Cormack Estate, 2016 ABQB 544

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Cormack Estate, 2016 ABQB 544 Date: 20161003 Docket: ES01 105430 Registry: Calgary Court File Number ES01 105430 Court Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta (Surrogate Matter) Judicial Centre Calgary Estate Name Stanley George Cormack (also known as Stanley G. Cormack) Applicant (Plaintiff) Reverend David Alastair Cormack Respondent (Defendant) Roxana Indergaard _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice G.H. Poelman _______________________________________________________ I.

Introduction [ 1 ] This decision arises out of disputed accounts of a personal representative, Roxanna Indergaard, relating to her administration of the Estate of Stanley George Cormack, deceased. Mr. Cormack appointed Ms. Indergaard his executrix under his will. [ 2 ] An oral hearing was conducted pursuant to an order of February 12, 2016, with evidence called by David Cormack (the applicant) and one of the beneficiaries; and Ms. Indergaard. Issues in dispute concern the delay in administering the estate and Ms. Indergaard’s dealing with several assets. II. Facts

A.

Summary of Events [ 3 ] Stanley Cormack died on August 11, 2008. Pursuant to his will, executed on May 12, 2008, Ms. Indergaard was appointed his personal representative. [ 4 ] The main asset of the estate was residential property in Calgary. In addition, there were relatively minor accounts and investments, life insurance and various items of personal property. [ 5 ] The will made bequests of specific items of personal property to relatives.

The residue was distributed among his children: 10 percent each to 3 children of his first marriage (David Cormack, Bradley Cormack and Christina Cormack); and 70 percent to Heather Cormack, the only child of his second marriage. (To avoid confusion, I will refer to these beneficiaries by their first names.) [ 6 ] At his death, Christina, Heather and John Ross (Heather’s boyfriend) resided in the deceased’s residence with him. With agreement of all family members, a rental agreement was signed by them and Ms. Indergaard.

Under this agreement, each of Heather, John and Christina “has agreed to pay the sum of $350.00 & 1/3 of the monthly utilities on the last Friday of each month.” [ 7 ] Ms. Indergaard signed an application for probate in February 2009. A grant of probate was issued on April 27, 2010. [ 8 ] All three tenants stopped paying rent and utilities as of August 2010 (the last payments appear to have been for July 2010).

Based on the evidence, Christina seemed to believe she was overpaying and was not satisfied with the information she was receiving; Heather and John continued in occupancy, planning to buy the house and paying for repairs, maintenance, taxes and utilities in the meantime. [ 9 ] Christina remained a tenant for approximately two years after stopping rent payments. The property was transferred to Heather and John effective November 29, 2012 for its appraised value. They paid about 30 percent of the value to the estate (reflecting the fact that Heather was a 70 percent beneficiary of the residue).

Following informal requests which were not satisfied, on May 21, 2013 David filed an application for accounting. Accounts were provided on July 18, 2013. The accounts were disputed by David, who also made requests for additional documents. [ 10 ] An order was granted on December 5, 2013 that financial statements be examined by an accountant; that Ms. Indergaard provide David with the deceased’s income tax returns for 2006 through 2008; and that Ms. Indergaard forthwith deliver specific requests made in the will.

Pursuant to this order, Tammy Willerth, C.A., issued a report on February 28, 2014 relating to estate accounting for the period August 11, 2008 to December 31, 2013. [ 11 ] As disputes remained between the applicant (David) and Ms. Indergaard, the application for accounting was set down for an oral hearing by order of February 12, 2016. It provided that the nature of the application was “for passing formal accounts, costs with regard to the administration of the estate and of this litigation, and advice and direction generally.” It further provided that the issues to be determined were whether Ms.

Indergaard failed to administer the estate in a timely and efficient manner; whether she acted in a manner that caused loss to the estate and some or all beneficiaries; whether she is obliged to reimburse the estate for any loss; and whether she must reimburse the applicant for solicitor and client costs of the litigation. B. Testimony [ 12 ] In support of his application, David called Christina and testified himself. Ms. Indergaard called Peter Jackson and gave her own testimony. [ 13 ] I have difficulties with the credibility of some of the testimony given by David and Christina.

I will deal with them separately. [ 14 ] Christina went out of her way to minimize Ms. Indergaard’s involvement in assisting the deceased during his lifetime. She claimed that she provided no help, and said she only saw her visiting in the hospital from time to time. She wavered on this to some degree in cross examination, explaining that she was working and might not have seen things. [ 15 ] I do not believe this testimony and, while it does not touch specifically on an issue in dispute, it affects Christina’s overall testimony. As I will address presently, Ms.

