Renkinn Developments Inc., also known as Renkinn Developments Ltd., v. Reg Schancel Wood Finishing Ltd., 2016 ABQB 549

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Renkinn Developments Inc ( Renkinn Developments Ltd) v Stevens, 2016 ABQB 549 Date: 20161004 Docket: 0601 10121 Registry: Calgary Between: Renkinn Developments Inc., also known as Renkinn Developments Ltd., and Reg Schancel Wood Finishing Ltd. Plaintiffs - and - Kenneth James Stevens, Diana Lyn Marie Irving also known as Diana Stevens, 816270 Alberta Ltd., and Diana Stevens carrying on business as DLI Business Services Defendants -and- Kenneth James Stevens and Diana Lyn Irving also known as Diana Stevens Plaintiffs by Counterclaim -and- Renkinn Developments Inc., Renkinn Developments Ltd., Stephen King and Reno Volpi

Defendants by Counterclaim _____ Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on October 6, 2016; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment. __________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of A. R. Robertson , Q.C., Master in Chambers _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] On February 25, 2005, Renkinn Developments Inc. entered into an agreement with Ken Stevens and Diana Stevens to act as construction manager for the renovation of the Stevens’ home in Calgary.

The work was started and, according to Renkinn, mostly completed, when a dispute arose. The work stopped in February 2006. Renkinn’s charges were based on “cost plus 15%” as set out in a written Renovation Contract, and it submitted its only invoice, in the amount of $314,515, after the work was stopped. Mr. and Mrs. Stevens did not pay. [ 2 ] I will generally refer to all of the defendants collectively, including 81670 Alberta Ltd., as simply “the Stevens” or “Mr. and Mrs.

Stevens”. [ 3 ] Renkinn and one of its sub-trades, Reg Schancel Wood Finishing Ltd., sued for builders’ lien remedies, although the form of renovation contract used by Renkinn contained a “dispute resolution” clause. The application of that clause to the facts is an issue in the dispute. [ 4 ] Mr. and Mrs.

Stevens argue in their defence and counterclaim that the work was done badly, things were charged improperly, and there are various other issues that they have raised by counterclaim to set off damages against Renkinn’s claim. [ 5 ] Renkinn wants these proceedings stayed pending the outcome of arbitration proceedings, but there was no suggestion that the dispute should be resolved by arbitration until long after the dispute arose and these proceedings were underway. [ 6 ] The defendants say that (

a) there was never a proper commencement of the arbitration process and the limitation period for doing so has now run, (

b) the issues raised in their counterclaim are not properly the subject of an arbitration, because the “dispute resolution” clause is very limited as to what might be referred to arbitration; (

c) the plaintiff has attorned to the jurisdiction of the court; and (

d) in light of the delays and prosecution of this action should be dismissed for delay, pursuant to rule 4.31. [ 7 ] Therefore, the Stevens oppose the stay, and they ask that this claim be dismissed for delay and prejudice under rule 4.31.

They ask, in the alternative, for security for costs. [ 8 ] I have concluded that the arbitration clause was too restrictive to include all of the aspects of the dispute, many of which have been raised by the plaintiff; that there was no proper commencement of arbitration proceedings; that the time to do so has run; and that the delays and prejudice resulting are such that the action must be dismissed. I have made no specific decision on the “attornment” argument by itself. The issue of security for costs is moot.

The Commencement of Dispute Resolution Proceedings [ 9 ] Apparently Renkinn did not have a standard form agreement of its own. The Renovation Contract was in a form that Mrs. Stevens found on the Internet. She put the form forward and it was accepted by Renkinn. By mistake, the Renovation Contract referred to “Renkinn Developments Ltd. ” Instead of “Renkinn Developments Inc. ” [ 10 ] The lawsuit was begun by two plaintiffs. One of them had not agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration.

Renkinn and one of its sub-trades, Reg Schancel Wood Finishing Ltd., jointly brought these proceedings in 2006 pursuant to the Builders’ Lien Act , RSA 2000, chap. B-7. However, counsel for the plaintiffs later ceased to act for Reg Schancel Wood Finishing Ltd., and that plaintiff’s claim was dismissed long ago, for delay. [ 11 ] The Renovation Contract’s “Ltd.” vs “Inc.” error led to the counterclaim adding principals of Renkinn as defendants by counterclaim, because the party who originally sued (“Ltd.”) did not exist. This is one reason why the style of cause is more complicated than it might otherwise be.

