Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 Date: 20161121 Docket: 1504 00745, 1504 00747, 1504 00746 Registry: Grande Prairie Action No. 1504 00747, 1504 00745 Between: Shirley A. Hok Applicant - and - Her Majesty the Queen In Right of Alberta Respondent - and - The Honourable David R. Shynkar, Provincial Court Judge, Provincial Court of Alberta Respondent (Not a party to this application)

Action No. 1504 00746 And between: Shirley A. Hok Applicant - and - Her Majesty the Queen In Right of Alberta Respondent - and - The Honourable David D. Holmes, Provincial Court Judge, Provincial Court of Alberta Respondent (Not a party to this application) _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Gerald A. Verville _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] Shirley A.

Hok sought judicial review of three decisions by two Judges of the Provincial Court of Alberta who refused to issue process, pursuant to s 507.1 of the Criminal Code , RSC 1985, c C-46, against an RCMP officer and members of a family who lived next door to her. Ms. Hok had a long-standing conflict with those neighbors. The RCMP officer on investigating the dispute, laid charges against both Ms. Hok and one of her neighbors. [ 2 ] On June 8, 2016, I issued written reasons that denied Ms. Hok’s judicial review applications: R v Hok , 2016 ABQB 335 ( Hok #1 ). In that decision, I determined that Ms.

Hok’s judicial review application was an instance of vexatious litigation: paras 79-103.

Pursuant to s 23.1 of the Judicature Act , RSA 2000, c J-2, I notified Ms. Hok and the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General (Minister) that they had 30 days to make written submissions as to: 1. whether Ms. Hok should be declared a vexatious litigant, 2. whether Ms. Hok’s access to Alberta Courts should be restricted, and 3. what form those restrictions, if any, should take. [ 3 ] Ms. Hok’s written submissions were received on July 4, 2016. The Minister provided a brief of law on July 7, 2016, but took no position in relation to Ms. Hok. Ms.

Hok filed an “Affidavit of Rebuttal, et al” in response on July 18, 2016. The respondents made no submissions. II. Submissions to the Court A. Ms. Hok [ 4 ] Ms. Hok submits that her access to Alberta Courts should not be restricted in any way. She seeks the following: 1. I want a voiding-out of judge/Verville’s false-and-misleading/defamatory-libelous claim of me being a “vexatious litigant” ; 2. I want a quashing/voiding-out of judge/Verville’s false-and-misleading and curtailing court-order to make me have to apply to the court if I want to make any court-action filings; 3.

I want a voiding-out of ALL of judge/Verville’s disgusting misleading statements of my having some kind of a mental disorder et al (ie: whenever someone is vigilant, that is NOT some kind of mental disorder et al); 4. I want the re-opening of my file ->> because I want that criminal offender of [D.B.], the son Michelle Sapp/Baron (Baron Oilfield Supply et al) brought to justice/to set an example/to act as a deterrent et al; 5.

Any such further and other relief as I may advise and this Honourable Court deem fit. [Emphasis and styling in original.] [ 5 ] The grounds for her application are: 6. “Legal standards frequently call for the application of the reasonable person test .

Judicial fact-finding, an important part of a judge’s work, calls for the evaluation of evidence in light of common sense and experience .” - per Commentary 4/Integrity/Ethical Principles for Judges/ Canadian Judicial Counsel ; 7. “An abuse of discretion is a failure to take into proper consideration the facts and law relating to a particular matter; an arbitrary or unreasonable departure from precedent and settled judicial custom.” On appeal of an exercise of judicial discretion, “abuse of discretion” is a standard of review requiring the appellate court to find that the lower court’s decision would “shock the conscience” of a reasonable person in order to reverse the decision below.” - per my Wikipedia-download ; 8.

Recall that any judge sitting on their “fat-chair” “ MUST decide HONESTLY and IMPARTIALLY on the basis of THE LAW and THE EVIDENCE ” et al - per: Ethical Principles for Judges/Canadian Judicial Council ; 9. But, judge/G.A. Verville had made many, many errors of law and errors of applicable usable facts -->> giving many, many ground of mixed fact and law errors ; and had denied facts et al; AND had displayed gross ABUSE OF DISCRESSION of me; 10. But, judge/G.A.

Verville had made many false-and-misleading, slanderous libelous statements about me - without his having had any PROOF at all (as his backing) to give him the necessary requirement to make such disgustingly false-and-misleading documented slanderous libelous claims of me; 11. But, judge/G.A. Verville had displayed much severe abuse of discretion against me - making the decision-reasoning of his an atrocity of justice towards me and my rights to have a fair and ethical Special Chambers hearing/judicial review of June 7, 2016 ; 12.

