told him, to which C responded that at least he had gotten rid of his problem. It was after this exchange that Mr. Wruck suggested C should Google him. After they did so, C said the mood got lighter, they joked around, had some drinks and talked about unrelated topics. [ 4 ] On January 5, Mr.

Wruck invited B, C and some other “friends” (also undercover police officers) to his residence for a social evening. There were three male and two female officers present. During the evening, Mr. Wruck expressed concern that C might be an undercover police officer and was concerned about what he had said on December 19. Later, C and Mr. Wruck went downstairs and Mr. Wruck again brought up his former girlfriend (referring to Ms. Collins), confirming that what he had said the previous occasion was true. He again expressed concern, in front of C and another officer, that C might be an undercover RCMP officer. Mr.

Wruck again confirmed that what he had disclosed earlier about Ms. Collins was true, and he provided information regarding the RCMP interview he had had three years earlier. [ 5 ] On February 22, Mr. Wruck changed his story concerning Ms. Collins’ death. He admitted to C that he had not hired anyone to kill Ms. Collins but, instead, he had killed her himself. Mr. Wruck’s explanation for having not admitted this initially was that he was not sure if B would be “ok with me doing my own girlfriend”. He expressed the concern that C might consider him “a bit of a loser” for doing so.

In other respects, the description of the manner of her death was consistent, although it was far more detailed. [ 6 ] Mr. Wruck’s detailed description of how he said he killed Ms. Collins and disposed of her body remained consistent from that point on, until the very end of the Operation, when Mr. Wruck’s story changed dramatically. His recounting of events to D on February 23 was consistent with what he had told C the day before. It remained so in his “interview” with E (“Mr. Big”) on March 24, and in the “re-enactment” that occurred immediately thereafter. [ 7 ] Mr.

Wruck had identified one item that might tie him back to Ms. Collins’ murder – a large Rubbermaid container which he said had previously been used to store his Christmas ornaments, and which he used to transport Ms. Collins’ body after he killed her. He said it was still in his possession, in his garage in Kelowna. Under the guise of assisting him in disposing of any items which might incriminate him, on April 3, C requested that Mr. Wruck give him the Rubbermaid container so he could dispose of it. This caused Mr. Wruck to become agitated. He said he could not get it right then, because Ms. Wilson was there.

C said he would drop by later and get it. Soon after C left, Mr. Wruck started to send text messages, including the following: “Dude. I don’t have that thing. I never did.” ... “I didn’t do what I told you and your uncle. I was just trying to impress you guys, cuz that’s what’s you wanted to hear. I’m sorry for deceiving you. But, if I was to do that kind of thing I sure as fuck would never tell anyone.” ... “Bro. I have come to love you like a brother. So I feel bad about lying to you and Oliver. But, I never believed that this was real until I wasn’t arrested. I never did that thing. I swear.

I wasn’t scared to admit to it because I’m innocent. If you want, come look in my garage. There’s no big Rubbermaid thing.” ... “Hey man. Sorry about the messages. I don’t even remember what I said because I got into the bottle last night. Chevy [referring to Ms. Wilson] and I are at it again.” [ 8 ] The undercover officers did not respond to these text messages and Project Kolumbo was terminated. Applicable Law and Case Authorities

[9] The parties provided me with a number of authorities. Both the Crown and the Defence rely on the authorities listed inSchedule A. The Crown also relies on the authorities listed in

Schedule B. The Defence also relies on the authority listed in

Schedule C. Analysis [10] The leading authority in relation to issues engaged by Mr. Big operations is the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R vHart, 2014 SCC 52. Hart provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to take an in-depth look at Mr. Big confessions and theprinciples that should govern their admissibility. The Court felt it was time to create a legal framework to address the unique issues thataccompany confessions obtained in the course of such operations.

