R v Maghera, 2016 ABQB 50

Court of Queen ’ s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Maghera, 2016 ABQB 50 Date: 20160122 Docket: 130986847Q1 Registry: Calgary Between: Her Majesty the Queen Crown - and - Navin Maghera (a.k.a. Nav Shipra) Accused _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Oral Decision of The Honourable Mr. Justice P.R. Jeffrey _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] This is my decision on sentence following Mr. Nav Shipra’s plea of guilty to four offences under Alberta’s Fair Trading Act . My comments throughout refer to Mr.

Shipra and this is to be understood as referring to the same person as, and who previously went by the name of, Navin Maghera. Facts [ 2 ] The facts are set out in full in an Agreed Statement of Facts, filed on the Court’s sentencing record, which I hereby incorporate by reference.

Briefly, however, the facts are these. [ 3 ] On four separate occasions between August 2009 and October 2009, Shipra, on behalf of a company called Modena Homes, received monies on deposit from four separate individuals, or couples, for new homes to be constructed for them, in conjunction with signing contracts for same with Modena Homes. Each of those contracts contained wording highlighted in bold face print, misrepresenting as follows: The Builder represents and warrants that it is a Registered Builder Member of the National Home Warranty Program in this Agreement (called the “ Program ”).

[ 4 ] The Agreement also expressly assured potential signators that deposit protection under that non-existent Program covered “payments made ... to the Builder towards the purchases”. Yet at no time were any of the purchasers’ deposits under these four contracts in fact insured by the National Home Warranty Program, or any other program. [ 5 ] Therefore the unfair practice offence committed by Shipra, four separate times, was, in the words of section 6(4)(

d) of the Fair Trading Act , a ‘representation that Modena Homes had a sponsorship, approval, status, qualification, affiliation or connection that it did not have’. [ 6 ] The total amount of deposits by these four sets of victims, who received nothing in exchange, or any return of their funds, was $322,867.96. This total was comprised of $86,800 from Thomas Ventullo, $124,067.96 from Ken and Laurel Pasishnik, $25,000 from Alan and Karen Bromby and $87,000 from Istvan Ulisnyak and Cynthia Borouski.

Parties’ Positions [ 7 ] The Crown seeks a sentence of 22 months in jail, 3 months’ probation and restitution in full to each of the victims.

Along with the probation she also seeks various additional conditions designed to address both the offending conduct and what she perceives to be continued “preying upon” the public that is now occurring, she says, just in a different form, and for which she adduced evidence on the sentencing hearing record. [ 8 ] If, however, full restitution is made before I impose sentence, then the Crown recommends a period of 90 days incarceration, served intermittently, and then probation with various conditions attached.

Sentencing had been delayed to give more time to Shipra to access other money he said he expected to soon receive, with which he would repay the victims. [ 9 ] Shipra says there should be no incarceration whatsoever if full restitution is made prior to sentencing. If restitution is not made prior to sentencing, Shipra did not have a specific recommendation as to sentence, perhaps reflecting confidence that there would be full restitution prior, but argued that these particular offences are at the lower end of the range regarding the gravity of offences.

He contrasted these offences, by way of example, with those he considered more serious that were involved in Judge Fradsham’s decision in R v Kreft , 2006 ABPC 258 , to which both counsel referred. [ 10 ] The probation officer suggests Mr. Shipra is “a suitable candidate for community supervision” and then recommends a series of conditions that ought to be imposed in his case. Sentencing for Regulatory Offences [ 11 ] Although the Crown commenced its prosecution under the Criminal Code of Canada , the offences here are regulatory not criminal.

That is significant for sentencings purposes. [ 12 ] In all sentencings, consideration is to be given to various sentencing objectives, to mitigating and aggravating factors, all applied to the specific unique facts of the particular case. The paramount objective is to impose a fit sentence, that is, one proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

With regulatory offences, however, typically the degree of moral blameworthiness will be less than in criminal offences, as will be also the gravity of the offence. [ 13 ] In R v Virk , Madigan, JP said, and I agree: Not all public welfare offences are equal in gravity. Some are more serious than others. Those requiring proof of wrongful intention or knowledge are more serious, for sentencing purposes....

Quite undeniably, the intention to defraud and the intention to lie qualify as morally blameworthy. [...] In the case of most regulatory offences, the sentencing court usually attempts to balance the competing considerations in favor of rehabilitation of the offender and protection of the public. However, in cases involving proof of mens rea, the balance must favor the objectives of denunciation, retribution, and deterrence. Whereas mens rea offences involve some degree of moral blameworthiness or fault, absolute liability and strict liability offences do not.