Indergaard gave detailed descriptions, which I accept, of her close relationship with the deceased over her entire life. She was appointed as his attorney, an appointment that took effect around 2005 when the deceased was severely ill, hospitalized and close to death. Likewise, she gave detailed evidence regarding the later years with the deceased, before he passed away in 2008. [ 16 ] The deceased’s choice of Ms.

Indergaard as his attorney and executrix, rather than any of his four children or brother, also speaks to a close, enduring relationship between the two of them. [ 17 ] David’s credibility is also questionable. He chose his words exceptionally carefully, and was often evasive in answering questions on cross examination. Even on matters with which he could be expected to give forthright, easy answers (such as his own e-mail), he took much time to consider what to say. [ 18 ] In my view, both Christina and David bore strong animosity to Ms. Indergaard, and their evidence was coloured as a result.

It is difficult to know why this was so. They might have been upset, understandably, at the small shares of the estate they received in comparison to Heather and may have seen Ms. Indergaard as aligned with Heather. Whatever the reason, I treat their evidence with caution on disputed points. [ 19 ] Ms. Indergaard testified for the most part freely, forthrightly and dispassionately.

Her description of the deceased’s difficulties, the work she did for and with him especially from around 2004 until his death, and the condition in which she found the estate upon his passing away were given confidently, with ample details. In general, I accept her evidence on these matters.

[ 20 ] During cross examination, sometimes she became defensive as her administration was challenged. This occurred particularly as she attempted to explain various delays in administration and discussions with Ron Cormack (the deceased’s brother) about a firearm specifically bequeathed to him. During several of these exchanges, she became argumentative, defensive, and fell into embellishing, exaggerating and being untruthful on certain details. (Examples were her involvement with estates of friends and family who passed away and conversations about the firearms.) [ 21 ] Nevertheless, on the whole I found Ms.

Indergaard’s testimony to be honest and reliable.

She has given her life largely to admirable work, almost all on a volunteer basis, for a group home (first operated by her parents, now largely by herself) and accepted her role for the deceased’s estate from purely disinterested motives. (She declined his first request to be an executrix, unless he removed her as a beneficiary from his will.) Her character does not answer for her duties and responsibilities as a personal representative, but it is one factor among many which assists me in credibility findings on the few points where such findings are necessary. [ 22 ] Peter Jackson testified for Ms. Indergaard.

He is a retired Calgary Police Service officer, who knew the deceased from their joint time as officers. He had a speciality in firearms as part of his designated duties at CPS. [ 23 ] He was involved in dealing with a Browning firearm of World War II vintage owned by the deceased, both when the deceased was in the hospital in 2005 and after his death. He was able to inspect the firearm on both occasions, and spoke with both Ms. Indergaard and Ron Cormack, the deceased’s brother, who was designated as the beneficiary to receive the firearm. [ 24 ] He gave his evidence in a straightforward, confident manner.

I have no doubt about the reliability of all of his testimony. C. Fact Findings [ 25 ] There are several areas in which findings of fact may be usefully collected here. Others will be addressed in their proper place. [ 26 ] As I intimated earlier, I accept Ms. Indergaard’s description of the many hours she spent with the deceased over the last 4 or 5 years of his life. Efforts by others, particularly by Christina, to minimize this are unconvincing. [ 27 ] The time spent with the deceased is, of course, not directly relevant to the issues before me. Ms. Indergaard is not entitled to compensation for this time.

However, it adds credibility to her description of the state of the deceased’s affairs on his death. She had already spent considerable time in assisting him (often unsuccessfully) in attempting to bring his financial matters to a more regular, current state. [ 28 ] The testimony about the condition of the deceased’s house on his death was sharply contradictory. Christina and David both testified that the house was “immaculate,” without giving details. Ms. Indergaard, in contrast, testified that the home was filthy and in need of significant repair.

She explained that the deceased was incapable of completing most things, including keeping himself clean. The filthy condition of the house arose from cats, dogs, dirty clothing and dirty linens. It had come to the point where home care nurses had to wear gloves and their safety had become an issue. [ 29 ] Ms. Indergaard testified that she had begun the process of arranging for thorough housecleaning and was considering arranging for the deceased’s move to an institution, but he died before these things could occur. Ms.