In undertaking this task, the Court observed that it needed to strike ajust balance to guard against the risk of wrongful convictions flowing from false confessions, on the one hand, and to ensure that policeare not deprived of the opportunity to use their skill and ingenuity in solving serious crimes, on the other (paras 83-84). [11] In the result, the Supreme Court established a new principled rule of evidence to be used in assessing the admissibility of suchconfessions. Under the approach adopted by the Court, any confession made by an accused during the course of a Mr.

Big operation is tobe treated as presumptively inadmissible (para 85). This presumption is overcome where the Crown can establish, on a balance ofprobabilities, that the probative value of the confession outweighs its prejudicial effect (para 85). The probative value of this type ofconfession depends on its reliability. Its prejudicial effect derives from the harmful character evidence that invariably surrounds theconfession.

In addition, the Court observed that trial judges must carefully scrutinize the conduct of the police to determine whether anabuse of process has occurred (para 86). [12] The majority in Hart adopted a two-pronged approach, which they felt struck the appropriate balance between guardingagainst the inherent dangers of Mr. Big operations, while recognizing the need for police to have the necessary tools to investigateserious crime. This approach relies on a more robust conception of the doctrine of abuse of process than has been typically employed todeal with issues of police misconduct (paras 84-86).

Police Conduct/Abuse of Process Analysis [13] In Hart, the Court suggested that trial judges might prefer to begin the admissibility analysis with an assessment of whetheran abuse of process has occurred, because a finding of abuse would eliminate the need to assess probative value and prejudicial effect(para 89). I will therefore begin my analysis in this case with a consideration of the police conduct involved in Project Kolumbo. [14] Mr. Big operations, by their very nature, involve trickery on the part of the police.

The employment of tricks and lies, thestaging of false events, and the other tactics commonly employed by the police in connection with these operations will not generally befound to constitute misconduct or abuse of process. Rather, as explained in Hart, coercion or some other form of abuse that the trialjudge deems significant is generally required.

This in turn usually entails some form of physical violence or threats of violence, althoughother forms of abusive conduct should be considered if present (paras 117-118). [15] In R v Johnston, 2016 BCCA 3 at paras 51-58, the British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that staged violence in frontof an accused that is “typical”, and roughly proportional to the violence for which the accused is standing trial, will likely not be anabuse of process, as long as the violence was not used as a threat against the accused. [16] Similarly, in R v Allgood, 2015 SKCA 88, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, applying Hart, concluded that there was noabuse of process because the accused was never threatened with violence.

The Court reached this conclusion even though violenceagainst others was simulated “to show that the organization approved of violent acts being done to non-members, including women”(para 16), a tactic aimed at increasing the accused’s likelihood of confessing. [17] Several cases decided before Hart also concluded, in relation to whether an abuse of process had occurred, that the primaryconcern in Mr. Big cases is that of police coercion.

In R v McIntyre, (NB CA), affirmed (SCC),[1994] 2 SCR 480, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal concluded that there was no coercion as “the appellant could have left the policeofficers and had nothing further to do with them at any time” (page 15). The Supreme Court agreed, making the observation that “thetricks used by the police were not likely to shock the community or cause the accused’s statements not to be free and voluntary”: R vMcIntyre, [1994] 2 SCR 480 at para 1. In R v Bonisteel, 2008 BCCA 344, the British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected the appellant’sargument “that an undercover [Mr.

Big] operation such as this is inherently unfair, unreliable, shocking and inevitably results in amiscarriage of justice” (para 96). In R v Niemi, 2012 ONSC 6385, the Court found there was no significant coercion and no abuse ofprocess as “the general consensus in the public would be that this was an example of excellent policing” (para 189). [18] There is no doubt that, in the approximately four months of Project Kolumbo, the undercover officers gave the impression ofsuccess and gradually revealed aspects of their involvement in a (fictitious) criminal organization as the source of that success.