Such further and other grounds as I may advise and this Honourable Court deem fit. [Emphasis and styling in original.] [ 6 ] Her written submissions continue to broadly criticize my conclusion that her actions are abusive. What follows are several representative excerpts from Ms. Hok’s “Written Submissions”: 52) Know that judge/Verville had NO BACKING , NO REAL ETHICAL SUBSTANTIATON to give him the required merit to curtail my want of doing valid court-filings et al.

Know that only because he mimics both false-and-misleading judges et al NEVER EVER gave him any real, rational merit to label me as a “vexatious litigant” - cause he cannot merely SPEWL-OUT that claim (without having any required REAL authentic support of it). 53) And, know that by judge/Verville’s falsely misleading and unethical claim of me having already been a “ vexatious litigant ” he has deliberately put a BLOCK onto me -->> intentional done to curtail my want of public prosecution service (along with my want of brining criminal offenders to justice) et al.

54) Plus, judge/Verville’s false claim of me being a “vexatious litigant” has also slandered me/ DEFAMATORY LIBELOUSLY defamed me [three right facing arrows one above the other] he has HARMED me/damaged me! ... 60) And by judge/Verville’s slanderously-libelous documentation that my determination and fight for justice et al “ suggest an obsessive inability to let matters go ” -->> but HUH!

Know that by judge/Verville having made such a falsely misleading claim about me clearly shows that he’s wacko+- and with an ulterior motive (being that of to get me to stop; to NOT bring around justice of those criminal offenders et al). Be aware of the fact that whenever “ matters are decided” unethically/falsely - there then is a real valid right to fight further to get an ethical and rightful and fair/just end-point. Is that not odd et al?

But - for a judge, being like that of judge/Verville, to falsely cite that a determined person (that is fighting for truth and justice, and rightfulness), is therefore obsessive -->> gives verification of a judge’s dementedness et al! And, the judge is then highly biased and inciting barratry et al! ... 64) Next, severely unethical judge/Verville goes on to make the claim that I have been a “vexatious litigant” via my having committed “escalating proceedings” - but exactly WHAT THE HECK is the result of gotten unethically false end-point?

Recall that any hearing HAS TO BE FAIRLY and ETHICALLY and JUSTLY rendered -->> but do not stupidly claim that all judges and lawyers and Crown prosecutors et al are ethically decent and fair “people”.

They are very capable of having hidden hostilities - and know that a pecuniary cop is NOT the only facet of the public-service sectors that has those “ on the take ” et al! ... 70) Next, judge/Verville continues-on to make the false-and-defamatory claim that I had brought my three individual judicial review applications “ for improper purposes ” - but HUH ! 71) And, yet again judge/Verville falsely cited that when I had boldly made a positive statement that then meant that I had “a dmitted ” to something (see his paragraph 94 ) - but HUH !

Yet again judge/Verville wants the reader to believe that I had been doing something bad or wrong, and that I had then “ fessed-up ” -->> but B.S.! What judge/Verville was attempting was to falsely invalidate all of the criminal negligence and false complaints-dismissals et al that had been constantly and unethically+ done onto me -->> that shows that I have been a “target” ; and not getting any proper public-service by the RCMP et al!

And, what I had been doing was showing the networking/collusiveness of all of the breaches of public service et al towards me et al! [lightning bolt icon] Therefore, my having made my bold statements NEVER had been “admissions” of guilty actions et al!

Here again judge/Verville had WARPED et al what really had taken place -->> showing deviousness and unfairness et al of judge/Verville. ... 76) All that I am going say regarding that above falsely misleading accusation (by demented judge/Verville) that takes into account his paragraphs 98-100, is that I DEFINITELY DO have the PROOF of my claims about the slough of gross misconducts et all perpetuated via lawyers, judges, police-members, etc.

KNOW that each and every organization has a CODE OF CONDUCT and/or a CODE OF ETHICS and/or PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS et al -->> that over-rules each and every regulated members . And KNOW that we, the lowly “little people” have RIGHT S, including the right to have decent and ethically given PUBLIC SERVICE (given by those within the realms of providing public-service ) ET AL! 77) And again - know that a judge is there in place to be a public service to that of even the lowly “little person” that is without MEGA- MONEY-BUCKS/mega-influence et al.