Another reason is that the statement of claim, filed August 28, 2006, was then amended October 12, 2006 – not only to make reference to the erroneous “Ltd.” name, but also to add more defendants, DLI Business Services and 816270 Alberta Ltd. Neither “BLI Business Services” nor 816270 Alberta Ltd. were parties to the Renovation Contract. They were a business name and a corporation used by Ms. Stevens to provide accounting services to Renkinn, although those services stopped when the dispute arose between them.

[ 12 ] The result is that there are several named parties who had not agreed to dispute resolution by arbitration. [ 13 ] The dispute resolution clause in the Renovation Agreement is limited to “a dispute as to the

interpretation of this Contract or the extent of the Work”. Renkinn submits that these words capture the quality of the work and since that is much of what is really in dispute, the balance of the issues can be stayed and dealt with after the arbitration is complete. [ 14 ] Mr. and Mrs. Stevens argue that that is not correct, but in any event they point out that the pleadings raise many more issues. Other issues asserted by Renkinn in the amended statement of claim include an allegation of “grossly” negligent accounting services by Mrs. Stevens; the allegation of “secret retainer” by Mr. and Mrs.

Stevens of subcontractors; and wrongful interference with sub-trades. [ 15 ] The defence and counterclaim add even more issues that are said not to be captured in the stated scope of arbitration: Renkinn’s alleged negligent underestimate of the contract cost; Renkinn’s delay in completion; poor supervision of workers; failure to pay sub-trades; shabby workmanship; failure to protect the home from the elements; and other claims advanced by Mr. and Mrs. Stevens. Arbitration was a Latter-Day Proposal [ 16 ] The lawsuit did not proceed quickly.

The delays are relevant both to the issue of a stay pending arbitration and the application to dismiss the lawsuit for delay. [ 17 ] The statement of claim did not mention arbitration proceedings. Reg Schancel Wood Finishing Ltd. was not a party to the Renovation Contract. It had no basis for commencing arbitration proceedings.

Counsel for Renkinn filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act for Reg Schancel on April 19, 2007, and perhaps this opened the way to commencing arbitration proceedings, but that was still long before the possibility of arbitration was first raised. [ 18 ] The claim, issued August 28, was amended October 12, 2006. The statement of defence and counterclaim were filed October 3, 2006, and the counterclaim added the principals of Renkinn Developments Inc.

Counsel for the plaintiffs wrote on October 13, 2006 undertaking to respond to the counterclaim on behalf of all the individual defendants by counterclaim. [ 19 ] There was no discussion about going to arbitration in that letter. [ 20 ] The statement of defence to counterclaim was not filed on behalf of Renkinn until January 17, 2008, about 15 months after the claim was begun, after its counsel had ceased to represent Reg Schancel. This defence to counterclaim raised, for the first time, the possibility of arbitration, but only for part of the dispute.

It said: In answer to the whole of the counterclaim, the defendant by counterclaim repeats the contents of the amended statement of claim. Renkinn Developments Inc., is owed substantial amounts by the plaintiffs by counterclaim, for which that defendant by counterclaim has received no payments whatsoever. The desire of Renkinn Developments Inc., is to proceed through arbitration for that issue to be addressed. [Emphasis added.] [ 21 ] The statement of claim did not expressly explain what “that issue” was.

It appears to me that it referred only to Renkinn’s debt claim and, one assumes, the Stevens’ counterclaim and set-off. [ 22 ] The same day, Renkinn filed a notice of motion returnable January 23, 2008, asking for (

a) summary judgment in favour of Renkinn for “$304,515 or a portion thereof”; (

b) summary dismissal of the counterclaim as against two individuals added by the counterclaim; (

c) an order “remitting the remaining issues raised in the within action to arbitration in a place and time to be determined between the parties, or with the assistance of the Court”; (

d) a stay of the action pending the final determination of the arbitration; and (

e) directing that any future court applications contemplated by the Arbitration Act , RSA 2000, chap. A-43 be made in these proceedings. [ 23 ] However, that application was not heard in 2008, nor was it heard at any subsequent time until the matter came before me in 2016, over eight years later. The matter first came before me on March 29, 2016 and I adjourned it to a special application to be heard on August 9, 2016.