This distinction justifies the difference in approach to sentencing. [ 14 ] Judge Fradsham of the Alberta Provincial Court reviewed some of the case law on the sentencing of regulatory offences, in Kreft , supra . In that case he was dealing with, like this case, offences under Alberta’s Fair Trading Act . He reached the following conclusions, with which I agree, found at para 47 thereof: 47 [...] 1. One starts with the general proposition that: [t]he objective of regulatory legislation is to protect the public or broad segments of the public ... from the potentially adverse effects of otherwise lawful activity.

Regulatory legislation involves a shift of emphasis from the protection of individual interests and the deterrence and punishment of acts involving moral fault to the protection of public and societal interests. While criminal offences are usually designed to condemn and punish past, inherently wrongful conduct, regulatory measures are generally directed to the prevention

of future harm through the enforcement of minimum standards of conduct and care. ... [R]egulatory offences are directed primarily not to conduct itself but to the consequences of conduct. ... The concept of fault inregulatory offences is based upon a reasonable care standard and, as such, does not imply moral blameworthiness in the same manner ascriminal fault. Conviction for breach of a regulatory offence suggests nothing more than that the defendant has failed to meet aprescribed standard of care (R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., supra). 2.

However, regulatory offences form a continuum ranging from the less serious to the very serious. As one approaches the “veryserious” end of the continuum, one is dealing with offences which are designed to address “inherently wrongful conduct” and for whichthere is a greater degree of moral blameworthiness on the part of the offending defendant.

Those regulatory offences which “if not aspecies in the family of fraudulent conduct are a close cousin” are examples of regulatory offences which involve a greater degree ofmoral blameworthiness on the part of the offender, and the penalties for them will reflect that. 3. Having said that, regulatory offences which do not involve inherently wrongful conduct (with its attendant moral blameworthiness)can still attract significant penalties.

Regulatory legislation has as its goal adherence to a particular standard of care by those involved inthe regulated activity, and the severity of the consequences of a failure to meet the legislated standard of care will vary with the regulatedactivity involved and nature of the failure. A defendant who commits an offence under a regulatory statute may cause little, if any, actualdamage as a result of his or her particular actions. In other words, the acts of the defendant, while violating a provision of a regulatorystatute, may not in a particular case result in any significant actual harm.

However, the provision of the regulatory statute which thedefendant violated may be such that violations of it in general have the potential to cause serious harm to the public. Therefore, in thecase of little, or no, actual harm arising from the offence, the penalty for the violation may still be substantial so as to deter others fromviolating the statute because the consequence of a future violation could be very serious.

As noted earlier, regulatory offences aredirected at the consequences of failing to abide by the legislated standards of care, not at the actual actions which constituted theviolation. “Consequences” include not only actual harm resulting from the specific actions which constituted the offence, but also thatwhich could potentially result from the commission of the offence. Sentences for regulatory offences must similarly take into accountthe potential consequences of committing the particular offence. Examples of this concept are often found in environmental lawsentencing cases such as R. v.

Van Waters & Rogers Ltd. (1998) 1998 ABPC 55 , 220 A.R. 315 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) and R. v.Terroco Industries Ltd. (2005) 2005 ABCA 141 , 367 A.R. 1 (Alta. C.A.). [15] The Ontario Court of Justice said, in R v Hayward, 2013 ONCJ 668, at para 98: as a regulatory offence approaches or becomes more like a criminal offence where there is an element of mens rea or moralblameworthiness, then the objectives of denunciation, retribution and a deterrence gain more importance in sentencing. [16] The sentencing process is not exclusively about the offender.

Crimes are wrongs to both individuals and the community: R vArcand, 2010 ABCA 363, at para 67. This is particularly true of regulatory offences which relate to the public interest and community.

Statutory Provisions [17] The Fair Trading Act contains the following sections with respect to my sentencing discretion: Penalty 164(1) Any person who is convicted of an offence under this Act or the regulations is liable to a fine of not more than (a) $300 000, or (b) 3 times the amount obtained by the defendant as a result of the offence, whichever is greater, or to imprisonment for not more than 2 years, or both. [...] 168(1) A justice who convicts a defendant of an offence under this Act or the regulations may, on the application of the Minister ofJustice and Solicitor General or of a person aggrieved or that person’s representative, at the time sentence is imposed, order thedefendant to pay to an aggrieved person an amount as restitution for loss of or damage to property suffered by the aggrieved person as aresult of the commission of the offence where the amount is readily ascertainable.