And, for a judge (like that of judge/Verville) to do such mal-service and mega-damage et al to me displays HIS intentional demeaning INSOLENCE ARROGANCE - up to the point one can safely assume that judge/Verville is using his PENIS-head to do the thought-processing, and/or has “itchy palms” ( jist waiting for a pay-off et al). ... 87) And so, as judge/Verville had falsely and unethically declined to grant me any of the remedies that I had wanted (along with my want of the over-turning of the process-hearing judge’s refusal to “ issue process ” of my “ private information ” ‘s “ 507.1”/process hearing ), I am therefore requesting that my file be re-opened et al -->> to allow the process to continue-on (to bring around justice et al) - as judge/Verville has been obstructing justice while also having defamed me (along with his false BLOCKAGE of my opportunity to court-file further any applications et al). (note: see Rule 9.13/Alberta Rules of Court ).

And - I want that vexatious litigant order of Verville’s (of me) quashed et al. [Format and style as in original.] B. The Minister of Justice and Solicitor General of Alberta [ 7 ] The Minister’s submissions relate to the principles and procedures for court intervention that affects the steps required for a person to access Alberta courts. The Minister cites RO v DF , 2016 ABCA 170 , 87 CPC (7th) 1, and submits that a court order that restricts court access should be structured to restrict litigation in relation to a defined group of ‘target’ litigants, where that class can be identified by a litigant’s history.

The Minister also argues that a Court should only restrict access to itself (i.e., Queen’s Bench), unless there is evidence a person “had acted (or was likely to act) in a vexatious manner in some other court.” [ 8 ] The Minister also observes that there is a question of whether superior courts have an inherent jurisdiction to restrict litigant access, or whether the authority to limit court activities is strictly set by the Judicature Act , RSA 2000, c J-2, ss 23-23.1 provisions. [ 9 ] The Minister does, however, note that Rooke ACJ of this Court in Re Boisjoli , 2015 ABQB 629 , 29 Alta LR (6th) 334 concluded that the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench had inherent jurisdiction to take steps of this kind.

The Minister submits that the

courts have a broad discretion to set processes for how leave may be sought, including steps to shelter court staff, and preconditions which must be met before a person is permitted to resume litigation, such as that outstanding court costs are paid. III.

A Two-Stage Procedure to Court Access Restriction [ 10 ] In Lymer v Jonsson , 2016 ABCA 32 , 612 AR 122, Costigan JA ruled that procedural justice requires that a person against whom court access restriction has been considered have the opportunity to make submissions as to whether any restriction is appropriate, or, if so, what the scope of that restriction should be. This Court has responded to Lymer by adopting a two-step process in scenarios where a person has abused the Court’s processes. This procedure is analogous to the common-law approach to contempt of court.

The hearing judge, having observed a problematic court participant, evaluates that court participant’s conduct to determine whether the person has abused court processes and/or exhibits indicia of vexatiousness, and therefore may potentially require restrictions on access to court functions, or other disciplinary steps. The second step is where restrictions are ordered, if appropriate.

The candidate for court access restriction is given an opportunity to make submissions on whether access restrictions are appropriate, and what form those restrictions would take. [ 11 ] Two other reported judgments have partially implemented the Lymer two-step process. In Gauthier v Starr , 2016 ABQB 213 , 86 CPC (7th) 348, Rooke ACJ declared Gauthier a “vexatious litigant”, and invited the Minister to apply to have Gauthier’s court access restricted. No application was made.

A divorcing spouse in Kavanagh v Kavanagh , 2016 ABQB 107 was also declared a “vexatious litigant” and an additional hearing was set for the second step of the two-step procedure, however, that litigant passed away before that hearing. This response to Ms. Hok is therefore the first judgment to conduct the second step of this two-step process. [ 12 ] This two-step process is not an absolute requirement.

Lymer , also states that: “The sufficiency of notice will be assessed in the context of whether ... [the abusive litigant] ... was not taken by surprise by the issuance of a vexatious litigant order on the Court’s own motion.” R v Grabowski , 2015 ABCA 391 , 609 AR 217 is cited as example of where surprise did not occur because the prior litigation history made it clear that the appellant was given ample opportunity to deny impropriety and to assert his good faith, thereby rendering the two-stage process unnecessary. [ 13 ] However, what satisfies the ‘no surprise’ rule is difficult to evaluate since Lymer (Re) , 2014 ABQB 674 , 9 Alta LR (6th) 57 reports Lymer had previously made submissions that his actions were not frivolous and vexatious and therefore that his filing activities should not be restricted (para 13).

Master Smart in Lymer (Re) also applied Chutskoff v Bonora , 2014 ABQB 389 , 590 AR 288, affirmed 2014 ABCA 444 , 588 AR 303, the leading authority on the indicia of litigation abuse, and concluded Lymer had engaged in five of the categories of litigation misconduct that each individually warrant gatekeeping restrictions on Lymer’s court access: paras 85- 113 . IV.