Mr.Wruck was provided with various tasks to perform, for which he was paid relatively modest amounts of money (totalling approximately$5,000). Following a staged incident of violence between D and his supposed sexual partner, Mr. Wruck was asked to assist in a cleanupof the hotel room in which D had allegedly assaulted this female (also an undercover officer). There followed a fake kidnapping, inwhich Mr. Wruck accompanied undercover officers who then staged an incident in which the female was threatened with a gun to keepquiet about what had occurred between her and D. [19] On the other hand, Mr.

Wruck was also exposed to a fictitious “firing” of an employee of the organization, as well as the“retirement” of another. These events were staged to show Mr. Wruck that it was possible to walk away from the organization withoutnegative consequences (i.e. without being harmed or killed). [20] At no time was Mr. Wruck threatened with violence. To the contrary, the message sought to be conveyed by the officers wasone of friendship and support. It was suggested that Mr.

Wruck obtain counselling for the problems he was experiencing, that it was notnecessary to be willing to kill someone to become a member of the organization, and that he could remain friends with C even if he

decided not to join the organization. C suggested Mr. Wruck cut back on his drinking and offered to help by cutting back himself. As is typical in these operations, the importance of honesty and loyalty were repeatedly stressed. [ 21 ] However, it is clear that it is not just violence or threats of violence that constitute police misconduct or abuse of process. Hart and other cases have confirmed that it is unacceptable for those involved in Mr. Big operations to prey on an accused’s vulnerabilities (para 117).

These may include: mental health problems, substance addictions, youthfulness, social isolation, poverty and other socio- economic and health related vulnerabilities. [ 22 ] At the time of Project Kolumbo, Mr. Wruck was about 39 years old. He was a skilled tradesman, steadily employed in or around Fort McMurray. The evidence indicates that he was clearing approximately $6,000 a month after all deductions, but before tax refunds. He was living in a house in Kelowna worth more than $500,000. He was in a common-law relationship with Ms. Wilson and was very close to their son.

He was particularly close to his parents, who provided him not only with emotional support, but also assisted him financially when he became over-extended. The evidence shows that he had friends and co-workers with whom he socialized. He was about 6 feet tall, about 200 lbs., in good physical condition, well dressed and well groomed. Mr. Wruck did not suffer from any of the vulnerabilities typically referred to in the cases.

I cannot conclude, as has been suggested by him, that his unwise spending habits or his dissatisfaction with certain aspects of his employment constituted vulnerabilities which so overwhelmed him that he was incapable of resisting the overtures made by this fictitious criminal organization. [ 23 ] There is no evidence that Mr. Wruck was threatened in any way with violence at any time, or that he was coerced into saying or doing the things he did.

As described above, his first disclosure, at his first meeting with members of the undercover team, was a voluntary response to a rather innocuous (albeit staged) comment about C’s prior girlfriend problems. In none of the interactions, the majority of which were recorded, was Mr. Wruck pressured into speaking about this topic, although questions were certainly asked from time to time. Mr.

Wruck likely felt there were advantages to discussing this topic, but there is nothing in the record to indicate he was coerced into making any admissions. [ 24 ] Hart confirmed that the onus of establishing an abuse of process lies on the accused (para 89). Mr. Wruck did not focus his argument on this aspect of the analysis established in Hart , but focused it on its other aspects, for obvious reasons. There is nothing in the evidence to support a finding of police misconduct. Accordingly, I conclude that there was no abuse of process in relation to Project Kolumbo.

The evidence obtained is therefore not rendered inadmissible on this basis. Prejudicial Effect Analysis [ 25 ] While prejudice concerns are not completely eliminated in a judge alone trial, they are significantly reduced where there is no jury. This was the conclusion of this Court in R v Magoon , 2015 ABQB 351 at paras 107-108 , which observed that there is little risk of moral or reasoning prejudice when a trial judge is sitting alone. The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench reached the same conclusion in R v Hales , 2014 SKQB 411 .