(2) If an amount that is ordered to be paid under subsection (1) is not paid forthwith, the applicant may, by filing the order, enter as ajudgment in the Court of Queen’s Bench the amount ordered to be paid, and that judgment is enforceable against the defendant in thesame manner as if it were a judgment rendered against the defendant in the Court of Queen’s Bench in civil proceedings.

(3) Every person who is ordered to pay an amount under this

section must make the payments in accordance with the order. Offender’s Personal Circumstances [18] Shipra is 39 years old; he was 34 at the time of the offences. He has no record of prior offences. He has a wife and 3 childrenfor which he is responsible. He was sole shareholder and head of Modena Homes. Modena Homes failed as a business venture. Shiprareceived financial support from his extended family. At the time of his pre-sentence report he had not been a salaried or waged employeesince Modena Homes closed its doors in 2010.

Until his most recently past court appearance, he remained unemployed, surviving only bythe good graces of others. It also appears from the information on the sentencing record that Shipra had become dependent upon

extended family for funds for basic living expenses and that in the summer of 2014 he and his family were evicted from their rentalhome for non-payment of rent. [19] There was no evidence that throughout this period Shipra was not readily employable, but he was unemployed. At the time ofsentencing submissions, his lawyer reported that Shipra had recently started work as a paid employee.

No further details were given. [20] In between the closing of the Modena Homes business and the commencement of wage or salaried employment, it appearsthat Shipra attempted initiatives called “Ethos Finance” and the “Shipra Human Fund”. Also, his wife was listed as a principal of anentity called “Abler Finance”, through which it appears Shipra may have also operated.

At the time of his meeting with the probationofficer authoring the pre-sentence report, Shipra was bullish on the prospects of these various undertakings infusing him with US$1,000,000 initially, which would then be parlayed into between US $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 “coming afterwards if the initial modelsare successful”. He indicated that his share of the first $1,000,000 would be $350,000, though the website representations in respect ofthose initiatives suggest the first $1,000,000 deposited would not be encroached upon and be at virtually no risk to the depositor of suchseed capital.

The seeming impossibility of both these representations being true at the same time is most disconcerting -- that is, that allthe initial $1,000,000 would be repaid imminently at the same time as $350,000 of it would go to him personally (unless it comes fromthe expected further $10,000,000 - $20,000,000 that miraculously gushes in immediately on the heels of the first million). [21] To the probation officer Shipra also reported having declared personal bankruptcy in 2011 “and wrote off $4.5 million ofdebt.” At the time of his interviews with the probation officer he indicated that since then he had again accumulated a further $86,100 indebt to a variety of lenders including credit card companies and relatives. [22] If the report of new employment is true, this would be a significant step forward for his rehabilitation.

In returning to the workforce in productive capacities, he may finally be starting to become responsible. By it he may learn of the dignity that results from work,from creating and from producing value by personal effort and energy. If nothing else, and if combined with some spending control, hewill have stopped digging himself deeper and deeper into debt, delaying still further any repayment to his victims.

Nature of the Offences and the Regulated Activity [23] With respect to the nature of these offences, in the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in Wholesale Travel, they involvedfailing to meet the standard of care prescribed in the Fair Trading Act. There is no mental element to the offences. It is representing thatModena Homes Inc was a registered member of the National Home Warranty Program when it was not. [24] Despite the specific offence not having a mental element, based on the agreed facts, these particular offences entailedknowingly misrepresenting to the victims that they had deposit protection.

I say “knowingly” because based on the Agreed Statement ofFacts Shipra’s conduct satisfied the test for the mental element for fraud, recently articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R vRiesberry, 2015 SCC 65. There the Court said the mental element of fraud consists of two states of mind: first, subjective knowledge ofthe prohibited act; and second, subjective knowledge that the prohibited act could have as a consequence the deprivation of another. [25] Both of those states of mind are demonstrated in the Agreed Statement of Facts.

First, Shipra was aware that Modena Homeshad applied for membership in the warranty program and that it had been declined. He therefore had subjective knowledge that therepresentation in the Modena contracts was false. He also had subjective knowledge that the prohibited act could have as a consequencethe deprivation of another. The representation was emphasized in bold font, from which I infer Shipra knew of the existence andimportance of that representation to potential counter parties.