The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench’s Authority to Control Court Activities [ 14 ] As previously stated, the Minister argues that it remains unresolved whether an Alberta court has an inherent jurisdiction to restrict commencement or continuation of a legal proceeding.

If it does not, the alternative is that some or all court authority to control abusive litigation may be obtained only through legislation. [ 15 ] The Minister cites Pawlus v Pope , 2004 ABCA 396 , 357 AR 347, where the Court of Appeal at para 16 stated “[t]here are conflicting authorities as to a court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent a litigant from commencing an action without leave of the court. ...”. These conflicting authorities are, however, not identified.

The Court went on to state at para 17: 17 The issues relating to inherent jurisdiction and the breadth of any inherent jurisdiction to deal with vexatious proceedings are very important. This Court has not dealt with s. 23.

Nor do we wish to do so without notice to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General, who should have an opportunity to address the meaning of s. 23 and the extent to which it should limit the court's inherent jurisdiction, if at all. [ 16 ] In Alberta, there are two statutes that authorize a Court to intervene and restrict litigation activities where litigation is “vexatious”, namely: the Judicature Act , referred to by the Minister, and the Family Law Act , SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 91.

The interplay of these two provisions has received little judicial commentary. [ 17 ] Two UK Court of Appeal decisions, Ebert v Birch & Anor , (also cited as Ebert v Venvil ), [1999] EWCA Civ 3043 (UK CA) and Bhamjee v Forsdick & Ors (No 2) , [2003] EWCA Civ 1113 (UK CA), set out the common law authority of UK courts to restrict litigant court access.

Some Commonwealth authorities had concluded that UK and Commonwealth courts had no inherent jurisdiction to restrict a person from initiating new court proceedings, and instead that authority was first obtained when Parliament passed the Vexatious Actions Act, 1896 . Ebert concludes that is false, as historical research determined that in the UK courts had exercised common law authority to restrict persons initiating new litigation prior to passage of the Vexatious Actions Act, 1896 .

That legislation and its successors do not codify the court’s authority, but instead legislative and common-law inherent jurisdiction control processes co-exist. [ 18 ] The Quebec Court of Appeal, citing Ebert , also recognizes an inherent jurisdiction to control new and hypothetical proceedings: Tremblay v Charest , 2006 QCCA 204 at para 6 .

That Court indicates this inherent jurisdiction extends to provide superior courts the authority to shelter tribunals and other bodies that are unable to control vexatious litigants: Productions Pixcom Inc. v Fabrikant , 2005 QCCA 703 at paras 22-23 , JE 2005-1493, leave denied [2005] SCCA No 460. [ 19 ] In Dykun v Odishaw , 2001 ABCA 204 , 286 AR 392, the Alberta Court of Appeal issued what is functionally a modern Judicature Act , ss 23-23.1 vexatious litigant restriction, though the order is styled as an injunction. However, no legislation at that point

existed that could support issuing the Dykun v Odishaw order.

Instead, the Judicature Act vexatious litigant provisions then in effect required a separate application by originating notice, with written consent by the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Alberta: 23(1) When, on an application made by way of originating notice with the consent in writing of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Alberta , the Court is satisfied that a person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Court or in any other court against the same person or against different persons, the Court may order that no legal proceedings shall, without leave of the Court, be instituted in any court by the person taking those vexatious legal proceedings . ... [Emphasis added.] [ 20 ] The Dykun “injunction” order did not conform to the Judicature Act procedure, and was made on the Court’s own motion.

Logically, this decision was therefore made under the Alberta Court of Appeal’s inherent common law authority to control its own processes. A subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied leave: Dykun v Odishaw , [2001] SCCA No 442. [ 21 ] In light of the Minister’s submissions, a key issue is whether there are three alternative bases ( Judicature Act , Family Law Act , inherent jurisdiction) on which this Court can restrict an abusive court participant’s litigation activities?

Or as queried by the Minister, is this capacity only granted to Alberta Courts via legislation? [ 22 ] In KE v CSM , 2016 ABQB 342 at paras 14-20 , Browne J. observed these two legislative schemes are alternative approaches, and a court can choose either option in a family law dispute, or a superior court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction (at para 40).

Other decisions of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench also conclude that Court has an inherent jurisdiction to restrict litigant filing: Re Boisjoli , 2015 ABQB 629 at para 9 ; Sikora Estate (Re) , 2015 ABQB 467 , at paras 16-17 . [ 23 ] Other Court of Appeal judgments indicate Alberta courts have the inherent authority to restrict court access. Grabowski , at para 9 , confirms a Queen’s Bench court access order was made explicitly on Rooke ACJ’s own motion under the Judicature Act , s 23- 23.1 authority.

