Canadian Natural Resources Limited v Red Deer County, 2016 ABQB 558

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Canadian Natural Resources Limited v Red Deer County, 2016 ABQB 558 Date: 20161020 Docket: 1410 00400 Registry: Red Deer Between: Canadian Natural Resources Limited and Trident Exploration Corp., NAL Resources Limited, Bonavista Energy Corporation, Bonavista Petroleum Ltd., Vermillion Energy Inc., Vermillion Resources Limited and Whitecap Resources Inc. (as represented by AEC Property Tax Solutions) Applicants - and - Red Deer County and Central Alberta Regional Assessment Review Board Respondents _______________________________ ________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Mr.

Justice J.W. Hopkins _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] This application involves the

interpretation of legislation relating to the municipal tax assessment of land at well sites. The Applicants are all energy companies appealing six decisions of the Red Deer Regional Composite Assessment Review Board [the “Board”]. [ 2 ] The sole issue for this appeal, as determined by the leave to appeal decision of Justice Jerke, is whether the Board erred in

law or jurisdiction in its

interpretation of

section 4 of the Matter Relating to the Assessment and Taxation Regulation. The leave to appealdecision was reported at 2015 ABQB 220 [the “leave decision”]. Background to the Application [3] The applications all involve a surface lease for lands consisting of an access road or point and then an area surrounding an oiland gas well.

Within the leased area surrounding an oil and gas well there is an uncultivated area that is teardrop shaped. [4] The dispute relates to whether the lands to be assessed relate to the entire land leased area, based on the necessary spacingrequirements dictated by the Alberta Energy Regulator and development set back requirements, as the Respondents contend, or only theteardrop area, as the Applicants contend. [5] This involves the

interpretation of the Municipal Government Act, RSA 2000 ch.

M-26 [the “Act”] and the Matters Relatingto Assessment and Taxation Regulation, AR 220/224 [the “MRAT”]. [6] The Board at paragraph 60 of the decisions, which are identical in wording, found “[t]he evidence indicates that the entireleased area is used for the intended purpose of oil and gas exploration.” [7] Further, at paragraph 65 of the decisions: The Board finds that evidence must be provided by the lease holder to prove that a farming operation exists exclusively or permanentlyon a portion of the leased area during the entire assessment period otherwise the leased area in its entirety is to be assessed as anindustrial parcel. [8] The Board continued at paragraph 69 of its reasons: . . .

The Act section 304(1)(

f) defines the lease holder as the assessed person. The lease holder holds a lease for a defined area. Theleased area is the area to be assessed to the lease holder. How it is to be assessed is to be determined by the assessor, but the entire leasedarea is to be assessed to the lease-holder. [9] The Board was not explicit in its analysis of the Act and the MRAT. As the leave decision acknowledged, “The CARARBdecision may be difficult to read . . .” (at para 50).

In Appendix “C” to the decision, the Board did refer to the legislation, dictionarydefinitions, a prior composite assessment review board decision, and the provincial Assessment Bulletin. Legislation [10] The assessment process under the Act takes place on an annual basis, as set out in

section 285: “Each municipality mustprepare annually an assessment for each property in the municipality, except linear property and the property listed in

section 298.” [11] The Act defines “linear property” in section 284(1)(k)(iii). Linear property that relates to well sites includes the pipe and wellhead installations at a well head site and the legal interest in the land for the well site, but it excludes land and buildings. Linear propertyis assessed by the Province. [12] The Act defines “property” in the following way in section 284(1)(r): ... (r) “property” means (

i) a parcel of land, (ii) an improvement, or (iii) a parcel of land and the improvements to it; ... [13] Except for linear property, assessments for all property must be assessed by an assessor appointed by the municipality undersection 289(1). Section 289(2) provides: Each assessment must reflect (

a) the characteristics and physical condition of the property on December 31 of the year prior to the year in which atax is imposed under

Part 10 in respect of the property, and (

b) the valuation and other standards set out in the regulations for that property.

[ 14 ] The duties of the assessors are set out in

section 293 of the Act : 293(1) In preparing an assessment, the assessor must, in a fair and equitable manner, (

a) apply the valuation and other standards set out in the regulations, and (

b) follow the procedures set out in the regulations.