R v Streiling , 2015 BCSC 597 , is also supportive of this proposition. [ 26 ] I am alive to the danger of, and prohibition against, moral and reasoning prejudices which may arise from Mr. Wruck’s comments or actions in the course of Project Kolumbo. I am satisfied that I can guard against engaging in moral or reasoning prejudice if I conclude that his statements ought to be admitted as evidence in the trial proper. I conclude that, in these circumstances, the prejudicial effect of the statements is ameliorated by my understanding of the prohibition against engaging in prejudicial reasoning.

Probative Value Analysis [ 27 ] Admissibility of Mr. Wruck’s statements depends primarily on this issue.

In determining the probative value of his statements, there are two key considerations: the circumstances in which the statements were made and indicia of their reliability ( Hart at paras 102- 105 ). [ 28 ] When examining the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements, factors to be considered include the following: 1. the length of the operation; 2. the number of interactions between the undercover officers and the accused; 3. the nature of the relationship between the officers and the accused; 4. the nature and extent of any inducements offered; 5. the presence of any violence, or threats of violence, against the accused; 6. the overall conduct of any questioning of the accused; and 7. the accused’s personality, including his or her level of sophistication, age, and mental health.

Allgood at para 43 ; Hart at para 102 . [ 29 ] In examining the statements for markers of reliability, the Court should consider factors such as:

1. the level of detail contained in the statements; 2. whether the statements result in the discovery of additional evidence; 3. whether the statements identify elements of the crime which were not made public; and 4. whether the statements accurately describe mundane details of the crime the accused would not likely have known had he or she not committed it. Allgood at para 43 ; Hart at para 105 . [ 30 ] I have already mentioned some of the circumstances surrounding the statements made, particularly details surrounding the first statement made by Mr. Wruck.

The total length of the operation was about five months, although interactions with Mr. Wruck occurred over a period closer to three months. The number of interactions with Mr. Wruck was limited by the fact that he continued his regular employment, which took him to Fort McMurray for periods of two weeks at a time. This limited the number of face-to-face interactions, although there were also many text and phone communications. However, although of short duration and limited contact, it is clear that from Mr.

Wruck’s perspective the relationships were very positive and increasingly close, and they can be accurately described as rapidly developing friendships in which the participants referred to themselves as “brothers”. [ 31 ] As I previously mentioned, the monetary inducements paid during the course of Project Kolumbo were minimal (relative to Mr. Wruck’s income earning capacity at his regular job). While he did accompany officers to Montreal for a special UFC event, neither the types of restaurants or hotels to which Mr.

Wruck was taken during this trip or other trips would be considered extravagant or unusual from those which one might expect to be enjoyed by a person in Mr. Wruck’s socio-economic group. The possibility of future payments of increased amounts, which would enable Mr. Wruck to purchase items that he clearly wanted, did constitute inducements, but not of the type which one would reasonably expect to overcome Mr. Wruck’s ability to resist.

Also as I mentioned previously, there were no threats, questions asked were not conveyed in an oppressive or threatening atmosphere, and most statements were made with little prompting. [ 32 ] It was clear from the evidence of the officers who testified, as well as from my review of the audio and video recordings, that Mr.

Wruck fit in well with the group, was comfortable around the others, was of similar age and physical condition, was sophisticated, appeared to suffer from no mental health condition, and was able to assert himself and challenge the others when he wanted to. [ 33 ] I conclude, in relation to the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements made by Mr. Wruck, that, although the prospect of receiving increased payments through membership in this fictitious criminal organization was appealing to Mr.

Wruck and would act as an inducement, the majority of the circumstances weigh in favour of their reliability. [ 34 ] I turn then to the contents of the statements themselves. Mr. Wruck’s statements are generally quite detailed. This is so in relation to his description of surrounding circumstances, specifics of the events described (both in relation to Ms. Collins’ death and the disposal of her remains), his feelings at the time of the events described, and his feelings and concerns at the time he made the statements and following the making of those statements.