However, the Court cites Queen’s Bench and Court of Appeal authority and states: The Court enjoys an inherent jurisdiction to control its own process ; as such , a judge may declare a litigant vexatious on his or her own motion . ... [Emphasis added.] [ 24 ] SG v Larochelle , 2005 ABCA 111 at para 13 , 363 AR 326, leave denied [2005] SCCA No 220, confirms a court access restriction order issued by Lee J. of this Court in SG v Larochelle , 2004 ABQB 33 , 355 AR 32.

One of the grounds of appeal was Lee J. had “... exceeded his jurisdiction in precluding the appellant from pursuing further applications and actions without leave.” Notably, Justice Lee at para 89 made explicit that this order was made under the trial court’s inherent jurisdiction: ... I am exercising my inherent jurisdiction and prohibiting Mr. S.G. from filing any further applications in this Action or initiating any other proceedings in this Court without prior leave of the Court.

This too confirms the Court of Appeal has recognized Alberta courts possess an inherent jurisdiction to restrict future and hypothetical litigation by an abusive litigant. [ 25 ] The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, a superior court of inherent jurisdiction, has at least the same authority to restrict court access as the Alberta Court of Appeal, especially since the Court of Appeal derives its authority and power from legislation: Court of Appeal Act , RSA 2000, c C-30.

I therefore conclude this Court’s authority to restrict court access is not solely derived from the Judicature Act and/or Family Law Act or restricted by this legislation but rather co-exists with it. V. Principles that Guide the Scope of Court Access Restrictions for Future Litigation [ 26 ] Court access and activity in Canada is moving away from a focus centered strictly on litigants’ rights and interests.

In the past several years, the Supreme Court of Canada has increasingly instructed that judges and court participants engage in a “culture shift” when it comes to litigation procedure, and the formal rights of litigants.

In Hryniak v Mauldin , 2014 SCC 7 , [2014] 1 SCR 87, Karakatsanis J. wrote that the steps required in civil litigation should be proportional to their functional value (para 28): “... [T]he best forum for resolving a dispute is not always that with the most painstaking procedure.” The historic over-emphasis on procedural rights and exhaustive formality has made civil litigation impractical and inaccessible (para 2): ...The balance between procedure and access struck by our justice system must come to reflect modern reality and recognize that new models of adjudication can be fair and just. [ 27 ] This principle extends to all court proceedings, “especially those involving self-represented parties”: Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (Attorney General) , 2014 SCC 59 at para 110 , [2014] 3 SCR 31. [ 28 ] More recently, the Supreme Court, in R v Jordan , 2016 SCC 27 , at paras 44-45 , has called for a parallel “change in courtroom culture” that emphasizes efficiency and the functional protection of an accused person’s rights in a criminal proceeding.

A key instruction to criminal trial courts is that useless litigation steps should be immediately dealt with in a

summary manner: para 63. [ 29 ] The Hryniak “culture shift” applies to control of persons who abuse court processes: Chutskoff at para 31 , Gao v Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board) , 2014 ONSC 6497 at para 5 , 37 CLR (4th) 7; Tupper v Nova Scotia (Attorney General) , 2015 NSCA 92 at paras 46-49 , 390 DLR (4th) 651, leave denied [2015] SCCA No 520; Raji v Borden Ladner Gervais LLP , 2015 ONSC 801 at para 8 ; Dias v WSIB , 2016 ONSC 5226 at para 7 ; Purcaru v Vacaru , 2016 ONSC 1609 at para 14 , 265 ACWS (3d) 710; Raitman v Medallion Developments (South Maple) Limited , 2014 ONSC 3380 at para 16-17 ; and Lelond v The Park West School Division , 2015 MBCA 116 at paras 79-84 , 3423 Man R (2d) 188.

A. The Impact of a Vexatious Litigant Order [ 30 ] There is no dispute that a person cannot be denied access to Canadian courts. However, that right of access is not unlimited. Chief Justice McLachlin in Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia , at para 47 , explains: ...

There is no constitutional right to bring frivolous or vexatious cases , and measures that deter such cases may actually increase efficiency and overall access to justice. [Emphasis added.] [ 31 ] Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia explores when a barrier to court, in this case filing fees, is unconstitutional as it impedes access to justice.

While barriers to frustrate or discourage abusive litigation are a legitimate exercise of legislative or court authority, “... legislation which effectively denies people the right to take their cases to court ...” [emphasis added] is prohibited: para 40. “Undue hardship” is the threshold that blocks effective access: paras 45-48. [ 32 ] Though orders that restrict court access are sometimes described as “extraordinary”, the the potential infringement of a person’s rights inflicted by the standard pre-filing leave application requirement should not be exaggerated.