(2) If there are no procedures set out in the regulations for preparing assessments, the assessor must take into consideration assessments of similar property in the same municipality in which the property that is being assessed is located. [ 15 ] The applicable provisions of the MRAT ,

section 4 states as follows: 4(1) The valuation standard for a parcel of land is (

a) market value, or (

b) if the parcel is used for farming operations, agricultural use value. . . .

(3) Despite subsection (1)(b), the valuation standard for the following property is market value: . . . (

e) any area that (

i) is located within a parcel of land, (ii) is used for commercial or industrial purposes, and (iii) cannot be serviced by using water and sewer distribution lines located in land that is adjacent to the parcel;

(4) An area referred to in subsection (3)(c), (d), (

e) or (

f) must be assessed as if it is a parcel of land. [ 16 ] The provision entitled “Recording the Assessed Person” in section 304(1) requires that the “name of the person described in column 2 must be recorded on the assessment roll as the assessed person in respect of the assessed property described in column 1.” The following

schedule appears with the pertinent part reproduced: Column 1 Assessed property Column 2 Assessed person (

f) a parcel of land, or a part of a parcel of land, and the improvements to it held under a lease, licence or permit from the owner of the land where the land and the improvements are used for (

i) drilling, treating, separating, refining or processing of natural gas, oil . . . or any combination, product or by product of any of them, (

f) the holder of the lease, licence or permit; [ 17 ] Section 304(2) further provides: “When land is occupied under the authority of a right of entry order as defined in the Surface Rights Act or an order made under any other Act , it is, for the purposes of subsection (1), considered to be occupied under a lease or licence from the owner of the land.” Standard of Review [ 18 ] Both the Applicants and Respondents argue that the applicable standard of review for this appeal is correctness: Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Limited v Edmonton (City) , 2015 ABCA 85 , 599 A.R. 210, leave to appeal to SCC granted, [2015]

S.C.C.A. No. 161 [Capilano].

Capilano is currently under reserve in the Supreme Court of Canada, and a decision is pending. [19] Where the standard of review applicable to a question to a court has been previously determined, a court need not engage in afull standard of review analysis: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 SCR 190 at para 57 [Dunsmuir].Capilano determined the applicable standard of review was correctness based on the application of a contextual analysis, and theanalysis of the Court of Appeal is binding in this instance. [20] In Dunsmuir, at para 50, the Supreme Court of Canada described the analysis based on the standard of correctness as follows: As important as it is that courts have a proper understanding of reasonableness review as a deferential standard, it is also withoutquestion that the standard of correctness must be maintained in respect of jurisdictional and some other questions of law.

This promotesjust decisions and avoids inconsistent and unauthorized application of law. When applying the correctness standard, a reviewing courtwill not show deference to the decision maker's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysiswill bring the court to decide whether it agrees with the determination of the decision maker; if not, the court will substitute its own viewand provide the correct answer. From the outset, the court must ask whether the tribunal's decision was correct. [21] Accordingly, I will review the correctness of the Board’s determination.

First, it is necessary to review the respectivepositions of the Applicants and Respondents. Position of the Parties [22] The Applicants argue that the Board’s finding that the larger lease area should be assessed area is contrary to the clearwording of section 4(3)(

e) of the MRAT. According to the Applicant, the MRAT section 4(4) removes any ambiguity in the wording ofthe provision in this regard. [23] The Applicants argue the MRAT indicates what property to assess and how to determine its size. The Applicants argue for asequential reading of the legislation to argue that the provisions that refer to the MRAT

section 4 relate to how to make an assessment andsection 304 relates to against whom to make the assessment. The Applicants refer to the heading of

section 304 to support thisinterpretation. [24] If the Board’s

interpretation was correct, the Applicants argue, rather than the MRAT referring to “use,” the legislation couldhave referred to a “lease,” or could have included language suggesting future events or intent. The Applicants also referred to the otherprovisions of s. 4(3)(

e) of the MRAT and sections 289 and 290 of the Act, which define the parcel based on the area used. [25] The Applicants rely on the prior decisions of the assessment boards and the provincial Assessment Bulletin to demonstratethat the legislative intent is that only the area in actual use is to be assessed. [26] The Respondents’ position is that