Indergaard played a central role in going through the home and its contents after his death. [ 30 ] On this point, again I prefer Ms. Indergaard’s testimony. It was given with convincing detail and I have no doubt that she was intimately familiar with the house. [ 31 ] On the other hand, I accept on the evidence that Ms. Indergaard did not consult or obtain consent from all the beneficiaries before selling the house to Heather and John. From all the evidence, I conclude that shortly after the deceased’s death, there were initial discussions among all beneficiaries and Ms.

Indergaard about the possibility of a sale, and inquiries about who might be interested. Further, I conclude that David (who lived in Ontario) indicated he had no real interest in purchasing the house, but would consider doing so if no one else was interested. He also expressed the view that he did not want his sisters thrown out. Heather and John clearly were interested, but not yet in a position to purchase in 2008, and the other beneficiaries were not interested or not in a position to make the purchase. [ 32 ] Ms.

Indergaard attempted to characterize these types of discussions (and perhaps another one to like effect with David over the next year or two, by telephone) as obtaining consent to selling the home to Heather and John. She did not go so far to say that she sought and obtained actual consent to the sale, and the terms of the sale. But attempting to characterize the earlier discussions as giving consent to the sale some years later is disingenuous and one area of Ms.

Indergaard’s testimony that I could not accept. [ 33 ] Finally, there is perhaps some dispute over whether there were adequate reasons for delay in administering the estate. In my view there can be no doubt that the administration of this estate took an excessive amount of time. I accept that Ms. Indergaard had personal challenges from time to time, but as I will address presently, none of these excuse the passage of eight years with very little accomplished. III.

Personal Representative’s Responsibilities and Liabilities [ 34 ] The duties of a personal representative are found in the applicable statutes and rules, and elaborated upon in the authorities. The overall principles are usefully summarized in Widdifield on Executors and Trustees , 6th ed (Toronto: Thomson 2002, updated

looseleaf) as including an obligation to exercise ordinary care and prudence in acting impartially between beneficiaries and be ready with her accounts (pp. 10-1 to 10-2). In addition, Widdifield summarizes the standard of care, relying on authorities, as follows: The trustee cannot be criticized for lack of training or experience but the court will try to enforce good faith, proper motives, and a minimum of good judgment.

The law requires that the trustee turn his mind to his various tasks and exhibit the same degree of diligence in the exercise of his discretion as would be expected from a man of ordinary prudence in the management of his own affairs. The test is whether a reasonable and honest man might have come to the same conclusion rather than whether the judge would have handled the matter otherwise. [p. 8-3.] [ 35 ] Of particular interest here is the length of time required to complete administration.

Some cases have referred to a presumption that assets should be brought in, realized and distributed within a year of the grant of probate: Laboucane Estate , 2011 ABQB 253 , para. 58 . However, as fairly conceded by the applicant here, one year is often unrealistic, and regard must be had to the nature of the assets and overall circumstances. [ 36 ] As noted in Laboucane Estate , where there is unreasonable delay a personal representative will be personally responsible for any loss caused by it. IV. Delay in Administration [ 37 ] In my view, Ms.

Indergaard failed to act in a timely manner in administering the estate. The administration is only now nearing completion, over eight years after the deceased`s death. [ 38 ] Ms. Indergaard certainly had difficulties: disorganized and incomplete records; conflict among the beneficiaries; significant personal challenges; all-consuming responsibility as a group home volunteer; and the need to reasonably give allowance for the testator’s children to occupy and purchase his house, the estate’s major asset.

In addition, it is common ground that the solicitor retained to assist with probate and administration (not the current solicitor) seems to have been far less diligent, helpful and proactive than is expected of a reasonable solicitor. (I must add, however, that these allegations were made without the solicitor being present to answer them.) [ 39 ] But the estate was relatively simple – a residential property, insurance policies, modest investments and few items of personal property. Despite this, for many years no assets were liquidated, the property was not listed, there were no distributions and Ms.

Indergaard failed to report to the beneficiaries. [ 40 ] Nevertheless, I conclude on the evidence that Ms. Indergaard acted with good faith and proper motives throughout. She accepted her responsibilities as

an act of goodwill towards the deceased, only on condition that he cancel gifts he had made to her in an earlier will. [ 41 ] The applicant suggested, in written and oral argument, that Ms. Indergaard preferred one beneficiary (Heather) over others, based on how the house rental and sale were handled. For reasons I will give shortly, that allegation is not established on the evidence, although Ms.