I directed that the passage of time between March 29 and August 9 was not to be taken into account in connection with the arguments about delay, discussed below. [ 24 ] The plaintiff Renkinn argues that the Renovation Contract clearly contemplated arbitration, that arbitration is mandatory, and it has been trying to commence arbitration proceedings since early on in the dispute. It asks for the assistance of the Court in doing so, pursuant to

section 6 of the Arbitration Act . Renkinn refers to Agrium Inc. v. Babcock , 2005 ABCA 82 at para. 12 for the submission that arbitration is mandatory where the agreement elects it, and refers to West Coast Installations Inc. v. Frazer Industrial Company , 2015 ABQB 257 at para. 51-51 and 57 for their explanation as to why disputes may still be resolved by way of arbitration even though proceedings have been commenced under the Builders’ Lien Act . [ 25 ] The fact that Renkinn initially sought remedies under the Builders’ Lien Act is not, by itself, a bar to arbitration.

The parties to a construction contract cannot contract out of their builders’ lien remedies, but there has long been a peaceful co-existence of builders’ lien claims and arbitration: West Coast Installations, Inc. , at para. 51-56. Accordingly, the commencement of builder’s lien proceedings, by itself, does not amount to an “attornment” to the court process. There Was No Notice to Arbitrate [ 26 ] Section 23(1) of the Arbitration Act provides as follows: An arbitration may be commenced in any way recognized by law, including the following:

(

a) a party to an arbitration agreement serves on the other parties notice to appoint or to participate in the appointment of an arbitrator under the agreement; (

b) if the arbitration agreement gives a person who is not a party power to appoint an arbitrator, a party serves notice to exercise that power on the person and serves a copy of the notice on the other parties; (

c) a party serves on the other parties a notice demanding arbitration under the arbitration agreement. [ 27 ] Although this description of how an arbitration may be commenced is stated not to be exhaustive, a common theme in the examples given is that there is to be a clear notice of some kind. [ 28 ] The only documents that could possibly be considered as having the effect of commencing arbitration proceedings were the defence to counterclaim and the notice of motion. The Stevens refer to paragraph 7(2) (

d) of the Arbitration Act (discussed below), and argue that this was too late because there was “undue delay”. [ 29 ] In any event, neither the defence to the counterclaim nor the notice of motion clearly had the effect of commencing arbitration proceedings. The reference in the defence to counterclaim was oblique; it did not state that it was invoking the arbitration route for resolution of all aspects of the dispute, just for part of them.

The notice of motion also did not purport to invoke the arbitration process; it indicated that the plaintiff was going to ask the Court to grant part of the relief sought (which would include the debt claim) and then refer “the remaining issues” to arbitration, but the Court was not actually asked to do that until 2016. The “remaining issues” would at least involve the claim against Mrs. Stevens’ accounting business, although there are many other issues raised in the pleadings.

There was no other document that might be considered a “notice to arbitrate” served on the defendants before the limitation for doing so had expired. [ 30 ] There was also a much later court application filed by Renkinn to move the case to arbitration. On January 25, 2013 Renkinn filed an “Application by the Plaintiffs to Appoint an Arbitrator”. However, Renkinn cannot rely on that document to argue that the arbitration process was invoked in time, because by then the two year statutory limitation period had already run under the Limitations Act , RSA 2000 chap.

L-12. [ 31 ] In this case the Arbitration Act , RSA 2000, chap. A-43 would be the applicable arbitration legislation and

section 7 provides, initially, that the court shall stay the court proceeding in favour of arbitration:

(1) If a party to an arbitration agreement commences a proceeding in a court in respect of a matter in dispute to be submitted to arbitration under the agreement, the court shall, on the application of another party to the arbitration agreement, stay the proceeding. [ 32 ] Despite the mandatory words of subsection 7(1), subsection (2) addresses circumstances where the court may refuse to stay the proceedings. Sub-paragraphs (c), (

d) and (

e) require consideration, They provide that the court may refuse to stay when: (

c) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of being the subject matter of arbitration under Alberta law; (

d) the application to stay the proceeding was brought with undue delay; (

e) the matter in dispute is a proper one for default or

summary judgment. [ 33 ] Subsection (3) points out that, “An arbitration of the matter in dispute may be commenced or continued while the application is before the court.” Accordingly, there was nothing stopping Renkinn from serving a Notice to Arbitrate in 2006, either before or after having a statement of claim issued under the Builders’ Lien Act to protect its lien rights. [ 34 ] West Coast Installations involved the International Commercial Arbitration Act , not the Arbitration Act . Here, the issue as to when arbitration proceedings must be sought involves consideration of “undue delay”.