section 304 of the Act identifies what property is to be assessed and to whom while

section 4of the MRAT addresses the method of valuation. [27] The Respondents propose a step-by-step analysis. The first step, according to the Respondents, is to read the definition ofproperty and linear property, which excludes land at the well sites. [28] The next step, the Respondents argue, is to consider

section 304. The meaning of section 304(1)(

f) put forward by theApplicants, according to the Respondents, does not work harmoniously with the phrase “part of a parcel of land held by lease,” whichresults from a 2008 amendment. [29] The final step, according to the Respondents, is to consider the MRAT, which applies a valuation standard of market value towell sites that are located on farmland parcels. Section 4(4) of the MRAT, according to the Respondents, provides that the area referredto section 4(3)(

e) must be assessed as if it is a parcel of land. [30] The Respondents point out that section 4(3)(

e) does not refer to “area in use,” as the Applicant contends but is rather “any area. . . that is used for commercial or industrial purposes.” The Respondents further argue section 4(3)(

e) of the MRAT applies in manycircumstances, not only in the case of a lease as suggested by the Applicants. Law and Analysis [31] The approach to the

interpretation of fiscal statutes was described in Cwalina Estate v Parkland (County), 2013 ABCA 343,at para 20, 561 A.R. 166: The proper approach to interpreting taxing provisions depends on the “precision and clarity with which a taxing provision is drafted”.Taxpayers are entitled to rely on a provision's clear meaning and if its words are precise and unequivocal, they play a dominant role inthe interpretive process. Any ambiguities require the court to take a “unified textual, contextual and purposive approach” tointerpretation.

The residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer applies only in the “exceptional case” when the foregoing rules (“clearmeaning” or “unified textual, contextual and purposive approach”) do not allow the court to “discern the meaning” of the taxingprovision: Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v Ontario (Minister of Finance), 2006 SCC 20 (S.C.C.) at paras 21-24, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 715(S.C.C.) [Placer Dome]. [32] In other words, to properly understand the meaning of

section 4 of the MRAT, it is necessary to approach the analysis

considering the text, context and purpose of the legislation as a whole. Only where the meaning of the taxation provision is unclearfollowing this analysis does the residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer apply (ibid). [33] The words of the statute are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with thescheme of the statute, the object of the statute and the intention of the legislature: Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., (SCC),[1998] 1 SCR 27, at para 21, citing Elmer Driedger, The Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at p. 87, seealso,

Interpretation Act, RSA 2000, ch. I-8, s. 10 (an enactment shall be given “the fair, large and liberal construction and

interpretationthat best ensures the attainment of its objects”). [34] The leave decision of Justice Jerke considered the immediate context of the legislation (at paras 13-16): The applicants are companies that lease lands on which they operate well sites. The leased areas are located within parcels used forfarming operations. These leases frequently include lease trails (access roads) and lease sites (the working well areas). The amount ofland leased is stipulated by the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) to provide for necessary spacing . . .

The stipulated land area alsoprovides for development setback requirements. There are both AER setbacks for exploratory well sites, and setbacks required bymunicipal bylaws for indicated parcels. The actual surface area physically in use by the company at any given time is often much less than the leased area; parts of the leasedarea and the access right of way can be used from time to time by the adjoining farmer for farmland. Under s304(1)(

f) of the MGA, these applicant companies are “assessed persons” potentially liable for the payment of taxes because theyare "the holder of the lease, licence or permit" for property which is used for the following activities: (

i) drilling, treating, separating, refining or processing of natural gas, oil, coal, salt, brine or any combination, product or by-product ofany of them, (ii) pipeline pumping or compressing, or (iii) working, excavating, transporting or storing any minerals in or under the land referred to in the lease, licence or permit or under landin the vicinity of that land. In

summary, the owners of the parcels of land and the applicants as leaseholders are both assessed persons. The question is for howmuch land and on what valuation standard. [35] I find that reading section 4(3)(