In Wong v Giannacopoulos , 2011 ABCA 277 at para 8 , 515 AR 58, Slatter JA observed: The applicant argues that the vexatious litigant order denies her the basic right of a Canadian citizen to commence a legal action. That is not the true effect of the order. The applicant can still commence any legitimate action; she is only subject to a screening procedure to make sure that any action she proposes is properly founded in fact and law, and will be diligently prosecuted.

The vexatious litigant order does not substantially prejudice the applicant . [Emphasis added.] [ 33 ] Typical vexatious litigant orders (for example Henry v El , 2010 ABCA 312 , 193 ACWS (3d) 1099, leave denied [2011] SCCA No 138), require that the vexatious litigant provide to the court an unfiled copy of the proposed statement of claim, motion, or application, and a supporting affidavit to establish grounds for that filing. Realistically, this is not a great hurdle. There is no cost to submit this material (it is not “filed”) or make this application. Filing fees only follow if leave is granted.

The proposed filing had to be prepared anyway. Any person considering legitimate litigation should at least have taken the step of mustering the evidence and argument they plan to advance. Transforming that into an affidavit is a comparatively minor additional step. Courts often strike out actions that are based on bald allegations: GH v Alcock , 2013 ABCA 24 , at para 58 . A person subject to a vexatious litigant order should not be able to access the courts with bald allegations. This ‘evidence mustering’ requirement is therefore unremarkable and would be required for a valid claim in any event.

This step does not represent “undue hardship” any more than other routine litigation steps that require documentation. [ 34 ] Vexatious litigant orders have included more stringent requirements, such as: 1. representation via a lawyer is a pre-requisite of filing ( Boe v Boe , 2014 BCCA 208 at para 36 , 356 BCAC 217), 2. an abusive court participant must pay outstanding court costs as a precondition to future litigation steps ( Grabowski , at para 12 ), and 3. requiring payment into court of security for costs ( Dykun ).

Obviously, these substantial financial obligations are therefore reasonable ‘hurdles’ to control an abusive court participant. In light of Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia , this emphasizes simply how low an obstacle a leave application actually is, when it comes to access to justice. B.

Relevant Factors for the Scope of a Vexatious Litigant Order [ 35 ] The Judicature Act , ss 23-23.1 and RO v DF appear to suggest “a history of “persistently” engaging in any of the prohibited actions in subsection 23(2)” is required prior to court intervention to restrict a person from initiating or continuing litigation without leave. However, in Henry , a single instance of baseless litigation coupled with bad out-of-court conduct was a basis for a vexatious litigant order.

The Ontario Court of Appeal in Bishop v Bishop , 2011 ONCA 211 at para 9 , 200 ACWS (3d) 1021, leave denied [2011] SCCA No 239 concluded activities inside and outside of court are viewed as a whole in assessing litigation misconduct. [ 36 ] I conclude that when a court considers limits to future court access by a person with a history of litigation misconduct the key questions for a court are: 1. Can the court determine the identity or type of persons who are likely to be the target of future abusive litigation? 2. What litigation subject or subjects are likely involved in that abuse of court processes? 3.

In what forums will that abuse occur? [ 37 ] Hryniak instructs that modern case management balances litigant rights against net benefits and expenditure of court resources. The tangible impediment caused by a requirement that a person seek leave to initiate or continue litigation is low. Control of frivolous, vexatious, and abusive litigation is a valid exercise of legislative and court authority: Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia . I conclude that when a court makes a vexatious litigant order it should do so to respond to anticipated abuse of court processes.

This is prospective case management step, rather than punitive. VI. Ms. Hok’s Personal Actions and Statements Predict

Broad Litigation Abuse [ 38 ] There is no dispute that Ms. Hok has engaged in abuse of court processes. This is paralleled by her other complaint activities. That information was largely volunteered. In Hok #1 , I concluded she has engaged in hopeless proceedings: paras 87-88. She escalated her conflict with her neighbors in a range of non-court contexts, and has initiated at least four lawsuits, attempted to lay criminal informations against persons which had no merit, and then challenged that result via judicial reviews that were also unsuccessful: paras 89-90.

Her litigation and complaint activities have no reasonable purpose, but are intended instead to cause harm: paras 93-100. She does not conceal her anger and hostility to those she perceives as opposing her. Ms. Hok’s language is openly scandalous and inflammatory, both in the past, in her judicial review applications (paras 101-102), and now in her submissions in response to Hok #1 . [ 39 ] These are all bases to conclude her litigation is abusive, and each could warrant restriction on her court access.