Because he knew it was false he also knew he was placing the counterparty victims’ pecuniary interests at risk. [26] With respect to the nature of the regulated activity involved, the purpose of the Fair Trading Act, according to a prior Courtdecision, is “the regulation of business ethics and consumer protection”: R v Schulz (2003), 2003 ABPC 13 , 331 AR 96 (AltaProv Ct) at para 58.

In the civil context, this Court has said the legislative purposes of the Fair Trading Act are “to protect unsuspectingconsumers from unconscientious suppliers of goods and services”: Patel v WG Housing Ltd, 2012 ABQB 734 at para 170, andMcKercher v The Renovation Store Ltd, 2015 ABQB 748. [27] In Ontario (Ministry of Consumers and Business Services) v Kirk, 2005 ONCJ 352 , [2005] OJ No 3316, the OntarioCourt of Justice, per Kurkuin, J at para 35 said: Unfair practices, if not a species in the family of fraudulent conduct are a close cousin.

They both involved depriving a victim ofproperty, money or security through very similar means. [28] As this court has said previously, in R v El-Sayed, 2013 ABQB 504: At their core, crimes of fraud and deceit imperil confidence in the honesty, integrity and trust of one’s fellow man, which confidence isfoundational to our systems of commerce and justice. Such offences erode one’s willingness to rely upon the honour and word of one’s fellow man. [29] The significance of offences such as these should not be trivialized.

I do not, for example, accept that these are merely theunfortunate consequences of a failing business. The offending conduct would not have been permissible if Modena Homes had juststayed in business. The offending conduct is still offensive and a breach of the statutory standard. Further, just because a business isfailing does not somehow justify deception or misrepresentation in the operator’s further dealings.

A failing business is not license fordeception. [30] I further note that the specific context of these misrepresentations were to the less sophisticated consumer, within the retailhome construction market. A home is most often the single largest asset a person owns, providing security for retirement years, meaning

the effects of such conduct are much more difficult for people to recover from. They reach beyond economic effects, as devastating as those can be, to health impacts and relationship strains. Therefore the activity regulated is of critical import. Mitigating and Aggravating Factors [ 31 ] As mitigating factors for sentencing purposes, Shipra pleaded guilty to the regulatory offences. It was on the morning of trial about to start on the criminal charges. The Crown accepted the guilty pleas to the regulatory offences, withdrawing the criminal fraud charges.

Counsel agree that the Crown had some “technical difficulties” in succeeding with convictions on the criminal offences. I know nothing more than that.

This approach saved the participants the burden of seeing the process through to conclusion by trial, though it came so late in the day none of the other demands and stresses on the victims and system were saved. [ 32 ] As additional evidence of Shipra taking personal responsibility for his prior conduct, though, he consented to having his new name, Nav Shipra, added and identified for the purposes of these convictions and this sentence. [ 33 ] The statement Shipra read to the court at the time of the sentencing submissions was brief and matter of fact.

It expressed regret but was undermined by the fact that, despite over six years passing since the offences, not a single dollar was returned to the victims. Actions speak louder than words. [ 34 ] Shipra’s lawyer says this was merely a failed business venture, a young business man running into financial difficulties, nothing more. The defence says Shipra was not lining his pockets with the proceeds of these deposit transactions. He also says he had no personal involvement in each transaction, receiving deposits while knowing there was not warranty program protection. I cannot agree.

Businesses can fail without dishonesty or deception creeping in. [ 35 ] As for Shipra not offending for personal benefit, I also disagree. This was not altruistic behaviour; he was not giving the deposits to charity. These supported his business interests, for his personal advantage. The funds appear to have been dissipated into either his own pockets or the business which was a mere extension of himself. [ 36 ] As an aggravating factor is the magnitude of the amounts extracted on the strength of these misrepresentations.

The Criminal Code of Canada draws a distinction between frauds under $5,000 and those over $5,000. Although these offences are not Criminal Code fraud offences, I consider that $5,000 dividing line to still be a relevant proxy for identifying offences with effects of greater significance. These offences victimized people for far in excess of $5,000 each. [ 37 ] Shipra argues that the entire amount one of the victims placed on deposit, Mr. Ventullo, was not placed on deposit pursuant to one of the Agreements that contained the misrepresentation as to participation in the Program.