e) of the MRAT based on its plain and ordinary meaning, it is unclear whether the meaning ofthe phrase “any area that . . . is used for commercial or industrial purposes” relates to the teardrop area immediately surrounding thewell-head or to the entire leased area. Rather than removing any ambiguity, as the Applicants suggest, section 4(4) supports the oppositeconclusion by indicating that any area referred to in subsection 4(3)(e) “must be assessed as if it is a parcel of land.” [36] I cannot accept, as the Applicants argue, that the wording of section 4(3)(

e) of the MRAT is clear and unambiguous and isconsistent only with an

interpretation that the tear-drop area is to be assessed. I find there to be ambiguity in this wording. [37] The Applicants relied on the Encana and Penn West Petroleum Ltd. v Kneehill County, (24 May 2013) Kneehill CountyComposite Assessment Review Board [the “Kneehill Decision”] and the Assessment Services Branch, Assessment Bulletin IB Bulletin13-02, “Land at Well Sites” (July 2013) [the “Assessment Bulletin”] to support a textual

interpretation of the provision. [38] The Kneehill Decision states at paragraphs 124-125: The Assessor stated that he had assessed the area in use, but upon reflection thought that the leased area was more appropriate. TheCARB is of the view that the Assessor’s use of the “area in use” is appropriate. It parallels the words set out in section 4(3)(

e) ofMRAT-“area of land ... that is used for commercial or industrial purposes ... “. While the CARB recognizes that the entire leased areamight be considered to be “used for commercial or industrial purposes”, the CARB takes a purposive

interpretation of the words of thelegislation. The assessment is to reflect physical characteristics, one of which is the actual use of the land. Only the “area in use” is usedfor the industrial purpose, as the evidence before the CARB was that the balance of the leased area was used for farming operations.Therefore, the CARB believes that the Assessor correctly interpreted the legislation in using the “area in use” to calculate theassessment.

If the balance of the leased area was not used for “farming operations”, it would and should be assessed as industrial;however, where farming operations are being conducted, regulated farmland rates apply. Although the disturbed area could increase, the Assessor must determine the characteristics under

section 289 of the MGA. If there is along term change to the area in use, it would have to be identified on a parcel by parcel basis. Although the CARB heard argument thatthis may occur, it has no evidence about how frequently it occurs and how much additional area is disturbed, so the CARB has noevidence on which to base any variance. [39] The Kneehill Decision did not apply a plain meaning

interpretation of the provision, but rather what it deemed to be a“purposive”

interpretation. The reference to the term “area in use” that was determinative in its analysis of the legislation is not found inthe wording of the statute. The actual wording relied upon is “any area that . . . is used for commercial or industrial purposes.” I thereforeconsider the reasoning of that decision to be questionable. [40] The Assessment Bulletin entitled “Land at Well Sites,” released after the Kneehill Decision, reads as follows: Regarding section 4(3)(

e) of MRAT – is the intent of this to look at the actual area in use or could it be the actual area of a lease?

The intent is to assess the actual area in use. Section 4(3)(

e) is about an unserviced area within a parcel used for commercial or industrialpurposes. This

section states “used for” and is therefore the actual area in use. It is to be assessed as a parcel of land (MRAT 4(4)). [41] The Assessment Bulletin correctly states that the wording of the

section is “is used for” and from this concludes the intent ofthe provision is to assess the actual area in use. While administrative practice and

interpretation may resolve doubts as to theinterpretation of a taxation statute (see, Placer Dome, at para 10, and see also, JNA Holdings v Alberta Assessment Review Board, (27June 1990), Edmonton 8903-20688 (ABQB), per Cooke J at 10), the Respondents argue that the rationale behind the

interpretation in theBulletin is not clearly articulated. I agree. Accordingly, I afford the

interpretation in the Assessment Bulletin minimal weight. [42] The Applicants and the Respondents advance competing analyses of the scheme of the legislation, both attempting to discernhow the provisions or parts of the legislation work together to give effect to a plausible and coherent plan. Each considers how theprovision to be interpreted can be understood in terms of that plan (see, Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed.(Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at p. 409, para 13.12 (“Sullivan”), citing Melnychuk v Heard, (AB KB), [1963]A.J. No. 72, 45 W.W.R. 257 (Alta S.C.), at 263).