Indergaard’s handling of some of these matters was inadequate. [ 42 ] Thus, the usual principle of a trustee’s compensation will apply: she is liable only for the losses caused by her breaches of duty: Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada , 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2012), at 1270 and 1279-81. In addition, she is liable to account for all receipts and disbursements of property under her trust: Waters , 1273. [ 43 ] I will turn, then, to the specific areas where the applicant alleges that Ms. Indergaard caused loss to the estate. V. Rental income [ 44 ] The applicant alleges that Ms.

Indergaard failed to receive rents and related charges for occupancy of the residential property and must account for the shortfall. He relies on the report of Ms. Willerth. [ 45 ] Ms. Willerth’s report is helpful. However, there are challenges in using it. She did not testify and thus counsel and the court have been left with the task of interpreting a brief report without supporting tables to explain its calculations. Further, as her report indicates, she was relying upon incomplete information. (I am unable to assign responsibility for the incomplete information, because Ms.

Indergaard testified that important documents were lost due to flooding, break-ins and vandalism at her home.) [ 46 ] I have attempted to reconstruct some of Ms. Willerth’s calculations, and made some of my own.

The objective is to determine what should have been paid by Heather and John; the amount Christina owed for her occupancy after stopping rent payments was deducted from her distribution. [ 47 ] The period for calculation is August 2010 (the first month rent was not paid) through the end of November, 2012. (The testimony is unclear whether the first month with no rent payments was August, 2010 or September 2010, but my

interpretation of Ms. Willerth`s report and of the

schedule of rent and utilities forming part of Ms. Indergaard’s July 18, 2013 statement of accounts is that August 2010 was the last payment.) Thus, there are 28 months to address. [ 48 ] Under the rental agreement, each tenant owed $350.00 per month. Thus, for 28 months, Heather and John’s base rent obligation was $350.00 x 2 x 28 months = $19,600.00. (In attempting to reconstruct Ms. Willerth’s calculations, I believe she took the same approach.) [ 49 ] Ms. Indergaard testified that she did not charge Heather and John for this rent in closing the sale of the house in November, 2012 because it was more than offset by benefits they provided. A major credit to the tenants was shown in

Schedule H to the July 18,

2013 accounts, for a total of $11,382.21. Unfortunately, while Ms. Willerth refers to this item, she uses a total credit of $9,420.00 without giving details of what it comprises. She then deducts $3,500.00 from the credit for lawn, yard maintenance and snow removal for 2009 through 2012, because “normally, the tenant is responsible for maintaining the lawn and snow removal.” She accepted the other credits, although (as noted) it is unclear why she started with $9,420.00 rather than $11,382.21. [ 50 ] Ms. Indergaard testified about why she credited Heather and John for lawn, yard maintenance and snow removal.

She said that while Christina, Heather and John occupied the house together, there was significant conflict between them and they could not agree on responsibilities for maintaining the property. I accept this evidence, as Christina also testified that the atmosphere among the three of them was “toxic.” Thus, Ms. Indergaard retained a yard maintenance service to do these tasks – the same company, at the same rates, which she and her parents had used for their properties for a number of years.

She believed this was necessary to ensure that the property was properly maintained for liability and insurance coverage purposes. [ 51 ] She later made an arrangement for Heather and John to do this work for one half the rate the contractor had been charging. I am satisfied that this was not an unreasonable exercise of her discretion, and thus I do not agree with Ms. Willerth’s deduction of $3,500.00. Therefore, the tenants are entitled to a full credit of either $11,382.21 (the

Schedule H number) or $9,420.00 (Ms. Willerth’s number) leaving a balance of either $8,218.00 or $10,180.00. [ 52 ] Ms. Indergaard justified not collecting this balance on the basis that Heather and John continued to do repairs and maintenance, such as fence replacement, repair of leaking windows, chimney repairs and payment of property taxes (expenses additional to the items shown on

Schedule H). The repairs totalled, she testified, approximately $9,000, but she no longer has receipts. [ 53 ] It is regrettable that the accounts are not more accurate and precise and that so much documentation is missing. However, having regard to the findings already made and the difficulty Ms. Indergaard had with loss of some documents, I am not prepared to presume everything against her just because documents are missing. I must make the best findings possible based on the evidence available. [ 54 ] I accept Ms.