Arbitration proceedings could have been commenced here after the statement of claim was filed. (The International Commercial Arbitration Act has different requirements in this regard.) [ 35 ] The first pleading by Renkinn did not, by itself, eliminate the possibility of arbitration, because of (

a) the express provisions of the Builders’ Lien Act ; (

b) the long history of compatible court/arbitration proceedings, discussed above; and (

c) the requirement in the Arbitration Act to commence arbitration proceedings without “undue delay”, not necessarily before pleading. But here Renkinn did not refer to the arbitration clause in its first pleading – the statement of claim – or in any correspondence at the time. In fact, it amended its statement of claim to sue Mrs. Stevens’ business, and it expected and received a defence from Mr. and Mrs. Stevens and her company.

Even in its defence to the counterclaim filed much later it did not clearly invoke the arbitration clause – it suggested arbitration for only part of the dispute, apparently for the debt claim. That was the part of its claim that was, perhaps, most strongly aligned with the arbitration clause in the Renovation Contract. But then it filed notice of its intent to seek

summary judgment – using the court process – for the very issue that it had suggested in the defence to counterclaim should be referred to arbitration, and it proposed that only the remaining issues would be resolved by the court process. [ 36 ] Both the defence to counterclaim and the notice of motion proposed bifurcating the dispute. Neither clearly invoked arbitration, and that is a requirement of whatever document is used to commence arbitration proceedings. “For the purposes of limitation the commencement of arbitration must be clear and unequivocal”: Surrendra Overseas Ltd. v.

Sri Lanka , [1977] 2 All E.R. 481 (Q.B.) . In my view, the commencement of arbitration must be clear and unequivocal in order to have any effect at all. The commencement of a lawsuit in the court requires paying a fee and filing a statement of claim or originating application. When that happens, there is no doubt that the action has been commenced. In contrast, commencing arbitration under the provincial legislation does not require the payment of any fee or the filing of any document. It is done by notice.

A suggestion that the parties should go to arbitration, or notice that the court will be asked to stay proceedings in case the parties go to arbitration, is not the same as commencing arbitration proceedings any more than threatening a lawsuit is the same as commencing a lawsuit. The demand in West Coast Installations was far clearer. The statement of defence in that case specifically stated, “This action is barred and should be dismissed in accordance with arbitration clause

set out in paragraph 22 of the agreement…”. The party asserting its right to arbitration was leaving no doubt as to its position. [ 37 ] The law is clear that even though a party has sued in court within two years of the deadline for doing so, where their proper remedy is in arbitration, but the claimant has failed to commence the arbitration proceedings within the limitation period, the claim must be struck as being statute-barred: A.G. Clark Holdings Ltd. v.

HOOPP Realty Inc. , 2014 ABCA 20 , at para. 7 . [ 38 ] Accordingly, since arbitration proceedings were not commenced, they are now statute barred, and it was already too late to commence arbitration proceedings in 2013 when a new application was filed that more clearly made the attempt. [ 39 ] The application for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration proceedings fails on that ground alone. Arbitration proceedings were never begun.

The Arbitration Clause Was Not Sufficiently Broad [ 40 ] Furthermore, the claims advanced by the plaintiff, even without looking at the issues raised in the counterclaim, describe a dispute that goes far beyond the things that are described in the arbitration clause. Most of the dispute appears to be beyond what was agreed to be resolved by arbitration. [ 41 ] When the claims advanced by the counterclaim are also considered, it becomes clearer.