The level of detail, as well as the specifics of the details given, are supportive of their reliability. [ 35 ] The statements did not result in the discovery of additional evidence. At the point in time when Mr. Wruck was asked to produce the Rubbermaid container, Mr. Wruck recanted. The container was never obtained by the RCMP. This weighs against their reliability. [ 36 ] Mr. Wruck’s statements did identify elements of the death of Ms. Collins which were not made public and would not likely have been known by someone other than the person who killed her.

However, these details were not details known to the police, nor were they capable of being confirmed following the making of his statements. For example, Mr. Wruck maintained in his statements that Ms. Collins had been choked or strangled. The forensic pathologist could not confirm the manner of death, given the state of the remains when they were discovered. [ 37 ] Mr.

Wruck argues that inconsistencies between his statements, as well as inconsistencies between his statements and other evidence produced in the Voir Dire and the trial proper, render his statements unreliable, and that they should therefore be excluded. He points to several areas where he submits such discrepancies exist. The Crown disagrees that some of these are inconsistencies. It further argues that there are many points of consistency that have to be considered.

The Crown too has given examples of matters it considers fall into this category. [ 38 ] I do not feel it necessary, at this juncture, to carefully compare all of the evidence with the view of determining whether these disputed areas should be categorized as inconsistencies. I recognize that there are differences in the evidence given by different witnesses. There are also differences between the various statements given by Mr. Wruck, and his recantation raises a serious issue. [ 39 ] In R v Campeau , 2015 ABCA 210 , our Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of confirmatory evidence.

While not making a finding on this issue, the Court did not disapprove of the Crown’s suggestion that “confirmation does not always have to be aimed at the specific topic... [provided it] can bolster the reliability of the evidence touching on the material area” (para 12).

In addition, the Court indicated that “a truth verification strategy (we can help cover this up if we know what happened)” is likely to produce more reliable evidence than “a strategy which might induce false bragging (are you tough enough for our organization)” (para 21). [ 40 ] In Streiling , the accused had provided a detailed confession consistent with medical evidence, but other circumstantial factors suggested the confession should be excluded (for example, the accused had quit his job to join the fictitious criminal organization and there were both threats and simulated violence) (para 146).

Power J noted that at the admissibility stage she had to determine, on a balance of probabilities, that the confession had sufficient indicia of reliability, both considering the circumstances under which it was made and the nature of the confession itself, to justify its submission at trial (para 145). She recognized that there were factors weighing in favour of both admission and exclusion but, given the balance of probabilities standard, she admitted the statement.

[ 41 ] There are factual similarities to the case before me in R v Decoine-Zuniga , 2013 ABQB 563 . In that case, the accused gave three confessions that were inconsistent in some respects with each other and with evidence given by other witnesses. These differences included: the location of the stabbing, the condition and position of the victim, the person who did the stabbing, and the actions of the accused (para 86). The only corroborative evidence mentioned was that parts of the confessions were supported by evidence of certain witnesses.

However, the circumstances of the confessions, combined with the level of detail provided, convinced the Court that the statements had a “ring of truth” (para 94). Of particular importance was the spontaneity of the first confession and the fact that the latter two confessions were not prompted by police demands (paras 73-75, 80). The Court concluded that the differences could be reconciled and, despite the inconsistencies, there were sufficient indicia of reliability for the purposes of the admissibility analysis.

While this case was decided before Hart , when there was no presumption of inadmissibility in relation to such confessions, it nonetheless provides some guidance with respect to assessing reliability in the face of inconsistencies between confessions and the evidence of other witnesses. [ 42 ] Inconsistencies in an accused’s confessions were also dealt with in R v Balbar , 2014 BCSC 2285 .

Despite the discrepancies, the trial judge concluded that their probative value was high and “the extent to which these variations amount to important inconsistencies is for the ultimate trier of fact”, since other indicia of reliability bolstered their probative value (para 366). Accordingly, the statements were admitted. [ 43 ] This Court also addressed the issue of inconsistent confessions in R v NRR , 2013 ABQB 288 , another pre- Hart decision.