It is necessary to critically analyze both approaches. [43] The Applicants argue that a sequential analysis of the statute yields the most coherent

interpretation, citing Leckie v Mitchell, (BC CA), [1997] BCJ No. 2227, 152 D.L.R. (4th) 448 (BCCA) at para 10. While reading the headings of the statutewill provide a contextual feature, the weight to be afforded to it will depend on the circumstances (R. v Davis, (SCC),[1999] 3 S.C.R. 759 at para 53, cited in Edmonton (City) v Innvest Properties MacDonald Nominee Ltd., 2010 ABQB 459 at paras 19-22, Moen J aff’d 2011 ABCA 333 at para 11). The Applicants argue the Act and the MRAT set out a step by step scheme for the entireproperty assessment and taxation process. [44] The Assessment of Property, set out in

Part 9 of the Act, is divided into divisions. Division 1, Preparation of Assessments,includes sections 285 through to

section 301.1. It includes the provision contained in sections 289(2) and 293, which refers to thevaluation standard set out in MRAT. Division 2, Assessment Role, contains sections 302 to 307. This

section includes

section 304, whichis entitled “Recording Assessed Persons.” Division 3, Assessment Notices, deals with the contents and the providing of assessmentnotices. [45] Reading the legislation sequentially indicates that the first division, Preparation of Assessments, which refers to the MRAT,precedes

section 304, contained in the second division, the Assessment Roll.

Section 304 relates to who is to be assessed for variousproperty types after the assessments have been completed. According to the Applicants,

section 304 does not establish how to assess,merely who to assess once the assessment has been completed. [46] The Respondents argue that if there is a choice between two plausible

interpretations, the

interpretation that avoids a gap inthe legislative scheme is preferred: see, Sullivan, at pp. 384-385, para 12.22, citing R. v Atchinson, 2006 ABCA 258, at paras 9-12, 401A.R. 198 (interpreting the word “pedestrian” to include skateboards). [47] The Respondents set out a three part analysis to determining the process of assessment. First, because the definition ofproperty excludes linear property under section 284(1)(k)(iii) of the Act, the Respondents argue that the legislature intended that landbeyond the well sites should be assessed. Second, section 304(1)(

f) identifies the assessed property as a “parcel of land, or part of aparcel of land, and the improvements to it held under a lease.” The property to be assessed is the lands held under the lease, licence orpermit and the person to be assessed is the holder of the lease, license or permit. Third,

section 4 of the MRAT determines that well sitesare a use of land for commercial purposes, and should therefore be assessed based on market valuation. The MRAT also provides that anarea of land must be assessed as though it was a parcel of land. [48] The Respondents’ argument is that the most logical and coherent approach to the legislation is first to determine what andwhom to assess, and then determine how to assess it. [49] In my view, the

interpretation advanced by the Respondents is the correct one. This

interpretation is the most coherent andinternally consistent and reflects the intention of the legislature for municipalities to assess property based on the parcel of land leased. [50] When the legislation distinguishes between “property” and “linear property,” it does so in a manner that suggests exclusivitybetween municipal and provincial assessments of land. The Applicants’

interpretation that limits the assessment of lands to the well siteis inconsistent with this scheme of legislation, which contemplates a separate provincial assessment for land at the well site and themunicipally assessed “property” (or parcel) beyond it. This is because “linear property” in

section 284(k)(iii), including “well headinstallations or other improvements located at a well site” and “any legal interest in the land that forms the site of the wells,” is to beassessed by the province. When the definition of property and linear property are read together, it is clear that the legislationcontemplates the municipality assess something different than the lands at the well site. [51] Section 289(1) provides that the assessor appointed by the municipality must prepare assessments for all property in amunicipality, other than linear property.

Section 289(2) provides that the assessment must reflect the characteristics and physicalcondition of the property and refers to the valuation standards, which are contained in

section 4 of the MRAT (see also, s. 293). [52] While I acknowledge that the legislature in sections 289 and 290 applied an approach based on “area in use” in relation torailways, roadways, irrigation works and grazing leases, the legislature made a different choice in this instance and did not confine itselfto “area in use.” [53] The legislature removed any doubt that the leased portion of the land used for oil and gas development was to be assessed byamending section 304(1)(f).