Furthermore, the plaintiff has involved other parties, who had not agreed to arbitrate their differences, as in Nizamov v. 1861398 Alberta Ltd. , 2016 ABQB 401 . [ 42 ] In Yaworski v. Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP , 2013 ABCA 21 the Court of Appeal allowed a dispute to go to arbitration even though a “non-party” was involved, but the “non-party” was the owner of the professional corporation who had agreed to arbitration. The Court said, Yaworski argues that

section 7 of The Arbitration Act does not apply to him personally as he is not a party to an arbitration agreement. However, arbitrations cannot be avoided by simply having a related party commence a lawsuit claiming relief with respect to arbitrable subject matter. In this case Yaworski PC and Gowlings agreed that all disputes between them was to be arbitrated. [ 43 ] That is considerably different than the case here, where (

a) the addition of 816270 Alberta Ltd. and Diana Stevens carrying on business as DLI Business Services was done by the plaintiffs, not the defendants, and (

b) the arbitration clause has clear limits to its scope, and that scope did not extend to these sorts of claims advanced against the accounting business. [ 44 ] Since so much of the dispute is not properly included in the arbitration clause in the Renovation Contract, on that ground alone I would not have stayed the action pending arbitration, as provided by section 7(2) (

c) of the Arbitration Act . Delay and Prejudice [ 45 ] I now come to issues of delay and prejudice. [ 46 ] In March of 2016, the lawsuit was almost 10 years old. Much of this delay was the direct result of the plaintiff’s, or plaintiffs’ at the relevant time, inactivity. (In fact, the Reg Schancel claim was dismissed on March 16, 2012 for long delay; its builder’s lien and CLP were removed from title.) The defence to counterclaim was not filed until January 17, 2008, over a year after the Stevens filed their affidavit of records.

After the Stevens filed a supplemental affidavit of records on March 19, 2009, there was a three year gap where nothing occurred. (Rule 4.33’s predecessor, in effect at that time, required a five year gap for dismissal for long delay.) Then another 10 months of inactivity passed, and then on January 24, 2013, Renkinn asked the Stevens’ lawyer to

schedule an arbitration hearing. By then, it appears that Renkinn had ceased to carry on business, and the Stevens had sold their house. [ 47 ] The plaintiff’s application for an order scheduling an arbitration hearing was brought before the court, and the master directed the application and cross-application to be heard together as a special. But then there was another 2½ years of complete inactivity. Activity only resumed in March 2016 when it was brought before me. [ 48 ] Therefore, the Stevens do not accept that they were responsible for the long delays.

The plaintiff had demonstrated only sporadic interest in moving its claim forward. [ 49 ] Master Schlosser talked about the evidentiary “best before date” in Mintage Financial Corp. v. Altenhofen , 2013 ABQB 486 , 2013 CarswellAlta 1600 at para. 36-41 and in Regco Petroleums Ltd. v. Gerling Canada Insurance Co. , 2014 ABQB 459 , 2014 CarswellAlta 1421, 591 A.R. 173. I commented on the approach he suggested in M. L. Bruce Holdings Inc. v. Ceco Developments Ltd. , 2015 ABQB 604 , 2015 CarswellAlta 1790, [2015] A.W.L.D. 4153, 259 A.C.W.S. (3d) 62.

At para. 38-40 I suggested that the general “best before date” for slow litigation is 10 years, although various factors must be taken into account, such as whether or not the case is a “documents” case, the complexity of the matter, the number of parties, the possible advanced age or deteriorating health of critical witnesses, the proceedings that are been taken along the way, whether there have been long periods of inactivity, and whether the delay had substantially been caused by the defendant. [ 50 ] This case is partly a documents case, but it seems clear that it is also one that will depend to a great extent on oral testimony and therefore memory.

There are not a great number of parties, and there has been virtually no progress made over the almost 10 years it has been ongoing. There have been long periods of inactivity. The defendants have not substantially obstructed the progress. The defendants have also not advanced their counterclaim, but their counterclaim is largely for purposes of set-off. The “Delay” Rules in the Rules of Court [ 51 ] Rule 4.33 is the so-called “drop dead” rule that addresses cases that have languished for more than three years.

This case is now so old that, as mentioned, during part of the time it has been active the relevant period of delay has changed from five years to three years. There has not been a continuous period of either three years or five years (at the applicable times) of no activity at all. Rule 4.33

does not apply. [ 52 ] Rule 4.31, however, does not approach the issue of delay using the same “drop dead” approach. Rule 4.31 involves a consideration of prejudice. If there has been delay and consequential prejudice the court may dismiss the action. Where the delay is “inordinate and inexcusable”, the delay is presumed to have resulted in significant prejudice to the party that brought the application (in this case, Mr. and Mrs. Stevens).