In that case, the Court considered the reliability of the confessions and concluded that they were inherently unreliable due to the extreme vulnerability of the accused, his susceptibility to inducements, and the fact that he repeatedly changed his story “not to be truthful, but to relieve Mr. Big’s incredulity” (para 417). In addition, the confessions were incompatible with much of the known evidence obtained at the scene of the crime.

While there were some accurate details, the trial judge found that these could have been learned at the Preliminary Inquiry and that the accused could have manufactured a confession using this information in order to impress Mr. Big. I note that in some respects this could also be said in the case of Mr.

Wruck, insofar as the general location and condition of the remains was a matter of public record. [ 44 ] Moldaver J, speaking for the majority in Hart at paragraph 98 , noted that “in conducting this weighing exercise, the trial judge is only deciding the threshold question of ‘whether the evidence is worthy of being heard by the jury’ and not ‘the ultimate question of whether the evidence should be accepted and acted upon’”.

This is particularly relevant in the circumstances of this case. [ 45 ] Although there are issues in relation to the statements made, there are significant indicia of reliability present in this case. The statements have high probative value, notwithstanding these issues. On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that Mr. Wruck made the statements freely and voluntarily, free of concerns for his safety.

Furthermore, his personal circumstances, personality, and physical and mental condition do not give rise to any concerns that he was vulnerable, certainly not to the extent that he would have been unable to resist the relatively modest inducements offered by the undercover officers. [ 46 ] In addition, at this stage in the proceedings, I am tasked with determining whether the Crown has established the threshold reliability of the statements. Whether or not I accept any of them as being truthful is a separate issue to be addressed at a different stage in the trial.

Once admitted, they will be re-evaluated in the context of all of the other evidence in determining whether the Crown has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wruck is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. This will entail further consideration of the inconsistencies and uncertainties in the evidence. Conclusion [ 47 ] Having concluded that:

a) there is no evidence of police misconduct or abuse of process;

b) I am able to guard against moral and reasoning prejudice and therefore, the prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence is not a significant factor;

c) the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements provides significant support for their reliability; and

d) the negative indicators of reliability are not outweighed by the presence of markers in support of their reliability; a proper balancing weighs in favour of admitting Mr. Wruck’s statements into the trial proper. Accordingly, Mr. Wruck’s statements obtained during Project Kolumbo, together with the other Mr. Big Voir Dire evidence, are found to be admissible. Heard from the 16 th to the 20 th days of May, and from the 21 st to the 27 th days of June, 2016. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 12 th day of July, 2016.

D.L. Shelley J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Mr. James E. Stewart Alberta Justice for the Crown Mr. Ajay Juneja Chadi & Company for the Defendant

Schedule A 1. R v Hart, 2014 SCC 52 2. R v Mack, 2014 SCC 58 3. R v Oakes, 2016 ABCA 90 4. R v Campeau, 2015 ABCA 210 5. R v Magoon, 2015 ABQB 351 6. R v Johnston, 2016 BCCA 3 7. R v Allgood, 2015 SKCA 88 8. R v Streiling, 2015 BCSC 597 9. R v Hales, 2014 SKQB 411 10. R v Balbar, 2014 BCSC 2285 11. R v Sharples, 2015 ONSC 4410

Schedule B 1. R v McIntyre, (NB CA), affirmed (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 480 2. R v McIntyre, (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 480 3. R v Osmar, 2007 ONCA 50 4. R v Bonisteel, 2008 BCCA 344 5. R v Niemi, 2012 ONSC 6385 6. R v West, 2013 BCSC 132 7. R v Welsh, 2013 ONCA 190 8. R v Vuozzo, 2013 ABCA 130 9. R v NRR, 2013 ABQB 288 10. R v Decoine-Zuniga, 2013 ABQB 563

Schedule C 1. R v Worme, 2016 ABCA 174