Indergaard’s evidence that she determined, on reasonable grounds, that she was receiving services of sufficient value to offset rental obligations for the period after the three tenants discontinued paying cash rent. Further, I take into account the need to ensure that the property was secure and that having it occupied was the best means to that end; the shared view of the beneficiaries that the deceased’s children should have the ability, to the extent reasonable, to occupy the property; and the fact that Ms.

Indergaard was working toward sale of the property to Heather and John at its appraised value. [ 55 ] However, there remain unanswered questions about utilities. Ms. Indergaard testified that at some point Heather and John began covering utilities and property taxes, while the estate maintained insurance payments (because a property loss claim was being processed). Thus, I find that the rental arrangement Ms. Indergaard used her discretion to implement was to credit Heather and John the value of their services in exchange for rent, but to require them to pay all utilities.

However, the July 18, 2013 accounting shows that the utility charges continued to be incurred by the estate, and I see nothing in the accounts or Ms. Willerth’s report to indicate that they were reimbursed. [ 56 ] As part of her obligation to account, Ms. Indergaard must demonstrate that the estate has been reimbursed for utilities for the period August, 2010 through the end of November, 2012. If she is unable to do so, she must reimburse the estate for the utilities not collected from the tenants.

If records of the utility charges for that period are available, the reimbursement obligations will reflect that amount. [ 57 ] In the absence of necessary records, I determine the amount of utilities that should have been collected based on the average total utility charges for the period from August 2010 (the first month rent was not paid) through September 2011 (the last month for which the total utilities paid is given in the accounting): $355.00 (4,976.06 ÷14 months) ÷ 3 (because the responsibility was divided among Christine, Heather and John, and Christine’s amount was paid by deduction from her distribution) = $118.00 per tenant.

Two shares should have been collected for Heather and John, for a period of 28 months (August 2010 through November 2012), thus $118.00 x 2 x 28 = $6,608.00. VI. Firearm [ 58 ] On the evidence, I find that Ms. Indergaard did not breach her duties as a personal representative by disposing of the Browning firearm, which had been specifically bequeathed to Ron Cormack, the deceased’s brother. [ 59 ] David gave vague, imprecise recollections of the firearm, describing what he understood of how his father had acquired it, and believing that it had some distinctive Nazi markings.

However, I prefer the disinterested evidence of Peter Jackson that the firearm had no unique characteristics and at the deceased’s death was incomplete and inoperable. [ 60 ] Further, on Mr. Jackson’s evidence, I conclude that it could not reasonably be expected that a beneficiary would go to the trouble and expense of seeking out replacement parts (which Mr. Jackson was not sure could be found) and seeking permits for, on a best case scenario, a restricted weapon. [ 61 ] Finally, Mr.

Jackson testified and I find that he advised Ron that there was no way the gun could be allowed back into anyone else’s hands, and he was going to have it destroyed. There is no evidence that Ron objected. Further, Ms. Indergaard had involved Mr. Jackson in these steps, and I find that she acted reasonably on his advice. [ 62 ] Thus, Ms. Indergaard did not breach her duties as a personal representative with respect to the firearm. Quite apart from that, there is no evidence that it had any value for which compensation could be paid.

VII. Interest [ 63 ] Ms. Indergaard did not invest the estate’s cash in an interest-bearing account. The cash amounts were quite modest for the first few years, but increased after sale of the house. [ 64 ] Ms. Willerth estimated the total interest which might have been recovered through December 2013 at $3,300.00, using various rates paid by chartered banks for savings deposits. [ 65 ] Ms. Indergaard explained that the Calgary Police Service Credit Union, in which the deceased had kept his funds, does not pay interest on estate accounts.

She left the funds at that institution. [ 66 ] The applicant argues that a reasonable personal representative would invest liquid assets, especially if they were to be held for a number of years. There is considerable merit in that argument. On behalf of Ms. Indergaard, it was argued that the interest rates used by Ms. Willerth are not reasonable and there was always a need to keep some cash readily available. [ 67 ] The applicant also argues that beneficiaries should be paid interest from a date I deem would have been reasonable for them to have received their distributions. [ 68 ] The main response of Ms.

Indergaard’s counsel to these claims is that the potential amounts involved are too minor to be the subject of second-guessing (as of the end of 2013, Ms. Willerth came to a total of $3,300.00, based in part on an interest rate of 1.8 percent for the last year). He points out that any interest owed to the residuary beneficiaries would be minor, given their ten percent interests. He submits that rather than engage in detailed calculations over minor amounts, on which taxes would be paid, I should credit Ms. Indergaard’s foregone compensation against these claims.