The amendment clarified that municipalities must assess the leaseholder for the parcel or part of a parcel ofland for oil and gas exploration and development: 2008 c. 37, s. 3. Section 304(2) already provided where a right of entry order isgranted under the Surface Rights Act, the land is considered occupied under a lease or license from the owner of that land.

Section 304,in other words, defines and clarifies who is to be assessed with respect to what property.

[ 54 ] The provisions of

section 4 of the MRAT must be read in the context and scheme of the legislation, not in isolation. I agree with the Respondents’ submission that

section 4 of the MRAT relates to the valuation standard rather than defining the property to be assessed. The wording of sections 289 and 293 , the reference to valuation standards in the wording of the provision itself, and its heading (“Valuation Standard for a Parcel of Land”) support this

interpretation. [ 55 ] The wording contained in

section 4 of the MRAT , “any area that . . . is used for commercial or industrial purposes” is intentionally flexible and encompasses any number of commercial and industrial uses, not just the assessment of lands at the well site. For this reason, the provision does not refer to a lease or the intended use. [ 56 ] The intention to assess the lands as a parcel is consistent with the definition of “property” contained in section 284(1)(

r) of the Act and is further clarified by the MRAT section 4(4), which states that “an area referred to in [s. 4(3)(e)] must be assessed as if it is a parcel of land.” [ 57 ] The foregoing

interpretation of

section 4 of the MRAT is the most coherent and consistent with the overall intent and scheme of the legislation. The land is to be assessed as a parcel of land based on the leased area, not based on the teardrop area or the “area in use,” as the Applicant contends. [ 58 ] The Applicants further argued the prior Kneehill Decision and Assessment Bulletin reached a contrary result than the one advanced by the Respondents and that the taxpayer is entitled to a clear and consistent

interpretation. While I accept that certainty and predictability favours a consistent

interpretation of the legislation by different assessment review boards (see, Altus Group Limited v Calgary (City) , 2015 ABCA 86 , at para 23-24 , 599 A.R. 223), I was not referred to any binding judicial authority interpreting this provision. This is the first opportunity for the Court to consider the correct

interpretation that should be applied. [ 59 ] The Applicants argue that the

interpretation advanced by the Board was impermissible as it results in an increase in taxation resulting from a complaint by the taxpayer. [ 60 ] In Capilano , the Court of Appeal found at paragraph 39: Overall, the scheme of the statute reflects a balancing of interests. The municipality has the ability to reassess every property, every year. Accordingly, an arguably "unfair" assessment will only prevail for one taxation year if a municipality is not allowed to cross-complain . . . Concurrently, taxpayers are protected from retroactive increases in their tax liability.

Each property is to be assessed as of December 31 of the previous year, and once the assessment is issued a taxpayer can plan its affairs on the assumption that its tax liability will not be re-opened by the assessor. A taxpayer can complain about an assessment being too high, without the danger of it being increased even further.

This is consistent with Canadian expectations about the imposition of taxes; retroactive taxation is possible, but not presumed . . . [ 61 ] I recognize that the decision of the Board to revise the assessment was on its own initiative, and not, as in Capilano , the result of a cross-application by the municipality. Nevertheless, I consider that the principle against retroactive taxation to be equally applicable. Conclusion [ 62 ] In answer to the issue to be determined from the leave to appeal decision, namely, whether the Board erred in law or jurisdiction in its

interpretation of

section 4 of the MRAT , I find that the determination by the Board was correct (see, Dunsmuir , at para 50 , above). The Respondents are entitled in future assessments to rely on the correct

interpretation of the scheme of the legislation as set out in this decision. [ 63 ] However, I further find that the Applicants are entitled to rely on the originally assessed values for the 2013 tax year based on the presumption against retroactive taxation as set out in Capilano . [ 64 ] The parties may apply to speak to costs in this matter, with the application to be made within 30 days of the date of this decision. Heard on the 3 rd day of March, 2016. Dated at the City of Red Deer, Alberta this 20 th day of October, 2016. J.W. Hopkins J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances: Brian Dell Wilson Laycraft for the Applicants Carol Zukiwski Reynolds, Mirth, Richards & Farmer LLP for the Respondent - Red Deer County Gwendolyn Stewart-Palmer Shores Jardine LLP for the Respondent - Central Alberta Regional Assessment Board