If the presumption applies, the plaintiff has the burden to rebut it. [ 53 ] Renkinn argues that there is no prejudice to trigger the application of rule 4.31; and that the delay is not “inordinate and inexcusable” to lead to a reversal of the burden of proof of prejudice. [ 54 ] As well, Renkinn submits that “any delay was caused solely by the defendants through repeated requests for adjournment, requests for cross-examination that were never scheduled, and requests to put matters over to special application that were never followed through on.” [ 55 ] Furthermore, Renkinn submits that even if there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay and significant prejudice resulting, the Court has a discretion not to dismiss the claim, citing Ursa Ventures Ltd. v.

Edmonton (City) , 2016 ABCA 135 at para. 113-116 . I note that the passage cited appears in the dissenting opinion. Furthermore, the case was decided under rule 4.33, not 4.31. [ 56 ] Although rule 4.31creates a presumption of prejudice where the delay is “inordinate and inexcusable”, the Stevens argue that the Court need not rely on finding that the delay is both of these things; the defendants argue that there is actual evidence of prejudice. They say that the memory of Mr. Laratta, the witness initially put forward by Renkinn, has been weakened by time.

However, a review of the transcript of his cross-examination does not reveal any material prejudice. [ 57 ] I am advised that in fact there is no builder’s lien registered against what used to be the home owned by the Stevens. It seems clear that the Renkinn lien was never actually registered by Renkinn notwithstanding the reference to the Builders’ Lien Act and the issuance by the clerk of the court of a certificate of lis pendens .

The house is now owned by someone else. [ 58 ] The consequence of this delay is that there is no longer any ready availability of access to the house, and the claim advanced here will almost certainly require some level of expert reports. How can they be done 10 years later? Aside from the issue of access, it would be very difficult to determine what the status of the renovations was at the time the work was stopped, given the change of ownership and high likelihood that there have been at least some modest, if not significant, subsequent changes made within the house.

Some prejudice seems very likely to have resulted from the delay. [ 59 ] There is really no good explanation for the length of delay. The delivery of a defence to the counterclaim, alone, took over a year. There has been no questioning which, at the time this lawsuit was started 10 years ago, was still called “examination for discovery”. The claim has very substantially drifted for most of the 10 years it has been active. Requests for adjournments by the Stevens do not count for enough of the lost time to have any material impact. [ 60 ] Rule 4.31(2) provides for the reversal of the burden of proof.

It states: Where, in determining an application under this rule, the Court finds that the delay in an action is inordinate and inexcusable, that delay is presumed to have resulted in significant prejudice to the party that brought the application. [ 61 ] Accordingly, the burden falls on Renkinn to show that there has been no significant prejudice in order for the lawsuit to proceed. Virtually no evidence in this regard was tendered. The closest we get to evidence that there has been no significant prejudice is that in cross-examination Mr.

Laratta was still able to remember some important parts of his evidence years after the fact – although his cross-examination was about two and a half years before March 2016, when “time stopped” for the delay analysis, as discussed above. [ 62 ] In addition to generally fading memories (which affects the ability of a witness to answer questions in cross-examination correctly, even where the witness has given a great deal of thought to what he or she anticipates will be his or her direct evidence) the passage of time and change of ownership creates prejudice to both sides in the presentation of expert evidence as to the quality of the work done. [ 63 ] In the circumstances, it is my conclusion that the delay has been inordinate and inexcusable, and the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that prejudice has not resulted: Regco Petroleums Ltd. , supra .

The presumption of prejudice has not been rebutted. The claim must be dismissed under rule 4.31. Conclusion [ 64 ] The application to stay the court proceedings pending arbitration is dismissed. [ 65 ] In light of the delay in prosecuting the court proceedings, the action, including the counterclaim, is dismissed. [ 66 ] There is no reason to consider the application for security for costs, so it is dismissed as being moot. [ 67 ] Costs may be spoken to. Heard on the 9 th day of August, 2016 . Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 4 th day of October, 2016.

A. R. Robertson, Q.C., M.C.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Norman D. Anderson Shea Nerland Calnan LLP for the Applicant/Respondent (Plaintiff) Renkinn Developments Inc., also known as Renkinn Developments Ltd. Todd Kathol Field Law LLP for the Respondents/Applicants (Defendants) _______________________________________________________ Corrigendum of the Memorandum of Decision of A. R. Robertson, Q.C., Master in Chambers _______________________________________________________ Citation Line has been amended Renkinn Developments Inc ( Renkinn Developments Ltd) v Stevens, 2016 ABQB 549