In my view, that is the proper approach to take in this case, given the minor amounts involved and Ms. Indergaard’s concession that she will abandon claims to compensation. VIII. Other Clai m s [ 69 ] The remaining claims can be dealt with summarily. [ 70 ] I agree that if the estate is charged interest or penalties by Canada Revenue Agency for late filing of returns, they are the responsibility of Ms. Indergaard to the extent they were late to a period after June, 2013. [ 71 ] Ms. Indergaard acknowledged responsibility for failing to cancel the Calgary Sun subscription. This cost the estate $804.80.

She is responsible to reimburse the estate for that entire amount. [ 72 ] As I believe the applicant concedes, no damages were caused by late disposition of corporate shares and failure to cash dividend cheques. If Ms. Indergaard had sold the shares promptly, the estate would have suffered a loss because of market conditions in 2008 and for some time thereafter. The dividends are still recoverable, most conveniently when the shares are sold. That process is now nearly complete. [ 73 ] The house was sold to Heather and John for its appraised value.

Further, because there was no need to list the property, the charges of a real estate agent were not incurred. There is no evidence to show that if Ms. Indergaard had acted otherwise, a higher price would have been received. Thus, there are no damages even though Ms. Indergaard would have acted much better to have sought the input of the other beneficiaries. IX. Executrix Compensation [ 74 ] While testifying, Ms. Indergaard expressed great regret for having taken so long with the estate, although she believed she had excuses for much of the period. She said she did not expect to receive compensation.

Nevertheless, her counsel properly put before the court an argument that she was entitled to compensation for work performed. In the will, the deceased set compensation at $20 per hour. [ 75 ] Administration of this estate took far too long. Nevertheless, Ms. Indergaard spent considerable time on her duties. I listened carefully to her testimony, and noted the extent of time and work that must have been required in performing countless tasks which often went unrecorded.

Among other things, she sorted and compiled personal effects, dealt with the house (collecting rent and utility payments for much of the period, arranging for maintenance and repairs, pursuing a property insurance claim for water damage and successfully convincing the insurer to maintain a residential rather than commercial insurance policy), and taking the necessary steps to restore the deceased’s life insurance to good standing after his death (despite the fact that he had allowed the policy to lapse through non- payment of premiums). [ 76 ] Ms.

Indergaard did not testify to the total number of hours she spent, other than to say it was far in excess of the 115 hours referred to in Ms. Willerth’s report. In my view, given the tasks involved, she probably spent in the range of 250 hours at least. [ 77 ] As with the personal representative in Laboucane Estate , despite the difficulties and delays, Ms. Indergaard here also did a “tremendous amount of work ... and there is no doubt that administering the estate constituted a major disruption in her life” (para. 80). At $20.00 per hour, her fee would be in the range of $5,000.00 [ 78 ] In my view, Ms.

Indergaard’s foregoing of her compensation is adequate recompense for the loss of interest the applicant claims on behalf of the estate.

X. Conclusions [ 79 ] It is obvious that administration of the late Mr. Cormack’s estate has taken far too long, and thus must be concluded as soon as possible. I will not set an arbitrary date for that to occur, because current counsel for both parties are working cooperatively toward that goal. [ 80 ] Despite Ms. Indergaard’s lack of timely attention to concluding the estate (only some of which can be attributed to problems over which she had no control), losses occasioned by the delay are relatively minor. Ms. Indergaard bears responsibility for some of them, which I summarize as follows:

a) She must account to the estate for utility payments on the house from August 2010 through November 2012 which were the responsibility of two tenants, or, in default of an acceptable accounting, pay $6,608.00 to the estate;

b) If there are interest or penalty liabilities to Canada Revenue Agency for the period after June 2013, Ms. Indergaard must indemnify the estate for them;

c) To recognize the loss of interest that might have accrued, Ms. Indergaard will not be entitled to compensation she otherwise would have earned. [ 81 ] I hope the parties, through their counsel, will be able to complete the remaining matters expeditiously, including agreeing upon the distribution schedule. They may

schedule a meeting with me to address these matters if necessary. [ 82 ] The matter of costs remains outstanding, and a meeting may be scheduled for that purpose as well. Heard on the 6 th , 7 th , 8 th , and 9 th days of September, 2016. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 3 rd day of October, 2016. G.H. Poelman J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Mr. G. Kirk for the Applicant M.G. Vanderleek and Mr. J. Kinson (Student-at-Law) for the Respondent