It was handed over to Shipra pursuant to a separate joint venture agreement. Therefore, he argues, slightly more than $35,000 of the total ought not to be included in my considerations of monies placed on deposit pursuant to the misrepresentation or made subject to a restitution order. [ 38 ] I disagree. That reasoning would follow if the $35,000 incremental amount were passed over to Shipra before Mr. Ventullo received the misrepresentation as to the Program. If that were the case then it would have appeared that Mr. Ventullo had simply made an improvident business transaction with Shipra via Modena Homes.

That is not what happened here. Here the roughly $35,000 additional funds were handed over by Ventullo pursuant to the joint venture agreement after the misrepresentation under a new home purchase contract. Therefore I am satisfied that the entire amount may have been tendered as a consequence of Shipra’s false veneer. It all should be considered for sentencing purposes, including for any restitution to be ordered. [ 39 ] The Crown says these were blatant misrepresentations and characterizes Shipra as having “preyed” on unwitting victims. That overstates the agreed facts.

Further, with respect to the evidence of Shipra’s apparent internet fundraising initiatives, Shipra needs to understand that these have not factored into my sentencing decision other than precipitated a single self-reporting condition that I will describe later. That is, this conduct is not treated as an aggravating factor nor is it proof of further offences. Shipra has not been separately charged .

As I alluded to earlier, on its face the additional information is disconcerting, but Shipra was not called on to respond, has not been heard in respect of it and it would be manifestly unfair to escalate Shipra’s sentence on the admitted offences because of that additional evidence. Procedural Delays [ 40 ] On the matter of the delays to the process, some comments are warranted. While I cannot speak to the procedural delays leading up to the first day of trial, when the matter was placed on my docket and Mr. Shipra entered the guilty pleas, I can comment on the adjournments since.

On each occasion that a further adjournment was requested, I had the discretion to grant or deny the request. In each case there was a reason stated for the request. In each case it may have been genuine. It may not. I fully understand that after the succession of delays, however, especially when layered onto the prior delays to trial starting, an objective observer might legitimately wonder if there wasn’t an ulterior purpose behind the various changes of counsel and requests for adjournment. Frankly, there may well have been.

But in this case each sentencing delay, and each additional adjournment occasioning the delay, held out the prospect that full restitution might be made before sentencing. This would certainly be a relevant consideration to determining a fit sentence and, equally importantly, would have gone a long way to ameliorate the situation for the victims. And so until sentence had been imposed there remained an incentive on Shipra to make full restitution now, rather than over time if ordered as part of the sentence. Put another way, granting the adjournments kept a fire under Shipra to make restitution.

I suspect I was not alone in hoping he would make good on his repeated assurances. In my view that prospect of Shipra making restitution now was worth the added delays and inconvenience to those affected, that have faithfully attended on each such occasion. [ 41 ] Regrettably, and despite Shipra’s various representations to the Court, there has been no restitution, even in part.

Sentence Determination [ 42 ] For major fraud offences, the sentencing objective to be weighed more heavily than others in the analysis is general deterrence: R v Steinhubel , 2013 ABCA 39 . Given the similarity of these particular offences under the Fair Trading Act to fraud offences, I consider general deterrence to be a more significant sentencing objective here also. [ 43 ] The Crown says this Fair Trading Act regime is only effective if significant sentences are levied. I disagree. If that were true, the province would prescribe minimum heavy sentences and it has not.

Therefore each offence must be considered for sentencing purposes on its own unique facts. [ 44 ] Therefore, while the level of moral culpability is high for these regulatory offences, they are still regulatory offences. The proportionality principle requires there be some differentiation in sentence between criminal fraud offences and regulatory misrepresentation offences, all other things being equal. [ 45 ] In my view a fit sentence here must contain a number of elements. First, there must be restitution in full. This is a significant component of the sentencing options available under the statutory regime.

This will serve the deterrence objective and help Shipra appreciate the devastating effect of his offences on the these individual victims and maybe on the public generally. Had the Program been available to the victims the maximum they would recover would have been $25,000 each, but the statute speaks of restitution in terms of the amount lost by the victim and that is in each case the total amount. I consider their full losses to be causally connected to the misrepresentation. [ 46 ] Second, there must be a period of incarceration.