Multiple abusive aspects favours immediate court intervention to control this abuse of court processes. [ 40 ] The Alberta Court of Appeal recently in Hok v Alberta (Justice & Solicitor General) , 2016 ABCA 356 applied Rule 14.92(

e) to strike out one of Ms. Hok’s appeals. The Registrar referred Ms. Hok’s appeal of a Court of Queen’s Bench

summary judgment that dismissed a lawsuit against a number of Crown Prosecutors. Ms. Hok’s appeal was made contrary to my order in Hok #1 and Ms. Hok had also engaged in “inflationary re-configuration” of her claim from $3,227.73 to $600,000.00. [ 41 ] Ms. Hok in her written submissions indicates she has filed two additional appeals of Queen’s Bench judgments: Action No. 1404 00582 – Shirley A. Hok v QE II Hospital Psychiatric Unit et al Action No. 1404 00583 – Shirley A. Hok v RCMP PACT Unit et al [ 42 ] The Minister made brief submissions of law in relation to Ms. Hok and this decision.

Notably, the Minister took no position on whether Ms. Hok should be subject to court access restrictions. Nevertheless, Ms. Hok’s “Affidavit of Rebuttal et al” responds to the Minister’s brief in a very negative manner: 9) But then -->> on July 13, 2016 I had been hand-served Mr. Timothy Hurlburt’s un-court-filed “ Written Submissions of the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General of Alberta ” (of July 12,2016) And what a complete BIASED and unethitcal document that is et al! ... 12) Know that via Mr.

Hurlburt’s totally UNFAIR/BIASED+ “ Written Submissions of the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General of Alberta ” (of July 12/2016) the reader is led to believe that there is just NO WAY IN HELL that I can ever be successfully vindicated of judge/Verville’s false order (of Verville having labelled me a vexatious litigant ) - along with his delusional SLANDER/DEFAMATION of me et al! That then means that a disgustingly unethical judge can never be fought - and that a judge is NEVER wrong about that moot point et al -->> but HUH ! [lightning bolt icon] ... 17) And Mr.

Hurlburt, by his “ Written Submissions of the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General of Alberta ” (of July 12/2016), has automatically backed the “ vexatious litigant order ” against me -->> which his NOT right! 18) As well - know that I want an ethically decent judge to do the reviewing/decision-making in regards to my disputing/challenging judge/Verville’s “ vexatious litigant order ” of me et al.

But, recognize that what I have been repetitively subjects to are judges that are either seeing “ PINK ELEPHANTS ” or “ people with six heads ” et al; and judges deeming that I have NO FINGERS at all held up, none at all - when really I am holding-up ALL FIVE of them (on my one hand) et al! Know that the slough of filthy, unethical judges that I have been subject to “ stink to high heaven ” et al -->> and all of that HAS TO BE RIGHTED et al! [lighting bolt icon] 19) And so, I am making my complaint against the unfair , falsely misleading/mis-conductful incompetence of Mr.

Timothy Hurlbert/Counsel for the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General and his totally biased““ Written Submissions of the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General of Alberta ” (of July 12/2016) that he is using to curtail me while defaming absolutely innocent and ethically right me. ... 21) Note: on May 29/2016, I had a para-normal revealing dream that showed me that “ they ” were planning/plotting to deliberately turn- down MY three individual judicial reviews on June 7, 2016 -->> and so I then right-away faxed that point to the Prime Minister of Canada ; etc. [Format and style in original.] This further illustrates Ms.

Hok’s hostile posture to even neutral parties: ‘You are with me, or against me.’ [ 43 ] Ms. Hok has had an opportunity to respond to the findings made in Hok #1 . Her submissions allege that any and all criticism she has received is false, and that those who have not accepted her position are corrupt, biased, and incompetent. She claims that her cause is just, and she promises she will continue her activities until her neighbors, the “U of A Mafia”, and their co-conspirators in the police, Crown Prosecutor’s office, and judiciary are disciplined. [ 44 ] Ms.

Hok’s submissions indicate she does not recognize that her actions are illegal or rationally connected to the substance of any injury she has experienced. I conclude her attacks will continue. Ms. Hok promises exactly that.

[ 45 ] Ms. Hok’s identified misconduct is in all three Alberta courts, and she self-reports making many more complaints. The range of persons she sees as wrongdoers and warranting sanction is clearly expanding. As she identifies more ‘conspirators’, they too become potential targets. [ 46 ] Ms. Hok’s personal history and stated intention makes it clear that her inappropriate dispute activity has increased in size and scope. There is no reason to believe that pattern will change. [ 47 ] As a result, Ms.

Hok is a person who is an appropriate target for broad, global court restrictions, in all those forums where this Court has a jurisdiction to act. I therefore prohibit Ms. Hok from initiating or continuing any litigation in the Provincial Court of Alberta, or Court, without leave of an appropriate chief judge or justice. I would extend that prohibition to the Alberta Court of Appeal. However, given the unsettled nature of its jurisprudence, I will not take that step, though I believe it is highly likely that Ms. Hok’s litigation abuse will continue in that Court. [ 48 ] Ms.

Hok’s history, her pattern of conflict escalation and expansion, and Ms. Hok’s stated intentions are a basis to restrict her future court access by requiring her to obtain leave to initiate or continue an action, under either the Judicature Act or alternatively via this Court’s inherent jurisdiction. [ 49 ] I therefore conclude that Ms. Hok’s right to initiate or continue litigation in this Court and the Provincial Court should be prohibited, except with leave of the Chief Justice, Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge of those Courts. VII.

Court Order [ 50 ] In KE , Browne J at paras 35-38 , recommended seven elements that should be present in a court order that restricts court access so that the scope of the restriction is clear, the authority on which the order is made is explicit, to provide instructions on how a leave application should be structured, and to whom that application ought to be directed. I have adapted the elements and structure used in Boisjoli, para 110. [ 51 ] I order: 1.

Shirley Anne Hok is prohibited, under the inherent jurisdiction of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench and Judicature Act , ss 23- 23.1, from commencing, or attempting to commence, or continuing any appeal, action, application, or proceeding in the Court of Queen’s Bench or the Provincial Court of Alberta, on her own behalf or on behalf of any other person or estate, without an order of the Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, of the court in which the proceeding is conducted, or his or her designate. 2.

The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate, may, at any time, direct that notice of an application to commence or continue an appeal, action, application, or proceeding be given to any other person. 3. Shirley Anne Hok must describe herself, in the application or document to which this Order applies, by her exact full name (“Shirley Anne Hok”), and not by using initials, an alternative name structure, or a pseudonym. 4. Any application to commence or continue any appeal, action, application, or proceeding must be accompanied by an affidavit: (

i) attaching a copy of the order issued herein, restricting Shirley Anne Hok’s access to the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench and Provincial Court of Alberta, (ii) attaching a copy of the appeal, pleading, application, or process that Shirley Anne Hok proposes to issue or file or continue, (iii) deposing fully and completely to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed claim or proceeding, so as to demonstrate that the proceeding is not an abuse of process, and that there are reasonable grounds for it, (iv) indicating whether Shirley Anne Hok has ever sued some or all of the defendants or respondents previously in any jurisdiction or court, and if so providing full particulars, (

v) undertaking that, if leave is granted, the authorized appeal, pleading, application or process, the order granting leave to proceed, and the affidavit in support of the order will promptly be served on the defendants or respondents, and (vi) undertaking to diligently prosecute the proceeding. 5. Any application referenced herein shall be made in writing. 6. The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her delegate, may: (

i) give notice of the proposed claim or proceeding and the opportunity to make submissions on the proposed claim or proceeding, if they so choose, to:

a) the involved potential parties,

b) other relevant persons identified by the court, and

c) the Attorney Generals of Alberta and Canada. (ii) respond to the leave application in writing; and

(iii) hold the application in open court where it shall be recorded. 7. Leave to commence or continue proceedings may be given on conditions, including the posting of security for costs. 8. An application that is dismissed may not be made again. 9. An application to vary or set aside this Order must be made on notice to any person as directed by the Court. [ 52 ] This order takes effect immediately. VIII. Conclusion [ 53 ] I exercise this Court’s inherent jurisdiction and order that Ms.

Hok is prohibited from initiating or continuing litigation in the Alberta Provincial Court and Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, without leave of the appropriate Chief Justice, Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge. The facts of this case also warrant the same result pursuant to the authority granted by the companion Judicature Act , ss 23- 23.1 provisions. I do not extend that restriction to the Alberta Court of Appeal in light of the jurisprudence that addresses court participant access for that institution. [ 54 ] Ms.

Hok’s submissions indicate this Court is only one of a number of forums where she has advanced her allegations and claims. Given this Court’s inherent jurisdiction, other tribunals that cannot legally restrict Ms. Hok may make applications to this Court to restrict abuse of their processes. Dated at the City of Grande Prairie, Alberta this 20 th day of November, 2016. Gerald A. Verville J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Shirley Anne Hok for herself Timothy Hurlburt Q.C. Litigation Services Division Civil Law - Litigation for the Alberta Justice and Solicitor General