This is necessary for a host of reasons but significant among them are denunciation, deterrence and Shipra’s rehabilitation. [ 47 ] Third, it must require that Shipra work. If his gainful employment ever ceases during the period of his sentence he can be required to work in volunteer capacities. This is first and foremost for his own rehabilitation to achieve the sorts of objectives I referred to earlier in my reasons. [ 48 ] But of course those last two desired elements, the incarceration and the full time work, are mutually exclusive unless the time in custody is made intermittent.

That may only be done if the time in jail is not more than 90 days. [ 49 ] I consider the appropriate period of incarceration on each charge to be in fact 90 days in custody. I am aware that concurrent sentences should be reserved for crimes arising out of the same incident. These were 4 separate incidents. Yet the offending conduct was common to all four and, in any event, the total period of incarceration in my view, for reasons of parity and proportionality, should be 90 days plus probation thereafter.

Therefore the four 90 day sentences shall all run concurrently. [ 50 ] In my view 90 days is only within the range of a fit sentence in this case because of the magnitude of the restitution orders in aggregate, because of the added probation and because this is a first offence for Shipra. I am also mindful that Shipra continues to bear responsibility for his children.

Sentence [ 51 ] For those reasons I pronounce the following sentence. [ 52 ] Nav Shipra, previously known as Navin Maghera, is sentenced to 90 days in jail on each offence, to be served concurrently and intermittently, plus 18 months probation thereafter, plus restitution is ordered in the following amounts: $86,800 to Thomas Ventullo, $124,067.96 to Ken and Laurel Pasishnik, $25,000 to Alan and Karen Bromby and $87,000 to Istvan Ulisnyak and Cynthia Borouski plus, in each case, interest at the pre-judgment interest rate from the date of deposit to today. [ 53 ] To be clear there are to be four separate restitution orders as I described, each of which shall carry with them the following additional terms: • Each is deemed to be a debt falling within section 178(1) (

e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ; • If Shipra changes his name again before all amounts ordered have been paid, he must notify each victim still owed money under the restitution orders of the name change and consent to the new name becoming subject to any civil judgment issued under s. 168(2) of the Fair Trading Act and pay all costs they incur as a consequence thereof.

If he fails to notify them, he must pay them an additional 50% of all their legal and other costs incurred as a consequence of the name change (that is 150% of all such costs); these amounts shall be added to the restitution orders, and payable forthwith thereafter; • These terms shall continue to apply in any event of any default by Shipra and of entry thereafter of this restitution order as a judgment of this Court pursuant to section 168(2) of the Fair Trading Act ; and • These terms are not to limit in any way the full rights and powers of judgment enforcement available to the victims under that s. 168(2). [ 54 ] With respect to the period of intermittent incarceration and probation, in addition to all standard and mandatory terms, the following conditions shall also apply: • Mr.

Shipra shall diligently maintain full time employment; • For any period of time in which Mr. Shipra is not so employed, including during any period of notice for which he is given at any

severance of employment, he must work no less than 30 hours per week for a registered charity or charities approved by both himself and his probation officer; • Mr. Shipra must not directly or indirectly, vicariously or corporately, with family member or friend or on his own, or in any other way, receive funds on deposit or in any trust capacity, formal or informal; • Mr. Shipra must inform his probation officer of any investment initiative or funds solicitation that he initiates, participates in, collaborates on or advises to; • Mr.

Shipra must make some payment towards the restitution orders, to the Clerk of the Court, commensurate with his income, within 48 hours of each and every pay he receives for his employment, and provide proof of same to his probation officer within a week of each such payment which must include proof of all income and any other revenue sources; • Mr. Shipra shall not change his name further; • Mr. Shipra shall not hold himself out as anyone other than Nav Shipra; • Mr.

Shipra must remain in the Province of Alberta unless permitted otherwise by his Probation Officer for work and he must turn over to his Probation Officer his passport; • Mr. Shipra must report sober for incarceration by 8 pm today, Friday January 22, 2016, remain in custody until 8 pm Sunday, January 24, 2016 and weekly thereafter on that pattern as directed; • Mr. Shipra must report to his Probation Officer within 7 days and thereafter as directed; and • Mr. Shipra must advise the Alberta Securities Commission of these offences, this sentence, plus provide it with a copy of Mr.

Esau’s sworn affidavit and comply with whatever further demands it places upon Mr. Shipra, all to the satisfaction of his Probation Officer. Heard on the 17 th day of December, 2015. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 22 nd day of January, 2016. P.R. Jeffrey J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Britta Kristenen, for the Crown Norman Kelly, for the Accused